Dustin Santomenna TAH: A More Perfect Union- Year III Peter Gibbon 9/27/2012

History Lessons from the Moro War

President McKinley never anticipated that the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine would force America to become a colonial power in the Far East, and subsequently lead to America’s longest war. When Commodore George Dewey’s steamers defeated Spanish Admiral Patricio Motojo y Pasaron’s wooden ships, the were opened up for American occupation. While the American’s battled a Filipino insurgency led by the likes of Emilio Aguinaldo in the northern islands, it sent a detachment to the southern Philippines, referred to as the . Mindanao was very different from the other Filipino regions in the north (Luzon) and central (Visayas) areas. Three quarters of the people of the Mindanao were Muslim, while the remainder were relocated Christian Filipinos from the north, Chinese merchants, and animistic tribal people so far removed from civilization that even Islam could not penetrate the volcanic craters and dense rain forest to reach them. Mindanao’s , referred to as the Moros presented the greatest challenge for American occupation and “civilization” attempts in the Philippines. In his book, titled , The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913, military historian James R. Arnold describes how Moro resistance to American occupation posed “an unprecedented challenge for the America army: how to defeat an Islamic insurgency on its home soil” (Arnold, 14). Though the topic and subject matter of his book certainly has relevance today; namely the United States’ efforts to bring peace, civilization, and democracy to a foreign land comprised of Islamic tribal peoples echoes the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Arnold largely refrains from doing so. This book is certainly filled with teachable moments and lessons of history that are relevant for the United States’ foreign policy from the Cold War and into the 21st century, but those connections have to be made by the reader. In the last chapter of his book, Arnold gives brief attention to the similarity of the United States fighting foreign wars in Vietnam and the War on Terror that helps place the Moro Wars into better context. He writes, “The history of counterinsurgency shows the vital role of national commitment to achieve victory” (254). Arnold uses an example from the Vietnam War to illustrate this point and compare it to all wars in which the U.S. occupies a foreign land. He cites from an American general who was touring a newly pacified Vietnamese hamlet, and was asked by a Vietnamese government official, “All of this has meaning only if you are going to stay. Are you going to stay?” (254). Despite this connection and comparison to Vietnam, Arnold spends the majority of his book describing the eleven year struggle to pacify Moroland during the Moro Wars, and it is apparent his intention was never to do a comparative study between the Moro Wars and the Vietnam and Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, in the conclusion he identifies that there are valuable lessons learned from the Moro Wars that rang true during the Vietnam War as well as currently in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is largely left up to the reader to connect Arnold’s lessons on American occupations of foreign lands with each other, but these lessons are vividly clear in his graphic description of the warfare in the Moro Wars and America’s pacification efforts there. Arnold reminds the reader of the relevance and impact of a truly forgotten about war in America’s military and diplomatic Santomenna, Dustin. 2 history. The timing and publishing of his book could not have come at a better time as well, making the connections and lessons all the more pertinent. The Moros and Moroland: A large part of what makes this book so interesting arethe descriptions of the Moro peoples living in the Mindanao, the southernmost archipelagArnold writes at great length to try to identify a people and culture that was so foreign and seemingly antiquated from the American occupiers. The Moro province, referred to as Mindanao was named after the largest island in the archipelago, but contained other large islands such as Palawan and Basilan, as well as 369 smaller islands of the Sulu Archipelago. In ancient times Asian trading vessels from China, Indonesia, India, and Thailand engaged in trade with some of these islands, in particular the main port of became a major trading center. In addition, Arab merchants brought Sunni Islam to the area between 800 and 1000CE. Arnold points out that Islam was really the only unifying bond between the dozen or more cultural and linguistic groups in the Philippines (4). Though Arnold points that very few Moros and datus (the term for a noble-man) practiced true fundamentalist Islam, there was little separation between church and state. He writes, “With the exception of few traditional customs, all Moro laws were in accordance with Islamic law, or sharia” (4). Certain odd practices shocked and disgusted many of the American soldiers stationed there, such as their practice of polygamy and slavery. Arnold writes, “In American eyes, Moro civil customs and behavior seemed to come from feudal times. Moro chieftains practiced slavery, piracy, and polygamy while pursuing blood feuds and engaging in frequent war. These behaviors contributed to the American notion that the Moros were uncivilized and beyond redemption” (122). Moro society was organized in a clan or tribal basis. A region’s