This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 69-4857

COATS, George Yarrington, 1935- THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY: 1901—1917.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1968 History, modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

COPYRIGHT

GEORGE YARRINGTON COATS

1968 THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULMY: I9OI - 191?

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By George Yarrington Coats, B.S., M.A.

********

The Ohio State University 1968

Approved hy

Adviser Department of History DEDICATION

For Carol and our children, the "Coats Kids":

Catherine, Diane, "Tarry", Rohbie, Matt, and Brad,

11 CONTENTS

DEDICATION oooo.ooo.oooo ii

VITA ...... V

CHAPTER

I • PROEOŒ^I •ooo9»* o«oG»ee«« I

II. DEATH KNELL OE THE INSURRECTION: 1901 — 1902 a . . 0 . 0 . 00.0000 28

III. THE GOLAOHE, RIOS AND GA8IC CAMPAIGNS: 1 9 0 1 1 9 0 000000000000000 9 9 A"

IVo THE OLA-TOLEDO UPRISING: 1902 - 190$. . 79

Vo SAN MIGUEL'S "TOY REBELLION," 1902 -

1903 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 107

VI, TUMULTUOUS CAVITE: I9OI - 1904. . , . . 139

VIIo THE CAVITE-BATANGAS UPRISING: 1903 -

I9O8 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 188

VIII. MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN LUZON: 1 9 0 2 — 1 9 1 0 . 00000000000000 190

IX, THE CONSTABULARY AND THE HEAD-HUNTERS OF NORTHERN LUZON...... 215

X. THE PACIFICATION OF NEGROS: I9OI -

1907 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 240

XI. PACIFICATION OF CEBU AND PANAY: I9OI -

I9C8 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 289

XII. THE "PAPA" FAUSTINO CAMPAIGN: LEYTE 1902 — 1907 oooooooo oo-oooo 287

XIII. BLOODY SAMAR: 1902 - I9 II ...... 310

XIV. THE CONSTABULARY IN MINDANAO AND THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO: I903 - 1 9 1 7 ...... 352

111 ZV. EPILOGUE...... 394

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 401

IV VITA

March 25, 1955 Born Topeka, Kansas

1954 - 1956 . United States Army

I960 B.S., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1963 M.A., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OP STUDY

Major Field; American History

American Military History and The Early National Period. Professor Harry L. Coles

The Emergence of Modern America: I85O - 1 9 0 0 o Professor Francis P. Weisenburger

Slavery & Reconstruction. Professor Henry H. Simms «

V CHAPTER I

PROLOGUE

If someone with a capable pen could write the history of the Constabulary it would make a romantic and a heroic tale. The story of wet and weary trails; of sleepless nights freezing and burning from fever; the weight of heavy responsibility; wounds and death would be one to make any man glory in the pride of his race ^ d the achievements of his countrymen on foreign soil.^

It is true that President McKinley had considerable difficulty in determining the wisdom of the United States retaining control over the Philippine Islands, but after much soul searching, he announced that the United States had no alternative but to;

!l . take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace to do the beSt we could by them. . .

In this way. President McKinley laid the basis for America's

Philippine policy which was to reach its logical climax in

1946 when the United States granted those islands their

complete independence.

^"The Philippine Constabulary" by ex-tiente, PC., Infantry Journal, XXX, (April, 192?) no, 4,422-424. 2 Quoted in Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power: 1898-1954. Hew York, 1954, 51. Despite these idealistic motives, large numbers of

Filipinos were convinced that they should receive their independence immediately and not in some far distant and undefined future.

Led by Emilio Aguinaldo, the natives began to agitate for complete autonomy and the American recognition of their new state. In August of 1898, Aguinaldo issued a proclam­ ation to the effect that an independent Filipino state was actually in being. However, when the United States refused to recognize this nation, relations became increasingly strained until February of 1899, when actual fighting broke out in the Manila area. For the next two years well over

70,000 American soldiers fought a counter insurgency war which has seldom, if ever, been surpassed in the ferocious­ ness and barbarity committed by both sides.^ It was only after the spectacular capture of General Aguinaldo by the bold American General Frederick Funston in March of 19OI that the backbone of the insurrection was broken.^

During the latter stages of this insurrection, Congress passedso-called Spooner Amendment which authorized the

^See J.E.M. Taylor, "History of the Philippine Insurrection", in galley proof at the National War College, Washington, D.C.

^For an interesting account of General Funston’s accomplish­ ments see a series of articles which appeared in Scribners Magazine beginning in June, 1911 end ending in November, President to establish a civil government for the Philippine

Islands. William Howard Taft was then selected by the Pre­ sident as the first Civil Governor, and on July 4-, 1901, he relieved the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands.^

Henceforth, the civil authorities assumed the responsibility not only for completing the pacification of the Islands by eliminating the remnants of the insurgent forces but also for initiating economic, sanitary and — most important-— educational reforms which ultimately paved the way for in­ dependence.

In addition to Taft’s duties as Governor of the Islands, he was designated to serve as the President of the Philippine

Commission, a body which was authorized to serve as the legis­ lative branch of the islands. The Philippine Commission was given power to pass laws, to raise revenue, and to establish an educational,Civil Service and court system. In addition, the Commission was given the responsibility to supervise the establishment of local governments and of course to maintain law and order throughout the Archipelago in areas no longer under military rule.^

^Letter McKinley to Root, April 7, 1900 reprinted to Public Laws and Other Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine CommissionV division of Insular Affairs, War De­ partment, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1901, 5-10 (hereafter cited as Acts of the Philippine Commission) ; Ibid, Letter, Root to Taft, June 21, 1901.

^Wo Cameron P.ohbes, The Philippine Islands, New York, 1928, I, 130ffo 4

The maintenance of law and order presented the civil

government with its first and most pressing task. Despite

the surrender of Aguinaldo and his efforts to persuade his

fellow insurgents to acknowledge American suzerainery, large numbers of forces remained in the field. In fact, it re­

quired the Army another year to defeat the remnants of this

force in the ffeinila area and on the island of Samar. None­ theless, it was considered unwise to prolong actual military

occupation or domination, unless local conditions made it

absolutely necessary.

The Vice-Governor of the Islands, Luke E. Wright, was

also a member of the Philippine Commission. This ex-con­

federate hero of the battle of Mirfreesboro, and future

ambassador to Japan and Secretary of War under Roosevelt,

was greatly concerned as to the method by which civil govern­

ment might complete the pacification of the islands.^ To

Wright's thinking, the task of the United States Army con­

sisted mainly of crushing the insurrection. It was incon­

ceivable to this man that regular troops, trained in the

traditional methods of warfare, could effectively search

out and destroy the remaining insurgent forces which were

by this time breaking up into small bands and carrying on

O their struggle from mountain retreats, 7 'Arthur S. Pier, American Anosties to the Philippines, Boston, 1 9 5 0 , ° ~

^Forbes, loc cit. I, 203-204, Wright had considerable support in this line of think­ ing as many argued that the Army would be hopelessly unsuited for this type of campaigning,^ In addition, there was con­ siderable pressure to remove the stigma of military occupation to appease the anti-imperialist element in the United States.

Luke Wright then was the first to conceive the idea of creating the Philippine Constabulary as the main instrument of the civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order

A number of Wri.ght ' s contemporaries, however, argued vehemently that transfering responsibility Per the maintenance of peace to the Constabulary was premature and would have disastrous results. This view was shared by most Army

officers, several of whom, in fact, secretly provided the

local press with specific and often inflammatory arguments

which were designed to create an atmosphere which would be

^"What Has Been Done in the Philippines", 58th Congress, Second Session, Senate Document no. 504: Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1904; Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines: Past and Present, New York, 1 9 5 0 , 314: For an interesting and brief analysis of the disadvantages of regular forces completing the pacifi­ cation of the Philippines, see the unpublished undated manuscript, "The Philippine Constabulary and Its Work", by Captain Robert A, Duckworth-Ford, PC, located in the John R, White Collection at the University of Oregon.

^^Forbes, loc cit. I, 203-204. conducive to the continuation of military domination through­

out the islands.The Members of the Philippine Commission

rejected this pessimistic position and favorably responded to

Wright's suggestion by passing the all-important Act Mo. 175

on July 18, 1901. This Act, which formally established the

Constabulary, outlined the entire Constabulary organization,

including the duties and responsibilities of its Chief, 12 Assistant Chiefs, Senior Inspectors and Inspectors.

Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Philippine Commission,

and Secretary of the Interior, as well as a noted expert on

the Philippine Islands,has defined the Constabulary as follows:

The Philippine Constabulary may be defined as a body of armed men with a military organization, recruited from among the people of the islands, officered in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos and employed primarily for police duty in connection with the estab­ lishment and maintenance of public order. ^

While this may be considered an official definition, it

appears that in reality, the Constabulary, at least until

1 9 0 7 , was more militarily orientated. Its officers were

^^Letter, Allen to Taft, January 27, 1902, Allen MSS: For a most critical approach toward the Constabulary see the controversial work by Parker Willis, Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial Policy. New Ÿork, 1905, p. 120-149. 12 Acts of the Philionine Commission. No. 1-265. 559-57^• 15 ■'■^Worcester, loc cit, 511. 7 largely men trained in the United States Army^^ who drilled and instructed their companies, using United States Army

Manuals,The purpose of this training was to prepare the..

Filipino soldiers for the task of suppressing the large numbers of natives who were frequently inspired by fanatical religious organizations and used guerrilla tactics similar to those per­ fected by Mao Tse tung.^^ Thus the Constabulary during its first few years was, in fact, more of a military organization than a police force. Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, long time chief of the explosive Constabulary Third District, well sub­ stantiated this generalization when he stated that the Con­ stabulary:

. . , o has entirely outgrown the character given it upon its inception and can no longer be considered an organization of police in the common acceptance of the word. The work in this district has of necessity been of a military character, and the ordinary police duties have been, by district order and later by law, reserved entirely for the municipal authorities and the municipal police. While the constabulary may not be quite a

Report of the Philippine Commission, 1901, II, 585-391» It should be noted here that the Philippine Commission was under the direct supervision of the War Department, there­ fore, the Commission’s annual reports were incorporated within the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War although printed and bound separately (hereafter cited as R.P.C,),

^^See General Order 75, June 16, 1904, Constabulary HQ,, Manila located in the National Archives, Bureau of Insular Affairs Record Group 350, Pile No, 13698: R.P.C., 1904, III, 24-25: Ibid, 190?, II, 338-340.

^% a o Tse tung On Protracted War, first ed, - Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954, 8

military organization, yet the character of the sern vice requires that it be organized on those l i n e s . '

That the Constabulary quickly evolved along military lines was due to the chaotic conditions which prevailed in the Islands after the insurrection was declared officially at an end. After years of struggling first against the

Spanish domination and then against American occupation, the islands were, in sum, completely prostrate. Lands remained dormant and uncultivated since the natives had no incentive to produce much beyond their immediate needs.

All too often their products were confiscated either by the Spanish, their own insurgent army, or merely bands of outlaws, commonly known as ladrones, which had for centuries traditionally preyed upon the more peacefully inclined coastal farmers. Nature also failed to cooperate during this period as the islands were plagued by serious epidemics, especially of cholera, which killed tens of thousands of natives; and suria and rinderpest which all but destroyed the local supply of horses and carabao. Even had other conditions been more favorable, without the services of the carabao, it would have been most difficult to cultivate adequate crops to feed the nearly 7,000,000 inhabitants of iTa.p.c.. 1903, III, 127. "I o the Philippine Archipelago.

Portimately, the men selected hy Governor Taft, with

the consent of both the Philippine Commission and the War 19 Department, proved to be more than capable of meeting

these challenges. The first Director of the Constabulary

and the man to whom, more than any other, applies the title

of honor as "Father of the Constabulary" was Captain Henry

To Allen, a regular army officer, graduate of West Point

and a veteran of the Cuban campaign. This talented army

officer, not only directed the Constabulary through the

turbulent years of 1901 -1 9 0 7 ? but eventually rose to the position of Major General in the regular army and succeeded

General John J. Pershing in 1919 as Commander of the American 20 Forces in Germany,

Another early appointee in the Constabulary who also

became its chief and then went on to a_distinguished career,

ultimately serving as a Major General in the United States

See U. So Senate Document No. $04-, cited in footnote 9 ‘* also Henry T, Allen's Reports to the Secretary of Commerce and Police dated December 15, 1901 and December 26, 1901, MSS Record Group 350, B.I.A., National Archives, file No. 1184; R.P.C., 1904, III, 113-122: Ibid, 1902, I, 3-5 and 198ff: and Duckworth-Ford's manuscript cited in footnote 9- ^^Acts of the Philippine Commission, No. 1-263, 8-10.

^^J.W. Jenks "Philippine Constabulary and Its- Chief", Review of Reviews, XXFI, (October, 1902), 436-438: Pier, loc. cit., 127*. Manila Times, July 4, 1902 , 5« 10

Army during World War I, was Henry Hill Bandholtz, of

Michigan. Bandholtz was also a regular army officer, a graduate of West Point, who had served in the Philippine theater with distinction prior to becoming Governor of

Tayabas Province, and also Governor of Albay Province.

Bandholtz's contributions to the Constabulary rival, if 21 they do not surpass those of Henry T. Allen.

Still another outstanding product of this fighting force was James G. Harbord who was given the task in 1903 of organizing the Constabulary in the Pifth District which consisted of the large island of Mindanao and the Sulu

Archipelago. Harbord served with distinction under the

Military Governor of Mindanao, General John J. Pershing, and eventually he too rose to become Chief of the Con­ stabulary. During World War I Harbord became Pershing's first Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces and then was given command of the United States Marines in the crucial battle of Chateau-(Thierry. Eventually Harbord

Letter to E. K. Massee from Bandholtz, April 29, 1909, Bandholtz MSS, University of Michigan: Manila Limes October 19, 1902, 1: Ibid, October 6, 1903, 1: H. H. Elarth, Lhe Story of the Philippine Constabulary, Los Angeles, 1949, 12^° It should be noted that Elarth has painstakingly assembled over 4-0 pages of biographical in­ formation on the nearly 1000 Americans who served in the Constabulary. Lhese sketches are brief yet have proved to be invaluable in the preparation of this study. It is doubtful that any other could have compiled this vast in­ formation as Elarth was assisted by the Philippine Con­ stabulary Officers Association which attempted to maintain records of their members. 11

commanded the United States Army's Second Division in the

Soissons Salient, and ultimately retired as a It. General

only to enter private business and become the President of

Radio Corporation of America in the 1920's with a reported pp annual income of #100,000 per year.

For a decade General Pershing himself played a prominent

if not a dominate role in the pacification of the Moros.

During this period he acquired a deep appreciation for the

Constabulary officers and he was instrumental in elevating

the careers of both Harbord and Allen. He also selected

another Constabulary product as his Chief of Intelligence

Division, Dennis Noland, a man who also rose to become a p% Major General.

Along with these distinguished soldiers, the destiny

of the Constabulary was initially directed by numerous other men who eventually rose to high positions both within this

fighting organization and also in the regular army. For

example, Mark L. Hersey, Charles E. Kilbourne, Peter E,

Traub, Marcus D. Cronin and William C. Rivers, all became

Major Generals. In addition, the following Constabulary pioneers rose to the rank of Brigadier General: William S.

Scott, Herman Hall, James C. Rhea, and Alexander L. Dade.

^^Pier, loc. cit., 1 2 7 . ^% b i d , 114-128. 12

Small wonder perhaps that the Constabulary fulfilled its role so effectively when one considers its leaders were of such caliber that one rose to the rank of Lt„ General, eight became Major Generals, four Brigadier Generals, and scores of others became Colonels and Majors in the regular 24 army.

During the summer and fall of 1901, when Allen began to recruit his officers and enlisted men, there was no precedent in American military annals to guide in the estab­ lishment of a corps of this nature. The British, however, had succeeded in a similar endeavor in the creation of such a force in Burma and also with the establishment of the 25 Canadian Mounted Police. Despite these handicaps, by

December of 1901 Captain Allen reported to his immediate superior, the Secretary of Commerce and Police, that he had succeeded in creating a force of some 2,500 officers and men which had already occupied nearly 100 posts formerly held by regular troops.

Captain Allen was acutely aware of the potential dis­ advantages and problems which might be created in so

7>lX- Elarth, loc cit., 15«

^^"The Philippines (sic) Constabulary" by Colonel W« C. Rivers, an unpublished manuscript located in the voluminous John R. White Collection at the University of Oregon.

See Allen's report to the Secretary of Commerce and Police as cited in footnote 18. 13 rapidly establishing a large military organization. But the fact that there ware still large numbers of insurrectionists in the field, not to mention literally tens of thousands of ordinary bandits or ladrones, absolutely necessitated the rapid build-up of this force.

Unfortunately5 despite Captain Allen's precautions, not a few appointees were found to be unsuited for the rigorous physical demands of the corps. Others proved incapable of effectively training and disciplining the native enlisted men or unsuited for the diplomatic task of cooperating with the municipal authorities. Thus, within a brief period, not a few of these individuals were compelled to resign from the 27 corps while many were summarily dismissed. '

Nearly all those whom Allen selected as Senior Inspectors and a large percentage of lower grade inspectors had received valuable military and combat experience in the war against

Spain. One prime consideration given to any applicant was

pQ his sobriety. It was important that the American officers not be overly addicted to alcohol due to their extensive civil and military responsibilities.

Nonetheless, Captain Allen himself appointed an officer to this corps even after the applicant had informed him in P9 'R.P.C., 1 9 0 5 , III, 3 1 : "Journal of W. Cameron Porbes", II, 40, located in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Con­ gress. (Hereafter cited as Forbes "Journal").

^^R.P.C., 1 9 0 1 , II, 386-391. 14. blunt terms:

I drink all I want, and at anytime I wantpit® But® ® o . drunk or sober, I can fight like Hell®"

Although the task of recruiting American officers was often a delicate and difficult one, it proved even more difficult to recruit several thousands of natives to serve as enlisted men for this organization® The military author­ ities throughout the islands were particularly apprehensive about this phase of the Constabulary in that they felt that it would be almost suicidal to arm and train large numbers of natives who might then possibly become the nucleous of another insurrection movement.

Captain Allen was aware of the possibility that certain natives might volunteer for the Constabulary if for no other reason than to obtain weapons which they then could either sell or simply use as ladrones. Therefore, applicants were carefully screened and Senior Inspectors were required to have all native applicants produce at least two reliable citizens to bear witness to their good character and motive.-"^

Again, however, the necessity for rapidly organizing and

^^Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol; The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, New York, 1938, 62. Hurley's book is a readable but not always accurate survey of the Constabulary, 1901^ 9 3 5 » Fortunately, however, he had access to certain manuscript collections which are no longer open to scholars although he does not document his sources.

^Oq.p.c., 1 9 0 1 , II, 390-3 9 1 . 15 enlisting this force compelled Senior Inspectors to deviate frequently from this announced policy. For example, many

Inspectors felt that it was most desirable to recruit large numbers of their enlisted men from ex-members of the Spanish

Civil Guard, which, in fact, was something of a forerunner of the Constabulary except that it was used primarily as an instrument of terror throughout the islands.In order to make the Civil Guard as ruthless as possible, the Spaniards deliberately recruited its members not from their own locality but from the areas of their traditional enemies.

In contrast to the Civil Guard, the American authorities insisted that the Constabulary enlisted men be recruited and serve in their own local areas. It was felt that natives serving within their own tribal area could valuably assist the American officers in becoming familiar with local con­ ditions, dialects and customs, trails and habitations of the local outlaws.^

Of necessity. Senior Inspectors of the various provinces were given considerable leeway in the recruitment of their enlisted men. For example, when Jesse Garwood, one of the corps' most famous fighters, organized the Constabulary in

^^Vorcester, loc. cit., $08ff.

^^Acts of the Philippine Commission, No. 1-263, Act No. 175? July 18, 1 9 0 1 , Section 9 : K.P.Ce, 1901, I, 77-81. 16

Albay Province, he felt compelled to refuse one applicant who could not meet the necessary requirements. But this native insisted that he would prove his loyalty. When

Garwood suggested that to do so he might go into the hills and capture one particularly noted outlaw, the native seemed satisfied and left. He returned several weeks later with the heads of several ladrones, one of whom was promptly identified as Jose Pinto, the man Garwood had suggested he track dom. Phis native was promptly enlisted.

In the recruitment of native enlisted men, the corps met with an outstanding success despite the grave doubts expressed by many, including the Commanding General of the

Philippine Division, as to the wisdom of this policy. Phat these means of recruitment proved successful is well illus­ trated by the enthusiasm with which the chief of the corps praised these developments in his official report at the close of the year. Captain Allen was particularly impressed that of the some, 2,500 enlisted men, only two had actually XZl deserted.^

In January, 1902, Allen wrote to a friend and stated

^^Hurley, loc. cit., 92-9 3 <

2 See Allen's Report to the Secretary of Commerce and Police, dated December 15 and 26, 19OI, B.I.A. Record Group 550, Pile Ho. 1184, National Archives. 17 that he was huilding "a little army from the cellar to the roofTo this officer, of course, fell the task to implement Act No. 175 which had outlined in broad terms the organizational structure of the Constabulary, The force which emerged under his guidance may be summarized briefly. The islands were first divided into four, later five, districts. Each had an Assistant Chief designated

as immediately responsible for fulfilling Constabulary

duties within the specified area. The First District con­

sisted generally of the area surrounding Manila. The

Second District consisted of the provinces south of Batangas,

Laguna, Tayabas line on Luzon proper including numerous small

islands to the south of Luzon, the most important of which was Mindoro, The Third Constabulary District consisted of

the so-called Visayan Island group, which included the islands

of Samar, Leyte, Bohol, Cebu, Negros, and Panay. The Fourth

District consisted of all provinces in northern Luzon beyond

Tarlac-Nueva Ecija line. This incidentally was the land of

the head-hunters. To the far south, the Fifth Constabulary

District, comprised of the large Island of Mindanao and the

entire Sulu Archipelago, this was the land of the fierce,

fanatical Moslems commonly referred to as the Moros.

^^Letter to Caspar Whitney from Allen, January 15, 1902, Allen MSS. 18

Each of the five districts was suh-divided into a numher

of province?,the boundaries of which were altered frequently

in order to facilitate the maintenance of law and order. A

Senior Inspector was appointed to supervise Constabulary

functions in each of the thirty-five provinces. The size and

population of the provinces varied considerably. Some were

as large in area as the State of Ohio, with a population of

nearly a quarter of a million, while others were but a frac­

tion of this size. The provinces themselves were then divided

into a number of stations and posts where the strength of the

Constabulary might range from a full company of fifty enlisted

men and one or two officers, or as few as six men under a native n.c.o. Each Constabulary company was authorized at

least one sergeant and several corporals, while it was stipu­

lated that the enlisted men, where at all possible, would be

selected and serve among their own people.

Both the native and American members were paid by the

civil government and were directly responsible to it except in the areas such as Mindanao and Sulu which remained under military rule until 191$. In case of the latter, the Con­

stabulary was directly controlled not by the civil adminis­ tration but by the military authorities, namely, the Military

Governor of Mindanao.The Chief was paid #4,000 per year.

^^Acts of the Philippine Commission, No. 1-26$, Act No. 175? Section 2, $, 4, and $.

3^E.P.C., 190$, III, 14$-144o 19

while the Assistant Chiefs received #2,700 a year and the

Senior Inspectors received anywhere from #800 to #1,400

annually. The pay for the enlisted men varied from province

to province according to what was considered à living wage

in any particular area. The maximum pay per month anywhere

was 50 pesos for the First Sergeant, while the minimum was

20 pesos per month for a Second Class Private.

In the early stages of the Constabulary approximately

25 per cent of each province was mounted therefore forming

an extremely mobile and effective body capable of striking unexpectedly and responding to sudden calls for assistance.

It was initially hoped that this percentage might be in­

creased but epidemics of such diseases as surra and glanders

caused so much havoc among the ponies that this proved im­ practical. The Constabulary had no artillery but when the need arose to shell a fixed fortification, the army provided

the necessary implements.

The Constabulary also had an incipient signal corps, although not organized as such. Several Constabulary officers were designated to supervise the telegraph lines and telephone facilities which were turned over to this corps as the military forces gradually abandoned their

^^See footnote No. 56, Sections 4-, 5, 16 and 18.

^%anila Times, July 4-, 1904-, 5= 20 n-umerous outposts. Eventually the civil government estab­ lished a telegraph school to train natives as operators.

Another unique feature of this service was that it carried mail into the wildest regions of the island. Nearly all the longer mail routes were under the direct super­ vision of the Constabulary, The longest route in the islands was from Baustista in Pangasinan Province through

Nueva Vizcaya Province to Echague on the head waters of the

Cagayan Eiver. The mail was carried on ponies usually with a Constabulary guard of a corporal and six enlisted men,^^

The Constabulary also had a naval branch as it was necessary for this corps to operate from the sea as well as land in order to fulfill its mission. Initially this navy consisted of four boats; The Rover, stationed in the

Visayas, The Ranger operating in southern Luzon, The

Scout which operated in the waters of northern Luzon and

The Pope which patrolled Laguna Bay. These small boats, which averaged 110 feet in length, not only carried men and material between the various posts but also hauled commissaries and other supplies distributed by the insular government. There was an Inspector on each boat in addition to a sailing master and a guard of usually six Constabulary

^ Ibid.: R.P.C., 1 9 0 3 , III, 11 and 35-36 and 1 9 0 3 , III, 60-61. ^^Eanila Times, July 4-, 1902, 5« 21

21 p enlisted men.

To distribute supplies to the civilian employees throughout the provinces, the Philippine Commission author­ ized the establishment of a commissary store which was under the direct supervision of the Constabulary. This proved no

easy task as it was necessary to determine the needs of both the Constabulary employees and all other civil employees in the islands. Huge requisitions were therefore made in order

to supply adequately these stores with all items ranging

from food to clothing and personal needs. It was necessary

to rent or build warehouses, provide for transportation ser­ vices and, of course, appoint competent officers to supervise

these functions® In a few months after the establishment of

this branch, the commissary was reported to have sold tens of

thousands of dollars of goods.

It was to the supply division which fell the task of

obtaining uniforms and arms for the rapidly expanding corps.

The uniforms varied considerably but generally consisted of

a khaki material with red shoulder straps. Constables were

not infrequently referred to as members of the "Khaki and

^^Ibid.

^^Acts of the Philippine Commission, Ho. 1-263, Act Eo. 24-2 dated September 27, 1901: R.P.d. 1901, iV 27-28, 38?: Ibid, 1902, I, 34-35, and 181: Ibid, 1903, III, 24- and 126, 22

Red." While this was the normal dress, in northern Luzon

where the enlisted men were members of the wild tribes who

were frequently used to wearing nothing but G-string, there

the uniform consisted of only a khaki shirt and hat, along

with the traditional G-string. In the land of the Moros,

the uniform was varied so that it might not interfere with

the religious practice and prayers of the Moslems which re­

quired those faithful to turn towards the Mecca several

times daily and touch the ground with their forehead in

their prayers. As a result, the hat was modified and the i\i\ Moro Constabulary became famous for their red fez type hat.

One of the earlier controversW-aspects of th4 corps

centered upon the type of weapons which were authorized for

the native policemen. The military authorities were reluctant

to arm this force with anything other than shotguns and a

.45 caliber revolver. In mid-1901, the Division Commander

of the Philippine Islands ordered that all single loading

Remington shotguns and .45 caliber revolvers be turned over

to the Chief of the Constabulary for distribution to his

^"Uniforms of the Philippine Constabulary", 1912 (no loca­ tion given.) This is a large one page folder type publica­ tion which consists of pictures of the various Constabulary units. It is located at the National War College in Wash­ ington, D.C: Philippine Constabulary; 58th Anniversary, 1959 Î 18-20. (Tiiere is no' other information given but this magazine was obviously printed in the Philippines.) 25

zi-5 forces. But these weapons soon proved insufficient and prompted Captain Allen in his first annual report to re­

quest additional weapons and clearly indicated the need for rifles and carbines. Despite Allen's urgent request,

General Adna Chaffe, the Commander of the Philippine

Division, strongly advised against arming the Constabulary with anything other than the revolvers and shotguns.

Chaffe was convinced that if the Constabulary were armed with carbines and rifles, many of these weapons would

eventually come into the hands of the ladrones or the remnaj.t of the insurgent forces. In Chaffe's own words:

Great efforts have been made by my two predecessors to bring about a disarming of the people of these islands. . . . It has been demonstrated many times in the past, even now it is self-evident, that 5 0 , 100, or 200 men, with hostile intent, armed with rifle or carbine, constitute a force that takes^thousands of troops and months of time to overcome.

But if the Commanding General of the Philippines had doubts as to the wisdom of arming the Constabulary with modern

^^General Order No. 255, Hq. U. S. Army, Division of the Philippines, as cited in R.P.C., 1901, II, 589-590.

46 Letter to the Adjutant General of the United States Army, from Adna Chaffee, Commanding Division of the Philippines, July 50, 1 9 0 1 , Record Group 550, Pile No. 1184, National Archives. 24. weapons, the Senior Inspectors conducting vigorous campaigns in the field against well-armed ladrones who fought with modern, smokeless rifles, had even stronger opinions of the absolute necessity of providing adequate arms for their men.

One Senior Inspector, for example, complained to Captain

Allen that the ladrones in his province alone had some

300 modern, long range rifles. Furthermore he argued that if his men were to effectively carry out their mission with­ out suffering unnecessarily high casualities, they must be armed with magazine rifles. Unfortunately, General Chaffee's opinion was sufficient to convince Governor laft and as a result the Constabulary was not adequately armed for several years.

And so it was, after four months of organizing, recruit­ ing, arming and greatly improvising, the corps of the Con­ stabulary gradually took shape. The ever-optimistic chie f reported in glowing terms in December of I9 OI;

it is believed that the experimental stage is passed and that the constabulary may be duly reconed (sic) upon as a potent factor in the maintenance of order in the Philippines." ^

4?E.P.C., 1 9 0 1 , II, 389-3 9 0 .

^^Letter to Chaffee from Taft, July 8, I9OI, Record Group 3 5 0 , file no. 1184-, National Archives.

^^Allen's Report to the Secretary of Commerce and Police dated December 15 and 26, I9 OI, Record Group 350, Pile H.o. 1184-, National Archives. 25

And well might General Allen he proud, for by this time the corps had a total strength which was rapidly approaching some 5,000 officers and men* Already the Constabulary was organized in thirty-two provinces and relieving the army of the responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Con­ stabulary had participated in numerous engagements, killing and wounding nearly fifty outlaws as well as capturing 37''+? 50 along with nearly 200 guns, many bolos and one cannon*-'^

General Chaffee, in keeping with the directives of the.

President of the United States and Secretary of War, announced in July, 190I that he was gradually concentrating the regular army in larger garrisons and that the army would be used only to suppress a general uprising, Chaffee stated that henceforth:

"The duty of preserving peace and order in all provinces in which the civil government ha^ been or may hereafter be established, as against ladrones and ordinary law breakers, has thus been remitted to the civil author­ ities,"^

5°Ibid: R.P.C., 19OI, II, 586-391.

^^Ibid, 1901 , I, 58: Also see the important General Order No. 179? HQ,, Division of the Philippines, dtd July 20, 19OI found in Record Group 550, Pile No, 1184 National Archives, This General Order established the basis for the relationship between the civil and military authorities and also lists the provinces which were to be under the control of the civil government. Section II of this order is especially signi­ ficant as it outlined the procedure by which regular troops might be called in by the Governor-General when conditions necessitated. 26

The task of completing the pacification of the islands remained formidable « For even after the army had completed its duties, it required years of active campaigning against the most ferocious outlaws in southern and central Luzon and against tens of thousands of fanatically inspired pulajanes and Moros of Samar and Mindanao before the march of civili= z at ion cou].d continue. During the next sixteen years the Constabulary, headed by American officers completed this task. In the words of one of the corps most illustrative products it was as though the Constabulary had, in effect, "made the Philippines,"^^ So well had the Constabulary performed their mission, that the Governor-General of the Islands reported that even with the wholesale resignation of American officers in the spring of 1917j there was no appreciable threat to the maintenance of law and order throughout the entire Philippine Islands, American officers of the Constabulary had by 191? not only supervised the completion of the pacification of the islands but had expertly trained numerous natives so that

^^"The Men Who Made The Philippines", an unsigned, undated, and unpublished manuscript found in the White Collection at the University of Oregon, The content and pencil corrections, however, clearly identify the author as being John R« White, 27 they themselves could and did assume the task of directing the corps.

^^Report of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, 1919» dated September 25» 1919 for the year ending December 31, 1918, 1-62 and 70. CHiLPTER II

DEATH KNELL OE THE INSURRECTION I9OI - 1902

The campaign inaugurated by General Bell in the Provinces of Laguna and Batangas and carried to a successful issue, was the death knell of the insurrection; hut it remained for the Constabulary in its Leyte campaign, ably conducted by Assistant Chief Taylor, to administer the coup de grace.

It was not without some forethought that July 4-,

1901 , was selected as the day on which it was proclaimed that the insurrection was officially over. It was the hope of all civil authorities from the President of the

United States down that this day might eventually usher in a new era of peace and prosperity for the Filipinos as it had done for the Americans in 1776» Several days later

General Adna Chaffee issued his famous General Order No,

179, in which he officially relinquished military control in the twenty-four provinces which had been turned over to the civil authorities. In these provinces, which included the

explosive islands of Leyte and Negros, as well as the Ladron- infested provinces of Albay, Sorsogon, Rizal, Tayabas,

Bataan, Bulacan, and Tarlac, General Chaffee ordered that

all military personnel abstain from any and all attempts to coerce, control, influence or interfere with the civil

authorities except when formally requested by the Governor ipvp.c,, 1902, 1 , 179.

28 29

2 General himself. The main task of maintaining peace in these areas was therefore delegated to the Constabulary.

Noticeably absent from this list, however, was the entire Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago and the islands of

Samar, Cebu, Bohol, and the provinces of Batangas and

Laguna. In these areas, either the remnants of the in­ surgent army remained in the field or the majority of the natives refused to accept American rule. Therefore, vigorous campaigns were launched by the regular army in

November and December of 1901 to suppress these elements. J. Franklin Bell directed the army's campaign in Batangas and Laguna provinces to exterminate the insurrectionary forces operating under General Malvar. General Hughes simultaneously directed operations on the islands of Cebu and Bohol, while General Jacob Smith commanded the forces on the bloody island of Samar,

General Smith's Samar campaign eventually netted the desired results but not before the pulajanes, as those forces were referred to, had almost perfected the tactics used in a guerrilla war. In this struggle the natives commonly worlnd 2 See footnote 51 in Chapter I, ^E.P.C., 1902, I, 15. 30

in the fields during the days with their holes while at night they emerged as ruthless pulajan fanatics and used these same instruments to wreck havoc upon their enemies.^

So exasperating were these tactics, that General Smith finally resorted to the drastic measures in order to

suppress the pulajanes. For example, Smith informed one of his more important field commanders, one Major Waller, that; "the more you kill and burn the more you will please me»" Smith said that he wanted Samar to be made into a,

"howling wilderness", and to do this, he suggested that all native boys over ten years of age be killed.^

The ensuing campaign was conducted accordingly with several thousand U. S. Marines and regular soldiers driving the pulajanes, under General Lukban, from the north and south towards the center of the island. In this process all villages and towns which were known to be harboring the insurgent forces were burned and destroyed.^ It was a war of annihilation, but General Smith defended these tactics as absolutely necessary in order to deprive General Lukban's

^Manila Times, November 19, I9OI, 5»

^Ibid, April 9, 1902, 1.

% e w York Tribune, December 20, 1901, 1. 31

forces of the food, supplies and reinforcements. These tactics temporarily proved successful, and December of 1901 700 bolo men were compelled to surrender because of lack of food and supplies.^ In February of 1902, Lukban was captured and several months later his successor. General Guevara, was compelled to surrender the entire insurgent force on the island of Samar. In June of 1902, the Philippine Commission passed Act Ho, 4-19 which authorized the establishment of civil control throughout this island, and so ended the period of O military rule. While Smith was defeating Lukban's forces on Samar, General Hughes was directing a similar, but less severe, campaign on the islands of Bohol and Cebu. By December of 1901 these islands were considered satisfactorily pacified, therefore the Philippine Commission passed Act Ho, 322 which authorized the establishment of civil government in these areas.^ Meanwhile, in the Manila area. General Bell was directing the conclusion of his campaign against the ^Ibid, December 18, 1901, 9®

%.P.C., 1902, I, 1 5 : For additional information on Smith’s controversal Samar campaign see: Letter to Colonel Arthur Murray from Henry T. Allen, February 1, 1902, Allen MSS: Manila Times April 22, 1902, 1, and Hew York Tribune, April 29, 1902, 2.

^E.P.C., 1902, I, 13< 32 insurgent forces under the direction of General Malvar» Un­ like the Samar and Cebu-Bohol campaigns, the Constabulary did, on a limited scale, participate in the mopping up operations on Luzon» Nonetheless, the main impulse was directed by the military authorities» General Bell commanded nearly $,000 troops in this area and conducted his operations much as Smith had done on Samar. Bell too vowed to kill or capture every able man as he felt this was the only way to complete his mission. To facilitate these operations, the army forced some 100,000 natives to relocate within prescribed zones where they were subject to rigid control. This was ob­ viously designed to cut off General Malvar®s army from their supplies in the field. Outside these relocation camps, any native encountered by the army was considered hostile and subject to immediate and drastic retaliation.^^ Operating mostly on the periphery of these major engage­ ments, the Constabulary nonetheless assisted the military considerably in the Batangus-Laguna-Tayabas area. For example, Cary I, Crockett, with a detachment of the corps' mounted reserves stationed at the old Santa Lucia barracks in

^^Ibid; Manila Times, March 12, 1902, 1 and April 17, 1902, 1, 33

Manila,conducted extensive patroling operations along the Cavite-Batangas border. Crockett's mission was to pre­ vent the escape of Malvar ' s army which was attempting to flee into Cavite province. During this period, Crockett's troop had many small skirmishes and was responsible for the capture of more than 200 rifles, plus a large store of 1? miscellaneous military supplies. In neighboring Tayabas province, which was technically under civil administration,, the Constabulary contributed more substantially towards this effort and participated in numerous engagements in November and December. On

11 It was initially hoped that a large percent of the Con­ stabulary would be mounted, but this proved impractical because of an epidemic of surra and the poor condition of ponies which the army turned over to the civil government. Nonetheless, Allen was determined to maintain an elite reserve corps of highly mobile mounted Constabulary in Manila. Gradually this reserve force became an incipient Constabulary school which provided advanced training for promising native n.c.o.'s. See R.P.C., 1901, II, 391: Ibid, 1902, I, 181; Ibid, 1903, III, 49-50; See especially Record Group 350, file no. 15698, National Archives which contains numerous Constabulary General Orders, Circulars and Address given before graduating cadets; "The Con­ stabulary Academy at Baguio" by Capt. Emanuel A. Baja, P.C. in Khaki and Red; Journal and General Magazine, IV, no. 27, February 29, 1924 , 7-8; kanila TimesT July 4, 1902, 3. 12 Hurley, loc. cit. 79 * It should be noted that Hurley used the extensive Crockett Papers which have since been closed to scholars. 54

DecemlDer 12, 1901, ■under the command of Inspector Bruin, a most energetic and determined officer, a Constabulary detachment, succeeded in surrounding a relatively large force under one Colonel Marquez. In the following engage­ ment this Chief escaped, although Bruin captured four officers and thirty-two enlisted men.^^ The following month, Inspector Bruin, with seventy Constables, while on a scouting patrol discovered a supply base for the outlaw forces and destroyed 250 tons of rice.^^ In January,

Inspector Schultz had a series of engagements with the enemy in which he killed several, wounded others, destroyed large quantities of rice and captured important documents of the insurgent forces.

In order to care for wounded Constables in this cam­ paign, General Chaffee, early in 1902, ordered military hospitals to treat Constabulary casualties where civilian hospitals were not available. In return, the civil author­ ities were to reimburse the military for the exprenses in­ curred.

^%anila Times, December 12, 1901, 1.

^^Ibid, January 12, 1902, 8.

^.^Ibid, January 17, 1902, 1.

^^Ibid, February 2, 1902, 1. 35

Captain Allen was encouraged by the showing of his force and in January of 1901, wrote that he was confident General Bell would give the Constabulary credit for their assistance and cooperation rendered during his campaign. Not only did the Constabulary operate in the provinces immediately under Bell's command, but in the surrounding areas Constabulary patrols maintained something of a cordon to prevent the elements of the insurgent forces from fleeing into areas under the control of the civil governmentMore important, a Constabulary detachment under Inspector August 0, Sorenson had captured Cortez, 1 ft Malvar ' s second in command. The impact of General Bell's vigorous campaign was felt in the province of Eizal where considerable numbers of natives attempted to flee in order to escape the wrath of the regular army.Eizal province was under the civil administration and found it most difficult to meet its pressing needs. But under its energetic Governor Flores, ably assisted by the Constabulary and numerous volunteer units, the outlaws from Batangas and Laguna provinces

^^Letter to Colonel J. A. Johnson, from Allen, January 21, 1902, Allen MSS; Manila Times, February 20, 1902, 1.

l^ibid, February 21, 1902, 1.

l^Ibid, March $, 1902, 1. 36 received a warm welcome and a lively campaign quickly 20 developed. Initially the Constabulary met with several serious reverses against Malvar's forces. For example, at

Boso Boso a detachment of twenty-five Constabulary, under a native sergeant, was struck by a band of seventy-five natives.

In the ensuing engagement which lasted until dark, nineteen 21 were either killed or temporarily lost. Less than a week later, however, the Constabulary was somewhat compensated at Sililoan, Laguna, where a large body of natives sur­ rendered to this corps with over thirty rifles, twenty- 22 two shotguns and a large number of pistols and revolvers.

Meanwhile General Bell's campaign received an unexpect­ ed boost as the result of a scathing speech which he deliver­ ed before a group of prominent ex-insurgent natives at Santa

Cruz, Laguna. Bell expressed his bitter disappointment with the cooperation that he was receiving in tracking down the insurgent General Caballes. General Chilles, an ex-insurgent leader, was visibly moved ^ d pleaded with Bell to

^ I b i d , March 4, 1902, 1, March 3, 1902, 8, and March 6, 1902, 1. ^^Ibid, March 4, 1902, 1.

^% b i d , March 12, 1902, 8. 57

be given an opportunity to prove his loyalty to the

United. States. Cailles suggested that if he were given

a force of 100 hand-picked expert Scouts,he would per­

sonally go into the mountains and bring back Caballes,

dead or alive. Bell agreed and the force was organized.

To guarantee the success of this mission and the elimina­

tion of Caballes's .force, the Constabulary also mounted

an extensive expedition which consisted of some 14-0 men under the immediate direction of Inspector Sorenson.

It was calculated that this rival expedition operating

independently would stimulate Cailles's effort, as well pZ[. as put additional pressure on the insurgents. It was

Cailles, however, who eventually succeeded in capturing

General Caballes. The following summer. Cailles was

selected as a Governor of Laguna Province, partly in 25 reward for his successful campaign.

25 A distinction must be made between the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary. Both native forces were officered by Americans but the Scouts were attached directly to the United States Army while the Constabulary of course was responsible to the civil government, 24- Manila Times, March 2, 1902, 1.

^^Ibid, July 3, 1902, 1. $8

The native forces were not always led by men; some of its most ferocious fighters were women» ?or example, during Bell's pacification of laguna and Batangas, the Constabulary succeeded in capturing the leader of one band, which had terrorized these areas with the most brutal atrocities. One of their victims had miraculously survived their torture even though he had been robbed, boloed, buried to the neck and had his throat cut. He provided the Constabulary with the necessary information and identi­ fication and a detachment soon succeeded in capturing the leader of this organization who claimed to be a General. It was a woman. The constant pressure brought to bear on Malvari's forces by both the military and the Constabulary proved sufficient and in April of 1902, he surrendered all his forces in Batangas.Within a month, the Philippine Commission was preparing legislation which authorized the establishment of civil government in Batangas and Laguna Provinces. In his first annual report to the Director of the

^^Ibid, November 10, 1901, 1.

^E.P.O., 1902, I, 13.

^%anila Times, May $1, 1902, 1. 39

Constabulary, Major Jesse Garwood, the Gonmiander of the

Second District, clearly indicated the extent to which the

Constabulary had actually assisted General Bell in the final suppression of the insurgent forces in the Batangas, Laguna and Tayabas provinces. Garwood noted that his force was compelled to take the field even before properly armed and equipped. Yet, despite these handicaps, the Constabulary in the Second District completed 570 expeditions during the year, covering over 17,000 miles. They participated in thirty-one engagements and killed seventy-six outlaws, wounding nearly as many again. More astoundingly, they captured or received the surrender of 57^ renagades, captured

54-8 rifles, over 200 other miscellaneous guns as well as numerous bolos and nine cannons. This represented no small accomplishment for a corps which had been created from the bottom up and had been in existence for barely one year, ^

General Bell's campaign in Laguna and Batangas, along with General Smith's on Samar proved to be the death knell af the insurrection, but, as Captain Allen srbated, it

29a.P.C., I, 199ff. 40 remained for the Constabulary in its Leyte campaign to administer the cou-p M erace.^O The island of Leyte had been turned over to the civil government in July of 1901» But conditions remained turbulent and in the following March, Wallace G. Taylor, Chief of the Third District, personally took command of the Constabulary's campaign on this island* As Taylor's campaign progressed, however, the military authorities, headed still by Chaffee, became in­ creasingly uneasy as to the wisdom of delegating this re­ sponsibility to the Constabulary* They argued, of course, that it would require the full effort of the military forces to complete the destruction of the insurrection on the island of Leyte. Captain Allen was concerned with the developments but after conducting an extensive personal investigation on Leyte, he urged Governor Taft not to yield to the pressure from the military. Allen acknowledged that it would be a diffi­ cult campaign but he argued that the reinforced Constabulary force on Leyte, under Wallace Taylor would be capable of restoring peace to the island without military assistance. Finally Allen cautioned Taft that if the military were called in, it would unquestionably lend support to those political leaders in the United States who were still advocating the

50Ibid, 1902, Part I, 179« 41 necessity of military rule throughout the Philippine Islands.

In planning his Leyte campaign, therefore, Allen realized

it would be a test for the Constabulary. If his force proved

successful, it would destroy the pessimistic arguments of the military leaders. But if the Constabulary did not rise

to the occasion, it would be temporarily, if not permanently

disastrous to civil administration. Thus careful plans were made, reinforcements were rushed into the area, and Wallace

C, Taylor, one of the corps' most effective tactitians, was

ordered to take direct command of field operations. Yet

another extremely important aspect of Allen's plans called for policies which were designed to win the support of the bulk of the natives of Leyte. Allen realized that if the Con­

stabulary was"to be successful it must have the active support of the native population. In other words, Allen was fully

^^Letter to Taft from Allen, March 28, 1902, Allen MSS; R.P.C., 1902, I, 2 1 9 : It is interesting to note that this was just one incident in which Allen came into conflict with the military authorities. There was, in fact, considerable friction between the leaders of these two forces over similar matters in addition to differences over such trivial matters as saluting. It is doubtful however that these conflicts ever seriously interfered with the conduct of field opera­ tions, but nonetheless resulted in considerable ill feelings between individuals which at least on one occasion tempor­ arily jeopardized the advancement of one regular army officer detached for service with the Constabulary. Por an interest­ ing and heated exchange on this matter, see Letter to Allen from General Bell, February 18, 1907j and Allen to Bell, March 29, 1907, Allen MSS. 4-2

aware that success depended upon the ability of the govern­

ment forces to persuade the native population to assume

their share of the responsibility in order to crush the

outlaw forces. Obviously armed force alone was considered in­

sufficient to complete this task.^^

The importance of this campaign for the Constabulary

can scarcely be overestimated as this was the first major military effort of the corps, initiated and completed with­

out the assistance of the regular army. It was in the

deepest sense of the word the test for this newly organized

force. That they more than rose to this challenge was un­

questionably due to the sound strategy developed and executed

by Allen and Taylor with the able assistance of such field /

commanders as Peter Borseth, Ole Waloe and Gary I. Crockett.

It was under the leadership of these men that the strengthened

Constabulary forces of Leyte, numbering some 4-00 men, pre­ pared for the upcoming campaign.

The situation in Leyte was made more difficult by the

energetic campaign of annihilation which v/as simultaneously being conducted by General Smith on the neighboring island

^^Letter to Taft from Allen, March 9, 1902, Allen MSS.

^^Hurley, loc. cit., 80-85• 4-5 of Samar. As a result of Smith's constant pressure, elements of Samar's insurgent forces attempted to slip into Leyte to continue their resistance to American rule and also to obtain rifles, ammunition and other supplies which could easily be smuggled into Samar. Dissatisfied elements on Leyte were greatly encouraged by the success of their fellow insurgents on Samar and therefore increased their resistance and activi­ ties.^^ One insurgent leader on Leyte was actually an American renegade named Harry Long who had deserted several years before from the United States Army. Long was reported to have entered Leyte to conduct raids on local municipal police in order to obtain weapons and ammunition to supply his immediate superior on Samar, Colonel Francisco Rafael. In one specta­ cular raid on the barrio of Alang-Alang, Long personally led the assault on the police detachment by posing as a Constabu­ lary officer. In this manner, he obtained entrance into the police headquarters and then at a given signal his men commenced the attack which resulted in the death of several police officers, as well as the loss of seven guns. Long succeeded in making his escape but a Constabulary detachment in the area was immediately summoned and pursued the outlaws.

^^Letter to Taft from Allen, March 28, 1902, Allen MSS; Manila Times, February 5? 1902, 1, and April 2$, 1902, p. 6.

^^Ibid, February 5, 1902, 1. 44

Shortly after this Taylor ordered a force of thirty- nine Constabulary under Inspector Neddo to occupy the island of Biliran which lies just a few miles north of the island of Leyte» Biliran Island had traditionally served as a haven for criminals from both Samar and Leyte. Upon arriving on this island Neddo organized his forces and for nearly a week conducted a search-and-deStroy mission at­ tempting to track down the leaders of the fanatical religious movement knovm as the Dios-Dios.^^ This movement was especially strong on Samar and was under the overall leadership of "Papa" or "Pope" Pablo. The Dios-Dios element on Biliran Island, however, represented a minor element of this movement and, therefore, it was left to the Constabu­ lary to eliminate the force. So aggressive and, indeed, audacious were the Dios-Dios men on Biliran Island and so confident of their ultimate victory over Ueddo's small Constabulary force, that on one occasion they actually sent in advance notice informing the Constabulary of their in­ tentions of immediately attacking. It was in mid-April when these fanatical bolomen launched their self-announced

^ The Dios-Dios movement was one of many similar organi­ zations which existed throughout the Islands. While their professed creed varied all were hostile towards American rule and at one time or another attempted to recruit large numbers of natives to resist American control. Among the more important of these sects were: Dios-Dios, Pulajanes, Golorados, Cruz-Cruz, Santa Iglesia, Caradores, Colorum, Santos Ninos, Guardia de Honor, Soldados Militantes de la Iglesia, and Hermanos-del Tercero Orden. See Allen's Annual Report for 1905 in R.P.C., 1905, Part III, 53-49ff. 4-5

,attack, Heddo, after deploying his men, continued to direct

their defense until the leader of the outlaws managed to get

behind the Constabulary officer and deliver a mortal bolo

thrust. In the ensuing engagement a dozen natives were

killed but Neddo paid for this victory with his life and

thus became the first American Constabulary officer to be

killed in battle.

With this serious setback Taylor began preparation for

an all-out campaign to clear Biliran Island, In May, the

illustrons Captain Peter Borseth began an intensive campaign

in which he was ably assisted by over 300 volunteer bolomen

from the villages of Alang-Alang and Naval. Within several

weeks, Borseth reported that his combined force had killed

sixty of the fanatics and captured twenty others along with

large quantities of arms and equipment. So successful was

this joint effort, that the outlaw Dios-Dios force was com­

pelled to scatter and flee to the mountains in order to

avoid complete destruction. The success of this mission

was unquestionably due to the overwhelming cooperation of

the town people who served willingly in the field and also

provided the necessary intelligence reports as to the location

of the outlaw force. In this respect, Allen's proposed

policies to win the active support of the natives was

37Manila Times, April 18, 1902, 8 , and April 23, 1902, 6. 46

already providing ample dividends.

Meanwhile, on the mainland of Leyte, Taylor was direct­ ing a most active campaign where up to twenty separate Con­ stabulary detachments continually scoured the country, %q tracking down the irreconcilable insurgents.During this phase, of the operation, the Constabulary succeeded in cap­ turing the insurgent fort at Ormoc along with several cannon, horses and miscellaneous military stores. One of the most effective officers in this area, was the famous Cary I.

Crockett of Virginia. This truly gallent fighting man en­ gaged in no less than eighteen operations against the enemy and succeeded in destroying the forces of the American renegade,

Harry Long, who by this timeuclaimed to be the military com­ mander of the insurgent forces on the island of Leyte.

Another important aspect of the Leyte campaign, was the decision to close the local port facilities. It was calcu­ lated, that this action would compel the merchants to support the government's effort to restore peace if only to have the ports reopened. More important,the closing of the ports deprived the insurgents of vital supplies which had either filtered to

5Glbid., May 20, 1902, 1. 59ibid., April 24, 1902, 1.

^^Hurley, loc. cit., 84-85- 47

their forces via sympathetic town leaders or were merely-

confiscated hy the outlaw forces in swift raids from their mountain haunts.It was believed by some that the closing

of the ports actually proved to be decisive in the Leyte

campaign. 42

At any rate, the overall effort gradually had the de­

sired effect and in early June local papers reported that

the major leaders of the official insurgent forces on LL7. Leyte were, in fact, preparing to surrender. The com­ mander of the insurgent forces, Pernaranda, who had served

as Lukban's chief of staff on Samar before being dispatched

to take command of Leyte, agreed to surrender his entire force. On June 19 and June 20 Pernaranda surrendered his 44 army of 500 men and 200 rifles to Wallace Taylor. Several days later the insurgent General Jorge Kapili, who had pre­ viously broken with Pernaranda and refused to recognize his

authority in Leyte, surrendered to the Constabulary forces at Malitbog.^^ Kapili, on contrast to Pernaranda, was a ladron or common bandit rather than a genuine

^^Manila Times, June 1$, 1902, 8.

4^Ibid, June 12, 1902, 1. 4^Ibid.

