The Black Sea and the Turkish Straits: Resurgent Strategic Importance in the 21St Century

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The Black Sea and the Turkish Straits: Resurgent Strategic Importance in the 21st Century

THESIS

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the

Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Andrew M. Hascher

Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies

The Ohio State University

2019

Master’s Examination Committee

Angela Brintlinger, PhD, Advisor

Yana Hashamova, PhD

Rudy Hightower, PhD

Copyrighted by

Andrew M. Hascher

2019

Abstract

The Black Sea and the Turkish Straits have played an important geopolitical role in the world since the time of antiquity, despite the Black Sea being a geographically closed body of water.

The objective of this paper is to articulate the importance of the Black Sea region as a source of geopolitical power, both historically and moving into the future. Of particular importance are the power dynamics between the Russian Federation, Turkey and the West. This paper reviews the history of the region and the major treaties over time which attempted to answer the “Straits

Question” of access to and from the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. Then analysis of the current geopolitical situation and a projection for the future of the region is offered based on the research.

Analysis of the history and diplomacy of the area shows that the major actors continue to place a great deal of strategic importance on their territorial claims, military position and economic standing in the Black Sea region. The evidence shows that the Russians place an enormous level of importance on the Black Sea as it holds their only viable warm water ports.

Furthermore, they have a long history of breaking regional treaties in what seem to be repeated attempts to renegotiate and improve their Black Sea presence. Turkey has their own ambitions in the region but are not presently in a position to challenge Russia, or the diplomatic status quo.

Trends over time suggest that this may change in the coming years if the Turks are able to complete their canal project near Istanbul. An understanding of the regional history is important for policy makers when considering future treaties and setting strategic direction for diplomatic, military and economic operations in the region.

Vita

May 2003…………………………………….Medina High School

December 2007………………………………B.A. Criminal Justice, Bowling Green State

University

December 2007 to Present……………………U.S. Army Officer

Fields of Study

Major Field: Slavic and East European Studies

Disclaimer

Andrew Hascher is a Major in the United States Army. The United States Army has provided funding for tuition in pursuit of his Master’s Degree as part of the Foreign Area Officer program education requirements. This paper is the academic work of Andrew Hascher and does not reflect the official position of the United States Army, Department of Defense, or any entity of the

United States Government.

iii

Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………ii

Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………………iv

List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………..v

Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………………....1

Chapter 2: History…………………………………………………………………………………7

Antiquity: Greek and Roman Colonization……………………………….7

Ottoman Imperial Control………………………………………………...10

Post World War 1…………………………………………………………13

The Cold War……………………………………………………………..19

Post Soviet Union…………………………………………………………20

Chapter 3: Diplomacy………..…………………………………………………………………..24

The Straits Question……………………………………………………….24

Pre-Montreux Convention…………………………………………………25

The Montreux Convention…………………………………………………33

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea……………………40

Chapter 4: Security…………………………………………………………………………..…..42

Chapter 5: Implications and Conclusions………………………………………………………..56

References………………………………………………………………………………………..64

List of Figures

Figure 1: Crimea Annexation Exclusive Economic Zone Map…………………………………...4

Figure 2: Ottoman Empire Expansion Map……………………………………………………...12

Figure 3: Post WWI Ukraine Territorial Map……………………………………………………16

Figure 4: Exclusive Economic Zone Map of the Black Sea……………………………………..40

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Russians and Bulgarians call it Chernoye More, the Ukrainians Chorne More,

Romanians Marea Neagră, the Georgians call it Shavi Zghva, the Turks call it Karadeniz, the world knows it as the Black Sea. Each of these nation-states share a littoral border on the Black

Sea, and all have geopolitical interest in maintaining their access and use of the inland sea.

Turkish borders exist on both sides of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, effectively giving the Turks complete control of the world’s access to the Black Sea, and perhaps more importantly, control over the maritime access of the Black Sea riparian states to the rest of the world.

Since the time of antiquity, the Black Sea and Turkish Straits have played an important geopolitical role in the world, despite the fact the Black Sea has always been a geographically closed body of water. The recorded importance of the Black Sea and Turkish Straits extends all the way into the history and mythology of Ancient Greece and continues through today. The strategically important location of the Black Sea, and the varied interests on and around it over the centuries, have kept this region in a state of perpetual contest. This thesis will explore the history of imperial claims on the Black Sea, its unique place in the realm of international trade and maritime law, and the delicate security balance we see in the region today. It is the intent of this thesis to articulate how the Black Sea has always been, and will continue to be in the the 21st century, a source of geopolitical power. Of particular importance are the power dynamics between the Russian Federation, Turkey and the West.

For the purposes of this paper, the West is defined as the Western Europe, the United States of America, and those countries who make up the NATO alliance, depending on the particular time period being discussed. Turkey’s interests are considered as an entity separate from their

1 place within the NATO alliance, as they have distinct historic and geographic considerations, as well as unilateral geopolitical ambitions concerning the Black Sea. For Russia the Black Sea is paramount to geopolitical strategy. Because Russia’s only warm-water naval ports are on the

Black Sea, in order to effectively project naval power the Russians must not only exert control of the sea, but also have unrestricted access to the Dardenelles and Bosphorus Straits. The famed

Russian Black Sea fleet, headquartered in Sevastopol, has ensured Russian military primacy on the Black Sea for hundreds of years. The other riparian states of the Black Sea have their own interests however because these states do not rise to the level of great powers, and because they have historically found themselves alligned with one of the aforementioned power, they will be separately evaluated as appropriate.

The Black Sea is approximately 730 miles wide from west to east, and has a surface area of

168,500 square miles. Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine share coastal frontage on the Black Sea. 8 major rivers flow into the Black Sea, effectively linking not only the coastal states, but also Moldova, Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, and

Belarus. 1 2 These rivers allow otherwise land locked countries access to maritime trade opportunities, while obviating the need or opportunity to maintain a navy.3 Furthermore, after centuries of being a source of economic importance in Europe, the Danube was linked to the

Rhine via the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal. Completed in 1992, this canal effectively linked the

1 The 8 major rivers that flow into the Black Sea are: 1- Danube, 2- Dnieper, 3- Southern Bug, 4- Dniester, 5- Don, 6- Kuban, 7- Rioni, and 8- Kizilirmak 2 Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and Serbia are linked via the Danube River, and Belarus is linked via the Dnieper River, though development work would be required to make the Belarusian portion of the river to be navigable. Moldova is linked via both the Danube and Dniester Rivers, as is the breakaway and internationally unrecognized Transnistrian region. 3 In a modern context, the only land locked countries would be Austria and Hungary, however, in the history of Europe, with its every changing borders, this would have effected a variety of former nation states, such as the Kingdom of Bavaria. As such, the Danube has played an important historic role in the economic development of Europe.

2 whole of Europe via navigatable riverway, from the North Sea at the Rhine Delta in the

Netherlands to the Black Sea at the Danube Delta in Romania.4

Modern maritime shipping in the Black Sea and Turkish Straits is responsible for a wide variety of goods being brought to the global market. Perhaps most notable are the energy products of Russia, the South Caucasus region, and Turkey. Oil and natural gas are brought from as far away as the Caspian Sea via pipelines, then transit the Black Sea in both ships and further pipelines. The Black Sea itself is thought to hold vast quantities of oil and gas, and riparian states have invested in projects to exploit these resources. For example, in 2018 the

Romanian energy company Black Sea Oil and Gas completed several explorative drilling missions in a bid to establish a permanent off-shore drilling site.5 While the 2018 attempts did not prove to be commercially viable, the Black Sea riparian states and much of Europe have great interest in exploiting new sources of oil from the Black Sea as part of a larger strategic effort to reduce dependence on Russian energy sources. Energy issues notwithstanding, because the Black Sea is shared by six nation states, the region continually faces geopolitical issues involving territorial waters, economic exclusion zones and fishing rights. While not presently a settled issue, the Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 drastically changed the land map of the region, adding the nearly ten thousand square miles of the peninsula to Russia. More importantly, this land grab by the Russian Federation radically changes the nautical map of territorial waters and economic exclusion zones in the Black Sea. While not recognized by the international community, the theft of Crimea results in the doubling of Russia

4 Clarke, M. (2018, June 27). Main-Danube Canal. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Main-Danube- Canal. 5 Husseini, T. (2018, August 6). Black Sea Oil & Gas completes two-well exploration drilling off Romania. Retrieved from https://www.offshore-technology.com/news/black-sea-oil-gas-exploration-drilling/. 3 territorial water claims in the Black Sea and theoretically the fishing and resource exploitation rights that come with them.

Figure 1: Exclusive Economic Zone Map before and after annexation of Crimea. Source: Ryan,

W. B. F. (2014). Retrieved from https://medium.com/@AndersonLaMarca/crimea-an-eu-us- exxon-screwup-be78670d3a7e

The Black Sea is often assumed to derive its name from the color of the water due to some natural condition. The ancient Greeks initially named the Black Sea ‘Pontus Axīnus’ meaning inhospitable sea, and the word ‘Axinus’ is derived from the Persian word “axsaina” which refers to a dark blue-gray, or black color. While it is true that the Black Sea does contain iron sulfide which darkens the color of the water, there is in fact, another reason for the name. Turkish maps delineate the cardinal points on maps are designated by colors. Black is used for north, red for

4 south, white for west, and green or light blue for east. Since the Black Sea was found to the north of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, it acquired the appropriate name Black (or north)

Sea.

While this information may seem little more than an interesting bit of historical trivia, it does highlight the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the region for centuries. More importantly, that influence was largely lost after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, leaving Turkey as little more than the gatekeeper of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, bound by a series of treaties that do not necessarily reflect the level of influence that Turkey believes it should have. Today the

Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of Straits governs international access to the Black

Sea through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The convention fails to satisfy all parties’ desires and is perhaps a compromise agreement in the truest sense. However, the treaty has remained in effect for far longer than originally intended, and there are those who believe that it may not be compatible with the contemporary environment.6

For nearly a millennium, various empires and regional or global powers have competed for influence and control of the Black Sea. While the reasons behind desire for this control may have shifted over time, the struggle for it has consistently boiled down to three parties: The West, the Russians, and the Turks. As the major land holders on the northern and southern banks of the

Black Sea, the Russians and Turks have had the most vested interest in exerting their control, and

Western interests have largely overlapped with those of one of these two powers.