datu exerted patriarchal control of all the Moros in his area. Minor datus were subservient to major datus, and major datus subservient to . Underneath the datus were a class of free people, and at the bottom were slaves. Feudalism still existed here, and the Moros desired to protect this system from first the Spanish infidels, who they felt were trying to change their religion and convert them to Christianity (in the northern Philippines this was largely successful) and the American infidels who brought their “American laws and secular government”. Arnold writes, “the American notion of a regulated liberty was a hopelessly irrelevant, unknown, and unknowable concept to the Moros: ‘It is a proud boast of the Mussulman [Muslim] that a people who live in accordance with the teachings of the prophet [the Koran] have no need for other codes, constitutions, charters, and bills of rights…’” (Arnold, 15). According to most Moros, adopting American laws meant that the laws of the Koran were not good enough. Moreover, Moro culture was very different as well to any opponent the U.S. army had ever dealt with before. True they were a tribal people and not very united, much like the American Indian tribes on the Great Plains, often fighting amongst themselves rather than against their foreign occupiers, but they possessed a far different belief system than the Native Americans. After reading Arnolds’ description of the Moros, it should not be politically incorrect to consider them a “war-like” people. Arnold describes some of their favorite activities, “Of course many of the pursuits of the Moros considered lawful and normal-slavery, piracy, cattle theft from one’s ancestral foes- the Americans judged as crimes” (41). To further explain the Moro warrior culture, Arnold describes their connection to their razor sharp blades and swords, “Every male adult Santomenna, Dustin. 3 past the age of childhood wore a blade. To appear unarmed in public was a sign of disgrace or indicated that one was a slave” (46). Moros were deadly with their bladed weapons and trained how to use them at an early age. The relationship that Moros had with their weapons was certainly strange to Americans; a similar comparison can be drawn to the relationship a Samurai has with his sword. One of the bloodiest periods of this war occurred ironically near the end of the combat in Moroland in 1912 and 1913 when newly anointed brigadier general, John Pershing, returned to Moroland after a six year hiatus as the new military governor of the Moro Province. On September 8th, 1911 Pershing issued an executive order making it illegal for Moros to carry firearms and/or edged weapons over fifteen inches long. Previous governors and Tasker Bliss toyed with the idea of doing this, but figured correctly it would inevitably lead to more conflict and violence. It did. Arnold writes, “Pershing proposed to change centuries of culture in a mere three months” (224). Relying on Filipino Scouts and a Filipino/Moro Constabulary to largely enforce this rule led to many conflicts. Arnold writes, “The constabulary received orders to seize every , , and kampilan they encountered during the course of a patrol. It proved bloody work. For hundreds of years the possession of an edged weapon had been a Moro symbol of manhood. The Moros could not help seeing Pershing’s disarmament policy as a coordinated policy to unman them” (241). In addition, many Moros preferred to die rather than surrender their blades. When encountered by a U.S. soldier and later the Filipino constabularies, it was not uncommon for a Moro to charge them in order to die, “Being a Moro, he preferred to die on a blade” (242). The Moro concept of death rather than surrender may remind historians of the Japanese bonsai charges and kamikaze attacks during World War II. The Moros with their edged weapons, spears, outdated Spanish firearms, and whatever stolen rifles they could find was no match in big-pitched battles against the U.S. army, and most of the Moros already knew this. However, when faced with the choice of annihilation or surrender, most Moros choose to die. They would put on their most colorful clothes and robes and charge in front of American artillery, ready to die. One veteran of the Moro Wars recalled, “I doubt if there was a man, on Bagsak (one of the major battles of Moro Wars) at the finish who had not the greatest admiration for the enemy and the courageous stand he had made. The pity was that centuries of Moro traditions, prejudices, and superstitions made affairs of this sort not only necessary but inevitable” (240). Arnold himself had a more cynical view of the ritual slaughter, “All the Moros accomplished was to show yet again that they were not afraid to die” (241). Arnold points out that one of the major factors why the Moros were easy to fight against in big-pitched battles, aside from the technology gap, was the predictability of the Moro attack plan. Previous battlefield experience during the Indian Wars on the Great Plains and even during the Filipino Insurrection, taught field commanders that hesitation was bad because it gave opportunity for the enemy to escape. However, this was not the case with the Moros who viewed hesitation and caution as weakness. Once American field commanders realized that all they had to do win against the Moros was hesitate, defeating the Moros in open battle was not difficult. All the officers had to do was heavily shell the Moros, advance their position a little bit, wait patiently for the Moros to charge with their spears and swords, and then shoot them down. In addition, the Moros never adapted or learned from this because it was ingrained in their culture. Arnold writes, “This meant that Americans could employ a methodical approach using their vastly superior firepower. It Santomenna, Dustin. 