^R.P.G., 1902, I, 215c

45Ibid, 1903, H i , 115. 48 insurrectionist. He had by this time earned the distinction of being "the bandit chief of Leyte" because of his ruthless and selfish domination of his own people.^^

The distinction between a ladron and a legitimate in­ surgent was at times most difficult to make since there was considerable blending of the two activities. This is especial­ ly true after the summer of 1902 when the last official in­ surgent units surrendered. However, with the collapse of the official insurgent armies, many ex-insurgent officers refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States and fled to the hills, from their mountain retreats, they continued their warlike activities by robbing and exploiting their own people, especially the more prosperous and peacefully in­ clined coastal and town inhabitants. In contrast an insurgent was one who opposed only the authority and supremacy of the

United States and who presumably hoped to protect not exploit the natives. Once an insurgent was defeated in the field he submitted to American authority. On the other hand, a ladron was a thief, a bandit, and usually a murderer, who opposed all authority, all restraint, and all law other than his own.^*^

As a result, once the insurgent leaders surrendered,it was

^%anila Times, June 12, 1902, 1 and June 18, 1902, 1<

^^ibid, July 25, 1902, 4. 49 necessary to conduct numerous mopping up expeditions through­ out the summer of 1902. This was certainly true in the Leyte area where Taylor instructed Captain Borseth to proceed to the Island of Biliran to destroy the remnants of the Samar insurgent force. In one such operation Borseth succeeded in killing nineteen Dios-Dios fanatics as well as capturing eleven members of this band, including the wife, daughter and three sons of "Pope" Pablo, the high priest

h Q of the Dios-Dios movement on Samar. Unfortunately, "Pope" Pablo continued to plague the Constabulary for the next five years or so even without the benefit or condolences which he might have received from his family. It was "Pope" Pablo who led the pulajanes of Samar during the uprising of 1904 to 1905. Wallace Taylor in his annual report to the chief, with justifiable pride, declared that the entire Third District, with the exception of the northern tip of Mindanao was at long last free from all organized insurgent forces.^^ Obviously, the Constabulary had met the challenge. And in the process, there emerged several outstanding combat leaders who, throughout the next decade, contributed invaluably

^^Ibid, July 10, 1902, 1.

^^R.PoC., 1902, I, 215. 50 towards creating the rich heritage of this fighting corps.

Three of the Constabulary's most illustrious products who participated in the Leyte campaign were: Wallace 0. Taylor,

Peter Borseth and, above all, Gary I. Crockett.

A vital ingredient in this campaign was the coopera­ tion of the native population. Wot only did they serve admirably well within the forces of the Constabulary, but they provided substantial numbers of volunteer units which contributed heavily towards the ultimate success of this mission. But even more indicative of the spirit of these native soldiers, was a fight in which eleven Filipino en­ listed men performed so heroically that they were awarded the coveted Medal of Valor, the highest distinction for bravery which the civil government could confer. This small detachment was surrounded by a superior force which promised them immunity and 100 pesos each if they would surrender their weapons. There was no American officer present but their training and discipline proved more than adequate as this ultimatum was answered with a volley from their rifles. When one considers the ferociousness of these outlaw insurgents, the resistance of these native Con- 50 stables takes on added importance and significance.^

^^See General Order Wo. 21, Philippine Constabulary Head­ quarters, 1902 Series. 51

The insurgent era finally came to a close in mil-1902 with the destruction of Lukhan's insurgent force on Samar and Malvar's insurgent forces in Batangas, Laguna, Tayahas provinces and Taylor's successful Leyte campaign. With the passing of these legitimate armies, in irregular hands, usually led by ex-insurgent officers, began to emerge in alarming numbers throughout the Archipelago. The responsi­ bility for eliminating these bands was delegated almost exclusively to the Constabulary. With the exception of

Mindanao and Sulu, the army passed into the background and the Constabulary became the mainstay of peace throughout the

Philippine Islands.

A new phase in the pacification of the Philippines began in the summer of 1902 when numerous die-hard insurgents took to the hills and turned toward a life of robbery, murder and exploitation of their fellow countrymen. These men became ladrones and as such sought only to enrich them­ selves at the expense of the majority of the natives. The ladrones on Luzon claimed to be fighting for independence but there is little evidence to suggest that they were in earnest. They were, in fact, bandits and whenever possible avoided direct confrontation with the Constabulary.

Simrbrly the pulajanes and other religious fanatics which 52 dominated the Visayan Island group also sought to advance their own positions, although there was at least an effort to extend protection to those who supported their cause-» In contrast to the ladrones, the pulajanes were extremely aggressive fighters and actively sought out Constabulary patrols.

The situation on Mindanao and Sulu differed sharply from that in the Luzon and Yi say an areas. In this area, the natives were Moslems and had successfully resisted Spanish domination for over three hundred years. The Moro had not participated in the insurrection of 1899-1901, Nonetheless when the United States attempted to establish their control in this area, the Moslems willingly continued their resistance against domination by the Christians, For these people it was a "Holy War" and they eagerly sought combat with Christians because according to their religion this was the surest way to ascend to heaven. So determined was the Moro resistance that the United States Army dominated this area until 1915 when the first civil government was established. In contrast to the ladrones and pulajanes, the Moros' prime objective was to protect their families and religion, from domination by the Christians, That the Constabulary was prepared for its task, is substantiated by the narrative of this paper. By September 55 of 1902, the Constabulary had occupied over 225 posts throughout the islands with the force of nearly 5,000 officers and men. During the heavy fighting of the previous year, this force had conducted nearly 9,000 expeditions covering a distance of well over 100,000 miles and killing, capturing or receiving the surrender of hundreds of bonified insurgents, in addition to killing nearly ?00 ladrones and capturing an additional 2,802. In September Allen noted that during the previous four or five months, the Constabu­ lary had assumed exclusively the task of maintaining peace and order in areas under civil administration. The regular army, in fact, Allen pointed out, had not fired a single- shot outside the Moro country, which was to remain under 51 direct military supervision for still another decade.

Well might the Constabulary look forward to the impend­ ing campaigns with confidence that their small but competent force could complete the pacification of the Philippine

Islands.

^^Memorandum for General Wright prepared by Allen, dated October 1, 1902, Allen MSS. CHAPTER III

THE GOLAGHE, RIGS, AHD GASIG CAMPAIGNS ; I9OI - 1903

The bane of Philippine civilization in the past was ladronism; and the present conditions are most favor­ able for its growth and maintenance.

The rise and fall of Antonio Golache as a prominent ladron leader serves as an example of the pattern which developed throughout the Philippine Islands once the United States Army had been withdrawn from a so-called pacified area. The Governor-General in collaboration with the Philippine Commission and the military authorities of the islands made the decision as to when any province was con­ sidered sufficiently pacified to permit the civil author­ ities to assume the full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. Once this decision had been made, it was the Philippine Constabulary which assumed total law enforce­ ment responsibilities in these areas and the military forces were gradually withdrawn from smaller posts and concentrated 2 into the larger posts.

Letter to the Philippine Commission from Taft, November 1, 1902, Record Group 350, Eile No. 1184, Exhibit N, Report of the Chief of the Philippines (sic) Constabulary to the Secre­ tary of Commerce and Police, National Archives.

% . P . C . , 1901, 1, 13-14.

54 55

Prior to Golache's emergence as the outstanding ladron in Sorsogon Province, he had served in the Spanish Army as an enlisted man. During the insurrection against the

United States he had served as an officer and in 19OI be­ came one of de la Cruz's top lieutenants in Sorsogon.

Golache had surrendered to the 47th Infantry and, as re­ quired, took his oath of allegiance to the United States, lie then attempted to retire to a small barrio and entered into the hemp business, but unfortunately, he was unsuc­ cessful. Then, like so many incipient barbarians, Golache simply took to the hills and began to organize a band.

Under Golache's leadership, his band gradually in­ creased in numbers and established their headquarters deep in the almost inaccessible mountain regions of Sorsogon

Province. Prom his post he began to direct his outlaw band in their life of brigandage, robbery, intimidation, and murder. Their victims were.usually the more prosperous and peacefully inclined townsmen and coastal people who had re­ nounced violence and resistance to the American rule and were % attempting to resume something bordering on a normal life.

^Ibid, 1902, I, 206. It should Is noted here that occasion­ ally the District Directors of the Constabulary inserted long quotes from their Senior Inspectors of the various provinces if a given campaign was considered particularly significant. This is especially important considering that the official Constabulary records were either lost or destroyed (cont) 56

Golache’s first serions attack occurred on March $0,

1902, when he led his hand to the toivn of Bulusan on the

eastern coast of Sorsogon Province. Here he succeeded in

capturing and then murdering a number of the municipal police of this town. Once this information had been passed

on to the Constabulary authorities, the Senior Inspector,

Harvey P. Hevill, immediately dispatched Inspector Swann

with 3. detachment of twenty enlisted men to search the

area for the outlaw band. After several days of scouring

the hills, Swann concluded that the entire eastern coast

was, in fact, either overtly or covertly, allied with

IL Golache's band.

Swann immediately sent a detachment of five enlisted

men to notify his superiors at the barrio of San Vicinite

of the extent of Golache's so-called Anting-Anting move­

ment. The message was delivered but on the return trip,

this detachment was attacked by Golache and his band of

^ ^ ^during World War II, Fortunately the Golache campaign was considered worthy of this coverage. Thus the narrative of this paper closely follows the official reports.

^E.P.G., I, 206-207= 57 about 100 strong. It was a traditional atnbush in which the outlaws had concealed themselves in a low ravine, heavily covered with foliage until the Constabulary patrol passed between them. This detachment was directed by

Second Class Private Ambrosio Pruto. Initially Pruto made several desperate attempts to extricate his men from their very precarious position,, but soon he and two of his comrades were cut down by the fanatical bolomen. The two surviving Constables, however, managed to fight their way to the road which ran parallel to the cliff overlooking the sea. Their only hope was to attempt a desperate plun^into the water. They succeeded and swam their way into the open sea and were picked up by friendly fishermen.^

Within hours after learning of these developments, Lt.

Swann, with a detachment of ten men, set out to recover the bodies of his fallen comrades. When they arrived at the scene, they found only pieces of flesh and bone, bearing mute record of the awful fate of their former companions in arms.

It was reported in the local newspaper end later confirmed by official reports, that the bodies of Pruto and his two compan­ ions had been horribly mutilated. Their eyes had been gouged- . cut

^Ibid; also see Manila Times, April 9, 19C2, 1. 58 with sticks, and then they were laid on hot sands with the sun heating into their eyeless sockets. The fanatics com­ pleted their task hy hacking them into small pieces. The bodies were picked up in sheets and huried at Bulusan.^

When the Senior Inspector Nevill received this report, he immediately left for Bulusan with twenty enlisted men and arrived there on the yth of April. During the following two months Wevill conducted a determined campaign against

Golache's hand. In his own words,

'From the 5th of April I waged a relentless warfare against Golache and his hord (sic) with the confidence that I would ultimately hring ahout his capture or his death. ‘

Wevill remained in the immediate vicinity for ahout a week before concluding that it would take more than his small

Gonstahulary force to conclude this campaign successfully.

Therefore, he withdrew to the capital city of Sorsogon where he conferred with the Governor and planned a systematic campaign to annihilate the fanatics. At this time, Golache had approximately 4-00 men in his force, in addition to the sympathy of most of the natives living on the eastern coast.'

^Ihid; R.P.G., 1902, I, 20?.

^E.P.G., 1902, I, 207. 59

Governor Monreal and Nevill agreed on the following

overall strategy. First, they were to raise a large force

of native volunteers, arm them and use them to supplement

the Constabulary force. The volunteers would be used primar­

ily to establish a cordon around the most infected areas.

Within that zone all work would be suspended and the natives

would be compelled to relocate in larger towns and barrios

outside this infested area. Then the Constabulary would

operate within this area, assisted by additional volunteers.

This was obviously an effort to prevent the scattering of the

ladrones and to cut them off from their supply of food and O reinforcements.

The volunteers were raised in each municipality at the

request of the Governor and were under the immediate super­ vision of the tovm presidents. By the 15th of April nearly

five hundred volunteers had been raised, armed and organized.

On the following day several cordons were established for

the purpose of attempting to maneuver the ladrones into the desired position. By the 19th of April, the cordon was per­

fected and the real work of hunting the ladroœs began.

During this period Colache had occupied several deserted barrios. But, whenever the combined forces of the Con-

^Ibid, 208. 60 stabulary and the volunteers approached an occupied barrio or town, the ladrones in typical guerrilla fashion abandoned their position without a fight. Nonetheless, they still re­ presented a formidable adversary in the field and continued plundering and terrorizing a large section of the area of the province.^

At noon on the 21st of April, while Lt. Swann, with a mixed force of 165 Constables and volunteers were taking a break near the barrio of Santa Barbara, some 150 bolomen under Golache's direction began a fanatical attack. After the first volley the volunteers began to panic. A complete rout was prevented only by the disciplined action of Lt.

Swarm and his Constabulary who quickly formed a skirmish line and returned fine. When the ladrones observed the initial wavering of the government line they prepared an allout assault. Fortunately, the Constabulary stemmed the bulk of their attack with Swann himself firing his Krag with devastating accuracy. The volunteers, encouraged by this stand, rallied and assisted in the defense of their position. The ladrones, surprised by this unexpected re­ sistance, fled from the field, leaving four killed and six wounded.

^Ibidc ^%anila Times, April 26, 1902, 1: R.P.C. , 1902, I, 208. 61

The fight near Santa Barbara proved to be the turning point in the campaign. Prom this time on, Nevill pressured

Colache increasingly and gradually depleted his forces by keeping numerous Constabulary and volunteer patrols con­

stantly scouring the field while others were left to, guard the towns. There was a shortage of American officers and,

as a result, Nevill detailed authority to command volunteer units to several deserving présidentes. Late in April

Nevill received Constabulary reinforcements from nearby provinces and from the 27th until the completion of the

campaign, he kept from four to six columns constantly in

the field.

In order to supply these cordons Nevill established

small supply stations within easy marching distance of the

field force. On May 4, Lt. Swann surprised Colache in his camp and routed a force of thirty men, and captured all

of Colache's personal papers. After this, the ladron

force rapidly deteriorated and lost all resemblance of an

effective organization. With the papers captured by Swann.,

Nevill arrested ninety-three of Colache's supporters in

the town of Bulusan and fifty others in various parts of

the province.

l^Ibid, 209o 62

In the first week of May, large numbers of this band began surrendering in groups of from three to fifteen each.

During this period Nevill received reinforcements for the final clean-up of the province. On May 11, the volunteers units which had established cordons across the northern and southern sections of the province were ordered to advance in order to tighten the net. On the 15th, a general forward movement was ordered since, by that time, the ladrones were no longer operating in large groups but were hiding out in­ dividually in the bushes and in the hemp fields. This general movement toward the center ended on the 18th. The area was cleared but few ladrones were actually captured.

Nonetheless, it demonstrated, the overwhelming power of the government forces.

Many minor skirmishes' followed but on the 19th Nevill captured most of Colache's band, including a great number of his officers. At this time, Nevill estimated that

Golache's force consisted of only five men besides himself.

As a result Nevill decided to disband the volunteers and bring about the final capture of Colache by the use of 12 Constabulary spies. This was financially expedient because

1 2 ■ One of the more important component parts of the Constabu­ lary was the Division of Information which was essentially the espionage branch of the corps. This division consisted of a superintendent with the rank of It. Colonel and equal in pay and other privileges with the Assistant Directors of the (cont) 63 the volunteers were paid by the civil government, and, of course, their services were no longer absolutely necessary.

On May 23 Constabulary secret agents were sent out to locate

Colache's new camp. On the 24-th, Colache’s camp was dis­ covered but the spies reported that it would have to be taken before the next morning as Colache was planning to move. The camp was struck at 3:00 A.M. and all captured, 15 including their notorious leader.

The campaign against Colache lasted fifty-six days for the Constabulary, thirty-eight for the volunteers.

The combined forces took nearly 250 prisoners in the field and succeeded in killing fifteen, as well as wounding an equal number. But unfortunately, only eight weapons or guns were captured. This, in itself, was

(Co 'Constabulary and several inspectors, detectives and clerks. The Division of Information hired spies to in­ filtrate outlaw bands and not infrequently to assassinate their leaders. Unquestionably these spies contributed heavily in tracking down certain criminals. But it was highly unpopular with the natives and contributed greatly towards the unsavory reputation of this corps during its first few years of existance. One of the major objectives of the native press was the élimination of this branch, (See Act 264- in Acts of the Philippine Commission, No. 264-424; Act 429, Ibid, No. 423-949: Act 1?89, Ibid, No. 1539-1800: R.P.C., 1901, II, 386: Ibid, 1902, I, 220. Nor a highly critical account of this branch see Henry Parker Willis, Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial Policy, New York, 'l'905, 145-146. i l^R.P.C., 1902, I, 210: Manila Times, May 28, 1902, 1: Ibid, June 15, 1902, 1. 54 noteworthy since it was the practice of ladrones to hury their weapons when either surrendering or facing capture so if the opportunity later arose, they could retrieve their guns and resume their former activities

Colache and about 200 of his men were put on trial in the Court of First Instance. As was to be the case, only the leaders were fully prosecuted while their more ignorant followers were released once they had the oath of allegiance fully explained to them. With the destruction of this band, the pacification of Sorsogon Province was completed. To be sure, during the following years numerous minor bands IS arose, but none reached the proportion of the Colache

"Petty Insurrection." After this the people were permitted to leave the reconcentrated areas, return to their barrios and peaceful pursuits. Once again, the Constabulary force had proved more than adequate in maintaining law and order.

Approximately 100 miles north of Sorsogon Province lies the province of Tayabas which stretches along

^^Ibid.

^^Elarth, loc. cit., 27< iGa.p.o., I, 210. 65 the eastern coast for nearly 200 miles. During the in­ surrection itself 5 layahas Province proved a major stumbling block in the pacification of central Luzon.

But Bell's energetic campaign had destroyed the insurgent forces and layabas Province was one of the first turned over to the civil authorities in the summer of 1901.^^

Yet conditions remained unstable and it required several additional years of active campaigning before this province was, in fact, truly pacified.

The most prominent leader of the dissatisfied natives was Ruperto Rios. Rios, like most ladron leaders, was active in the insurrection and served as an officer in the

Philippine Army. But unlike most, he refused to surrender and take the oath of allegiance to the United States and instead took to the hills and began to organize a formid­ able, semi-religious band of outlaws. Rios, who claimed to be a prophet, proved to be the leader of one of the most fanatical and criminal bands in all the Philippine Islands,

After a serious engagement in November, 1901 with the combined forces of the Constabulary and the regular army,

^^Ibid, 1901, I, 13-14,

^-^Ibid, 1903, III, 100: New York Times, Nay 2, 1903, 8, 66

Rios' band pulled the famous "lightning change act". This meant that they buried their weapons, changed their clothes, and then appeared as "amigos??; ' until the opportunity later arose for them to renew their plundering of the native popu­ lation.^^

For the next year, Rios remained in the hills of Tayabas and completed the organization of his fanatical movement.

He successfully recruited a large following and encouraged his converts by lavishingly distributing commissions in his army. He eventually appointed one Captain-General, one Lt.-

General, twenty-five Major Generals, and no less than sixty

Brig, Generals as well as a host of other officers of lesser grades. So well did he succeed in this organization that he also established an exterior municipal government with elaborate equipment and officials. In appreciation of his own ability, he appointed himself "Generalissimo" and

"Viceroy" and stated his intention of having himself crowned

"King of the Philippines". Earthly titles not proving sufficient he then announced himself to be the "Son of God" 20 and began dispensing "anting-antings" which were guaranteed

^%anila Times, November 26, 1901, 1,

20 Anting-Antings were commonly used by ladrones. They varied at times but might be little more than a piece of paper, or glass worn around the neck. 67

PI to make the wearer invulnérable to bullets and attack.

By September of 1902, Rios had assembled a personal following of nearly 200 bolomen in addition to some thirty guns. Also, throughout the province he had an undeter­ mined number of sympathetic followers who willingly supplied him with food and equipment and provided him with an almost inexhaustible reserve. The Constabulary, under

Senior Inspector Smith, began to receive intelligence in­ formation of this extensive operation. In September,

Smith himself rounded up about yoo men who had been

. ssisting Rios and supplying him with the necessities of o-ife. Those natives who did not cooperate with Rios were terrorized and not infrequently simply murdered, For example,

Rios with his entire band, attacked the tovm of Lajumanoc be­ cause its inhabitants refused to contribute to his treasury.

In this raid his band wantonly killed several women and girls, in addition to wounding a number of men. The residents of this town sent for assistance and a detachment of Constabu­ lary was rushed in. Fortunately, they arrived in time, opened fire, killed several of the band, and drove the ladrones from 22 the town before they could do any more damage,

Z^R.P.C., 1905, III, 100. ^%anila Times, September 6, 1902, 1, 68

Following this. Senior Inspector Smith increased his pressure and constantly pursued the tulisanes, as the ladrones in this area were commonly called. On one

expedition, Smith hiked in the field for twelve days south of Lucena. During this expedition, he had four fights with

the hand, captured twenty-five, killed eighteen and con­ fiscated a dozen rifles and thirty holes. He also destroyed

four outlaw barracks and most of Rios' papers, which later proved incriminating evidence when he was brought to trial.

After this expedition. Smith reported that the hand was pretty well broken up, although he felt that Rios, himself, would never surrender due to his long list of crimes which would 25 render him ineligible for any type of amnesty.

Smith also reported engagements on the 14th and 19th

of September in which he killed four and captured four, in­

cluding one of Rios' captains who was killed. He perhaps

over-optimistically reported that in his opinion the area

was quickly approaching peaceful conditions and that the

people were returning to their agricultural pursuits. His

campaign did, in fact, almost destroy Rios' quasi-government

as most of his officers were either captured or so disillu­

sioned that they willingly surrendered. But Rios himself ronained

^^Ibid, September 15, 1902, 1. 69 out and was forced to flee to a nearby island in order to

OIL escape the determined Constabulary.

During this campaign the Constabulary obtained valu­ able information in tracking down these bands, in addition to becoming familiar with the tactics they used. For example, Smith reported that he had received several offers from the leading ladron chiefs to surrender with guns with the understanding that there would be a temporary truce to arrange these negotiations. But past experience had con­ vinced Smith that the ladrones merely used a truce to re­ cruit and to reorganize their forces. He therefore informed his superiors of his determination to completely disperse or destroy the band. As a result. Smith prepared an expedi- 25 tion to Rios* island retreat on Calbalete.

In mid-October Governor of Tayabas Province, H. H,

Bandholtz, who later rose to become Chief of the Constabu­ lary, returned from Manila where he had obtained use of the much needed launch, The Rover. It was also during October that the Constabulary *s campaign north of Lucena reached a climax with the forced surrender of Destajo, one of the lesser known chiefs, near Mauban.^^ By mid-October only

^^Ibid, September 24-, 1902, 1< Z^Ibid ^^Ibid, October 19? 1902, 1. 70

Rios himself remained -unaccounted for and it was reported that he had only a few followers and three guns under his immediate command. Following Smith's successful campaign, conditions greatly improved throughout the province and it was reported that the natives were making considerable progress in the fields of agriculture and that new in­ dustries and educational facilities were being introduced 27 in the province. '

That the Constabulary needed adequate water trans­ portation was abundantly made clear in the Rios campaign.

This was due to the necessity of policing the province with nearly 500 miles of coast in addition to the necessity of actually tracking down ladrones who not infrequently took to the water in an attempt to escape the civil authorities.

For example, in late October Inspector Herrera of the

Constabulary succeeded in capturing Versatigue, one of

Rios':, most infamous lieutenants, after conducting a month­ long campaign. During this month-long expedition, Herrera and his small force disguised themselves as ladrones and gradually reduced the band to only several rifles,

Versatigue, accompanied by his family and a few soldiers, attempted to flee Tayabas in a large sailboat, Herrera 27ibid. 71 pursued the outlaws in a similar craft, overtook them and after a brief fight, captured the entire party. In the exchange Versatigue was mortally wounded. He had for some time contributed heavily toward the turmoil in Tayabas but in the past, when pursued, had always managed to escape to the Island of Marinduque where he had succeeded in eluding the Constabulary. That was until Inspector Herrera had PR launched his determined and successful campaign.

During Smith's active campaign against Rios, it was once again judged necessary to reconcentrate large sections of this native population. This was done in conjunction with Governor Bandholtz of that province. But unlike the reconcentration as developed by General Bell during the actual insurrection, the civil government persuaded the natives to comply voluntarily.

Inspector Smith, in a lengthy report to headquarters, outlined the method by which he convinced the natives that it was to their advantage to consent willingly to recon- centration.For example, Smith would go into a village suspected of aiding the ladrones either willingly or by compulsion, and lecture them as to the defects of such aid.

2®Ibid, October 28, 1902, 1.

^^R.P.Co, 1 902 , I, 33: This long report was thoroughly covered by the Manila Times on December 25, 1902, 1. 72

clearly pointing out that they would be eventually caught

and forced to pay for this assistance. All this was done

in a straightforward manner, almost as though he was talking

shoulder to shoulder as he explained the absolute necessity

of reconcentration. He explained to the villagers the diffi­

culty that the Constabulary encountered insofar as distinguish­

ing between the friendly natives and the actual ladrones.

Thus, he argued it was necessary to adopt this policy.

Then, Smith would put the question directly to the leaders

of the vills^e and ask them if they would cooperate in re­

locating the peaceful natives within the prescribed zones.

Once the governments position was fully understood, the local

leaders invariably cooperated. Thus Smith concluded;

"It really became concentration of Filipinos and by Filipinos against Filipinos."^

In this respect the civil authorities had gone far to perfect

the system of reconcentration which had been developed by the military authorities.

The civil government's reconcentration policies were

successful. The Senior Inspector of Tayabas reported in

late December of 1902 that he observed a remarkable change

in the attitude of the natives during the past eight months

^^Ibid, 73 that he had been in command. When Smith first arrived the natives had been quite hostile to the government and noticeably sympathetic with the outlaws. But the judicious and wise policies as carried out by the Constabulary had convinced the natives that the civil administration was dedicated to a policy of protecting them from exploitation.

Once this was done, Smith noted a remarkable transition in their attitude towards the government and the people began to willingly cooperate in the elimination of ladronism."^

In January of 1903 ? Captain Robert B. Murphy assumed the position as Senior Inspector of Tayabas Province. It was this determined officer who directed the final campaign against Rios. There was considerable action in the month of January; for example, on January 6, a Constabulary detach­ ment clashed with Rios' band and captured one Captain and several enlisted men. On January 10, a Lt. Colonel, and four enlisted men, and a number of spears and bolos, in­ cluding four wooden guns were captured. The following day one Commandant, Juan Par, one Lt, Colonel, and twelve en­ listed men were also captured.

Captain Murphy continued his campaign throughout

January and February. On March 8 , 1903, he made one of the

5^Ibid.

^%anila Times, January 23, 1903, !• 74 most spectacular discoveries in the annals of Constabulary history. On this day near the town of Infanta, Murphy captured many documents of the Eios movement. Among these was a box with the word "Independencia" painted on the top.

The followers of Rios solemnly believed that when they had proved themselves worthy Eios would open this box and they would then obtain the mysterious something called inde­ pendence for which they had so long been fighting. Rios had explained to his followers that independence would produce a utopian society in which no one would be required to labor or pay taxes and that there would be no jails and no Constabulary to disturb their activities. Rios told his followers the box would only be opened when they proved themselves worthy and in this way spurred his band on during their difficult days.^^

By the spring of 1905 the campaign against Rios became so intense that he was compelled to leave Tayabas Province and enter into nearby Laguna Province.^ When Rios entered

Laguna Province he was, in fact, a defeated man. Por three months prior to this he and his small party had been compelled to live on wild fruit as no other food was available. It was reported that this motley group was completely deteriorated,

^^R.P.G., 1903, III, 100.

^^anila Times, March 11, 1903, 1< 75 filthy and diseased, a pitiful sight for the once proud

General Rios. He had, no doubt, hoped that he might recruit new followers in Laguna Province but here he was bitterly disappointed. Por, not only were the people unreceptive toward his advances, but the natives of the provinces of

San Antonio and Paete actually conspired with the civil authorities in order to bring about his final capture. These people invited Rios into their town under the pretense of being sympathetic with them only to disarm the entire band and turn them over to the Constabulary, under Captain U. S.

Grove. The people acted in this manner because they knew only too well that Rios and his band had terrorized their neighbors to the east for many, many months.

In May of 190$, Rios and his band were placed on trial before the Court of First Instance and all found guilty of murder and sentenced to die. And so it was, in early

December of 1903» this former blacksmith who had been successful in organizing a minor uprising was hanged at

Alimonan.^*^ With his passing peace finally came to Tayabas

Province. The Director of the Second District of the Con­ stabulary forces was able to report in his 1904 annual

^^Ibid, May 4, 1903, 1: Ibid, June 1, 1903, 1=

5&ibid.

^^R.P.C., 1903, III, see Allen's Supplemental Report dated December 23, 1903, 140. 75

sumraary to the Chief of the Constabulary .that the entire district, including, of course, Tayabas, was the quietest in its entire history.

Southwest of Tayabas lies Mindoro, one of the larger islands in the Philippine Archipelago, This island is approximately 100 miles long and some fifty miles wide and lies due south of Manila Bay. Throughout the seventeen years covered by this study Mindoro was a very peaceful island. Its inhabitants were relatively poor with large numbers of wild tribemen living in the mountainous regions in the interior.There appeared only one serious threat to the peace of this island and this was the result of the

emergence of the ambitious Valeriano Casio.

In February, 1903? with a relatively large force of

some 100 well-armed outlaws, Casio led an attack on the

Constabulary in the town of Maujan. A desperate close- range fight followed, which lasted for six hours and re­

sulted in the death of at least one Constabulary enlisted man, as well as several other casualties. The real tragedy

of this engagement, however, was the unintentional wounding

of twenty women and children who were innocent bystanders.

^^ibid, 1904, III, 87.

^^Worcester, loo, cit., I, 587> 77

Nonetheless, the Constabulary rallied and succeeded in driving the band to the outskirts of town where they dug in for an additional effort. Once the news reached Manila,

Coast Guard Gutter Luzon was immediately dispatched with

Constabulary reinforcements. This ship was also authorized to act as the supply carrier, as well as a dispatch boat if the telegraph wires were cut as it was expected.

Following this engagement a detachment of Scouts was dispatched to the island to supplement the small Constabu­ lary force. On July 19, 1903, Scouts under Lt. Holtman struck Gasic's camp and succeeded in killing twenty in addition to capturing some ten guns."^^ The Constabulary of the island, under the overall direction of the Senior In­ spector, the famous Captain H„ 0. Fletcher, conducted numerous patrols in an effort to locate Gasic's main camp.

In early-November,under the immediate leadership of Con­ stabulary Lt. Gilheuser, a trap was laid for Gasic and his band. It was sprung successfully on November 11 and

Gilheuser captured Gasic, most of his followers and nineteen guns. The Director of the Second District of the Constabulary forces was therefore able to report in his annual summary to the chief that the capture of Gasic

^Manila Times, February 12, 1903, 1: New York Tribune, February 13, 1903, 2. ^^E.F.C., 1903, III, Allen's Supplemental Report dated December 23, 1903; 140. 78

4-2 proved to be "the death blow of bandolerismo»"

There is an interesting footnote to the Gasic campaign which is somewhat indicative of the skills which the Con­

stabulary was compelled to develop before it could effective­

ly eliminate ladronism. It was during this period that the high authorities realized that a band operating in the interior usually had a number of sympathizers in the towns themselves. It was from these individuals, who usually disposed of the stolen goods for the ladrones, that the bands received vital supplies and information. There­ fore after the capture of Gasic, the Constabulary of

Mindoro continued its efforts until it had sought out his accomplices in the larger towns. In this effort, they proved successful and in the latter part of this year, several influential citizens were brought to trial, found guilty and appropriately sentenced. With the completion of 4-5 this campaign peace came to the island of Mindoro.

^'^Ibid, 1904-, III, 85: Manila Times, November 15, 190$, 1,

^^Xbid, November 21,1905, 1. CHiPTEE IV

THE OLA-TOLEDO UPRISING; 1902 - 1903

Important as were the Colache-Rios-Gasic Campaigns in themselves, their extent and magnitude is dwarfed, at least in the Second District of Southern Luzon, by the Ola-Toledo

Uprising of 1902-1905° Simeon Ola was a native of Albay

Province. He had served as a major in the insurgent army and had surrendered in July of I9OI, but shortly after took to the hills and began to organize a band of ladrones.

Similarly, Lazaro Toledo also served as a major in the in­ surgent army, surrendered in July of I9OI, only to become a ladron leader.^

The seat of trouble in the Albay Province was in the section extending along the main road reaching from Albay to the town of Libon. In this area, the total native p population was approximately 150,000. Operating within this area there were at least two separately organized and distinct bands under the leadership of Simeon Ola and

Lazaro Toledo.^ Ola was clearly recognized as the most

^R.P.C., 1905, 111, 9 1 = % b i d , 159.

^Ibid, 1904-, III, 82.

79 80 prominent and outstanding bandit leader and was ably- assisted by bis lieutenants, especially Toledo. Under their overall direction, they controlled an armed force in excess of 1,500 men, with 150 gujis.

The origins of the Albay uprising are somewhat complex.

In addition to the chaotic conditions which existed through­ out the Archipelago, Albay was plagued by other divisions.

For example, while Ola was serving in the insurgent army, he deliberately burned the house of one of his political enemies. When the insurrection was over, this individual became the présidente of the important town of Guinobatan and used his position in an attempt to obtain vengeance against Ola. As a result, Ola took to the woods and began to organize his band of disillusioned natives. Shortly after this Toledo was released from jail. He proceeded to recover a number of guns which he had previously buried and then joined Ola's movement, although to a certain extent he always remained independent.^

The first indication of a serious disturbance in Albay

Province, occurred on August 11, 1902, when Ola personally led his band in a raid on the town of Oas, on the boundary

Ibid, 85: Lettef to the Honorable J. C. Burrows, U, S. Senator from Michigan, from Bandholtz, April 14, 1904. Bandholtz MSS. 81 between the provinces of Albay and Ambos Gamarineso The band entered Oas shortly after the dinner hour and proceeded to disarm the municipal police who offered no resistance.

The outlaws obtained possession of four shotguns, three re­ volvers and an undetermined amount of ammunition.^ Six weeks later Ola with an armed force of fifty to seventy- five men attacked a small Constabulary detachment of eleven men, wounding two, and capturing six constables and seven rifles. That same afternoon, however, Lt. McLean, with another Constabulary detachment, overtook the band and killed two and captured three. Shortly after this,

Ola released his Constabulary captives and made good his escape. 6

During the early part of October, the government author­ ities opened negotiations with Simeon Ola in an attempt to induce him to surrender. For well over a month, conferences were held periodically while the hostilities were suspended.^

On one occasion the Chief of the Second District, Major

Jesse Garwood, responded favorably to Ola's invitation for a peace conference. Garwood agreed to proceed to Ola’s headquarters without escort and was led blindfolded for six

% . F . C . , 1903, III, 91.

^Ibid, 9 2 .

^Ibid. 82 hours deep into the hills before reaching Ola's camp.

When he finally emerged, he found himself surrounded by

1500 outlaws. For the next few hours Garwood attempted to convince Ola of the wisdom of surrender and charmed him with many stories while eating stewed grasshoppers with the bandit chief.^

Ola agreed to surrender but it was all a ruse, for he had no intentions at this time of abandoning his life as a ladron chief. It appears that Ola's main purpose in calling this conference was to obtain a temporary truce so that he might continue to organize his band.

He also felt that he would derive considerable propaganda advantage from having a Constabulary chief visit his camp.

This was considered tantamount to recognition by the

Americans and as a result Ola's effort to obtain addi­ tional recruits was considerably enhanced. As a gesture toward Garwood's bravery, Ola permitted him to return to safety. Nonetheless Ola broke off negotiations in

November, 1902 and withdrew to the hills with his enlarged force. Less than two weeks later the Senior Inspector of

Albay, Captain Harvey P. Nevill, struck the outlaws under

^Elarth, loc. cit. , 29-50: Hurley, loc. cit., 148: Manila Times, August 7, I905, 1. 83

the immediate command of Toledo and killed two.^

For the next two months a number of minor engagements

developed» For example, on January 5, I903, native volunteers

from the town of Camalig succeeded in capturing two of

Toledo's men. Less than a week later, however, Toledo

successfully raided the town of Pilar where he disarmed the municipal police and robbed the local citizens. Then, on

January 15, Toledo extracted contributions from the resident?

of the pueblo of Jovellar in the southern part of Albay

Province. But on January 27, a detachment of Constabulary, under a native n.c.o. encountered this band near Gabraran.

A sharp fight followed in which ten ladrones were killed and five wounded.

With this increasing activity in Albay Province, the authorities in Manila became increasingly concerned. So serious were conditions that the Assistant Chief of the

Constabulary, Major Garwood, met with the Governor of Albay

Province in an effort to plan a coordinated campaign to eliminate ladronism. Unfortunately, however, Governor

Betts dominated these conversations, and succeeded in per­ suading Major Garwood to adopt his own plan of pacification.

9p.p.c., 1903, III, 92. ^^Ibid, 93. 84

Once this was done, the Governor left the province for

over a month to attend a conference of provincial governors

in Manila»

Without the presence of the Governor, Garwood was not

ahle to suppress ladrones in this area. Nonetheless, in

order to increase the effectiveness of his force, Garwood

did request that the civil authorities authorize additional

weapons and other equipment in order to arm volunteer units.

Major Garwood also suggested that it would he desirable to

send detachments of the Philippine Scouts to supplement his 12 force.

While Garwood was attempting to organize his campaign.

Captain Harrison 0. Fletcher of the Constabulary was visit­

ing this province in order to testify in the mutiny trial

of the crew of the Dos Hermanos. This heroic officer had

unquestionably accomplished one of the most spectacular

captures in the annals of Philippine history. In August of

1902; while he was in command of the Constabulary at the

port of Virac in Albay Province, Fletcher heard a commotion

on board the ship Dos Hermanos. He immediately took a

small boat with but two men in order to investigate. As

he approached the ship, he found the mutinous crew had

gained possession of the ship after killing several of the

^^Manila Times, January 8, 190$, 1»

^^Ibid, January 10, 190$, 1. 85

crew and wounding a num.'ber of the passengers. Not dis-

"mayed hy his own small force, Fletcher boarded the ship,

killed two of the crew and captured thirty-four others.

Several months later, on January 7, I903, while riding

a bicycle on the road between Camalig and Guinobatan,

Fletcher was attacked by a ladron band of thirty outlaws.

The fight which followed is best described in Fletcher's

own words as he explained the developments in an interview with a correspondent from the Manila Times :

Well, it didn't amount to much. I jumped on my wheel one night about 9:00 o'clock and left Guinobatan for another pueblo, and had only gone a short distance, when thirty ladrones jumped me. I thought it was all off because four of them got in their work with their bolos before I could draw my weapons, but I turned loose on them and by the time I emptied my revolver and carbine they had all disappeared except five unfortunates who were lying dead on the ground. I c.aught one hoinbre and took him back with me as a souvenir.

In this fight, Fletcher had personally killed five, wounded an additional four and captured one while receiving three serious bolo wounds. Not dismayed, he returned to town only long enough to have his wounds dressed and then pursued the band with a detachment of Constabulary and killed

six more.Fletcher's feat was duly acknowledged half way

1 9 0 3 , III, 91-92: Manila Times, August 19, 1902, 1.

^^Tbid, January 26, 1903, 1 and January 16, I9 0 3 , 1. 1 q -^Ibid. 86

axo'imd the world when the hew York Times captioned one of 16 its articles "Bolomen Catch a Tartar."

Meanwhile Major Garwood proceeded with his less

spectacular hut infinitely more important campaign to

eliminate ladronism in Alhay Province, V/hile Fletcher

had engaged this hand in what is Icnown in Constabulary

annals as the "bicycle incident," Garwood had gone to Manila

seeking additional reinforcements. In late January he re­

turned with fifty-five hand-picked Constables to reinforce his command. While in Manila, he had been instructed by

the Chief of the Constabulary to take command personally

of field operations. Upon his return, therefore, Garwood

immediately began to reorganize the Constabulary and to recruit as many volunteers as he could properly arm and

control. It is noteworthy that by this time the ladrones had recognized the outstanding leadership of both Garwood

and Fletcher and paid them the ultimate tribute by offering 17 a reward for their heads.

The Ola-Toledo bands did not confine their plundering

strictly along provincial boundaries. For example, in

early February a detachment of Toledo's force moved south

^%ew York Times, January 17, 1903, 8.

^%anila Times, January 27, 1903, 1. 87

into Sorsogon Province. The Senior Inspector of Sorsogon,

Captain Linforth, received information that a small band was

headed for the town of Abucay. linforth, with ten Constables,

headed for Abucay and after a brief engagement managed to

capture two outlaws. He received no information as to the

location of the main body, but proceeded on his expedition

deeper into the surrounding hills. He located the band in

a small barrio and launched his attack, killing several of the

outpost guards. But as he continued up the hill towards the

center of their position, he came under heavy fire from all

sides from uniformed ladrones. Linforth, therefore, was

compelled to order the retreat but quickly found his way

blocked by a band of 1^0 ladrones. In the ensuing fight

several Constables were killed, but after a three-hour

engagement, the Constables managed to reach the town of

Pilar. Unknown to Linforth at the time, he had with only

ten Constables engaged the entire army of "General" Toledo which consisted of over 4-00 ladrones.

Before leaving the field, Linforth killed ten of

Toledo's band and wounded Captain Valerio, Toledo's second

^^Ibid, February 21, 190$, 1: New York Times, February 2$, 19ÜJ7"4-. “ 88

in commando Valerio had been shot by Sergeant Vidal who had served in the insurgent army with Toledoo While Toledo had become a ladron in the post-insurrection period, this native had entered the Constabulary and had risen to the rank of sergeant. During the fight Vidal shouted;

Toledo, do you know me? I know you well enough. Come down here with your macheteros yourself.

Toledo ignored this challenge and continued to urge his

bolomen to the attack. But as the fight progressed, Vidal managed to shoot Captain Valerio while he and Toledo were 19 attempting to rally their men.

Several weeks later on February 28, 1903, a band of

150 ladrones under the immediate leadership of Magno

Eagel, one of Toledo's lieutenants, attacked the Constabu­

lary garrison at Oas. This raid netted the outlaws

forty-eight rifles and 1600 rounds of ammunition, and

represented one of the most serious Constabulary defeats

in the history of that corps. It was a complete victory

for the ladrones who quietly slipped into the town square

and mingled with the people who were crowded on the plaza.

The Constabulary headquarters was located on one side of

this public square and as a result, the ladrones were able

to drift towards that position without alarming the author­

ities. At the given signal, they merely dashed up the

1903, III, 99. 89

steps and into the euartel. They moved so quickly and

quietly that most of the garrison never fully realized

their predicament until they observed these strange men

at the Constabulary arms racks.

A brief scuffle ensued as ten Constables attempted to

wrestle the weapons from the intruders but they soon were

overpowered. During the fight twenty volunteers that had

been attached to the Constabulary unit began to assist the

ladrones. The traitorous conduct of the volunteers. proved

to be of great assistance in making the capture possible.

It was later determined that most of the volunteers had,

in fact, been a part of this conspiracy.

While the fighting was going on, Lt, Buenaventura

happened to ride into town. Seeing the crowd in front of

the cuartel, he immediately rushed through the ladron cordon

and reached the steps of the building before realizing that

the post was in the hands of the enemy. Leaping from his

horse, he penetrated the circle and ran around to the end

of the building where he attempted to enter by a window

only to be met by a mob of bolomen. He then retired to a protective wall some seventy-five yards away and began

firing his revolver, but the ladrones had already accom- 20 plished their mission, and thus retired with their loot. on ^^Ibid, 93-94: Manila Times, March 4, 1903, 1. 90

In this melee several Constables were killed and fifteen captured* Upon hearing the news in Manila, the

Chief of the Constabulary requested that General Davis release two companies of Philippine Scouts to bolster 21 the Constabulary in Albay Province*

Several days before the raid on Oas, Its* Simmer and

Scott took a large detachment of Constabulary and located the camp of the notorious ladron leader of Albay, Simeon Ola, in the center of Albay Province* Ola had selected his camp with care and felt that his band was safe from the author­ ities. He was surprised by Summer's attack and compelled to retire but not before ten of his 100 man force had been killed and another eight captured* The Constabulary, as was their practice, proceeded to destroy the site and large 22 quantities of clothing and rice.

To cope with these disturbances, three companies of

Philippine Scouts were sent into Albay Province in March of 1903* In addition Colonel D* J* Baker, Jr* was sent to take command of the overall campaign. Colonel Baker held a commission in the regular army of the United States and, therefore, according to the Act of Congress of January $0,

1903, was authorized to command the units of the Philippine

^^Ibid: New York Tribune, March 4, 19035 3° ^%anila Times, March 2, I903, 1, 91

Scouts if they were properly detached to the civil author­ ities.

During the early part of March, Col. Baker directed the redeployment of his troops and began making prepara­ tions for an extensive campaign. In order to free more

Constabulary units for actual field operations, Baker used the Scouts, under his command, to garrison the towns. He also strengthened the weaker Constabulary posts and garrisons throughout Albay so that they might be defensible while larger units of government forces plunged deeper into the hills in order to pursue the enemy. On March 18, Lt.

John R. Corfield, with a detachment of forty Constables, struck Toledo's band, which numbered about fifty guns and an undetermined number of bolomen in the barrio of Panoris on the Jovellar River. In this engagement, five ladrones

OIL were killed but there were no Constabulary casualties.

This small victory was soon avenged by the bandits.

On March 21, Captain Prank Linforth, along with Lts.

Grossman and Paucett, with a detachment of sixty-soldiers struck part of Toledo's band near the barrio of Buena

Vista. In this brief engagement, two ladrones were killed*

1903, III, 94.

Z^ibid. 92

"but Lto Grossman, was shot through the hip. He was rushed to the nearest hospital, arriving thirty hours after being wounded and died on May 13, 190$.^^

While Corfield, Linforth, Grossman, Paucett and other

Constabulary officers were actually operating in the field.

Colonel Baker was perfecting his plan for a decisive cam­ paign to crush the forces of Ola and Toledo. Baker con­ cluded that the most effective means of eliminating the source of the outlaw's supply of both men and material was to initiate once again a policy of reconcentrating the natives in the afflicted area. As a result, a zone was established which extended twenty-five miles north of the city of Albay and varied in width from eight to fifteen miles to the center of that province. Natives living out­ side this area, were relocated within the zone. According to Baker's strategy, once the natives had been relocated, large government detachments would scour the area on both sides of this zone. Following this the sweeps were to clear the area to the north of the zone and conclude with a sweep through the southern area. It was hoped in this way that the countryside could be completely pacified. The cam­ paign was expected to last four or five weeks and the soldiers Z^Ibid. 93

Pfi were supplied accordingly.

By early April, Baker’s plan was in full swing. He had approximately gOO troops under his command, and kept the hands constantly on the move with numerous patrols.

In the second week of April, it was reported that approxi­ mately 125,000 natives had been relocated within the pre­ scribed zone and that the outlaws were being starved into submission.

Yet despite this accumulation of government power, the ladrones were still exceptionally powerful. In early,

April Ola led his force and raided the barrio of Buhi.

They terrorized the village, killed several natives, kidnapped four and burned thirty-two houses before a joint force of forty Constables and eighty Scouts drove

p o the band into the surrounding hills.

Thus by early summer it had become abundantly clear to the government authorities that Colonel Baker had not succeeded in his campaign. The Constabulary's chief trouble shooter, Colonel H. H. Bandholtz therefore was ordered to take command of the government troops. Bandholtz arrived in Albay Province in June of I905 and made a determined

^%anila Times, March 25, I905, 1<

27lbid, April 11, I9 0 5 , 1. 28n"Ibid, April 4, I905, 1, 94- effort to convince the natives that there was to he no major shift in strategy. Colonel Bandholtz was well aware of the necessity to convince the natives that the govern­ ment's policy was not a vacillating one.^^

Nonetheless, it was obvious to Bandholtz that circum­ stances demanded a modification of Baker's strategy. One of his first actions was to disarm all the volunteer units.

Bandholtz felt this was justified because the volunteers were notoriously wasteful of ammunition and not always completely loyal to the government. This latter premise is well substantiated by the treachery of the volunteers during Ola's raid on Oas.^^

With reference to Baker's decision to reconcentrate large numbers of natives in a prescribed zone, Bandholtz agreed wholeheartedly that circumstances dictated the vital necessity of this move. Reconeentrâtion was always very controversial and Colonel Bandholtz took every precaution to convince the natives and even the citizens of the United

States of the wisdom and necessity of this policy. He argued that reconcentration in Albay had no resemblance to the severe policies which had been adopted by the military

Z^R.P.C., 1904-, III, 83: Manila Times, May 1$, 1903, 1.

5°R.P.C., 1903, III, 138. 95

during the actual insurrection itself. Those compelled to relocate were treated humanely and given adequate food and medical attention. There was no wanton slaughter of defense­ less women and children found outside the zone. And the moment Ola surrendered, orders were issued to permit the people to leave the reconcentrated area and return to their homes. Reconcentration was justified and contributed substantially towards the ultimate pacification of Albay

Province.

On July 15, 1905, a decisive engagement took place in the town of Jovellar, This town was garrisoned by a de­ tachment of twenty-five soldiers of the 31st Company of the Philippine Scouts and under the command of a native n.c.o. Ola with 250 bolomen attacked at noon but they were met by a most obstinate and gallant defense. The natives' sergeant, Nicolas Napolis, used his skill and in­ telligence to prevent a disaster. At one point in the battle, when the Scout's ammunition had been almost totally exhausted, he decided upon a ruse as the only means of saving the day. He sent several men to a nearby building with instructions to return with a few boxes of commissary supplies. Once this was done he began to shout taunts

^^Ibid, 5-6, 159: Ibid, 1904-, III, 82-83: Acts of the Philippine Commission, Acts 425 to 949, No. 781. 96 at the ladrones, pleading for them to launch another attack since he now had all the ammunition he needed.

fearing that boxes had contained ammunition the ladrones delayed their attack. Meanwhile, several Scout and Constabu­ lary detachments heard the firing and rushed to the town to relieve the besieged Scouts. It. Sutherland, with a detach­ ment of twenty-five Scouts, and Lt. Sommer, with an equal number of Constables drove the band from Jovellar. In this engagement, twenty-ladrones were killed and another thirty wounded, while the Scouts lost but one killed and two wounded.

;.fter the Jovellar fight, Bandholtz took advantage of the u^uioralized condition . of the ladrones. He ordered that the field detachments be decreased in strength so that the number of patrols might be increased. The object of this maneuver was to increase the pressure on the ladrones and, of course, compel them to surrender. This strategy proved effective and in the next few weeks large numbers of bolomen began surrendering, for example, at Guinobatan, nearly $00 bolomen airrendered to a detachment of the

Philippine Scouts.

^^R.P.C., 1903, III, 138: Manila Times, July 20, I903, 1, and December 17, 1903, 1 : hew York Tribune, July 22, I903, 1. 53R.P.C., 1903, III, 139. 97

During the month of August there were a number of

significant engagements. On August 4- a detachment of twenty-five Constables under Sergeant Japon was attacked by Ola and a force of 200 ladrones with fifty guns. The fight took place near Buena Vista, the spot where Lt.

Grossman had been mortally wounded. The fight lasted from 1:00 P.M. until midnight, Japon killed twenty- three ladrones and captured numerous documents, some of which shed considerable light on the Oas raid and the famous interview between Ola and Major Garwood. In addi­ tion it was reported that these documents contained sufficient information to guarantee the hanging of all principal leaders of this band.^^

The Ola-Toledo forces used traditional guerrilla war tactics. Colonel Bandholtz noted that the ladron chiefs used their bolomen most effectively. Usually the bolomen led the attack while on the offensive and at all times were deployed in such a manner as to afford maximum pro­ tection for the riflemen. This was obviously a measure to protect the more valuable riflemen and especially to prevent the loss of their guns. At any rate, Bandholtz's tactics proved effective and by the end of August, large

^'^Manila Times, August 7, 190$, 1. 98 lumbers of bolomen began to surrender. Those who did surrender usually were in an emaciated condition, many of them being covered with tropical ulcers as large as a man's fist.^^

During the heavy fighting in August, numerous Con­ stabulary detachments engaged in heavy skirmishes with the outlaws and killed no less than eighty-nine and captured many others. So successful had been the Con­ stabulary operations during this month that Colonel Band­ holtz concluded that the Jovellar fight, along with the

Constabulary's successes in the month of August, proved to be the turning point in the Ola-Toledo campaign. In

Colonel Bandholtz's own words:

After these successful engagements, it was practical­ ly impossible to force the ladrones to a fight at all. They were frequently surprised and many killed, wounded, and captured, but they did no more fighting worth mentioning.^

In early September, Colonel Bandholtz wired General

Allen that still another 100 bolomen had surrendered at

Guinobatan, while an additional twenty-five had surrendered at other posts. Bandholtz stated negotiations had been opened with several ladron leaders in an attempt to persuade

55%.p.p., 1 9 0 3 , III, 139: Ibid, 1 9 0 4 , III, 83-84.

5Gibid, 84. 99 them to surrender before they buried their guns. In this same telegram Colonel Bandholtz noted that Lt. liellermeyer had met a sub-chief named Pio Manta and his band on the 3rd of September and had killed five including Pio and cap­ tured' I three.

Toward the end of September, I903, Bandholtz deduced that "General’' Ola himself might be willing to negotiate a surrender as a result of his recent heavy losses. Accord­ ingly he selected a small party which was authorized to enter communication with Ola. But fearing that this outlaw leader might use the truce, as he did in November of 1902, merely to reorganize and re-supply his force, Bandholtz instructed his agents that Ola must surrender immediately or hostilities would continue. The result of this decision was reached on September 23, 1903 when General Ola and twenty-eight men with thirty-one guns surrendered to

Bandholtz at Guinobatan.^

^^Manila Times, September 10, 1903, 1= It should be noted that the Manila Times covered Constabulary campaigns rather extensively and not infrequently sent special correspondents into the field in order to obtain first hand information. The Times also assigned a reporter to cover Constabulary HQ to obtain the daily bulletins released by that office. These bulletins apparently included copies of telegrams received from field commanders as the Times regularly reprinted these reports in full. Considering the fact that the bulk of these official records were lost or destroyed by the Japanese during World War 11, the Times reproduction of these tele­ grams represents a vital link to early Constabulary activi­ ties. ^Gp.P.C., 1904, 111, 84. 100

With, justifiable pride, Colonel Bandholtz wrote the

United States Senator from his native state of Michigan and

outlined his accomplishments while he had been in command ; of the Albay campaign. Within four months he had suppressed this uprising, killed 250 ladrones, captured 200 rifles, and had personally received the surrender of General Ola and over 1500 of his followers.^

Colonel Bandholtz was exceedingly cautious in the terms which he had offered General Ola, knowing full well the political repercussions which might develop if any unsavory bargain vras struck. As a result, he authorized his agents

to inform General Ola that his surrender must be uncondition­

al , pledging only that Ola would not be summarily shot in

the public plaza and would receive a fair trial. After he

had surrendered, however, Qla agreed to use his influence

in an attempt to convince other outlaws of the necessity Zl-O of surrendering to the government forces.•

With the surrender of General Ola, Colonel Bandholtz wired General Allen in early October and stated, ’"This ends

the so-called Albay Insurrection." He further noted that

the natives were evacuating the reconcentrated zones.

^^Letter to the Honorable J, 0. Burrows, United States Senator from Michigan, from Bandholtz, April 15, 1904-, Bandholtz MSS.

^^Ibid: Manila limes, September 26, 1905, 1; October 6, 1905, 1 and January 10, I9O6, 1. Also see New York limes, September 27, 1905, 15» 101 returning to their homes,and that the restrictions on travel and traffic were also being removed. But Colonel Bandholtz pointed out that Toledo himself was still in the field with approximately twenty guns and that there would be no let­ up until the last gun in Albay Province had been accounted for.^^

Two months later, Colonel Toledo realizing the futility of further resistance surrendered to Colonel Bandholtz at h O Guinobatan. Following Toledo's surrender, the remaining ladrones, with a few exceptions, followed the advice of their leaders and turned themselves in to the government forces.

