THE FIRST RULE OF IS YOU DO NOT TALK ABOUT CAMORRA: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE RISE OF THE SYNDICATE IN ,

by

DALTON MARK

B.A., The University of Georgia, tbr 2013

Mark 1

In Naples, Italy, an underground society has a hand in every aspect of civilian life. This organization controls the government. This organization has been the police force. This organization has been a judicial board. This organization has maintained order in the jails. This organization is involved in almost every murder, every drug sale, every fixed election. This organization even takes out the garbage. But the first rule of Camorra is you do not talk about

Camorra. The success of this crime syndicate, and others like it, is predicated on a principle of – a strict silence that demands non-compliance with authority and non-interference in rival jobs. Presumably birthed out of the desperation of impoverished citizens, the Camorra has grown over the last three centuries to become the most powerful force in southern Italy. The

Camorra’s influence in Naples was affirmed when various local governments commissioned the them to work in law enforcement because no other group (including the official police) had the means to maintain order. Since the Camorra took control of the city, they have been impossible to extirpate. This resilience is based on their size, their depravity, their decentralization, and perhaps most importantly, the corruption of the government attempting to supplant them.

Nonetheless, in 1911, the Camorra was brought to a mass trial, resulting in the conviction of twenty-seven leaders. Unfortunately, the Camorra, indefatigable as always, has continued to run their illicit operations through recent decades, despite any arrests that may be made. Therefore, the Camorra is and will remain the uncontested strongest force in southern Italy.

Because of the Camorra’s pervasive influence on Italian society, the origins of this organized crime syndicate have been the subject of avid investigation and speculation. However, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact time or impetus of this group’s incipience because of the natural lack of documentation from the time period. “All of these gangs arose amongst the city’s poor – people who never kept written records due to their illiteracy; hence the difficulty in Mark 2 establishing any categorical evidence about what kind of organization, if any, the Camorra grew out of.”1 Many historians have traced the history of the Camorra to Spain or have pursued some other purported origin story and projected their own interpretations of the facts available to attempt to reconstruct the Camorra’s history, but no single account is definitively accurate. Later segments of the Camorra’s history are available though. The actual term ‘Camorra’ seems to have derived from the Spanish word ‘chamarra,’ signifying “a cloak worn by bullies and thieves.” Following the lexicology then, ‘Camorra,’ originally signified ‘a quarrel with fists,’ or in some contexts ‘trouble,’ a fairly appropriate handle for an organization responsible for most of the deaths in Naples, Italy each year.2

In the seventeenth century, economic hardship and a plague led to a mass migration out of the countryside and into the city of Naples, which in turn, led to large numbers of unemployed, poor people, looking for a solution to their newfound poverty.3 Naturally, these desperate souls turned to criminal activity to satisfy their most basic Maslovian needs. Thus began the development of a criminal uprising in southern Italy. This trend was intensified during a period of political upheaval in the Risorgimento. The failure of the Neapolitan Republic to establish a resilient government in 1799 led to the reinstatement of the Bourbon Regime. Large portions of the middle class began to join secret organizations (including the Camorra) to feel a sense of solidarity in response to the absolutism of King Ferdinand II. “In 1820, there were seventy thousand persons in the city of Naples alone who belonged to secret societies.”4 Clearly, anti-despotic sentiments fueled the citizens of Naples. The Liberals noticed their opportunity to seize power and recognized the authority and respect commanded by groups such as the Camorra

1 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 9. 2 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 147. 3 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 10-11. 4 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 146. Mark 3

(a tribute in itself to the rising strength of this syndicate), so Liberals hired the Camorra to incite rebellion against Ferdinand II.5

In 1860, following the tide of revolution pushed forward by the Camorra, Garibaldi and his forces finally reached Naples to overthrow Bourbon rule. Due to communication issues from the opposition, Garibaldi’s arrival in Naples was surprisingly uneventful. “Garibaldi entered

Naples, arriving by train well in advance of most of his army, amid scenes of extraordinary jubilation.”6 The people of southern Italy had heard tales of the mysterious liberator and were relieved to be free of Ferdinand II’s oppression. However, the government set forth by the

Liberals was slow to win the favor of the people, especially due to some devastating economic initiatives they implemented in hopes of unifying Italy. Liberals introduced a uniform tax structure for the country, which eliminated high protective tariffs that had previously allowed the textile industries in Naples to prosper.7 These reforms though left the South at the mercy of the quickly growing productivity of the North, resigning southerners to even more poverty and even more loss of faith in their government. “The indications are that in the first forty years of unification the standard of living of the Italian population as a whole did not improve at all – indeed in many cases it seems to have fallen.”8 Naples plunged into a deeper poverty, where the incentive to join the Camorra was ever rising.