This thesis will explore first the history of the Black Sea to identify those events and eras that inform the contemporary geopolitical situation in the region. Next a review of diplomacy over

6 Ögütçü, M. (2018, April 18). Revising the Montreux Convention. Retrieved from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/mehmet-ogutcu/revising-the-montreux-convention-130148.

5 time in the region, and how various treaties have attempted to answer the “Straits Question.”7

Next a review of the contemporary security situation of the regional powers will place this discussion firmly into the present. Finally, the thesis will conclude with a prognosis for the future and policy ramifications for the Western world.

7 The “Straits Question” is discussed beginning on page 22 6

Chapter 2: History

The Black Sea in Antiquity

As Greek civilization expanded from the relatively geographically protected Aegean Sea, the

Greeks established colonies along the shores of the Mediterranean, and eventually held colonies along the coast of the Black Sea. Sea faring Greeks easily established colonies throughout the

Aegean, reaching the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara. However, the Bosphorus straits were exceedingly narrow and difficult to navigate. According to the epic poem Argonautica by

Apollonius Rhodius, the Golden Fleece was a symbol of authority and power.8 The Golden

Fleece was held in the Kingdom of Colchis, a far off land found at the “edge of the sea and of the world.” 9 To reach that land, a Greek traveler would have to traverse the Dardanelles and

Bosphorus Straits, as well as the Black Sea.

When Jason and the Argonauts set out in search of the Golden Fleece, they departed the relatively safe harbor of Iolcos, nestled in the Pagesetic Gulf, sailed along the coast of Thessaly and through the Aegean Sea to the island of Lemnos. From there they entered the Dardanelles

Straits, and then Propontis.10 Only after visiting the Bebrycians on the eastern coast of Propontis were they prepared to traverse the narrow Bosphorus Straits. In the ancient world, it was believed that the Bosphorus Straits were impassable, due to ‘clashing rocks’ which would crush any ship attempting to enter the Black Sea. Ostensibly, Jason was the first westerner to successfully navigate the Bosphorus Straits, and after crossing the Black Sea, eventually he reached the Kingdom of Colchis to retrieve the Golden Fleece. For Jason, the key to success rested with the ability to sail the Black Sea.

8 Rhodes, A. de, & Race, W. H. (2008). Argonautica. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. 9 Ibid 10 Propontis is now called the Sea of Marmara. 7

While Homer’s Iliad chronicles the fabled Trojan War being fought over the honor of the the beautiful Helen of Troy,11 it is reasonable to assume that perhaps the war was prosecuted over control of the strategically important Dardanelles Strait, given the location of the city of Troy.

As previously mentioned, the Greeks initially named the Black Sea the ‘Inhospitable Sea’, as few ships returned from their voyages in the Black Sea. In recent years, the Black Sea Maritime

Archaeological Project has discovered as many as sixty remarkably preserved ancient sailing vessels, many of which have been found off the coast of Bulgaria, suggesting that these early explorers were unable to successfully navigate much of the Black Sea.12

The location of the Black Sea and Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits has been so strategically important to ancient empires that these waterways are mentioned throughout much of recorded history. Even the fabled Persian warrior Xerxes bridged the Dardanelles in his attempt to conquer western Greece in 480 B.C.13 As maritime travel became more routine, the Greeks renamed the the Black Sea “Pontus Euxinus” meaning hospitable sea. Greek and subsequently

Roman colonization of the Black Sea region would see dozens of coastal colonies appear throughout the otherwise untamed region. Arguably the spread of both Christianity and Islam in the region was made possible largely due to the infrastructure set up by the Greeks along the coast of the Black Sea.

For the purposes of this paper, the ancient history of the Black Sea is important only to show that Western civilization, via the Greeks, has held a long-standing interest in the Black Sea as

11 The Internet Classics Archive: The Iliad by Homer. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://classics.mit.edu/Homer/iliad.html. 12 Daley, J. (2017, September 21). Exceptionally Preserved Ancient Ships Discovered in the Black Sea. Retrieved from https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/another-fleet-ancient-ships-discovered-black-sea-180964978/. 13 Vali, F. (1972). The Turkish Straits and NATO. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 8 culture and empire spread throughout the known world. It is important to note that derivations of the Greek name “Pontus Euxinus” were found on European maps through the Renaissance period, and in some cases even later. By the late 1700’s European maps began using both Greek and Turkish names and eventually the influence of the Ottoman Empire would lead the world to adopt the name Black Sea.

As the Black Sea changed over time from being the inhospitable sea, to the hospitable sea, maritime travel became so routine that famed explorer Marco Polo mentioned only briefly in his account of his travels that he and his crew traveled the Black Sea from Trebizond to

Constantinople.14 According to Black Sea scholar Charles King, Polo feared that to write more would bore his readers, as traveling the Black Sea had become so commonplace by the late thirteenth century that no one was impressed by it.15 Nearly twenty years prior to Marco’s journey, his father Nicolo Polo traveled from Constantinople to Soldaia (Sudak) through the

Black Sea, on a trade mission.16 The Genoese had established a Western presence in the Black

Sea with several colonies on the Crimean peninsula. The fortress at Sudak is remarkably well preserved and today is a tourist attraction for the city. Similarly, the Genoese established a colony at the city of Kaffa (previously the Greek colony Theodosia and modern day Feodosia) on the Crimean peninsula around 1280, as the southern coast of Crimea was viewed as an important location for trade with the Mongols in the context of east-west movement from Europe to India/Asia. Because these colonies were effectively at the midway point of the northern coast of the Black Sea, they offered easy access to sea routes and the ability to move over land for

14 Polo, M., & Masefield, J. (1918). The travel of Marco Polo the Venetian. London & Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons. 15 Körber-Stiftung. (2007). The Black Sea between the Eu and Russia: security, energy, democracy: june, 23-25, 2006, Odessa: 134th Bergedorfer Round Table. Hamburg. 16 Polo, M., & Masefield, J. (1918). The travel of Marco Polo the Venetian. London & Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons. 9 trade. European territorial holdings on the Black Sea would decline as the Ottoman Empire expanded.

The Ottoman Empire

Marco Polo mentions the Turkoman inhabitants of “Turkomania” in his journal of travels. He notes that they are “a rude people, and dull of intellect.”17 Polo further notes that these people adhere to the Islamic faith and live in the mountains, subsisting on purely animal food. As a merchant, he has an interest in the Turkoman horses are considered excellent quality and sold for high prices. Marco Polo would have traveled through “Turkomania” sometime in the 1270s, and at this point the House of Osman had not yet coalesced into the Ottoman Empire. Near the end of the 13th century, the imperial House of Osman, originating in northwestern Anatolia

(modern day Turkey on the eastern side of the Straits), began to consolidate their power over the people and territory of Anatolia.

Starting with the city Bursa, which served as their capitol until 1453, the Ottomans subsumed the Sultanate of Rum and much of the surrounding area under an Islamic banner.18 While early territorial expansion did include Black Sea coastal lands, it was only in 1352 that the first strategically important port city was captured. The walls of the city Gelibolu were destroyed during an earthquake and the Ottomans took the opportunity to seize the city in its weakened and less defended state. This is significant because Gelibolu had an established, Western style port, and is located on European side of the Dardanelles, which led to an Ottoman foothold in continental Europe, which the Ottomans went on to expand over the next nearly four centuries.

Ottoman power, influence, and territorial holdings spread from Anatolia to the Balkans, and

17 Polo, M., & Masefield, J. (1918). The travel of Marco Polo the Venetian. London & Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons. 18 Faroqhi, S. (2009). The Ottoman Empire: A Short History. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers

10 eventually pushed into Central Europe, the Caucasus, modern day Russia and Ukraine, and much of the Islamic Middle East and North Africa.19

The first major power conquered by the Ottomans was the Byzantine Empire and the

Ottomans captured the heart of the Byzantine empire, the city of Constantinople, in 1453. This established Ottoman control of the Bosphorus strait and access to and from the Black Sea.

Control of the Bosphorus has been maintained by the Turks since 1453, which helped the concept of the “ancient rule”20 of the Straits by Ottomans that would be cited in future treaties.

Fewer than 10 years later, they captured Trebizond, a triumph that marked the end of the

Byzantine Empire. The fall of the Byzantine Empire meant the Ottomans had begun consolidating control of the southern Black Sea coastal areas in a de facto manner through their territorial acquisitions.

Figure 2 maps the territorial expansion of the Ottomans over time. Early in their expansion in the Black Sea region they were largely unopposed in terms of naval military power. The establishment of the Crimean Tatar Khanate, which became a vassal state of the Ottomans and effectively gave them control of most of the Black Sea. The Ottomans went on to conquer the

European colonies on the southern coast of Crimea in 1475, thus securing the strategically important peninsula. During this time, Western European powers largely lost interest in the

Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean as a trade route, especially following Vasco da Gama’s successful navigation around Africa in 1497-1498.21 Da Gama’s voyage of exploration was ostensibly undertaken to save time and increase trade profits for Portugal, however it is

19 Faroqhi, S. (2009) The Ottoman Empire: A Short History. Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton. 20 The “Ancient Rule” of the straits is cited in the London Straits Convention of 1841 and will be discussed in further detail in chapter 3 of this paper. 21 Towle, G. (1878) Vasco Da Gama. Lothrop, Lee and Shepard, Boston 11 reasonable to assume that Ottoman expansion, and therefore disruption of the trade route status quo also served as a motivation to bypass the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

Figure 2: Map of Ottoman expansion over time. Source: Encyclopedia Britannica. (n.d.).

Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire/images- videos#/media/1/434996/678

Ottoman control of the entirety of the Black Sea region was briefly challenged by Cossack warriors in 1637, who for a brief time captured and held parts of the Sea of Azov. However, their victory was short lived, and the Ottoman regained control quickly. Over time, the Ottoman

Empire expanded and at its peak held all coastal land on the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and the

Straits by 1683. In September of 1683, the Ottomans attempted for the second time to capture

Vienna and failed. The Habsburg Monarchy was assisted by King John III Sobieski of the

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and for the first time the major European empires of the time cooperated against the Ottomans.

The European powers had become frustrated with Ottoman expansionism, Muslim challenge to Christianity, and the perceived barbarism of the Ottoman Turks. An account of the Ottoman army moving through the Austrian town of Perchtoldsdorf on their way to lay siege to Vienna tells of the Muslim army promising the townspeople safety, only to betray that promise and slaughter much of the village in a horrific manner.22 Such accounts were politically expedient for the European powers, who highlighted what they considered the duplicitous nature and savagery of the Ottomans. These sorts of accounts effectively served as propaganda for uniting the Christian powers who then pushed the Ottomans out of much of Europe.

In 1684, Pope Innocent XI organized the Holy League, an alliance of the Holy Roman

Empire, Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth, Venice and eventually the Russian empire. While most of the powers of the Holy League apart from Russia had no real strategic interest in the

Black Sea, the larger Great Turkish War would drastically change the balance of power in the region. After the failed attempt to capture Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman army was severely weakened. This point in history has been recognized recognized by historians as the end of an expanding Ottoman Empire, and the beginning of an empire in decline, at least in terms of territorial holdings. By 1700 the Habsburgs captured and controlled territory all the way to the

Hungarian Danube, including Transylvania.

Seeing the Ottoman losses, the Russian Empire first chose to take advantage of the perceived weakness in the Ottoman’s hold on the Black Sea region. Peter the Great challenged Ottoman primacy in the Sea of Azov by capturing the fortress at Azov, and briefly controlling the northeastern most stronghold on the relatively protected body of water. As the Russian empire

22 Fichtner, P. (2008) Terror and Toleration The Habsburg Empire Confronts Islam, 1526-1850 Reaktion Books Ltd., London, U.K. 13 expanded it became clear that access to a warm-water port would be necessary for the projection of naval power and maritime trade, and Peter’s eyes turned southward.

While Peter the Great achieved a solid victory over the Ottomans at Azov, his aspirations of access to a warm water port for the continued expansion of the Russian empire were not fully realized. The Ottomans still controlled fortresses at the Kerch Strait, effectively closing access to the larger Black Sea, which made capturing Azov largely pointless from an economic perspective. Peter constructed a port from scratch at Taganrog (near modern day Rostov-on-

Don), used coerced labor, and failed to consider the logistic ramifications of a supporting such an ambitious Russian colony.23 The use of forced labor meant no real investment in the success of the colony by those building it. By 1711 the colony had failed, not because of Ottoman push back against Russian expansion, but because the Russian empire simply couldn’t effectively support the area, especially with limited economic or political reward. Logistically speaking, a new colony so far from the heart of Russian territory, which could not be supported via sea lanes and had no established agricultural base to support the population proved impossible to maintain.

Despite the initial failure at Azov, the Russians have since that time sought control of warm water ports. The Black Sea has long been their only logical choice for this endeavor. The

Russian empire began to chip away at the Ottoman primacy in the Black Sea, fighting a series of wars over more than a century to capture the entirety of the northern coastal areas. The Russo-

Turkish wars between the later half of the 1700s and the late 1800s saw a series of short conflicts followed by peace settlements which slowly eroded the Ottoman control of the Black Sea.

Despite their best efforts to hold on to power, the Ottoman Empire would continue to recede and eventually following World War I it collapsed, becoming the modern nation Turkey.

23 Boeck, B. J. (2008). When Peter I Was Forced to Settle for Less: Coerced Labor and Resistance in a Failed Russian Colony (1695–1711). The Journal of Modern History, 80(3), 485–514. doi: 10.1086/589589 14

Post World War I

In the wake of World War I, the balance of power in the world radically changed. Not only did the Ottoman Empire collapse, but the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire, the German

Empire, and the Russian Empire all failed. The borders of the European map were redrawn, with a variety of new, or resurgent countries forming. While the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed in large part as a consequence of World War I, the Russian Empire collapsed due to the Bolshevik Revolution. Romania coalesced into the country the world knows today, which controls nearly 225 kilometers of Black Sea coast,24 as well as the ecologically, economically, and strategically important Danube Delta. The power vacuum created by the collapse of so many empires left the world in a state of geopolitical confusion.

Turkey was born out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, though the transition from an ancient empire to a new country was not a simple process. The new borders were not defined until the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923. Turkey was left with the territory seen on a map today, controlling both the European and Asian sides of the Straits, but World War I had left them militarily and economically crippled. They were in some ways unable to assert their sovereignty over their territory, specifically the Straits, in diplomatic negotiations. With the collapse of the Russian Empire, Georgia briefly gained its independence, though the newly formed USSR quickly reconquered the small territory which also controlled the important oil port of Batumi.

The Ukrainians also had a short-lived period of independence as the Ukrainian Republic prior to being subsumed by the Soviets. Directly following World War I, they claimed the entirety of the northern coast of the Black Sea, from Romania to Georgia. The map in figure 3 was

24 The World Factbook: Romania. (2018, February 1). Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook/geos/ro.html. 15 presented at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, showing Ukraine’s territorial claims. The important take away from this map is that it completely cuts off Russian access to a warm water port, which was an unacceptable outcome for the Russians.

Figure 3: Territorial borders of Ukraine presented by the Ukrainian delegation to the 1919 Paris

Peace Conference. Source: Forrest. (1919). Retrieved from http://likbez.org.ua/ua/ukrainskaya- respublika-karta-dlya-parizhskoj-mirnoj-konferentsii-1919-g.html

While the riparian states of the Black Sea briefly enjoyed independence following World War

I, what was truly created in the chaos of the post war world was a power vacuum. The Soviet

Union was the power that stepped in to fill that vacuum in the. Black Sea region. By the dawn of

World War II, they had firmly put the Black Sea’s northern coast from Turkey to Romania under

Russian control once again. In terms of strategic importance, the Black Sea’s significance was no different to the USSR than to that of the Russian Empire. Despite the massive expansion of the Soviet Union over time, the Black Sea still provided the only viable warm water port location.

Under Stalin, the Soviet regime brutally secured its control over the critically important

Ukrainian territory. The mass starvation of Ukrainians during the Holodomor in 1932-1933 is perhaps the the greatest example of taking advantage of a bad situation to secure strategic ends.

The transition to socialism was not universally accepted throughout the Soviet Union. Ukrainian peasants had disagreed with the central government controlling the distribution of all of their harvests, preferring to be able to hold some for themselves, both for their own consumption and also to bring to market and net some profit. The Soviet government however viewed the harvest both as part of the collective and as an economic resource that could be traded for foreign machinery which could then further the industrialization effort.25

It is estimated that the forced collectivization killed between 3 and 10 million people.26

While scholars have argued that the Holodomor was perpetrated by the Stalin regime as a means of forced collectivization, there was at the time a growing anti-revolutionary and independence movement within the Ukrainian population.27 Bearing in mind that during their brief independence, the Ukrainians claimed the entirety of the northern shore of the Black Sea, it becomes clear that the Ukrainian separatist movement threatened not only the ideological legitimacy of the Soviet government, but also the territorial access to the only warm water port.

Whether purposeful starvation or a natural famine exacerbated by bad policy, the Kremlin capitalized on the opportunity to rid themselves of the potentially counter-revolutionary

Ukrainians.

25 Engerman, David (2003). Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 26 Snyder, T. (2010). Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. London: The Bodley Head 27 Kuromiya, H. (1994). Ukraine and Russia in the 1930s. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 18(3/4), 327-341. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/stable/41036906 17

After the Holodomor, the Soviet Union was not internally challenged again on the Black Sea.

World War II however brought an external threat to the Black Sea, as well as opportunity for the

Soviets to further expand their control of the region. The naval campaigns in the Black Sea between the Soviet Union and Axis powers resulted in an eventual Soviet victory, though at the cost of much of the Black Sea fleet and many lives. Between October 1941 and July 1942, the

Axis powers laid siege to the strategic port city of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. The

Axis controlled Sevastopol until 1944 when they were eventually routed by the Soviets. Given the geography of Crimea, controlling the peninsula allows for military power projection in all directions. Some military leaders even refer to Crimea as the ‘unsinkable battleship of the Black

Sea.’28

For most of World War II, Turkey remained neutral and, in keeping with the Montreux

Convention, allowed few naval vessels through the Straits. This meant most of the combat power for the opposing fleets had to be constructed within the Black Sea, or in the case of the

Axis powers, shipped there via the Danube. As a means of subverting the limitations on combat power set in the Montreux Convention,29 these vessels were assigned to Romania, which began

World War II on the side of Germany. Following the war, the Soviet government pressured

Turkey to change the Montreux Convention, and went so far as asking for a joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Straits. The Soviets wanted no less than a naval base in the Straits, which was unacceptable to the Turks as it would violate their sovereignty. The Soviet demands led to

Turkey seeking the support and assistance of the United States. Prior to this point, and outside

28 Referring to Crimea as ‘The Unsinkable Battleship of the Black Sea’ was commonplace as an apt description of the strategic importance of Crimea during the author’s tour of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Romania. 29 The Montreux Convention is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 of this paper. 18 the context of the World Wars, the United States had only ancillary economic interests in the region, limited primarily to the right of free trade.

The Cold War

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 in Washington, D.C.

Because both World Wars had originated on the European continent, it was decided that a treaty of collective defense and cooperation among like minded nations would be the best way to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union.30 Turkey was not a founding member of NATO, however their security concerns over the Soviet Union’s interest in securing a naval base in the

Straits pushed them to enter the alliance. From the beginning, many have Turkey’s place in the alliance as matter of opportunity for the West more than a genuine concern for Turkey’s security.

