8. Turkey's Objectives in the Caspian Region
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8. Turkey’s objectives in the Caspian region Ali Karaosmanoglu I. Introduction The emergence of the trans-Caucasian and Central Asian states as independent actors has significantly changed the geopolitics of Eurasia. The new republics are facing the problems of transition to a market economy and making efforts to open up to the international economic system. They are seeking ways to be the masters of their own resources and to change the terms of their relationship with Moscow. Their major concern is the consolidation of their independent status. Moreover, after the cold war, the Caspian region has grown in import- ance as a source of energy. In the words of Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, the resources of the Caspian Sea Basin should be considered together with those of the Persian Gulf and the ‘Gulf–Caspian energy ellipse’ has become ‘one of the most significant geostrategic realities of our time’.1 The Caspian region is also an essential link between Central Asia, the Black Sea and Turkey. The issue of energy and possible oil transport routes has come to be regarded by regional and extra-regional states as a significant ‘determinant for the long-term geopolitical orientation of the region’.2 This has in turn has exacerbated rivalries among the regional states as well as between Russia and the United States. Since the breakup of the USSR Turkey has become increasingly involved in this new and dynamic geopolitical environment, which presents it with oppor- tunities as well as challenges. The Turkic world which was previously closed to Turkey has opened up to it. Turkey’s foreign relations have acquired new political and economic dimensions with a new Russia and with the emergence of independent Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. For various reasons, however, Turkey’s initial high expectations about the expansion of its influence in the newly independent states have not fully materialized. This is particularly true of Central Asia; in the South Caucasus, by contrast, Turkey has gradually con- solidated its position since the early 1990s. The South Caucasus is of particular geopolitical interest for three reasons. First, the region is a gateway to Central Asia. Second, it provides direct access to the markets of the West for the Caspian oil and gas. Here Iran’s anti-Western policies and US ‘containment’ of Iran have made the region even more sig- nificant. Third, Azerbaijan and Georgia are of the utmost strategic importance 1 Kemp, G. and Harkavy, R. E., Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East (Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1997), p. 111. 2 Ruseckas, L., ‘Turkey and Eurasia: opportunities and risks in the Caspian pipeline derby’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1 (fall 2000), p. 223. 152 THE S EC UR ITY OF THE C AS P IAN S EA R EGION to Turkey. Their independence and territorial integrity are regarded as indis- pensable for the security and stability not only of the Caucasus but also of Central Asia. This chapter examines Turkey’s objectives and strategies in the Caspian region in general and in the South Caucasus in particular. It focuses on Turkey’s priorities not only from a regional perspective but also in terms of trans-regional linkages which usually exert considerable influence on Turkey’s decisions and actions. Turkish policy is widely viewed as being motivated almost solely by eco- nomic considerations, particularly by the energy (oil and gas) issue. Turkey’s political and other non-economic interests are often neglected or, at best, only touched on briefly. In fact, Turkey’s primary long-term objective is political— the creation and maintenance of a pluralistic Eurasia which is open to the West in general and to Turkey in particular. It also has other serious concerns— environmental concerns about the transport of oil by tanker through the narrow straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles (the Turkish Straits) and the maintenance of good, cooperative relations with Russia in the interests of regional stability and economic benefit. This, however, is not to overlook the energy issue, which is undoubtedly important both in itself and because of Turkey’s rapidly growing energy needs. It is also regarded as an instrument for the realization of the long-term political objective of building a pluralistic Eur- asia. In this sense, the exploitation of energy resources and the transport of oil and gas are often seen as promoting stability, nation-building and independent statehood rather than the causes of rivalry and conflict. The energy issue is in one way or another related to other objectives. This raises the question of the compatibility of different objectives. To what extent does Turkey’s policy in the region contribute to