The Camorra began to show signs of legitimization in the early nineteenth century. “The first official news of the Camorra as an organization dates from 1820, when police records detail

5 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 16. 6 Duggan, Christopher. The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy Since 1796. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008, pg 209. 7 Chubb, Judith. Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1982, ch 1. 8 Duggan, Christopher. The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy Since 1796. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008, pg 264. Mark 4 a disciplinary meeting of the Camorra.”9 1820 also saw the first written statute of the Camorra.10

This is an important shift in the dynamic of the Camorra because it signifies a transmogrification of the small-time criminals into an organization with a fixed structure and hierarchy. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the rising influence of the Camorra was the submission of the true government to trust the Camorra in enforcing order. “For a long time [the Camorra] has been considered as ‘the minor evil’ thanks to its capacity to ‘regulate the disorder’ and even to create the order from the disorder.”11 In many cases, the local government had no choice but to sign over power to the Camorra. “Duggan believes that a paranoid ruling class and a failure to improve the economic situation in Italy… deepened the tension between Italy’s citizenry and politicians.”12 The Camorra was a better-respected and better-equipped force that held authority in Naples, in part, simply by dint of its longer history in the city. In Naples, there was a policy of

‘prepotenza,’ which means “rule of the strongest.”13 In this case, the strongest was the Camorra.

“The control of the impoverished and alienated masses was a service which the Camorra could offer local rulers.”14 For a while at least, the local rulers accepted the Camorra’s offer, especially in maintaining order during the transition from Bourbon rule to Garibaldi’s rule.15 At various points in the Camorra’s history, it has been asked to act as security, to run the jails, and to even act as a makeshift police force.16 “The police had no need to intervene in those dangerous places;

9 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 12. 10 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 12. 11 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 2. 12 Bellew, Robert Shelton. A Socio-Economic Study of the Camorra Through Journalism, Religion and Film. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Georgia, 2011, 2011, pg 67. 13Chubb, Judith. Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pg 22. 14 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 13. 15 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 7. 16 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 11. Mark 5 they entrusted the members of the sect [the Camorra], which was then tolerated.”17 In 1860, the

Camorra aided their own legitimization, and in so doing assumed an even stronger and seemingly inherent control over the city. Even when the local government dissolved the

Camorra’s involvement in official law enforcement, “Having played this formal role… they continued to provide forms of security in their restored private status… in the construction of a new social contract.”18 The Camorra had now established itself as an ipso facto authority in

Naples, which the people had come to expect. Having grown up as a voice for the people, asserted themselves with violence, and in some cases been recognized by the official government, the Camorra now had more or less free reign to rule with factional command in a city accustomed to their particular form of crime.

Despite their still burgeoning identity, the Camorra was already a household name by the opening of the nineteenth century. “In the days from 1820 to 1860, to be a Camorrist was a matter of pride and a rare distinction among the baser sort.”19 Many Camorristi would then wear a uniform to broadcast their association with the powerful crime syndicate: a red necktie, a parti- colored sash, and a cane. This attire would help identify a member of the gang, at whichever stage of involvement he had reached. Even in the factional, dissociated structure of the Camorra, there persisted a certain hierarchy to the membership. An aspirant would begin as an

‘apprentice,’ who served as an errand-boy for the more elite members of his clan. The

‘apprentice’ would later progress to being a ‘novice’ after six to ten years involvement. Finally,

17 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 15. 18 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 10-11. 19 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 148. Mark 6 the ‘novice’ would earn the title of “district leader,” where he would be able to lead his own gang.20

Gangs in the Naples Camorra are fairly autonomous, and so have a fair amount of liberty in the types of crime they commit. Criminal endeavors range among extortion, protection services, garbage pickup, assassinations, and more. “Not only was [the Camorra] earning money from gambling and theft, it also earned rake-offs from goods which arrived at the port and passed through the city’s gates.”21 In some cases like these, the Camorra was in a position to demand a form of taxes on goods that were transported through Naples ports. The most common Camorrist crime, though, was homicide. Murder became part of the standard procedure for the execution of any crime. The Camorra began to murder not as an end, but as a means to their crimes. The

