Description of document: United States Cryptologic History, Special Series, Crisis Collection, Volume 3, The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown, National Security Agency (NSA), 1989 Requested date: 01-August-2012 Released date: 13-May-2013 Posted date: 22-July-2013 Source of document: Mandatory Declassification Review Request National Security Agency Declassification Services (DJ5) Suite 6884, Bldg. SAB2 9800 Savage Road Ft. George G. Meade, MD, 20755-6884 The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. 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We have determined that this document was previously reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) r ~ quirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 in MDR-60085, which w::is closed on 23 April 2013. Therefore, in accordance ·with Section 3 .5( d) of the Executive Order, this document is not subject to re-review until two years from that date. lf you wish, you may re-submit your request for re-review on 24 April 2015. The material reviewed in MD R-60085 is enclosed. If you have any questions regarding this action, please contact me at 301-688- 7785. Sincerely, BLAKE C. BARNES Chief Declassification Services Encl: a/s TOP SECRET united states ayptolo9lc history The National Security Ageney and the EC-121 Shootdown ~ MS DOCUMINT eONTAtNI eODlwetB MMlllAL Cknlilied 8y NSA/CSSM 123-2 Dlrdoulfy On1 Orivfnatlnll ACllMY I Dllhmilatlan Requinld TOP SECRET eclassified and Approved for Release by NSA, CIA. DIA, the Joint Staff, NSC and OSD on 4-23-2013 ursuantto E.0. 13526 MOR Case# 60085 • Coatenll Of Ibis publ.icadon lhould not be reprocl.uced, or furtber diJsemin•ted outside the U.S. IDldlipncc Community withom die permiuion of the Director, NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction and diaemlnation lhould be directed to the Oftk:e of CryptoJosic Al:cllives and History, T54. • TOP S!CR!T' tlMIM UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Special Series Crisis Collection Volume3 The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown {S:6rol._ P.L. 86-36 .OFFICE OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 1989 TOP Sl!CRIT tlMlltA i TOl9 S!Cltl!T t:IMlltA Table of Contents Page Foreword ..............................•.•...........•........................• v Introduction . 1 Background: A Cold War Legacy • • • . • . • . ... • • • . • . • . • . • . • • 4 U.S. Aerial Reconnaissance Program . • . 7 The Risk Asaeument Proceu . 11 The Sbootdown . 13 Search and Rescue Operations . 24 NSA Reaction . • . 26 The Intelligence Community on the Defensive . 32 Defending the Sigint Response Tim~ I .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 34 The Nb:on Administration's Reapotlff to the Shoot.down . 37 Formal Reviews and Recommendations . 41 A Final Look at the Crisis ....... , . • . • . • . 45 Note& ••••••••....•............•.•.........•..........•.••........•.•.......••• 49 Notes on Sources .............................................................. 65 Appendix ..................... ~ . • . 68 1. 4. (c) P.L. 86-36 iii TOI' SIClllT l:JMIM TOP searr tlMIM Foreword Tu Ncdional &curity Agency an.cl the BC-121 Slaootdown is another addition to the NSA History and Publications Division's Special CrisiaReporta aeries. On lo April 1969 a North Korean MIG-21 shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121 reeonnaiuance aircraft over the Sea of Japan. Thia is a study of the role NSA played in the crisis. It traces the origin and purposes of the flight, NSA•1 response to the shootdown, the aftermath investigations, and the resulting chanps in the U .8. aerial reconnaiuance prosram, warning procedures, and the development of the National • • t Operations Center (NS()C). Produced by bile on a George F. Howe History Fellowship, the atudy provides remarkab e insights into NSA's relationship to the armed services and the intellipnce community. It a1ao furnishes detailed information on NSA•s collection and reporting procedures. NSA's ability to react to a crisis and supply policymakers with accurate and timely intelllpnce, and the aftermath of the crisis. Relying on NSA trackinc information and message traftic as well as congressional investigation testimony and oral interviewsrlplaces the episode in the context or the Cold War and the U.S. de&ire for increuecl iii'iillIPnce on the Soviet Union and its allies. He reveals the cooperative efl'orta of the Soviets in the rescue attempts, NSA's unique role in documenting