4 would prove to be a tactic for which the Moros had no answer” (38). In truth, the Moro was most dangerous at close range and in particular at ambushing an oblivious sentry or unsuspecting bystander. The hardest part about controlling Moroland was limiting the surprise attacks and ambushes that Moros would partake in at the center of town or at one of the remote army outposts. Even “good” or “friendly” Moros could not be fully trusted, and had to be carefully watched because they could pull out a cleverly concealed blade and hack and slash away at a soldier or civilian administrator. Much in the way that the U.S. army had difficulty identifying friendly Vietnamese civilians from the Viet Cong and how U.S. forces presently face difficulty discriminating civilian Afghanis and Iraqis from hostile terrorists, the U.S. forces had difficulty discerning docile Moros from dangerous ones. Arnold describes, “A Moro’s skill with edged weapons made him a deadly assassin, yet to a Western eye there was no way to distinguish a potential assassin from any other Moro male” (123). American soldiers today have to be cautious and look out for jihadists looking to blow themselves up and any combatant or civilian that happens to be within a few hundred yards of them. During the Moro Wars, American soldiers too had to worry about suicide attacks from fanatical Muslim assailants. The Moros practiced a ritual called juramentado, or a on foreign occupiers. Arnold describes the preparation of a juramentado attack, “Early in the morning, a candidate received absolution from an imam, shaved his body hair, and wrapped himself tightly with cloth so he would not bleed to death before accomplishing his mission, dressed in a white robe and turban, attached a charm to ward off blows, and sallied forth to kill as many Christians as possibly before dying (or “run amok”, in the language of the time)” (122). These religious soldiers believed they would earn a heavenly paradise featuring eternal youth and a plethora of concubines. At first this practice was sponsored by imams, but since many Moros later realized that Islam was not under attack (unlike when the Spanish were there), since the Americans established a secular government, they stopped granting approval for suicide attacks. However, this did not stop rogue individuals from “”. These random attacks were hard to stop because they were isolated events and did not follow any particular pattern. Arnold writes, “Because of their ability to masquerade as peaceful civilians one moment and turn into frenzied assassins the next, juramentados imparted a unique fear among American soldiers. An officer who had served in the Indian Wars remarked, “Even the veteran Indian fighters…had to learn that a Moro juramentado was more dangerous than a renegade Apache and twice as hard to kill” (125).

Two significant military changes that occurred because of the danger these suicide attackers presented was the switch from the weaker .38 caliber revolver to the more powerful Colt .45 caliber handgun because of its stopping ability at close quarters. Another technological change that occurred as a result of these diehard Moros was the usefulness of the machine gun. Arnold explains that the manually operated Gatling machine gun was used during the Indian and Spanish-American Wars, but in limited use. Usage of these guns in the Moros wars proved extremely valuable, though too its use was limited. Arnold points out that the U.S. Infantry Drill Regulations viewed machine guns as emergency weapons only, and only allowed funding for only four machine guns per regular regiment until 1916 (250). Finally, one last Moro custom or personality trait that Americans found horrifying was the penchant for Moros to keep their families close to them during major battles, ensuring large numbers of women and children casualties. The Santomenna, Dustin. 5

Battle of Bud Dajo, on top of a 2, 175 foot extinct volcano rising out of the jungle floor, highlighted this unfortunate fact. Though, according to Arnold, this battle could have been avoided altogether by way of diplomatic means and negotiating, General Leonard Wood felt the best way to end Moro violence was by punitive means and putting on a massive show of force. This battle occurred on a volcanic ridge six miles from the major port city of Jolo between March 5th-8th, 1906. Though exact number of Moros killed and wounded at the Battle of Bud Dajo is not known, estimates range from eight or nine hundred. Either way, almost all of the Moros living on this volcanic fortress perished in this bloody battle. The most disturbing facts were the number of women and children killed. Arnold writes, “Because Moro warriors habitually gathered their women and children with them to defend the stronghold, many of the slain were noncombatants” (169). One might imagine the PR nightmare of this type of thing happening today, but even in 1906 there was a public backlash against this military action. A New York Times headline read “WOMEN AND CHILDREN KILLED IN MORO BATTLE…PRESIDENT WIRES CONGRATULATIONS TO THE TROOPS” (171). This report even revived the Anti-Imperialist League. Though General Leonard Wood saw this as an unfortunate, but unavoidable cost of combat and in particular the Moro way of fighting, others did not see it this