One of the more serious difficulties encountered by the Constabulary during this campaign, as well as all others, was the lack of adequate medical facilities to care for the wounded. Immediately following the insurrection period, the

Commanding General of the Philippine Division had recognized this problem and issued General Order Number 22, dated

January 30, 1902, which authorized that wounded Constables

'Telegram to Allen from Bandholtz, dated October 3th- 6th (sic) 1903, File No. 512984-, Record Group 94-, National Archives.

^^Manila Times, October 14-, 1903, 1. , 1905, III, 139. 102

might receive medical attention at military hospitals

iLh where no civil hospitals were availableo

But it was obvious to the civil authorities that if

the Constabulary were to be self-sufficient it must main­

tain its own medical facilities. As a result, the Philippine

Commission passed Act Number 595 which provided for the be­

ginning of a medical division for the Philippine Constabu­

lary by authorizing the appointment of three surgeons for

this corps. Captain J. M. Wheate was one of the first

medical officer appointees and was given the task of estab­

lishing an incipient medical corps.

During the Ola-Toledo campaign, Captain Wheate was

ordered to Albay Province in February of 1903 in order to

establish facilities to care for the anticipated casualties

which the government forces would incur in the suppression

of ladronism in that province. Wheate took a few supplies

and arrived in Albay in the latter part of February, I9 0 3 .

A few days later he received a telegram informing him of

,the attack on the garrison at Oas and of the wounding of a

number of Constables.

After hasty preparation, he proceeded to Oas with such

supplies as could be carried by himself and a single orderly.

^General Order No. 22, HQ, Division of the Philippines, United States Army, Jan. 30, 1902, File No. 1184, Record Group 350, National Archives. 10$

Upon his arrival, however, he found that the four wounded

Constables had been carried to the town of Guinobatan.

Finally, he overtook the party and described their plight.

They had been wounded at 7:$0 P.M. on the preceding day

and had received no surgical aid whatsoever until Captain

Wheate treated them although one comrade attempted to

stop the appalling flow of blood from one of the more

serious wounds by filling it with "carabao dejecta."

These wounded natives, after lying unattended during the night and the following morning, were placed in hammocks and carried through the afternoon nine or ten miles along the dusty road to Guinobatan where Captain v/heate found them in the late afternoon almost dead.

After dressing these wounds. Captain V/heate and his orderly began to set up an aid station in this town. Later in the month of March, 190$, Colonel Baker, then in command of the Albay campaign, instructed Captain Wheate to proceed to Manila where he was authorized to purchase supplies in order to equip a hospital with twenty to twenty-five beds.

This was done and with the heavy fighting it was soon filled to near capacity.

Captain Wheate soon recognized the obvious necessity of training hospital orderlies and was instrumental in the

establishment of a school to fulfill this purpose. Promising 104 natives were detached from the various stations within the

Second District for service at this hospital.

Some idea of local conditions is indicated by the fact that Captain Wheate, upon attempting to establish a medical hospital, took careful inventory of the scanty supplies available to him and found them shockingly inadequate. For example, the Second District which was at that time respon­ sible for some 2,000 government troops had but eighteen first-aid packets.

Nonetheless, a beginning was made and within a few weeks. Captain Wheate had established a hospital capable of caring for two dozen patients. This development typified the experience of medical officers in other provinces and well illustrates the tremendous handicap under which the

Constables were compelled to fight in the field, knowing full well that at best very limited medical facilities were available if they were to be wounded. In this respect, the

Constables were compelled to fight under conditions which were very similar to the United States Cavalry in the Far

West during the Indian Wars. In both of these areas, medi­ cal facilities were pitifully inadequate and the mortality rate of those wounded in the field was considerably higher

, 1903, III, 103-105, 105

than one might reasonably expect.

Regardless of these handicaps, the civil authorities

under the immediate leadership of Colonel Bandholtz did

complete the pacification of Albay Province. In November

of 1903 Governor Betts referred to the increasing prosperity

and the thriving agricultural enterprise throughout Albay

Province. More significant perhaps. Governor Betts stated

that in one week alone in November, some 7,000 laborers had been induced by high wages to enter Albay in order to work 45 in the hemp fields.

Several years later, Colonel Bandholtz, still in

command of the Second District, noted a complete change in

the attitude of the people in Albay Province who no longer willingly aided the outlaws. Once the natives were con­ vinced that the government could and would protect them from ladrones and thus enable them to cultivate, harvest

and sell their crops, the natives wholeheartedly cooperated with the government. Bandholtz noted that the Senior In­

spector of Albay Province had received no less than forty-

two notices in a single day with reference to the move- 47 ment of a single minor band.

^%an ila limes, November 19, 1903, 1<

47 R.P.O., 1903, III, 70-71. 106

The following year Colonel James G. Harbord, the

commander of the Second District, relieved all Scout

companies under his command, stating that they were no

longer needed. In his words:

The district is at this time tranquil... There is nothing in any province of thg district which at present threatens the peace.

Once again, the civil administration, under the

leadership of the Constabulary, had pacified an infested

area. With peace, the natives resumed their agricultural pursuits and prosperity returned to Albay Province.

4'Glbid, 1906, II, 242-247, CHAPTER V

SM MIGUEL'S "TOY REBELLION": 1902 - 190$

Throughout the entire Archipelago, during the period

I9OI-I9 1 7 , no other single area surpassed central Luzon in

the production of mal-contents, fanatical leaders, intrigues,

and rebellions against the authority of the United States,

This turbulent area was, in fact, the center of the resistance movement to American suzerainty. It was in the Manila area that the military forces conducted some of their most Vigorous

campaigns during the insurrection. It was also in this area

that General Bell conducted extensive operations for nearly

a year after the establishment of civil government. And, it was in this same area that the Constabulary found one of its most serious challenges to the maintenance of law and order.

The central Luzon provinces which comprised the Con­

stabulary First District, included Bataan, Bulacan, Lagmia,

Batangas, Rizal and Cavite, The natives were primarily

Tagalcgs and as such traditionally were prone to lawlessness,

intrigue, conspiracy, and violence. It was these very

characteristics which made these ignorant natives susceptible

to the numerous ladron leaders who emerged and played upon

their superstitions and prejudices by claiming to be genuine

107 108 insurgents, carrying out the will of God in order to,free the Philippines from the Americans

During the winter of I9OI and 1902, numerous hands began to organize in the Province of Eizali One such band was commanded by "Lt. Colonel" Timoteo Pasay. Other bands were organized by Julian Santos, "Colonel" Samson, Papa

Paustino Guillermo, and General Luciano San Miguel. As far as can be determined, the band of Pimoteo Pasay was one of the earlier ladron forces to be organized. It received the attention of the government forces and was put out of business before it could merge into the overall movement which later emerged under General San Miguel in the later part of 1902.

The only connection between Pasay and these other outlaw leaders was their proclaimed allegiance to the Mew Katipunan

Society. The original Katipunan Society had been established as an underground organization during the Spanish times to 2 precipitate a revolt against Spain.

Ip.P.C., 1902, I, 182-185o 2 The Katipunan Society claimed a membership of some 200,000 in 1896. After the defeat of the Spanish, an active core of this movement continued to lead in the resistance to American domination. It appears, however, that while all claimed allegiance to this organization, in most cases this was done simply because it was politically expedient to pose as genuine insurgents. See Hurley, loc. cit. , 120-12?: E.P.C., 190$, 111, 7 1 , 142: Ibid, 1902, 1, 185-186. 109

In comparison with the San Miguel-Guillermo Uprising

of 1902 and 1903 in Rizal Province, Pasay's depredations

might well he considered a relatively -unimportant develop­

ment. There were himdreds of minor ladron leaders only a

few of whom succeeded in organizing a force which seriously

challenged the ability of the civil government to maintain

law and order in any given area. But if Timoteo Pasay repre­

sented no major threat to the government, the combination of

several other bands operating within Rizal under the overall

leadership of General San Miguel, presented the Constabulary with one of its most serious challenges on the Island of

Luzon. ^

San Miguel's ultimate successor and chief lieutenant was

Paustino Guillermo. While Pasay was organizing his band

in southern Rizal, Guillermo supervised the consolidation

of the remnants of several gangs in northern Rizal and merged them into the substantial force called the Dili­ man Gang, Initially this gang preferred to confine its

activities to wholesale cattle stealing. Guillermo

established a network of thieves and in cooperation with z For considerable detail on Pasay's brief ladron career see: R.P.G., 1902, 1, 185; and especially the Manila Times, 1 of March 4-, 5 , 6 , June 1, 15, 17, 20 and 2?, 1902. 110 certain agents within the city of Manila itself, stolen cattle were brought from the outlying provinces into the city and sold on the open market. The ladrones received a portion of the profit but their Manila agents generally grabbed the bulk of the loot. The Constabulary sent numerous

secret service agents into the field in an unsuccessful effort to penetrate the band and bring the outlaws and their accomplices to justice. In this process, the detectives met with a heavy loss but did compel the gang to seek refuge

IL in the hills of northern Rizal. Guillermo then reorganized his men and under the naiae of the Mew katipunan which gave an air of respectability to the outlaws, Lt, Geronimo with a small

Constabulary detachment located Guillermo's camp and launched a determined but unsuccessful attack. Shortly after this

Geronimo's detachment was surprised by Guillermo who was ac­ companied by Samson and twenty-five ladrones. A lively exchange ensued and one Constable was killed and another seriously 5 wounded before the detachment escaped.^ After this engagement,

Geronimo wired the Acting Chief of the Constabulary,

^R.P.C., 1 9 0 2 , I, 185-186.

^Ibid, 1 9 0 5 , III, 71 and 185-186 Ill

Do Jo Baker, Jr., and requested sufficient reinforcements to pursue the ladrones. Geronimo suggested that 100 -

150 additional soldiers would be necessary to eliminate

Guillermo's band of an estimated fifty riflemen and an equal number of bolomen. Had Guillermo knovm that Geronimo had served as a General in the insurgent army and was in command of the insurgent forces which killed General Lawton in December, 18991 he might well have moved into another province rather than face this intrepid officer.^

Before Constabulary reinforcements arrived, however,

Guillermo, wearing Geronimo's blouse, which he had captured in an earlier engagement, attacked the Constabulary post at San Jose, Bulacan. The ruse was successful and the entire garrison was captured and Guillermo obtained fifteen much needed rifles. To Guillermo's everlasting credit the

Constables were eventually given an opportunity to return to their comrades and all but one did so. The latter re­ mained with the band and it was assumed that he had been instrumental in arranging the ruse and assisting the ladrones in executing this minor coup de etat. With the set-back at

% a n i l a Times, July 1?, 1902, 1. 112

San Jose, it was quickly determined that Geronimo's earlier request had been most understandable and Assistant Chief,

Jesse Garwood, was designated to proceed to Rizal and take command of the beefed up Constabulary forces. Garwood quickly reorganized his force and supervised the raising of several volunteer native units to supplement his force for the impending campaign.

Several weeks before Geronimo's clash with Guillermo's band, the Senior Inspector of Bulacan Province, Captain

William W. Warren, had engaged in an active campaign seeking to track down Paustino's outlaws. After the raid at San

Jose, Bulacan, Warren was instructed to proceed to Novaliches in Rizal and establish a headquarters from which he was to initiate a campaign throughout the surrounding country.

Guillermo and his band were chased from Manila to Ipo. On the night of August 15, 1902, Warren caught up with the band and killed three men and captured five guns, but the Con­ stabulary lost two dead and three wounded one of whom was the Senior Inspector himself. While Warren convalesced in the hospital, Lt. Cary I. Crockett took command of the operations but little of any consequence took place until

September 1 when the entire force of the Constabulary was sent into the southern part of Bulacan where Guillermo's

^R.P.G., 1902, I, 186: Ibid^ 1903, III, ?1: Manila Times, July 18,1902, 1. 113 band of approximately 100 armed men was concentrating.

To supplement the government's force an additional seventy- five volunteers were organized.^

In September of 1902, the various bands operating in northern Eizal and southern Bulacan consolidated and General

San Miguel eventually emerged as the supreme military commander of the combined forces* Miguel had a number of able lieutenants, the most prominent being Guillermo him­ self, along with Samson and Julian Santos* This force con­ sisted of over 150 men with an estimated equal number of guns most of which had been captured from municipal police detachments* Yet, despite the determined efforts of Captain

Ira Keithly, the Senior Inspector of Rizal, and Lt. Crockett, the band continued to elude the authorities by using tradi­ tional guerilla tactics. When pressed, they would merely go to the hills and disband only to re-organize when the 9 opportunity seemed desirable.^

By October 1, 1902, the Constabulary command felt that the outlaws might surrender if offered an amnesty for past crimes. Undoubtedly the Constabulary leaders were encouraged by the fact that in the preceding weeks the ladrones had

'R.P.C., 1 9 0 3 , III, 3 5 .

^Ibid, 71 and 35. 114

refused to fight. Therefore, the civil governor, acting

in cooperation with the Chief of the Constabulary, author­

ized Arturo Dancel to open negotiations with the band for

this purpose. Captain Keithly was instructed by General

Allen not to plan any operations which might interfere with

the negotiations. In the initial talks, the outlaws agreed

to surrender by November 1 if they were to receive immunity

from past offences. As a result the outlaws were permitted

to rest while being generously fed and subsidized with secret

service funds entrusted to Mr. Dancel. But all hopes for an

early termination of hostilities elapsed when on the last day

of grace, October $1, 1902, the outlaws renewed hostilities

and attacked a Constabulary detachment under Lt. C. J. Bates

and inflicted considerable casualties. It was later learned

that the ladrones had reorganized and rebuilt their forces

during the three week truce. V/hen they resumed hostilities

at the end of October, the band had approximately $00 armed men with 200 guns. For the next two months a vigorous but

largely ineffective campaign was waged against this force but

the bandits continued to use their favorite tactics and

simply dispersed when approached by a superior force.

^^Ibid, 72: Manila Times, November 7, 1902, 6, November 8, 1902, I, and December 2 1902, I. 115

In mid-December a new plan was adopted in which the

Governor of Rizal encouraged the local officials to give their wholehearted cooperation to the suppression of ladronism.Well over a hundred municipal police re- sponded to the Governor's request and established a line north of Manila in order to prevent the ladrones from escaping the Constabulary columns. Large numbers of natives suspected of being ladrones were arrested by the municipal police and turned over to the Constabulary for identification. Meanwhile to the north, the Constabulary of Bulacan Province also was actively engaged attempting to prevent the outlaws from Rizal from seeking refuge in that province. In this respect, the government obviously was attempting to seal off the affected area and prevent the escape of the bands either to the south or to the IP north.

Once the Manila area had been sealed off, the munici­ pal police, under the direction of Captain Luthi were in­ structed to fan out and converge on Pasig while Captain

Keithly took 250 Constabulary from the interior of Rizal

Province and also moved toward the capital of Rizal, In

^^Ibid, December 12, 1902, 8.

^% b i d , December 19, 1902, 1. 115

this way the hands were driven towards the center of the

Province where it was hoped they might he destroyed. At

Pasig the outlaws realized that they had heen trapped. All

efforts to hreak the Constabulary and police lines failed.

The outlaws knowing that they faced no alternative other than death therefore surrendered in mass. Captain Keithly

took 200 captives to the jail at Pasig where they were pro- 1 % cessed for trial.

On Christmas Eve, 1902, less than a week after Keithly

hagged 200 at Pasig, approximately 150 armed ladrones

approached Pasig City in fast-moving hoats via the Maraquina

River. The Constahulary guard challenged the ladrones despite

the fact that all were dressed in regulation Constabulary uniforms and most apparently were carrying Constabulary weapons. When they failed to respond to his challenge he

fired and killed one but a moment later he fell the first victim of the attack. The assault was planned with split

second timing. For example, when thirty ladrones rushed the

Constabulary cuartel simultaneously three other groups entered

the town and proceeded with precision to clear the people out

of the plaza. Once this was done, the two groups joined

^^Ibid, December 20, 1902, 1. 117 the attack on the Constahulary detachment which consisted of only nine men under Keithly himself. A sharp fight developed and it was later reported that only Captain

Keithly's iron nerve prevented his small group from being completely annihilated as they were out-numhered approxi­ mately twenty to one. In this fight, two Constables lost their lives hut the ladrones lost five in addition to others being wounded. The Constables' stubborn and unexpected re­ sistance compelled the band to retire despite their superior numbers. One wing of the band attempted to flee to the north but met the industrious officer, Lt. A. 0. Sorenson, who managed to divert their thrust in addition to capturing three outlaws, wounding several others and confiscating a number of weapons.

In mid-January, 190$, General Luciano San Miguel came to Rizal Province from his native Cavite and was elected 15 supreme commander of the outlaw forces in that area.

At this time San Miguel was approximately forty years of age and he had played only a minor role in the revolution against Spain. But during the insurrection against the

^^Ibid, December 27, 1902, 1 l^E.p.c., 1905, III, 72. 118

United States, be had served as one of Aguinaldo's g e n e r a l s . His prime purpose for entering Rizal was the hope that he might persuade both the Andres Bonifacio and the Aguinaldo wings of the old Katipunan Society to reconcile their differences and revive that movement. He was unsuccessful in this endeavor and as a result was in­ strumental in the establishment of a Hew Katipunan and was selected to head this organization. Other bands in central

Luzon were contacted and many of the leaders were duly in­ stalled as members of this organization. The New Katipunan also had strong ties with the Labor Union Movement under

Dr. Dominador Gomez and most of the leaders of the important

Nationalist Party also had allegiance to the Katipunan

Movement.

Miguel was a competent officer and quickly reorganized his newly acquired and substantially increased army. By raising the banner of the New Katipunan Society, the ladrones

IGManiia. Times, March pO, 190$, 1: R.P.&., 190$, III, $9-41.

^^Ibid. There seems to be some doubt in the official records just when Miguel was elected as "generalissimo" of the Katipunan forces. Probably the official act occurred on October 1, 1902 rather than on January 1$, 190$ when Miguel was recognized by the various ladron bands in Rizal province. 119 presented themselves as legitimate insurgents in an effort to persuade the ignorant masses to join their cause.

In February, 1903, serious fighting broke out between the Constabulary and the outlaws and for the next two months the government launched a vigorous campaign against San

Miguel. The fighting was not confined to Rizal itself as considerable activity occurred in southern Bulacan Province.

In early February Lt. Warren with forty Constables and another Constabulary detachment under Lt. Twilley were at­ tacked by 150 ladrones and both units were driven from the field. Lt. Warren's force, however, retreated only after it had expended its entire supply of ammunition. To add to the government's problems in early February, a large segment of Governor Tecson's volunteers in Bulacan Province deserted and joined San Miguel's growing army. But this energetic

Governor was not dismayed and quickly organized additional units to supplement the 100 Constables who were operating in southern Bulacan, The Constabulary was also strengthened by the arrival of a detachment of Philippine Scouts from 1 P) Caloocan which was assigned to the civil authorities.

Meanwhile in Rizal, Captain Cary I, Crockett with

Company A of the Manila Battalion had been ordered by

^'Bp.p.O., 1903, III, 33, 120

General- Allen to strike San Miguel who was reported con- iq centrating at Bobo see. Upon entering the town of Boso-

Boso, Crockett deployed his men and searched the area where he found the presidents bound with a bloody rag. The native's ears had been cut off at Miguel's order because he had ac­ cepted a civil position under the American government.

Miguel had then crossed the river and taken up a strong de­ fensive position. After reconnoitering the area and knowing that there were no other units in the immediate vicinity,

Crockett decided to attack despite the fact that the odds were at least four to one against his command. At dawn the following day he sent two native runners with the following message :

To any American officer: Arrived Bobosco February 7 without meeting other columns, San Miguel with force estimated at 400 men now entrenched on east side of Marquina River opposite town. It will attack at day­ light tomorrow. Advise Commanding General, Field Force, Pasig, Signed, Crockett,

^This town was undoubtedly misspelled by Crockett in his diary or reports as it should be Boso-Boso. It is under­ standable that the names of outlaws and towns, etc, fre­ quently should be spelled differently by American officers in the field considering the haste of their movements and the absence of adequate maps or thorough knowledge of the many native dialects.

^^Hurley, loc. cit., 102-10$ff, 121

At dawn Crockett was within 400 yards from Miguel's line. He attacked the ladrones' right flank with such ferociousness that Miguel was convinced that he faced a superior force and after a brief defense fled the field.

Crockett's command suffered only two wounded but undoubtedly would have been annihilated had it not been for his bold, and, indeed, brilliant flank attack.

In addition to Crockett's force, several otlB? detach­ ments had been scouring the vicinity and within hours after

Miguel had left Boso-Boso, one wing of Captain Keithly's

110 man force led by Lt, Harris unexpectedly came upon the strongly entrenched position of the ladrones. Harris, who had been in the corps less than two weeks, fell mortally wounded with the first volley having received five bullet wounds. Undoubtedly the ladrones chiefs had instructed their men to single out the Americans as their first target. After

Harris had been eliminated from the battle, a native took command of his small detachment and continued to skirmish until Captain Keithly, with the other two wings of his com­ mand arrived and drove the band from the field. The fight lasted for nearly two hours before the Constabulary cap­ tured and then destroyed the ladron fortress which was exceedingly well supplied with weapons, clothing, 122 blankets, hospital supplies and food including large PI quantities of beer and cigars.

The preceding engagement occurred on February 8, 1905) at Corral na bato and represented the first decisive engage­ ment in this campaign. The government's forces suffered at least two killed but the ladrones were routed, losing fifteen dead, large quantities of supplies and guns and approximately PP fifty wounded.

Following this engagement the newly appointed Director of the First District, Colonel W. S. "Tex" Scott, personally took to the field to command the government forces. Colonel

Scott was the second ranking regular army officer within the

Constabulary and had graduated from West Point in 1880 and served with distinction in the regular cavalry where he rose to become a It. Colonel. The selection of Scott to head this campaign was particularly significant because the civil government was contemplating the necessity of requesting large numbers of Philippine Scouts to serve under its direction in order to clear* up Rizal and Bulacan Province. According to the Act of Congress of January 50, I905, Constabulary offi­ cers with the rank of Major or higher in the regular army

01 Ibid; For considerable detail of this fight see Manila Times, February 9, 1903, 1 and February 10, I9 0 5 , 1.

^%.P.C. , 1903, III, 72: New York Times, February 10, 1905, 1: New York Tribune, February 10, I903, 2. 12$ were authorized to take command of a detachment of Philippine

Scouts when requested by the Governor-General and approved by the Commanding General of the Division of the Philippines,

Accordingly, in early February, 190$, the appropriate orders were issued and the way was cleared for Colonel Scott to take pz command of the Scouts.

With the government forces substantially increased by the addition of six Scout companies, totalling approximately $00, men, Governor Taft along with General Allen and Colonel Scott began to prepare for an extensive campaign to clear the Rizal-

Eulacan provinces, Taft, Allen, Scott and General Davis, agreed that with 3,000 armed ladrones in the field it would require large numbers of Scouts to supplement the Constabu­ lary force if the area were to be pacified. Captain Keithly, the Senior Inspector of Rizal, had actively campaigned for some time but lacked sufficient power to force a decisive engagement. But with the addition of the Scout units, it was calculated that the civil government could restore peace without calling in the regular army.

Manila Times, February 9, 190$, 1 and February 11, 190$, 1 ; Cablegram to General George Davis from General Corbin, February 9, 190$, File No, 1184, Record Group $$0, National Archives, ^^lianila Times, February 10, 190$, 1, 124

The strategy adopted called for the establishment of a massive cordon to ronnd'-up the outlaws after the natives in the affected areas had been relocated in larger barrios.

The Scouts were to operate in conjunction with the Constabu­ lary and were assigned to various strategically located sta­ tions throughout the provinces. These detachments were to be large enough so they could resist, if necessary, any î<- outlaw attack. Smaller and therefore more vulnerable sta­ tions were either abandoned or strengthened to meet these standards. In addition an American officer was placed in command of each station in order to strengthen discipline and reduce the possibility that the native Scouts might fall pr- prey to the outlaw propaganda,

While preparations were being made to coordinate an all-out campaign, numerous Constabulary detachments con­ tinued to operate in the field under the supervision of

Captains Keithly and Crockett and Its. Kcllvaine, Morris,

Schermerhorn, and Geronimo. One such detachment, under the command of Captain Crockett, assisted by It. Mcllvaine,

Z^E.p.C., 1903, III, 72. 125

scoured the area in the vicinity of Caloocan but met no

resistance. Crockett proceeded to the liovaliches and

Polo County but again failed to make contact with the

enemy, VJhile on this expedition, however, he received

important information from the Governor of Bulacan to the

effect that a group of armed volunteers, operating with

Lto Warren of the Constabulary, had plans to defect and

join Miguel's forces, Crockett attempted to notify Warren

via telegraph of these plans but the ladrones had out the

wires. As a result, a courier was sent post haste in order

to avoid this disaster and the defection was prevented.

During these trying times there was considerable

anxiety for the safety of the citizens of Manila which was

less than ten miles from the affected area. There was con­

siderable speculation as to whether the Constabulary, even with Scout reinforcements, might rise to the occasion and

suppress what was then considered to be a..full scale in­

surrection, It was obvious that the impending campaign would represent yet another test for the Constabulary,

Prior to this, General Allen and others had argued of the necessity of using Scout detachments when the occasion

^%anila Times, February 10, 1903, 1 and February 11, 1903, 1. 126

demandedo These arguments had prevailed and Congress re­

sponded with the Act of January 50, 1905» In sum, General

Allen for the first time had all that he had previously

asked for: namely, the use of the Scouts.

Once the natives had been reconcentrated and the Con­

stabulary had been reinforced in the area, the massive

campaign unfolded. By this time, General Miguel had con­

centrated nearly 400 of his men at his headquarters near

the important city of Montalban in the northern Rizal,

Above this well-entrenched stronghold flew the Katipunan

flags while the insurgents prepared for battle. On

February 22, 1905, It. Mcllvaine, with a small detachment

of twenty Constables, discovered this headquarters and

after a face-to-face confrontation with Miguel himself,

Mcllvaine retreated in order to notify his superiors.

Within hours reinforcements were pouring into the area.

Major Atkinson of the Constabulary left for Montalban with 150 men while a company of Scouts from Caloocan under the

command of Lt. Nickerson and two additional companies of

Scouts from Novaliches and another from San Jose del Monte 28 converged on Miguel's headquarters,

^^Ibid, February 12, 1905, 4. 28 Ibid, February 25, 1905, 1, February 24, I905, 1, and February 25, 1905, 1» 127

Miguel's force deliberately avoided contact with the government troops but managed to raid the villages of

Taytay, Cainta, and Montalban where they captured eleven

Scouts, twenty-two rifles and large quantities of ammuni­ tion. The purpose of these raids was frankly stated by

Miguel in his official proclamations to obtain weapons.

He instructed his followers that they were not to attack regular army troops who were stationed in the immediate vicinity in an obvious effort to prevent the United States

Army from entering the conflict. During these raids, several Constabulary detachments fought bravely, especially at Taytay where Lt. Sorenson, with fourteen Constables held that position under heavy attack.

Within hours of Mcllvaine's discovery of Miguel's stronghold near Montalban, Major Atkinson clashed with

Guillermo's band of 100 outlaws and drove them into the

Morong district. The ladrones had attempted to trick

Atkinson and boldly approached his force obviously pre­ tending to be Constables. Little damage was done and fol­ lowing the skirmish. Major Atkinson with I50 men, including

Crockett and Geronimo, left San Mateo for Montalban to join the other government troops, which were then converging on Z^Ibid. 128

Miguel's headquarters. But Miguel evacuated his fortress at the last moment rather than face a decisive engagement with superior forces.

Several days later Governor Bancel of Rizal led a group of natives and surrounded the house of Lt. Colonel Julian

Santos while he slept in a barrio of Mavotas only five miles north of Manila. Prior to his capture, Santos had been one of Miguel's top lieutenants and had commanded the ladron force in November of 1902 which besieged the small Constabu­ lary force under Lt. 0. J. Bates in Novaliches. It was also

Santos who personally led in the Christmas eve raid on the town of Pasig. He had been considered such an important leader the government had offered a reward of 2,00C pesos for his capture or death.^

Binding it difficult to make contact with Miguel's elusive army, General Allen in early March, 1905, requested that six additional Scout companies be assigned to the Con­ stabulary to supplement the eight already under his control.

This brought the total Scouts under Allen's command to approximately 1,500. These latest additions however were

^^Ibid, February 25, 1905, 1 : New York Tribune, February 25, 1905, 2. ^^Manila Times, February 2?, I905, 1: Elarth, loc. cit., 55: New York Times, February 28, 1905, 2. 129 not assigned to the Rizal-Bulacan area. Rather they were

sent to nearby provinces in order to strengthen the depleted

Constabulary units which had been sent into the Miguel campaign.

One reason Allen and Scott found it difficult to bring

Miguel's army to bay was that large numbers of ladrones were escaping into neighboring provinces in order to con­ duct raids to obtain money, ammunition, and weapons. For example, the town of Bacoor, Paranaque was raided by a band of 300 Rizal exiles. They looted the town after cutting the telegraph wires which, of course, delayed the local officials' frantic pleas for assistance. The Constabulary raced to

Bacoor but arrived too late as the band had already fled.^^

A serious repercussion of the heavy fighting was the disruption of agricultural pursuits of the peacefully in­ clined natives. In order to protect the farmers from the loss of their carabao the Governor of Bulacan required that even the carabaos be relocated into herds of 100 or more.

This was obviously designed to deprive the ladrones of this important source of food and money since these animals could be sold relatively easily. It mattered little to the farmers

^Manila Times, March 3, 1903, 1 and February 24, I903, 1. 33ibid, March 3, 1905, 1. 130

whether their animals were taken from them since they

could not cultivate their land due to the serious fighting

in the surrounding areas.

In the first week of March, 1903, Colonel Scott's

combined force of approximately 100 Scouts and Constables,

being supplemented by 100 city police from Manila, through­

out a large circular line which was gradually drawn towards

Manila in an attempt to draw the bands into this net. Addi­

tional units were stationed along the Cavite border to pre­

vent the ladrones from crossing the Pasig River into that

Province. In this way it was hoped all avenues of escape

could be blocked and the ladrones forced into a decisive

engagement.Again, however, the ladrones merely pulled

the "amigo act," hid their weapons and sought refuge in the

hills or in the homes of their sympathizers and thus avoided

the government trap. Several minor clashes developed during

this abortive roundup. In these skirmishes, the government

troops were at considerable disadvantage in that the ladrones

were armed with modern, smokeless weapons while the Constables

were armed primarily with single shot carbines, loaded with

^^Ibid, March 5, 1903, 1» 35ibid, March 7, 1903, 1. 131 black powder cartridges and no bayonet. This continued to be a major source of irritation for the Constabulary leaders and it wasn’t until several years later that this corps was adequately armed with the lîrag-Jorgenson rifle,

Despite these handicaps, Colonel Scott continued to press his campaign and on March 13 a serious engagement took place near San Juan del Monte. Scott had been maneuvering north of Pasig attempting to force a fight with a wing of Guillermo's band. On one occasion, Scott positioned his troops in order to block the escape route and therefore compel the ladrones to fight. In the engage­ ment Scott’s command, which included four companies of

Scouts along with numerous Constabulary under Captain

Keithly and Captain Crockett, killed six, captured fifteen and wounded several others. While on this expedition Colonel

Scott also arrested no less than 430 natives suspected of giving aid to the bands. Once arrested, these suspects were taken into the capital, Pasig City, and interrogated by the

Constabulary secret service agents, '

Colonel Scott continued his campaign with increased vigor and on March 20, it was reported that an additional

, 1903, III, 84: Manila Times, March 9, I903, 1. 37lbid, March 13, 1903, 1. .. . 132 company of Scouts was thrown into the battle which now brought the government forces up to approximately 2,000.

The soldiers continued using the cordon system but as usual when the outlaws were cornered the bands simply dispersed. The entire area was constantly being patroled and scouted and those natives that had not been recon­ centrated fled the area in great numbers to the point where large sections of these provinces were deserted by living beings.^08 ■ '

By the end of March, Scott's continuous pressure began to have its effect. At that time it was estimated that

Miguel's personal command had dwindled from a maximum

strength of $00 to approximately 200 men. Then on March 28,

Lt. Nickerson and Lt. Reese in command of the First and

Fourth Philippine Scout Companies located Miguel in a

strongly fortified position at Cora na bato, midway between Caloocan and Mariquina, This fort was extremely well camouflaged being located in the middle of a dense

jungle and had remained undetected by earlier patrols

that had passed within a few yards of its entrance.

It consisted of a large square stone block house which

stood in front of an area, approximately an acre in size,

58lhid, March 20, I9 0 3 , 1. 133 which was enclosed hy a stone wall fully eight feet high.

But the dense jungle had obscured its vision until the fateful morning of March 28 when the Scouts detected an artificial arrangement of the foliage and began to prepare for their assault.

Lt. Reese led the attack from the west and immediately came under heavy fire from Mausers and Erags which the ladrones fired through loopholes in the wall. The order was given to attack and the gallant Scouts scrambled over the wall and in hand-to-hand combat drove the ladrones out the east side of the fort where Lt. Nickerson had deployed his troops. Reese was wounded in the melee just before

General Miguel with his personal bodyguard of thirty ladrones attempted to flee through Nickerson’s front.

That alert officer detected this maneuver and instructed his men to hold their fire until Miguel closed in and then delivered a devastating volley. Miguel was hit three times, but as he fell he drew his revolver and fought until his last breath.

This bloody battle represented the turning point in the

Miguel campaign. During this fight Miguel had commanded

^% b i d , March 28, 1903, 1 and April 16, 1903j 1^ New York Times, March 28, 1903, 5 and March 29, 1903, 13: New York Tribune, March 29, 1903, 4. 134

nearly 200 well-armed men and had made a determined effort

to repel the Scont attack. It was reported that Miguel

personally forced his men to continue the fight and at

times actually beat those who attempted to flee.^^ As a

result, only a few of the band succeeded in making their

escape, Nickerson personally retrieved the bullet-riddled

Katipunan flag which had flown over the fort during the

battle. Among the .captured military stores the Scouts

located voluminous Katipunan records which were found to

implicate numerous Manila citizens.

Several days after the death of San Miguel the govern­

ment authorities, including Governor-General Taft and

General Allen, made several pledges to the natives that

the campaign would continue uutil all ladrones were accounted

for. Accordingly, Allen directed Scott to remain in the 42 field until the entire area was pacified.

With the passing of Miguel, Faustino Guillermo became

the commander in chief of the outlaw forces in the Rizal

Province.Guillermo recognized that to remain in Rizal

would lead to the ultimate destruction of his command. So

^^Manila Times, March 28, 1903, 1 and April 14, 1903, 1.

4^ibid, March 28, 1903, 1: R.P.C., 1903, H I , 73-

^^Manila Times, March 31, 1903, 1«

^^Ibid, August 19, 1903, 1» 13^ this wily, ladron leader crossed into southern Bulacan and joined Colonel Contreras, still another of Miguel’s sub-chiefs.

Before making this move, Guillermo disbanded his Rizal force and instructed his men to return to their homes until again called out. Meanwhile Colonel Contreras in southern Bulacan, also remained inactive being content in dodging the combined force under the energetic Governor I'ecson. For the time being, both ladron Chiefs were content to lick their wounds lllL and hopefully survive mitil better days.

While Guillermo had fled north, another of Miguel’s minor lieutenants, Tomas de Guzman, with seventy well-armed ladrones crossed Manila Bay and entered Bataan Province where they sought refuge in the Zambales Mountains. The ladrones entrenched and prepared to defend their position.

The Senior Inspector of Bataan, Captain Knauber, had been operating in the Rizal campaign but was ordered to return to Bataan Province with a company of Philippine Scouts in order to talce part in the Constabulary operations, Knauber launched immediately a vigorous campaign and proceeded to track down the band.'^^^

^^Ibid, April 16, 1903, 1.

4^Ibid, April 11, 1903, 1 and May 23, 1903, 1. 136

Less than a month later, on June 11, 1903? Guillermo himself was captured through the combined efforts of the présidente of Cainta, Colonel Scott and Captain Keithly.

His capture was the result of a plot devised when it was discovered that Guillermo was making plans to secure the desertion of a number of Constables located at Cainta.

By this time his band had dwindled to less than a dozen and he had set up a temporary headquarters at Boso-Boso from which he hoped to secure the defection of Constabulary enlisted men or native volunteers to bolster his band.

But Presidents Ampil of Cainta was notified of

Guillermo’s plot by his men who remained loyal. When

Ampil informed Colonel Scott, a counter plan was devised by which a group of soldiers would pretend to defect and thus obtain entrance into Guillermo's camp. In order to be more convincing, this band “raided" Boso-Boso and shot up the town being careful not to hit anyone and then took to the hills where Guillermo was convinced of their sincerity.

Captain Keithly by pre-arrangement was in the immediate area and played his part to the hilt by chasing the defectors throughout the countryside. Considering these theatrics, it was understandable that Guillermo was more than willing to accept these alleged defectors into his small band. l$7

Once admitted, they waited the opportunity and then over­ whelmed Guillermo and signaled Captain Keithly* This brought to a close the career of one of the most famous outlaws on

Luzon* He was taken to Bilibid Prison, tried, convicted and executed in the public square at Pasig City in May, 1904*

With Guillermo's capture and the death of Miguel, the Rizal-

Bulacan campaign was brought to a close although several minor leaders remained out for a brief period*

And so it was, by the summer of 1903 Miguel's "Toy

Rebellion" or the Rizal-Bulacan Uprising was finally sup­ pressed* The Senior Inspector of Rizal Province, Captain

Ira Keithly in his annual report to the chief of the corps, with justifiable pride, reported that his province con­ tained no organized bands* Furthermore, he stated that the general condition of this area was more promising than it had been at any time in his knowledge* Once again, the people were returning to their work and once again the normal agricultural pursuits consumed the energies of the natives of that province*^^ Similarly, the Senior Inspector of Bulacan Province, Captain William W* Warren, reported;

^^RoPoC*, 1 9 0 3 , III, 75 and 1904, III, 68; Manila Times, June 11, 1 9 0 3 Î 1, November 3, 1903, 1, May 20, 1904, 1, May 2 3 , 1 9 0 4 , 1, August 3, 1904, 1»

^'^RoPoCo, 1903, III, 73. 138

"There are no longer any organized bands of ladrons (sic) }l Q in the provinceo"

These reports bear mute testimony to the effectiveness of the Constabulary organization. Once again under the overall leadership of General Allen, the civil authorities substantially assisted by large detachments of Philippine

Scouts and numerous volunteer units, had succeeded in suppressing a serious uprising. Obviously, this military corps had risen to the occasion and proved its effectiveness as a fighting force.

^Ibid, 34. CHAPTER VI

TUMULTUOUS CAVITE: I90 I - 1904

I'm going to try to hold Cavite» . » » That will be a severe te^t of Constabulary efficiency and fitness.

Cavite, turbulent Cavite, surpassed even Rizal Province

as being the most troublesome during both the Spanish and

the American occupation of the Philippines, Long before

the United States acquired these islands, Cavite had earned

the name as being the "mother of ladrones." It is located

to the south of Bataan Province across from Manila Bay and

also borders Rizal which lies to the north. Laguna Province which lies to the east and BatangasProvince which lies to 2 the south.

Immediately following the insurrection. General Malvar in a desperate effort to revive hostilities issued a number of commissions to well-known ladrones in Cavite, When

Malvar himself surrendered those ladrones continued to pose as patriots of Philippine nationalism, but it is clear from their activities that they were little more than thieves,

^Letter to Senator A. J. Beveridge from H. T. Allen, December 5? 1901.» Allen MSS,

^R.P.C., 1902, 1, 186.

139 140

% cattle rustlers and common murders. They were ladrones. In January of 1903, there were at least a half dozen organized hands in Cavite Province alone with a total strength of approximately 500 men. The most prominent hands belonged to Julian Montai on and Pelizardo. During the early part of the year a thirty-day truce was announced in which Montalon had agreed to surrender all those under his control. The truce was arranged in order to allow sufficient time to prepare.for the surrender. Montalon used this time not to prepare for the surrender hut to continue to pillage, blackmail and build up his force. Con­ templating the outlaw's reaction, reinforcements were sent into Cavite. Thus, when the truce officially ended, govern­ ment soldiers were prepared and therefore took to the field immediately, and vigorously sought out the outlaws.^

Captain Allen, the Chief of the Constabulary, was determined that his corps meet the challenge in Cavite and advocated a tough-line policy in dealing with the outlaws.

Allen wrote to the President of the United States and sug­ gested that the property and lands of native leaders who

% b i d , 187 o

^Ibid. 14-1 cooperated with outlaw element he confiscated,^ Allen was confident that his corps could suppress ladronism in

Cavite without the assistance of the regular army.^

The strategy which evolved during this campaign was somewhat typical of that used in other areas. The reloca­ tion of large bodies of natives was an essential ingredient in order to protect the natives and deny the ladrones the opportunity to extort money and supplies. Government soldiers were instructed also to maintain constant pressure on the ladrones in an effort to draw them into a fight.^

But the crucial element in Allen’s strategy was a determined effort to win the support of the natives themselves,^

In order to implement this broad strategy the First

Assistant Chief of the Constabulary, Captain D. J. Baker,

Jr., was ordered to prepare an expedition even before the deadline of the January truce so that the government forces would be prepared for immediate action if those arrangements failed to materialize. Initially Captain Baker was to have 5 Letter to President Roosevelt from Allen, November ?, 1 9 0 1 , Allen M8S.

^Letter to Senator A, J. Beveridge from Allen, December 5» 1 9 0 1 , Allen MSS.

^Letter to General Wright, from Allen, November 4-, 1902, Allen MSB.

^Letter to General Bell from Allen, April 25, 1902, Allen MSS. 142

twelve Constabulary detachments each consisting of some

fifteen to forty men. Each Constabulary detachment was

supplemented by ten native volunteers.^

In February of 1902 Cavite was literally filling up

with ladrones attempting to escape General Bell who was

eliminating the remaining insurgent armies in Laguna and

Batangas Provinces. Unlike Batangas, Laguna and Layabas

which had by that time reverted to military rule, Cavite

was still under the civil government. Thus, the ladrones

reasoned, understandably, that their chances for survival

were better in Cavite.

To cope with this situation, Cavite was reinforced.

In February of 1902, Inspector Henry Khauber, a native of

Germany and veteran of the war in the Philippine Islands,

was sent to Cavite. While enroute to his new station,

Knauber was ambushed by a band under Julian Ramos. His

horse was shot out from under him in the initial volley but he managed to grab his Mauser rifle and take cover in

the grass to await the inevitable bolorush. When it came

there was a bitter hand to hand fight in which Knauber

'^Manila Times, February 19, 1902, 1.

~^Ibid, February 20, 1902, 1. 14-$ killed eight and captured four guns. For this fight Knauher and the two enlisted men were awarded the first of the coveted

Medal of Valor, the highest award for bravery that the civil government could confer.

In addition to Knauber, hundreds of other Constables were ordered to Cavite to supplement the regular force of only 225 officers and men. A peak was reached in July of 1 2 1902 when Captain Baker commanded 1,200 officers and men.

Baker’s tactics in this campaign were considerably varied. Usually small columns were kept in the field, constantly patrolling and seeking out the ladrones in their haunts. In addition, numerous garrisons were distributed throughout the area from which these columns received their supplies and reinforcements. And very regularly native Con­ stabulary enlisted men were disguised as ladrones in an attempt to penetrate the bands themselves and then provide the neces­ sary information to the government forces for their capture.

Yet probably the most nearly standard tactic-'.used here and throughout the northern Luzon area was the cordon, or roundup system, by which large numbers of government forces, usually

^^See General Order No. 8, Philippine Constabulary Head­ quarters, Manila 1902 Series: Hurley, loc. cit., 31-34-® .

^%.P.C. , 1902, I, 187: Manila Times, April 30, 1902, 1. 144 supplemented with volunteers, would throw out a net or a ring and gradually draw it in driving the band into a trap.

But the cordon system was not always effective since ladrones frequently concentrated at one point and broke through,

From February through most of April, Baker continued to conduct a determined campaign. During this period no less than four Commandantes, ten captains, fourteen lieutenants and 185 enlisted men were either captured or compelled to surrender. In addition twenty-six ladrones were killed, eighty-seven were captured in the field and over

1$0 guns were confiscated.^^

Following Baker’s spring campaign, the outlaws remained relatively inactive for the next three months. Nonetheless the Constabulary continued to build up its strength and maintained constant pressure on the various bands. By mid-July there were over 1,200 government troops operating in the field in one. of the biggest operations of its kind.

Unfortunately, however, Montalon and Felizardo also reinforced 1 5 their bands during the lull in the fighting.

, 1902, I, 18y: See also letter to General Leonard Wood, from Bandholtz, February 9, I9IO, Bandholtz MSS,

^^Letter to General Bell from Allen, April 25, 1902, Allen MSS: Manila Times, April 25, 1902, 8. For minor develop­ ments see Manila Times, March 4-, 1902, 1, March 8, 1902, 8, and April 50, 1902,. 1,

^^Ibid, July 18, 1902, 1. 145

In order to prevent ladrones from escaping the govern­ ments net and also to prevent supplies and reinforcements from reaching the outlaws, a number of boats, operating under the Constabulary direction, were ordered to patrol Cavite’s coast line. So strict was this cordon that even laundrymnn who usually carried their goods in the Manila area by boat were not permitted to land at Bacoor.^^

The task of preventing weapons and ammunition from fall­ ing into the hands of the ladrones was difficult if not im­ possible. Not infrequently ’’muchacho boys” stole ammunition from the homes of Americans where they worked and passed this loot on until it eventually reached the hands of the ladrones.

In Manila a "muchacho boy” was apprehended but not before he had collected 100 rounds of Krag-Jorgensen, 404 rounds of

«45 calibre, nineteen rounds of .$8 calibre, and forty-one rounds of Springfield rifle ammunition all of which was ultimately destined for the ladrones in Cavite Province.

Baker nonetheless continued his efforts and late in July it was reported that large numbers of ladrones were being forced to seek refuge deep in the mountains. Still con­ siderable contact was made and fourteen ladrones were l^rbid, July 22, 1902, 1, 146 killed and fifteen captured along with nine guns in a single engagement.

By the end of July, Cary I. Crockett, already acknow­ ledged as one of the corps' most effective fighters, was scouring the mountains in the eastern section of Cavite

Province searching for Kontalon and Pelizardo. In one clash, Crockett reported that he believed he had personally wounded Pelizardo but the band managed to escape in a heavily wooded area. Upon receiving this information Senior In­ spector Hayson ordered all Constabulary units in the im­ mediate vicinity to converge on the area. One detachment under Lt. Thompson was sent to cut off Pelizardo's avenue no of escape and assist Crockett in the destruction of the band.

Despite these efforts Pelizardo and his band managed to escape to the south and crossed into Batangas Province

At the close of the fiscal year of 1902, Captain Baker notified the authorities of his decision to disband the native volunteer units. He explained that the volunteer units had reached a peak of approximately 200 men but had contributed little other than to increase the government

^^Manila Times, July 23, 1902, 1. l^Ibid,18] July 30, 1902, 1. 19n'Ibid, July 31, 1902, 1. 14?

expenses» Baker also complained that while the volunteers

often boasted of capturing numerous weapons none were

actually turned into the Constabulary» In fact, he argued

that the volunteers were, in essence, little more than a

convenient storehouse for arms which the ladrones would periodically raid to supplement their own weapons. In

this respect, at least one portion of Captain Allen’s over­

all strategy initially at least proved ineffective, although

it should be noted that Baker seldom worked well with natives in this capacity. Furthermore, Baker voiced his apprehen­

sion of the natives by recommending that the writ of habeas corpus be immediately suspended and that the government vigorously prosecute local officials who had been aiding the outlaws in the area. Finally he suggested that if these measures did not prove effective, it would be desirable to close all ports in Cavite Province in order to compel the bulk of the natives to cooperate with the government if for no other reason than to have these restrictions removed. 20 Thus, Baker outlined a policy of gradual escalation.

Following the heavy fighting in July, there was another lull for several months. The government forces

20R.P.C., 1902, I, 18?. 148 maintained their pressure hut the ladrones refused to fight. Nonetheless the Constabulary gradually wore down the ladrones and captured large numbers of guns. In late

September, 1902 Baker sent a government launch to Manila with approximately 2,000 guns, spears, and bolos which 21 he had confiscated during his campaign.

Yet conditions remained far from settled and in mid-

October a small band of ladrones dressed in captured Con­ stabulary uniforms hi-jacked a thirty-nine ton brig, The

Nauricia as it was approaching Manila from Tayabas Pro­ vince. This ship had been becalmed off the Cavite coast and several enterprising ladrones took advantage of this opportunity, disguised themselves in Constabulary uniforms, boarded her in the middle of the night, overpowered the 22 crew, looted the ship and proceeded to escape.

The following day Governor-General Taft and Captain

Allen left for Cavite Province to conduct a personal in­ vestigation with the object of formulating a plan which would complete the pacification of this area. During this trip they had numerous conferences with local officials

^^Manila Times, September 25, 1902, 1. October 21,1902, 1. 14-9 and sought their advice as to the best means to stamp out ladronismo " Within days after the completion of this tour, it was announced that additional units of the United

States Army would be sent into Cavite Province to garrison a select number of towns especially those located near ladron~infested areas. The army units were to defend the towns while the Constabulary did the field work and pursued the ladrones into the hills. It was also rumored at this time that a form of martial law would be pro- claimedo 24-

Governor Trias of Cavite, reflecting this increased determination to bring the campaign to a conclusion, doubled his efforts and arranged for the arrest of four town présidentes who were suspected of withholding infor- 25 nation on ladron movements. Even the local school officials were somewhat inspired by these efforts. Mr.

Buck, the Division Superintendent of Schools for Cavite

Province, organized a group of civilians and chased a small band of ladrones but managed only to get himself captured, Fortunately several days later he escaped,

^^Ibid, October 22, 1902, 1. 24 Ibid, November 10, 1902, 1.

^^Ibid, November 11, 1902, 6. ^^Ibid, November 1$, 1902, 1. 150

The ever optimistic Captain Allen radiated confidence

concerning the government's ability to handle the Cavite

situation. Undoubtedly this attitude was in part designed to persuade members of the United States Congress of the necessity of passing legislation which would authorize the detaching of Scout units to serve under the civil authority when circumstances so dictated. In this effort, Allen and the pro-Constabulary wing within the civil government did

succeed and Congress, of course, passed the very important

Act of January 50, 1903»^*^

That General Allen was over-optimistic is well illus­ trated by developments in late November. A detachment of twenty-five Constables was surrounded in Cavite by over p o 300 ladrones and nearly annihilated before being relieved.

Less than two weeks later it was reported another Constabu­ lary detachment, this time numbering fifty men, was also surrounded and beseiged by a large force of ladrones. Again this force was rescued by a detachment of Constabulary and volunteers, the latter being under the command of the in­ domitable Superintendent-of Schools for Cavite Province,

Mr, Buck,

^^Letter to General Wright from Allen, November 4-, 1902. Allen MSS.

^%anila Times, November 25, 1902, 1, ^^Ibid, December 2, 1902, 1. 151

With heavy fighting in Cavite, Hizal, Bulacan, and also in Leyte, Samar, and western Negros, there was con­ siderable agitation on the part of the pro-military sym­ pathizers to turn these areas back to military rule. Con­ stabulary critics argued that the establishment of civil authority had been premature and that only military rule could guarantee the rapid pacification of these areas.

One of the most ferocious advocates of military rule was not surprisingly the Army and Navy Journal. Captain

Allen sent one particularly abusive article to Governor-

General Taft who returned it to Allen and noted, "I'm not greatly excited by the views of the Army and Navy

Journal

Captain Allen responded to his critics by stating:

It is a pity .that the only immediate remedy is killing and for the same reason that a rabid dog must be disposed of. Education and roads will effect what is desired, but while, awaiting these, drastic measures are obligatory.^

While the debate raged as to the wisdom of permitting the Constabulary to complete the pacification, that corps continued its operation. On December 8 a detachment

^^Letter to Allen from Taft, December 24-, 1902, Allen MSS,

^^Letters to General Wright from Allen, November 19, 1902. Allen MS8. 152

located the camp of Montai on near Magallanes and drove the hand from its position. In accordance with Constabulary

strategy, the bamboo buildings along with 4,000 pounds

of rice and miscellaneous supplies were burned. It was re­ ported that ilontalon himself had been severely wounded in this engagement.-^

Constant pressure of this nature throughout December

and early January gradually depleted the ladrones' force.

On January 13, 1903, the Senior Inspector of Cavite,

Captain Hayson, in an interview with the correspondent from

the Manila limes, stated that of the 100 recent captives,

twenty-eight had already been sentenced to Bilibid Prison

for terms of ten years or more. In contrast with Captain

Baker, Hayson praised the efforts of the volunteers of

Cavite. In December a full 10,000 natives responded to

his request for volunteers. With this aid, he established

a line from Batangas to Cavite and captured 100 outlaws.

The ladrones remained inactive for nearly four months

following Hayson's campaign in December and January. But

in early May they resumed their plundering and raided the

barrio of Rosario where they looted the town and acquired

^^Manila Times, December 12, 1902, 8.

2^Ibid, January 13, 1903, 1< 153 a dozen horses and 25,000 pesos before being frightened off by a mixed force of Constabulary and municipal police.

Later in this month a band of seventy ladrones raided the town of Almedo while nearly the entire population was at­ tending a cockfight. In traditional style, the band sur­ rounded the citizens, blocked the incoming roads and then systemically robbed the natives of all money, valuables and even horses before the Constabulary in the nearby area was alerted and arrived to drive them off.

Following the raids on Rosario and Almedo, Hayson ordered several Constabulary detachments to pursue these bands. Towai’ds the end of the month, one of Hayson's de­ tachments located liontalon's band but could not force him into a fight. But ï'elizardo’s band was also in the area observing the government troops. He deployed and prepared for a flank attack. Unknown to Felizardo, Montalon and his force moved unexpectedly into the area in which Felizardo was expecting the attack and before the bands could identify themselves several volleys were exchanged although little damage was done.^06

^^Ibid, Hay 4, 1903, 1. ^^Ibid, Hay 26, I905, 1. ^^Ibid, June 1, 1905, 1. 154

After Montalon's clash with Hayson, he moved south and slipped into Batangas Province and reorganized his hando

He then crossed into Laguna Province via the uninhahitated country north of Lake Taal and in this way left the govern­ ment authorities in complete confusion as to his location®

The Constabulary had been aware that the country between

Lake Taal and Laguna de Bay had provided ladrones with an ideal avenue from which they could move undetected between

Cavite, Batangas and Laguna Provinces® Therefore the Senior

Inspector of Laguna Province, Captain Winfield S® Grove had instructed Lt® Sims to explore that region and map all trails so that the region could be more effectively patrol- led®58

Upon entering Laguna Province, Montalon with nearly

100 men proceeded to the town of Bay and on June 1, 1903 raided the town® The town people led by their twenty- five well-armed municipal police offered no resistance and merely fled® It was a well-planned and executed raid in which the outlaws robbed the town at will before departing for their Cavite hideoutWhen the Constabulary finally

^'^R.PcC®, 1904, III, 68: Manila Times, June 3, 1903, 1. ^%®P®C®, 1903, III, 64-3. ^%anila Times, June 3, 1903, 1® 155 mobilized, several detachments pursued the band. There were

several minor skirmishes but liontalon's band merely disin­

tegrated and scattered in the hills rather than face a sub­

stantial foe.^

In an attempt to flush out the elusive outlaws, Colonel

W. So Scott, who had succeeded Baker in the direction of this campaign, formed a large beating party of 400 Scouts and

Constables, This force assembled at Imus in the northern­ most part of Cavite Province with the purpose of sweeping southward to drive the ladrones from their hiding places.