minimizing conflictual tendencies and promoting stability? Finally, trans-regional linkages should be taken into account in dealing with Turkey’s objectives in the Caspian region. Turkey’s regional policies cannot be adequately understood separately from its Western vocation and its relations with the United States and the European Union (EU). II. Energy and the economy Since the breakup of the Soviet Union there has been growing Western interest in the Caspian region’s oil and gas resources. It is expected that sustained economic growth in North America, Europe and Asia during the first decade of the 21st century will bring about a considerable increase in demand for energy. Although the significance of the Caspian energy reserves is modest, they have the potential to supplement the Persian Gulf production on which most coun- tries are expected to be increasingly dependent. Consequently there is a grow- ing need to exploit the energy resources of Central Asia and the Caucasus by opening up these regions to foreign investment and international cooperation. TURKEY’ S OBJECTIVES IN THE CASPIAN REGION 153 Turkey is one of the most important potential markets for the oil and gas pro- duction of the Caspian region and Russia. Its need for energy has been increas- ing rapidly and will continue to do so if the present rate of economic growth is to be sustained. Energy security is also extremely important for sustained economic growth. Turkey is estimated to import around 28 million tonnes of crude oil in the year 2000 and over 40 million tonnes by 2010. The increase in the demand for natural gas is even more striking. On one very conservative estimate it is expected to rise from 10 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2000 to over 30–40 bcm in 2010. Turkey currently depends on imports for approximately 62.6 per cent of its energy consumption and for more than 95 per cent of the oil and gas it consumes. The major suppliers of crude oil are the Persian Gulf countries and Libya; the major supplier of natural gas is Russia.3 This trend has prompted Turkey to diversify its energy suppliers and to regard the Central Asian and trans-Caucasian states as important energy partners. Turkey is already beginning to suffer a shortage of gas supply. It plans to build new gas-fired power stations in order to meet the growing demand for electricity and a shortage of natural gas to supply them could cause economic crisis. All this makes it a very important market for the Caspian region’s gas and gives additional economic significance to Turkey’s relations with the region, which has the potential to become its main gas supplier in the very near future.4 Its growing demand for natural gas has led to Turkey concluding agree- ments to buy additional gas from Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia and Turkmenistan. All these new supplies require new pipelines connecting the suppliers to the Turkish market. However, the construction of infrastructure may take years, while the country’s gas shortage worsens in the meantime. Gas is therefore an urgent issue for Ankara which requires a short-term solution. This also makes the gas issue primarily an economic one, which hardly lends itself to longer- term political considerations. Russia currently supplies more than 11 bcm of natural gas to Turkey per year through a pipeline across Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. The parties are planning to upgrade the capacity of this pipeline. Moreover, Turkey and Russia have concluded an agreement providing for the transport of 16 bcm per year of Russian gas to Turkey by an underwater pipeline across the Black Sea shelf. The project, which is called Blue Stream, has already received the support of Russia’s Gazprom, Italy’s ENI, three Japanese companies and a French company. The Blue Stream pipeline is to be built by ENI.5 In contrast to the politics of oil, Russia is thus becoming ‘an important partner for Turkey rather than a rival in the field of gas’.6 3 On Turkey’s energy needs and policies see Söylemez, Y., ‘Turkey as an energy terminal in the 21st century’, Turkish Daily News (15 Feb. 2000), p. 16. The figures concerning Turkey’s energy needs that appear here are taken from this article. 4 Kramer, H., A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 2000), p. 101. 5 Pamir, A. N., ‘Is there a future for the Eurasian corridor?’, Insight Turkey, vol. 2, no. 3 (July/Sep. 2000), pp. 35–38. On this and other pipeline projects see also chapter 3 in this volume. 6 Winrow, G. M., ‘Turkey and Caspian energy: the importance of geopolitics’, Insight Turkey, vol. 2, no. 2 (Apr./June 2000), p. 64. 154 THE S EC UR ITY OF THE C AS P IAN S EA R EGION There are two more gas pipeline projects at issue. The second project is the US-backed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project, which Turkey is pursuing simultaneously with Blue Stream.