way. Mark Twain even wrote a sarcastic essay about Wood’s bloody victory, though it remained unpublished until after his death. President Roosevelt became alarmed at the growing criticism of his old Rough Rider buddy, and telegraphed Secretary of War Taft to ascertain the facts. Here Wood played a game of trying to cover up the facts and alter the details. Eventually discrepancies were found, and a credibility gap existed for a short while. Probably Wood should have just given his own private opinion about what transpired, in which Arnold seems to agree with. Wood writes, “This action was unavoidable unless the government decided to give up all attempt to control the Island of Jolo” (175). Though, Wood did lie about certain facts of how the bodies were buried, whether negotiations could have been successful, and whether or not the women and children were used as human shields, or simply just being ordered to stay with their Moro warrior husbands and fathers, his assessment on how this would probably continue until the Moros were either all killed or pacified was certainly accurate. The Differing American Administration Styles Arnold is a military historian, and this book certainly falls into the military history genre with his detailed accounts of the major battles and attack formations, as well as defensive positions. However, one highlight of the book is Arnold’s continual analysis of the major American administrators in the Moro province. The Moro province had three military governors: Generals Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss, and John Pershing. This book focuses on the strategies all three applied when governing this unruly province, as well as a handful of other officer administrators serving under them. These three men all had to wear two hats as governor of the Moro province, being a civil governor and also a military governor. This delicate balance of the two roles was one of the most difficult challenges to pacifying the Moroland. Though a capable administrator in Cuba after the Spanish-American War, Leonard Wood faced criticism and skepticism over how heroic his actions were in the field charging up San Juan Hill. Arnold feels that this criticism was a driving force in the way Wood handled many of his decisions as governor of the Moro province. Arnold writes, “Wood Santomenna, Dustin. 6 concluded that the naïve Moro mind required a simple, patriarchal government. They merely needed to learn that the territory belonged to the United States and its army. Then the benefits of peace would flow. It did not occur to Wood that the Spanish had tried this policy for three hundred years” (89). Wood informed President Roosevelt that he wanted to exercise restraint, but felt the Moros would probably need a severe beating to learn this lesson. The beating would have to be so severe and shocking that there would not need for another. As General Wood marched his men around Lake Lanao and other parts of the Mindanao in 1904, he issued one severe beating after another. Despite his plan to shock the Moros into pacification, Arnold asserts that one severe whipping may quiet them down for a little while to enjoy the internal improvements happening in the Moroland like passable roads, bridges, hospitals, schools and abundant economic progress and trade, but it would not permanently quell their taste for the blood of foreign invaders. Arnold writes, “Certainly if he had taken the time for even a cursory study of Moro history, he would seen that Moro identity was based on resistance to outside control” (90). Arnold seemingly feels that Wood accomplished a lot of killing, when perhaps some of the issues could have been solved through painstaking negotiations with Moro datus and tribal leaders. However, he does infer that power, strength, and violence were attributes that Moros understood and respected. Though they never respected it enough to stop trying to violently resist American occupation in the Moroland. In 1906 Leonard Wood received his much sought after and anticipated promotion to being head of the entire Division of the Philippines, making the way for the Moro Province’s next governor. General Tasker Bliss was perhaps the polar opposite of the medical-surgeon turned cowboy Leonard Wood. Bliss was born into an educational environment. His father, a professor at Lewisburg University (which is now Bucknell), expected his son to follow in his footsteps, until the family’s financial situation drastically deteriorated. Bliss opted for the military as an alternative. After graduating from West Point, he taught at the school for the next thirteen years, and then at the Naval War College. Bliss had a high intellect combined with a love of learning, but he lacked any combat experience whatsoever. His governorship would be drastically different from Wood. Whereas Wood governed more as a military governor, Bliss preferred to govern as a civil governor. One marked difference was that Bliss would treat the occasional juramentado suicide attack or a Moro refusal to pay their cedula (tax) as an issue to be handled by the civil government’s Filipino Constabulary force. Arnold describes the “Bliss Way”, “Bliss understood that the Moros had suffered terribly. He completely altered the American approach that had inflicted this pain. Instead of seizing upon every incident as an opportunity to chastise the Moros, Bliss ended large punitive expeditions. He treated the Moros’ incessant raiding, murders, and tribal feuds as criminal actions instead of direct challenges to American sovereignty” (181).