But again the outlaws managed to escape the net. In fact, in early October Governor Shank of Cavite reported to Gen­ eral Allen that all remained quiet throughout the province as there were neither "hide nor hair" of the ladrones. None­ theless he stated the Constabulary would continue patrolling the area extensively in the hopes that they might force the ladrones to a fight.

This lull was broken on December 25, 1905, when liontalon's band captured two famous Constabulary secret service agents by laying a trap for them near San Francisco de Malabon. These native detectives had been ladrones

^ I b i d , June 5, 1905, 1 and June 9, 1905, 1.

^^Ibid, September 9, 1905, 1 and October 8, 1905, 1. 156 themselves before joining the Constabulary and establishing the remarkable record of having sent no less than eighty of their former comrades to prison. They were captured at midnight and after being tormented, they were hanged at

Montalon's order, Following this, the band attempted to raid the town of Silang in broad daylight but a detachment dP of Philippine Scouts under Lt, Walker drove the band off.

Several detachments of Constabulary and Scouts converged on the outlaw force and compelled Montalon to flee into

Batangas Province, In one skirmish, Montalon was almost captured and in fact lost many of his personal, effects,

Montalon found no rest in Batangas Province where the

Senior Inspector, Captain Griffith, reported an interesting fight in which four Constables engaged Montalon's entire band of 100 on January 25, 1904 at Tabagan, There was little damage done on either side but the native officer in charge captured one outlaw. The prisoner led the Con­

stabulary officer to believe that he could arrest one of

Montalon's officers. He marched his small detachment all night and arrived at the prescribed destination only to

find that he had been the victim of a trap. It took this

4^Ibid, December 29, 1903, 1, ^^Ibid, January 5, 1904, 1, 157

small detachment nearly two hours to fight their way clear.

They eventually notified the authorities and then joined the larger force in pursuit of the hand only to find that

Montalon had headed once again for Cavite Provine

Shortly after Montalon's return to Cavite, a serious

split developed within the ranks of the ladrones. Colonel

Apolonio Samson, who had been one of San Miguel's top lieutenants in the Rizal-Bulacan Uprising of 1902-190$, moved into Cavite and joined with Montalon's band. These two ladron chiefs however soon quarrelled over seniority,

Samson claimed authority over Montalon's men and attempted to execute a coup d'etat. When this failed the two bands squared off and a bloody pitched battle developed in which twenty outlaws were reported to have been killed or wounded.

Having settled the matter of supremacy within his organ­ ization, Montalon ordered all his followers to assemble in the Talisay Eidge area of Cavite Province, Word was sent out via the so-called "bamboo telegraph" for his men to dig up their guns, and to maice their way for the rendezvous area.

The Constabulary, of course, was aware of this concentration and additional patrols were sent out to destroy as many of

'^'^Ibid, January 29, 1904, 1. ^^Ibid, March 22, 1904, 1. 158 the outlaws as possible while enroute to this meeting.

One engagement took place in Batangas Province near Mount

Maquiling where Lt. Sims with fifteen Constables met a wing of Oruga's band and killed five including one captain in addition to capturing numerous arms and a large quantity of ammunition.

Another prominent ladron leader who was attempting to make a rendezvous with Montalon was a twenty-five year old ex-barber, Macario Sakay. This colorful individual looked more like a houseboy rather than a prominent ladron leader in Luzon. let for years he had been active in the old Katipunan Society and was eventually appointed by the ladrones in central Luzon as the "President of the

Philippine R e p u b l i c . Sakay worked his way south, but the Senior Inspector of Bulacan, Captain Warren, had been alerted and sent several small detachments to intercept his band. In one skirmish, which occurred about thirty- five miles east of the capital of Bulacan, Malolos, a

Constabulary detachment discovered Sakay’s location and opened fire. In the brief exchange which followed three outlaws were killed and several captured in addition to

4^Ibid, April 4, 1904, 1. ^'^R.PoC,, 1904, III, 73. 159 foiir being wounded. During the fight Sakay was heard shouting to the bugler, “sound the attack." After a AO few minutes he ordered a retreat and fled.

Sakay continued to move south and while crossing Rizal

Province he barely escaped capture in the Morong District of that province. Montalon had headed for Morong hoping to merge with Sakay's force. Constabulary and Scout de­ tachments were ordered into the field to prevent this union. Montalon apparently was only too happy to leave

Cavite because Constabulary secret service agents had penetrated his unit and were seriously menacing his posi- tion. Despite these efforts the union was effected al­ though it is difficult to precisely date when this meeting occurred.

Several months before Montalon and Sakay finally merged their bands, the Chief of the First District,

Colonel ¥. S. Scott divided the Cavite Province into seventeen stations for the purpose of scouting, patrolling and secret service work. Ten of those stations were under the control and supervision of the Philippine Scouts who were serving under the civil administration and the re­ maining seven were under the direction of the Constabulary.

^%anila Times, June 24-, 1904-, 1. 4^Ibid, August 17, 1904-, 1. 160

Each station or district was under the command of an officer who was responsible for policing within that area. In order to expedite their mission, each station was assigned a tele­ phone with the instructions that one or two men were to be detailed to attend that telephone twenty-four hours a day.

This in itself represented an important trend toward, in­ creasing the mobility and effectiveness of the government forces* Colonel Scott also supervised the establishment of a secret service bureau at Imus and instructed his command­ ing officers to transmit all messages to the Senior Inspector of Cavite and to the secret service bureau at Imus.^^

Colonel Scott concluded that it would be necessary to reinstitute the policy of reconcentration in Cavite, This was done in May of 1904 and the natives living within prescribed zones were ordered to relocate where they might be protected from the outlaws. In many cases however natives were permitted to leave these reconcentration areas during

the day in order to return to their own barrios to work.

In other barrios natives were required to move their pro­ visions into the relocated towns but then were permitted to

live in their own homes, provided that they kept only two

or three days supplies on hand. In this way, it was hoped

^^E.PoC., 1904, III, 69. 161

that the ladrones would be denied the necessities of life

and he compelled either to surrender or fight.

In September 1904 the combined bands of the Cavite

area prepared for a major uprising. With large segments

of Constabulary and Scouts in detached service in Samai',

Montalon, I’elizardo, and Sakay along with their lieutenants reasoned that the time was ripe for resuming their ladron

activities. By the fall of 1904, the ladrones had worked

out their chain of command, Macario Sakay was acknowledged

as the titular head of the movement with the title of

"President of Philippine Republic," It was Julian

Montalon however who emerged as the overall military leader of the forces with the rank of Lt, General, Besides his own force Montalon also directly controlled the bands of Lt,

Colonel DeVega, Colonel Ramos and Colonel Masigla which dominated most of Cavite and eastern Batangas, Immediately under Montalon was Major General Pelizardo who controlled the bands of Caro and Giron which operated in the northern part of Cavite Province in Pasay-Bacoor area. Brig, General

Oruga controlled the bands of Colonel Villanueva, who operated in Batangas, Lt, Colonel Vito of the Lake Taal region and Major Flores of Laguna Province,

^^Ibid, 70. ^^Ibid, 190$, III, 129. 152

The first major attack of this unified command occurred on December 8, 1904 when the Constabulary stationed at

Paranaque in Rizal Province was overrun by Pelizardo who commanded seventy-five outlaws with twenty-five rifles.

It was a bold attack in which Pelizardo and his entire out­ fit were dressed in Constabulary uniforms. A brief fight developed in which one Constable was killed and an addi- tioneil two wounded before the rest of the garrison, which was commanded by a native, was captured. The outlaws looted the cuartel and made off with fifteen Springfield carbines, four colt revolvers and nearly a thousand rounds of ammunition along with miscellaneous military stores.

The Constabulary under the Senior Inspector of Rizal

Province, Captain Gwynne, pursued the band and were re­ inforced with detachments.from Pasig and Malabon. In addi­ tion, Captain Grove, of the Constabulary, led a detachment of Scouts in an attempt to run down the band.^^

Encouraged by their successful raids in December the outlaws next struck in Batangas on January 5» 1905 and raided the town of Taal. Once again they received the active assistance of the local municipal authorities.^^'

^%anila Times, December 9,1904, 1, December 5, 1904, 1, and December 10, 1904, 1.

^\.p.c., 1905, III, 54. 163

In late January, Montalon's force executed its most

successful raid at San. Francisco de Malabon. With a force

of 300 armed ladrones, most of whom were in Constabulary uniforms, they attacked the town from two sides and quickly

overcame the resistance of a detachment of fifty Constables and seven Scouts under the command of Lt. Jose Kerr. The ladrones captured practically all the Constabulary weapons and those of the local municipal police. They robbed and looted the town and also kidnapped the family of Governor

Trias before departing for their haunts.

The successful raid on San Francisco de Malabon was partly due to misunderstanding between the Information Division and the Commander of the Constabulary troops. Both officers were natives but the head of the Information Division was senior in rank to It. Kerr, the commander of the troops, Kerr failed to make adequate precautions against attack because he felt these measures were the responsibility of the senior officer. On the other hand, the representative from

Division of Information assumed that Kerr had completed 36 preparation.^

anila Times, January 23, 1903, 1 : R.P.C., 1903, 111, 3: New York Times, January 26, 1903, 3»

^% . P . C o , 1903, 111, 38, Lt. Jose Kerr eventually was dis­ missed for cowardice during this attack. See Manila Times, February 10, I903, 1. 154

The consequences of the raid of San Francisco Malabon were far-reaching. First, Montalon derived considerable prestige among the natives for having successfully completed a maqop raid, and therefore found recruitment.much facilitated.

Second, his band obtained an additional fifty rifles. Third, the natives throughout the Cavite, Batangas and even southern

Rizal areas and western Laguna began to seek accommodation with the ladrones since the government appeared incapable of adequately protecting them. Fourth, there was consider­ able pressure on the civil authorities to turn these areas over to the military so that the regular army might move in and quickly suppress this uprising. And finally there was pressure to have the civil authorities once again adopt the policy of reconcentration and suspend the writ of habeas corpus in the infested area.

The day after the raid on San Francisco, a squadron of four troops of the Second Cavalry was rushed into Cavite,

It also was reported that if necessary more troops would be sent in. These troops however were not authorized to operate in the field. They were merely to garrison the cities and in this way relieve the Constabulary so it might

^'^R.PcC., 190$, III, 54 and 58: Manila Times, January 26, 1905 , 1 and January 30, 1905, 1 and January 5 1 , 1905 , 1. 16^ pursue the ladrones in the field.

At this time, the countryside was dominated by the ladrones.. A reign of terror had been established and those who aided the government, in any capacity, were subject to the most horrible atrocities, l'or example government in­ formers had their lips cut off or the tendons of their legs severed. These fiendish atrocities were authorized by General Montalon himself in a signed order and were more than adequate in deterring natives from cooperating with the government.^' One town official expressed the dilemma of the peacefully inclined natives when he explained to Colonel Baker that when the ladrones demanded assistance, the natives had no alternative. This official said:

If I didn't my punishment would be swift and cruel. The Americans never deal out punishments that anyone is afraid of; they are slow and merciful.

V. Cameron Forbes, long-time Secretary of Police and Commerce, sympathized with the natives and acknowledged if in a similar position he too would be inclined to cooperate with the ladrones.

So complete was Montalon's organization that he developed a systematic form of taxation which provided his force with

^^Ibid, January 26, 1905? 1.

^^Ibid, January 30, 1903, 1 and January 31, 1903, 1=

^^Forbes "Journal," January 26, 1903, I , 139, library of Congress, Manuscript Division. 166

necessary commissary. The merchants and farmers were

visited regularly and even the taos (common laborers)

were assessed approximately ten per cent of their income.

These taxes usually were paid without a murmur for any re­

sistance would subject the individual to immediate re­

taliation.^^

Responding to the critical situation and the advice

of his advisors, the Governor-General,Luke E, Wright?,

issued Executive Order Number 6 on January $1, 1905 in which he ordered the suspension of the writ of habeas

corpus in Cavite and Batangas Provinces, It was obvious

to the civil authorities that drastic measures were neces­

sary if government troops were to suppress the uprising.

The Governor-General’s decision was entirely justified due

to the magnitude of the lawlessness which prevailed through­

out the region. The fighting and unrest during preceding months had caused the farmers to neglect their fields.

Also many women and children were sent to the provincial capitals and even to Manila for safety. Assassinations were not infrequent and abductions of peaceful men and women became common. The mutilation of those suspected

of giving loyalty or aid to the government rapidly in­

creased, Prior to the suspension, captured outlaws

obtained bail and intimidated witnesses. As a result.

^^Manila Times, January 51, 1905? 1. 167 many outlaws escaped conviction. In addition, Constabu­ lary officials had been compelled to divide their time between the courts and field operations in attempting to run down and destroy these bands.

The establishment of a Provisional District and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus represented a major turning point in the pacification of the area south of Manila, Por two years following these actions, approximately 3,000 soldiers were actively engaged in suppressing this uprising. The combined forces of Con­ stabulary, Scouts and regular army operated most effectively throughout this period and completely destroyed the outlaw bands by mid-1906. It is these developments to which we now turn our attention.

6? PuoP.C. , 1903, 111, 130. This long special report is en­ titled: "Report of Colonel D, J. Baker, Jr., Assistant Chief Commanding Provisional District, Philippines (sic) Consta­ bulary, on work done in that District since its organiza­ tion up to July 315 1903." G^ibid, 137. CHAPTER VII

THE GAVITE-BATMGAS UPRISING: I905 - 1906

Throughout the fall of 1904, the comhined hands of

Julian Montolan, Gornelio Eelizardo, Macario Sakay, and

Aniceto Oruga conducted a series of raids in the Gavite-

Batangas region in order to increase their military stores in preparation for a major uprising. This initial phase reached a climax in December and January when the ladrones successfully raided the large towns of Taal, Paranaque and

San Francisco de Malabon. To cope with this situation, the civil authorities established the Provisional District which consisted of Batangas, Gavite, Laguna and southern

Rizal Provinces. Colonel D. J. Baker, Jr., was the only available Constabulary officer with sufficient U. S. Army rank to command both Constabulary and Scout units and therefore was selected as the commander of this district.

Reinforcements were rushed in, the bulk of whom came from northern Luzon and Mindanao along with a detachment of mounted troops from the Manila Garrison.^

^R.P.G., 1905, 130-151.

168 159

In order to render the government forces less vulnerable and also more capable of offensive operations, they were col­ lected into fewer, but carefully selected, strong, and well- officered stations. Each of these stations or groups of stations was then assigned the task of destroying a specific band or bands of outlaws. The government also initiated a widespread campaign of public instruction designed to per­ suade the people of the necessity and wisdom of supporting the government. In this way, it was hoped the natives would provide vital intelligence information which would enable the government’s soldiers to pinpoint ladron locations and p destroy their forces.

Colonel Baker developed his overall strategy in response to the tactics used by the ladrones. The outlaws were adept at fighting a guerrilla war. Generally the bands moved only at night and slept during the day. They consistently avoided roads and even ordinary trails and followed little defined paths which curved, twisted and therefore made it very diffi­ cult for the government forces to pursue them. The ladrones developed an extremely effective security and intelligence system and rarely attacked government soldiers unless they could mobilize a superior force. They usually preferred to

^Ibid. 170 rush a police station or a Constabulary cuartel or even a

Scout post when it was weakly guarded. These attacks al­ most invariably occurred between dusk and bedtime when the officers and men were prone to scatter after dinner for recreation and relaxation. Whenever possible the attack was preceded by a thorough reconnaissance of the area to familiarize themselves with the terrain and determine the strength and habits of their intended victims. This was followed by a careful weighing of the chances and deliberate planning. Thus, once an enterprise was undertaken it seldom failed. When feasible, the ladrones attempted to minimize their risk by penetrating the government's force with spys in an attempt to win confederates on the inside. When the ladrones themselves were attacked, they usually scattered and the few who occasionally made a stand did so half­ heartedly and only to cover the flight of their leaders.

The ladron chiefs usually directed their forces from a safe distance and were the first to flee.^

The first objective of the combined government's mixed force which consisted of Scouts, Constabulary and the regular army, was to track down the bands of Felizardo and Caro which had kidnapped Mrs. Trias in their raid on

^Ibid. 171

San Francisco de Malabon. In early February Captain Herron with a detachment from the Second Cavalry scoured the Lake

Taal Region searching for Mrs. Trias. But despite Herron's vigorous efforts no contact was made. General Montalon had ordered his troops purposely to avoid a contact with the soldiers. Montalon reasoned that in this way government forces would be compelled to divide themselves into smaller patrols which would enable him to concentrate his forces and destroy these smaller units.

Colonel Baker also concentrated on the Lake Taal region. It was well known that this densely populated and isolated area provided a natural habitat for ladrones. Baker ordered several detachments of Scouts and one company of

Igorrot Constabulary from northern Luzon into the Lake Taal area. This move was particularly significant as these non-

Christian natives liked nothing better than an opportunity to kill a few Tagalogs who were their traditional enemies.

The Igorrots were the products of a head-hunting civiliza­ tion and were at times over-zealous in their efforts to destroy the Tagalogs, being restrained only by the strenuous efforts of the white officers.^

^Manila Times, February 4-, 1905? 1»

^Forbes "Journal", loc. cit, I, January 24, 1905, 156, January 26, 1905, 139, and February 5, 1905, 143-144, Forbes MSS. 172

Meanwhile additional Gonstahulary units were ordered to Batangas Province. One group consisted of twenty-five

More Constables under the command of It. Johnson. This detachment originated in the Jolo District and had been stationed on the island of Siassi. The previous year

Captain Thomas R. Hayson, who was then the Senior Inspector of Jolo District, had taken these G-string clad men, trained, disciplined, and built them into an extremely aggressive unit which was eager to locate Montalon and bring him to bay. These Moros preferred to fight with their barong which was a broad semi-circular chopping knife which could easily cleave an ordinary man from the collar bone to the pelvis. The Moros thoroughly enjoyed any fight especial­ ly if their opponents were Christian, According to their

Moslem religion, the more Christians they killed, the 5 better their chances were for going to heaven.

In order to prevent the ladrones from escaping the government forces, an additional coast guard cutter with massive searchlights and a Gatling gun was sent to patrol

the waters surrounding Cavite.^ Also the Constabulary of

Bataan Province was alerted and ordered to increase its

^Manila Times, February 7, 1905, 1.

^Forbes "Journal," loc. cit. , 1, February 5, 1905, 14-5-44-, Forbes MSS. 173

surveillance along the southern coast in order to prevent the ladrones of Cavite from escaping Baker's campaign.°

Meanwhile Major Frederick W. Sihley, who commanded the regular army in this campaign, finally rescued Mrs.

Trias and her two children with a detachment of the Second

Cavalry. Mrs. Trias had been a hostage for three weeks and had been brutally treated by both Felizardo and his top lieutenant, Cosme Caro. She had been tormented day and night and was reported to have been compelled to submit to the passions of a number of ladrones even in the presence of q her children.

During the month of February I9 0 3 , a reign of terror was initiated throughout the Provisional District. A band

of thirty outlaws raided the town of Quisao to inflict their vengeance on natives who were suspected of aiding the author­ ities. The ladrones frequently committed horrible atrocities to intimidate the natives. Those suspected of aiding the government had their lips and ears cut off and they were turned loose to serve as a warning to o t h e r s . As a re­ sult it was considered almost suicidal even to talk with

%anila Times, February 13, 1903, 1.

^Ibid, February 14-, I9 0 3 , 1.

^^Ibid, February 7? 1903, 1 and February 10, 1903, 1< 174- government authorities. If compelled to do so, the women would pray and beseech the authorities not to draw the vengeance of the ladrones down upon themselves and their families.

One of the first bands destroyed during this campaign was under the command of Brig. General Aniceto Oruga.

Operating primarily in Batangas Province, Oruga was assisted by Villanueva, Vito and Flores. Oruga himself had long terrorized Batangas Province. His primary interest was the management of a large cattle rustling gang but 12 occasionally he would kidnap a wealthy native for ransom.

In February, 1905j Oruga was the objective of an extensive campaign directed by Colonel Baker. On

February 24-, the Constabulary raided Oruga's cuartel. The ladron chief barely escaped but the Constabulary confiscated large quantities of supplies before pursuing the band.^^

Several weeks later Baker again hit Oruga near the town of

Silang in the Lake Taal region but there were few casual­ ties on either side. By this time detachments of United

States Cavalry were also operating in this area attempting to track down the illusive chief. But it was almost

^^Ibid, February 4-, 1905 j 1»

^^R.P.C., 1904-, III, 70-71.

^%anila Times, February 27, 1905, 1« 175

impossible to obtain information as to his movements be­

cause Oruga, like Montalon and Felizardo, had terrorized

the people with drastic retaliation for those who cooperated with the government forces.

Baker remained on Oruga's trail and during the first two weeks of March he nearly succeeded in capturing this wily outlaw several times, but Oruga's knowledge of the

country was sufficient to enable him to manage his escape.

Colonel Baker increased the tempo of the campaign and pushed

his forces even harder by maintaining constant patrols day

and night throughout the Batangas-Cavite area. He also

established massive cordons in an attempt to prevent the

outlaws from escaping his soldiers. Gradually Oruga's

command withered away under this constant pressure and by

mid-March it was reported that Baker had captured nearly

130 guns and large quantities of ammunition in the preceding

eight weeks. On March 14-, near Santa Cruz in the Taal

region, Lt. Sims captured several guns and one of Oruga's

principle tax collectors. Several days before a group of

volunteers had assisted the Constabulary in capturing five of

Oruga's men, including two of his personal bodyguards.

^'^Ibid, March 6, 1905, 1 and February27, 1905, 1 = ^-^Ibid, March 9, 1905, 2.

^^Ibid, March 15, 1905, 1. 176

The following month, Lt. McLean received the surrender of Lt. Colonel Vito in Batangas Province along with five men and five guns. Vito had led the raid on Taal in January and had a widespread reputation for his brutal atrocities, but

Baker's constant pressure reduced his following and compelled him to surrender.Meanwhile in Laguna Province, Major

Flores, another of Oruga's top Lieutenants, was constantly harassed and gradually observed the disintegration of his band. On April 10, Lt. Clark and a detachment of Scouts surprised Flores and nearly captured this chief before he managed his escape. In this engagement Flores did lose his horse and personal belongings,^®

By late April, General Oruga's force had gradually been reduced from over 100 men to less than a dozen. Oruga must have known that his days were numbered, therefore, rather than face destruction he surrendered on April 28, 1905 to the Governor of Laguna Province, Juan Cailles, At the time of his surrender, Oruga had but seven men and a few guns.

It was somewhat ironic that he chose to surrender to Cailles since Oruga had served under that officer in the insurrection 19 only to break with him and become a free lance ladron. With the elimination of this powerful chief, Batangas l^Ibid, April 8, 1905, 1. l'®Ibid, April 15, 1905, 1 and April 1905, 1. l^Ibid, April 28, 1905, 1. 177

Province was considered practically subduedo Accordingly

Colonel Baker lifted the reconcentration order for large PO segments of the native population.

While Oruga was attempting to dodge Colonel Baker ■ and Captain Thompson, Montalon was the subject of con­ siderable attention-by the government soldiers. Within the first week of April, Lt. J. B. Hutchinson with a detachment of Scouts fought three minor engagements with

Montalon in Cavite Province within forty-eight hours al~ PI though there were few casualties on either side. A month later, Constabulary spies located a ladron camp near

Silang which was occupied by de Vega, one of Felizardo's lieutenants. It was nearly a perfect camp with its stakes and other constructions cleverly camouflaged with artificial landscape. But the Constabulary spies noticed several suspicious characteristics and.of course reported their findings to their superiors. A mixed force which consisted of a Constabulary detachment along with a wing of the Second

Cavalry attacked the camp and nearly captured de Vega himself

p p before he managed to flee.

One of de Vega's officers was a notorious female bandit, named Apolonia Catra, who held the ran.k of lieutenant,

^^Ibid, May 4, 1905, 1. Zlpbid, April 5, 1905, 1» March 8, 1905, 5. 178

She dressed in men's clothes and was well known for her

cruelty and reckless courage. On March 5? a Constabulary

detachment engaged her band and after a stiff fight she was

killed. Following her death it was reported that the male 2% members of her band fled the field.

In March of 190$, Baker concluded that reconcentration

would be necessary in the Provisional District. Once the

crops were harvested, appropriate orders were issued and

large numbers of natives in Batangas, Cavite, and to a

lesser extent Laguna and Rizal Provinces were ordered re- 24 concentrated. The Governor-General was very reluctant to

agree to the resumption of reconcentration but finally sub­ mitted after concluding that there was no other remedy. It was estimated that approximately one-third of the population was completely relocated while another third was only partly relocated. Following this, large segments of the population fled Cavite in order to escape the inconvenience of being- relocated and also to protect their families from the

ladrones. A local newspaper reported that Cavite was virtually "a green desert" and that one could ride for miles without even a glimpse of a human being. Towns were deserted

and a death zone was established in certain areas. Natives

^^Ibid, March 15, 1905, 2. ^^R.P.G., 1905, III, 158. 179 found outside the prescribed zones were automatically con­ sidered outlaws. In some sections, armed guards were de­ tached to bring food into the reconcentrated zones while farmers were protected while they worked their land.^^

The month of April proved to be a major turning point in this campaign. As noted, Vito surrendered to Lt. McLean on April 7* A week later Captain Turner with a large de­ tachment of the Seventh Infantry struck a band that was partially under the command of Julian Ramos near the

Eyrielao Mountains and killed one, wounded one, and captured four along with a number of weapons and miscellaneous mili­ tary equipment. Several days before this near San Pablo in

Laguna, a half dozen members of Flores' band had surrendered with their weapons.

On April 14-, one of Felizardo's sub-chiefs, Cosme Caro, a bloodthirsty and desperate outlaw, was killed at Tres Cruces by Lt. Schnyder with a detachment of the Second Cavalry. The government troops had ambushed Caro and his band of twenty- five outlaws as they passed along the trail. His body was taken to Malabon and positively identified by none other than Mrs. Trias who had been one of his captives following

^%anila Times, April 8, 1905, 1.

2G%bid, April 15, 1905, 1» 180

the raid on San Francisco de Malabon» In this fight

three of Caro’s officers were also killed and the band

was so demoralized that the following day some voluntarily

surrendered while the remainder were reported to be pQ thoroughly disillusioned. There were other less

spectacular engagements during April and, of course,

Oruga himself had also surrendered,^^

Meanwhile Montalon and Felizardo's force had dwindled

to less than two dozen men as the result of the government’s

determined campaign,It was during this last phase of the

operation that the decision was made to import specially

trained bloodhounds to track down the ladrones in the dense

jungle areas. Accordingly, in the first week of May eleven

strong limbed, square-jawed bloodhounds arrived from San

Francisco, California.

Throughout this campaign, the Constabulary's secret

service remained vigilant in their efforts to track down

Montalon's supporters in Cavite and even in the Manila area,

27lbid, April 17, 19C5, 1.

ZGlbid, April 18, 19C5, 1.

^*^See for example Manila Times April 7, 19C5, 1 and April 28, 19C5, lo ~

^^Ibid,5C^ April 18, 19C5, 1,

^^Ibid, May 4-, 19C5, 1 and May 23, 1905, 2; The use of these dogs proved successful and in following years additional dogs were trained for similar purposes. See Letter to Captain D, J, Baker, Jr, from H, H, Bandholtz, March 22, 19C7, Band- holtz MSS, 181

In early Hay, secret service agents cooperating with city detectives and the Constabulary netted one of Montalon's officers in Manila itself.A week later General Simson

Basa who had been working for the United States as a draughtsman was also arrested by city detectives in Manila.

General Basa was something of a double agent in that he maintained constant communication with the outlaws in the

Provisional District while being employed by the govern- ment.^^ Meanwhile in Batangas, Colonel Baker discovered that the very influential and powerful Roxas family had been secretly aiding the ladrones. Baker ordered reconcentration in that area in an effort to prevent further supplies from reaching the outlaw forces.

Several miles east of Manila, Captain Warren with five spies and five Constables departed from Pasig in mid-May and hiked to Boso Boso. Warren was accompanied by "Boston", a famous Constabulary spy. While on patrol, Warren and

"Boston" detected some suspicious looking natives. Upon investigation, they discovered the headquarters of none other than Macario Sakay, the nominal head of the Cavite-Batangas uprising. Captain Warren with his small detachment crawled

52ibid, May 9, 1905, 35lbid, May 15, 1905, 1. ^^Ibid, May 10, 1905, 1» 182

up a 200-foot steep cliff in order to surprise Sakay's

force and then darted from tree to tree while pressing

the attack. Sakay escaped but his camp was burned along with considerable clothing and miscellaneous supplies.

On June 1, 1905, Julian Ramos, the last important

ladron in Batangas Province, surrendered unconditionally with his band of nineteen men and thirteen guns to Major

Sibley of the regular army. With his surrender Batangas was considered clear of the outlaw forces.Several days later Major Sibley was quoted as saying that in his evaluation there were but forty ladrones remaining in the field in Cavite Province. Major Sibley attributed this condition to the combined work of the regular army, the

Scouts and the Constabulary.^'

On June 8, Felizardo himself was reported shot by

Major Sibley's troops and Bartolomé Montalon, another brother of Julian, also unconditionally surrendered."^

Less than two weeks later on.June 21, a detachment of

Scouts, under Captain Van Schaick, surprised Felizardo while he slept in his camp near Litlit, approximately five miles from Bacoor. At that time it was estimated

55ibid, May 24, 1905, 1-

^^Ibid, June 1, 1905, 1-

^'^Ibid, June 6, 1905, 1=

-^^Ibid, June 8, 1905, 1» 183 that Felizardo was without food and had only six men and that one was killed and another captured in this engage- 39 ment.^^ In the clash, Felizardo was again wounded» He was hit on the right side of the head and shoulder, but managed to survive » Five days later Colonel Baker hit him and on the 28th of June Baker, Van Schaick and Lt»

McLeod struck the outlaw again but failed to capture him»^^

Nonetheless Felizardo no longer represented a serious threat to the peace of Cavite Province» His force, along with that of Montalon and Sakay, had been destroyed as a fighting unit. As a result, in July the regular army was withdrawn from the Provisional District, and the Constabu­ lary therefore resumed full responsibility for eliminating the remaining lawless elements»^^

In the first week of August, Captain C» C. Smith, after a three-day march in the mountains over most diffi­ cult trails struck Sakay's band at Tutura and killed one outlaw and captured two guns along with Sakay's personal flag, daggers and commissions» Smith could not press his attack because his men were exhausted after their long and 42 hazardous march.

59lbid, June 22, 1905, 1«

^ I b i d , June 30, 1905, 1.

^^Ibid, July 18, 1905, 2»

^^Ibid, August 9, 1 9 0 5 , 1. 184-

Not much, occurred for the next month except that the

hloodhounds finally were put in the field. On one occasion

they tracked Montalon and Felizardo for nearly ten miles

before losing their trail.In mid-September it was re­

ported that Felizardo had been cornered by the government

troops and deliberately leaped to his death over a 500-

foot cliff near the barrio of Calaco in Batangas Province.

He was "positively" identified and there was considerable

speculation with reference to the recipient of the 5,000

pesos reward. But several months later Felizardo again

appeared. It was, of course, only a trick in an effort 44- to gain time to rebuild his force.

Nonetheless even though Felizardo still lived his re­ ported death had important consequences. The natives in

southern Luzon, no longer fearing the drastic retaliation

began assisting the Constabulary by providing information

and other services. This change in attitude was especially

fruitful when the citizens of Taal led the government

authorities to the hiding place of none other than

Valentino Montalon, another brother of the infamous Julian-

Montalon,

^^Ibid, September 11, 1905, 1. ^^Ibid, September 18, 1905, 1 and September 19, 1905, 1= ^^Ibid, September 25, 1905, 2 and November 15, 1905, 1° 185

The remnants of these forces managed to elude the government troops for the next six months. There were minor clashes throughout this period but nothing of any consequence*.^^ Toward' the end of the year, high Con­ stabulary officials attempted to play down the signifi­ cance of the Cavite-Batangas uprising. Colonel Bandholtz suggested that the Constabulary concentrate on driving the ladrones from their regular habitats so as to compel them to operate in unfamiliar areas.This strategy re­ flected the frustration of the Constabulary leaders in not being able to draw the ladrones into a decisive engagement.

Furthermore, it was decided that the secret service division /IQ should increase its activities.

Throughout the fall and early winter of 1906, there was considerable rumor that Felizardo was not dead despite his well publicized “suicide". The Governor of Rizal, Mr.

Dancel, insisted that Felizardo was not only alive, but that he was rebuilding his force. In response to similar

^^Ibid, January 12, 1906, 1, January 23, 1906, 1, and January 27, 1906, 1.

^^Better to Colonel James G. Harbord from Colonel Band­ holtz, December 25, 1905® Bandholtz MSS. /I o Letter to the Executive Inspector, Philippine Constabulary from Colonel Bandholtz, January 7, 1906; Letter to the Honorable Potenciano Lesaca, Provincial Governor, from Colonel Bandholtz, January 11, I9O6 : and Letter to General Allen from Colonel Bandholtz, January 12, 1906, Bandholtz MSS. 186 suggestions, the Constabulary developed an ingenious plan by which two Constables agreed to "desert" their unit and join Felizardo's hideout. They succeeded in this endeavor and then persuaded Felizardo to conduct a raid on the Con­ stabulary garrison at Camp Hayson. Felizardo agreed but while enroute the natives aimed their rifles and attempted to assassinate the chief, but both guns jammed. A fierce hand-to-hand fight evolved and Felizardo was finally stabbed,

The Constables cut his throat to complete the task. Follow­ ing this, they took the corpse to Camp Hayson and claimed j±q the 5,000 peso reward.

Meanwhile the Constabulary secret service agents in the Manila area also increased their efforts. Operating in conjunction with the local police, they raided the headquarters of one of Sakay's top aides and captured his private secretary who held the title of "Keeper of the Archives.Several days later, another of Sakay's lieutenants, Villafuerte, surrendered to Colonel Bandholtz.

The following month, Montalon's small band was routed by the Constabulary near Caloocan. Prior to this,

^^Forbes, "Journal," loc. cit., March 7, 1906, I, 388: R.P.C., 1906, II, 240, and I, 30: Manila Times, March 2, 1906, 1 . 5°Manila Times, April 23, 1906, 1 and April 2?, 1906, 1. 187

Hontalon had been active in recruiting new followers and had huilt his force up to approximately fifty men. He had occupied an almost impregnable stronghold in the

8ampaloe Hountains north of Oaloocan. Its. Snodgrass and

Rohrer attacked this fortress and wounded two before driving the band off. Montalon's force again scattered and fled north where Captain Thompson, the Senior Inspector of

Batangas, chased the band until the trail was lost.^^

Meanwhile Colonel Bandholtz authorized the controversial

Dr. Gomez to open negotiations with Sakay^ in a . successful effort to persuade him to surrender. After months of fight­ ing and hiding Sakay and his Vice-President, Carr eon, agreed and in mid-June surrendered. Following his surrender Sakay was permitted to go into the mountains unescorted to meet with Montalon and other officers in an attempt to persuade them to surrender also.^^

Within a month Sakay more than proved his worth. He persuaded all major ladron chiefs in the Cavite-Batangas

area to surrender to Colonel "Bandholtz. Sakay had arranged for the surrender of Julian Montalon, Lucia de Vega, Benito

51lbid, May 20, 1906, 1.

^ New York Tribune, July 21, 1906, 2 has an interesting biographical sketch of Dr. Gomez. Also see New York Times, May 30, 1 9 0 3 , 4-, August 1, 1903, 7, September 25, 1903, 6, and September 30, 1907, 9: Cablegram to Secretary of War from Governor-General Henry C. Ide, July 20, 19O6 located in Bandholtz MSS: Manila Times, June 18, 1906, 1 and June 1 9 , 19O6 , 1. 188

Natividad and all important subordinate officers. Band­

holtz himself received high praise for his skill and pru­

dence in arranging these surrenders. Sakay later claimed

that he had received a promise for special consideration

if he canried out his mission, but absolutely no terms

were authorized other than guaranteeing the outlaws a

fair trial.

The surrender of Sakay and Montalon represented the

completion of the pacification of Cavite and Batangas.

In early August there was not a single gun unaccounted

for throughout the entire province of Cavite. Considering

that this had been the worst infested province in Luzon,

this represented a noticeable accomplishment for the Con­

stabulary. Conditions in neighboring Batangas Province were almost as good with only eight guns unaccounted for,-^-^

With the pacification completed, Constabulary units were reassigned and began concentrating in the provinces

55 ^^Cablegram to the Secretary of War, Taft, from Governor- General Henry C. Ide July 20, 1905, Bandholtz MSS: Letter to Colonel James G. Harbord from Bandholtz, July 28, 1906, Bandholtz MSS: Manila Times, July 25, 1905, 1 contains biographical sketches of the principal leaders who sur­ rendered. Also see Manila Times, November 20, 1906, 1. 54 Letter to Colonel D. J. Baker, Jr. from Colonel Bandholtz, July 27, I9O6 . Bandholtz MSS.

^^Manila Times, August 6, 19O6 , 1. 189 north of Manila where "Pope" Pelipe Salvador had assembled a large following and was seriously menacing the peace in those provinces.

^^Ibid, August 16, 1906, 1. CHAPTER VIII

MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN LUZON: 1902 - 1910

To the north of the Rizal-Bulacan-Tayahas Line, lies the sparsely populated, mountainous land of the head­ hunters. Here Constabulary duties were in sharp contrast to those in the central and southern Luzon areas where military matters took precedence over civil responsibil­ ities. In the north, there were few significant military campaigns.

The first significant ladron campaign in northern

Luzon occurred in Pangasinan Province which lies along the western coast approximately 100 miles northwest from

Manila. The leader of this movement was an ex-insurgent general named Manalan, an irreconcilable who never sub­ mitted to American authority. Little is known of his activities prior to mid-1902 other than the fact that he had built a substantial following and had preyed on the natives in Pangasinan and Zambales. The Senior Inspector of Pangasinan, Captain Rickards,had long sought this elusive chief, and on May $1, 1902, one of Rickard's sub­ ordinate officers Lt, DeWitt struck Manalan's force in the mountains near Dagupan, Manalan's wife, horse, and much

190 191 of Ills personal clothing were captured hut he managed to escape. It. DeWitt tracked the hand for several days without much success.^

M anal an moved hack and forth between Pangasinan and

Zamhales Provinces and it was nearly six months before the

Constabulary again drew the band into a fight. On

October 16 near A1aminos in Zambales Province, a small Con­

stabulary detachment under the command of Sergeant Orlino was ambushed by 100 "beno-crazed" ladrones while enroute to

A1aminos to prevent a ladron raid. The Constables were dis­ guised in civilian clothes but the ladrones were not deterred.

A half-hour fight ensued and nine ladrones were killed and many others wounded. Hanalaii and his entire staff had been

in the town prior to the fight but when hostilities broke

out they immediately left. Later several minor skirmishes

developed in which additional members of the band were cap­

tured and larger Constabulary units were sent into the hills

to track down the leader. A total of sixty-one prisoners

were talc en during this two-day period and they were sent to

Iba, the capital of Zambales Province, where they were pro- 2 cessed for trial.

^Manila Times, June 3, 1902, 1.

%bid, October 19, 1902, 1. 192

In November Rickards and DeWitt constantly patroled

the Pangasinan and Zambales areas seeking their prey. On

the loth an entire company of Constabulary took up a position

on the line between these two provinces in an effort to pre­

vent Manalan's reaching his hideout in Zambales Province.

For several weeks they patroled the area, covering nearly 1500 miles. During this expedition they had destroyed twelve

cuartel8 and also had captured six guns from one of Manalan's

tax collectors who had been forcing contributions of rice and

other materials from the natives. So effective was this minor

expedition that Rickards optimistically reported that the

anea was nearly pacified and that Manal an himself was re­ duced to hiding in caves. There were numerous caves in these mountainous areas, some of which were quite large. One, for

example, contained a single entrance from the top and it was necessary to drop fifty-four feet by rope in order to enter this hideout. In other areas Manalan had built stone forts, one of which contained sleeping accommodations for 100 men. 3 All were admirably concealed and strategically located.^

In late January, 190$, an American school teacher named Osborne organized a band of twenty-six volunteers

^Ibid, December $1, 1902, 1. 193

when he heard that Manalan was operating in the immediate

vininity, Osborne tracked down the band and a ferocious

fight took place which deteriorated into hand-to-hand

combat. A number of the volunteers fled but during the

fight Osborne noticed several ladrones standing off at a

distance. He and another American fired several volleys

and dropped the two. Later it was determined that Manalan

and his aide had been killed in this exchange. Following

the death of their leader a number of the ladrones pre­

pared to surrender but Manalan's chief lieutenants with the

remnants of his band took to the hills while the Constabu­

lary pressed their campaign.^

One of Manalan's wings encountered a Constabulary de­

tachment near Malasiqui under the command of Reyes, a native inspector.^ Prior to this, the band had attacked

Inspector Reyes' Constabulary post at San Carlos in a

desperate effort to obtain arms. Later, they planned to

tear up a railroad in order to make talibones and bolos

to carry on their depredations. Fortunately, however,

they met the indomitable Inspector Reyes who captured the

^Ibid, January 30, 1903, 1.

^This is probably Jose de los Reyes who later became a Major General in the Philippine Army only to be killed by the Japanese during World War II. See Elarth, loc. cit., 173» 194 entire band of thirty-six,all of whom were members of the

Katipunan Society. One held the rank of General while others also held high positions,^

In February of 1903 It. DeWitt captured the remain­ ing high officers of Manalan's force. DeWitt had received information that the band was operating in the northwest part of Pangasinan Province and immediately set out to track them down. DeWitt's command was disguised in plain­ clothes and managed to penetrate the camp and mingle freely with the ladrones before disclosing their identity and arresting the entire lot. Again the outlaws were members of the Katipunan Society. This maneuver proved decisive as there were less than two dozen of the band who remained out.^

Approximately 100 miles northwest from Pangasinan

Province on fne eastern coast of Luzon lies the Isabela

Province. While Manalan was directing his forces on the west coast, still another ex-insurgent officer, Manuel

Tomines, was organizing his band of outlaws in this region.

Tomines had slipped into Isabela Province from ïïueva

Vizcaya Province some time in I903 to begin organizing

% anila Times, January 31, 1903, 1<

'^Ibid, February 13, 1903, !• 195 his force. He was ably assisted by an American army de­ serter, Maurice Sibley. Little was done about 'Tomines until

Lt. William Greene was sent to take charge of Isabela Pro­ vince in mid-December of 190$. Lt. Greene quickly deter­ mined that Tomines commanded a large, well-armed band with forty guns in the southern district of Isabela.^

Upon evaluating the situation, Greene requested that the District Chief, Major Garwood, dispatch reinforcements before attempting to attack Tomines' superior force. Gar­ wood complied and personally accompanied a force of nearly

200 additional soldiers which arrived on January 10, 1904.

Prior to Garwood's arrival, however, Tomines commenced his campaign with an attack on the town of Naguilian. Accompanied by nearly 200 armed men with thirty or forty rifles, the band secretly infiltrated the barrio on the night of January 2, 1904. Simultaneously they attacked the small Constabulary garrison under a native n.c.o. and the home of a Justice of the Peace whom Tomines had hoped to kill. The garrison was routed. The home of the offensive judge was riddled with bullets, several of his servants were brutally murdered and Q his wife kidnapped before the band made good their escape.^

Gp.P.C., 1904, III, 105-106,

^Ibid, 106: Manila Times, January 22, 1904, 1. 196

The campaign dragged on until March but without any decisive engagements although a great many captures and arrests were made which filled to capacity the provincial

jail. The Constabulary's campaign was interrupted by a serious mutiny of the Constabulary in Vigan, the capital of Iloco Sur Province. As a result, Major Garwood was compelled to leave Isabela Province for approximately two weeks in order to stabilize developments on the western coast. Upon his return a vigorous effort was instituted and Tomines and Sibley were separated. Tomines' group found themselves so hard pressed that the men began to desert and surrender their weapons. On March 21, 1904 a

Constabulary detachment struck Tomines in the barrio of

Mallid and after a short fight routed the entire band, capturing several rifles and nearly 600 rounds of airmiuni- 10 non.

Several other skirmishes developed before Tomines was captured while making a visit to his brother's house in Eaguilian in an effort to obtain food and clothing.

Lts. McLean and Collins had received word of Tomines' presence and immediately posted a guard around the house.

McLean entered the house by the back door and Collins by lOp.P.C., 1904, III, 107, 197 the fronto Upon entry, McLean observed Tomines dozing on a bed with a pistol in his hand. He raced across the room reaching the bandit just before he was fully alerted.

In the struggle which followed, McLean choked the outlaw with his bare hands, disarmed him and took him prisoner.

This brought to a close the so-called "Tomines Insurrec­ tion."^^

The campaign had netted twenty-eight rifles plus an assortment of other weapons and the entire band was either killed or captured except for five men who fled with

Sibley. Tomines was tried and sentenced to death and most of his followers sent to Bilibid Prison in Manila. During his trial Tomines swore that he had been commissioned by a 12 ring in Manila under Ricarte, to organize and lead the uprising. Tomines had been led to believe that he would only have to resist the Constabulary in I.sabela Province and was greatly surprised when Major Garwood quickly mobilized detachments from the neighboring provinces and converged on Isabela Province. Garwood's action proved decisive and resulted in the suppressing of what con­ ceivably could have been a serious uprising. As it was llp.P.C., 1904-, III, 107: Manila Times, March 22, 1904, 1.

“I p General Artemio Ricarte served as one of Aguinaldo's generals and for years continued to resist American domination of the islands. See Ibid; R.P.G, 1913- 1914, 178; Worcester, loc. cit., 197; Manila Times, February 8, 9, 23, and March 3, 10, 1904. 198 the movement was destroyed and in early October Sibley himself was compelled to surrender to Governor Curry of

Isabela Province.

Regardless of the depredations of both Manalan and

Tomines, the main outlaw organization immediately north of Manila was the Santa Iglesia under the leadership of

"Pope" Pelipe Salvador*. In the outlaw or ladron hierarchy, Salvador ranks equally with Oolache, Ola, San

Miguel, Guillermo, Paustino, and even Montalon as being the most dangerous to the maintenance of peace. Pelipe

Salvador unquestionably was one of the most colorful and effective native leaders in this decade. He was reported to have been the son of a Spanish friar and organized the Santa Iglesia movement in 1894-. He was one of the leaders in the fight against Spain and in 1899

Aguinaldo made him a colonel in the revolutionary forces. But when the insurgents surrendered to the

Americans, Salvador took to the hills and became an outlaw.

Salvador's Santa Iglesia,or Holy Church Society, had considerable support from the natives especially

^%anila Times, October 10, 1904, 1.

^^Letter to the Honorable A. C. Carson from H. H. Bandholtz, April 18, 190?, Bandholtz MSS; R.P.G., 1906, II, 239. 199 in the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, northern Tarlac,

Pangasinan, and Eneva Ecija. The society was in fact a qnasi-religions sect. Its members were given or sold crucifixes and rosaries by Salvador and used various forms of worship similar to those of the Catholic Church,

Salvador himself posed as a prophet, wore long hair, and conducted elaborate religious exercises. Whenever pos­ sible he would conduct these services prior to or during the actual time when his men were committing murders or other depredations. His followers were usually ignorant and superstitious natives yet appeared to be very devout in their prayers and religious observations,^^

The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands,

Ignacio Villamor, once stated that Salvador was probably the most skillful, astute, witty and eloquent of all those outlaws which formed quasi-religious sects,

That Villamor's evaluation was accurate is well illustrated by even a brief glimpse at this man’s career and the methods he used to generate support for his movement. Por example,

in order to impress his ignorant followers with his

^^Ibid,

IGphid, 1906, 1, 31,

^^Ignacio Villamor, Criminality in the Philippine Islands : 1905-1908, Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1 9 0 9 , 31. 200 prophetic powers, Salvador would regularly obtain weather forecasts from the Manila weather bureau and then skill­ fully use this information to convince his followers of his unusual powers. Salvador preached a socialist doctrine and promised his followers ownership of the land and many other benefits once they overthrew the government. He warned that there would be another "great flood" and fire which would destroy all the unbelievers. Following this, he stated, there would be rain of gold and jewels for all 19 those who followed his movement.

Salvador also advocated plural marriages or polygamy and it was reported that every month he had a virgin pre­ sented to him in the hope that from this union there would be born a Redeemer, a Saviour of the Philippine Islands, who would free the Filipinos from the hands of the oppressor 20 and drive the invaders into the sea.

In many respects Salvador used the tactics which were later perfected by Mao Is© tung. He deliberately treated the people of the barrios very well and did not rob or 21 harm them unless they were known to be his enemies. l^Ibid.

^^Manila Times, July 20, 1905, 1.

Zlg.P.C., 1905, II, 239. 201

Salvador's method of obtaining money, recruits and supplies followed a definite pattern» Claiming to be a "Pope" he would enter a town with a band of his followers all of whom wore long hair and biblical-type clothes and plant a bamboo cross in the center of the plaza. He then began his exhortations and quickly worked the population into a frenzy to the point where the people willingly turned over money and many joined his force. He was considered by the natives as being something of a modern Robin Hood. It proved difficult for the Constabulary to obtain information because he commanded the sympathy of the natives due to his judicious treatment of the people and his eloquent attire 22 and speeches.

Using these tactics Salvador had little difficulty in maintaining a substantial fighting force. His military tactics were similar to those used by other ladron leaders in that he never personally led his men in battle but would stand off at a distance and direct their movements while offering prayers for their success. Salvador was constantly surrounded by a double personal bodyguard detachment which usually consisted of twenty men. These men were divided into two groups. When he was not moving the inner group of

^^Manila Times, March 28, 1905? 1< 202

six men knelt in a circle surroLmding him, faced outward

and continuously prayed with th^ir eyes closed. The re­

maining bodyguard formed another circle several yards from

the inner circle and they too offered prayers hut with

their eyes open. No one other than the guards talked pz directly to Salvador.

Salvador maintained his headquarters on Mt. Arayat from which he usually directed the many forays of his

roving hand. The objective of his force usually was to

raid small detachments or towns in an attempt to obtain

firearms. During the raids, Salvador’s force was usually

supplemented by large numbers of bolomen who were anxious

to cooperate with this "man of God." He told his followers

during fighting that their clubs would turn to rifles if

they fought bravely and were faithful to the movement. If 24 not, they deserved to pass on to the next world.

Little is known of Salvador's activities during 1901- 1902 except that he was arrested and confined in the pro­ vincial jail of Nueva Ecija in 1902, While confined he

told his followers that he was in jail of his own free will

andithat his confinement was a voluntary expiation of his

Z^lbid, July 20, 19O6 , 1.

1906, II, 239. 203

sins on earth. He said it was God's own wish and that at

any time he decided to leave jail he wonld merely walk ont

of the place. Later while Constabulary guards were convey­

ing him to Bilibid Prison in Manila he did manage to escape,

thus his followers believed it to be a realization of one

of his many prophecies,

Por his first major raid, Salvador selected the Con­

stabulary post at Ban Jose, Nueva Ecija, With approximately

ICO men and forty guns, Salvador's top fighting officer,

Manuel Garcia, better known as Captain lui, attacked the

post on September 16, 1903» The fact that Salvador was

confident that he could overrun this post is in itself

significant since that town was garrisoned by a full:,

company of Constabulary under an American officer. The attack

began about 12:30 when the sentinel was fired upon by the

outlaws. The alarm was sounded and the Constabulary re­

sponded immediately with several volleys which halted the

initial attack. On the third effort one ladron officer,

Captain Beyron, jumped on the breastwork and shouted to the

Constabulary: "We are here by appointment; keep your

promises; kill your commanding officer." This so alarmed the

enlisted men that all firing ceased for a few seconds. If

the American officer, Lt. Wakely immediately had not shot

^^Villamor, loc, cit, 31» 204 this man the garrison conceivably might have rallied to the outlawso With the fall of the leader, nonetheless,the fighting resumed with renewed vigor on both sides.

A party of bolomen meanwhile managed to enter the guard house where they obtained several rifles and turned them on the Constabulary. By this time five Constables had already been killed and three wounded. The fighting lasted fully two hours when Lt, Wakely ordered a flank assault and drove the band off after killing eleven. In this action this gallant officer was slightly wounded on the right hip when a bullet struck his belt and exploded thirteen Krag cartridges and momentarily knocked him senseless. Following Wakely's flanking movement, the band divided with sixty accompanying Salvador and another forty speeding off in another direction. The Constabulary under

Captain Kavanagh pursued one wing of the band but with little success. For his extreme bravery in this fero­ cious hand-to-hand fighting, Lt, James W. Wakely and several Constabulary enlisted men were awarded the coveted

Medal of Valor.

2GR.F.C., 1903, III, 135: Ibid, 1904, III, ?1: Manila Times, September 16, 1903, 1° ^^General Order No. 86, Philippine Constabulary Headquarters, Manila, 1903 Series: Manila Times, December 5, 1903, 1» 2 0 5

After the raid on San Jose, Salvador crossed into

Pangasinan Province and within a week nearly killed

Captain Pickards,the Senior Inspector, Rickards had re­

ceived information that Salvador was hiding in Monoado in

Tarlac Province, He decided to take a Constabulary de­

tachment disguised in civilian clothes and attempt to

capture the noted leader. Rickards picked up a guide along

the way and surrounded the house in which he was told

Pelipe was sleeping. When Rickards forced an entrance,

however, he found just one of Salvador's officers along with a native woman. While he was interrogating his

captives, the Constabulary guard was shot and the house

surrounded by members of the outlaw force. But the native

sergeant who had ac comp an." ad Rickards into the house im­ mediately shouted in the native dialect that if they

attacked he would personally kill all in the house in­

cluding the woman. The sergeant furthermore cautioned

the ladrones that his shot would be a warning signal to

other Constables in the area. It was a bluff, but it worked. At midnight the small detachment made good their

escape and notified the Senior Inspector of Tarlac Pro­ vince, Captain Thompson, who immediately organized a force 28 and scoured the area attempting to track down the culprit.

^^Ibid, September 23, 1903, 1< 206

Following the attack on Son Jose, Salvador directed

several other minor raids in order to obtain weapons from

the mimicipal police but his force invariably treated the natives and their property with the utmost respect. In

one raid not a shot was fired. The ladrones surprised

the sleeping municipal police, stole their weapons, and

kidnapped a local town official. With these depredations,

all Constabulary units in the infested provinces were

ordered to concentrate on Salvador's band. Yet the Con­

stabulary encountered considerable difficulty because

Salvador had the sympathy of the natives. Thus it was al­ most impossible to obtain any information even with the PQ promise of large rewards. ^

For the next three years Salvador committed few depreda­

tions and seemed satisfied to enlarge his following and

treasurer using tactics previously outlined. The Constabu­

lary continued their efforts to track down the band but with

limited success. So frustrating were the results that

Colonel Scott, the Director of the First District, stated

that in his opinion it would probably be necessary to rely

almost completely on the secret service agents in order to ZQ penetrate the band and destroy it from within.^

Z^E.F.O., 1 9 0 3 , III, 65.