the exact location: or the shootdown, and the use u .s. policymakers made or NSA-aupplied intem~,nce~ I !study is an important contribution to understancling the role of Sig.int in a CriSiS and the importance ofNSA to the entire U.S. intellipnce community~ Henry F. Schorreck NSA Historian p. L. 86-36 v TOP SECRET i1lvHIR4._ The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown DITRODUC'nON Tuesday, April 16, was a day of celebration in North Korea. The year was 1969 and the nation was obaerving the 57th birthday of its leader, Kim 11-So'ng. His birthday celebration had become the most important national holiday: a day rilled with festivals, artistic performances, sports competitions, and academic seminars and debates. 1 The workers and students, freed from their daily routines, were in a cheertul mood as they carried banners and placards of their leader in the numerous parades held during the day. The festive mood, however, changed radically when the crowds became aware or early evening bulletins announcing a "brilliant battle BUCCeu.,. Birthday cheers were quickly replaced by the familiar shouts of '1'.>own with U.S. imperialism'" and "Liberate the South.tot The incident that chanaed the mood of the holiday crowd& was the shootdown of a U.S. Navy BC·l21 reeonnaiasance plane by a North Korean MIQ..21 jet over the Sea of Japan oft' North Korea's coast. The shoot.down, which occurred at 1347 hours Korean time (2347 hours, Monday, 14 April 1969, Eastem Standard Time), claimed 31 American lives. For the second time in 16 months, small, isolated North Korea (referred to as a "fourth-rate power" by President Richard M. Nixon in his election campaign) had attacked a U.S. intelligence vehicle. This study traces the role the National Security Agency (NSA) played during the crisis situation and in the reevaluation of U.S. intelligence activities which followed. The shoot.down of the EC.121 caused a crisis situation at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. NSA declared a Sigint Alert, BRAVO HANGAR, OD the day of the shootdown and maintained it for the remainder of the month.1 During this crisis period, NSA officials and analysts played ma.jor roles in providinc answers to questions raised by the Nixon White House, the Pentagon, other U.S. intellipnce apnciea, the Congreu, and the press regarding the 1088 ofthe Navy intelligence aircraft. When NSA peraoDDel reported to work during the early hours of that April morning they faced a contusing Bituation. NSA's role in the mission of the aircraft seemed unclear. Although the United States Navy dubbed the flight a BEGGAR SHADOW mission, implying EO 1. 4. (c) that lt wu primarily a Comhit flifrht, and thua ~ :;!!lborlt. the ........,. ot the P. L. 86-36 aircraft was primarily an Elint-directed one in· direct support of Seventh Fleet requirements. The Navy, not ~SA: ~ conU:of the mission. The Navy's aupersensitivity in maintaining strict control over its own aasets caused NSA maJor problems in trying to justify the purposes and needa for theae particular intelligence-gathering flipts. As the entire airborne reconnais88DCe program came under the ICl'Utiny of the pre11 and Congress, NSA defended the night but stressed the importance of other flights conducted by the Air Force Security Service (now Electronic Sicurity ComJMDd) that were under NSA tasking. NSA deemed. them more valuable to national intelligence requirements. Another unfortunate aspect of the EC.121 shootdown was the Navy practice of double-loading the fli.pts for training purpoaes, allowing the trainees who accompanied these missions to take advantap of transportation to as well as a little liberty in South Korea. This resulted in the 1088 of 31 men. The normal crew 1 E.o 1. 4. ( c) P.L. 86-36 TOP S!Cfl:!T tJMlltA was between 10 and 15. Not only was NSA faced with dealing with the shoot.down of a mission that was undertasked but one that was considered overmanned. Yet another major NSA role in the EC-121 shoot.down crisis was to provide evidence to refute the North Korean claim that the plane had violated its airspace, that it had come within 12 miles of the North Korean coast. To refute that claim, NSA, in the days following the shoot.down, reTrted det.ailed t.rackinv information from rad., reflections from Soviet, North Korean, President Nixon used this NSA-supplied information (and caused some consternation at NSA when reporting the source) to refute the North Korean claim that the aircraft had callously intruded upon its airspace.