Even though Bliss was highly educated and had a more progressive plan for the Moroland than his predecessor, he shared a similar understanding of the Moro’s savage state. Arnold writes, “Bliss saw only the possibly route for Moro advancement as economic development brought by whites. He thought the notion of Moro self-government preposterous. He asserted that even the advanced Moro did not understand the concept...he thought American governorship provided the people with some benefits, whereas native leadership meant a reversion to pillage and murder” (181). Santomenna, Dustin. 7

Arnold credits Bliss with skillfully managing the army bureaucracy, and keeping true to his convictions about how to manage the Moros. He understood like few others that dealing with the Moros required enormous patience (203). By breaking up the larger concentrations of U.S. soldiers stationed at major forts into smaller but more numerous bases, spread out across guerilla territory, it helped quell any major resistance movement by serving as a constant reminder to the Moros that a more powerful force was always nearby watching. Arnold credits Bliss’ governorship and decline of total casualties compared to his predecessor, “He could and did keep American regulars out of large-scale combat during the entire time he served as governor of Moro Province” (206). The Moros even refer to Bliss’ three year term reign as governor as the era of peace. As with Wood moving from governorship of the Moro Province to being overall head commander of the Division of the Philippines, so too did General Bliss. Bliss’ promotion at the end of 1908, paved the way for Mindanao’s prodigal son to return. Newly anointed Brigadier General Jack Pershing returned to the Mindanao, after a six year absence. When he was first in the Mindanao, he was only a captain, but given the charge of a large fort near the home of many of the most hostile Moros of Lake Lanao. There, in 1902, he marched his army around the lake, winning battle after battle against truly hostile Moros. He was able to largely pacify the area with a combination of diplomacy, having the stamina to endure those long-drawn out negotiations with influential Moro datus, and also the willingness to forcibly tame Moros who openly resisted American rules and laws. By the time he first left the Philippines in 1903, he stood out as a reliable field commander and excellent manager and administrator. His track record certainly convinced President Roosevelt to advance Pershing three ranks to brigadier general, skipping over 909 more senior officers (218). This move certainly aggravated scores of officers, because promotions still at the turn of the century were based on seniority and not merit. Pershing’s leadership style of the Mindanao sampled portions from both his predecessors. He was certainly concerned with rank and promotion, but did not openly seek punitive raids on Moros unless they were necessary. Like Bliss, Pershing saw the value in understanding as best as he could the Moro culture and even their language. Pershing, according to Arnold, “like his predecessors, promoted internal improvements. Better roads and wharves would allow products to reach expanding markets. A growing economy would attract investments, creating a self-reinforcing cycle that would raise living standards throughout the province” (219). After receiving some bad press about the safety in Mindanao due to an increase in blade attacks, Pershing decided to pursue disarmament. As previously mentioned this policy was extremely unpopular due to the associations Moro males had with their bladed weapons, the kris and kampilan. Even though the last major battle involving American regulars in the Moroland occurred during Pershing’s reign as military governor, on top of another extinct volcanic mountain, named Bud Bagsak, it was more unavoidable than Wood’s big battle at Bud Dajo seven years earlier. Though women and children were among the estimated two to five hundred Moro casualties, according to Arnold, this battle combined with the disarmament policy broke the back of armed Moro resistance (241). Though Arnold asserts that violence did not totally end, as there were still occasional random isolated attacks, Pershing was the last military governor of the Moro Province. The underrated and improved Santomenna, Dustin. 8

Filipino Scouts and Moro Constabulary handled the remaining crimes and violent acts, leaving the remaining American troops to prepare for a possible future foreign invasion of the Philippines. The Lessons: In the last chapter of his book, James R. Arnold provides the reader with significant lessons learned from the American involvement in the Moro Wars. These lessons, though not specifically directed at today’s military leaders, does provide helpful insight at how future American wars, in which American forces occupy a foreign land, can be managed. Arnold first points out that Americans have short-term and selective memories. He explains that American officers in the Mindanao did not listen to or take advice from those with prior experience in that region. He writes about American administrators in that region, “They did not perceive that there was a functioning Moro governmental organization based on Islamic principles. Instead of gradually introducing reforms and working through the traditional Moro political structure of datu council rule, the Americans impatiently chose direct rule. By military force they first abolished slavery and later disarmed the people while simultaneously