30lbid, 1905, III, 55. 207

Well might Colonel Scott have been disillusioned, and frustrated for not only did Salvador continue to elude the

Constabulary but it was reported that during the lull of the actual fighting, his organization was rapidly expand­ ing. For example, in March of 19055 a sister organization to the Santa Iglesia movement, the Guardia de Honor, was reported to have been spreading rapidly throughout the north­ ern provinces of Luzon. Prior to this the Guardia de Honor had been confined to the province of Pagasinan and La Union.

But with Salvador's continuing success, its influence spread to the point where it had a reported membership of no fewer 51 than 5)000" It was also reported in March that Salvador was actively converting the natives in the province of Nueva

Ecija especially in the vicinity of the capital, San Isidro.

Throughout this entire period, Salvador moved almost at will

since the natives refused to give information to the govern­ ment authorities, despite the fact that the government in­

creased the reward for Salvador to 2,000 pesos.

On September 15, 1905) a Constabulary detachment of

twenty men located Salvador in the great Candaba Swamp

^^Manila Times, March 1?, 1905, 1 and March 21, I9 0 5 , 1. March 28, 1905, 1. 208 in Pampanga Province, A sharp fight developed in which one long-haired follower of Salvador was killed hut the leader himself managed to escape although losing several weapons.

Additional Constabulary units were rushed into the area in order to surround the swamp and prevent Salvador's escape but the elusive outlaw nonetheless managed to maintain his freedom.

By the spring of 1906, Salvador was confident that his force was prepared to launch a major uprising. He decided to attack Malolos, the capital of Bulacan Province, Since he never personally led his men in battle, he selected

Manuel Garcia, better known as Captain Tui, to lead the assault. Captain Tui had already earned for himself an excellent reputation as being an extremely aggressive fighter. In fact, he was referred to as being a "jura- mentado" a name given to the Moslems in the south once they took an oath to die killing Christians. Like most ladron leaders Garcia was convinced of the power of his anting-anting, and therefore even in dangerous encounters he advanced with little concern for the enemy. In battle,

Garcia bared his breast, wore a bronze medal of the Holy

Trinity on his forehead and carried in his pocket a bronze cross, all of which were supposed to make him immune

^^Ibid, September 15, 1905, 1. 209 to any weapons used by his enemies.

Accompanied by approximately eighty bolomen Garcia personally led the attack. The outlaws surprised the Con­ stabulary cuartel and killed three Constables in addition to wounding ten others before completing their mission.

They captured twenty-two Springfield carbines and 1800 rounds of aiomunition in one of the most successful raids during the aftermath of the insurrection. Simultaneously another Santa Iglesia unit attacked Camp Hayson which was located approximately midway between Manila and Cavite

Province® This attack, however, was repulsed due to the splendid leadership of Major Orwig. The attack at Camp

Hayson somewhat typifies the tactics frequently used by the ladrones in that they marched into town when the plaza was crowded and attacked the cuartel while shouting "Viva

Santa Iglesia." But Major Orwig rallied his command and drove off the invaders. Orwig himself was nearly killed in this fight but Lt. McRae shot the would-be assassin before he could complete his task. ^

The Constabulary at Bulacan and Pampanga Provinces vigorously pursued Captain Tui. Many were captured,

^^Villamor, loc. cit., 51-52.

^%an.ila Times, April 16, 1906, 1 and 6: The Times (London) April 17, 1906, 5: R.P.C., 1906, II, 240. 210 including a mere boy who was the trumpeter of the force»

One of the major objectives of the Constabulary was to cut off the route leading to the Candaba Swamp» Major Orwig directed the encircling movement but unfortunately this effort proved unsuccessful. Salvador and his force again escaped the net»

In early May, 1906 Governor Sandiko made a desperate effort to gain the active support of the people in order to destroy Salvador's force» The Governor threatened to reconcentrate the people if they refused to cooperate.

But this had little effect and the "long hairs" or "fuzzy wuzzies", as the local press referred to Salvador's followers, continued on the warpath. They moved into

Pangasinan Province and looted the barrio of Malasit.

The Constabulary rushed in and managed to capture one but failed to retrieve the stolen goods.^ By mid-May, the

Constabulary high command had rushed all available rein­ forcements into this infested area and began converging on

Salvador's headquarters on Mt. Arayat. In addition to the

Constabulary from Eueva Ecija, Pampangas, and Bulacan

^%anila Times, April 18, 1906, 1 and April 19, 1906, 1. 57lbid, May 4, 1906, 1<

5Glbid, May 9, 1906, 1. 211

Provinces, a company of Constables from the Constabulary

School in Manila was . thrown into this campaign.

Salvador again eluded capture and moved east back into Bulacan Province. On May 15 his so-called "fuzzy wuzzies" attempted to raid the Constabulary cuartel at

San Rafael. The outlaws armed primarily with bolos ap­ proached the post from three directions. They had hoped to surprise the Constabulary as they had done at Malo.los but the sentry on duty became suspicious of the movements and ordered them to halt and opened fire when they failed to heed his warning. Peeling that the risk was too great, the outlaws turned tail and fled. The Constabulary gave pursuit but the outlaws managed to make good their escape.

After the abortive raid on San Rafael, Salvador and his force rapidly moved north into Mueva Ecija Province.

Here they rested and regrouped and toward the end of May began a quick march toward the capital of Nueva Ecija, San

Isidro. At this time Salvador commanded approximately 300

armed men with a total of 100 rifles and it was feared that

he might attempt to capture the capital city. However the

Constabulary and municipal police in southern Nueva Ecija

Province converged on the capital and apparently convinced

39ibid, May 15, 1906, 1.

^Ibid, May 16, 1906, 1. 212 the outlaws of the futility of such an endeavor and the raid never took place.

With the government pressure constantly mounting, a large wing of Salvador's army attempted to flee the Bulacan area. They sailed in several small sailing ships across

Manila Bay and. landed in Bataan Province. This force was under the command of Captain Tui who had hoped to receive support from the people in that province. He was bitterly disappointed when this assistance failed to materialize.

Furthermore, he was met by the determined Constabulary officer Captain Herman Hall who had been ordered to Bataan

Province to take charge of the operations. Undoubtedly

Hall had been ordered to Bataan because his regular army rank was sufficient to enable him to command detachments of Scouts. Hall chased Captain Tui and his band around the coast of Bataan and finally compelled the outlaws to flee that province. In early July, Carcia sailed back across Manila Bay and attempted to re-establish opera- /.I p tions in Bulacan Province.

The Bulacan Constabulary, however, had no intention of permitting Captain Tui to re-enter without a fight. In early July, Lt. Jose de los .Reyes at Hagonoy received mi Ibid, May 29, 1906, 1, ^'-R.P.C., 1906, 11, 240. 213 intelligence which, pinpointed the location of the band.

Reyes with nineteen Constables and four municipal police struck the outlaw force early in the morning of July 9»

The fight took place in a swampy rice field. Captain Tui had approximately fifty men with thirty rifles and the outlaws were so confident that they shouted taunts to the

Constabulary and demanded their surrender. Lt. Reyes pur­ sued his attack but soon found himself nearly overwhelmed by the superior force. He gallantly defended his position until reinforcements arrived in mid morning under Lts,

Walker and Bustos, In this fight twenty ladrones were killed including the infamous Captain Tui or Manuel Garcia,

The death of Captain Tui marked the end of this fanati­ cal sect as a fighting organization, Salvador remained at large until 1910 but was fatally weakened and seemed con-

44- tent to playing hide and seek with government spies.

His small army broke up into many poorly organized bands.

Salvador himself could find no fixed abode and was com­ pelled constantly to move back and forth throughout the

■^Manila Times, July 11, 1906, 1 and July 30, 1906, 2: R.PoC,, 1905, II, 240. Also see Letter to Colonel James G, Harbord from Colonel Bandholtz, July 28, I9O6, Band- holtz MSS. ZiZl Villamor, loc, cit,, 52, 214 provinces in this area»^^ He was reduced to living in the swamps and mountains along the Nueva Ecija and

Tarlac Provinces hut was protected by the natives who continued to believe in his supernatural powers.^^

The destruction of Salvador's force completed the pacification of northern Luzon. There were no other major ladron organizations in that area. Thus, the

Constabulary began to devote its full attention toward: extending the civil government's control into the hitherto impenetrable lands of the head-hunters.

^^RoP.G., 1907, II, 298-299 and 291,

^^Ibid, 269. CHAPTER 1%

THE CONSTABULARY AND THE HEAD-HUNTERS OE NORTHERN LUZON

It is not a war for robbery nor dominance, but to take heads, as the American Indian once took scalps, and the head of the old, young, sick or infirm of either sex, confers equal glory» These wild tribes are warriors, as wild as any that roam the earth, and their lusts for the blood of the native Christian or their tribal enemies is as strong as was, in its day, the thirst of the Sioux or Cheyenne for the blood of the paleface» The decline of head-hunting and its ever present peril to the lowland provinces of north­ ern Luzon are entirely dependant upon the.increase of the Constabulary stations in that region.

In the head-hunting regions of northern Luzon, the Con­

stabulary 's task was considerably different than in southern

Luzon» Military activities in the north were not directed

against organized bands, rather they were limited to punitive 2 expeditions against warring tribes. The civil government recognized the special problems in attempting to govern these

wild people and in 19O8 the head-hunting region of northern

Luzon was designated as Mountain Province. Later it was

further divided into five sub-provinces according to

ethnic groups. The major tribes in this area were the

^Colonel James G. Harbord, Acting Director of the Constabulary in his annual report for I9O8, See R.P»0., 1908, II, $68-369.

^Dbid, 19O6 , II, 2 2 9 .

213 216

Igorrote, the Apayao, the Bontoc, the Ifugao, and the

Kalinga.^

From time Limmemorial these wild mountain people had engaged in the practice of head-hunting, some for a type of religious motive but most because it was the accepted measure by which a man was judged. Bor example the women would have nothing to do with the man who had not proven himself by taking a head. They frequently asked for proof of the bravery of their suitors in the form of. fingers or other parts of the body. Most heads were taken in the months of January, February and March after the completion of the harvest. The tribesmen would travel in bands of fifty to 100 and seek out the small parties in order to fulfill their mission. They usually killed their victims with bows and arrows and after taking the head mutilated - the body in the most shocking manner.^

Despite this grotesque custom, these tribes were not completely primitive. They lived in bamboo houses, used cooking utensils, raised rice and garden truck and had horses and carabaos. They usually lived in so-called

^Forbes, loc. cit., I, 589”591«

Manila Times, March 30, 1902, 3; For the bloody details of these episodes see Cornelis DeV/itt Willcox, Headhunters of Northern Luzon and Independence of the Philippines, Kansas City, 1912. 217 rancherias which closely resembled the barrio and usually consisted of anywhere from six to twenty huts. They con­ ducted many raids not only for head-hunting but to capture prisoners whom they would either keep as slaves or sell.

Some of the more fortunate slaves were actually sold to

Christians who converted them to that religion.^

Prior to the organization of the Mountain Province in

I9O8 , the Constabulary had little contact with these head­ hunters except on the periphery of the central mountainous regions. Nonetheless within months of the organization of the Constabulary, detachments of this corps were sent out to track down a notorious Ibilao head-hunter who had been c terrorizing Pangasinan Province near the city of Sanquintin.

Next to the Igorrotes, the Ibilaos, who inhabited the

Sierra Madre Mountains which separated the province of

Pangasinan from Nueva Ecija, were the most ferocious of the various head-hunting tribes. During the head-hunting season the Ibilaos traveled in large bands and killed almost in­ discriminately. These warriors performed many other acts to prove their bravery not a few of which consisted of a 7 variety of self-punishment,

^R.P.C., 1901, I, 149-158ff: Ibid, 1903, III, 58-50. %anila Times, March 25, 1902, 1 and 5. ‘^Ibid, June 6 , 1902, 4-. 218

The first serious outbreak occurred in Lepanto-Bontoc

Province in the spring of 1903» The natives in this region had a long history of head-hunting and other criminal activities dating far back into the Spanish period. The

Spaniards, in fact, had never succeeded in pacifying the natives and on two occasions were thoroughly defeated by the wild people. As the years passed the region surrounding

Barlig became a haven for criminals. In the spring of 1903, a small Constabulary detachment was sent to Bail ig to arrest five murderers. The entire population greeted the soldiers and expressed their willingness to fight rather than sur­ render the fugitives. As a result, in May of I903, the

Senior Inspector, Captain Nathorst, organized a large force which consisted of ninety-six Constables and moved in to crush this petty insurrection.

After a harrowing night march through the mountains,

Nathorst and his command reached a plateau, 7,000 feet above sea level. The trail led through an extremely dense forest and at times it was entirely covered by long grass.

Travelling under these conditions, the patrol was constantly exposed to ambushes. The head-hunters also placed sharp-pointed bamboo sticks at a forty-five degree 219 angle along the trails in order to impede the Constahu- lary's advance. Fortunately these natives had no know­ ledge of poisoning.

About a mile outside of Barlig,Wathorst was met by the presidents of that town who pretended friendship with the government authorities but when Nathorst demanded the surrender of five criminals, the town official fled and alerted his people to prepare for hostilities. Upon entering the town, Nathorst noticed that the women, children, animals and everything of value had disappeared, obviously being taken to the nearby surrounding mountains. But large numbers of warriors had gathered on a nearby hill and greeted

Nathorst with laughter and sneers. At this time, the warriors began a slow descent chanting their war dance as they obviously prepared for an attack. They were armed with spears, shields and head-hunting axes. But rather than take advantage of his superior fire power, Nathorst took up a strong defensive position, hoping to use diplomacy to ac­ complish his mission.

During the first evening the natives attacked amid much shouting and yelling, but they were easily repelled. The next morning Nathorst ordered several detachments to advance and chased the natives away. Following this, he instructed his soldiers to destroy the town and rice crops as well as 220 dynamite the rice paddy walls* Once completed, the de­ tachment hegan its descent, being constantly confronted by hostile natives and, of course, the inevitable bamboo sticks.

Even though the five fugitives had not been apprehended,

Nathorst was pleased with the results of his expedition.

He felt the natives had been taught a lesson and would no longer resist American power. Shortly after the destruction of their village, the Igorrotes contacted the Constabulary and turned over the five fugitives, declaring their inten- Q tion to cooperate with the government authorities.

Several months after Nathorst's Barlig expedition, the Igorrotes head-hunters of Lepanto-Bontoc again went on the warpath. In mid-November a head-hunting party crossed into the territory near the pueblo of Bugias in­ habited by their traditional rivals. They kidnapped a number of women and children, stole all available livestock, and took eight heads. Captain Melton, the Senior Inspector of Benguet, who was stationed at Baguio, pursued the party with a detachment of Constabulary and a large number of Q volunteer Igorrotes,

°Nathorst's Barlig expedition was considered particularly indicative of Constabulary activities in northern Luzon and thus was included in the annual reports of the Philippine Commission in great detail. See R.P.CJ, 1903, III, 6p-63: Manila Times, July 14, 1903, 1° ^Ibid, November 15, 1903, 1, 221

In March of 1904, Lt. Percy A. Hill, commander of

the Third Constabulary Company in Nueva Ecija, conducted

a week long expedition deep into the mountainous regions

of the head-hunterso No Spaniard or American had ever visited this particular area. Fortunately It. Hill was

interviewed by a correspondent of the Manila Times and

thus the details of this interesting expedition have been preserved. Hill organized this expedition in an attempt to track down several murders in the northern section of

Nueva Ecija. He hoped that a punitive expedition would convince the head-hunters of the government's overwhelming power, and thus deter further raids. The patrol left San

Jose early in March and moved deep into the mountains. It was a severe trial for the Constables as the trails were almost impassable and they were compelled to wade through numerous rivers and ponds which were infested with leaches and other vermin.

Upon reaching their destination, they were received peacefully. The Constabulary commander held numerous conferences with the chiefs and stressed the necessity of ceasing all head-hunting activities. During one of these conferences, the chiefs asked the Constables to 222 fire their rifles in a demonstration. Since he did not want to waste ammunition Lt, Hill initially refused, but when a number of warriors began to close in, Hill changed his mind. Several rounds were fired through two of the wooden shields. The chiefs were duly impressed and Hill again emphasized the necessity of stopping head-hunting raids but received no firm commitment. On his return, there was one ambush but several rounds was sufficient to drive the head-hunters off,^^

Meanwhile to the north Nueva. Ecija, the Igorrotes of

Nueva Vizcaya, once again went on the vrai'path. The

Igorrotes of Guinea, Nueva Vizcaya traditionally had con­ ducted raids across the mountain divide into the Bontoc region. The Guines regularly raided the town of Balangao in Bontoc, In the spring of 1904, the Guines savages con­ ducted a raid of this nature. The Senior Inspector of

Bontoc wired the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya requesting authorization to enter that province on a punitive expedi­ tion. He received no response. Nonetheless the Senior

Inspector assumed full responsibility and sent Lt, Miller of the Bontoc Constabulary into the land of Guines. Miller was the first Constabulary officer and in fact the first

American personally to observe the method of fighting

^^Ibid, March 15, 1904, 1. 223

between these hostile wild tribes and therefore his report

was included in the official report of the Philippine

Commission.

The expedition began on the morning of March 12,

1 9 0 4 , and consisted of a detachment of twenty enlisted men from the station at Bontoc. Miller's objective was

Guines where he hoped to arrest the five men responsible

for the recent head-hunting raid in Balangao. After a

difficult march, Miller reached the town of Barlig and was

met by the présidente and a number of his warriors. The

town leader agreed to serve as a guide, along with twenty

Igorrotes. Upon reaching Balangao, the présidente initially

refused to cooperate with the Constabulary. He warned Miller

that his small force would be annihilated by the 2,000 Guines

warriors who frequently expressed their desire to engage an

invading army in order to obtain a new supply of heads.

Undeterred, Miller continued his advance on Guines.

The mountains were very hazardous and in many places it

was necessary for the Constables to literally pull themselves

R.P.C., 1 9 0 4 , III, 109-114. It was only rarely that the "Monthly Report of Conditions and Occurences", such as Miller's was included in the printed reports of the Philippine Commission. These reports were made monthly by Constabulary officers in duplicate, but were lost or destroyed during World War II. Throughout this study, less than a dozen of these reports have been discovered, thus they are exceedingly rare. 224-

up the steep incline by trees. Occasionally they were

compelled to lift one another up the side of the mountain

in "piggy-back" fashion. Once they reached the crest,

Miller ordered his detachment to make all haste in order to

get out of the underbrush before the Guines could be alerted

and organize a surprise attack. About this time Miller

learned that a number of warriors from Balangao had joined

the expedition. He attempted to persuade them to return but

this proved impracticable because the entire group was then

surrounded by Guines warriors. Miller therefore decided to move rapidly into Guines in order to conclude his business

quickly.

As Miller approached the town he observed a number of warriors closing to the rear and surrounding his little band. Later a group of Guines approached Miller and planted a Katipunan flag in the ground. Lt. Miller then opened negotiations with the leader, and attempted to convince the chief of his friendly intentions. At that time, several hundred Guines began to approach the Constables, Lt. Miller instructed the chief to order his warriors to put down their weapons but his request was met with jeers.

The Guines then began to chant their war songs. About this time Miller noticed a large number of Balangao warriors coming in over the same trail which the Constabulary had 225 recently entered the town. They had followed the Constahu- lary detachment force without being detected. The Gonstables occupied the ground between these two head-hunting tribes which were traditional and bitter enemies. Miller, none­ theless, maintained his presence of mind and immediately ordered the president of Balangao to lead his men back towards their home area. The Balangaos, numbering approxi­ mately 700 warriors, explained that they could not with­ draw because they too were surrounded by a superior force.

Miller than turned to the chief of Guines and attempted to explain the presance of the Bhlangaos, but warned that if the Guines attacked, his Constables would open fire. Again the Guines responded with jeers and taunts and began chanting

"Wait until tonight, wait until tonight."

What followed is best described in Miller's own words;

About this time a large body of Guines warriors was seen to break from the grass upon the retiring Balangao warriors. I attempted to place my detachment between the assailants and the assailed, but it was necessary to cross a number of rice terraces which were blocked in places by the Balangao people. . . .-Although I tried to stop the fighting by shouting at them and threatening them my voice was drown out by the noise, and had they been able to hear me they could not have understood me. While in that position two of the Balangao warriors were killed by their opponents within a few yards of me. The fighting was in the form of duels, two and two fight­ ing while the other warriors would not interfere. The combatants did not throw their spears, but thrust with them and guarded with their shields. After one of the combatants was down the other was allowed to finish killing him. In one case the victor was seen to twist his spear in the body of the unfortunate opponent. In several cases one of the opponents being wounded, would make his way back to his friends alive.

In this way Lt. Miller recorded the first known observation of combat tactics of these primitive people.

The Guines then began a general advance. Miller deploy­ ed and several volleys were fired in order to retard their advance. This proved a successful deterrant and the Guines withdrew. The Balangaos also began a general retreat and were followed by the Constables.

It was nearly dusk when Miller finally located a strong defensive position and made his camp. During the night, the

Guines continued to harass his force but with little avail.

One young Balangao warrior, however, was struck by a barbed spear in the leg. The shaft was broken and then the spear pushed completely through the legs since it could not be withdrawn owing to its construction. The result was the bones were cut clean and nothing could be done for this warrior as he lay dying from loss of blood. Meanwhile, the

Balangaos improved their defensive position by cutting a number of pointed sticks and placing them a few yards in advance of their own position.

^%.P.C. , 1904, III, 114c 227

Miller, in order to weaken the prestige of the leader of the Guines, several times attempted to provoke him into a personal duel hut without success. The next morning, the

Constabulary detachment began its march up the mountains.

They returned to Bontoc Province on March 18 with little difficulty, thus bringing to a close this interesting and rare expedition into the hitherto impenetrable land of the head-hunters.^^

So far as can be determined, the head-hunters remained inactive for nearly a year after Miller's expedition. But in February of 1905j the Igorrotes again went on the war­ path in Nueva Vizcaya Province. A band of 100 head-hunters fought a pitched battle with a detachment of Constabulary under the command of Lt. Levi E. Case, the acting Senior

Inspector of this province. This fight took place on

February 19, in the district of Fapao at the rancheria of

Sagaui. It was reported that the engagement was triggered off by Lt, Case's effort to liberate a kidnapped woman. In the fight one Constable was killed but eight head-hunters lost their lives in this engagement.

In June of I9 0 5 , both the Igorrotes and the Ilongotes in Nueva Ecija Province again resumed their head-hunting

13 Ibid. ^^Manila Times, February 2?, 1905, 1= 228

activities. Eight heads were taken by the Ilongotes while

Major Orwig, the Senior Inspector, was temporarily absent

from the Gonstabulaj?y headquarters at Bayombong. Two of

the victims were Christians and the remainder members of the pagan tribes. The Constabulary launched a minor campaign to track down these marauding bands and managed to capture fourteen Ilongotes, four of whom confessed to the murders. Major Orwig himself, upon his return, spent sixteen days in the field tracking these bands. During this expedition Orwig was fired upon by a group of Igorrotes 15 and in a sharp exchange five natives were killed.

While Orwig was tracking down head-hunters in Nueva

Ecija Province, Major Crawford, the Chief of the Fourth

Constabulary District with Lt. W. D. Harris, the Acting

Senior Inspector of Lepanto-Bontoc Province, and forty

Constables launched an expedition to investigate other reports of head-taking. The force departed on May 9 and marched 250 miles crossing over mountains nearly 8,000 feet from sea level and virgin forests, Crawford and his detachment finally reached the Balangao country and per­ suaded the chiefs of the warring tribes to enter a confer­ ence, This is significant since one of the prime tasks of the American officers in northern Luzon was to use l^ibid, June 2, 1905, 1. 229 diplomacy whenever possible to convince the warring head­ hunters that it was in their best interests to cease these practices.

With the exception of one chief, the leaders agreed to enter a truce. The dissenting chief, Mauwig of the

Balangao tribe, refused to do so until his adversaries presented him with a head in order to even the score.

Mauwig found it difficult to understand Crawford's reluctance to agree to such terms. When no agreement was reached ten­ sion mounted and Crawford felt it expedient temporarily to disband the conference. The next morning the fighting men of Chief Mauwig gathered with freshly sharpened weapons, obviously preparing to take the head themselves. Crawford persuaded them to disperse and Mauwig reluctantly resumed the negotiations. Finally an agreement was reached in which all tribes in that section of the Cagayan Valley agreed to a truce. Crawford cautioned all that violators would be punished harshly by the government authorities. Following this the Constabulary was host to a fiesta in which a phonograph record was played to the astonishment and enjoy­ ment of all the natives. The Constabulary furnished food and gave presents to all. Crawford, relying on diplomacy rather than force, succeeded in re-establishing peaceful relations between hostile tribes.

^^Ibid, August 14-, 1905» 1= 230

After Crawford's expedition into Balangao country, nothing more was reported from the head-hunting areas until

August of 19060 At that time Major Crawford, still the

Chief of the Fourth District, accompanied by Captain Knauber,

Lt. McIntyre and eight enlisted men, were exploring the upper waters of the Abulug River. The party was returning via a bamboo raft when a group of natives attacked with bows and arrows. There was a brief ex:change and the natives were easily driven off but not before they had wounded several Constables, including Crawford and Knauber.

The attack on Crawford's small force is illustrative of the tactics and problems faced by the Constabulary in northern Luzon. His force had been exploring a section of the Abulug River in order to re-map the entire region be­ cause the old maps were grossly inaccurate. Major Crawford reported that he had no difficulty in beating off the attack which was conducted by Apayao Igorrotes. He concluded despite these hazards that he expected to complete the sur­ vey of this northwest area and:thus produce an accurate 1 R map. Crawford continued his mapping expeditions and in the spring of 190?, he launched an expedition into the

Apayao country in eastern Isabela Province where the

^'^Ibid, August 6 , I9O6 , 1.

^^Ibid, October 22, 1906, 5» 231

iq Kalinga head-hunters dominated the [jungle.

A major problem in any under-developed and wild country is of course the lack of an adequate network of roads. The government authorities were well aware of the need to improve transportation especially in northern Luzon so that the Con­ stabulary might extend its influence into the wild head­ hunting regions. The improvement of transportation was especially important in northern Luzon due to the large provinces. Lor example, as late as 1908 there were only

120 Constables stationed in the large Cagayan Valley which is approximately 10,000 square miles, nearly equal to the PO Island of Samar.

The lack of an adequate road system presented the

Constabulary with additional problems in supplying detach­ ments stationed deep in the interior of the mountainous region. For example, the Constabulary in Lepanto-Bontoc

Province was supplied only with great difficulty from the port of San Esteban, Ilocos Sur on the eastern coast of northern Luzon. Supplies reached this port from Manila and were then loaded on pack trains or the backs of cargadores and transported across a network of trails into the interior. The Chief of the Constabulary

^^Ibid, February 16, 1907, 1. 20R.P.G., 1908, II, 407.

Z^Ibid, 1904, III, 109. 232

recognized this problem and personally designed a special

pack-horse saddle which weighed only seventeen pounds and 2? was used extensively in the mountain country.

A major function of Constabulary detachments in

northern Luzon was to survey and even build new trails

in order to improve transportation for police work.

William E. Dosser, one of the early Constabulary officers

sent into the land of the head-hunters, explained the vital

necessity of improving transportation so that the Constabu­

lary might prevent head-hunting. Dosser's task was to

subdue a large number of head-hunting tribes in the Balangao

country. But he found his task impossible because of the

inadequate road system. Native trails always followed the high ground for defensive purposes. Dosser recognized the necessity of improving the trails, and therefore launched

an ambitious program. One project called for the con­

struction of a horse trail which ran from Dammag through

Bunhian to the Balangao country. Lacking adequate tools,

Dosser was compelled to improvise. To complete this trail he said, "I made my own level from an old carpenter’s level, using a nickled safety razor blade container for a reflector." The road was completed in late 1912 and was considered the best graded road in the mountain country.

^^anila Times, December 12, 1902, 1. 233

'Thus Dosser earned for himself a reputation as an expert

trail-road builder. Following this task Dosser was detached

temporarily at the request of the Secretary of the Interior,

and sent to Iloilo, Province in the Visayan Islands to in- 23 spect the construction of the roads in that area.

Dean C. Worcester, long-time Secretary of Interior of

the Philippine Islands and an authority on the wild people,

outlined the importance of the construction of an adequate road system, Worcester explained that time and time again the government authorities had built a trail to "an ugly, fighting, head-hunting settlement," These people at first treated the road laborers with great hostility and threw spears at them. But when they understood the benefits of improved transportation, invariably they built their own pa trail to meet the government trail.

The Constabulary duties in northern Luzon involved considerably more than enforcing the peace, preventing crime, discouraging raids between head-hunters, and im­ proving transportation. Perhaps their main task was to extend the benefits of civilization to the wild people.

In order to do this, it was necessary for the Constabulary

^Colonel W. E, Dosser, "The Dosser Story of Experiences During Forty-Six Years Service in the Philippines," 23-30. This is an unpublished bound manuscript in the possession of Mrs. W, E, Dosser, 559 Huntley Dr., Los Angeles, California and loaned to the author through an intermediary, Lt, Col. il, H, Elarth, Eet. pn Worcester, loc. cit., 4-4-3. 2$4 to establish, posts deep into the interior. In this way the Constables could protect the more peacefully inclined natives and permit all to observe the benefits of civiliza­ tion. To expedite this objective, in 190? additional sub­ provinces were created in the Mountain Province. Also additional Constables were authorized in order to expand the government's control over the wild people. In this process Constabulary officers were cautioned to use force only as the last resort. Thus in the north diplomacy and not force was the main instrument by which the Constabulary 25 sought to fulfill its mission.

Major Jesse Garwood, Chief of the Fourth District, outlined the civilizing effect which the Constabulary had in these mountainous provinces. Garwood noted that the influence exerted over the tribes by having their young men enlisted in the Constabulary was very great. The young native Constables were encouraged to have their hair cut, bath regularly and remove rings from their ears, legs and arms. They were taught also to read and write. The married enlisted men, almost without exception, took their wives and families from the dirty hovels and placed them in new pine houses where they lived according to the

Z^E.p.o., 1907, II, 31^-315, 368-369. standards set by the Constabulary. The influence was very 2S great and could be seen on all sides. In sum, the native

Constables appeared to be stronger, healthier and better disciplined than non-Constabulary trained members of their own tribe.

Constabulary officers in northern Luzon frequently were required to preside over peace pow-wows between warring tribes. At these conferences, both tribes usually attempted to provoke its opponent into breaking the truce by boasting of the number of heads they had taken from their enemies. Threats were freely exchanged and in many instances only the diplomacy of the American Constabulary officer prevented these outbursts from deteriorating into 2S open conflict. Peace pacts were not infrequently broken for the most trivial reasons. One such agreement for example between two rancherios with a long history of raids and war, lasted four years, but was broken when one chief stated that the truce was no longer valid because the grass had died on the ground where the peace meeting had originally taken place. Following this announcement, two dozen heads were taken before peace was established and a

^^Ibid, 1904, III, 116. 27 ■Willcox, loc. cit., 99" See also Forbes' "Journal," loc. cit.. Ill, 60-641 May 2, 1909. 2«o'a.p.c., 1908, II, 407, 2$e

Constabulary detachment was stationed in that vicinity.

Of course, diplomacy was not always successful and

the Constabulary was compelled vigorously to train their

enlisted men in preparation for military action. In

April of I9O8 Lt. Jeff I). Gallman was ordered to launch

an expedition to catch Lingay, a notorious outlaw, whose band had killed a policeman in the most treacherous manner.

A desperate fight followed in which nine of Lingay's band were killed, and the Constabulary captured ten of the band’s eleven guns. The natives recognized the futility of further resistance and soon made peace with Lt. Gallman, 31 who was also serving as the Lt. Governor in that area.

Even William Dosser, the noted trail builder, had occasionally to resort to the threat of force in order to fulfill a mission. Dosser was tracking down a famous head-hunters Liuayan, who lived in Dammag in the Ifugao country. Liuayan was a massive man and enjoyed his reputation of being one of the country's most fero­ cious badmen. He was reported to have taken no less than

100 heads. When Dosser first visited Liuayan's settlement,

29%.P.O., 1907, II, 312. ^^Manila Time s, April 11, I9O8, 1<

2^Worcester, loc. cit., 499-500. 237 he personally observed a number of heads which decorated

Liuayan's hoisse.

Dosser laid plans to capture Liuayan and made several trips to Dammag to carry out this task, but Liuayan, know­ ing his fate, refused to be drawn into a fight. On one occasion. Dosser and five Constables accidentally sur­ prised the head-hunter. Dosser shoved his sawed-off shotgun in Liuayan's belly and told him notLtoo diplomati­ cally, that the least murmur would be his last. Liuayan made no motion other than meekly placing his arms forward to be handcuffed. His capture brought to a close a notorious career. He was brought to trial, convicted and sentenced to twenty years.

The Constabulary met with limited success in its early efforts to suppress head-hunting. It proved to be a long arduous task. In fact in 19C8, head-hunting reached serious proportions with a record forty-four heads being taken.

Even this did not represent the total heads lost since the tribes seldom bothered to report a raid. Instead, they merely attempted to even the score. Colonel Taylor's annual report of 19C8, read something like a Saturday review of football games in which he said, "Cadaclan and Barlig ex­ changed a head and Mayayao lost a head to the Gaddangs",

^^Dosser, loc. cit., 21-22. 238

etc. 5 etc. Taylor was acutely aware of the problems in­ volved in attempting to suppress this ancient practice.

He argued that the solution to this problem was entirely dependent upon the increase of the Constabulary.^^

In order to control the wild people more effectively,

Colonel Taylor instituted a pass system by which natives of the interior were required to obtain a pass if they desired permission to travel to the lowlands. In this way if a head were taken, it was relatively easy to identify the assailant since the Constabulary could quickly determine which native had been permitted to go into the particular area. The pass system worked effectively and particularly was appreciated by the people of the coastal areas who had traditionally been the objective of periodic raids by the 7)lL head-hunters of the interior.^

Gradually the Constabulary reduced the head-hunting practice.By 1914 Dean Worcester was able to report that he travelled safely throughout the length and breadth of the Mountain Province unescorted and unarmed and usually

^^.P. C . , 1908, II, 407.

^^Ibid, 408.

^^Porbes,’'Journal'; III, 340-341, April 29, 1911. 239 accompanied by his wife=^ Nonetheless these peaceful conditions were directly dependent upon the continued maintenance of an adequate Constabulary force throughout the Mountain Province.

^^Worcester, loc. cit., 452.

^^Dosser, loc. cit., 37» CHAPTER Z

THE PACIFICATION OP NEGROS: I9OI - 190?

The Visayan Island Group, which was designated as Con­ stabulary Third District, consisted of six major islands:

Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte, and Samar. The most turbulent, strife torn island in this group unquestionably was Samar, followed by Leyte and Negros. There was some fighting on Panay and Cebu but the island of Bohol con­ sistently remained tranquil throughout the period I9OI to

1917» In direct contrast to Cebu, Bohol, Leyte and Samar, there was no continuation of the insurrection in either of the Negros Provinces. Nonetheless, large numbers of out­ laws inhabited the central mountain region under the overall leadership of "Papa" Isio.^

As an outlaw leader. Papa Isio ranks with the most notorious of the Philippine Islands, fully equal to Colache,

Ola, San Miguel, Montaion, and Salvador. Isio's meteoric rise to prominence parallels in many respects the other outlawso He was of a peasant background and had worked as a farm laborer in Antique Province on the Island of p Panay and became a fugitive even during-the Spanish Period.

Ip.P.C., 1902, I, 215-218, and 190$, III, 140-141. ^Manila Times, February 6,1905, 4: R.P.C., I907, II, 511. 240 241

During the insurrection, Isio rose to high rank under

General Araneta, the conmiander of the insurgent forces in Negros. But with the surrender of the insurgents, a large section of the insurgent army, under Papa Isio, took to the mountains and began a life of uncurtailed liberty, license, murder and brigandage.^

Isio, whose real name was Dioisio Magbuela, quickly assumed the title of "Pope”, erected crude churches, baptized, performed marriages, and sold anting-antings to his followers.^ He ruled the interior of Negros with

an iron hand and ruthlessly eliminated those who resisted his domination. He preached a doctrine of free love and promised his followers immunity from diseases and other

afflictions if they maintained their loyalty to him.^

Papa Isio's top lieutenant was Dalmacio, whose Mother was a full blood Negroite. Dalmacio was by far the more dangerous fighter, being extremely aggressive and bold.

^"Monthly Report on Occurrences and Conditions (sic). May, 1905»" Negros, Occidental, by John E. White, Senior In­ spector, White MSS. This is one of the exceedingly rare monthly reports which survived World War II. Each Senior Inspector was required to submit these reports in dupli­ cate, one copy going to the District Director and the other to Constabulary Headquarters. So far as can be determined they remained in the Philippines and were lost during the war.

^R.P.C., 1907, II, 310-311- ^Manila Times, February 5, 19055 4. 242

He cominaiided the outlaw forces in northern Negros.^

Isio and Dalmacio dominated the interior of Negros until the arrival of John R. White in the spring of 1902. At that time Negros was virtually prostrate having suffered numerous misfortunes during the insurrection against both

Spain and the United States. There had been the usual droughts and animal epidemics which carried off the carabao, thus making cultivation of crops nearly impossible.

White estimated that in 1902 not one-fifth of the lands which had been cultivated prior to 1898 were being worked. As a result a large part of the native population was suffering from malnutrition and conditions were ripe for the expansion of ladronism.^

Such were the prevailing conditions when John R. White was sent to establish a Constabulary post in Isabela which is located in the central section of Negros Occidental in the heart of Papa Isio's territory. White was only twenty- two years old yet he was already a veteran of several armies having served in the Greek Foreign Legion, the British Army

^R.FoG., 1903, III, 114. ^"Monthly Report of Occurrences and Conditions (sic) for October 1902" by John R. White, Senior Inspector, Negros, Occidental. White MSS. 24-3

O and the United States Army in the Philippines» Although

White served in Negros for slightly more than one year, when he was reassigned in 190$, he had already earned a reputation as being one of the corps’ most ferocious fighters. Throughout his long career in the Constabulary he stands unsurpassed as a combat leader. He ranks along­ side Cary I. Crockett, Leonard Furlong, and Wallace C.

Taylor as being the most famous of the Constabulary's field commanders.

Prior to White's departure from Manila, where he had served briefly at Constabulary headquarters, he wrote,

I'm going down to put out the last flames of in­ surrection, which have died down into brigandage. The island is overrun with "ladrones", "tulisanes", who levy tribute on the rich plantations for which Negros is celebrated,^

Several weeks later he informed his Mother, "Don't expect to hear from me very much while in Negros as I expect to be out in the wilds for some time."^^ It is

Q See John R. White, Bullets and Solos; Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands (n¥w York, 1928.) Ï» In addition to this book. White accumulated voluminous papers, letters, diaries, and short stories which have been preserved and are now located at the University of Oregon. For the most part, this study will use the original reports rather than the printed manuscript since the reports are in greater detail: Also see. The Mindanao Herald, March 18, 1911, 1«

^Letter from White to his Father, February 18, 1902, White MSS.

^^Letter from White to his Mother, March 9, 1902, White MSS. 244- doulDtful that this soldier of fortune could possibly have anticipated just how busy he would be for the next eighteen months while he completed the pacification of Negros and earned for himself such a fine reputation»

After a harrowing and thoroughly disgusting trip on a filthy inter-island transport, White reached his post in early March. He brought with him 200 shot guns and three tons of miscellaneous supplies and ammunition, all of which he felt would be most suitable for jungle fighting. He proceeded to Isabela, in central Negros, and began to 11 organize the first Constabulary post in that region.

In less than two weeks he recruited, organized, and began to train a small detachment. By late March, he was operating in the field, leading his force on extended patrols to track down ladrones in his vicinity. In one skirmish, he chased a group of outlaws for nearly eighteen miles before his own 12 men gave out.

White recognized that before he could hope to launch an extensive campaign it would be necessary to complete

^^Letter from White to his Mother, March 13, 1902, White MSS: White, loc. cit., 20-21.

^^Letter from White to his Mother, March 24- or 27 (illegible), 1902, White MSS. 24-5 the organization and training of his men. During this pro­ cess, his regular non-field duties fell into a daily routine which is illustrative of Constabulary officers throughout the islands. He was usually up before 6:00 A.M. and at his desk by 8:00 or 8:50. In quick succession he held con­ ferences with his first sergeant and other aides and at­ tended to the task of securing supplies as well as arranging for drills of his men. He also talked with leading citizens, hearing their complaints and assuring them that the Constabu­ lary would be capable of establishing law and order in the area. An important part of his regular routine was dealing with Constabulary spies which he liberally paid to obtain information of ladron movements.Gradually he whipped his detachment into something resembling a fighting force al­ though they were inadequately armed, uniformed and supplied.

Nonetheless conditions dictated that his force immediately take to the field. This too was typical of the Constabulary throughout the Philippine Islands.

White's first prolonged expedition into the mountains of Negros Occidental was under the direction of Captain

Kennon of the Sixth Infantry. Kennon outlined a campaign

^^Letter from White to his Sister, July 11, 1902, White MSS. 24-6

which called for three expeditions from Isabela, Castellana

and Wagallon to converge on Papa Isio's headquarters at

Macadon which was approximately twenty miles nc,:theast from

Isabela. White prepared for this expedition b;/ purchasing

food supplies in Isabela. With twenty of his best men,

White departed for Macabon in the middle of the night of

April 22. One of the problems incurred during this long,

difficult march was the lack of water since the Constabu­

lary had not yet been issued canteens. White had antici­ pated this and had ordered each man to cut a hollow bam­ boo cane and fill it with water. The detachment wandered back and forth attempting to locate the trail to Isio's headquarters but without success. White finally captured

a native and "after persuasion" the individual agreed to

serve as a guide. Whenever the detachment came upon a village which would not cooperate, it was destroyed.

The detachment gradually worked its way towards

Macabon where they merged with soldiers from the Sixth

Infantry and the native Scouts. The mixed force then climbed a steep hill via a single narrow trail which cut a path between the thick impenetrable forest. Upon reach­ ing the plateau. White quickly formed a skirmish line ex­ pecting a fight. But in typical fashion, the main body 247

had fled rather than face a superior force. After the

arrival of the army and Scout detachments, the entire camp,

including thirty houses, a wooden church and a large nipa barracks along with huge quantities of food and supplies was destroyed. Following this the detachments again se­ parated and White worked his way back to Isabela where he arrived on the morning of April 28.^^

In a sense the foregoing expedition was a shakedown experience for White's men. They learned of the necessity for taking adequate provisions and also had learned techni­ ques necessary in crossing jungle mountainous regions.

Following this White urged that emergency rations of canned meat, vegetables, hardtack, and bacon be supplied to all Constabulary units for expeditions of this type.

His force had travelled I50 miles in eight days over mountain trails of the worst sort. White had proved his capabilities as a field commander. He led the assault and was the first officer to reach Macabon. He was also 15 the only commander to capture prisoners and weapons.

^^"Report of an Expedition in the Mountains of Occidental Negros, April 22 to April 29, 1902." John E. White, White MSS.

^^Ibid, H.B. Orwig's (The Senior Inspector of Negros, Occidental) 1st Endorsement on White's report as cited in Footnote 16. White MSS: "Personal Service Report," June 3 0 , 1902 by Second Class Inspector John R. White, White MSS. 248

It was not until the middle of May that White learned precisely of Papa Isio's new locationo At that time his most trusted and faithful spy, Julian, had located Isio's new headquarters at a town near the summit of Mt. Lanao, just across the border in Negros Oriental. Mt. Lanao was approximately three-days' journey from White's head­ quarters in Isabela. Julian cautioned White that the final ascent up the mountain would be most difficult be­ cause the single trail was almost perpendicular and com­ manded from above by heavily guarded trenches.On top of Mt. Lanao, Isio had approximately 200 well-armed soldiers. White was not deterred and after two rainless days, selected thirteen of his best enlisted men and pro­ ceeded to Payao, where he picked six additional Constables and completed the preparations for an extended expedition.

Fourteen cargadores were hired to carry the supplies which included 100 pounds of salted fish, a box of hardtack and a large supply of rice.

With this small force, White slipped out of Payao at moonrise on the 24th of May. He marched his column all night, crossing several rivers and moving up and down

"Report of An Expedition in the Mountains of Occidental Negros," May 24-29th, 1902, by John R. le/hite, 2nd Glass Inspector P.O., White MSS. The following narrative will be taken almost exclusively from this long report. 24-9

hills. On the 25th, the column "began its ascent up the

first range of mountains before approaching Mt, Lanao,

White described the hardships and monotony of the arduous process of climbing up one side of a mountain and then

descending the other time and time again. It was parti­

cularly difficult as frequently the mountains were covered

with heavy brush and the trails were extremely steep. In

addition there was a species of a small leech which caused much annoyance as they hung on every brush and tree and

attached themselves to the bare legs of the cargadores and

even wormed their way through the shoes and the leggings of

the soldiers. Many halts were necessary to remove those

little blood-sucking leeches. Nonetheless White drove his men on throughout the day of the 25th, The following morning, the men ate a hastily prepared breakfast of rice

and fish which had been cooked the previous night and once

again resumed their march.

Early in the morning of the 26th, White’s advance

guard signalled the approach of an outlaw party. He

quickly deployed his soldiers and managed to capture three

armed soldiers of Papa Isio's, It was an exciting adventure

in which White remained hidden until the last moment and

then leaped up and shoved the muzzle of his gun directly 250 in their faces. "After persuasion," the men admitted that they were Isio's soldiers and had been sent to gather food and scout the Constabulary garrisons at Payao and Isabela. Later in the day of the 25th, the detach­ ment finally reached the foot of Mt. Lanao and for several hours White and his men crept up a narrow, steep trail.

By 3:00 P.M. they were only 200 feet from the crest when they were finally detected.

Isio had instructed his men to accumulate large boulders, rocks, sticks and logs so that they might hurl them down at any assaulting party. White's detachment quickly bore the full brunt of this preparation as massive rocks, some of which weighed an estimated two tons, were rolled down the mountains with such force that they carried away large trees as if they were so many sticks. The assaulting party took refuge behind trees and rocks and opened fire on the ladron. outpost which was then only twenty ..feet from their position. Several yards above this outpost were two lines of trenches which represented Isio's main line of defense.

After ten minutes of sustained fire, the outlaws abandoned the outpost defense and occupied the first trench.

They fired a steady barrage from their Remington-Mauser 2^1

rifles and continued hurling rocks and spears. Again the

attacking force was compelled to take cover. White,

realizing the necessity of carrying the first trench, attempted

to holster the confidence of his men with personal bravery.

But only four Constables responded. Nonetheless they did

manage to take the first trench. For the next hour White

and the four Constables in the first trench could do nothing

other than cling to the ground and duck a continuous stream

of rocks and spears which were hurled down the mountainside.

After an hour and a half of fighting, White still

occupied only the first trench, although numerous babaylanes,

as the local outlaws were called, were wounded in the fight­

ing. White recognized the situation had become desperate.

He could not hope to storm the trench with only the four men and all his efforts to persuade the remainder of his

force to join him proved unsuccessful. In a final gamble.

White climbed out of the trench and stood up so that his

men below could see him. He shouted and taunted them by

calling them old women and cowards. While dodging rocks

and spears, White joked with his men and told them that he

was like Papa Isio and that rifle bullets would not harm

him. Being thoroughly chastised, the Constables from below

crawled up and finally joined White's position in the first 252 trenctL. Tîien the entire force assaulted the second trench.

When they arrived at the top they were somewhat surprised because the enemy had evacuated the fortress.

By this time, it was dusk and the Constables were too exhausted and nervous to pursue the fleeing outlaws. While the detachment prepared their camp, V/hite himself scouted the plateau and located a number of buildings along with several wounded and dying outlaws. He learned from one of his captives that Papa Isio had been wounded early in the fight and had been taken back into the mountains by four of his followers.

The following morning all the houses were destroyed and the dead buried. The remainder of the day was spent resting as the men were too tired, stiff, and sore to attempt the descent and the long return to their post. The night of the 27th of May passed uneventfully and on the morning of the 28th White ordered the return trip. After a miserable two-day march through the rain soaked mountains, the detach­ ment finally reached Isabela at 11:00 A.M. on May 29, thus bringing to a close this highly successful expedition.

White’s force had covered ninety miles and had destroyed

five tons of palay, eight tons of corn, a half a ton of

tobacco as well as twenty-seven houses which were being used by the outlaws. In addition to this the Constabulary 253 captured four and killed five and wounded many others.

White himself was slightly wounded as were six enlisted men.

Well might Inspector White have been pleased with his Mt. Lanao fight for his activities won him the praise of high Constabulary officials and also a recommendation for promotion. Throughout central Negros, the ladron element was completely demoralized. In fact, White was considered "the terror of the lawless element in his entire district." More important, White observed that the natives after a lapse of four years were once again culti- TO vating their land and resuming a normal life.

Not content with resting on his newly won laurels.

White maintained constant pressure on Isio's force. In mid-July, he crossed the Island of Negros from Isabela to

San Jose and destroyed seven babaylâîî.-. villages and cap­ tured three outlaws in addition to collecting numerous spears. The following month, he returned to Mt. Lanao and burned seven newly constructed houses of Isio's.

17 'Ibid ; For a brief account also see Manila Times, June I, 1902, 1; also see telegram to Chief of the Constabulary from Senior Inspector Orwig, Negros, Occidental, May 50, 1902, White MSS. 1 R Report of Orwig to The Adjutant, Philippine Constabulary, July 2 5 , 1902 , White MSS: "Personal Service Report" of John R. White, June 3 0 , 1902, White MSS,

"Report to the Adjutant of the Philippine Constabulary, October 25, 1902,"by White, White MSS, 254

White himself was jubilant with his success and confided to

his Mother, with justifiable pride, that he was being com­

mended by everyone from the Governor down in bringing peace 20 and tranquillity to this district.

While resting between campaigns. White enjoyed diver­

sions which were available in Negros. There were the many

dances held in Isabela and the hero of Mt, Lanao mastered

the intricacies of native dances along with those of the

waltz and polka. He commented that there were "plenty of

pretty girls here to teach one" and then volunteered that

he was "in deep water with one little Spanish (mestiza),"

lie also enjoyed hunting as there was an abundant supply of

duck, herons, parrots, etc., and frequently enjoyed the 21 exhilarating sport of riding carabaos.

In the fall of 1902 White was promoted and became the

Senior Inspector of Negros Occidental. He thoroughly en­

joyed the prestige and power of his new position. He spent

the bulk of his time in enlisting and discharging men and

tracking down carabao thieves. By November he commanded

250 enlisted men and seven white officers. He was directly

responsible for the 250,000 natives in his province, and had dozens of secret service agents to keep in contact with

^^Letter from White to his Mother, September 4, 1902, White MSS. ^^Ibid, Letter from White to his Father, November 10, 1902, White MSS. 255

22 Papa Isio's movements.

Some time during the fall of 1902, White became in­ volved in an interesting intrigue which is illustrative of the problems which faced Constabulary officers. One of the Constabulary's major tasks throughout the Visayan

Island group as well as Luzon, was to eliminate carabao thieving rings which regularly included a number of prominent local citizens. White first became suspicious of one wealthy landowner in the La Carota district, approximately thirty miles north of Isabela, when his secret service agents informed him that Don Carlos del

Hosario was receiving stolen carabao from Papa Isio.

Before confronting Carlos, White completed his homework and obtained affidavits from nine of Carlos' own herdsmen.

They swore that Carlos received stolen cattle from Isio and, also, furnished the outlaw with supplies, ammunition, and information. Carlos had no alternative but to aclcnow- ledge the validity of these charges, and begged for an opportunity to right his wrong and avoid prison. He volunteered to provide sufficient information to destroy the cattle rustling ring. Carlos also offered his daughter, without marriage, for White's pleasure. He was

^^Letter from White to his Mother, October 18, 1902, White M88. 256 convinced that White would accept the offer since White had been courting his beautiful seventeen-year old daughter, Aurelia, who was known as the "belle of the

Negros".

Following this conference. White returned to his post and weighed all the factors. He decided to con­ fide in Aurelia and disclose her Father’s involvement and propositions. Meanwhile he placed Carlos under house arrest and detached three Constabulary guards to prevent his escape. When White finally met with Aurelia,

Carlos was convinced that it was to consume the illicit bargain. But, of course, White merely informed Aurelia of her Father's position. She was deeply impressed and in return told White of her Father’s plan to kill the

Constabulary guard and White that very evening.

About this time a number of Isio's soldiers surrounded the house and a bloody fight ensued in which the three Con­ stabulary guards were killed along with Carlos himself.

White and the girl took refuge in a room where he con­ tinued the fight, expending his entire supply of ammuni­ tion, The babaylanes cut a hole in the wall and moved in for the kill. White grabbed a bolo and defended himself and the girl. But in the struggle, Aurelia was fatally 257 wounded when she deliberately stepped in front of a spear in order to save White who was fighting another outlaw.

At this precise moment a Constabulary detachment arrived from La Garlota, a nearby town, to investigate the shooting. The remaining outlaws fled and White turned to his dying sweetheart and comforted her in her last few moments. In this case, White's upright character had un­ doubtedly saved his life.^^

While White was tracking down Don Carlos in the fall of 1902, there were numerous expeditions and minor skirmishes in central Negros. On September 5 0 , a Constabulary detach­ ment under the command of a native corporal while on a routine patrol near San Carlos was suddenly attacked by a band of forty with an estimated twenty-five rifles. The corporal threw out a skirmish line, returned the fire, and then proceeded to attack despite being outnumbered. After a few minutes the outlaws broke and fled. This determined

^"Sisters Under Their Skins", 26-4?ff. This is an unpub­ lished story written by V/hite which outlined some of his experiences in Negros in 1902-190$. Although this account is partially fictitious, White clearly identified the accurate portions in a letter to Mrs. Edna Schley of Schley and Leonardon Publishers in Los Angeles, California, dated February 2, 19335 White MSS. 258

corporal pursued the band and managed to kill five and OIL wound three others.

Unquestionably Isio and Dalmacio deliberately in­

creased their activities in October of 1902 when the bulk

of the United States Army withdrew from Negros. Dalmacio,

himself far more aggressive and dangerous than Isio, be­

came extraordinarily bold. In order to increase the

general hostility against the Americans, the outlaw chiefs

spread rumors charging that the Americans had poisoned the wells. In late October, Dalmacio launched his campaign with the ultimate goal of capturing Bacolod City, the

capital of Negros Occidental. In preparation for this task, he attempted to occupy the town of Murcia, located approxi­ mately ten miles east of Bacolod, White therefore rushed all available Constables to Murcia and on October $0,

1902, fought one of the decisive battles in this campaign.

White personally reconnoitered the area and devised an in­ genious plan by which he hoped to bring the outlaw forces into a decisive engagement. He instructed the small Con­ stabulary post at Murcia to scout the hills but to retire every time they struck the enemy, hoping to draw them into a trap near Murcia. These instructions were followed implicitly"... and the enemy was engaged several times but

^'^M anil a Times, October 4, 1902, 1. 259 after firing a few shots, the Constables retired to Murcia«^^

On the 29th of October White left Bacolod City for

Murcia and arrived late that same day only to learn that

Dalmacio with seventy armed men were camping within a few miles from Murcia. The following morning accompanied by

Lt. Walter A, Smith and twenty-two enlisted men, White launched his attack. He located Dalmacio in a strongly defensive position about three miles from Murcia. The ladrones had occupied a position on the bank of the River

Caliban which flowed between themselves and the Constables.