The strategic significance of the Turkish Straits to the Russians and later the Soviet Union had never been a secret, and having Turkey as an ally to NATO gave an enormous strategic advantage in the effort to counter and contain the Soviet Union, and continues to be in keeping with the Truman Doctrine.31

Turkey’s ascension to NATO membership was ultimately a win-win situation. Turkey gained the security of the collective defense guarantee, while the West gained a means of further containing the Soviet Union. The Black Sea was not a strategic imperative for the NATO alliance, but the addition of an ally with the ability to limit or choke off Soviet access to the

Mediterranean was a strategic advantage. While freedom of navigation through the Straits is guaranteed in the Montreux Convention, that treaty also granted the Turks the ability to restrict access if they felt under threat of war. Within the context of the Cold War, articulating the

30 Nato. (n.d.). Why was NATO founded? Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/wearenato/why-was-nato- founded.html. 31 The Truman Doctrine, 1947. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman- doctrine. 19 concern of being threatened by the Soviet Union would have been a fairly easy sell to the international community. However, completely closing the Straits would have likely drawn the world into a hot conflict, and military vessels were largely allowed passage in keeping with international law. The importance of access to the Turkish Straits was especially apparent during the Yom Kippur war. During this brief conflict in 1973, the United States Navy and Soviet Navy nearly escalated what was a naval standoff to a shooting conflict in the eastern Mediterranean while supporting opposing sides in the ground conflict between the Israelis and its Arab neighbors.32

The United States regularly operated naval patrols in the Black Sea throughout the Cold War, and always within the rules of the Montreux Convention. Restrictions on the number of ships allowed were followed, and freedom of navigation operations were conducted by the United

States Navy, usually several times per year.33 The Soviet Navy developed a reputation for reckless operations in the Black Sea, often harassing the U.S. vessels by sailing too close and on occasion even colliding with the U.S. Navy.34 If in these incidents the Soviets were attempting to goad the United States into firing on their vessels to cause a conflict they ultimately failed.

The United States and NATO conducted naval operations within the Black Sea through much of the Cold War and never escalated any encounter to a hot conflict.

Post Soviet Union

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West once again largely lost interest in the

Black Sea region from a security perspective. Trade, diplomacy, and foreign aid to the former

32 Rabinovich, A. (2012, October 26). The little-known US-Soviet confrontation during Yom Kippur War. Retrieved from https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10-26/little-known-us-soviet-confrontation-during-yom-kippur-war. 33 Butler, W. E. (1987). Innocent Passage and the 1982 Convention: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy. The American Journal of International Law, 81(2). doi: 10.2307/2202406 34 Cushman, J. H. (1988, February 13). 2 Soviet Warships Reportedly Bump U.S. Navy Vessels. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/13/us/2-soviet-warships-reportedly-bump-us-navy-vessels.html 20

Soviet states were a fact of life, however the Russian Black Sea fleet posed no real threat during the 1990’s. Western Europe’s primary interest in the region was as a supplier of energy. Russia had largely been financially crippled by the collapse of its system and it wasn’t until the United

States and NATO went against the wishes of Russia and conducted air operations in the Serbian-

Bosnian conflict that Russia began to reassert itself as a potential problem for the Black Sea region.

The military and intelligence resources of not only the United States, but much of the NATO alliance were largely devoted to the Middle East following the terror attacks of September 11,

2001. This was advantageous for Russia, as they were able to largely operate with impunity in the Black Sea region. In 2008, Russian forces backed the separatist movement in the South

Ossetia region in Georgia and have been training and supplying the military of the breakaway region since that time. This was the first major Russian incursion into the sovereign territory of another nation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While South Ossetia does not have access to the Black Sea, occupying a contested territory in Georgia does accomplish the goal of keeping

Georgia out of NATO, and served as a learning experience that would be leveraged later by the

Russian military.

The South Ossetia conflict was a win for Russia, however it highlighted some of their military weaknesses. The Russian Air Force performed poorly and lost several aircraft. Communications between the air and ground forces were strained at best, and the Russians were using mostly legacy Cold War era equipment, much of which was plagued by maintenance issues.35 The

Russians won largely because they were not fighting a military peer. The relatively small

Georgian military had even older equipment, was vastly outnumbered and had no allies to call on

35 Kofman , M. (2018, September 4). Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgian War Revisited. Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/russian-performance-in-the-russo-georgian-war-revisited/. 21 for assistance. Russian military operations in South Ossetia made it clear that military modernization was needed. They began the modernization process through a series of policy reforms, personnel reductions, and equipment modernization.

Russia’s military budget benefited greatly from the historically high oil prices between 2008-

2014.36 In 2012, Vladimir Putin penned an article in Foreign Policy magazine, explaining his rationale for military modernization to the world. Several of the weaknesses noted from the

South Ossetia conflict are directly mentioned as agenda items for modernization in the article.37

The collapse of the Soviet Union caused the Russian military to skip at least one modernization cycle of military hardware. For a nation attempting to engage in great power competition, an aged and incapable military seriously limits perceived status on the international stage. Military modernization however has come at the cost of shoring up social programs, most notably the pension system.38 In 2018, the Putin regime proposed changes to the retirement age which cause a great deal of backlash among the Russian people.39

The most recent cases of Russian military adventurism in the Black Sea are the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and subsequent frozen conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.

The annexation of Crimea has been denounced by most of the world, though no power has been willing commit military forces to do anything about it. While the international community recognizes Crimea as Ukrainian territory, the de facto status of the peninsula puts it in Russian territory. Russia and specific Russian citizens have been subjected to a variety of personal,

36 Historical Crude Oil Prices Table. (2019). Retrieved from https://inflationdata.com/articles/inflation-adjusted- prices/historical-crude-oil-prices-table/. 37 Putin, V. (2012, February 21). Being Strong. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/21/being-strong/. 38 The Moscow Times. (2014, December 30). Pensions and Military Spending Strangle Russia's Budget. Retrieved from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/12/30/pensions-and-military-spending-strangle-russias-budget- a42631. 39 Bennetts, M. (2018, August 29). Putin appeals to Russians to accept 'painful' pension changes. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/29/vladimir-putin-russia-pension-reforms-retirement.

22 economic, financial and diplomatic sanctions as a result of the country’s actions in Ukraine, however the benefit of holding Crimea has been worth dealing with the sanctions.40 Notably, the deputy commanders of the Russian Black Sea fleet were subjected to EU sanctions, freezing any assets held in the EU and imposing visa restrictions. These sanctions are meant to be punitive specifically to key players in the Russian operations and deliver a warning to other Russian officials that future actions that break the international norms will have personal consequences.

The annexation of Crimea and the Donbas conflict are now five years old, and a great deal of policy change in Russia, the United States and European Union, and Turkey have resulted from these actions. The contemporary security situation will be discussed in chapter 4.

40 Gutterman, I., Grojec, W., & Rfe/rl. (2018, September 19). A Timeline Of All Russia-Related Sanctions. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-sanctions-timeline/29477179.html. 23

Chapter 3: Diplomacy

The Straits Question

The Straits Question is a recurring motif of European diplomacy in the 19th and 20th centuries.

In simplest terms, it deals with allowing the passage of non-Black Sea state naval warships through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits. The Ottoman Empire, holding the coastal land on both sides of the straits, maintained the ability to close the straits for hundreds of years. Prior to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea which codifies the distance from a shoreline that is considered territorial waters, what was claimable by a nation-state was effectively the distance a canon could fire from the shore.41 Both the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits are fairly narrow, the Bosphorus being less than one half mile at its narrowest point. Even the early canons of medieval artillery could be fired with a high degree of accuracy at such a short distance. Thus, the Straits Question attempts to reconcile the concept of freedom of navigation on the high seas versus the de facto complete control over these narrow passages held by the Ottomans.

After the Western European powers largely lost interest in trade routes in the Black Sea following Da Gama’s voyage around Africa, the Straits became largely an issue needing to be resolved between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. The Straits Question is bookended by the

1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarii, which was the first real challenge to the absolute supremacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea, and the 1936 Montreux Convention of the Regime of

41 This equals approximately three miles from shore, and was the widely recognized, if not codified standard of territorial waters for many years. While it has been argued in the past that the cannon shot rule does not entirely account for this distance, it remains widely accepted as the precursor to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Kent, H. S. K. “The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 48, no. 4, 1954, pp. 537–553. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2195021. Even as canon technology improved over time to be able to fire a round further than three miles, the curvature of the earth makes approaching ships invisible from the shoreline at distances greater than 3 miles. This can be calculated by using the equation: s^2 = (r + h)^2 – r^2, in which r is the radius of the earth, and h is the height of one’s eyes. Using this equation, a 6-foot tall person would see the horizon at 2.9 miles. This 3-mile standard was widely adopted in international law. 24

Straits, which remains in effect today. A long series of treaties mostly between the Russian and

Ottoman Empires establish the narrative of Russian expansionism and Ottoman decline during this period. It wasn’t until the industrial revolution and the discovery of oil in the Caucasus region that Western Europe would again have a real interest in economic trade on the Black Sea.

While no Western power directly challenged Ottoman control over the Straits, they were able to apply pressures to the Sublime Porte to advance their own interests over time.42

Early Diplomacy / Pre-Montreux Convention

Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarii - 1774

The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji was a peace treaty that marked the end of the Russo-Turkish

War of 1768-1774. While several treaties over time have governed the Black Sea, for the purposes of this paper, this timeline starts with the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji. This treaty is chosen as the starting point because it has recognizable elements of modern international law and serves as a true starting point to highlight the struggle for control of the Black Sea between

Russia and the Turks.