Camorra was unreasonably violent, reaching a point where they would almost kill for the sake of killing. “In Southern Italy, in fact, organized crime accounts for over 40% of homicides. With 88 recorded killings in the year 2005, Naples is the capital of homicides.”22 The Camorra is responsible for over half of organized crime-related homicides in all of Italy. Compared to other crime syndicates in Italy, the Camorra is the bloodiest. “The scope of violence is broader. Thus, when violence is directed against rival clans or internal enemies, the Camorra kills not only the members of the family of a rival clan but also the girlfriends or even the acquaintances of the enemies.”23 Although most people involved in the mob were responsible for a homicide at some point in their careers, some men specialized in killing. “Carmen Alfieri’s main hit man, Domenico Cuomo, confessed to ‘about’ ninety murders in the 1983-93 period.”24 However,

20 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 152. 21 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 15. 22 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 4. 23 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 9. 24 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 6. Mark 7 this man’s tally was just a fraction of the death toll for which the Camorra as a whole was responsible.

One of the most sacred facets of the mob dynamic is the concept of Omertà. Omertà is a

Code of Silence among organized crime syndicates. “The rule of silence, the so-called omertà

(the conspiracy of silence: I do not see – I do not hear – I do not speak).”25 Omertà was a tacit agreement amongst all criminals to not speak of each other’s crimes and to not recognize another criminal as such. This sense of conspiratorial camaraderie among criminals transcended any territory lines or even mob memberships. Even civilians dared not violate omertà, although their compliance was more likely out of fear of the consequences than respect for the ideal. “Orlando explains that in the past Mafiosi had been tried as individuals and generally acquitted because omertà intimidated witnesses…Those rejecting omertà could have their shop or business damaged or pay with their life as a lesson.”26 The Camorra’s influence on society is grounded in the tacit, fearful acceptance by the general public, which protects the Camorra from prosecution.

Everyone knows that the Camorra runs Naples and that their methods are illegal, but the

Camorra ensures that no one is brave enough to break that Code of Silence. Generally though, omertà refers to the professional courtesy that one gang member affords another and the fraternal commitment to crime that all gang members share.

Another reason that the Camorra is so difficult to eradicate is the lack of centralization.

“There are approximately 100 gangs each led by one familial group (clan) with around 7,000 affiliates.”27 Other crime syndicates are organized through a more hierarchical structure, such

25 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 6. 26 Bellew, Robert Shelton. A Socio-Economic Study of the Camorra Through Journalism, Religion and Film. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Georgia, 2011, 2011, pg 66. 27 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 8. Mark 8 that by killing or arresting one mob boss, law enforcement could cause disarray and disorienting anarchy within the entire syndicate. However, the Camorra is structured much more horizontally, meaning that there are many separate but related clans, where the only role of centralized authority is to ensure that the different families stay in their own territory and do not interfere with each other’s business. “In a Darwinian way, this renders the Camorra more resilient when top leaders are neutralized, because new clans can rise up to supplant the old ones.”28 Thus, decommissioning one mob boss only affects that boss’s family, rather than cutting the head off of the entire organization. This lack of centralization also allows the Camorra to engage in a wider variety of crimes, where there is less interference among the clans and more avenues to integrate the syndicate into society. “The anarchy of the Camorra results in a unique capacity of adaptation to different situations and the willingness to deal with all typologies of illegal activities.”29 By leaving the individual clans autonomous in regards to their own business activities, the Camorra opens itself to a more sustainable form of criminal organization. This horizontal structure also fosters rivalry from within the Camorra, which explains why the dispatching of one leader will not eliminate this threat. Police Inspector Simonetti said in 1911,

“All the camorrists respect one another but they act every man for himself.”30 One Camorrist would never betray another Camorrist, but when the position of mob boss is available, every

Camorrist throws his hat in the ring. If a mob boss is ever defeated, it just opens the door for one or more factions to rise in power in his place. Therefore, there is no simple violent solution to uprooting the Camorra from Naples.