White advanced, divided his force, and left ten men to engage the ladrones from the front while he and the remainder of the force crept down the river bottom by a small gulley.

His movement was concealed by tall grass, and thus White crossed the river and began his flank attack without being detected. When the ladrones realized their predicament, they poured in several well-placed volleys and killed two men at White's side. A bullet also struck White's rifle and almost knocked it from his hand. Nonetheless the

Constables held their ground, returned the fire and so

"Monthly Report of Occurrences and Conditions (sic) for October 1902," by John R. White, Senior Inspector, Negros, Occidental, White MSS; R.R.C., 1903, III, 115: Manila Times, November 1, 1902, 10. 260 disrupted the outlaws that they holted and began to run.

By this time the other soldiers joined the assault, formed a skirmish line, and pursued the fleeing ladrones.

Each man singled out his quarry and then chased down his pray. White himself saw two men making off about 100 yards from his position one of whom was carrying a rifle.

He chased them for nearly a mile and killed one and wounded the other in the leg with a well-placed rifle bullet. White explained.

The wounded man was game to the last, vainly snapping his revolver as I approached and finally worming his way toward me through the grass with his bolo in his hand, I was about to administer the coup de grace when he cried out that he wag Dalmacio, dropped his bolo, and begged for mercy.

In this fight the Constabulary killed seven including

General Anselme who had attempted flight with Dalmacio before being stopped by White, A variety of weapons was captured, including one two-inch cannon. Following

“Special Eeport of Engagement with Dalmacio's Band of Outlaws," November 4, 1902, by White, White MSS: R.P.C,, 1903, III, 1155 contains a brief summary of this engagement: For additional insights see Letter from White to his Mother October 18 with an addition dated October 27, 1902: and a letter dated November 6, 1902, from White but no indication as to whom addressed: and Telegram to Allen from White, October 30,1902, White MSS. 261

Dalmacio's arrest, many minor leaders surrendered» Many

expressed their desire to live in peace and explained that

Dalmacio had compelled them to fight against the government authorities» For this brilliant action White earned wide- 27 spread acclaim from his superiors» '

The destruction of Dalmacio's band, however, did not complete the pacification of northern Negros. Less than three weeks later, several Constabulary detachments were tracking down the band of Ignacio Villanueva also in the

Murcia area, Villanueva managed to escape a net established by Lts, Conway and Colmenares after a one-hour fight. But in the process, the outlaws ran into another Constabulary de­ tachment at the Murcia Pass, Sub-Inspector Azcona with twenty Constables struck the band and in a fierce engagement killed nineteen outlaws including the chief. Several others were wounded and- a considerable supply of weapons was con­ fiscated.

Papa Isio himself, however, remained completely in­ active for a period following the capture of Dalmacio,

^Ibid: Telegram to General Allen from Governor Loc&in of Negros, October $1, 1902 and Letter to White from Allen, November 1, 1902, White MSS,

^%anila Times, November 19, 1902, 1» 262

But when the army completed its withdrawal in January of

1903, Isio resumed his activities. He re-established himself in his old headquarters in the Sacup Valley and began sending threatening letters to the officials in the neighbor­ ing towns attempting to coerce them into supporting his band.

In mid-February, 1902, Captain White with two officers and twenty-four Constables drove Isio out of his headquarters and compelled him to return to the Macabon country, twenty miles north of Mt. Lanao. In this engagement White killed two of his men, captured a number of weapons and destroyed their quarters. White outlined his strategy in his official report fro February, 1903 by stating.

Papa Isio’s prestige and force has been greatly diminished by the repeated blows which he has re­ ceived and I do not let him rest, but strike the moment that his whereabouts is ascertained, al­ though continued expeditions in the mountains are very hard on officers and men, putting many on the sick list. ^

During this period, the most reliable information the

Constabulary received, came from the friendly half-savage mountaineers or monteses. These people had suffered

^^"Monthly Report on Conditions and Occurrences (sic), February, 1903" by Senior Inspector White, White MSS. 263

greatly -under Papa Isio’s regime. His soldiers used them

as slaves, raped their women and stole their food and

household goods. The Constabulary had long recognized the

wisdom of cultivating their friendship, despite their

natural suspicion of government troops. In order to over­

come these doubts, a n-umber of captured monteses were taken

to Bacolod where they were well treated, given considerable

advice and set free so that they might spread the good word

of the benefits of cooperating with the government author­

ities. Captain White made every effort to cooperate and protect these mountaineers from the plundering raids of the outlaws. Under his supervision a substantial number of these people were relocated in barrios under direct Constabu­ lary supervision. This was obviously an effort to d;eny

Isio one of his major sources of supplies and money.

On March 18, 190$, Peliziano Cabezon, one of Isio’s

Colonels and a noted criminal, was finally captured.

Peliziano had attempted to surrender several months prior to this, but White refused to offer him any terms other than unconditional surrender. The outlaw chief explained that he was tired of being chased about from place to place

^^’’Monthly Report of Occurrences and Conditions (sic), March 1903”, by Senior Inspector White, White MSS. 264 like a will animal and expressed his willingness to co­ operate with the government in order to prove his re­ pentance. White was impressed with this young man who, though twenty years of age, had fought in the insurrection against Spain and had been one of Isio's top officers, keliziano however had fallen out with his Chief when

Isio compelled one of his sisters to join his harem. As a result, white decided to use keliziano, much in the same way that Bandholtz had used Ola and Sakay in Luzon, as a spy hoping that he might obtain information which would lead to the destruction of Papa Isio.

By the end of April, 1903, White noted that the large carabao rustling rings were practically eliminated, and that most animal stealing occurred by starving natives.

Phis relatively tranquil situation was a direct result of extensive Constabulary patrolling. These patrols remained in the field upward of ten days. In keeping with the hours of the ladrones, these patrols usually slept during the day and scoured the area at night. It was observed that the best results were obtained when the Constabulary dressed in native clothes, hid their revolvers, and travelled only

^^Ibid: Also see Letter from White to his family March 22, 1903, White MSS. 265 with holos "because uniformed Constables were quickly de­ tected by Isio's spies. Captain White, in his Monthly

Report for April, 1903, stated;

There's no doubt that the babaylanes are on their last legs. The capture of Papa Isio or his flight from Megros is but a matter of time and patience on our parto^

On May 20, I903, Isio attempted to escape from

Negros, but was trapped by Lts. Conway and Bowers who managed to capture seven of his armed men although the elusive Isio escaped. Nonetheless, by this time his band had only two rifles, and as White noted, the babaylanes

have had their day, and it is not anticipated that they will give us any further trouble, though ex­ peditions will be continuously sent into the mountains to prevent the formation of new bands.

Around the first of July, I9 0 3 , a few of Papa's Isio's veteran soldiers moved to the northern tip of Negros

Occidental after hiding in the mountains of Negros Oriental for about six months. This band was captained by Isio's secretary, Valentin Guillermo Ledesma and consisted of

^^"Monthly Report of Occurrences and Conditions (sic), April, 1903," by Senior Inspector White, White MSS. ^^"Monthly Report of Occurrences and Conditions (sic). May, 1903," by Senior Inspector I'Jhite, White MSS. 266 approximately fifteen men and seven rifles. They were joined I by a few unsettled natives from the north and a few exiles from neighboring Cebu Island and began levying tribute; in the vicinity of Sagay and Cadiz. The local municipal police made no effort to interfere with this band despite their numerous depredations. The band did not move south into the richer valleys because they were acutely aware of Constabulary efficiency in that region.

In late July, White sent an expedition to hunt down this band but without success. The following month, several detachments coverged on the infested area and a spirited engagement followed. Four of the band were killed and a number of weapons and uniforms captured, thus destroying this wing of Isio's comand and completing the pacification of the northern portion of Negros Occidental. Thus, with the entire province pacified, White was transferred to Mindanao where he and Colonel James G. Harbord's

Adjutant organized the Constabulary in the land of the

Moros.

With Isio inactive, the natives of Negros in 1905 cultivated and harvested a bumper sugar crop which more

^^"Monthly Report of Conditions and Occurrences (sic), August, 1903," by Senior Inspector White, White MSS. 267

than douhled the output of the previous years» Had it not been for the destruction of the ladrones, who traditionally- wrecked havoc upon the agriculturally inclined natives by plundering their products and stealing their crops, this would not have been possible.

For the next years Isio remained in hiding in the

central part of the island. He continued to elude the Con­

stabulary, and concentrated his efforts on developing a number of devices to perfect his defense. But by this time

Isio's prestige had sunk so low that he found it impossible to gain support. In fact, the vast majority of the natives

cooperated with the government authorities in an attempt finally to eradicate this outlaw chief. In early February, I907, Isio made a desperate attack on the town of Suay in an effort to stimulate another general uprising. About twenty of his pulajanes, as his followers were then called, entered the town on the night of February 12

and burned twenty-four houses, spreading the rumor that this was the beginning of a new revolution to drive the Americans out of Negros. There was no Constabulary at Suay and the band proceeded to the village of Cabancalan which had a

^^Manila Times, March 20, I905, 1< ^^R.P.C., 1907, II, 310o 268

Constabulary garrison of nineteen enlisted men under a native corporal. The corporal in charge made several tactical errors, and as a result, his command was overwhelmed.

Isio obtained several rifles and regained some of his lost prestige. His band swelled by the additional 100 volun­ teer bolomen who succumbed to Isio's propaganda.

But Isio had grossly underestimated the influence which the Constabulary had generated with the bulk of the natives.

Rather than rally to his cause, the natives of Negros

Occidental redoubled their efforts to assist the Constabu­

lary in tracking down Isio and in reestablishing peace.

When Isio finally realized that his bid for native support

had failed, he became thoroughly disillusioned and on

August 6, 1907. voluntarily surrendered to the Senior In­

spector of Negros Occidental at White's old post of Isabela.

Papa Isio was quickly brought to trial and sentenced to

death, while three of his generals received heavy penalties XQ ranging from twenty to thirty years.^ With these develop­

ments the Province of Negros Occidental was completely

pacified.

57ibid.

^^Ibid, 19O8 , II, 402; Manila limes, August 7 5 1907, 1.

59ibid, October 1, I907, 1. CHAPTER ZI

PACIFICATION OP CEBU AND PANAY: I9OI - I9O8

Cebu Island lies approximately twenty-five miles east of Negros. Its shape resembles a dagger in that it is long, approximately I50 miles, but only some twenty- five miles across at its widest point. During the actual insurrection, Cebu Island was the scene of considerable fighting and in fact it was conspicuously absent from the list of provinces initially turned over to the civil authorities in mid-1901. By December of that year, however, the military had completed its task and Cebu was then turned over to the civil administration,^ With the remnants of the insurgent forces eliminated, the Constabu­ lary assumed the task of completing the pacification of

Cebu by destroying numerous bands of outlaws in the mountainous regions.

The first serious challenge to the Constabulary was raised by Quintin Tabal, and his brother Anatalio, when they organized a substantial band and began to terrorize the central section of the province. In June of 1902,

^R.P.C., 1 9 0 1 , I, 13-14: Ibid, 1902, I, I3.

269 270 four American school teachers arrived in Cebu to help establish a network of primary schools for the native children. The teachers were overly curious and decided to take an excursion into the mountain region near Cebu

City. Inspector Ross personally warned them not to make the trip because the territory in question was dominated by the Tabal brothers and thus was considered unsafe for such adventure. But this advice was ignored.

When the teachers failed to return, the Constabulary sent three columns to search for them but without immediate 2 success,

for the next month the Constabulary, operating in the vicinity of Cebu City, conducted numerous expeditions at­ tempting to track down the band. In late July Inspector

Buga succeeded in killing the leader of this minor band and discovered conclusive evidence that the dead outlaw had been immediately responsible for the kidnap and the murder of the teachers. Throughout the remainder of July, the remainder of this small band was eliminated and the incident considered closed.^

The outlaws or pulajanes of Cebu remained active for a number of months throughout the fall of 1902 but

^Manila Times, June 19? 1902, 8 and June 22, 1902, 1,

^Ibid, July 25, 1902, 1. 271 the Constabulary vigorously pursued the bands deep into the mountainous regions. Developments reached a high point in the first two weeks of December when the Con­ stabulary killed or captured an additional fifty-two outlaws. In one engagement Inspector Adams led the

Constabulary against the pulajanes in the Gandaro country Zj- and in a single fight killed twenty-nine outlaws.

The Tabal brothers were not dismayed and from

January through May they remained in their mountain hideouts recruiting and rebuilding their forces. On

May 15? 1905, 200 well-armed pulajanes attacked a Con­ stabulary detachment near Carcar, less than twenty miles south from Cebu City. Dressed in red uniforms the pulajanes attacked ferociously with no concern for their personal safety because they were convinced that anting-antings made them invulnerable to Constabulary bullets. The Con­ stabulary therefore inflicted heavy casualties killing twenty and wounding many others before the ranks of pulajanes broke and fled the field.^

About this same time, a large force of pulajanes captured the town of Tubutan. Constabulary units promptly

^Ibid, December 19, 1902, 4.

^Ibid, May 18, 1905, 1. 272 converged on the tovm, hut the outlaws fled and most of them reached safety in the nearly mountains. A few days later It. William Walker received information that a hand of outlaws was camping in the mountains near his post.

Walker immediately took twelve men and sought out the outlaws. When he located the camp, he quickly detected that it was much stronger and better armed than originally anticipated. But it was too late and in the fight which ensued, Walker and six of his men were overwhelmed hy

1500 pulajanes.^ Colonel Taylor, the Chief of the Third District, ordered all available government units to take the field in order to avenge the death of Lt. Walker.

Several days later Lt. Poggi, with twenty-two Constables and eighty volunteers, located the Tabal band near Tabogan in northwestern Cebu.^

Quintin Tabal had carefully selected this fortress which was located high in the mountains and well protected by rock walls and deep trenches. The only entrance was by means of bamboo ladders which were easily withdrawn to deny access

^Elarth, loc. cit. , 73“7‘^* Manila Times, May 18, 1903, 1 and May 1 9 , 1903, 1.

'^Manila Times, May 26, 1903, 1 and June 6, 1903, 1« 27$

"by an assaulting force. But Lt. Poggi's attack was unex­ pected and the Constabulary rushed up the ladders before

they could be withdrawn. Colonel Elarth described the battle

as follows,

The battle fought here,hand to hand oh swaying ladders, upon the edge of the abyss will ever be an epic of Constabulary combat. The wounded fell with the dead into the dizzy depths below, and Poggi's sole chance of survival was to gain the victory. And win he did though his losses were heavy.

When the fighting was over, the losses of the Constabulary

and volunteers were far smaller however than those of the pulajanes. Poggi and his men killed over 100 and captured

fifty others along with numerous blade weapons and spears.

But the Tabal brothers managed to escape and moved deeper 9 into the mountains to rebuild their battered force.

There was no rest for the pulajanes as the Constabu-

lary maintained constant pressure on the elusive force.

On August 1, 1 9 0 3 , Lts. Page and Luga met with the band at the foot of Ht. Sudlum. This too was a fiercely

fought battle in which fifty outlaws were killed while

no casualties were reported by the Constabulary or the

volunteer forces.

^Elarth, loc. cit. , 7'^»

"^Manila Times, Hay 25, 190$, 1 and June 6, 190$, 1.

^^Ibid, August 1, 190$, 1. 274

nonetheless, the outlaws continued to roam in the

Sudlum mountains near Cebu City. Colonel Taylor, the

Chief of the Third District, reasoned that the Constabu­

lary had been unable to destroy the band because the volunteers tended to abuse the mountain people which re­

sulted in large numbers of these people willingly join­

ing the outlaw band. In order to alleviate this source

of irritation and therefore deny the Tabal brothers these recruits, Taylor ordered that the all volunteer units gradually be permitted to "die a natural death." In

addition, the Constabulary discouraged the creation of additional volunteer units and bluntly informed those in

existence that no further operations on their part were desired.

The following year, Colonel Taylor devised a scheme which proved decisive in the pacification of Cebu. He concluded that the success of the campaign would be deter­ mined by the allegiance of the natives. He therefore de­ cided to establish a series of relocation camps in the heart of the pulajan region. As a result, some 5,000 natives were systematically relocated into founteen small barrios. Each barrio was surrounded by a stockade and

^a.P.G., 1904, III, 92. 275 located at a central point with reference to the land cultivated "by its people. Each maintained a force of approximately fifty armed men who were on a constant alert in order to defend their camp. Also the Constabu- lai’y supervised the establishment of a network of spies to keep the government soldiers informed of pulajan activities. Finally each of the fourteen barrios was located within easy striking distance of a strong Con­ stabulary,post.

Furthermore, during the dry season when the mountain people were traditionally short of food the Constabulary, under the immediate supervision of Major hevill, arranged for the natives to obtain jobs working on public projects.

This enabled them to buy the necessities of life and generated considerable good will towards the government and Constabulary. Also the people living within the re­ located areas received vaccines and other benefits of civilization. As a result the natives of the interior soon became convinced that the government meant to protect them and they cooperated completely. Taylor's strategy proved effective and when the Tabal brothers attempted a raid on the barrio of Lapo-Lapo, the natives of that barrio slipped out during the night, located the assaulting 276 party, killed their leader, and drove the rest away.^^

Throughout the year I905 and during the first six months of 1906, Captain Harvey P. Nevill continued re­ locating large numbers of natives. In fact, by 1906, reconcentration in Cebu had become more extensive than in any other province throughout the Archipelago. The net result of this policy was to deny the Tabal brothers their prime source of recruits, supplies, food and 13 money.

Meanwhile additional Constabulary units continued probing the central regions in Cebu. But the Tabal brothers refused to be drawn into a decisive engagement, knowing full well that their force would be destroyed.

Finally they agreed to enter negotiations with Governor

Segio Osmena, a man who was destined to help lead the

Filipinos to independence. In June of I9O6 , amid much pomp and ceremony, the Tabal brothers surrendered to the

Constabulary. This act virtually completed the pacifi­ cation of Cebu Island. Henceforth there were no bands of any significance on this island although numerous minor bands periodically arose. l^ibid, 1905, III, 88-89. l^Ibid, I9O6 , II, 251. l^Ibid, 1907, 307. 277

Northwest of Oehu lies the large island of Panay.

It was divided into three provinces: Antique, which occupied a narrow strip of land on the western coast;

Gapiz, the northern section of Panay;and Iloilo, the southern part of that island» In contrast to Samar,

Leyte, Negros and Cebu, the provinces of Panay were fairly tranquil and peaceful throughout the period

1901 to 1917. This was especially true of the northern province of Gapiz where there were only minor bands which operated deep in the mountains along eastern section of that province. As a rule these mountain bands seldom bothered the lowland natives and confined their depreda­ tions almost exclusively against the mountain people them­ selves. Prior to the fall of 1903, there had been con­ siderable carabao stealing in the lowlands, but Captain

Jones, in September and October of 1903, destroyed these rings.Following this there was little action of any significance in Gapiz Province and the Chief of the Third

District recommended that the Constabulary concentrate its efforts on improving the efficiency of the local municipal police. In this way, the Constabulary could reduce its l^ibid, 1904, III, 95e 278

force in the province and maintain only a reserve garrison

in the capital. These policies were implemented and proved

successful. Gapiz remained tranquil.

In neighboring Antique Province there was but one minor campaign throughout the period I9OI-I917. This province was one of tha poorer throughout the Archipelago

and the people generally were quiet and peaceful although

subjected periodically to molestation by marauding outlaws.

These depredations usually took the form of petty thievery which was handled by the local municipal police. The Con­

stabulary was used in this province, as in Gapiz, primarily to prevent the formation of larger bands and to assist the local police when they were incapable of maintaining law and order.

The one serious menace to the peace of Antique Province was a band of outlaws under the leadership of Ompong. He had been an outlaw since the Spanish era and operated primarily in the northern section of the province. The

Constabulary in late I903, under sub-inspector Salvador, made contact with the band and killed several but Ompong

^^ibid, 1905, III, 87. ^^Ibid, 86-87. 279 eluded capture® In October of I903 one of the outlaw's children died of a mysterious disease and the fanatical band raided the barrio of Ibaja and wantonly killed thirteen men, women and children® Ompong later explained that since his child had died of some form of witchcraft, he was compelled to kill several natives so that they might attend his child in the next world®

As a result of this hideous crime the Constabulary redoubled its efforts to track down this outlaw. The local natives also were determined to assist the govern­ ment in reestablishing peace in Antique Province. The

Senior Inspector, Lt. 0. E. Barry, finally located Ompong in the mountains near Pandan in the northern tip of

Antique Province. A fierce engagement developed in which both Barry and Ompong were killed, but the band was iq destroyed in the process, With the death of Ompong, 20 peace once again settled in Antique Province.

The third province on Panay was Iloilo which occupied the southern section of that island. Iloilo Province was first organized under the civil authorities in the fall of

^^Ibid, 1904, III, 93: Manila Times, September 6, 1904, 1, ^% b i d , October 21, 1904, 1. 20R.P.C., 1907, II, 306, 280

1901, Lewis Patstone was one of the first Constabulary officers to help establish the corps in this province.

As was the case throughout the Philippines, the Constabu­ lary in Iloilo was compelled to take to the field within weeks after it was organized. For example, Patstone assisted the army in crushing the final remnant of the in­ surgent forces especially in the vicinity of Passi in the pi north central part of that province.

With the destruction of the insurgent forces, a re­ lative peace settled in Iloilo Province with the exception of numerous carabao thieving rings. These bands operated from their mountain retreatswwhere they organized and launched small raiding parties to steal carabao from the natives in the lowlands. The animals were then sold or transferred to "go-betweens" and later resold to Iloilo

Province or transferred to Negros. In an attempt to protect their property, the natives of the lowlands sur­ rounded their barrios and individual houses with heavy barricades and double fences of thorny bamboo and brush.

Many towns were entirely surrounded by similar devices,

complete with large double gates at the entrances. At night the carabao were herded into the towns and guarded 2? together. These measures proved successful and in

^^Manila Times, November 3, 1901, 3- Z^E.P.G., 1903, III, 113. 281

1904, it was reported that the loss of carabao had been reduced to a point even below that during Spanish times.

But even with the destruction or elimination of large-scale carabao thieving, Iloilo Province and, in fact, the entire island of Panay, faced other problems which re­ duced those provinces to near chaos. In the spring of 1903, after epidemics of cholera and malaria and a very poor harvest, the people were destitute and nearly starving.

Under such conditions, ladronism, or common brigandage, 24 flourished. lo counter these developments, the Constabu­ lary increased its patrols. In March of 1903 Lt. Gouter- mirsch with twenty-five Constables and ten-days' supply headed for a well-known ladron rendezvous site near

Alimodian. There were other expeditions, and several minor 25 engagements developed during the early part of March.

These bandits lived in their mountain fastnesses and had no visible means of support other than robbery, arson and murder. They usually swept down at night upon an un­ protected barrio, committed their depredations and then

Z^lbid, 1904, III, 93- ^"^Manila Times, March 7, I903, 1. Z^Ibid, March 12, 1903, 1- 282

returned to the mountain hideout. They dominated the

territory within a few miles of every city and virtually

challenged the authority of the civil government. Noting

these developments, General Allen stated, "They hold no

cedulas, pay no taxes, and respect no law." Therefore,

Allen recommended a vigorous campaign to pacify the

countryside.

The Senior Inspector of Iloilo Province at this time

was Major Orwig. Thus- it fell to this officer to

eradicate ladronism in this province. Por the next five months Orwig directed his soldiers in an unceasing campaign

to fulfill this mission. By the end of August after numerous minor engagements, all of which gradually took

the toll of the outlaw element, Orwig's campaign was con­

sidered completed. The Constabulary fought eight engage­ ments within five months and had killed no less than four

ladron chiefs in addition to several dozen ordinary outlaws.

During this campaign Major Orwig commanded 120 Constables 27 and 300 volunteers and municipal police.

One of the highlights of Orwig's campaign had been

the kidnapping of Sergeant Yates, a Signal Gorpsman, at

^^Letter to Major General Henry C. Corbin, Adjutant General, U.S.A., from Allen, March 24, 1903, Allen MSS. ^"^Manila Times, August 22, 1903, 1 and August 27, 1903, 1. 28$

Passi, The Gonstahulary received information of the kid­ napping and Orwig immediately dispatched units from Gapiz to join those from Iloilo Province itself. When they arrived at the scene? they found that Sergeant Tates had been tortured, as the outlaws were determined to extort

some type of ransom. They had placed a rope around his neck and slowly lifted him off the ground until only his toes touched but he insisted that he could not raise the ransom money, so they released him. The band then pro­

ceeded to the town of La Paz where they stole twenty-five

carabao. The Gonstabulary pursued and a spirited engage­ ment developed. Following this the ladrones pulled the

"amigo act", hid their guns and blended in with the native 28 population.

On September 22, 190$, an all-day fight occurred near

Iloilo City. A band of forty ladrones had raided Maasing

and stolen fifty carabao. The Gonstabulary and municipal police pursued the band and recovered most of the animals

although the ladrones cut the throats of six;; of the

animals just before losing them. The leader of this force

was the notorious Toribio who controlled thirty rifles and

a large body of men. After the animals had been recovered

heavy fighting developed in which twenty-two of the ladrones

^^Ibid, August 27, 190$, 1, 284 were killed outright while numerous others were wounded.

Torihio's hand was routed and almost annihilated.^^

In early February, 190$, Major Crawford himself was conducting an expedition against lorihio's hand. Crawford located the outlaw hand in the thick hrush heside a trail.

A sharp skirmish developed in which Torihio's mother and infant child were accidentally killed although the leader escaped. Despite this Torihio continued to lead his hand on numerous other raids. On February 21, the Constabulary again met Toribio who was accompanied hy Sano, another noted bandit chief of Iloilo Province. In this engagement one

Constable was separated from his detachment, captured and then brutally murdered. Less than two weeks later, the outlaws attacked the town of Massin and burned several houses and a sugar mill, but the leader of this raid. Bias, was %Q mortally wounded.^

Meanwhile the Constabulary Division of Information increased its activities by ordering spies to penetrate the bands in order to identify the outlaw:.supporters and sympathizers in the towns. In the spring of 190$, twenty local officials were arrested, brought to trial, and sentenced to terms ranging from ten to twenty-five years.

Z^Ibid, September 29, 190$, 1, ^'Olbid, March 16, 190$, 1. 285

Two town inhabitants were similarly charged hut they re­ ceived the death sentence for aiding the ladrones.

With the Constabulary operating in the field gradually destroying the bands and with the secret service agents identifying local officials and sympathizers in the towns, the backbone of the carabao thieving ring was broken by the early part of 1905, although the principal leaders o2 themselves remained unaccounted for.^

Even with the elimination of wholesale carabao thieving, however, there remained considerable fighting before the remnant of the outlaw force was completely subdued. On June 23, 1905 a spectacular engagement took place in which Captain James R. Lewis found himself in a desperate hand-to-hand bolo fight with Tomas, a minor leader of the ladrones of Iloilo. The fight took place in the mountains near Leon where Lewis headed a number of volunteer bolomen. In the initial hostilities Lewis's gun jammed but he picked up a bolo and in a man-to-man duel decapitated Tomas. The fight continued and Lewis killed several others although he was shot once in the head and received a slight wound in the leg. A total of nine outlaws were killed while three volunteers also died. For this conspicuous bravery, which was one of the

3^ibid. ^^Ibid, March 18, 1905, 1< 286

■bravest fights in the corps’ history, Captain Lewis re­

ceived the coveted Medal of Valor»^^

During the next two years the Constabulary continued

to eliminate numerous small bands in Iloilo Province. In

1907 eight bands were identified, the largest having only xzl twelve guns.^ The outlaws remained relatively inactive

throughout I907 and most of I9O8 , confining their depreda­

tions to the stealing of a few carabao. By July of 19O8

the principal bands of Iloilo Province contained no more

than a total of forty outlaws and about eight guns. Even

though Sano and Toribio remained unaccounted for, peace had settled throughout Iloilo Province, That this condi­

tion prevailed was due to the energetic campaigning of thé

Constabulary and especially their successful effort in winning large-scale support of the mountain people,^

^^Ibid, June 27, 19055 5 and August 50, 1905, 2: See also General Order No. 73, paragraph 4, 1905 Series, Philippine Constabulary.

^^E.P.C., 1907, II, 307.

^^Ibid, I9O8 , II, 402. CHAPTER XII

THE "PAPA" EAUSTINO CAMPAIGN: LEITE 1902 - I907

The Island of Leyte lies southwest of Samar. It is approximately 125 miles in length and no wider than fifty miles in breadth. It was the scene of some of the heaviest fighting during the insurrection and the United States

Army remained until mid-1902 when the remnants of the insurgent force finally were compelled to surrender.

Also during the summer of 1902 there had been considerable fighting in the northern section of Leyte and especially on Biliran Island.^

During the years 1902 to I9 0 7 , Leyte ranks with central Luzon, Samar, and Mindanao as being one of the most turbulent provinces in the Philippine Islands. The outlaw forces were led by Eaustino Ablen, an illiterate peasant, who organized a fanatical religious movement originally known as the Dios-Dios. Eaustino, like Isio and Salvador, claimed to possess supernatural powers and assumed the title of Pope. He went one step further and signed his correspondence "Senor Jesus and Maria."

^See Chapter II.

287 288

Initially his movement was well received by the ignorant natives in central Leyte and he quickly built a strong fanatical, semi-religious, military organization.

The tactics which Eaustino used were very similar to those developed by Salvador in northern Luzonj in fact,

Eaustino was sometimes referred to as “the Salvador of the South.“ Eor example, he claimed to make spiritual visits to Rome nightly and to confer with the Virgin

Mary in order to receive her orders. Each convert was required to purchase an anting-anting which was supposed to render them invisible to the weapons of their enemies.

An anting-anting varied, sometimes being little more than a small piece of wood, a carabao horn, a piece of paper with some curious characters inscribed upon it or anything which the leader might sanctify.

Eaustino also sold a holy oil which he claimed would cure everything from bunions to cholera. His selling techniques were interesting. Those who refused to buy the oil were considered to be unfaithful and thus deserved no place on this earth. The bolo came out and the unfaithful were immediately dispatched. Hot surprising,sales were reported to be very brisk. Like Salvador, Eaustino also promised his followers that once they destroyed their 289 enemies, he would lead them to a mountain top on which they would find seven churches of gold, all their dead relatives who would he well and happy, and their lost carabaos. Faustino himself never personally took part in any of the fighting but remained a safe distance behind with the women and weaklings where he prayed for 2 the success of his soldiers,

Faustino's headquarters wexe in the vicinity of

Ormoc on the northwestern coast of the Island. Being born and raised in Ormoc, he was thoroughly familiar with this region. By the early fall of 1902, the ranks of his organization were swollen as a result of his persuasive propaganda which exploited the chaotic conditions: which prevailed in Leyte following the long struggle against both the Spaniards and the Americans. In October of 1902, his band ambushed and killed four municipal police and, of course, confiscated their shotguns. The Senior In­ spector of Leyte, Captain Borseth, one of the corps best known officers, recognized the seriousness of the situation and requested that reinforcements be rushed in in order to prevent a major insurrection.

%anila Times, April 23, 1908, 1, March 14-, 1903, 1, December 29, 1902, 1: E.F.C., 1903, III, 38 and 1907, II, 309. 290

Lt. Gary I. Crockett was sent to Ormoc to take charge of operations in that vicinity. Additional units from both the Negros Provinces and Cebu also were ordered into this district, bringing Crockett's command up to the total strength of 125. Por the next two months a fierce weu? was waged and the pulajanes were eventually driven from the mountains of

Ormoc. Por this campaign, Crockett divided the district into three sub-districts. He then stationed a Constabulary detachment in each of these areas and instructed them to make day and night forays into the pulajan infested areas.

It was, of course, impossible for his small command to police the northwestern section of Leyte thoroughly and as a result the outlaws succeeded in a number of raids.^

In early November, a detachment of pulajanes from

Biliran Island crossed over into Leyte and raided the town of Carigara along the northern coast. The outlaws were motivated by their desire to wreak revenge on the natives who had been cooperating with the government. They be­ headed the présidente, boloed his wife, and abducted their children.^

^Manila Times, November 29, 1902, 1: E.P.C., 1903, III, 115. "^New York Tribune, November 3, 1902, 1. 291

'Ten days later, the pulajanes attacked the barrio of

Dolores, defended by a Constabulary detachment of eighteen men under a native officer. The Constabulary sentinel was decapitated before he could sound the alert. The assaulting party managed to reach the guard house and kill several others before the remainder of the Constables was aware of the attack. One boloman jumped into the living quarters and jabbed right and left with his bolo eventually killing six Constables before he himself was dispatched. The attack finally was repulsed but the pulajanes burned a large part of the town and killed a number of natives before withdraw- ing.5

Despite these reverses, Crockett remained exceedingly' active in the Ormoc region and during the month of .November he killed thirty pulajanes in a series of engagements. The pulajanes repeatedly attacked Crockett's detachment at

Dolores where both forces sustained heavy casualties.

Crockett described these events by stating.

While I was stationed at Dolores that post was attacked seven times in a period of ten days by forces varying from 200 to 500 men, Hy total casualties were six killed and nine wounded ; the pulajanes lost more than 100.

In one engagement, Crockett was wounded when his detachment of five soldiers and 100 volunteer bolomen was attacked by

^R.PcC., 1903, III, 115. 292

200 pulajanes at Matagot, The government lost two dead, hut killed over forty of the outlaws. Several days later on November 14-, the pulajanes made a night attack on

Dolores and inflicted casualties on half of the small 6 garrison before withdrawing.

The Chief of the Constabulary himself became greatly alarmed at the conditions throughout Leyte Island and was determined to initiate a vigorous campaign to annihilate 7 the outlaws.' This decision resulted in the build-up of

Constabulary forces throughout the summer and fall of 1902. following Crockett's energetic but indecisive cam­ paign of October and November, Faustino limited his activities primarily to increasing his force and preparing for a major uprising. There was considerable activity on

Biliran Island where the Senior Inspector of Leyte,

Captain Peter Borseth, conducted a campaign against three or four hundred Dios-Dios fanatics.^ In the Ormoc Region

Constabulary secret service agents were instrumental in exposing the fabulously wealthy Tan brothers who were

^Quoted, by Elarth, loc. cit., 55: Manila Times, November 29, 1902, 1.

^Letter to Governor-General Taft, from Allen, March 9, 1902, Allen MBS.

Manila Times, March 14-, 1903, 1. 29$ receiving stolen hemp and carabao from the pulajanes.

Faustino's fanatics committed a number of minor depreda­ tions but nothing which seriously challenged the mainte­ nance of law and order in that area.^

The Constabulary continued to seek their elusive prey and in late January, 1903, Captain Borseth received infor­ mation which pinpointed Eaustino's headquarters in the center of the mountain region between Dagami and Ormoc.

Borseth organized two parties which consisted of munici­ pal police and volunteers. He then led his command in the assault of the pulajan fort which was defended by two small brass cannons and about 100 pulajanes. A bitter fight developed which lasted for more than an hour before the fortress was taken. In the process Eaustino himself was wounded in the chest, two of his sisters captured, and thirty-two of his followers were killed. Borseth personally brought in the two brass cannons along with a number of miscellaneous weapons, papers, and documents.

The Governor-General recognized the contributions of

Captain Borseth and thus he became the Governor of Leyte.

But, with the serious fighting in central Luzon and Samar,

% b i d , March 20, 1903, 1. IPR.E.C., 1903, III, 38. 294

Borseth was arable to obtain a sufficient number of American officers to lead adequately the Constabulary in Leyte, As a result Faustino remained free and continued to build his small army in addition to constructing a number of forti­ fications throughout the Ormoc Region. In late August, 1904, the new Senior Inspector, Captain Henry Barrett, took to the field in search of Faustino and tracked the band to one of these fortresses northeast of Ormoc. Barrett grossly under­ estimated the strength of the pulajanes and ordered an assault at dawn of August 25= The attack was repulsed and Barrett was killed.Unfortunately the junior officer to whom the command fell, abandoned the attack and retreated without even recovering the body of his fallen commander. 12 Several days later Borseth, now a major, personally led an escpedi­ tion and recovered Barrett’s body. The Major stated that

Captain Barrett had been hit twice with rifle fire and once lo with a slug fired from a bamboo cannon.

With the death of the Senior Inspector, Faustino's prestige reached a new high among the outlaw elements.

^^Manila Times, August 25, 1904, 1.

^^R.P.C., 1905, III, 89. “%anila Times, August 29, 1904, 1: Hew York Times, August 25, 1904, 6. 295

Conversely the Cons tabulary 's prestige hit rock bottom.

General Allen, in Manila, recognized the gravity of the

situation and ordered a detachment of fifty men from

Company B, Headquarters Battalion, under Captain Frank K,

Knoll to proceed to Carigara, Leyte, Knoll’s force was

transported to Leyte on The Luzon part of the so-called mosquito flotilla under the overall command of Admiral 14 Foster,

Ho further action occurred until February 27, 190$, when Governor Borseth reported a serious fight with the pulajanes between Orinoc and Jaro, In this engagement,

the Constabulary was ably assisted by the presidents of

Jaro and a number of volunteers. They assaulted Faustina's

stone fortress south of Ormoc where Captain Barrett had been killed the previous year. Three pulaganes were killed 15 and over thirty captured in this engagement, Less than

two months later Captain Grove, after an eight-day search,

corralled most of Faustina's men in a block house, A sharp

engagement ensued in which eleven pulajanes were killed and 16 several weapons captured. Three months later one of

See Henry T, Allen's Scrapbook for 1904, for a newspaper clipping which has no date or letterhead. This scrapbook contains many such clippings which have been carefully attached and well preserved. There are several remarks written in the book in Allen's own handwriting, Allen MSS,

^%anila Times, February 27, 190$, 1,

^^.F.C., 1905, III, 89. 296

Faustino's top officers, Major Juan Tamayo, was killed by the municipal police of Zumarraga.

With the death of Tamayo, a leading spirit of the pulajan movement, and the capture of a number of other top officers. Governor Borseth concluded after an extensive tour throughout Leyte that the province was more nearly free from ladronism than in all its history. Even the

Ormoc region appeared to be pacified and again the natives were cultivating huge crops of hemp, corn and rice.^^

Unfortunately Borseth's optimistic report proved premature.

He underestimated the persuasive powers of Eaustino and his ability to recoup ■ his losses and resume the offensive.

What Borseth had failed to foresee was that Eaustino had yet to make his major bid to dominate Leyte,

It took Eaustino another year before he felt strong enough to resume the offensive. In mid-July I9O6 , Eaustino ordered his number one fighting lieutenant, Felipe Ydos, to lead an attack on the municipal police station at the pueblo of Burauen in central Leyte. Shortly before day­ light on July 19, I9O6 , Ydos with 300 pulajanes entered Burauen and proceeded directly to the municipal police headquarters where they overwhelmed the garrison, killing

^"^Manila Times, July 10, 1903, 1.

IGibid, July 24, I903, 1. 297 five cOid. capturing fifteen much needed rifles. The pula- janes made no attempt to roh or molest the people of the town since their principal objective was to obtain weapons and wreak vengence on the local municipal police. The pulajanes suffered heavy casualties but they carried off iq their dead and wounded before fleeing, ^

The raid of Burauen prompted the Constabulary high command to order additional reinforcements rushed to the area. On June 23, Major Nevill of Cebu arrived with two companies of Constabulary and two others were sent in from neighboring Samar. Operations were launched immediately and on July 5, Major Nevill with one of his Cebu companies located and attacked a strongly entrenched pulajan position at Mantagara. He was compelled to suspend operations, however, when he lost seven men who fell into pitfalls which were filled with spears. He therefore fell back and waited for reinforcements which arrived on the 11th but by that time the pulajanes had abandoned their Mantagara 20 stronghold.

Several patrols engaged the outlaws after the

Mantagara fight but the next serious encounter came on

^"^R.P.C. , I9O6 , II, 239: New York Tribune, June 21, I9O6 , 3 : iiie "Times (London), June 21, 19^5,' 5° 20R.P.C., 1906, II, 239. 298

the morning of July 21, 1905, when the Constabulary

garrison at Burauen received information that a small

band was concentrating north of that town. Its. Williams

and Worswick and an American scout named McBride, pre­

sumably a secret service agent, accompanied by thirty-

four Constables set out after the band. The soldiers

located the force outside Burauen and attacked, but instead

of being a small party, the pulajanes had concentrated nearly

900 men. The religious fanatics instantly counterattacked and

overwhelmed the Constables. Worswick, McBride and twelve

enlisted men were killed. The pulajanes gathered fourteen

Springfield rifles and two revolvers before fleeing the area.

Fortunately It. Williams was able to rally fourteen of his 21 men and they fought their way to safety at a nearby barrio.

Determined that this "budding uprising" go no further

Governor-General Henry C. Ide requested that Major General leonard Wood, Commander of the Philippine Division, cooperate fully with the Constabulary in suppressing the leyte uprising.

Wood complied and immediately ordered two battalions of

United States Army to proceed to leyte to supplement army 22 units on that island.

^^Manila Times, July 23, I9O6 , 1: E.P.C., 1906, II, 259: The Times (lo'ndon) July 24-, 19O6 , 5«

^^Manila Times, July 23, 1906, 1. 299

Meanwhile Captain McMaster's company of the 24-th

Infantry had already moved towards Burauen where he linked up with Captain Nevill who commanded fifty Con­ stables. This mixed force pursued an estimated pulajan force of 1,000. On the evening of July 22, McMaster and Nevill received information that the band was located in the vicinity of San Victor. Nor the next several days they maneuvered their commands from town to town in order to prevent further concentration of the outlaws. Then on the morning of July 24, Nevill and McMaster with fifty

Constables and twenty-six colored soldiers from Company

E of the 24th Infantry left for the pulajan camp at

Tabontabon.

Upon reaching the river near Tabontabon, Captain

McMaster with six soldiers and four Constables pushed ahead while Nevill and the main body followed as rapidly as possible. Nevill observed the pulajanes breaking up in front of McMaster's advance and then closing in on both his flanks. Obviously they were preparing for an assault, and so he pressed on but was unable to reunite with McMaster before the pulajanes attacked. The fanatics

Z^Ibid: E.P.C., 1906, II, 259-260. 300 laimched three charges on N'esrill's main force hut were unable to break his line and sustained heavy casualties.

While Nevill's force stemmed this attack, McMaster was in critical condition. He attempted to fall back to Nevill's line but his men were compelled to use their rifles as clubs in the desperate hand-to-hand fight before making PZL the union. The pulajanes expected to overwhelm the small force and were surprised at the determined resistance of the soldiers. Gradually McMaster and Nevill rallied their scattered command and inflicted heavy casualties on the 25 fanatics, compelling them to flee the field.

Both Nevill and McMaster received high praise for this splendid fight. Colonel Taylor, the Chief of the Third

District, said of Nevill,

The broken gun stocks, and the pulajan dead, who lay on all sides, were grim evidence of the desperate, determined fight made by this intrepid officer.

Captain McMaster, in his official report to the War De­ partment, estimated the pulajan force at 500 and that

approximately 150 had been killed although only forty- 26 nine bodies were actually counted. 24- "Ibid, 260: The Times (London), July 25, 1906, 3»

^^Manila Times, August 1, 1906, 1.

^Gq.p.c., 1906, II, 250-251: Manila Times, August 10, 1906, 1. 301

These statistics prompted one high Constabulary officer to

remark, "I trust this will prove a convincing argument that

the pulajanes' anting-anting had lost its virtue

Some time after the fight at Tabontabon, it was learned

that Faustina's band had visited the barrios of Dagami

Dulag, Toloso, and Tanwan on July 21, 22, 23 and 24 before reaching Tabontabon. These visits were conducted in order

to obtain additional bolomen who were virtually abducted and then compelled to fight. Those who refused to join were killed. Those accompanying the pulajanes, were given weapons and placed in the center of the pulajan ranks and ordered not to speak nor change positions. The flanks and rear were guarded by loyal pulajanes with orders to kill any of the abductees who might attempt to escape. It was

estimated that of the 1,000 pulajanes at Tabontabon only fifty were full fledged members of Faustino's force while

150 were willing volunteers. The rest were kidnapped and compelled to fight. After their defeat most of these con­

scripts escaped and Faustina's hard-core force was reduced OQ to less than 200 men. The Tabontabon fight proved to be

the turning point in the Leyte pulajan campaign. After

^^Letter to Colonel James G. Harbord from Colonel H. H. Bandholtz, July 28, I9O6 , Bandholtz MSS.

^%anila Times, August 10, I9O6 , 1 and August 9, 1905, 1. 302 this the pulajanes were no longer anxious to engage the government force and were content in remaining in their 2Q mountain retreats.

Meanwhile General Allen and General Jesse M. Lee of the regular army prepared for the final roundup of the pulajanes in the vicinity of Burauen. Lee, in command of

500 regular troops and large bodies of Scouts and Con­ stabulary, hoped to surround the band on the eastern part of the island. Two gun boats were assigned to General Lee to patrol the straits between Samar and Leyte in order to close this traditional avenue of escape. On August 8, 1905, a detachment of the 8th Infantry under Lt. E. H. Anres accompanied by a Constabulary detach­ ment under Lt. Hemmett located a band of pulajan bolomen at Lake Bito. A short but severe fight developed in which ten of the fanatics were killed including a commandaht and one lieutenant. Thirteen outlaws were captured along with numerous bolos.^^ The following day, the pulajanes re­ taliated and struck a detachment of the 8th Infantry under

Lt. Jo Bo James near Julita. James had received informa­ tion that a party of outlaws were concentrating near his

% . E . C . , I9O6 , II, 262.

^%anila Times, August 1, 19O6 , 1,

^^Ibid, August 9, 1906,1 . 303 station. He rushed out with ten men to give fight, hut it was a planned amhush. The soldiers fought a determined battle in which they expended their ammunition and used their rifles as clubs in hand-to-hand combat. The detach­ ment, nonetheless, was overwhelmed and James, and seven other members of his party were killed or missing after the engagement.^ The pulajanes vented their hostility by mutilating the bodies of the dead soldiers.

Meanwhile the main body of the pulajanes had been surrounded on a hill by the mixed command of General Lee.

Before attempting an assault, lee ordered several field guns brought up to shell the fortress into submission.

Lee believed that his soldiers had executed a perfect encircling movement and that "the death ring" was un­ breakable.^^

About this time General Leonard Wood arrived on

Leyte and pledged to remain "on the spot" until the situa­ tion was stabilized.Wood ordered two additional

^^Ibid, August 10, I9O6 , 1.

^^The Times (London) August 11, I9O6 , 3,

^^Manila Times, August 9> 1906, 1.

^^Ibid, August 10, I9O6 , lo 304- battalions of regulars rushed into Leyte to complete the cordon. These troops sailed almost immediately from Manila on The Kilpatrick and landed at Tacloban, the capital of

Leyte. Each soldier was armed with a regulation rifle,

300 rounds of ammunition, and a bolo. They were accompanied by adequate support facilities with provisions for a 30-day campaign and two Colt automatic guns with 2,000 rounds of ammunition.

While the soldiers were preparing an assault, the native governor of Leyte, detected' a change in attitude of the bulk of the natives as thousands were rallying to support the government. Governor DeVeya swore in a number of volunteer units, several of which had minor skirmishes with the pulajanes at Baybay and in the Ormoc and Burauen areas. The volunteers were armed only with edged weapons but they fought bravely and compelled the pulajanes to take flight.

By late August the southern section of Leyte from

Baybay south was considered clear of pulajanes and con­ ditions on the west coast were considered highly

^^Ibid, August 1 3 , I9O6 , 1.

^^Ibid, August 24-, I9O6 , 1, 305

satisfactory.^® There were several minor engagements in early September but the pulajanes refused to be drawn into a serious fight. Instead they adopted guerrilla tactics. They ambushed small parties, fired a few volleys and then retired into the mountains.

In late September 1905, Major Mevill with fifty-one

Constables and a detachment of the 24th Infantry located

Faustina's new camp on the east side of the Lubi Mountains.

Nevill assaulted the position, killed one and wounded one but the main body slipped away before the troops could close in. Nevill ordered the partially built camp destroyed.

Four large barracks buildings and large quantities of rice and camot% were burned before the Constables returned to their post. Faustina himself was reported to have been present during the initial stage of the fighting but as usual managed to escape.

The next serious encounter occurred at La Paz on the eastern coast of Leyte. A detachment of twenty-five Con­ stables, under Lt. Ralph Yates, and Company L of the 8th

^®Ibid, August 27, 19C6 , 1.

^^Ibid, September 11, 19C6, 1; September Ip, 19C6, 1; and September 18, I9O6 , 1.

^^Ibid, September 22, I9C6 , 1. 306

Infantry, under Captain Ham, were attacked on December 5,

I9O6 by a strong force of pulajanes led by Basilic Samson.

Yates and Ham bad been patrolling the vicinity and at the

time of the attack were preparing for their night camp.

With a small detachment, Yates had gone forward to re-

connoiter but had proceeded only fifty yards when the pulajanes opened up.^^

While Captain Ham deployed to receive the main attack,

Yates and his small detachment were nearly annihilated.

Had it not been for the gallant action of Corporal Seth L.

Weld, Lt. Yates and his companions would have been killed.

But this brave corporal stood his ground, expended all his

ammunition and then used the butt of his gun to defend his wounded comrades. General Lee later stated.

The record of Corporal Weld's superb gallantry and sublime behavior reads like a romance and the facts mark him as one of the finest and bravest of the en­ listed soldiers in the rolls of the army.

For this action Wells received the Congressional Medal of

Honor.

While Yates and Weld were fighting for their lives.

Captain Ham delivered a devastating counterattack in which

'^^H.P.C.o , 1907, 11; 3O8 : Manila Times, December 7, 1905, 1 and December 8, I9O6 , 1: Hew York Tribune, December 12, I9O6 , 3. h? Manila Times, January 9; 1907, 1= 307 forty pulajanes were killed, including three prominent leaders and Samson himself. The remaining pulajanes /I % then fled, the field. Within a week of the La Paz fight, a troop of United States Cavalry was ordered to Leyte to work in conjunction with the infantry and Constabulary.

The Cavalry was expected to be stationed at Burauen, the heart of the pulajan region. Prom this post they were to be used as mounted troops in order to run down and wear out the pulajanes.Meanwhile the Governor-General authorized Governor DeVeya of Leyte to offer a 2,000 peso reward for Eaustino, dead or alive.

Still the pulajanes represented a formidable threat on Leyte, and on January 6, I907, they successfully at­ tacked a combined force of Constabulary, volunteers and regulars from the 16th Infantry. Pollowing this there were no more encounters until May 21, I907, when Lt. Snodgrass of the Constabulary and two American soldiers ran into a pulajan camp near Guinarona. The Americans managed to scatter the pulajanes but Snodgrass was severely wounded.

Prom this point on the pulajanes were rapidly picked up

1907, II, 308: Manila Times, December 8, I9O6 , 1,

^^Ibid, December 11, I9O6 , 1.

^^Ibid, December 12, I9O6 , 1, $08 by the troops while many simply surrendered. But the fight at La Paz had proved decisive. After this the pulajanes were thoroughly discouraged and disillusioned and fought only half-heartedly.^^

Pollowing Snodgrass's scrap, the soldiers converged hn on the area in order.to track down the band. ' In early

June there were fourteen separate columns of regular army and Constabulary operating in the infested region, keeping the pulajanes constantly on the move. Gradually no Paustino's command disintegrated. On June 11, I907,

Lt. Ralph A. Jones with a detachment of the 35th

Philippine Scout Company located a group of four pulajanes.

When the outlaws refused to halt, Jones ordered his men to open fire and one of the pulajanes fell wounded while three escaped. The wounded man had been shot through the right eye but he survived. Jones unknowingly had captured the famous leader of the Leyte uprising, Papa Paustino.

^^R.P.O., 1907, II, 308,

^'^Manila Times, May 23, 1907, 1° 48lbid, June 7 , 1907, 1.

^^R.P.C., 1907, II, 309: Manila Times, June 12, I907, 1. $09

With the capture of Faustino the pulajan movement in

Leyte was finished. Within two weeks, the regular army was being withdrawn from Leyte. Even Faustino's own sons volnji- 50 tarily surrendered to the government authorities.^ So im­ portant were these developments that the Governor-General,

James F, Smith, personally cablegrammed the Secretary of War and notified him of Faustino's capture. The Governor-General also noted that all guns had been captured except four which were presumed lost. Thus pulajanism in Leyte was thoroughly and completely crushed.Leyte had been pacified by the combined efforts of the Constabulary, numerous volunteer 52 units, and the regular army."^

^^Manila Times, June 15, 190?, T , Jnne IS, 1907, 1, June 19, 1907, 1 and June 25, 1907, 1. 51 Cablegram to the Secretary of War from Governor-General Smith, June 25, 190?, File Ho. 1258175, Record Group 94, National Archives.

1908, II, 402. CHAPTER XIII

BLOODY SAMAR: 1902 - I91I

As previously noted, Samar had been the scene of heavy fighting during the insurrection. After the sur­ render of Aguinaldo, General Lukhan remained in the field and required an energetic campaign hy the United States

Army under General Jacob Smith before that island was con­ sidered ready for civil administration.^ Even witn

Lukban's surrender, however, a number of outlaw leaders refused to follow his example and fled to the interior.

The most prominent chiefs were Pope Pablo, Antonio Anugar and Pedro de la Cruz, all of whom were members of the 2 fanatical Dios-Dios religious sect.

Shortly after the establishment of the civil adminis­ tration and the organization of the Constabulary, Pope % Pablo emerged as the titular head of the Dios-Dios.

^See Chapter 11.

% . P . C . , I9O6 , 111, 28. ^In contrast to the majority of the ladrones in Luzon whose motive was personal profit, the pulajanes were dedicated to overthrowing American rule on Samar, Leyte and other islands in the Visay an group.

$10 311

But in 1902, it was beyond the physical capability of the pulajanes, as the Dios-Dios followers were soon called, to continue the struggle against the United States.

Thus, Pablo and his followers retreated deep into the mountains and for the next two years built a sizeable army in preparation for an eventual showdown with the

American government. Throughout the period of 1902-1904,

Pablo supervised his band, accumulated huge stock piles, and attempted to persuade dissolute taos (native laborers) to join his movement. Initially recruitment was not easy because many natives hoped that the American regime would bring peace, prosperity and justice to their bands. Un­ fortunately, however, these benefits of civilization were not immediately bestowed on the natives of the interior,and they were confronted with corrupt local officials, new taxes and a series of confusing laws which they did not understand. Pablo took advantage of these conditions and became the undisputed leader of the mountain people in the northern section of the island. Those natives who refused to join the pulajanes were subjected to various

forms of retaliation, including death.^

^Manila Times, March 16, I903, 3- Stanley P. Hyatt was one of the Times top reporters and frequently accompanied soldiers on field operations. He covered the Samar Up­ rising of I904-I9O6 extensively. $12

Prior to 1904, little was known of the nature or extent of Pablo's influence on Samar. It was assumed that he headed only a small fanatical group which repre­ sented no substantial threat to civil government. During this period, the pulajanes limited themselves to attacking municipal police and small Constabulary detachments in an obvious effort to obtain much needed rifles.^ In the fall of 1902, Wallace 0. Taylor was sent to Samar to organize a minimum of 200 Constables. Several government launches were assigned to Taylor to increase his mobility. This was absolutely necessary because Samar lacked an adequate road system and most of the area was mountainous and covered with dense wilderness which made the use of trails extremely hazardous in the pulajan-infested regions.^

During the next two years, Colonel Taylor supervised the organization of the Constabulary and directed their limited field engagements. There were a number of minor skirmishes,7 but nothing of any major importance until the

'^See Manila Times, November 28, 1902, 2, for an interesting account of an engagement in which Lt. Hendryx's small Con­ stabulary detachment was overwhelmed by the pulajanes in the Gandara Valley.