Using the language of the time, the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji establishes not only peace between the Russian Empire and the Sublime Porte, but also a series of stipulations following this peace. It is important to note that Russia definitively defeated the Ottomans at the battle of

Kozludzha in modern day Bulgaria. As such, it was the Russian Empire that was dictating the terms of the treaty, and this is clear in reading the text. The treaty goes over a variety of articles and clauses that range from extradition of criminals to economic and trade clauses.43

42 “The Sublime Porte” is one of the names used for the Ottoman Empire, and is used interchangeably, as it is the most often used name in early treaties. 43 The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774). Retrieved from http://doc.histrf.ru/18/kyuchuk-kaynardzhiyskiy-mirnyy- dogovor-mezhdu-rossiey-i-turtsiey

Article Seven codified the Russian Empire as the official protector of the Christian people of the Ottoman world.44 The treaty also included a clause in Article Eight, which guaranteed a duty-free passage and right to visit the Holy Land for Russian citizens making a pilgrimage.

This clause is significant because its ramifications are still seen today in Jerusalem in the Russian compound which houses the Holy Trinity Church and Sergei’s Palace.45

Perhaps the most important portion of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji is Article Eleven, which establishes the freedom of maritime navigation of both parties within the Black Sea. It goes further to guarantee freedom of navigation between the Black and White (Mediterranean) seas, as well as a reciprocity agreement for port calls for trading. The treaty stipulates that both nations’ vessels shall enjoy the benefit of mutual assistance on the high seas that are enjoyed by other friendly parties. Article Eleven effectively established the same commercial privileges that modern maritime merchants enjoy in terms of passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, without specifically naming the straits.46

The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji also specified territorial boundaries which radically changed the balance of power in the Black Sea region from one of unquestioned Ottoman primacy to a one that effectively balanced the northern and southern shores of the sea. The treaty stipulated that Russia controlled the territory from the Bug river to the Dnieper river, though in exchange it returned territory that was captured in what is modern day Romania.

One of the most important parts of the treaty is Article Three, which effectively ends the

Ottoman Empire’s suzerainty over the Crimean Tatars and recognizes them as a free and

44 Ibid 45 The author visited Jerusalem from 5-9 February 2018 on government business and has first hand knowledge of the Russian compound in Jerusalem. 46 The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774). Retrieved from http://doc.histrf.ru/18/kyuchuk-kaynardzhiyskiy-mirnyy- dogovor-mezhdu-rossiey-i-turtsiey

26 independent people.47 This is significant because doing so effectively gave Russia the ability to conduct a variety of military and economic operations on the Crimean peninsula without necessitating a military response from the Ottoman Empire, as they would only have to deal with the Tatars, not the Ottomans. Even in modern times this status remains of strategic importance to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the Russians violated this article of the treaty in 1783 when Catherine the Great annexed the whole of the Crimean Peninsula for the Russian Empire, ending the Tatar Khanate. Annexing the Crimean Peninsula was a major cause of the Russo-

Turkish War of 1787-1792.

Treaty of Jassy - 1792

The Russo-Turkish War of 1787-1792 ended with the Treaty of Jassy (Iași). The war had started because the Russians had violated the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji, and the Ottomans had a desire to restore some of the former prestige and territorial holdings of their empire, while

Catherine the Great had intentions of not just conquering more territory on the Black Sea, but reestablishing the Byzantine empire in Constantinople. On the surface, reestablishing another empire at a strategic location may seem counterintuitive as a cogent foreign policy, however, it is important to remember that the Russians established themselves as the protectorate of Orthodox

Christendom. Reestablishing the seat of the Orthodox Church in Constantinople would have been in keeping with with this self-designated role and secured guaranteed Russian access to the

Bosphorus and Dardanelles in perpetuity. While both sides missed their goals in this war, the

Russians did advance their frontier to the Dniester river, while the Ottomans regained control over most of modern-day Romania.48

47 Ibid 48 The Treaty of Jassy (1792). Iasi. Retrieved from http://doc.histrf.ru/18/yasskiy-mirnyy-dogovor/ 27

Treaty of the Dardanelles – 1809

The Treaty of the Dardanelles was conducted between the Ottoman and British Empires, affirming that no warships of any power should be permitted to traverse the Turkish Straits. The

British were at this point still the preeminent naval power in the world, and this treaty effectively confined the Russian fleet to the Black Sea, meaning that Britain would not have to compete for naval primacy in the Mediterranean. While the treaty did confirm the trading and consular privileges of the British in Ottoman territories, it was more about security for both sides than economic concerns. Napoleon had begun his attempted conquest of Europe, which was concerning for both the British and the Ottomans. While at first glance it may appear that this treaty benefited the British far more than the Ottomans, there were secret provisions to the treaty which stated the British would militarily assist the Ottomans in the event that France declared war on the Sublime Porte.49

Treaty of Bucharest - 1812

In keeping with most of the peace treaties in the larger context of the Russo-Ottoman wars, the peace established by the Treaty of Jassy was relatively short lived. The two empires fought again beginning in 1806, with Russia supporting the Serbs in the Ottoman controlled Balkans who had begun rebelling against the Ottomans after centuries subjugation. This time the conflict would end with the Treaty of Bucharest in May of 1812. Keeping with their role as the

“protector of Christianity,” the Russians secured guarantees of amnesty and autonomy for the

Serbian Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. Furthermore, they gained commerce rights on the

Danube river, allowing them access to European markets that were previously unreachable.

49 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2019). Treaty of Çanak. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Canak. 28

In the larger context of history, the Russians perhaps could have won a larger victory during this campaign, but they were compelled to achieve peace with the Ottomans due to the larger geopolitical situation in Europe. Napoleon’s Grande Armée had conquered much of the

European continent and was marching east ward toward Russia. Russia had signed a secret agreement with both Britain and Sweden to counter Napoleon’s advances, and indeed

Napoleon’s army reached Russia’s western front in June of 1812.50 By establishing peace with the Ottomans, the Russians were able to free up military forces from their southern flank and divert them to the west. Despite Russia’s heavy losses in the Patriotic War of 1812, the strategic decision to end conflict with the Ottomans and have their military forces fighting on only one front was a key reason for their eventual victory over Napoleon’s army. If not for Napoleon’s push into Russia, it is likely that this conflict between the Russians and Ottomans would have ended differently.

Treaty of Edirne - 1828

The Russians and Ottomans enjoyed another brief period of unsteady peace for just over a decade before again going to war in 1828. This war was concluded with the Treaty of Edirne, another embarrassing defeat and loss of territory and prestige for the Ottomans. On the eastern shores of the Black Sea the Russian Empire secured their claim on Georgia. On the western shores, the borders moved from the Dniester River to the Prut river.51 This border terminated approximately at the modern-day town of Galați in Romania. Article Five of the treaty stipulated that while the Ottoman Empire would retain the principalities of Wallachia and Moldova as territorial holdings, these states were to be given full autonomy. The Romanian principalities

50 Palmer, A. (1974) Alexander I: Tsar of War and Peace London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 51 The Prut river is effectively the modern day border between Moldova and Romania. This territorial acquisition effectively put all of modern day Moldova in the hands of the Russian Empire. 29 were further granted protection from the Ottomans in a separate act as an addendum to the treaty.

This addendum stipulated that not only would the Ottomans grant the Romanian peoples full autonomy, it demanded that all Muslims move from the “left bank” or north side of the Danube to the non-contested southern side of the Danube.52

Underscoring the importance of the Black Sea as a strategic maritime hub for the Russian

Empire, Article Seven of the treaty guaranteed freedom of navigation through the Turkish straits.

Freedom of navigation was defined as not only passage through the straits without being stopped, but also without regard to size of vessel, cargo or ballast.53 It also stipulated that this was to be in both directions of travel, meaning that Russia had full rights to not only export goods into the Mediterranean, but also import goods on the return voyage without paying any duty or being subjected to inspection by the Ottomans.54 By 1812, this was essential for Russian trade and projection of maritime power. Freedom of navigation through the Bosphorus and

Dardanelles became a fixture of all future treaties regarding the Black Sea, effectively providing an answer to the Straits Question. Even today, Russia relies on freedom of navigation through the straits for both economic and military power.

Treaty of Hunkar Iskelsi – 1833

Due to internal Ottoman fighting, Sultan Mahmud II requested military assistance from the major European powers in quelling the insurgent pasha of Egypt, Muhammad Ali. Britain,

France and Austria all declined to send assistance. Russia, despite the history of fighting between the two empires, was willing to send military assistance to the sultan. The Treaty of

52 The Treaty of Erdine (1828). Retrieved from http://doc.histrf.ru/19/adrianopolskiy-mirnyy-dogovor-mezhdu- rossiey-i-turtsiey/ 53 ‘Ballast’ is the term used in the treaty, but a modern equivalent for the meaning of this term in the context of the treaty is ‘displacement.’ 54 The Treaty of Erdine (1828). Retrieved from http://doc.histrf.ru/19/adrianopolskiy-mirnyy-dogovor-mezhdu- rossiey-i-turtsiey/ 30

Hunkar Iskelsi was effectively payment for the Russian military aid. This was an eight-year peace agreement, which closed the Dardanelles to any foreign navy vessel except those belonging to Russia. The treaty drew the ire of the European powers, especially Britain, who had worked to close the straits to Russian naval vessels 24 years earlier in the 1809 Treaty of the

Dardanelles. Because of the provision allowing the Russian navy the right of passage through the Turkish Straits, which was a challenge to the status quo in the Mediterranean, the major powers of Europe came together in 1841 to address the Straits Question again in a multilateral format.

London Straits Convention – 1841

Because of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent rise of the Russian Empire, the

Straits Question had by the early 1840s for the first time become a multinational concern.55

While the great powers of Europe had long abandoned any real interest in the affairs of the Black

Sea, they were firm about keeping the Russian Empire from expanding into the Mediterranean.

The London Straits Convention closed the Straits to all warships once again, returning the status quo of the “Ancient Ottoman Rule” of the straits. Because of this diplomatic defeat, Russian began to rethink their strategy for continued expansion, considering that free passage of naval vessels through the Straits is key to the success of any Russian military power projection outside of the Black Sea.

