Missile Defense for the 21St Century by Gregory H. Canavan
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNICAL STUDIES SERIES MISSILE DEFENSE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY Gregory H. Canavan i Published by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 800-544-4843 heritage.org Copyright © 2003 The Heritage Foundation ISBN 0-89195-261-6 Cover design by Mark Hurlburt Layout by Michelle Fulton Smith Charts and Graphs by Russell Martin Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE / VII LIST OF FIGURES / VIII LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS / IX INTRODUCTION / XV TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MISSILE DEFENSE / 1 Early Missile Defense and Offensive Proliferation: Offensive Proliferation / 3 Early Technologies and Systems: NIKE Systems; Sentinel; Safeguard / 5 Uncertainties / 16 Summary of Developments in Nuclear Phases / 19 DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 1970S / 23 The ABM Treaty / 23 U.S. Army Programs and Hit-to-Kill Technology / 24 Space-Based Laser for Boost-Phase Intercept / 27 Summary of Developments During the Interim Program / 28 DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 1980S / 29 Strategic Defense Initiative: Exploration Phase / 29 Strategic Defense System Phase I / 32 Brilliant Pebbles / 37 Brilliant Pebbles in Midcourse and Terminal / 42 Summary of Developments During SDI / 45 GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED STRIKES / 47 Scope / 47 Elements / 48 Development and Testing / 50 Navy Contributions / 53 iii Ballistic Missile Defense Technical Studies Series International Discussions / 53 Summary of Developments During GPALS / 54 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE / 57 Key Elements / 57 Battle Management, Command and Control / 59 Advanced Interceptor Technology / 60 International Efforts / 60 Summary of Developments During TMD / 60 NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE / 61 Scope / 61 Coverage / 62 Integration / 62 Elements / 63 Battle Management, Command and Control / 68 Testing / 71 Countermeasures and Discrimination / 74 Summary of Developments in NMD / 75 SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT MISSILE DEFENSE / 77 Summary and Discussion of Earlier Approaches / 77 Spiral Development / 79 Theater Segment / 79 Terminal Segment / 81 Regional Segment / 84 Midcourse Segment / 85 Test Bed / 86 Command Structure / 87 THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY / 89 Elements for 2005 / 90 Integration / 90 Tests / 90 iv Missile Defense for the 21st Century Capability / 91 FOLLOW-ON PHASES / 93 Surface-Based Boost-Phase Concepts / 94 Space-Based Boost-Phase Concepts / 96 Theater and Regional Missile Defense from Space / 99 Impact of the ABM Treaty / 104 Attributes of Previous Successful Programs / 105 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS / 107 Layered Defenses for America / 109 APPENDICES A. Effects of Nuclear Weapons / 113 B. Radar Cross Sections and Technology / 115 C. Atmospheric Reentry / 117 D. Nuclear Effects / 119 E. Command Guidance and Hit-to-Kill Technology / 123 F. Directed Energy Weapon Scaling / 127 G. Space-Based Interceptor Scaling / 129 H. Survivability / 137 I. Sensor Satellite Scaling / 141 J. Surface-Based Intercepts of Theater, Terminal, and Regional Missiles / 145 K. Stability / 151 L. Surface-Based Boost-Phase Intercept of Rogue Missiles / 155 M. Space-Based Boost-Phase Intercept of Rogue ICBMs / 161 v PREFACE This study is part of a series of technical reports commissioned by The Heritage Foundation to exam- ine programmatic issues related to ballistic missile defense. Since the Bush Administration officially declared in June 2002 that the United States had withdrawn from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union, the focus has turned to the best way to build and operate a system that dramatically lessens America’s vulnerability to attack as quickly as possible. Intelligence indicates that countermeasures developed by the United States and Russia are readily available. President George W. Bush took a major step forward in addressing the programmatic issues when he announced on December 17, 2002, his decision to deploy a limited missile defense system for the pro- tection of the American people, U.S. forward-deployed forces, and U.S. allies beginning in 2004. The initial system is to include ground-based and sea-based interceptors and sensor systems deployed on land, at sea, and in space—elements that will be tied together by a common command and control sys- tem. The initial defense system will be augmented on a continuing basis to provide a more robust defense over time. As the Administration moves to execute the President’s plan, military planners and national security policymakers will need a fuller