^Manila Times, October 15, 1902, 1.

^See for example, the Manila Times, October 18, 1902, 1; December 2, 1902, 1; December 5, 1902, 1: December 9, 1902, 1; January p, 1905, 1; June 10, 1905? 1 and June 12, 190$, 1< spring of 1904« The first indication of a major new up­

rising occurred in early February when Pedro de la Cruz,

one of Pablo's sub-chiefs who dominated the headwaters of

the Gandara Valley, and approximately 500 pulajanes attacked

Lt. McCrea's small Constabulary patrol near Borongan.

McCrea and several Constables were killed and the pulajanes

collected their rifles and derived considerable prestige

among the natives for this victory. And even though the

Constabulary continued to patrol the northern and central

sections of the island, they found it almost impossible to

obtain intelligence information because the mountain people were either sympathetic with the pulajanes or reluctant to

assist the government soldiers because they feared retalia- p tion from the outlaws. Thus, the Constabulary high command

in Manila had no indication as to the extent of the pulajan movement until it was almost too late.

In the spring of 1904, the pulajan movement was sub­

stantially strengthened with the arrival of Enrique

Dagohob from Leyte. Dagohob was well educated and superior to all the other leaders in every respect. He soon made himself the master of the northeastern section of Samar especially

R.P.C., 1 9 0 5 , III, 90 : Manila Times, February 11, 1904, 1: New York Tribune, February 20, 1904, 5: New York Times, February 20, 1904, 1. 314

around the ...headwaters of the Oras and Dolores Elvers,

He established two headquarters which served as the seats

of his government, both of which were carefully selected

and considered inaccessible to an assaulting party. His main fortress on the eastern slope of the central range of

mountains was located at Maslog on the bank of the Dolores

River, His second headquarters was located at Buan (San

Jose) on the western slope of the mountains, From these mountain strongholds Dagohob developed his strategy which

he hoped would initiate a general uprising and destroy the

civil government on Samar. The key element of his plans was the destruction of all the towns and barrios of the

lowland and coastal regions. In this way he hoped to compel q natives to join his movement in the interior," In July of 1904, Dagohob, de la Cruz, and Pope Pablo began their campaign by initiating a reign of terror throughout northern Samar. Strong detachments of pulajanes

swept down upon the lowlands and burned dozens of towns and killed indiscriminately those who refused to join their movement. Initially the pulajanes concentrated on the

9E,P.C., 1905, III, 28-29. $15 rich. Gandara Valley and gradually worked north. The Con­ stabulary stationed in these regions vainly attempted to quell the disturbance but frequently were overwhelmed by the vastly superior pulajan army. These early reverses can also be attributed to the fact that the Constabulary was armed with obsolete Springfield carbines which had no magazines and therefore had to be reloaded after each shot. As a result, they were usually able to fire only one or two shots before the fanatics launched their bolo- rush and overwhelmed the smaller detachments.^^

In one such engagement a strong pulajan force under de la Cruz attacked the Constabulary post at Bulao. A bloody battle developed in which this small garrison killed fifty pulajanes and wounded many others before com­ pletely expending their ammunition. Constabulary casualties were also heavy and the survivors of this post were com­ pelled to retreat, seeking safety by swimming across a nearby river. In keeping with Constabulary tradition, every effort was made to prevent the capture of their weapons. One mortally wounded Constable managed to pitch 11 his rifle into the river before he died.

^^Ibid, 4 and 90.

^^Manila Times, July 30, 1904, 1. 316

Tile Constabulary reinforcements were rushed into

Samar and during the next month several successful engage­ ments were fought with the pulajanes. In early August,

Captain Cary I. Crockett, who had been assisting Captain

William C. Rivers in the pacification of Ambos Camarines

Province in southern Luzon, was ordered to Samar with a 1 ? large detachment of his Company A of the Manila Battalion.

Within two weeks of his arrival, Captain Crockett, a des­ cendent of Davy Crockett, became engaged in one of the most spectacular fights in the history of the corps. On

August 21, Lt. Bowers ordered a detachment of Constabulary to accompany thirty pulajan women prisoners to Tarangnan via the Gandara River. All proceeded well until this de­ tachment reached a large bend in the river which had been occupied by Anugar with twenty-five riflemen and a large number of bolomen. When the pulajanes called for the women to upset the boats, they unhesitatingly complied and then the outlaws poured in a withering fire which killed eight Constables.

Meanwhile Captain Crockett with a detachment of the

Manila Company heard the firing and rushed down the river l^ibid, August 11, 1904, 1. 317 and. landed just above the curve, Crockett and his men proceeded through long grass and came upon the band while it was disposing of the loot. He quickly formed a skirmish line and fired a volley into the outlaws. They immediately returned the fire and hit five of Crockett's men in the first volley. The pulajanes then advanced wildly from all sides crying "Tad-Tad" (cut to pieces), A fierce hand-to- hand fight developed but the well-disciplined Constables held their position and rallied behind their Captain,

One pulajan officer singled out Crockett, undoubtedly because of his officer's uniform, and rushed the officer.

Crockett emptied his revolver into the chest of the pulajan but the fanatic managed to inflict a ghastly wound with his dying effort, Crockett fell with his intended assailant and several other pulajanes fell on top of the officer. But several Constables managed to save their leader and literally lifted him out from underneath the dead and bleeding fanatics.

The pulajanes regrouped on the opposite side of the river, where they were spurred on by a woman who waved a flag and fired her rifle into Constable ranks, Crockett directed his men to retreat to a nearby Scout camp where his wounds were dressed. This determined officer then 318 returned to the area hoping to renew the fight« In this bloody fight, forty-one pulajanes were killed. For this brilliant engagement Crockett and three native Constables received the coveted Medal of Valor.

Several days before Crockett's epic struggle, the civil government decided to reconcentrate large groups of natives in the infested region. Two principal camps were established, one at Gandara and the other at

Gatbalogan, the capital of Samar. Public notices were distributed informing all natives that anyone found out­ side the camp limits would automatically be considered a pulajan. The government authorities delayed an active

Constabulary campaign until this relocation had been in completed.

In early September 1904, the Constabulary received information pinpointing Pope Pablo's headquarters in the

Gandara Valley. Major Crawford, the Acting Chief of the

^R.P.G., 1 9 0 3 , 111, 80: Manila Times, August 24, 1904, 1; August 27, 1 9 0 4 , 1; September 14, 1904, 2, this issue con­ tains official reports of this engagement by Crockett and his superiors; September 16, 1904, 1; September 1, 1904, 3: Hurley, loc. cit., 191-194; see also General Order No. 108, Philippine Constabulary, 1904 Series, and Henry T. Allen's Journal for additional details and newsnaper clippings, Allen MSS.

anil a Times, August I7 , 1904, 1. 319

Third District, organized a strong force of 180 Constables including Captain Crockett and Lto Bowers and launched an expedition to take the fortress. The detachment worked their way up to the Gandara River in small boats for about thirty miles and then disembarked and followed a trail to the fortress. After crossing a deep canyon and struggling up the mountain, the Constables stormed the stronghold but met only feeble resistance. The pulajanes had retreated without a fight. The outlaw headquarters had a number of newly constructed buildings capable of sheltering 500 soldiers and was well stocked with a large supply of palay, camotes, and corn. Before departing, Crawford ordered the 15 buildings and food destroyed.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Scouts were also heavily involved in tracking down the pulajanes. Lt. Overly killed fifteen of Anugar's men in a fierce engagement at Pugi.

Several days later Lt. Speth with a detachment of Scouts fought a two-day battle with a large group of pulajanes in the Catubig Valley, on the northeastern tip of Samar.

A week later. Major Crawford concluded another expedition

^^Ibid, September 15, 1904, 1.

^^Ibid, September 14, 1904, 1. 320 against the pulajanes in which he dispersed several hands, killed and wounded many, and captured a number of outlaws, guns, and incidentally Pope Pablo's hat.^^

The fighting was not limited exclusively to Samar itself. On September 17, It. Harrell with a small detach­ ment of Constabulary met a pulajan force on the little island of Parasan. A stiff fight developed in which Harrell killed four outlaws and captured six before the engagement was broken off. About this time on the main island a group of native volunteers from the village of liotiong clashed with a band of pul a janes which had raided their tov«i. The volunteers killed the leader of this band, Sebastian, and captured seventeen before the remaining pulajanes fled the field, farther north. Captain Alexander L. Dade, who had been assigned to Samar because of his regular army rank which enabled him to command Scout detachments, ordered Captain

Crockett and seventy-five Constables into the Catubig

V a l l e y . Dade sent Lt, Poggi with a Constabulary detach­ ment south where 200 pulajanes were reported concentrating under the command of Domingo. But nothing of any con- 1 Q sequence resulted from these expeditions.

^^Ibid, September 19, 1904, 1.

^‘^IbM, September 22, 1904, 1.

“'^Ibid, October 5, 1904, 1. 321

While Dade attempted to track down the pulajaaes, they were concentrating under Dagohoh's leadership for a massive raid on the 38th Philippine Scout Company's garrison at

Oras on the eastern coast of Samar. The twenty-man Scout garrison was overwhelmed hy 300 pulajanes. The raid netted

Dagohoh sixty carbines and greatly increased his prestige 20 among the pulajanes.

The success of the Oras raid stimulated the Constabu­ lary high command to order additional reinforcements to

Samar. Within two weeks after this raid, 350 Constables were detached from Luzon and headed for Samar. This brought

Captain Dade's command to a total of 1900 Constables and 21 Scouts. Dade wasted no time in deploying these reinforce­ ments. Captain Green with three lieutenants and eighty men were sent to occupy Balangiga on the southern tip of Samar while approximately 100 Constables were sent north to re­ inforce Crockett in the Catubig Valley. While these soldiers were taking up their assigned positions, additional coast guard cutters were ordered to Albay Province in southern

Luzon to ferry in additional reinforcements for the capital 22 of Samar, Catbalogan.

P.P.C. , 1905 5 III, 28 and 90: Manila Times, November 14-, 1 9 0 4 , 1: New York Times, November 15, 1904-, 5 : New York Tribune, December 25, 1904-, 3: See also the Scrapbook of Dora J. Allen, 1905 (sic), which contains a copy of cable- gram to General Corbin from Allen, December 24, 1904, Allen MSS.

21Manila, Times, November 28, 1904, 1.

^^Lbid, December 3, 1904, 1. V/itii these reinforcements, Major Samuel Crawford,

Commander of the Third District, in conjunction with

Captain Dade, in charge of field operations, prepared an extensive campaign by which they hoped to strike a decisive blow at the pulajanes. On December 1$, Its. Smith and

Poggi with seventy Constables attacked a strong pulajan force under Pic Rosa at Junap near Borongan on the eastern coast. A stubborn fight with 150 pulajanes ensued. The

Constabulary killed thirty-eight including Rosa and sustained a loss of one dead and three wounded, ^

Whatever satisfaction the Constabulary may have re­ ceived from their substantial victory at Junap was quickly reversed. On December 15, 1904, several hundred pulajanes attacked the Scout garrison at Dolores, on the eastern coast. Lt. Stephen K. Hayt and thirty-seven enlisted men of the 58th Philippine Scout Company were killed in this engagement. The pulajanes captured all the Scout rifles and ammunition and reaped tremendous psychological benefits from 24 having annihilated the government force.

^^Ib i d December 20, 1904, 1 and December 21, 1904, 5-

^\ . P . C . , 1905, III, 90: Dew York Tribune, December 24, 1904, 1; and December 25, 1905, 5: New York Times, December 25, 1904, 4: Manila Times, December 23, 1904, 1 and December 24, 1904, 1, 323

The same force which destroyed Hayt's company pro­ ceeded to Taft, less than twenty miles from Dolores, and besieged another Scout detachment. Nearly 2,000 pulajanes surrounded the small Scout garrison for several days. On

December 20, however, Lt. Schreiner with a strong Consta­ bulary detachment from Borongan broke the pula j an ring and relieved the garrison. By the close of the year, conditions in Samar had become critical. Thousands of well-armed fanatical pulajanes dominated the interior of the island and were capable of seizing large towns as they had done at Oras, Dolores, and Taft. There was growing doubt that the Constabulary would be able to suppress the uprising and considerable agitation and pressure put on the Governor-General to call for military assistance.

On December 27, 1904, General Allen received a telegram from the Governor-General, Luke Wright, in which the Governor expressed his concern with conditions. He stated.

It is also clear that if we are to end the present situation we cannot merely hold the towns but must put flying columns in the field and of sufficient size equipped to take care of themselves.

In this way, Wright reasoned, the pulajanes would be kept off balance and therefore could not concentrate their

^^Allen's Diary for 1904, December 27, 1904, Allen ilSSc $24- forces for massive raids on large cities. In sim, Wright wanted to assume the initiative and suppress the uprising quickly even if it were necessary to call in the regular army to garrison the towns.

Allen, of course, agreed and several days later, he requested American troops to garrison the towns of Laguan,

Oras, Taft and Llorents.^*^ With the regular army occupy­ ing the.towns, Allen planned to redeploy his forces and establish Constabulary posts on the headwaters of the

Oras and Dolores Rivers. From these posts, the Constabulary would be within striking distance of the pulaj an forces concentrated at Magtaon and Haslog. In order to supply these new posts deep in the interior. General Allen re­ quested an increase in the number of launches detailed to the Constabulary, all of which he wanted armed with 28 Gatling guns. The Governor-General approved Allen's request for both the infantry and launches, and also sug­ gested that the Constabulary chief personally move to the

^^Telegram'to Allen from Wright, December 27, 1904, Allen Diai'y for 1904, Allen MSS.

^^Allen Diary for 1904, December 29, 1904, Allen MSS.

^^Telegram to the Governor-General, Luke Wright, from Allen December $1, 1904, located in Allen's Diary for 1904, Allen MSS. $25

east coast in order to make firsthand observations and

recommendations.

Carrying out this suggestion Allen, in early January,

1905, conducted an extensive tour around the entire island.

While on the east coast, he ordered Lt. Poggi with 100

Constables and fifty Borongan volunteers to establish

a station in the mountain regions near Magtaon. He also

ordered Lt. Keesey with sixty Constables to establish a

garrison on the Oras River at Concepcion, and stationed

Lt. Avery with a detachment of Ocouts on the Dolores Elver near Maslog. Also Lt. De Court with a detachment of Scouts and Lt. Jeancon with forty Constables were stationed at

Catubig. Lts. Speth and Abbott with their Scout companies were established on the Gandara River at Tagibiron while other Scout detachments under Cook, Prisbie, and Nickerson were stationed at various points along the Gandara River,

Finally Allen stationed Constabulary units under Griffith at Cat aman, Williams at Palapag, Smith at Borongan, Green at Balingiga, Hemmett at Calbiga and Hunt at Catbolgan.

Crockett was ordered to proceed to San Ramon and establish a garrison at that coastal town. General Allen was con­ fident that the establishment of garrisons deep in the

^^Telegram to Allen from Wright, January 1, 1905, located in Allen's Diary for 1904, Allen MSS. 326 interior woiild enatle his soldiers to strike at the pulaj an stronghold and suppress the uprising.

While Allen was making his inspection tour, General

Corbin, the Conmander of the Philippine Division, ordered

General Carter, the Commander at the Department of the

Visayans, to alert his troops and hold them in reserve in case they were needed on Samar.Less than twenty- four hours after Corbin's instructions to Carter, addi­ tional army units were officially ordered into Samar.

The arrival of these troops provided a moral boost to both the Scouts and Constabulary soldiers and also served a warning to the pulajanes that the government was determined xp to suppress the uprising.^

Despite several initial setbacks, Allen's campaign began to unfold. On January 8, Lt. Avery with the 3?th

Company of Scouts and Lt. Helfert with fifty Constables launched an expedition to crush Dagohob's eastern fortress at Maslog, sometimes referred to as "a pulajan Port

Arthur." The mixed force was compelled to cross a trail which Allen aptly described as being fit only for aquatic

^^Letter to Wright from Allen, January 12, 1^0$, Allan MSS.

^Manila Times, January 2, 1903, 1.

^^Ibid, January 3, 1905, 1. 327 animals or prehensile ones. Before reaching the fortress,

Dagohoh sent 800 pula,janes to meet Avery's command. They killed eight Constables and wounded many others, including

Avery, and compelled the government soldiers to withdraw.

Dagohoh nonetheless evacuated Maslog and crossed the mountains to San Jose where he was joined by Pope Pablo and Pedro de la Cruz. Here they had built seventy-eight temporary houses and cuartels, capable of housing about

500 men, women and children. But several weeks later Lts.

Cook and Overly with 100 Scouts struck San Jose and forced

Dagohoh to recross to his Maslog fortress. A short time later another strong Scout detachment under Lts. DeCourt and Wilson struck Maslog and the pulajanes once again evacuated. Unfortunately, however, none of these engagements proved decisive because the long marches required to reach the fortresses exhausted the government soldiers and made it impossible for them to force a decisive engagement.

While the Constabulary and Scouts were chasing Dagohoh back and forth between San Jose and Maslog, Captain Crockett

^^Manila Times, January 5 5 1905, 1, February 4-, I905, 1 and February 8, 1903, 1«

"^Letter to W. Cameron Forbes, Secretary of Commerce and Police from Allen, March 5, 1905, Allen MSS. 328 was establishing an outpost on the northeastern coast at

San Hamon, General Allen personally selected Crockett to establish this outpost in the heart of the territory con­ trolled by Anugar, one of the major sub-chiefs of Samar.

Crockett's 148-man detachment arrived at San Ramon on

January 14, with only ten days' rations but a good supply of ammunitiono The town itself had been completely destroyed and the inhabitants either killed or compelled to join the pulajanes in the hills. Nevertheless Crockett disembarked and instructed the coast guard cutter to send for additional supplies.

The first night guards were posted while the remain­ ing Constables feverishly cleared grass and brush in order to establish a field of fire around their hastily built, semi-circular, crude fortress. Crockett knew, of course, that these measures would only temporarily delay a determined bolo rush and therefore strung up tin cans along the edge of the jungle in order to warn of a night attack. The following day they improved their little fortress. A small well was dug to provide water and in the following weeks they continued to improve its defense.

^^Manila Times, January 14, 1903, 1.

^°Hurley, loo, cit., 213-216. Hurley's account of Crockett's outpost at San Ramon is full and complete since he had access to the extensive Crockett Papers. 329

Once the fortress was completed, Crockett aptly

named it Port Defiance and waited for the anticipated

pnlajan attack. Weeks passed, however, and no sbtack

developed. During this time, the meager rations were con­

sumed and the force was compelled to send out forays for

food. They also built traps to catch octopi and jelly fish.

This diet was supplemented with a few coconuts, bamboo

shoots, wild honey, wild boar, birds, monkeys, giant

bats, and two 24-foot man-eating pythons. '

When no attack materialized, Crockett decided to take

out a reconnaissance party in force. He selected eighty

of his best men and left Lt. Hazzard in command of the

fortress with orders to hold it at all costs and not to

attempt to relieve his party under any circumstances. The patrol slipped out of Port Defiance and attempted to

capture several pulajan guides, but those who were appre­

hended willingly faced death rather than survive and be

subject to the retaliation of the notorious Dagohoh.

After an extensive survey of the terrain, Crockett returned

to Port Defiance to prepare for a full-scale attack.^

^^Ibid, 217-218; Manila Times, March 8, 1905, 1.

5%urley, loc. cit., 219-220. 330

The pulajanes, however, attacked that very night. The

first assaulting party consisted of sixty holomen, each

of whom had two holos lashed to their wrists. Others

carried long poles with burning torches in order to burn

the grass roof and force its occupants into the open where

they could be chopped down by the fanatical bolomen. The roof went up like tinder, but Crockett personally cut the rope which was designed to drop the burning roof upon the

attackers. Following this the main attack unfolded with

700 red- and white-uniformed pulajanes shouting "Tad-Tad," as they stormed the fortress. The bolomen received sup­ porting rifle fire from nearby brush but it was: not

effective as the pulajanes were notoriously poor shots.

All night the battle raged and gradually the pulajan bodies piled up outside the fort. Hundreds of pulajanes were wounded while 100 were killed outright before Anugar ordered the assault broken off.

One of the few prisoners taken was a small boy named Feliciano. At first the boy was extremely hostile but eventually kindness and gifts changed his allegiance and he became a great worshipper of Crockett. He confided in his hero and disclosed information which convinced

Crockett that the pulajanes completely dominated northern

Samar, Operating on this intelligence, he concluded that 331 he would have to strike to the south in order to find supplies for his besieged commande

In view of the severe defeat administered to the pulajanes, Crockett calculated his fortress would be relatively safe even if he removed a large portion of his command in order to seek relief. He left a sergeant in command and began a long, exhausting and almost impossible trip south through a jungle infested with crocodiles and snakes. For days his soldiers marched south surviving only on the roots of the trees, snakes and other indescrib­ able items. During this period Crockett himself moved from one end of the column to the other constantly prodding on his men. Gradually their uniforms ripped into shreds and much of their flesh was cut and torn by the thorns of the jungle. Finally they reached the Oras River, built several rafts and for two days moved through deep canyons and crossed rapids before they reached Oras. General Allen happened to be at Oras when Crockett's detachment arrived and immediate plans were developed to relieve the remaining Constables at

Port Defiance.

^%anila Times, February 4, 1905, 3: Hurley, loc. cit. , 221-223; Letter to W. Cameron Forbes, from Allen, March 5, 1905, Allen MSS.

^^Hurley, loc. cit., 223-22?: Manila Times, March 8, 1905, 1. 332

While Crockett's conmand was struggling for its very existence at San Ramon, other Constabulary and Scout detach­ ments were attempting to track down the elusive pulajan chiefs. Captain Dade led an attack on the pulajan strong­ hold in the heart of the wilds of Samar but was unsuccess­ ful.^^ Farther north Lt. Emil Speth with his 39th Company of Philippine Scouts engaged 700 pulajanes near Catubig.

Ihe Constabulary launch, 'The Florida, which had been temporarily rigged as a gun boat, complete with Gatling gun in the bow, was sent up the Catubig River and centri­ ng buted to the relief of the besieged Speth.' Several days later Lt. Gustin with a Scout detachment met a large pulajan force under Pedro de la Cruz near Mt, Taua.

Gustin was wounded twicer Yet he continued to direct his men and inflicted heavy casualties upon the fanatics before they broke off the attack and left the scene. In this engagement de la Cruz had assembled 1600 warriors with

100 rifles.

By early February conditions had become so unstable that one astute observer noted.

^ ^Ibid, February 4-, 1903, 1.

Ibid, February 8, 1903, 1»

Ibid, February 13, 1903, 1< 333

There is no law in Samar today — beyond the will of the pulajanes. The American authority extends as far as the sentinels around the few military posts and no farther. Outside all is anarchy and blood shed. There is no question of putting down an outbreak but rathen one of reconquering the greater part of the islands.

To bolster the effectiveness of the civil government, a battalion of the 12th Infantry was sent into the Gandara

Valley supposedly to relieve the Scouts and the Constabu­ lary for field duty. But it was well understood that the infantry would not confine their activities to garrison duties. They had been ordered to make extensive "mapping” expeditions in order to familiarize themselves with the area 4-5 and any pulajan found in their way was to be destroyed.

While the 12th Infantry was moving into the Gandara

Valley, General Allen received information that 2,000 pulajanes were entrenching near San Jose, A massive govern­ ment campaign was quickly organized in which all Scouts and

Constabulary in the immediate vicinity were ordered to con­ verge on the pulajan rendezvous area,^^ On February 12,

General Allen with a large force of Constabulary moved into the Gandara Valley where he met Colonel Foster of the

12th Infantry, The two officers agreed that three mixed

^ I b i d , February 4, 1905, 1» These were the conclusions reached by The Manila Times' field correspondent on Samar, Stanley Portal Hyatt,

^^Ibid, February 17, 1903, 1»

^^Ibid, February 20, 1903, 1= 334-

col-uims would converge simultaneously on San Jose. Colonel

Foster led 250 men from Bulao while General Allen commanded

150 men from Taiviran. Lt. Nickerson led the third main

group originating at Lokiloken. The total strength of these

columns was approximately yOO and each contained detach­

ments of Scouts, Constabulary, and infantry. According to

the plan General Allen's column was to block the three

trails leading out of San Jose to the west and north, while

Foster and Nickerson struck San Jose from the south and

east.

The columns proceeded with drill-like precision but

Dagohob evacuated his fortress without resistance. Obviously

the pulajan chief did not wish to risk complete annihilation.

Therefore, he withdrew and permitted the soldiers to pass peacefully along the main trail, striking only stragglers.

But in typical guerrilla fashion, five minutes after the last column had passed, Dagohob reassembled his command and thus the pulajanes retained their control of the jungle area.^'^

Colonel Foster returned to Bulao on the 18th of

February with three companies of infantry and Cook's

4-7 'Letter to ¥. Cameron Forbes, Secretary of Commerce and Police from Allen, March 5, 1905, Allen MSS. For a brief account, see the Manila Times, March 9 , 1905, 3» 335

detachment of Scouts leaving Allen with nearly $00 Scouts

and Constabulary soldiers. Allen selected 150 enlisted

men and six officers and followed the pulajanes toward

their eastern headquarters at Maslog. The march from San

Jose to Maslog took two and one-half days since Allen had no guide and none of his soldiers were familiar with the

territory. After considerable effort the trail to Maslog was located, and on the afternoon of the 21st, the soldiers rushed the fortress only to find it had been deserted. A

search of the area disclosed nearly thirty badly decomposed bodies, including six Constables and twenty-one pulajanes who had been killed in previous assaults. Allen decided to terminate his expedition because of the exhausted con­ dition of his men and their lack of supplies. Therefore, on the 22nd of February, rafts were constructed and his

entire command of nearly 200 Constables and Scouts floated down the Dolores River and arrived at Oras on the 24th.

When Allen arrived at Oras, he met Captain Crockett who had just completed his harrowing trip from Fort

Defiance. The officers exchanged notes and decided to

continue the attack after a few days' rest. On the 28th

of February General Allen, Captain Crockett and a detachment 336

of Scouts under Lts. Nickerson and Overly accompanied by

approximately 15O soldiers sailed north for Gamay Bay near San Ramon. The government launch was compelled to maneuver through the uncharted, reef strewn harbor of

Gamay and landed on the beach south of the Gamay River.

After a march of three quarters of an hour they arrived

at Cagamotan. Crockett's newly acquired friend, the

captured pulajan boy, Feliciano, located a trail which led

to the pulajan fortress. Within a half hour the head of the column was attacked by a fierce bolo rush by a large force of pulajanes who had concealed themselves in the high grass adjoining the trail.

When the attack commenced Crockett was on the point.

Though he was almost immediately shot in the arm, he con­ tinued directing his men throughout the engagement.

Shouting "Tad-Tad" the pulajanes charged with their boles but the discipline of the Constabulary and Scouts was

sufficient to drive the force off. Allen himself parti­ cipated in this brief but sharp engagement, later ex­ plaining that he "got into it with both feet and I might

add with my pumping Winchester also." The General dropped three gaudily bedecked pulajan officers while directing

^°Letter to Forbes from Allen, March 3, 1905? Allen MSS', 337 his connnand. The majority of the Constables was armed with single-loading Springfield rifles but several had ZlQ riot guns which substantially increased their fire power. ^

The fanatics could not withstand the sustained fire of the disciplined soldiers and soon fled, Allen pushed on to

Maslog only to find the pulajanes had evacuated and destroyed their own fortress.

On March 7? 1905, Lts. Williams and Mcllwain left

Catubig with ninety-five Constables in an attempt to track down the band which had ambushed Allen and Crockett during the preceding week. After hiking all day the 'column stopped at the burned-out barrio of San Vicente and made camp for the night. All during that night the hills surrounding San

Vicente swarmed with pulajan activities. The Constables observed numerous lights and heard the signal horns of the enemy. In the morning, Williams expected an attack but when it failed to materialize he ordered his column to go on the offensive. Before traveling far, however, the de­ tachment was ambushed. Williams’ arm was shattered before the pulajan force broke off the attack and fled. It was believed that this wing of 300 pulajanes had been

^^Letter to Governor-General Wright from Allen, March 5, 1905, Allen MSS.

^^Letter to Forbes from Allen, March 5, 1905, Allen MSS, 338

personally led by Dagohob.

The task of pvirsuing the pulajanes through the jungle

v/as particularly hazardous since it afforded the natives an

ideal opportunity for ambush attacks. It was extremely

difficult also to obtain intelligence information because

the pulajanes had terrorized the natives by mutilating and

torturing those who cooperated with the American government.

Another problem which made the tracking of pulajanes diffi­

cult was the fact that much of Samar was of volcanic origin

and therefore the surface left few footmarks by which the

Constables could track down their prey. Thus, what the

Constabulary needed in Samar was the use of bloodhounds which 52 had proved successful in Luzon,

Dagohob moved farther north where he encountered a mixed force of Scouts and Constabulary under Lt. Speth with

twenty-five Scouts and Captain Green with ninety-five Con­

stables. The two forces met at Bangon where Dagohob directed

a massive bolo rush against the government soldiers. So intense was the fighting that Speth and Green were compelled to supervise the retreat of their soldiers since they could 55 not withstand the repeated bolo rushes.

^^Manila Times, March 13, 1903, 1<

^^Ibid, March 15, 1903, 3»

^^Ibid, March 29, 1903, 1= 339

Meanv/hile V. Cameron Forbes,the Secretary of Commerce and Police, had concluded an extensive personal investiga­ tion of Samar. He hoped to evaluate the situation in order to determine what means would best suppress the flames of the insurrection. On the 1st of April, I9 0 5 , Forbes' plan was made public. He appointed a new governor of Samar,

Captain George Curry, a former Chief of the Manila Police

Department and ex-Governor of Isabela Province. Curry was given the authority to command all troops in Samar including

Constabulary, Scouts, and regular army. In this respect his authority was equal to that of General Leonard Wood in

Mindanao. Curry's instructions were brief and simple: he 34 was ordered to "clean up Samar.'

In mid-May 19055 Colonel Taylor with a company of Con­ stabulary launched an expedition to track down Otoy, one of Pablo's top lieutenants, who operated in the vicinity of Magtaon in central Samar, After several days' march in the forest, Taylor closed in on Otoy's fortress. A fierce fight developed and Colonel Taylor was severely wounded, having a section of his jaw virtually shot away. This intrepid officer refused to leave the firing line, however,

5 4Ibid, April 5, 1905, 1< 34-0

■until the enemy was routed. His detachment suffered heavy casualties and General Allen requested that two companies of the 23rd Infantry he sent to relieve Colonel

Taylor, Governor Gurry complied and also personally led seventy-five volunteers which joined Taylor and the in­ fantry on May 21. Taylor had been without adequate medical assistance for nearly five days and was kept alive by eating raw eggs found in the nests of wild birds, For his heroic action Colonel Taylor received the Medal of Valor.

The fight at Magtaon was the last serious encounter on the eastern coast in which the Constabulary played the dominant role. Shortly after this General Allen, recog­ nizing the impossibility of quickly suppressing the pulajan movement with his native force, on May 24-, 1903? recommended that Samar be divided into two sections with the army in complete control of the turbulent eastern zone and the

Constabulary retaining authority in the relatively peaceful western zone. The Constabulary chief justified this by ex­ plaining that pulajan movement unfortunately had not fully been determined until it ass'umed proportions too great to

^^Manila Times, May 22, 1903, 1 and September 21, 1906, 1: New York Times, May 22, 1905, 1 : Hurley, loc. cit. , 274-: Elarth, loc, cit,, 67: See also General Order No, 38, Philippine Constabulary Headquarters, Manila, 1906 Series, 341 be handled by the Constabulary» In addition, he stressed the cost to the insular government of the long campaign, the problems of a dual command, and the necessity to return de- tached Constabulary units to their home garrisons.^56

Several days later, the Governor-General, Luke Wright, formally requested that General Corbin, the Commander of the Philippine Division, assume the responsibility for the suppression of the pulajan movement in eastern Samar»

General Corbin immediately responded and ordered General

Carter, the Commander of the Department of Visayas, per­ sonally to take command of all Scout, Constabulary and regular army units in the eastern zone.^^

It is noteworthy, however, that General Allen was not entirely convinced of the necessity to call in the army and, in fact, was somewhat irritated at the critics of the civil government» Allen pointed out that the task of eliminating pulajanism was most difficult and of necessity would be time consuming and expensive even for the army. Nevertheless, he bowed to pressure and formally requested that the transfer be maô.e» He then cynically stated that General Carter would have the opportunity for which he had long desired and it

5GR.P.C., 1905, III, $0.

^"^Manila limes, May 23, 1903, 1. 54-2

would be interesting to note how quickly he could suppress

pulajanism.^^

At the end of May, 1905, Major H. A, Leonhaeuser of the

21st Infantry, commanding in the Catubig Valley, ordered

Captain Cromwell Stacey with eighty soldiers to take the

field against Dagohob. Stacey was accompanied by a detach­ ment of Scouts under W. ¥, Taylor, Jr., while Lt. Juan Sulse

of the Constabulary served as an observer and a guide. On

May 31 Stacey, who later earned fame in World War I as the

commander of the so-called Lost Battalion of the Argonne

Forest, ordered his assaulting force to avoid all known trails

and march in complete silence. The column took every pre­

caution to remain undetected and even cooking fires were fanned so that the smoke could not be observed. He ap­ proached Dagohob's stronghold and on June 2 came within firing distance without being detected. This in itself was

a marvelous accomplishment if one considers the extensive

spy network which the pulajanes had established throughout northern Samar. The attacking force consisted of less than

100 men while Dagohob had 4-00 well-armed, fanatical followers in his fortress. But the surprise was complete and the

superior discipline of the soldiers carried the day. The CO ■^ Letter to Governor-General Wright from Allen, May 257 1 9 0 5 , Allen MSS. 34-3

fighting was extremely heavy with over ninety pulajanes

being killed including the notorious Dagohob himself.

The death of Dagohob virtually put an end to ag­ gressive movement of the pulajanes in the northeast portion

of Samar. With the passing of their leader large numbers

of pulajanes surrendered to the government authorities

and the mountain people quickly,returned to the more peaceful task of cultivating their land. In sum, the pulajan movement had lost its leader, lost its heart and

abandoned its cause.

Six weeks after the death of Dagohob, Captain Ralph W,

Jones, the Senior Inspector of Samar, was leading a patrol in the vicinity of Magtaon when a force of 15O pulajanes

suddenly attacked. There were two bolo rushes both of which were repulsed with heavy casualties inflicted on the fanatics.

Thirty pulajanes were killed including one major and two , . 51 captains.

On August 16, 19055 a strong Constabulary force under the command of Lt. George A. Helfert accompanied by Lt.

^^Hurley, loc. cit., 2$8-24$. Hurley used the Stacey Papers in reconstructing these developments. See also R.P.G., 19055 III5 90 for a brief account of this fight: Manila Times, June 9, 1909, 1; June 10, 19055 1 and June 14, I905, 1.

^^R.P.C., 1905, III, 9 0 : Manila Times, June 30, 1905, 1.

G^Ibid, July 29, 1905, lo 344

JuazL Sulse surprised the camp of the pulajan chief Antonio

Anugar, who commanded the outlaw forces in the Gandara

Valley. A sharp fight developed in which Anugar was mortally wounded. The death of Anugar removed Samar's most effective agitator although he was not a particularly

skilled tactician. Following his death, most of his 6? command voluntarily surrendered.

No further encounters with the pulajanes occurred during the remainder of 1905 although there were minor skirmishes. ^

During the early part of 1905, Governor Gurry opened nego­ tiations with the outlaws and it was agreed that on

March 24-, 1906, the pulajanes would surrender at Magtaon in central Samar. Instead of surrendering, however, the pula­ janes, under the command of Nasario Aguilar, made a treacherous attack on the Constabulary garrison during the surrender ceremony. Aguilar commanded approximately

130 men, fifteen of whom had rifles and carbines. The pulajanes marched into the station about 10:00 A.M. and halted in a line facing the Constabulary cuartel at a distance of about forty yards. The Constabulary had a

force of about fifty men under Lt. Bowers and Captain

Jones. The lather became suspicious of the pulajanes

^^R.PoG., 1905, II, 254: Manila Times, August 18, 1905, 2, and September 7, 1905, 1»

^-^Ibid, December 14-, I905, 1. 34.5 owing to their maimer of march and gradually worked his way into the cuartel reaching it gust as Aguilar gave the command to attack.

The pulaganes fired a volley and then with drawn holes and spears rushed the cuartel. So unexpected was the attack that the Constabulary scarcely had time to fire one volley before the fight became a hand-to-hand combat. Due to the bravery of Captain Jones and Lt. Bowers, the Constabu­ lary held its position despite- the fact that fourteen Constables became separated from the main group when hostilities were first initiated. Governor Curry and a number of visiting dignitaries fled for their lives. Some swam the river in order to escape the fanatic bolomen.

The attack was finally beaten off but not before twenty-two Constables had been killed and many others seriously wounded. Captain Jones who was wounded in the chest early in the attack and Lt, Bowers received a gun shot wound in the arm. The entire detachment suffered eighty-six per cent casualties but managed to kill forty- three pulaganes and finally drove off the attackers.

Lor this gallant action Jones, Bowers and several enlisted 346 men received the Medal of Valor.

The next important development occurred eight months

later, in November 19O6. A group of ninety volunteers

under Captain Narciso Abuque had been tracking Pedro de la

Cruz's force for several weeks before maneuvering them into

battle. The pulajanes' force was nearly annihilated, de la

Cruz himself was killed in this battle, and a number of de la

Cruz's high officers were captured along with guns, ammuni­

tion, bolos, a pulajan flag and considerable papers and

documents. Governor Curry was jubilant over this victory

and stated that "it meant the death knell of pulajanisrn in

the northern part of the island.

Several days later, Major Murphy with thirty Constables

and ten volunteers attacked Pope Pablo's camp at dawn. While

Murphy moved in from the north, Lt. Sulse headed another

column from the south and Lt. Mason of the 8th Infantry

commanded a force which moved in from the east. Pablo's band was completely surprised and Pablo himself was mortally wounded. His son was killed along with nine pulajanes and

^E.P.O., I9O6 , II, 2 3 5 , 227 and 201: Manila Times, March 26, I9O6, 1; March 30, 1905, 1; April 21, 1906, 2: See also General Order Wo. 16, Philippine Constabulary Headquarters Manila, I9O6 Series,

^%anila Times, November 29, 1906, 1. 34-7

the remainder of his family, arms and papers were captured.

The government forces received no casualties,It was six months before the government conclusively proved that Pablo

had indeed been killed by Major Murphy. Pablo had managed

to crawl away but he died shortly after and in April of

1907 his skeleton was found and positively identified,

By the spring of 1907, the pulajan uprising had been

thoroughly crushed. In April of that year Governor Curry

announced his decision to resign, having completed the

task for which he was appointed. During his tenure, a

total of 7,000 pulajanes had either been killed or captured

in some of the heaviest fighting which occurred in the

pacification of the Philippines from I9OI to 1917.^^ Governor Curry’s successor was Major Murphy who had

served as Senior Inspector of Samar for eight months prior 50 to accepting this appointment, The following month, the

Commander of the Department of Visayas, General Mills,

informed General Wood that all regular army troops could

Ibid, December 1, I9O6 , 1,

G^Ibid, April 24, 1907, 2.

GGlbid, April 11, I907, 1; April 18, 1907, 1; April 24, 1907, 2 and January 5, 1907, 4.

G^ibid, May 17 , 1907, 1. 34-8

“be withdrawn from Samar as the island was pacified.

The task of tracking down the few remaining pulajanes was best suited for the Constabulary which travelled in small parties, moving quickly through the jungle.

There was only one significant leader at large in I907 and that was Otoy. He had twenty-five guns and a small following but contented himself with remaining deep in the mo.untains and avoiding government soldiers. He committed no depredations during the year 1907. Never­ theless, the Constabulary maintained constant pressure on Otoy. In April of 1907, Lt. Burbank reported that he had wounded Otoy who by that time had assumed for himself the title of head of the pulajan movement on 71 Samar,' In mid-June I9O8 , Lt, Juan Sulse with twenty Con­ stables located Otoy's camp near Calibiga, A sharp skirmish followed in which the Constables killed a major, wounded several others and captured miscellaneous weapons and 72 other materials,' The following August, Captain

Snodgrass and Lt, Weaver located Otoy's camp and surprised

^^Ibid, June 22, 190?, 1. f^E.P.G., 1907, II, 302. ^^Manila Times, June 23, 1908, 1. 34-9

the leader and killed one pulajan before the main body, headed by Otoy, managed to escape.

By June of 1908 Otoy's command had been considerably reduced and his followers possessed less than two dozen rifles. The Constabulary kept his small band constantly on the move in order to eliminate the remnants of the once powerful pulajan movement. In July of 1908, Simeon

Angeles, the second ranking pulajan chief in Samar, was killed and his band annihilated. On June 18, the Con­ stabulary killed Banigoos, Otoy's brother-in-law. Mean­ while Ubaldo Diaz, Otoy's principal fighting commander was captured by Governor Ginco.^^

From mid-1908 until early 1911, the official records given no indication that Otoy's small band committed any major depredations. But the mere fact that this nbted" pulajan chieftain remained unaccounted for represented a blemish on the civil administration. Therefore, in the early spring of 1911, Colonel George D. Long launched a determined campaign to seek out and destroy Otoy. Long commanded only 250 men which made it impossible to patrol the entire island of Samar thoroughly. Once he determined

'^^Ibid, August 22, 1908, 1. 1908, II, 594 and 598. 350 that Otoy was operating south of the Magtacn trail, Long developed his strategy. He sent a number of Constabulary detachments deep into the mountains with orders to comb their respective areas quietly and remain in the field until

Otoy was accounted for. In short, the entire southern half of Samar was occupied for the first time. In order to keep the patrols in the mountain regions. Long estab­ lished adequate logistics by which rations were sent regularly into the field to meet the patrols. As a result the Constabulary detachments remained in the mountains for long periods, one patrol for a total of 139 days.

Long also devised an ingenious plan which called for the disbandment of the fifth Samar Company and its re­ organization with a number of Otoy's former pulajan soldiers.

Long was confident that he could control them and that their knowledge of Otoy's haunts would enable him to destroy the band. General Bandholtz personally approved this measure on February 7, 1911 and. Long launched a campaign which lasted until November 14-, 1911. During this period Long himself spent 203 days in and about Samar directing operations, en­ couraging his officers and men, and allaying the fears of the faint-hearted citizens. The latter consumed the major 351 portion of the Colonel's time since it was necessary to explain minutely dozens of times the objectives of his campaign to prominent Filipinos. The climax of this long campaign

occurred in October 19II, when Lt. Leon Puno • finally located

Otoy and in a brief engagement killed the notorious chief.

The death of Otoy removed the last noted pulajan chief

from Samar and completed the pacification of that "dark and bloody island." After this, there was great progress,

especially among the mountain people. Sanitation reforms were introduced and widely accepted. Improved methods of

agriculture similarly were introduced and brought wide benefits

to these backward people. In short,with the elimination of the

fanatical pulajan movement, the natives of Samar began to

enjoy the benefits of civilization. In Colonel Long's own words, "the last chapter of pulajanism was successfully

closed by the Constabulary through its excellent teamwork

and perseverance."^^

^•^Lraft copy of a Report of George B. Long, District Director of Southern Luzon, July JO, 1912, 6-10. Located in the . Bandholtz Papers at the University of Michigan: E.P.C., 1912, 145. CHiPTER XIV

THE. CONSTABULARY IN MINDANAO AND THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO:

1905 - 1917

The pacification of Mindanao and Sulu was completed

not hy the Constahnlary hat by the regular army under the

leadership of Generals John J« Pershing, Leonard Wood,

and Tasker Bliss. It was a tragic story where tens of

thousands of Moro religious fanatics willingly sought

death killing Christians so that they might ascend directly

to heaven according to the principles of the Moslem religion.

The Constabulary played not the decisive role in this

struggle but a supporting one. In contrast to the. Vi say an

Island group and on Luzon where the Constabulary's role was primarily military in its early stage, in Mindanao and Sulu

this corps was largely restricted to civil responsibilities.

Prom 1905 to 1913, the Constabulary was under the direct command of the Commanding General of the Moro Province who

simultaneously served as the Governor of this region. Oc­

casionally the Military Governor of Mindanao called upon

detachments of Constabulary to participate in significant

military operations in order to prepare the Constabulary

for the period when the Constabulary would assume full

352 353

responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in

Mindanao and Sulu,^

In the siunmer of 1903, the Philippine Commission,

passed Act 7S7 which authorized the creation of the Moro

Province. Per the purpose of administration, this large

island was sub-divided into seven districts and provinces:

Zamboanga, Lanao, Ootabato, Davao, Sulu, Misamis and

Surigao. James G. Harbord was appointed Assistant Chief

of the fifth Constabulary District, with the task of

organizing the corps in the fifth District. His job was

complicated considerably because he was responsible

directly to the Governor of the Moro Province who was also

commander of the regular troops. Initially the Governor was reluctant even to permit the Constabulary to be organized

in the more turbulent areas, namely, the bake Lanao Region,

the Cotabato country and the Island of Jolo in the Sulu 2 District. Nonetheless, the Governor, General Leonard. Wood

"Three Generals," an unpublished manuscript by John R, White who served as Harbord’s adjutant and contributed significantly toward the creation of the corps in the fifth District, White MSS.

^R.P.C., 1903 , III, 25 and 143: New York Times; June 10, 1903, 2: Manila Times, June 9, 1903, 1. 3^4- cooperated fully with Colonel lïarhord and provided every possible assistance to the Constabulary

With Wood's permission, Harbord immediately began to organize the Constabulary in Zamboanga, Davao, and the

Sulu Archipelago. Officers were assigned as fast as they arrived and given special instructions to screen Mores being recruited into the corps. New officers were also instructed to familiarize themselves with the people, their customs and. dialects in addition to the topography of their particular region. These officers were cautioned to avoid offending the Moslems and to maintain harmonious relations with all civil and military officials.

There was considerable apprehension as to the wisdom of enlisting Moros to serve in the Constabulary. Many argued that the Moros would not prove satisfactory soldiers since they traditionally owed their allegiance to their autocratic rulers, the datus. Others felt that the Moslems would not cooperate with their Christian officers because of their militant religious doctrines which called for all

■^Letter to General Allen from General Leonard. Wood, September 29, 1903, Allen MSS: "Three Generals," an unpublished manuscri'ot by John E. V/hite, White MSS: E.P.C., 1 9 0 3 , III, 143 and 1904, III, 123. ^Ibid. 355 faithful' Moslems to unite in a Holy War against the non­ believers. Nonetheless, Harbord himself was convinced that the Moros would make excellent Constables if properly 5 officered. Events proved Harbord correct in his assumptions.

Colonel Harbord's adjutant, Captain John R. White, explained some of the problems initially met in attempting to recruit Moros. On one occasion, White had gone to the beautiful port town of Bongao in the Sulu Archipelago where he paid a visit to the local Datu to persuade him to furnish a number of recruits. The interview took place in the Datu's harem which was filled to capacity with gorgeous, reclining beauties in a luxuriously fitted room with pillows, reclin­ ing mats and tapestries. When Captain White attempted to explain the benefits which the young Moro men might receive from joining the Constabulary, his arguments were not too con­ vincing. Considering the surroundings of the interview, it is at least understandable why the Datu failed to appreciate 5 the full implication of White's argument. Despite these handicaps, by the close of 1905, Harbord and White supervised

^RoP.C., 1904, III, 125: Manila Times, February 25, 1902, 5. ^Letter from White to his Mother, December 12, 1905, White M88. 356

the establishment of thirty-nine Constabulary stations with

seventeen officers and 353 enlisted men»^

harbord recognized that the total illiteracy of the

Moro and pagan natives provided a formidable obstacle to

overcome before they could be adequately trained and dis­

ciplined. To correct this, each station established some

type of school and the Moro Province Legislative Council

agreed to supply these schools on an equal footing with

the regular public schools. Harbord, of course, was

acutely aware of the benefits of enlisting the natives in

his force. He stated.

The influence on these people of the Constabulary among them will be one of the most potent aids to their civilization. The Moro. . . . who exchanges his breech clout and spear for the khaki and carbine becomes a marked man among his race, is eagerly questioned at every opportunity as to his arms, clothes, food, and treatment, and every soldier thus becomes to his own people a living evidence of the fulfillment of government nromises.

Gradually, the Constabulary in Mindanao and Sulu took form. In late I903 and early 1904, they played a minor supporting role in the campaigns against the Datu

Ali in the Rio Grande Valley and Adriano Concepcion in

7mvP'..C., 1 9 0 3 , III, 144.

^Ibid, 1 9 0 4 , III, 1 2 3 . 357

Surigao Province, although these were almost exclusively

army affairs. For example, in one engagement General wood

personally commanded 2,000 soldiers which met and defeated

Datu Ali.^

More important to the Constabulary in this early period, however, was the serious blemish established upon

the corps when two officers. Captain George herman and

Lto Johnson, deserted. Both officers had unsavory reputa­

tions and at various times had abused prisoners, shot up

villages, and been involved in illicit affairs with native women, They also had mismanaged government funds. When

formal charges were drawn up against them, they stole addi­

tional money, commandeered a government boat and took to

the seas. Colonel Harbord personally ordered Captain White

to run them down. In the ensuing chase. White travelled many hundreds of miles throughout the Sulu Archipelago. At

one time he even landed on northern Borneo and enlisted the

cooperation of the British Constabulary. Meanwhile Herrman

and Johnson became involved in a death struggle with a group

of natives they had taken with them and Johnson was killed while: Herrman was badly wounded. Colonel Taylor, the Chief

-E.P.C., 1904, III, 121-122; and 190$, III, 117-118: Manila Times, April 5? 1903, 1; April ly, 1903, 1; April 29, 1903, 1; March 26, 1904, 1 and September 30, 1903, 5» 358

of the Third District, and Captain Haskell joined White

and eventually tracked down and captured Herrman, The

"Constabulary Pirate," as the local press tagged him, was

tried, convicted and sentenced to prison.

The Herrman and Johnson affair typified Constabulary responsibilities in this early period. Their main function was not military as in Luzon and the Visayans. Rather they

assisted the various district governors in ordinary civil matters. Most of their time was spent tracking down

criminals, providing escorts for civil administrators and running clown smugglers and Moros engaged in slave trade.

In the more peaceful sections of Mindanao, however, most of the regular army were withdrawn and the Constabulary assumed the prime responsibility of the maintenance of law and order. This was true in Davao, liisaniis, Surigao, in

Sulu District south of Jolo, and in Zamboanga outside the capital city,^^

Letter to Colonel Harbord from White, October 4-, 1903; letter to Harbord from White, October 5, 190.3; letter to C-rennan from George Herrman, October (no date given), 1903; Letter from George Herrman addressed only to a friend (no name given), October 26, 1903; Letter to Lt, Colonel W. C. Taylor, from White, October 6, 1903; Letter from White to his Mother, October 23, 1903, White MSB, l^R.P.C., 1903, III, 116. 359

If even a simmary view of the problems which faced that corps in Mindanao and Sulu are examined, Herrman and

Johnson's actions are at least understandable, lor example, the native population in the fifth District was approxi­ mately 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,; yet as late as mid-1903 the Constabulary had only 800 officers and men to police this area, further­ more, the bulk of the interior had never been penetrated by white men and the Moros in the interior were extremely anxious to engage any Christian so that they might enhance their opportunity for reaching the Holy band. Ihe lack of an adequate transportation system added to the burden of the Constabulary. There was no road system and the trails were difficult and dangerous to pass. Under these circum­ stances, Colonel Harbord decided it was absolutely neces­ sary for the Constabulary to have adequate water transporta­ tion, including coast guard cutters, launches, boats, and even sail boats to patrol the many rivers and the several thousand mile coastal regions. That adequate water trans­ portation was vital, is clear if one considers that the

Sulu District itself contained no less than 188 islands scattered over an area approximately I50 miles long by

100 miles wide.^^

1 22 , 126, 128 and 1904, III, 121-122. letter to Lt. Colonel W. C. Taylor, from White, October 6, 190p, White MSS, 360

A more serious problem for the Constabulary, however,, was the nature of their opponents in Mindanao. The Moros were religious fanatics who willingly sought death killing

Christians because this guaranteeed their ascending to heaven. To die fighting virtually assured a place in heaven and the more they killed determined the number of beautiful virgins who would serve them in the next world. With these rewards, it is not surprising that many Moros decided to take the appropriate religious vows and prepare to die killing Christians, Elaborate rites were performed and once these preparations were complete, the Moro was easily recognized as a juramentado.^^

Equally as menacing to the Constabulary were the philosophy and customs of the Moros which centered on the premises that fighting was the only true indication of man­ hood, Therefore from age four or five, all Moro boys were armed with a variety of knives, most of which were the deadly Kris, To the Moros, war was not a detestable in­ stitution but one which they thoroughly enjoyed and deliberately prolonged for the mere pleasure of fighting. On one occasion, for example, the Sultan of Bacolod replied to a plea for peace and friendship from the

Americans :

^^Manila Times, December 6, 1906, 7« $61

The Sultan of Bacolod desires war at once as he wishes to maintain the religion of Mohammed. Oease sending us letters. What we.want is war as we do not desire your friendship.

nonetheless, by mid-1905, the Constabulary had estab­ lished garrisons in all of the provinces of Mindanao and

Sulu. Until the military regime was brought to a close in 1913? the Constabulary, however, played only a support­ ing role in the attempt to pacify the fanatic Moros. Thus, it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a com­ prehensive view of the fighting throughout this long period,

In sum, this was army land. But it must be acknowledged that the Constabulary did contribute substantially in its supporting role especially in the provinces of Cotabato,

Lanao, and in the Sulu Province.

The Cotabato District somewhat typifies the problems which faced the Constabulary in Mindanao. It was a large district of some 60,000 population in an area slightly larger than the state of New Jersey. Yet in 19O6 there were only fifty Constables authorized to police this area, or one man per 166 square miles of territory. The Con­ stabulary was not expected to maintain law and order exclusively. The army was assigned this task, while the

^^Ibid, October 14-, 1902, 1 and February 2$, 1902, $. 362

Constabulary merely cooperated with the military, usually on the periphery. Another reason for the lack of Con­ stabulary military action is explained by the heavy fight­ ing in Cavite, Batangas and Samar in 1904-1905» Bor example, twenty-five per cent of the Constabulary of

Cotabato District was detached for these campaigns in the north. Nonetheless the corps did cooperate with the army in numerous expeditions against Datu Ali in the Cotabato

District, and in the spring of 1905 approximately twenty per cent of the Constabulary in the Cotabato District was detached for service in Jolo against the notorious Moro pirate, Pala. But in October of 1905 the Army tracked down and killed Datu Ali and with his passing most of his band voluntarily surrendered. Bellowing this the District of Cotabato remained unusually peaceful. There were a number of murders and isolated incidents but the Constabu­ lary assumed the major responsibility for tracking down 15 ordinary criminals.