imposing a Western-style civil society” (245). Arnold explains how some progressive Moros tried to adapt to this change, but many others did not care to adapt to “infidel rule”, and sought death before submission to anything other than Allah (246). Arnold feels that this failure to take the advice and learn from those with prior experience in dealing with the Moros lengthened America’s stay in the Philippines and contributed more to casualties on both sides. Another lesson that Arnold points out is the value of a national identity and a national unity in order for the Moros to have even a chance at successfully resisting the Americans. He writes, “The most important reasons the Moros failed was that their leaders never summoned latent nationalism, the idea of a unified ” (247). One former veteran of the Moro Wars pondered in 1968 that compared to Vietnamese Communists, the Moros were not nearly as strategic and did not have nearly strong leaders. This soldier even pointed out, “We found that a few hundred natives living off their land and fighting for it could tie down thousands of American troops, have a serious impact on the economy of the United States, and provoke a segment of our population to take the view that what happens in the Far East is none of our business” (248). Arnold cautions that a successful counterinsurgency requires officers who are experienced and able to stay for extended periods of time. One of the failures of the American military was to rotate officers out too quickly before they had time to get to know the people and make significant long lasting progress. Speaking of two American officers who commanded districts within the Moro Province, Arnold writes about committed and experienced officers, “When a man like Bullard or Scott (two successful administrators in the Moro Province) rotated back to the United States, it was extremely hard for his successor, whom the Moros did not know, to maintain the goodwill that had been acquired through long practice” (251). Tasker Bliss even lamented, “It is a great misfortune that this officer cannot remain for years at Jolo and continue the work which he has successfully conducted thus far” (251). The last and final lesson that Arnold pens about the Moro War, and which also has further significance, is the question of commitment. Arnold writes, “The history of counterinsurgency shows the vital role of national commitment Santomenna, Dustin. 9 to achieve victory. Using the advice that the Spanish general Don Julian Gonzalez Panado realized, a decade before the U.S. arrival in the Philippines, Arnold inserts, “The reduction of Mindanao is an undertaking which requires time, resources and perseverance. The complete dominion of this territory cannot be obtained by a single campaign…nor is it feasible to change in a few months the social and political conditions of a heterogeneous populations composed of tribes and families of distinct civilization and religion” (255).

Also relating to commitment to a cause, Arnold adds is commitment to results and commitment to winning battles in order to extract those desired results. Arnold writes, “The military governors of the Moro Province—Wood, Bliss, and Pershing—and their ablest subordinates, Bullard and Scott, were keenly aware that when they sent American forces against the Moros they needed to win. Anything short of a tactical victory would adversely impact future operations” (255). Arnold connects the question of commitment to the way the United States public has reacted to previous wars. Quoting Americans, as “not a patient people” he cites from a senior intelligence officer during the Vietnam War, “He believed that America’s foremost weakness in waging war in Vietnam was inherent to democracies: ‘incapacity to sustain a long, unfocused, inconclusive, and bloody war far from home, for unidentified or ill-defined national objectives” (256). The way that America largely escaped with doing so in the Philippines and in the Moroland was the fact that there were relatively few combat casualties and few large scale battles. In addition the public between the years of 1902 and 1913 was largely ignorant of what was happening there in the Moroland because of the limitations of the press and the inaccessibility of much of the terrain there to them. The inability of the Moros to unite behind a single leader or merge their tribes and factions into a single national identity, in addition to strong willed American commanders with superior weaponry proved to be the biggest Moro flaw in their struggle. By 1920 Americans, through forced subjugation and “benign assimilation”, controlled the Moro Province well enough to transfer control to Manila. America’s two main goals shifted to controlling the population and more importantly to be able to defend the Philippines against a foreign attack. Long had Americans been suspicious of Japan’s ever-increasing military and industrial might. For the entire struggle that took place during the Moro Wars, Arnold concludes that perhaps actual progress was achieved, because the Filipinos sided with the Americans in World War II. Arnold quotes from one of Pershing’s aides, “Pershing’s achievements in pacifying the Moros and in building up a program of public works…was to a great extent responsible for the loyalty of the people to America when the test came” (259).

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Bibliography Arnold, James R. The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902- 1913. Bloomsbury Press: New York, 2011.