Treaty of Paris - 1856

The next major conflict in the region was the Crimean War of 1853-1856. This conflict drew in the British Empire, French Empire and Kingdom of Sardinia. The European powers joined the side of the Ottomans, not out of any great concern for the Ottomans, but because Russian

55 Esmer, A. S. (1947). The Straits: Crux of World Politics. Foreign Affairs, 25(2). doi: 10.2307/20030040 31 expansion had upset the balance of power to the point that it had become a problem for the

Europeans. The Crimean War ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and was a major setback to

Russian expansionism in the Black Sea. The strategic Crimean port city of Sevastopol, headquarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet, had been captured by the Allied powers, and was returned to the Russians with extremely punitive conditions. Article Eleven declared the entirety of the Black Sea to be neutral, barring not only warships of foreign powers from transiting the

Straits, but also any naval vessels from conducting operations in the Black Sea, with minor exceptions to what amounted to coast guard operations. Article Thirteen further stipulated that because there were to be no naval vessels of any nation on the Black Sea, the Russians were prohibited from establishing garrisons on the shores of the Black Sea, as they would “have no purpose.”56 The provisions of the Treaty of Paris regarding the Black Sea effectively remained in effect until the Russian Empire broke the treaty by rebuilding their Black Sea fleet in 1870.

Clearly the Black Sea fleet was of such strategic importance to Russia that they choose to break the treaty as soon as they felt strong enough to challenge it.

Treaty of Lausanne – 1923

The Treaty of Lausanne was meant to answer the lingering questions preventing peace following World War I. While Section I of the treaty defines the new borders between the new state of Turkey, and its neighbors, Section II and the separate convention “regarding the regime of straits” is specifically about the status of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits. The treaty recognizes the principle of freedom of navigation through the Straits, allowing for commercial trade, and also stipulating that all nations have the right to send warships through the Straits, provided the passage is conducted during a time of peace. Annex Two of the Lausanne

56 The Treaty of Paris (1856). Retrieved from http://doc.histrf.ru/19/parizhskiy-traktat/ 32 convention did however limit the amount of tonnage to 10,000 per vessel and stipulated that the total amount of naval power a foreign power can send into the Black Sea must not exceed the most powerful fleet of a Black Sea riparian state.

This treaty was a major blow to Turkey’s power. It diplomatically canceled out their control of the Straits, in terms of right of passage of naval vessels of all foreign powers, but it went further. Article Six stipulated that Turkey must demilitarize the coastal areas of the Straits, applying strict limitations to any firepower that could be installed in the demilitarized zone.

Article Eight allowed only a token garrison at Constantinople, which was still the capital of

Turkey at the time of the treaty.57

The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits

Turkey became upset with the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne which forbade the militarization of the straits. The Turks had watched international affairs following World War I devolve to the point that they could justify challenging the terms of the treaty. Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, and Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935.58 To the Turks, these incidents, which were flagrantly against international norms, showed an alarming reversal in the trend of disarmament following what American president Woodrow Wilson called the “war to end all wars.” Turkey was also greatly concerned that the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, who had guaranteed the security of the straits, would not be able to uphold that guarantee.

The Turkish government sent an official diplomatic note to all of the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne on April, 10th 1936, employing the concept of rebus ric stantibus.59 This concept is

57 Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne (1923). Lausanne. Retrieved from https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne 58 Joyner, C. (2005). International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 59 Vali, F.A. (1972) The Turkish Straits and NATO. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press

33 a legal doctrine in the framework of international law which allows for the nullification of a treaty due to a fundamental change in the circumstances surrounding the original agreement.60

To the Turks, the fundamental change of circumstances was the fact that the high contracting parties had failed to demonstrate intentions of fulfilling their obligations to international peace in not responding to German and Italian aggression.

All of the signatories of Lausanne, with the exception of Italy, agreed to new negotiations regarding the status of the Straits. They convened a conference in the Swiss town of Montreux on June 22, 1936. The negotiations took place in the Montreux Palace, a luxury hotel built in

1906 and still in operation today under the name Fairmont Le Montreux Palace. The hotel has a storied history as a luxury resort, site of diplomatic negotiations and a hospital during both

World Wars I and II. Today there is a plaque commemorating the Montreux Convention in one of the ballrooms of the hotel.61 The negotiations lasted just under a month, with a new treaty being signed on July 20th, 1936.

Each state had their own interests in these negotiations, some more self-serving than others.

When Great Britain signed the Treaty of Lausanne, it represented the British Empire, which had since that time become the Commonwealth. As such, all of the ensuing states were technically subject to the terms of Lausanne.62 Only Australia sent a representative to Montreux. Canada,

New Zealand, India and Ireland all sent notice that they had no objections to revisions to the

Treaty of Lausanne. Australia was the outlier because they were and are a naval power, but more importantly, they had shed a fair amount of blood and treasure attempting to capture the

60 Bederman, D & Keitner, C. (2016). International Law Frameworks. St. Paul, MN: LEG, Inc. 61 Bradley, S. (2014). Montreux prepares for new diplomatic role. Retrieved from https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Syria-peace-talks_montreux-prepares-for-new-diplomatic-role/37740510 62 The Commonwealth States subject to the terms of Lausanne as former parts of the British Empire were Australia, Canada Ireland, India and New Zealand

Dardanelles during the Battle of Gallipoli during World War I, and they considered revision to this treaty to be of national interest, at least symbolically.63

Bulgaria and Romania (spelled ‘Roumania’ in documents at the time according to international spelling conventions) had interest in revisions as they are Black Sea riparian states.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had, via its Black Sea fleet, naval primacy in the Black Sea. At this time, the USSR included both Ukraine and Georgia and therefore accounts for the balance of Black Sea riparian states in the negotiations at Montreux. For the

USSR, coming to the negotiating table was an easy decision, as they wanted to ensure that their long-standing strategic interest of a warm water port with access to the Mediterranean was maintained.

Prior to World War II, the French imported a sizable amount of oil from the then Soviet port of Batumi (present day Georgia) and maintained an interest in ensuring that oil continued to flow.64 Greece, as a signatory of Lausanne and holding both de facto and de jure control over most of the Aegean Sea also had a vested interest in ensuring her interests were represented in any new negotiations, as any maritime traffic entering or exiting the straits would pass through

Greek waters. Yugoslavia had trade considerations in the Black Sea, and therefore an interest in ensuring maritime access was maintained in any new negotiations. Finally, Japan was present at the negotiations and a signatory to the Montreux Convention, though they had no strategic interest in the Black Sea at the time, only in clarifying what they considered to be their role in any sort of agreement. Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations officially in 1935 after

63 Hart, P. (2014). Gallipoli. Oxford: Oxford University Press 64 Vali, F. (1972). The Turkish Straits and NATO. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

35 having given notice in 1933 and wanted to articulate that they would not be bound by any agreements to guarantee security.65

The Turks brought a proposed draft of a new treaty to Montreux, which served as the starting point for negotiations. The plenary conference debated through June 25th, then adjourned to allow time for a technical committee of experts, including naval experts to work out various details. The British submitted a counterproposal to the original Turkish draft, and it was agreed that each of the articles were to be individually debated. The largest points of contention regarded warships, most especially those of non-Black Sea states. 66 At the time of signing, only

Japan presented formal reservations to the treaty, again emphasizing that their signing the treaty in no way modified their withdrawal from the League of Nations.67

The Montreux Convention is separated into five sections, 29 articles, and four annexes. The treaty starts off immediately recognizing and affirming the “principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits”68 This principle guides the framework of the treaty and reflects the values and interests of most of the signatory states. Sections One and Two provide most of the details and enforceable rules of the treaty. While not formally put forth during the negotiations, the Soviets considered the Black Sea a mare clausum or closed sea,69 as it doesn’t lead to further bodies of water. The USSR was not opposed to maritime trade on the Black Sea, but Soviet intent was to cut off the Black Sea to all but Soviet warships.70 The convention does indeed limit the amount of naval power non-Black Sea states may send through the Straits and

65 Burkman, T. (2008). Japan’s and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. 66 Vali, F. (1972). The Turkish Straits and NATO. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. 67 League of Nations, Treaty Series (1937). Treaties and International Engagements registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. (1936-1937 ed., Vol. CLXXIII, Sea. 4015, pages 215-241). 68 Ibid 69 Vali, F. (1972). The Turkish Straits and NATO. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. 70 Howard, H. (1936). The Straits after the Montreux Conference. Foreign Affairs, 15(1), pages 199-202. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/20030790. 36 into the Black Sea, but the Soviet aim of completely closing off the Black Sea to foreign navies was not achieved.

Section One of the treaty deals with merchant vessels and spells out rules for transit in times of peace and times of war. This section notes that it applies to all vessels not covered in Section

Two of the treaty. In general terms, merchant vessels sailing under any flag, carrying any cargo, have complete freedom of transit. The Turkish government can enact laws to provide for what amount to health and welfare checks at the entrances to the straits, to ensure foreign vessels are not carrying diseases which could spread to land in the event of a port call. Section One also allows Turkey to restrict access to the straits for merchant vessels who in a time of war, may be carrying supplies destined for an enemy of Turkey. That is to say that hypothetically if Turkey and the USSR were at war, Turkey would have the right to refuse the right of transit through the straits to a Brazilian flagged vessel if it were transporting supplies to the port at Sevastopol.

Finally, Turkey in granted the right to restrict the specific route of vessels and make pilotage obligatory if it feels it is under imminent danger or threat of war.71

Section Two covers “vessels of war,” and as mentioned above, Russia did not get the mare clausum it hoped for. This section of the treaty restricts non-Black Sea states from amassing any significant amount of naval combat power in the Black Sea, effectively ensuring Soviet (or

Russian) primacy in the Black Sea. The Black Sea states enjoy special status in terms of naval transit rights, as their ships are not subject to the same restrictions that the larger international community is.72 In the wake of World War I, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania have never been

71 League of Nations, Treaty Series (1937). Treaties and International Engagements registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. (1936-1937 ed., Vol. CLXXIII, Sea. 4015, pages 215-241). 72 Rozakis, C. & Stagkos, P. (1987). The Turkish Straits. Dordrecht (the Netherlands): M. Nijohff. 37 willing, nor able to afford fielding a navy to rival the USSR / Russia, therefore this section of the treaty inherently benefits the Russians.