28 Bellew, Robert Shelton. A Socio-Economic Study of the Camorra Through Journalism, Religion and Film. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Georgia, 2011, 2011, pg 70. 29 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 8. 30 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 167. Mark 9

One of the most disappointing reasons the Camorra cannot be easily ousted is the level of corruption that the Camorra has been able to inspire in Naples. This is an entirely separate issue from the government’s official endorsement of Camorra law enforcement. In this case, individual members of the government have made deals with the Camorra for personal gain (or in some cases simply out of personal fear for the repercussions the Camorra could enact otherwise). For example, the role of the Prefect as intermediary between different levels of government was, at least in practice, to ensure at any cost the election of deputies who were loyal to the national government. In so ensuring, the Prefect often had to turn a blind eye to the dealings of organized crime syndicates.31 Such corruption is not anomalous either. Camorristi have lists assembled of which officials are easily corruptible. “They divide the ‘relevant persons’ into two categories, the avvicinabili and non-avvicinabili. The first category is made up of the people that can be corrupted; the second are those known to refuse it.”32 The standardization of this system of bribery and extortion implies the banality of government corruption.

Other issues with stamping out the Camorra include the sheer size of the organization.

There are no specific criteria for entry into the syndicate and there are no entry rituals that must be overcome. Therefore, the syndicate employs many more criminals. Furthermore, the syndicate will often depravedly utilize younger boys for the more violent crimes or for the crimes with greater punishments because boys under eighteen years of age will not be tried as adults. In addition, the Camorra is less family-based in structure than the Mafia, and therefore is more difficult to trace or predict. Furthermore, the urban territory where the Camorra are active in

Naples is more difficult to monitor than the rural areas where the Mafia operate. Finally, much of

31 Chubb, Judith. Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pg 22-23. 32 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 6. Mark 10 the Camorra’s growth has occurred recently, and so the organization has evolved under ‘modern’ conditions.33

Despite these hurdles in counteracting the Camorra, substantial progress was made in

1911 when thirty-six Camorristi were brought to trial.34 It started on June 6, 1906 when Gennaro

Cuocolo “the Basista” was found dead near Vesuvius and his wife was found dead in her bed, having died at approximately the same time as her husband. The investigation began as an investigation should. The police arrived, documented the scene well, and began interviewing witnesses. An anonymous tipster informed the police that in a restaurant near the discovery of

Cuocolo’s body, five people had acted suspiciously. The police tracked down and arrested these five people, apparently hoping that the arrest would scare a confession. As the investigation progressed, Magistrate Romano of Naples was named Lead Investigator.

At this point, the corruption in Naples reared its head once again. “[Don Ciro Vittozzi, a priest] whispered the names of the real murderers – two ex-convicts, Tommaso De Angelis and

Gaetano Amodeo – and told where the evidence of their guilt could be obtained.”35 The priest also brought forth a witness by the name of Giacomo Ascrittore, who claimed to have overhead a confession and motive for murder. However, upon searching Ascrittore’s apartment, the police discovered a written copy of Ascrittore’s intended, falsified testimony. Ascrittore and Vittozzi were arrested for blackmail. Ascrittore then admitted that the five originally arrested were the true conspirators of Cuocolo’s death. Cuocolo, as it turned out, had at times aligned himself with the police and turned in lesser members of the Camorra. Furthermore, Cuocolo frequently would deny his fellow criminals of their share of the bounty from a crime. For these among other indiscretions, a central committee within the Camorra had condemned Cuocolo to death. Even

33 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 7. 34 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 176. 35 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 177. Mark 11 with this information and with the guilty parties in police custody, the case was still hindered by corruption. “The police were secretly hostile to the Carabinieri and hindered instead of helped them. Indeed, they assisted actively in the defence of the Camorra.”36 Nonetheless, thirty-six defendants were eventually brought to a mass trial at the Assize Court at Viterbo in 1911.

This trial, the first major blow to the Camorra, became one of the most important legal proceedings in Italy’s history. Four days were spent choosing a jury and one month was spent listening to the arguments of the individual parties.37 In the end, the 1911 mass trial “led to the conviction of twenty-seven leading gangsters for a whole range of crimes.”38 Unfortunately, under Article 40 of the Italian Penal Code, some of the defendants’ incarceration time would be mitigated due to time already served in prison waiting for their trial to be resolved.39

Despite this mass trial and other trials held in the last century, the Camorra has managed to retain influence in society through recent decades, in fact experiencing a resurgence in the

1980’s.40 In the last thirty years, the Camorra has become a noticeably more profitable organization, making it more difficult to defend as a necessary force for fulfilling the social contract. The Camorra learned that there is a limit to what even they are allowed under the social contract.41 The Camorra has lost their Robin Hood-esque image that had previously won them so much favor with the public. “[Saviano] reports that in 1989 Naples had one of the highest ratios of drug pushers to inhabitants in all of Italy.”42 These crimes and the manner in which they are perpetrated are perceived as more sinister, as opposed to the almost romanticized cliché of