appreciation of the key technical and strategic issues involved. In this study, Dr. Gregory H. Canavan, Senior Fellow and Science Advisor at Los Alamos National Laboratory, has surveyed the available technological options for ballistic missile defense based on the rapid development of the threat and on prior technological and organizational efforts to field missile defenses. His report makes specific recommendations on how policymakers and programmers should make the best use of existing programs to deploy the most robust missile defense possible. As one of the nation’s premier scientists working in the area of weapons technology and national security, Dr. Canavan brings to this evaluation not only his broad technical expertise but also a knowledge of past efforts to develop and field ballistic missile defense systems. The other studies in this series address such topics as contributions that missile defense systems will make to strategic stability in a multilateral environment. — Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D., Vice President and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. vii LIST OF FIGURES FIGURES 1 The Road to Ballistic Missile Defense, 1983–2007 C.1 Decoy Velocity Change As a Function of Altitude D.1 Absorption and Refraction Versus Time After High-Altitude Nuclear Burst E.1 Proportional Navigation and Augmented Proportional Navigation G.1 Resolution Versus Time During BP Fly-in G.2 Interceptor Range Versus Interceptor Maximum Velocity G.3 Constellation Size Versus SBI Maximum Velocity G.4 Constellation Cost for Single SBI Coverage Versus Maximum Velocity G.5 Heavy ICBM RV Kills and Leakage As Functions of SBI Constellation Size G.6 SLBM RV Kills in Each Phase As Functions of SBI Constellation Size G.7 SS-25 Kills for Boost and Midcourse Phases Versus Constellation Size H.1 Masses and Exchange Ratios Versus Number of Decoys H.2 Masses and Exchange Ratios Versus Satellite Mass I.1 Resolution Versus Range for Various Optic Diameters I.2 Sensor Diameter and Masses As Functions of Operating Range J.1 Interceptor Range Versus Velocity for Various Delay Times J.2 Interceptor Range Versus Detection Distance for Various Interceptor Velocities J.3 Sea-Based Interceptor Range Versus Velocity for Various Detection Distances J.4 Interceptor Range Versus ICBMs As a Function of Velocity for Various Delays J.5 Interceptor Range Versus ICBMs As a Function of Detection Distance J.6 Sea-Based Interceptor Range Versus Velocity for Various Detection Ranges with External Sensors J.7 Interceptor Range Versus Missile Range for Various Interceptor Velocities K.1 Crisis Stability Decision Tree K.2 Cost to U of Node 7 K.3 U and P with and Without Defenses L.1 Flyout Distance and Range for Fast Ground-Based Interceptor Versus Time Delay L.2 Missile and Interceptor Ranges Versus Range and Times L.3 Range Versus Delay Time L.4 Minimum Interceptor Velocity Versus Delay Time L.5 Missile and Interceptor Range and Footprint Versus Time Delay for ICBMs M.1 Constellation Cost Versus Maximum Velocity for a Rogue ICBM M.2 Number of Cluster Kills As a Function of the Time to Release Clusters M.3 RV Kills Versus Time for Bus Operations for a Single Missile with 3 RVs M.4 Interceptor Fly-in Range As a Function of Theater Missile Range for Point Launch of a Theater Missile M.5 Number of RV Kills As a Function of Theater Missile Range viii LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronyms1 AA attack assessment ABL airborne laser ABM anti-ballistic missile ABRES Advanced Ballistic Re-Entry Systems AFB Air Force base AHIT Advanced Hover Interceptor Technology AIT Atmospheric Interceptor Technology ALARM Alert, Locate, and Report Missiles. ALPS Accidental Launch Protection System AOA Airborne Optical Adjunct AOR area of responsibility APN augmented proportional navigation ASAT anti-satellite AWS Advanced Warning System BAMBI Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept BE Brilliant Eyes BM battle management BMC2 battle management, command, and control BMC3 battle management, command, control, and communications BMC4 battle management, command, control, communications, and computers BMC4ISR battle management, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar Systems BP Brilliant Pebbles BPI boost-phase intercept BSTS Boost-Phase Surveillance and Tracking System C1 initial capability C2 1. command and control; 2. intermediate capability CBO Congressional Budget Office CC Combat Commander CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability CEP circular error probable CIA Central Intelligence Agency CINC Commander in Chief (i.e., Combat Commander of a major command) 1. For a more extensive list of acronyms related to missile defense, see Missile Defense Agency, MDA Glossary, at www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/glossary.pdf