Because the Montreux Convention was completed in 1936, some of the language in Section

Two is not necessarily applicable to modern navies, but it demonstrates a great deal of foresight.

Article 12 stipulates that Black Sea states have the right to send submarines that were built or purchased outside the Black Sea through the Straits; however, they must travel on the surface and only during daylight. In practice this article has been interpreted to mean that only Black

Sea states are allowed to send submarines into the Black Sea, meaning that only Russia and

Turkey operate submarines in the Black Sea.73 Section Two further specifies the amount of foreign naval power that may transit the Straits and be in the Black Sea at any given time in terms of tonnage.74 All non-Black Sea navies are limited to 15,000 tons in the Straits at one time, and a total of 30,000 tons in the Black Sea. For reference, a modern United States

Zumwalt class destroyer is 14,564 tons, and most frigate class ships are approximately 4000 tons. Foreign navies also are prohibited from having any particular vessel in the Black Sea for longer than twenty-one days, and they must give Turkey a minimum of eight days notice if they wish to send a warship through the Straits.75 The tonnage restriction is important in modern terms because aircraft carriers, the pinnacle of naval power, are over 100,000 tons, and are therefore restricted from entering the Black Sea.

73 The Romanian Navy has one Soviet Kilo-Class submarine called Delfinul (The Dolphin) but it needs repairs and is kept in reserve status at the port in Constanța. 74 Tonnage as it applies in naval terms refers to the available space within a vessel. One determines tonnage by dividing the cubic feet of the closed spaces in a vessel by 100. Effectively, 100 cubic feet equals 1 vessel ton. Net tonnage is then determined by subtracting certain areas of a vessel that are considered to be non-usable spaces. This is explained in detail in the United States Coast Guard publication: Simplified Measurement Tonnage Guide 1. Eareckson, P. (2009). Simplified Measurement Tonnage Guide 1. (United States of America, U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Safety Center). 75 League of Nations, Treaty Series (1937). Treaties and International Engagements registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. (1936-1937 ed., Vol. CLXXIII, Sea. 4015, pages 215-241). 38

Section Three includes provisions for freedom of overflight for civil aircraft to transit between the Mediterranean and Black Seas, stating that Turkey must provide an air corridor if it is determined that flight directly over the Straits is prohibited. Because this was written in the infancy of commercial flight, this section is not overly detailed and objectively not particularly applicable today. Sections Four and Five give the general and final provisions of the treaty. Of note is Article Twenty-Eight, which states that the treaty shall remain in force for twenty years.

It further stipulates that if two years prior to the expiration of the treaty, no party has given notice of denunciation, the treaty will remain in force indefinitely until two years after such notice is given.76 The treaty has remained in force since signing as none of the signatories have ever given notice of denunciation. It also stipulates the right of the parties to petition every five years for amendments to the treaty, which would require new negotiations, but not invalidate the treaty.

The Montreux Convention is a landmark treaty in international law for a variety of reasons.

Notably it was the first treaty enacted following World War I through purely peaceful means.77

It has also remained unchallenged to this day, with none of the signatories willing to upset the status quo. Because of the geographic situation, in that Turkey controls both the east and west sides of the Straits, all nations, most notably the United States as the preeminent global naval power, are effectively bound by the terms of the treaty, even if they are not signatories of it. The

Montreux Convention provides the other bookend to answering the Straits Question.

76 Ibid 77 Howard, H. (1936). The Straits after the Montreux Conference. Foreign Affairs, 15(1), pages 199-202. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/20030790. 39

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, also known as the law of the sea treaty, was completed in 1982, though has been in full effect only since 1994. While this treaty does not specifically apply to the Black Sea or Turkish Straits, and does not supersede the

Montreux Convention’s specific provisions, it does offer a global common understanding of territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and the rights and responsibilities of various parties in terms of transiting the world’s waterways. The key takeaways from the law of the sea treaty as it relates to the Black Sea are the definition of territorial waters, which are explained in Article

Three as being not more than 12 miles from the shore. The other provision is the delineation of the exclusive economic zone, covered by Article Fifty-Seven, which defines the exclusive economic zone as being not more than 200 miles out from the established shoreline.78

Figure 4: Black Sea EEZ Map (Edited). Source: Black Sea EEZ Map. (2014). Retrieved from https://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/2014/03/16/the-first-target-of-putins-russia-is-not-only- crimea-but-all-eastern-and-southern-ukraine/

78 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 40

While there are certain stipulations regarding what constitutes the shoreline and how islands and other unique terrain may affect both territorial waters and economic exclusion zones, the rule of

12 and 200 is adequate to how the Black Sea is affected. Because the Black Sea is shared by seven littoral states and is in many places less than 200 miles from north to south, the law of the sea treaty explains how economic exclusion zones will be split between the various nations. The

Exclusive Economic Zone map in figure 4 shows the borders as recognized internationally, not accounting for the Russian annexation of Crimea 2014. Of note, if Russia’s claim on Crimea were to be internationally recognized, they would gain nearly all of the Ukraine’s Exclusive

Economic Zone on the Black Sea. This would also give Russia the right to conduct naval patrols of this area and force out fishing boats or other vessels looking to exploit resources from the

Black Sea.

Chapter 4: Security

Despite the Black Sea being a geographically closed sea, security concerns stemming from this body of water are both regional and global. Chapters 2 and 3 have described security concerns over time, and the intent of this chapter is to remain fully in the contemporary environment. In the modern era of great power competition, security concerns are not limited solely to the realm of the military. The United States’ paradigm for considering national power has for a long time been explained by the acronym D.I.M.E., which stands for Diplomatic,

Informational, Military and Economic. In the Black Sea region, all instruments of national power are in play for the major powers.79 While physical, military concerns are the most obvious focus area, economic and informational power should not be underestimated in the region.

Russian Perspective

While the Russians have long had access to the global oceans via the Baltic Sea and Arctic

Ocean, these are cold water ports, that present a variety of technical challenges during the winter months. The formation of ice in winter renders cold water ports useless for large periods of the year, and while modern ice-cutting vessels can mitigate this to some extent, effective icebreaker technology wasn’t available until nearly the turn of the 20th century. Largely out of necessity, the Russian Empire was the first to build and operate a viable icebreaker, named the Yermak in

1897.80 While icebreakers have developed and improved over time, allowing maritime access to the polar regions of the world, even today, they are expensive to operate and maintain, and are simply not a substitute for warm water port access.

79 The Department of Defense (2018). Joint Doctrine Note Strategy 1-18 80 Russian Presidential Library (2018). The first ice break in the world “Yermak” was commissioned. Retrieved from https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619672 42

The previous sections of this paper have articulated the importance of warm water ports to the

Russians over the last several centuries. Their necessity remains in the contemporary environment and will remain for the foreseeable future. In terms of naval operations, Russia places the highest priority on two ports. The first is Sevastopol, which the Russians and Soviets have fought to control for hundreds of years. Sevastopol has been the headquarters of the Black

Sea fleet for nearly 250 years. The second essential Black Sea port is Novorossiysk, which has the benefit of being firmly inside internationally recognized Russian territory, and though it is smaller and less capable of supporting an entire naval fleet, it is considered to be the auxiliary base of the Black Sea fleet. Novorossiysk is far more important as an economic port, from which ships depart to export Russian oil and grain to foreign markets.81

The Russian Federation placed such great importance in their strategic naval port in

Sevastopol that in 1997, they signed a twenty-year lease agreement with Ukraine to continue to base their Black Sea fleet at this Crimean port. Sevastopol is strategically important not only in terms of the well-established infrastructure supporting the Black Sea fleet, but also the symbolic value of the location, and deep history of being a place that many Russians fought and died in several wars to protect. The Russians repeatedly challenged the patience of the Ukrainians between the signing of this agreement and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The 2008 Russian incursion into Georgia, who are close allies of Ukraine, included naval support from the Russian

Black Sea fleet operating out of Sevastopol, which gave the appearance of an attack being launched from Ukrainian territory on an ally of Ukraine. This would be akin to North Korea

81 Clingendael International Energy Programme. (n.d.). Russia - Europe: the liquid relationship often overlooked. Retrieved from http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/files.cfm?event=files.download&ui=9C1E06F0-5254-00CF- FD03A39927F34043. 43 partially holding South Korea responsible if the United States were to launch an attack on North

Korea from South Korean territory.

Following the Russian incursion in Georgia in 2008, then Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia

Tymoshenko made it clear in the press that Ukraine would not consider renewing the lease of the port upon its expiration in 2017.82 Two years later in 2010, with energy prices rising significantly, Russia experimented with cutting off natural gas supply to Ukraine entirely, and under the new political leadership of Viktor Yanukovych, the Russians and Ukrainians reached an agreement to extend the lease on the Sevastopol naval base for an additional 25 years.83

Yanukovych was far more sympathetic to Russia than the preceding Ukrainian government, and

Russia took advantage of this opportunity to secure the port of Sevastopol. Russia had flexed its economic instrument of national power and achieved a strategic end without the use of military power. Cutting off Russian natural gas to Ukraine as a power play to force a deal meant that several European Union countries that relied on the transit of natural gas through Ukrainian pipeline connections were also left without energy. In doing so, angered Europe and involved additional countries in what may have otherwise remained a bilateral dispute.