36 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 181. 37 1912. "The Trial of Camorra in Italy". Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. 3, no. 4: pg 626-628. 38 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 23. 39 Train, Arthur Cheney. Courts and Criminals. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923, pg 182. 40 Santore, John. Modern Naples: A Documentary History, 1799-1999. New York: Italica Press, 2001, pg 261. 41 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 14. 42 Bellew, Robert Shelton. A Socio-Economic Study of the Camorra Through Journalism, Religion and Film. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Georgia, 2011, 2011, pg 74. Mark 12 protection services the Camorra used to offer. “The introduction of drugs, to which many

Camorristi soon became addicted, together with the unmotivated use of violence, produced a decline in the public perceptions of the legitimacy of Camorra governance.”43 This organization that had once been politically active and at times officially recognized by the local government has devolved into an anarchical band of criminals. Nonetheless, many youths, eager to make some money and to make a name for themselves, have continued to join the Camorra, despite its recent negative image.

Corruption in Naples government has also peaked in recent years, along with efforts to eradicate the corruption and the crime. “Between 1963 and 1980, the number of cases heard annually by criminal courts in metropolitan Naples rose from less that 72,000 to more than

317,000.”44 These numbers also include gang members and minor criminals, but large numbers of legislative and judicial officials have been arrested on criminal corruption charges. “In 1992, it was estimated that… one out of every six public officials was under investigation for crime.”45

“During the following two years, over 3,000 people were indicted, including several ex-prime ministers, dozens of parliamentary deputies and high government officials, and virtually the entire Christian Democratic leadership in Naples.”46 “Over 30 per cent of deputies in the 1992-4

Parliament are either facing trial or under investigation.”47 Encouragingly, these efforts are getting to the root of the problem. “Between 1993 and 1998, many of the Camorra’s most prominent leaders were arrested. Others were forced to flee the country and brought back through extradition, and the army was called in to reestablish local control.”48 The Camorra has

43 Bartolucci, Valentina. "The Privatisation of (in)security, the Case of the Camorra of Naples: An Anomaly Five Centuries Long?." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2009 Annual Meeting 2009), pg 16. 44 Santore, John. Modern Naples: A Documentary History, 1799-1999. New York: Italica Press, 2001, pg 268. 45 Santore, John. Modern Naples: A Documentary History, 1799-1999. New York: Italica Press, 2001, pg 262. 46 Santore, John. Modern Naples: A Documentary History, 1799-1999. New York: Italica Press, 2001, pg 265. 47 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. New York: Routledge, 1996, pg 3. 48 Santore, John. Modern Naples: A Documentary History, 1799-1999. New York: Italica Press, 2001, pg 267. Mark 13 not been routed entirely, but great strides have been made in limiting their influence in recent years. Nonetheless, the Camorra’s history indicates that State intervention is just another hoop through which the Camorristi have long since learned to jump.

Before the Mafia started up in , there was another organized crime-syndicate in

Italy called the Camorra. However, this syndicate was not so centralized and this made their particular brand of crime difficult to eradicate, leaving the Camorra to influence Naples for centuries. The only role of centralized organization in the Camorra was to ensure that the different families stayed in their own territory and did not interfere with each other’s business.

Therefore, arresting or killing one boss only affected a small portion of the syndicate rather than causing widespread disarray. Despite their internal rivalries, the Camorra stuck to a strict code of

Omertà, meaning silence, non-compliance with authority, and non-interference in rival jobs. This dedication to a symbiotic criminal Code of Honor hindered state intervention even more. Finally, the Camorra was difficult to prosecute because civilians and government officials would not speak or act out against the Camorra for fear of retaliation from the gang or because they were themselves members or beneficiaries of the Camorra. Overcoming these obstacles, the Camorra was finally brought to a mass trial in 1911, over the murder of Camorrista Gennaro Cuocolo.

This trial concluded with twenty-seven arrests including that of then mob boss .

Nonetheless, the Camorra has continued to hold criminal influence in Naples to the present, most notably through the stereotypical garbage control corruption and ‘protection’ services. Other leaders have been arrested and convicted, but new leaders always take their place and it seems the Camorra will not be usurped any time soon.