^^R.P.C., 1905 , III, 118-119 and I9O6 , II, 296. Bor con­ siderable details on the "Army’s Campaigns see: the Manila Times, September 1, 1904, 1; December 20, 1904, 1; October 28, 1905, 1 and November 6, I905, 1 : New York Times, August 24, 1904, 6: May 24, 1904, 5 : New York Tribune, May 24, 1904, 5 and October 29, 1905, 4. 36$

Not all murder investigations were routine. On one occasion, for example, It. Leonard Furlong, who ranks along with Crockett and White as one of the corps' most aggressive combat leaders, accompanied the District Governor of Oota­ bato into,the Buidun region north of Parang. The purpose of the expedition was to arrest the murderers of Private

McDonald. Furlong was accompanied by three secret service men, two Scouts and four Constables. When the expedition reached the Moro camp, Furlong demanded the surrender of the outlaw leader, Sultan Dimabara. At that exact moment he heard the juramentado chant which meant,of course, that the outlaws were preparing to fight to the death. Still Furlong attempted to use diplomacy but the Moros replied that they-were fighting men and were there for a fight. After this they attacked. Six

Moros were killed but Furlong was unable to arrest Dimabara.

Yet for his bravery under fire, Furlong was recommended for the Medal of Valor.

16 Report to the_Adjutant, Fifth District, Bureau of Con­ stabulary from Lt, Furlong, July 14, I9O6 and Report of the District Governor of Cotabato to the Secretary of Moro Province, July 12, I9O6 , Furlong MSS, University of Oregon.

^^Letter from the District Governor of Cotabato, Charles T. Boyd, Captain, 10th Cavalry, to the Secretary of the Moro Province, August ?, I9O6 , and Letter to the Governor of the Moro Province, from H. Gilsheuser, Senior Inspector, August 8, I9O6 , Furlong MSS. $ 6 4

There was little other Constabulary activity in the

Cotabato District until mid-Janiiary, 1907, when Lt, Furlong with sixteen Constables and Captain Foster with a detach­ ment of the 19th Infantry conducted an expedition in the

Butig region. They had hoped to arrest the murderers of

Patrick Burns and to track down the Sultan Dimabara, but were unsuccessful. Two months later It. J. IT. Merrill led an attack on the Moro cotta, a wood and stone fortress, occupied by two Sultans and their followers. Merrill succeeded in capturing both cottas and in the process killed nineteen Moros including both leaders. In the second assault

Merrill was severely wounded by one of the Sultans whom

Merrill then shot and killed. For this gallantry the Lt. was specially mentioned in General Orders.

The next serious encounter occurred in June of 190? when Lt. Furlong accompanied by Lt. James L. Wood and fifty- three Constables marched north into the Kamanga region of the

District of Lanao. In one fight Furlong successfully attacked the cotta of Haleim. Some time later Wood and

Furlong attacked the notorious outlaw Mpuan-Agaus at

"^R.FoC., 1907, II, $$$. Also see General Order No, 14, Philippine Constabulary Headquarters, Manila, 1907 Series. 365

Didauguïio In this engagement fourteen Moros were killed including one Datu,and a number of rifles and miscellaneous wea- 1 q pons captured»

A month later, Furlong was on an expedition in the

Taraca Valley. Iiis command was attacked by the Mores, but Furlong rallied his command and advanced on the Moro fortress. The walls of the cotta were fifteen feet high, enclosing a space of about fifty yards square. Three sides were surrounded by a deep moat while the fourth side rose abruptly twenty-five feet above a river. Furlong demanded their surrender but was met with jeers, taunts and renewed firing by the Mores. Furlong and several of his men grabbed a huge log and attempted to batter down the gate while under direct fire from the Moros above. A number of Constables were killed and others wounded. Nonetheless, Furlong pressed the attack, took the fortress, and killed seventeen of the fanatics. Throughout this engagement Furlong displayed ex­ ceptional bravery and ability and set an example to his men

^^Eeport to the Adjutant, Fifth District, from Furlong, June 19, 1907, Furlong MSS: R.P.G., 190?, ll, 354: Telegram to the Executive Inspector of the Constabulary from Colonel Borseth, Director of the Fifth District, June 24, I907, Furlong MSS. 366 which materially contributed to the success of this under­ taking. For this action he received the Medal of Valor.

In recognition of Furlong's excellent work, General

Tasker H. Bliss, the Governor of the Moro Province, offi­ cially requested that It. Furlong be retained in Cotabato

Province until he had completed the pacification of the ' PI notorious Buldun country and captured Datu Alamada.

The following month Furlong launched an expedition to penetrate the region dominated by Datu Alamada. On

November 21, near Buldun, he met the band and killed fifteen.

After this a number of skirmishes were fought in which an additional thirty-seven outlaws were killed. Those remain­ ing in the field were constantly kept on the move with little food and no shelter. As a result Alamada's force was crushed and the Buldun country subdued. A total of fifty-two outlaws had been killed on this expedition, many weapons captured, and nineteen stolen cai-abao and ten head of cattle

20 General Order No. 33, Bureau of Constabulary, Manila, 1907 Series: Report of Charles T. Boyd, Governor of the Cotabato District to the Director of the Constabulary, September 12, 19075 Furlong MSS,

^^Letter to Colonel Griffith, from Bliss, September 22, I9O8, Furlong MSS. $67

PP recovered.

As a result of Furlong's numerous expeditions in northern Cotabato, the outlaw element was completely driven out of the Buldun country. Thus, peace and tran­ quillity came to the Cotabato D i s t r i c t . Unfortunately, however, Furlong's long and distinguished Constabulary

career ended abruptly in May of 191I when he succumbed to personal pressures, unquestionably a result of many years of almost constant field activity, and took his own life in Manila.

North of the Cotabato District lies the District of

Lanao. Because of the determined resistance of the 22 Report to Lt. Colonel E. W, Griffith, from Furlong, December 18, I9O8 : Letter to the District Adjutant from Charles E. Heartt, Senior Inspector Cotabato, December 5, I9O8 : Report to the Adjutant, Fifth District from Furlong, December 7 5 1908; Letter to Furlong from the Executive Inspector of the Constabu­ lary, January 7 , 1909, Furlong MSS. For earlier expeditions against Alamada see Report to the Adjutant of the Fifth Dis­ trict by Furlong, September 6, I9O8 in which Furlong outlines his August 12 to September 14-, I9O8 expedition, Furlong MSS. 2S ^Reuort to the Adjutant, District of Mindanao, from Furlong, April 5, 1909, Furlong MSS: R.F.C., I9O8 , II, 366 and 41$. PJ- General Order No. 16, Bureau of Constabulary, Manila, I9II Series: Letter to Charles ¥, Furlong from General H. li, Bandholtz, July 21, 19II, Record Group 350, National Archives, File NOo 6728/22: Letter to Major George H, Shelton, Acting Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs from Charles \L Furlong, July 31, 19115 Record Group 350, National Archives, File No, 6728/22. $68

ferocious Lake Lanao Moros, the Constabulary was not

organized in this area until 190$. There were approxi­

mately 50,000 natives living in the Lake basin, the vast majority of whom were Maranaos, commonly referred to as

the Lake Moros. These natives were all Moslems and stand unsurpassed in all the Philippines as aggressive fighters.

Also living in this area were a few Manobos who inhabited

the Capay Country in the hills bordering Lanao and Misamis.

The Manobos had no religion and generally were quite peace­ ful although subject to numerous raids by the more aggressive

Lake Moros,

There was little military activity on the part of the

Constabulary in the Lanao District until 1907» At that time the main leader of the Lake Moros was Ampuan Agaus who dominated the eastern shore of Lake Lanao in the Taraca

Valley with a band of fifty men with a dozen Krags. They committed few depredations but refused to acknowledge the

supremacy of the American government or to pay their taxes.

In June of 1907, Lt. Purlong, from the Cotabato District moved north into the Lake Lanao region and conducted an extensive campaign in the Taraca Valley, In one engagement

25g.p.C., 1905, III, 120 and 19O8 , II, 417, $69

on June 4 Furlong killed seventeen Mores while losing two

Constabulary and three wounded. But the cotta was taken

after a fierce hand-to-hand fight. Several weeks later

Furlong encountered a large body of outlaws at Didaugun under the immediate command of Ampuan Agaus, Again the Moros were routed after losing fourteen killed.

Furlong's exploits in this campaign, as well as many

others, won for him a well-deserved reputation among the

Moros themselves. They felt that he possessed a superior

“anting-anting" and not a few Moros volunteered for service 27 in the Constabulary in order to serve under Lt. Furlong, ‘ In 19O8 , four large bands still operated in the Lake Lanao region. The most important was under Ampuan Agaus

and consisted of approximately 300 men and seventy rifles. The band of Amai Guindulungan consisted of only twelve men with twelve guns but nonetheless plagued the Constabu­ lary for many years. The third force was under Tukalu and consisted of approximately eighty-five men with foiuy-five

guns, while the last band was under Am ai Marur who had less

than a dozen men, Ampuan Agaus was the best Icnown of the

Moro leaders in the Taraca Valley and the other leaders 28 generally recognized his superiority,

^^Ibid, 1907, II, $39. ^^Letter to F, Killian, from A. Suarez, August 19, 1931, N.C., Killian Collection, University of Oregon. 28R.P.C., 1908, II, 416. 370

In July of 1907 the Constabulary conducted three ex­ peditions against Mpuan Agaus but with little success. Two months later It. James Wood located a minor batu and killed

him along with thirteen of his band, iimpuan Agaus and

other More leaders held a meeting at Kumanga and decided to

avenge this loss of force by initiating a series of attacks

on American soldiers who travelled over the Keithley Road.

In November, Lt. Tarbell launched a campaign in the Taraca

Valley and killed several Moros but the engagement was not

decisive. In January of 19O8 Lt. Wood attacked iimai

Guindulungan's camps in Upper Ramain and killed three and

drove the remainder of the force deep into the hills before destroying their camp. But in late January I9O8, Ampuan Agaus with eighty Moros and fifty guns made a night attack on their Constabulary cuartel at Dansalan, the capital of the Lanao District, A fierce fight developed in which the Moros nearly overwhelmed the Constabulary detachment but withdrew before obtaining their objective. The next month Amai Marur led a force which attempted to assassinate

Governor Gard of Lanao despite the fact that he had an escort from the Sixth United States Infantry. The Governor was shot and seriously wounded but the Moros managed to escape. In March Lt, Tarbell struck Marur's band and killed six at Kakadar, In the same month Lt. Wood destroyed four 371 houses of Ampuan Agaus at Kayagan, A month later Wood again struck Ampuan Agaus at Ilian and killed five of the hand while having two of his sixty-five man Constabulary detachment killed in this engagement. Numerous other engagements followed but in June of 1908 a mixed force of Constabulary and infantry under Captain Martin of the

18th Infantry struck Ampuan again at Ilian and killed thirty-three of the band but the leaders as usual

escaped. On June 24-, Lts. kulton and Whitney with a Con­

stabulary detachment attacked a cotta near lugaya and in pQ a fierce engagement killed twenty-four.

The Governor of Moro Province, General Bliss, recog­ nized the absolute necessity of increasing the Constabulary

in order to complete the pacification of the interior regions.

Bliss reasoned that if the corps were reinforced, it could

establish a number of posts deep in the interior. Prom

these posts the Constabulary could initiate extensive patrols

and also extend the protection of the government upon the

friendly Moros who were willing to cooperate but refrained

from doing so because they feared retaliation from the out­

law element. Bliss outlined the role of the Constabulary:

29 l b i d , 4-17. $72

These men (Constables) speak the language of the natives, establish friendly relations with them, and easily pick up information that no one else can acquire. Then a quiet expedition of a half dozen men will result in the capture, without a shot, of an influential outlaw, followed by the prompt disintegration of the band which he alone could hold together* Until such measures are adopted, continued disorders may be expected to occur* Experience has abundantly shown that regular troops can accomplish nothing in this sort of work* If there be a regularly organized re­ sistance against the Government, if hostile Moros await in their fortified cottas the coming of the troops, the latter can destroy them but in such work as has for a long time been necessary on the east side of Lake Lanao, they can do nothing* The outlaws scatter at their approach while their mere coming excites fear and suspicion in the minds of friendly Moros* Some always believe that it means the beginning of war and at once join the hostiles. When the body of the population is hostile, that is, when there is a state of wa r ,- the troops can restore peace; but to send columns of troops into a country like this and among people like these, when the con­ dition is one_of general peace, is wanton provoca- tion of war.20

General Bliss also noted the importance of improving

transportation in the More Province* He urgently advo­

cated the construction of a railroad to the Lake Lanao

country since it would expedite the occupation of that

area by peaceful natives. In addition, the railroad would

improve the mobility of the army and Constabulary and thus be a major factor in the maintenance of law and order* In

^^Governor Bliss' Annual Report for 1908, P.P.0., 1908, I, $7$. 373 this respect it was pointed out that once.Moros received protection from the government, they were as a rule coopera­ tive and very industrious. Without these improvements, it remained a formidable task to supply even government soldiers in the bake regions.

For the next several years conditions in the Lake

Lanao region remained relatively tranquil although the most noted More leader, Ampuan Agaus, remained unaccounted for. Ampuan had for years dominated the lake region. In 1902 he had been the prisoner of John J. Pershing but escaped and remained on the warpath for the next decade. By i912, however, Ampuan had restricted his activities and appeared content to live out his remaining days in peace. The Governor of, the Lanao District, Lt. Colonel Henry Gilsheuser of the Constabulary, remarked that it was as difficult to obtain information from the natives on this elusive chief as it was "to discuss the delicacy and flavor of pork stew with the Moros.Nonetheless, Colonel Rivers, the Chief of the Fifth District, was determined to maintain pressure on Ampuan and spared no effort in gathering evidence eventu­ ally to convict this elusive outlaw and bring to a close his

^^Lbid, $74, and II, 429. ^^Letter to Colonel W. C. Rivers, from Gilsheuser, September I7 , 1912, Gilsheuser M88, located at the University of Oregon. 374

career.

In 1912, a major problem for the Constabulary throughout Mindanao and Sulu was to comply with General E.ershing's .Executive Order No. 24 of September 8, I9II. This contro­ versial order required that all guns be confiscated by the

authorities. This order was not received by the Constabulary

without criticism. Many officers argued that since the

lioro traditionally did his serious fighting with blade weapons, the order placed undue emphasis on possession of

guns. Thus many suggested that Pershing's Executive Order

No. 24 be expanded to include these cutting weapons. Only

in this way, they argued, would peace completely come to the 34 Lake region. Considering that the Moros had successfully

resisted Spanish domination for nearly 300 years and had a strong tradition of maintaining their independence, the en- 33 forcement of this order proved most difficult. It is significant to note that by 1912 the Constabu­ lary could become involved in the discussion as to which

^^letter to Gilsheuser from Rivers, September 3, 1912, Gilsheuser MSS.

^^letter to Rivers from Gilsheuser, September I7 , 1912, Gilsheuser MSS. 35petter to Gilsheuser from Rivers, September I7 , 1912; Letter to Rivers from Gilsheuser, September 4, 1912, Gilsheuser MSS. 375 weapons they ought to confiscate, Por many years, prior

to this period, their main function had been to track

down criminals. But hy 1912 conditions had progressed

to the point where they were preparing for the total pacification of the area. Conditions in the Lake region

indeed had improved greatly by this time with the con­

struction of a number of schools, roads, and even several

suspension bridges capable of carrying automobiles,^

The Constabulary itself was actively engaged in construct­

ing a hospital in Dansalan in cooperation with the munici­

pal authorities,^^

Even with this substantial progress, however, the

Lake Moros had not completely been subdued. In mid-

January, 1913 there was a minor uprising south of Lake

Lanao in which Lt, Fletcher reported killing nine Moros,

Additional Constabulary, Scout and regular troops, were 58 rushed in and quickly scattered this band,^ In May of 1913, the Lake Moros again entrenched themselves in

fortified cottas and defied Government authority. Colonel

Peter Traub of the Constabulary requested that the regular

^%emorandum for Colonel Rivers from Governor Gilsheuser, September 17, 1912, Gilsheuser MSS,

^^Letter to Rivers from Gilsheuser, September 4-, 1912: Letter to the Senior Inspector of Lanao, July (no date) 1912 from Colonel Rivers, Gilsheuser MSS. ^®New York Times, January 15, 1913, 1® 376 army be sent in to assist in suppressing this minor up­ rising. Accompanying the army were several detachments of Scouts and heavy artillery guns which were used to dislodge the defiant M o r o s . As a result the army moved in and defeated the Moros with heavy artillery.

In the spring of 1916, the Constabulary finally organized a systematic expedition to explore and expand the government's control deep in the .interior. The Con­ stabulary carefully cultivated the cooperation and assistance of the peacefully inclinced Moros by patiently informing them of their intentions and objectives. As a result, many natives who had previously identified themselves with the outlaw element began to cooperate with the government forces. Within a period of three months the Constabulary captured or received the surrender of over pOO lawless Moros and I50 guns, many of which were high-powered rifles. This campaign effectively extended government control over 3,000 square miles and eliminated a traditional retreat of the outlaw Moros.^

By extending the government's control into the high­ lands, it was hoped that a decisive blow might be delivered

^^Ibid, May 29, 1913, 1. ^^Eeport of the Governor-General to the Secretary of War for 1916, 40, 1917. 377

to the elusive ilmpuaiio Captain Guy 0. Fort was in coma and.

of field operations in this campaign. He too was aware of

the necessity of obtaining the cooperation of the native

peoples, and outlined his strategy accordingly. Fort

planned to establish a line around the outer edge of

Ampuan's territory and thus destroy Ampuan's supply camps

and drive his band into a decisive engagement in the Zi-1 Lanao lowlands, near Lanao and Pundung.

Captain Fort also established an elaborate network

of More spies. They were instructed to travel as Iloro Zj-2 hunting parties so as not to arouse suspicion. Thus

accurate intelligence information was compiled which

guided the Constabulary campaign. Equally important,govern­ ment soldiers deliberately cultivated the cooperation of the natives. while in the field, Fort took every precaution to protect his force from ambush. For example, when a More outlaw canp was located rather than attack immediately he encircled it to

“Memorandum for Lt. Polk, from Fort, May 5, 1916, H.C. Lillian MSS. This is a lengthy,, report in which Fort outlines extensively the means by which the government could win the support of the natives. ^^Memorandum to Station Commander from G. 0. Fort, May 12, 1916, Lillian MSS. 378 determine the enemy's strength and to discover the best approach. Once done, he made his plans accordingly. If the camp were stormed and taken it was destroyed,

Using these tactics, the outlaw force gradually dis­ integrated, By mid-June, 1915, Ampuan Agaus's fighting force had been destroyed, although the leader remained unaccounted for. Later he was wounded in a fight at Palubarakat but all efforts to locate him proved un­ successful,^^ Ampuan's power and evil influence had been decisively broken. It was presumed that he had either died of his wounds or was content to live out his days in hiding. With his passing central Mindanao became peaceful. This condition was due to the energetic campaign conducted by the Constabulary of Lanao and Gotabato in the spring of 1916.^^

Several hundred miles south of Lanao and Gotabato, lies the Sulu Archipelago. The Sulu District stands unsurpassed

em0randum for Captain Fort from A, K. Buck, May 20, 1915: Memorandum for Masae Station from Fort, June 7, 1916, Killian MSS. ^"Monograph of Lanao Province 1915," prepared by Philippine Constabulary of Lanao under Senior Inspector of Lanao, Captain Henry Gilsheuser, 80, This monograph is in excess of 100 pages and deals extensively with all aspects of the district. It appears that all Senior Inspectors were en­ couraged to compile these studies although,the author's research has uncovered only two or three such works, Gilsheuser MSS. 4-9Ibid, Appendix "A", 1-2 379 in producing the most bloody conflicts with the American and Constabulary forces. J3o turbulent was this area that the civil administration was not fully established until

1913. The Constabulary itself was not organized in the Sulu District until 1904 when the Senior Inspector Captain

Thomas E. Hayson, assisted by Lt. E. H. Elarth, organized the corps in that area. The Sulu District consisted of

188 islands the most important being Jolo, Siasi, and Tawi-

Tawi. By mid-1905 the Military Governor had delegated the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order south of Jolo to the Constabulary. Yet only three officers and

120 enlisted men were authorized to carry out this assign- 46 ment. The Constabulary was first called upon in the spring of 1905 to assist the regular army in the Pala Campaign. Pala was a fanatical Moro who had conducted a series of raids throughout the Sulu Archipelago as far south as British

Borneo. His avowed purpose was to drive the "pig eaters off the island," To effect this he conducted nightly raids which established virtually a reign of terror through- 47 out the southern Sulu District. ‘

^^b.P.C., 1903, III, 120 and I9O6 , II, $02: letter to E. C. Killian from H, H, Elarth, April 26, 1948, Killian MS8.

^"^Manila Times, May 1, 1903, 380

The Governor of the Moro Province, General Wood, requested that the Director of the Fifth District of the

Constabulary, Colonel James G. Harbord, send 100 Con­ stables for the Jolo expedition against Pala» Harbord could not spare the Constables from his command because large numbers had already been detached for service in central Luzon during the Cavite-Batangas Uprising.

Nonetheless detachments were sent from Zamboanga and

Cotabato along with Reserve Company A of the Fifth

District.

The campaign which developed against Pala was brief but ferocious. General Wood personally took command and directed the assault against Pala's headquarters three miles east of Maibun on Jolo Island, Two desperate fights developed which destroyed Pala's force. In one encounter nine soldiers were killed but JOG Moro fanatics were killed after having taken an oath to die killing

Christians, In the second engagement an additional 100

Moros were killed and Pala's force disintegrated. Several days later Pala himself was killed and the brief expedi­ tion came to a close. In this ten-day campaign approxi­ mately 4-00 Moros were killed while nine American soldiers

^^R.P.C., 1903, III, 120. 381 and two Constables also died.^^ 'The Constabulary led the final assault on Pala's strongly fortified cotta, with such determination and precision that it resembled a drill ground formation. After the fight, the regular army gave the Constables a hearty cheer in appreciation for their 50 gallant action in this decisive engagement.

Two weeks after the death of Pala, nearly 100 of his followers reassembled in order to fight the Americans again.

General Wood sent an ultimatum demanding their surrender but they rejected it, stating that they would show the

"unbelieving dogs how the sons of Allah could fight,"

Pala's successor, Mejam, then struck his chest and informed the Americans that he and his men were invulnerable to bullets and proudly declared that no army in the world could defeat his men. Negotiations, of course, were broken off and both sides prepared for bautle. Mejam was the first to fall and was followed by eighty-five of his co-religionists, all of whom wore anting-antings. It was said by those who recovered

Mejam's body that the expression on his face was one of utter surprise. Apparently in his dying moment he realized that his anting-anting was not effective. With the destruction

^"^Manila Times, May 16, 1905, 1; May 18, 1905, 1; and May 19, 1905, 1: New York Times, May 15, 1905, 1» ^^Manila Times, May 51, 1905, 1 and May 25, 1905, 4. 382

of jhis force, the so-called Pala Uprising was thoroughly suppressed.

The elimination of Pala, however, did not pacify

Jolo. Governor H. L, Scott of the Sulu District granted permission to a large number of Moros to live in the volcanic crater on top of Mt, Bud Oajo. Scott granted this privilege only after the Moros had pledged that they would harbor no criminals, pay their taxes and refrain from attacking their'friendly neighbors. But gradually these promises were broken. The Moros became openly up defiant after perfecting their defenses on Bud Dajo.^

Confronted with this situation. General Leonard Wood, the

Military Governor of Mindanao, personally directed ground and naval operations in the battle of Bud Dajo. Wood later described the Moro fortifications on Mt. Bud Dajo as being the most formidable that he had ever observed in his long 33 and distinguished military career.

Always a strong supporter of the Constabulary General

Wood was anxious that the corps participate in the battle.

^^Ibid, June 6, 1903, 4: E.P.C., 1903, III, 120. ^^ibid, 1906, II, 302.

^^letter to George Andrews, Military Secretary from General Wood, March 9, 1906, White MSS. 383

In compliance with Wood's request, Captain John R. White, the Adjutant of the Fifth Constabulary District, was given command of a mixed force of Constables from the First Sulu

Company, and the Third Zamboanga Company. His fifty-man detachment was equipped with ten days' rations and eighty rounds of ammunition per man and ordered to report to

Colonel Joseph W. Duncan of the Sixth Infantry for field duty on the island of Jolo.^^

Once the troops assembled, preparations were made for the assault. There were three main trails leading up to the top of Bud Dajo, all of which were strongly fortified and heavily guarded. Colonel Duncan established three columns, one for each trail, to assault the fortress simultaneously. Each column consisted of approximately 150 men. White's Constabulary company was assigned to the second column under the immediate command of Major Bundy of the Sixth Infantry, White requested that he be per­ mitted to talce the'advance position of the second column,

Duncan agreed and.,the appropriate orders were issued.

^^Special Orders Ho, 18, Fifth District, Constabulary, 1905 Series, a copy of which is located in the White MSS,

^^Report to the Executive Inspector, Constabulary from W, 8, Scott, District Director, March 10, 1906, White MSS, $84-

The attack began at daylight on the morning of

March 6, with columns two and three in the lead. In preparation for the advance, artillery, including Colt

Automatic Guns, thoroughly shelled the fortress. White's detachment spearheaded column number two. The trail was difficult, and very tedious. When the detachment reached the crest. White personally led his men over the top and succeeded in taking the Moro's secondary defense line.

That evening, mountain guns were brought up and the ad­ vanced Moro position was shelled throughout the night.

The Moros then retreated to the crest of the mountain and occupied their main cotta.

The cotta itself was thirty by forty feet and its walls were made of logs planted upright in the ground.

Many bamboo firing holes had been built in the walls which provided the Moros an excellent field of fire.

White and his detachment led the final attack and suffered heavy casualties. They reached the foot of the cotta and were temporarily pinned down but continued to fight, shooting those Moros who peered over the top. About this time. Captain White was wounded by a rifle fired through one of the bamboo tubes. He rolled down the hill and was given medical treatment for severe gunshot wounds in the leg, $85

Meanwhile the other colnmns pressed the attack, reached the crest and joined in the deadly hand-to- hand comhato Having taken an oath to fight to the death, the Moros fulfilled that obligation. When the fighting was over an estimated 600 men, women and children lay dead. The regular array suffered fifty-two wounded and eighteen killed. The Constabulary received seventeen 56 casualties out of the forty-four men engaged.^ Captain

White and his Constabulary detachment received the highest praise from all civil and military officers for their gallant action. He eventually received the Medal of

Valor for his leadership in this engagement. Even the

Army and Navy Journal, which was usually quite critical of the Constabulary, praised White and his detachment for 57 their participation in this engagement.^'

^^Ibid. ^^Telegram to White from Harbord, March 11, 1906: Letter to George Andrews from General Wood, Mai'ch 9? 1906; Letter to Colonel ¥, S. Scott, Commanding Fifth Constabulary Dis­ trict from Major Omar Bundy, 6th Infantry, March 12, 1905; White MSS: General Order, Bureau of Constabulary No. 19, I9O6 Series: Manila Times, May 25, 1906, 1 and May 1, I9O6 , 2. For additional information on the battle itself see: The Times (London) March 10, I9O6 , 7j and March 14-, I9O6 , 5: The New York Tribune, March 10, 1905, 1; March 11, I9O6 , 1; March 12, I9O6 , 1; March 14-, I9O6 , 5; March 15, I9O6, 1: Letter to the Secretary of War from General Wood, March I5 , 1906, Record Group 94-, National Archives, File No. 1109531; Memorandum for the Secretary of War from Major Hugh L. Scott, 14-th Cavalry, March 20, I9O6 , Record Group. 94, National Archives, File No. 1109331: Manila Times, March 10, I9O6 , 1; March 13, 1906, 1 and April 21, 19O6 , 2. 386

White was not the only officer to receive an award

for this battle. Lt. Gordon Johnston of the Signal Corps

was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor by

Major Omar Bimdy who commanded White’s column.Two

officers and nine enlisted men of the United States Wavy

also received General Wood's praise for their operation of

the Colt Automatic Guns. The naval detachment used pack

mules to move their guns and 4,500 rounds of ammunition,

to the crest of the mountain. These guns were instru­

mental in reducing Moro resistance and as the attack

progressed the guns were moved forward and eventually turned

on the Moros in the trenches with devastating'accuracy.

Even with the destruction of the Bud Dajo Moros, the

Sulu District still virtually seethed with discontented

natives who were only too willing to die fighting the

Americans. This was particularly true after 190? when most of the small, light-draft gun boats were withdrawn.

These boats had been employed by the American government

^®See Major Omar Bundy's Letter of Certification, May 28, 19065 Record Group 94-, National Archives, Rile Wo. 108912.

^^Report to Captain P. Lawton, 19th Infantry, from J. W. Hayward, Midshipman, U, S. Wavy, Commanding U.S.S. Pampanga, March 9, 1906, Record Group 94-, National Archives, Rile Wo. 114314-7: Also see Wood's letter to Andrews, March 9, 1906, White MGS. 387 for the suppression of piracy on the Sulu seas. When these gun boats were withdrawn there was a resurgence of piratical acts by Jolano Moros. The most notorious pirate was Jikiri. In early 19O8, he killed two Americans on the island of Basilan, just south of Zamboanga.'" He continued to plunder the Sulu seas despite the persistant efforts of the regular army and navy.

But in July of 1909: he was traced to his Patian Island headquarters and surrounded by a martial array of United

States Cavalry and a number of United States Naval vessels.

Jikiri and his small band took a vow to fight to the death and for four days they defied the cannons, machine guns, and rifle fire of the American forces. When the American com­ mander felt that the band had been destroyed, a direct as­ sault was ordered on their cave stronghold. Much to the chagrin of the assaulting force, Jikiri and mdst of his band emerged from the cave swinging their deadly blade weapons with devastating effect. In the melee which followed, the pirate band was annihilated but not before they killed three

Americans and wounded twenty others.

GOp.P.C., 19O8 , I, 374

G^Ibid, II, 421.

GZporbes, "Journal," July 7, /^09, 194-195, Forbes MSS: Letter to General Allen from General H. H. Bnndholtz, May 6, I909, Bandholtz MSS. 388

The Constabulary played no role in the final elimina-

tion of Jikiri and only a secondary one during the entire

campaign. This irritated the commanding officers of that

corps because they felt tneir men were much better suited

for tracking down such pirates. The Chief of the Constabu­

lary, in fact, argued that had his soldiers been turned loose

on Jikiri, he would have been cleaned out with far fewer

casualties. General Bandholtz suggested that the regular

army had misused its soldiers sending cavalry, instead of

infantrymen with bayonets, to fight the terrible Moro with

his deadly kris.^^

Following the elimination of Jikiri, several years passed with no particularly significant military develop­ ments. But in January of 1913 there occurred a fierce

engagement with a large number of Moros under Sahipa. The

Governor of the Sulu District, Mr. Gordon, requested that

a Constabulary detachment participate in the campaign. The

Senior Inspector of the Sulu District, Captain Vernon L.

Whitney, himself one of the bright stars of this corps,

ordered the Sixth Moro Company to join his expedition.

Whitney, along with two junior officers, Lts. C. D. Crites,

^Letter to Colonel J. G. Harbord from General H. H. Band­ holtz, July 5, 1909; Harbord MSS, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. 389

and James Lee Cochrun and nearly fifty enlisted men reported

to Captain Patrick McNally, the commander of the mixed force

of fifty Constables, eighty Scouts and twenty-five soldiers

of the Eighth Cavalry.

The soldiers reached Sahipa’s fortress on the morning

of January 2$, 1913 and,surrounded it. Captain Whitney with

an interpreter and a Scout soldier advanced under a white

flag in s. vain attempt to convince the Moros to surrender.

Vfhen they were met with jeers and rifle shots, Cs; bain

McNally ordered the Mountain Gun Detachment to or-.n up.

They lobbed in fifty common shells and five or six shrapnel

shells, the latter setting the building on fire. When the

guns ceased, this was a signal for the soldiers to advance

and they proceeded accordingly. The first assault was un­

successful as the Moro cotta was well built and had a

breastwork of logs and earth. McNally was killed, Lt.

Cochrun was shot in the stomach and Captain Whitney re­

ceived a severe wound in the thigh. As a result, a with­

drawal was ordered. The assaulting force regrouped and then penetrated the fortress, but not before a large bore musket

or a similar type weapon fired several rounds of small bam­

boo arrows which wounded a number of the government’s

soldiers. When the fight was over, two Constables were

dead and four wounded while seven Scouts were killed and 390 ten others vroimded.

The last major fight on Jolo Island occurred in June of 1913. General John J. Pershing, still the Governor of the Horo Province, personally commanded the government force which consisted of one company of infantry, one troop of cavalry, seven companies of Philippine Scouts and two companies of the Constabulary. The Jolo Mores, under the leadership of the Sultan of Jolo, took up positions on Mt.

Bag sale in a strongly fortified position very similar to that which had been constructed on Bud Dajo, Pershing ex­ hausted all diplomacy in an effort to persuade the defiant

Moros to comply with his disarmament order. Most,of the

Jolo Moros, in fact, had surrendered their guns. The govern­ ment had collected no less than 3,000 rifles prior to this last ditch resistance of the hard-core Moro fanatics.

Initially some 5,000 Moros had taken refuge on Mt. Bagsak but only $00 remained and continued to defy the American authority until death. Government casualties were kept relatively low, due to the use of a battery of four mountain guns and a machine gun platoon. This engagement

Report from the Senior of Sulu, Vernon L. Idiitney to the fifth Constabulary district Adjutant, January 25, I915. A carbon copy of this rare report is in the possession of Colonel James Bee Cochrun, Jr., 566 Putter Point Place, Nanles, Florida: New York Times, January 27, 1913, 7, January 29, 1913, 1 aad June 14, I91 5 , ?: General Order No. 5, Bureau of Philippine Constabulary, 1913 Series. 391 proved decisive and the last major force of Moros in the

Sulu District was destroyed.

Following the Battle of Bagsalc, General Pershing was confident that the Constabulary would be capable of main­ taining law and order in Mindanao and Sulu if adequately 66 reinforced. Several months later the first civilian

Governor of the Moro Province relieved General Pershing.

Thus the period of military rule in the Mindanao and Sulu regions was brought to a close and the Constabulary assumed full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

In late November, 1914 Colonel Peter E, Traub of the

Constabulary prepared a campaign to complete the pacifica­ tion of Mindanao and Sulu. The bulk of the United States

Army troops had been withdrawn and there was considerable fear.that the Constabulary would not be able to fulfill its mission. Nonetheless, Colonel Traub,in cooperation

°^New York Times, June 13, 1913, 4; June 14, 1913, 7, and June 17, 19137^ : Cablegram to Adjutant General, War De­ partment, Washington, from General Bell, Commanding Philippine Department, U.S.A., Manila, July 3, 1913- Cablegram to Adjutant General, War Department, Washington from General Bell, August 13, 1913: Cablegram to Secre­ tary of War from Governor-General W. Csmieron Forbes, June 21, 1913: located in Pershing MSS, "Early Period, Special Correspondence," Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. ^‘^Letter to Colonel J. G, Harbord, Acting Director, Philippine Constabulary from General Pershing, November 3, 1913 , Pershing MSS. G^Letter to General Bell, Commanding Philippine Department, from Pershing, October 29, 1913, Pershing MSS. 392

with the civilian Governor, conducted a pacification pro­

gram which ultimately succeeded in establishing tranquil

conditions throughout the Fifth District. For the next

twenty-one months, over 4-00 outlaws were killed, captured

or compelled to surrender, and pOO blade weapons were

confiscated by the government authorities. These accom­

plishments were not made without bloodshed as ten Con­

stables were killed and twelve wounded during this period.

A major contributing factor toward the success of this

program was the determined and successful effort in per­

suading the majority of the natives that it was to their

advantage to cooperate with the government forces. One

leading American newspaper succinctly summed up the situa­

tion with the following headline:

Moros are Pacified by American Regime; Once Blood-Thirsty Natives Now Cpnfide in White Men and Seek Peaceful Pursuits.

The pacification of Mindanao and Sulu was largely the work of the United States Army. Throughout the period of

1901 to 19135 the army conducted numerous campaigns especially in the Lalce Lanao region and on the Island of Jolo.

The army seldom permitted the Moros to approach near

enough to use their deadly blade weapons. Indead, die

G^Mew York Times, August 2?, I9I6, (VII), 3. 393

army relied upon its superior fire power, including

artillery, machine guns and occasionally naval guns, to

destroy the opponents before they could close in. Once

the army had destroyed the major concentration of lioro

fanatics, it withdrew and the Constabulary assumed the

responsibility for tracking down the remnants of the Moro

forces. This strategy was devised by Generals Wood,

Pershing and Bliss and was readily accepted by the Con­

stabulary high command. But the key element in this

struggle was the successful effort to win the support of

the bulk of the natives who were taught the benefits of a peaceful and prosperous civilization. CHATTER ][V

EPILOGUE

When President McKinley decided to maintain control of the Philippine Islands, he stated that his ultimate objective was to educate, uplift and civilize the natives.

Once the insurrection had been crushed, it was the

Philippine Constabulary which assumed the task of track­ ing down the remnants of the insurgent forces, eliminating ladronism on Luzon, and crushing the numerous fanatical religious organizations, especially in the Visayans.

Without the accomplishments of the Constabulary, without the leadership of Allen, Bandholtz, Harbord, Taylor, ^White,

Purlong and Crockett, there would have been neither law nor order in the Philippines. That there was is. due to the accomplishments of the Philippine Constabulary which completed the pacification of Luzon, Panay, Negros, Cebu,

Leyte and cooperated extensively with the United States

Army in completing this task on Samar, Mindanao and Jolo.

Throughout the period from 1901-191'?} the Constabulary proved to be the mainstay of peace and order, thus it literally paved the way for the Bureaus of Education,

Health, Public Works and other utilities which gradually

$94 395 bestowed upon the natives the benefits of civilization»

In the final analysis, it was the Philippine Constabulary, led by a mere handful of American regular army officers, which made it possible for the ultimate fulfillment of

President.McKinley's objective for the Filipinos*

The Constabulary was created shortly before the sur­ render of Aguinaldo in I9OI by the Philippine Commission at the suggestion of Luke E* Wright* It was Wright who recognized that the United States Army was neither trained nor equipped for the tasks of completing the pacification of the Islands once the official insurgent armies dis­ integrated into numerous guerrilla bands. It was Wright who suggested that a native police force, led by American

Army officers, trained and equipped to meet the outlaw bands on their own ground, would be more effective in com­ pleting the pacification than the cumbersome regular army.

Thus the Philippine Constabulary was created along these lines, and under the leadership of Keinry T* Allen, H* H.

Bandholtz and James G. Harbord, the Constabulary gradually emerged as a semi-military national police force. During the next sixteen years nearly 1,000 Americans served as officers in this corps and built what is generally con­ sidered to have been one of the most efficient police 396 organizations in the world.^

Even before the American officers had.completed their initial recruitment of native enlisted men, a segment of this corps was compelled, ito take to the field in an attempt to establish law and order. Initially, the Constabulary cooperated with the army in completing the destruction of the remnants of the insurgent forces in the Batangas and

Cavite areas. As a result of this experience, the Con­ stabulary was prepared to assume the role of maintaining law and order throughout the Philippines north of Mindanao, when the insurrection was officially declared over on

July 4-, 1902. Por the next several years, General Allen conducted a series of vigorous campaigns which crushed several small armies in southern Luzon, including those of Colache in Sorsogon Province, Pope Rios in Tayabas

Province and Ola in Albay Province. In central and northern

Luzon, the forces of San Miguel and Guillermo were destroyed along with those of Montaion and Eelizardo and Salvador,

Similarly in the Visayan Island Group, Pope Isle's force was decisively eliminated even though he remained out until 1907.

^Charles Burke Elliot, The Philippines to the End of the: Commission Government: A Study in Tropical Democracy, Indianapolis, 1907, 168. 397

The Constabulary continued its military activities

until 1907. By this time, it had completed the pacifica­

tion of Leyte with the destruction of Pope Paustino Albena's

pulajan movement„ The islands of Cebu and Panay also were

freed from their minor outlaw bands by I907. The Island

of Samar, however, proved a more formidable task. In late 1904, a group of religious fanatics led by Pope Pablo

and Dagohob initiated an uprising which required the regular

army to suppress. It must be noted, however, that the Con­

stabulary's mission was to suppress minor uprisings and prevent, as far .as possible, the emergence of major organ­ izations which were capable of challenging American control of'.the Islands. But when any movement reached these pro­ portions, it was the United States Army which was expected to crush the movement. This was its mission. Once the backbone of any major organization was broken, then the

Constabulary moved in, as it did on Samar, to complete the pacification.

Following the destruction of ladronisra on Luzon and pulajanism in the Visayans, the Constabulary became less military and concentrated on its civil duties. In northern

Luzon, for example, the Constabulary's main task was to establish garrisons deep in the head-hunting regions so that they might eradicate that age old custom. In other 398 areas, the Constabulary fulfilled its regular police duties such as arresting criminals, serving search warrants, furnishing escorts for government officials, guarding jails and patrolling highways.

Equally important, the American officers of the

Constabulary trained tens of thousands of native enlisted men. Thus, when the United States entered World War I in

1917, and the vast majority 01 'merican officers resigned their commissions in order to fight in the Great War, a hard-core nucleus of native officers were prepared to assume the direction of the corps.

There was considerable apprehension that the Con­ stabulary could not maintain its efficiency without

American officers but subsequent events proved that the

American trained natives were more than capable of fulfilling this task. In 19175 a milestone in the history of this corps was passed when a native, General Rafael

Crame, became the Chief of the Constabulary after sixteen years of American leadership. Under Crane’s leadership, the Constabulary continued to maintain law and order throughout the Archipelago. Then in 1999, the Constabu­ lary became a regular division in the newly created

Philippine Army. By that time, the Constabulary Academy 399

had become knovm to many as the West Point of the Philip­

pines. During the early stages of World War 11, the Con­

stabulary operated in hostilities against the Japanese on

Bataan and suffered heavy casualties. Throughout the war

a number of Constabulary trained natives formed guerrilla bands and continued the fight against the Japanese. After

the War, the Constabulary was integrated with the Philippine

Armed Forces and contributed substantially towards sup- 2 pressing the communist led Hukbalahap uprising.

In 1959) the President of the Philippine Republic,

Carlos }?. Garcia, gratefully acknowledged the accomplish­ ments of the Constabulary when he stated:

Fifty-eight years ago, (I90I) the Philippine Con­ stabulary was founded to secure internal peace and order throughout the islands and to prepare the rural area for the spread of civilization. Since then our people have found reason to rejoice over the fore­ sight of the men who created this organization, for as year after year and decade after decade swiftly passed, the Constables proved their worth by going after those who would seek to undermine the rule of law in this land and challenge the authority of our government officials.^

"The Constabulary story: 1901-1959" in P.C. : 58th Anni­ versary, 12 and 32= This magazine was sent to the author by Constabulary Headquarters and is now located at the Uni­ versity of Oregon in their extensive Constabulary collection. No date or publisher information is given.

^Ibid, Letter from Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, 3° 400

Thus, it is with considerable justification that one refers to the accomplishments of this corps as representing one of the most neglected chapters in the annals of American mili­ tary history. BIBLIOGEAPHl

401 BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources lo Government Publications

Annual Reports of the Secretary of V/ai'-, G.P.O., 1900- 1918. Bureau of Constabulary, Index to General Orders, I9OI- 19175 Manila. Located in Library of Congress, also The National War College in Washington has fairly complete collection. Presumably these are the only ones in the United States.

Bureau of Constabulary, General Orders, I9OI-I917, Manila, Located in the Library of Congress and'the National War College.

Bureau of Constabulary, Manual of the Philippine Consta­ bulary, 1907 and 1911 editions, Manila, Library of Congress.

Public Laws and Other Resolutions Passed by the United States Philippine Commission, I9OI-I907, 7 volumes, G.P.O. These volumes contain the Acts of the Philippine Commission and are included in the Annual Reports of the Secretary of Wa r , although printed, boun'd 'and cat'al'oged" separately.

Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of Wa r , G.P.O., 1916-1918. These volumes are included in the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, although printed, bound and cataloged separately.

Report of the Special Mission on Investigation to the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, G.P.O. 1921.

Special Report of Wm. H. Taft, Secretary of War to the President, G.P.O., 1908.

4-02 403

Villamor,'' Ignacio, Criminality in the Philippine Islands, Manila, 1909» This is a "Special Report by the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of Finance and Justice," which analyzes criminal activity during the later part of the Spanish period and during 19OI-I909 of the American period. It contains elaborate statistics and chai'ts which break down crimes by years and provinces.

"What Has Been Done in the Philippines," 38th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 304, 1904, G.P.O.

2. Contemporary

The Manila Times, I9OI-I9IO.

The New York Times, I90I-I903 and 1913-1917» The New York Tribune, I9OI-I9O6.

The Times .(London), 1906-191?»

3. Manuscript Collections

Library of Congress:

1. Henry T. Allen Collection: This collection is voluminous, containing diaries, scrapbooks, extensive correspondence and numerous printed government reports.

2o Prank W. Carpenter Collection: Carpenter was the first civilian Governor of the Moro Province and succeeded Pershing in 1913» This collection is limited and of little value.

3» William Cameron Porbes Collection: This collection consists of five volumes of typed materials, complete with index.

4. James Guthrie Harbord Collection: This collection consists of four bound volumes of correspondence and miscellaneous materials. It is most useful. 404-

5. John Ja Pershing Collection: This collection is voluminous hut only Series 3, "Philippine Correspondence" was directly pertinent to topic and this is of little value.

6. William Howard Taft Collection: A voluminous collection, but poorly indexed and little material directly pertinent with military developments.

7. Leonard Wood Collection: A voluminous collection but little directly pertinent to topic.

University of Michigan : lo Henry Hill Bandholtz Collection: This collection is located at the Michigan Historical Collections at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and is quite voluminous. It contains extensive corres­ pondence during his Constabulary career and five bound volumes of Constabulary secret service agent reports, dealing mostly with intelligence informa­ tion on Japanese espionage.

University of Oregon:

This is the largest collection of Constabulary materials known to be in existence. Mr. Martin Schmitt, the Director of Special Collections, is making every effort to contact all known survivors of the Constabulai'}' or their relatives to obtain additional materials. It contains the following:

1. Lemuel Boren: Diaries. Brief and of little value to this study.

2. Don P. Branson: "My Story," fragment, typed, Xerox copy.

3. H. H. Elarth: Diary and Letterbooks, 1$02-1904.

4. Leonard Purlong: Official papers and manuscripts, including articles on the Constabulary and rare reports of expeditions. 4-05

5. Henry Gilsheuser: Personal correspondence book, 1912-I915, Poster of officers, District of Mindanao. Miscellaneous Constabulary Circulars, I907-I9I6 , General Orders 1915-1916 and an extensive monograph of lanao Province.

5, Mark Hersey: Diaries and a few letters.

7. Vic Hurley Papers; Extensive materials dealing with author's many articles and books including those on the Philippine Islands. Hot consulted because they were acquired after the Oregon Collection had been used by this student.

8. H. C. Killian; Miscellaneous personal and official papers including considerable correspondence from Colonel Alejandro Suarez, P.C.

9. Charles C. Smith: Dearies very brief.

10. J. V. Thebaud; Diaries and photograph album.

11. John E. White: Voluminous collection which includes diaries, extensive correspondence, miscellaneous Constabulary reports and papers, considerable material on Iwahig Panal Colony and rare reports when White was Senior Inspector of Negros Occidental.

4. Manuscripts Miscellaneous

Maurice P. Alger Collection: This is in the possession of Mrs. Alger, Box 4-95 Merritt Island, Florida. It is quite large and consists of books, training manuals, letters, photographs, a few General Orders. Most important it contains nearly a complete set of annual bulletins of the Philippine Constabulary Officer's Association which lists last known address and other vital information of Constabulary veterans,

Carl T, Bauman Collection: This is in the possession of Mrs. Bauman, 127 East Montford Ave., Ada, Ohio. It is limited, consisting of a few old magazines and miscellaneous papers. 4-06

Don Po Branson Collection: It. Colonel Branson lives at 1810 Conventry Road, Columbus, Ohio. He has preserved considerable materials, in­ cluding correspondence with Gary I, Crockett. Colonel Branson has written "My Story" which is a large typed manuscript. The first sections all deal with his eight years in the Constabulary and most informative especially on the non-mili­ tary aspects of the corps.

James Lee Cochrun Collection: This is in the posses­ sion of Lt. Colonel James lee Cochrun, Jr., $66 Putter Point Place, Naples, Florida. It is quite limited, consisting of a few letters, and records of Cochrun's accomplishments.

William E. Dosser Collection: This is in the posses­ sion of Mrs. Dosser, $59 E. Huntley Dr., Los Angeles, California. It is extensive and consists of many letters from high officials and photo­ graphs. More important, however. Colonel Dosser wrote, "The Dosser Story of Experiences During Porty-Six Years Service in the Philippines" which is a 216-page typed manuscript. It is most en­ lightening since it deals with Dosser's activities in the head-hunting territory of northern Luzon,

Robert A. Duckworth-Eord Collection: This collection is in the possession of Robert, Jr., 658 Del Mar Ave., Chula Vista, California. It consists of a few books, several letters and photographs.

Minor L. Stephens Collection: This is in the posses­ sion of Mrs. Stephens, of Newnan, Georgia, It is limited and consists of a few miscellaneous papers, letters and General Orders,

Vernon n. Whitney Collection: This was in the pos: sion of Mrs. Whitney, 2700 South Ives St., Arlington, Virginia, but his papers, etc. were lost several years ago and Mrs. Whitney generously donated several books to this student. 407

5 = Interviews and Correspondence

Lt, Col. Don P, Branson, P.C. 1907-1915, interview July 27, 1966, Columbus, Ohio.

Vic Hurley of Yakima, Washington, phone conversation, July 12, 1967. Lt, Col. H, H, Elarth of Los Angeles, California, considerable correspondence 1966-1967,

6. Books Primary

Elarth, Harold Hanne, Lt, Col. (editor). The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, Los Angeles, 1949, Elarth served in the Constabulary from 1904 to 1919. Many years later he became an officer of the Philippine Constabulary Officers Association and painstakingly complied biographical informa­ tion on 997 Americans who served in that organi­ zation (see pages 144-185). Elarth used a variety of manuscripts and the official reports of the Philippine Commission, most of which have been preserved and deposited at the University of Oregon, His account is brief and accurate, but unfortunately it is not documentated nor did he consult contemporary newspapers.

White, John R,, Lt, Col., Bullets and Bolos: Pifteen Years in the Philippine Islands, Hew York, 1928, White served in the Constabulary during most of this period and was one of the corps' most gallant field commanders. He rose to the rank of Lt, Colonel and became an Assistant Director before being compelled to retire due to poor health. His account tells of his dramatic experiences through­ out this period and is written with considerable flair. 408

7" Periodicals: Primary

Army and Navy Register, Vol. LXXXIII, No. 24-86 (March 1?, 1928)' '24-2.

______, Vol. LXTiŒV, No. 2519, '(November 5, 1928) , 416,

J. w. dtjxiks, "Philippine Constabulary and It’s Chief," Review of Reviews, Vol. XKVI, (October, 1902), 436-438. Professor Jenks of Cornell inter­ viewed Allen in the Philippines to obtain informa­ tion for this article,

Charles S, Lobingier, "Peacekeepers of the Philippines, Review of Reviews, Vol. XLII, (September, I9IO), 310-314, Lobingier served as a Justice of the Court of First Instance during the early part of this century and presided over the trials of many ladrones, thus obtaining information directly from the participants.

II. Secondary Sources

I, Books Secondary

Elliott, Charles Burke, Ihe Philippines to the End of the Commission Government: A Study in Tropical Democracy, Indianapolis, I917. Forbes, W, Cameron, The Philippine Island, Vol. I and II, New York, 1928. Forbes served as a member of the Philippine Commission and as Secretary of Commerce and Police, In his capacity of the Inter­ position he was the immediate superior of the Chief of the Constabulary,

, The Philippine Islands, Revised Edition, Cambridge, 1945

Friend, Theodore, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1926-1946, New Haven, 1965. Friend visited the islands in 1957-1958 and worked in the Philippine Archives where he learned of the destruction of valuable records during World War II, when Vargas decided to burn the records after Quezon left for Corregidor in 1941, 409

Hagedorn, Herman, Leonard Wood: A Biography, Vol. II, New York, 1931°

Hurley, Vic, Jungle & t r o l : Ihe Story of the Philippine Constabulary, New York, 1938. Hurley has written a popularized history of the corps. He had access to valuable manuscripts, but it is not documentated and not always factually reliable.

Halcom, George A., First Malayan Republic: The Story of the Philippines, Boston, 1931=

May, Katherine, The Isles of Pear; The Truth About the Philippines, New York, 1924. This is a semi-fictional history but contains a brief and highly critical dis­ cussion of the Constabulary.

Palmer, Frederick, John J. Pershing General of the Armies: A Biography, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 194-8.

Pier, Arthur S., American Apostles to the Philippines, Boston, 1950° Pringle, Henry P., The Life and Times of William Howard Taft; A Biography, Vol. I, New York, 1939°

Roosevelt, Theodore, Colonial Policies of the United States, New York, 1937°

Saito, Shiro, Philippine Newspapers in Selected American Libraries: A Union List., University of Hawaii, 1965, This valuable study identifies issues of Philippine newspapers., located in various American libraries. Since most of the Bureau of Insular Affairs' records were lost during World War II, contemporary news­ papers become the vital link to Constabulary activities during this early period. Thus Saiot's study is in­ dispensable.

Taylor, George E,, The Philippines and the United States: Problems and Partnership, New York, 19'64-. ~ ~

Willis, Henry Parker, Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial Policy, New York, 1905° Willis wrote extensively on Philippine developments prior to the presidential election of 1904. Many of his ideas were used by the anti-imperialist Democrats in this campaign. He presents a highly critical evalua­ tion of the Constabulary, 410

Worcester, Dean G., The Philippines Past and Present, Dew York, 1930. The author served for years as the Secretary of Interior in the Philippines and became a world-renown authority on the wild-people of those islands.

2. Periodicals, Secondary

Adams, H. 0., "Go Home and Look for Work," Harpers Weekly, Vol. LIZ, (August 29, 1914), 211-212.

Baja, Gapt. Emanuel A . , P. G., "The Gonstabulary Academy at Baguio," Khaki and Red : Journal and General Magazine, Vol. IV, Ho. 27 (February 29, T9'24)' ii'anil'aT" This copy is in the possession' of Mrs. Carl T. Bauman whose husband served in the Gonstabulary from 1910 to I9I8 . Her address is 127 East Montford Ave., Ada, Ohio,

"The constabulary story: 1901-1959," P.O. , 58th Anniversary. This special magazine was sent to this student by the Philippine Constabulary Head­ quarters and has since been donated'to the Univer­ sity of Oregon's Constabulary Collection.

Ganey, Eugene P., "Mountain Chase," Military Affairs, Vol. ZZIV, (Winter, 1960-61) 205ff.

Morton, Louis, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, Vol. XI,(1959), 233-254. This article described the method by which General Douglas MacArthur initially planned to use the Constabulary in case of an attack on the Philippines by the Japanese.

"The Philippine Constabulary," by "ex-Tiente, P.O.," Infantry Journal, Vol. XXX, (April, 1927), 4 2 2 - 4 2 4 .