This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 69-4857 COATS, George Yarrington, 1935- THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY: 1901—1917. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1968 History, modern University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan COPYRIGHT GEORGE YARRINGTON COATS 1968 THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULMY: I9OI - 191? DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By George Yarrington Coats, B.S., M.A. ******** The Ohio State University 1968 Approved hy Adviser Department of History DEDICATION For Carol and our children, the "Coats Kids": Catherine, Diane, "Tarry", Rohbie, Matt, and Brad, 11 CONTENTS DEDICATION oooo.ooo.oooo ii VITA ...................................... V CHAPTER I • PROEOŒ^I •ooo9»* o«oG»ee«« I II. DEATH KNELL OE THE INSURRECTION: 1901 — 1902 a . 0 . 0 . 00.0000 28 III. THE GOLAOHE, RIOS AND GA8IC CAMPAIGNS: 1 9 0 1 1 9 0 000000000000000 9 9 A" IVo THE OLA-TOLEDO UPRISING: 1902 - 190$. 79 Vo SAN MIGUEL'S "TOY REBELLION," 1902 - 1903 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 107 VI, TUMULTUOUS CAVITE: I9OI - 1904. , . 139 VIIo THE CAVITE-BATANGAS UPRISING: 1903 - I9O8 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 188 VIII. MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN LUZON: 1 9 0 2 — 1 9 1 0 . 00000000000000 190 IX, THE CONSTABULARY AND THE HEAD-HUNTERS OF NORTHERN LUZON........................ 215 X. THE PACIFICATION OF NEGROS: I9OI - 1907 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 240 XI. PACIFICATION OF CEBU AND PANAY: I9OI - I9C8 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 289 XII. THE "PAPA" FAUSTINO CAMPAIGN: LEYTE 1902 — 1907 oooooooo oo-oooo 287 XIII. BLOODY SAMAR: 1902 - I9 II ...............310 XIV. THE CONSTABULARY IN MINDANAO AND THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO: I903 - 1 9 1 7 ...........352 111 ZV. EPILOGUE............ 394 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................. 401 IV VITA March 25, 1955 Born Topeka, Kansas 1954 - 1956 . United States Army I960 B.S., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1963 M.A., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio FIELDS OP STUDY Major Field; American History American Military History and The Early National Period. Professor Harry L. Coles The Emergence of Modern America: I85O - 1 9 0 0 o Professor Francis P. Weisenburger Slavery & Reconstruction. Professor Henry H. Simms « V CHAPTER I PROLOGUE If someone with a capable pen could write the history of the Constabulary it would make a romantic and a heroic tale. The story of wet and weary trails; of sleepless nights freezing and burning from fever; the weight of heavy responsibility; wounds and death would be one to make any man glory in the pride of his race ^ d the achievements of his countrymen on foreign soil.^ It is true that President McKinley had considerable difficulty in determining the wisdom of the United States retaining control over the Philippine Islands, but after much soul searching, he announced that the United States had no alternative but to; !l . take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace to do the beSt we could by them. In this way. President McKinley laid the basis for America's Philippine policy which was to reach its logical climax in 1946 when the United States granted those islands their complete independence. ^"The Philippine Constabulary" by ex-tiente, PC., Infantry Journal, XXX, (April, 192?) no, 4,422-424. 2 Quoted in Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power: 1898-1954. Hew York, 1954, 51. Despite these idealistic motives, large numbers of Filipinos were convinced that they should receive their independence immediately and not in some far distant and undefined future. Led by Emilio Aguinaldo, the natives began to agitate for complete autonomy and the American recognition of their new state. In August of 1898, Aguinaldo issued a proclam­ ation to the effect that an independent Filipino state was actually in being. However, when the United States refused to recognize this nation, relations became increasingly strained until February of 1899, when actual fighting broke out in the Manila area. For the next two years well over 70,000 American soldiers fought a counter insurgency war which has seldom, if ever, been surpassed in the ferocious­ ness and barbarity committed by both sides.^ It was only after the spectacular capture of General Aguinaldo by the bold American General Frederick Funston in March of 19OI that the backbone of the insurrection was broken.^ During the latter stages of this insurrection, Congress passedso-called Spooner Amendment which authorized the ^See J.E.M. Taylor, "History of the Philippine Insurrection", in galley proof at the National War College, Washington, D.C. ^For an interesting account of General Funston’s accomplish­ ments see a series of articles which appeared in Scribners Magazine beginning in June, 1911 end ending in November, President to establish a civil government for the Philippine Islands. William Howard Taft was then selected by the Pre­ sident as the first Civil Governor, and on July 4-, 1901, he relieved the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands.^ Henceforth, the civil authorities assumed the responsibility not only for completing the pacification of the Islands by eliminating the remnants of the insurgent forces but also for initiating economic, sanitary and — most important-— educational reforms which ultimately paved the way for in­ dependence. In addition to Taft’s duties as Governor of the Islands, he was designated to serve as the President of the Philippine Commission, a body which was authorized to serve as the legis­ lative branch of the islands. The Philippine Commission was given power to pass laws, to raise revenue, and to establish an educational,Civil Service and court system. In addition, the Commission was given the responsibility to supervise the establishment of local governments and of course to maintain law and order throughout the Archipelago in areas no longer under military rule.^ ^Letter McKinley to Root, April 7, 1900 reprinted to Public Laws and Other Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine CommissionV division of Insular Affairs, War De­ partment, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1901, 5-10 (hereafter cited as Acts of the Philippine Commission) ; Ibid, Letter, Root to Taft, June 21, 1901. ^Wo Cameron P.ohbes, The Philippine Islands, New York, 1928, I, 130ffo 4 The maintenance of law and order presented the civil government with its first and most pressing task. Despite the surrender of Aguinaldo and his efforts to persuade his fellow insurgents to acknowledge American suzerainery, large numbers of forces remained in the field. In fact, it re­ quired the Army another year to defeat the remnants of this force in the ffeinila area and on the island of Samar. None­ theless, it was considered unwise to prolong actual military occupation or domination, unless local conditions made it absolutely necessary. The Vice-Governor of the Islands, Luke E. Wright, was also a member of the Philippine Commission. This ex-con­ federate hero of the battle of Mirfreesboro, and future ambassador to Japan and Secretary of War under Roosevelt, was greatly concerned as to the method by which civil govern­ ment might complete the pacification of the islands.^ To Wright's thinking, the task of the United States Army con­ sisted mainly of crushing the insurrection. It was incon­ ceivable to this man that regular troops, trained in the traditional methods of warfare, could effectively search out and destroy the remaining insurgent forces which were by this time breaking up into small bands and carrying on O their struggle from mountain retreats, 7 'Arthur S. Pier, American Anosties to the Philippines, Boston, 1 9 5 0 , ° ~ ^Forbes, loc cit. I, 203-204, Wright had considerable support in this line of think­ ing as many argued that the Army would be hopelessly unsuited for this type of campaigning,^ In addition, there was con­ siderable pressure to remove the stigma of military occupation to appease the anti-imperialist element in the United States. Luke Wright then was the first to conceive the idea of creating the Philippine Constabulary as the main instrument of the civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order A number of Wri.ght ' s contemporaries, however, argued vehemently that transfering responsibility Per the maintenance of peace to the Constabulary was premature and would have disastrous results. This view was shared by most Army officers, several of whom, in fact, secretly provided the local press with specific and often inflammatory arguments which were designed to create an atmosphere which would be ^"What Has Been Done in the Philippines", 58th Congress, Second Session, Senate Document no. 504: Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1904; Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines: Past and Present, New York, 1 9 5 0 , 314: For an interesting and brief analysis of the disadvantages of regular forces completing the pacifi­ cation of the Philippines, see the unpublished undated manuscript, "The Philippine Constabulary and Its Work", by Captain Robert A, Duckworth-Ford, PC, located in the John R, White Collection at the University of Oregon. ^^Forbes, loc cit. I, 203-204. conducive to the continuation of military domination through­ out the islands.The Members of the Philippine Commission rejected this pessimistic position and favorably responded to Wright's suggestion by passing the all-important Act Mo. 175 on July 18, 1901. This Act, which formally established the Constabulary, outlined the entire Constabulary organization, including the duties and responsibilities of its Chief, 12 Assistant Chiefs, Senior Inspectors and Inspectors. Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Philippine Commission, and Secretary of the Interior, as well as a noted expert on the Philippine Islands,has defined the Constabulary as follows: The Philippine Constabulary may be defined as a body of armed men with a military organization, recruited from among the people of the islands, officered in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos and employed primarily for police duty in connection with the estab­ lishment and maintenance of public order.