The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 served Russian interests from a variety of perspectives. Certainly, since the time Empress Catherine the Great first annexed Crimea, it has been highly prized territory for the Russians. Strategic geographic positioning aside, the

Crimean Peninsula is an aesthetically beautiful land mass, and during the Soviet era many

Russian-born members of the Soviet military retired to Crimea. Over the life of the Soviet

82 Unian. (2008, September 24). No Russian fleet in Ukraine beyond 2017 -Ukrainian PM. Retrieved from https://www.unian.info/society/148224-no-russian-fleet-in-ukraine-beyond-2017-ukrainian-pm.html 83 Levy, C.J. (21 April 2010). The New York Times. Ukraine Woos Russia With Lease Deal. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/world/europe/22ukraine.html

Union, this practice bolstered an already substantial ethnic Russian population in Crimea, which offered an excuse to Putin to take the territory under the guise of offering protection to ethnically

Russian people.84 This ethnic gambit fails to pass the legitimacy test in terms of being an internationally recognized action, despite the Russian government using it as justification for their actions.85

The second way of explaining Russia’s annexation of Crimea is as an aggressive move to counter the possible ramification of Viktor Yanukovych having been unexpectedly ousted from power. Yanukovych had put a stop to Ukraine’s NATO Membership Action Plan, which had been initiated in 2008. Russia could not tolerate Ukraine joining NATO for many reasons, but among them may have been a fear that once their lease on Sevastopol ran out, there would be no chance of renewal. Even if the Russians could overcome anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine and convince the Ukrainian government to agree to a new lease on Sevastopol, the NATO alliance would likely forbid a Russian military base within the territory of an alliance member.

A NATO-aligned Ukraine would mean that nearly the whole of European Russia would be effectively surrounded to the west and south by a military alliance effectively designed to contain and counter the Kremlin. Any new western leaning Ukrainian leadership replacing Yanukovych would naturally want to resume talks to join NATO. By annexing Crimea, Russia created a conflict that not only served the purpose of securing their strategic port at Sevastopol, but also effectively prevented Ukraine from joining NATO. If Ukraine was a NATO member, Russia’s presence in Crimea would constitute a justification to invoke Article Five of the NATO treaty,

84 Treisman, D. (2016). Why Putin Took Crimea. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-russian-president-putin-took-crimea-from-ukraine. 85 Balouziyeh, J. (2014, April 14). Russia's Annexation of Crimea: An Analysis under the Principles of Jus ad Bellum. Retrieved from https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-law- blog/posts/russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-an-analysis-under-the-principles-of-jus-ad-bellum. B 45 calling all members to join a fight against Russia. Allowing Ukraine to join NATO under these conditions would effectively mean that the alliance would be in a hot war with Russia, which is not something any of the member states want.

Russia already had a strong cultural presence in Crimea, but they secured their hold on

Crimea by offering economic and development incentives to the population on the peninsula. A key factor to maintaining local support is bolstering the pensions of the older population.86

Almost immediately following the annexation of Crimea, plans for the Crimean Bridge, or Kerch

Strait Bridge were developed. By May 2015, construction on the bridge began and it was opened in 2018 with Vladimir Putin leading a convoy of trucks across the bridge.87 The bridge secures

Russia’s hold on Crimea by bypassing any need to ship goods through Ukrainian territory, which prevents Kiev from choking off the peninsula logistically.

The bridge also creates the ability to close the Kerch Strait as evidenced by the 2018 Kerch

Strait incident. In that action, Russia intercepted and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels, claiming they had violated Russian territorial waters off the coast of Crimea. Considering that

Crimea is internationally recognized as belonging to Ukraine, the waters within twelve miles from the shore are legally Ukrainian territorial waters. The Ukrainian vessels were attempting to enter the Sea of Azov, but the Russians placed a tanker under the Kerch Strait bridge, effectively blocking passage.88 The Russians went on to hold the Ukrainian sailors, and as of the writing of

86 Kramer, A. E. (2014, March 31). Russia Raises Some Salaries and Pensions for Crimeans. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/europe/russia-raises-pensions-for-crimeans.html. l 87 Rfe/rl. (2018, May 15). Putin Officially Opens Massive Bridge Linking Crimea To Russia. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/aerial-images-show-extent-of-kerch-strait-bridge-construction-updated/28675651.html. 88 BBC. (2018, November 26). Russia-Ukraine tensions rise after Kerch Strait ship capture. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46340283.

46 this paper, have yet to release them.89 For their part, Ukraine seized the Russian-flagged tanker vessel that blocked passage under the Kerch Strait bridge while it made a port call in Izmail on the Danube river, but unlike the Russians, released its crew to return to Russia.90

Though the international community does not recognize Russia’s claim on Crimea, the reality is that Ukraine has no means to control the peninsula, and no real diplomatic recourse to convince the Russians to leave. This creates a de facto border that places Crimea within Russian territory. Shortly after annexing Crimea, the Russian Navy would again use Sevastopol as a launch for its military operations, this time in Syria. However continued operations still require on the ability of the Russian Navy to transit the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits.

The Russian Navy has developed a history of pushing the borders of what is acceptable while transiting the straits. While they do not flagrantly break the Montreux Convention, they have been known to conduct themselves with needless aggression. For example, Russia began providing Bashir Al-Assad financial and material support in 2011. As the Syrian civil war escalated and ISIS became a serious challenge to Assad’s hold on the country, Russia committed combat forces to support Assad in 2015. At the time, Turkey suggested they may invoke Article

Twenty-One of the Montreux Convention and close the Straits to Russian forces. Article

Twenty-One states that if Turkey considers itself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, they may close the Straits to a belligerent navy.91

89 Rfe/rl. (2019, August 30). Ukrainian President Denies Prisoner Swap With Russia Completed, Says Negotiations Ongoing. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/report-ukrainian-sailors-released-in-prisoner-swap-with- russia/30137334.html. 90 Macfarquhar, N. (2019, July 25). Ukraine Seizes Russian Tanker That It Says Blockaded a Disputed Strait. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tanker.html. 91 League of Nations, Treaty Series (1937). Treaties and International Engagements registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. (1936-1937 ed., Vol. CLXXIII, Sea. 4015, pages 215-241).

In response to this suggestion, Russian ships that transited the Straits under otherwise legal conditions were observed carrying shoulder fired missile launchers on the deck of their vessels while transiting the Bosphorus. This incident was concerning enough to the citizens of Istanbul that the Turkish foreign minister summoned the Russian ambassador to lodge a formal complaint over the conduct of the Russian sailors.92 This unnecessary show of aggression served to remind

Turkey that Russia was not only taking an opposing side in the Syrian conflict, but that they were going to rub it in Turkey’s face. This incident followed Turkey shooting down a Russian fighter jet which Turkey claimed had violated its airspace in south-western Turkey while it was conducting combat operations in support of Al-Assad in north-western Syria.93 These rising tensions between Turkey and Russia echo the long history of conflict between the two nations.

Issues such as the status of the Crimean Peninsula, keeping Ukraine out of NATO, and the continued right of transit through the Turkish Straits for the purposes of projecting military power would suggest that Russian security concerns in the Black Sea are almost entirely reserved to the realm of military power. However, there are wider ramifications to their actions along the entire scope of national power. For example, if the annexation of Crimea is ever recognized by the international community, the Russian Federation would be free to claim both territorial waters and an economic exclusion zone on the Black Sea that would effectively choke off the rest of the riparian states. Figure 1 (in the introduction section of this paper) shows how not only the land borders change, but also the sea borders. In keeping with the U.N. Convention on the

Law of the Sea, securing Crimea as an internationally recognized border would grant Russia the

92 Pitel, Laura (2016, March 05). Russian warships sailing through Bosphorus strait frightens Turkey. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/Russian-warships-and-naval-assets-sailing-through- Bosphorus-strait-has-turkey-frightened-a6914796.html. 93 Nissenbaum, D., Peker, E., & Marson, J. (2015, November 25). Turkey Shoots Down Russian Military Jet. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-shoots-down-jet-near-syria-border-1448356509. 48 unchallenged right of resource exploitation within an economic exclusion zone that rivals

Turkey’s claim on the southern half of the Black Sea. This means not only oil exploitation, but also fishing rights, both of which would be accompanied by greater numbers of Russian naval patrols to protect their national economic assets.

Curiously, the unclassified version of the 2015 Russian National Security Strategy fails to mention the Black Sea even once, despite actions which lead one to believe that the Sea is a central tenet of their national security. Objectively this document is released for global consumption and reads in a way that lets the rest of the world know where certain priorities are, and it pays lip service to upholding international law. The United States’ unclassified version of its National Security Strategy, while formatted differently, reads similarly from a geopolitical point of view, effectively letting the world know the what the strategic interests of the nation are.

While unavailable for obvious reasons to international researchers and even much of the Russian academic community, it seems unlikely that the classified version of the Russian National

Security Strategy would fail to offer guidance on the Black Sea.

Turkish Perspective

Turkey’s security concerns on the Black Sea today would seem to be limited largely to the

Bosphorus and Dardanelles, at least from a military perspective. While the Turkish navy does patrol the Black Sea largely to protect their economic interests, the Turks have no need for absolute control over the Black Sea as the Ottoman Empire historically did. Furthermore, current Turkish security concerns are largely centered around its southern border with Syria and

Iraq. The Turks have the problem of not only terrorists from ISIS and the Kurdish PKK and

YPG, but Turkey also has borne the burden of massive migrant and refugee waves coming out of

Syria. The migrant crisis caused by the Syrian civil war and ISIS was only exacerbated by

Russia’s involvement in Syria, which arguably lengthened the conflict, as Bashir Al-Assad may have been defeated long ago without their help.

Curiously, although the migrant crisis has been a financial and security burden for Turkey, it has also presented them with opportunity. Turkish President Erdogan has used the fact that his country has accepted a large number of migrants and refugees as a way to shield his actions from criticism from the West. As recently as October of 2019, Erdogan has threatened to release millions of refugees into Europe should European governments criticize or take any punitive actions against Turkey over their military offensive into Syria.94 Erdogan has used the migrant crisis consistently since it began to get favorable treatment or financial aid from the international community, specifically the EU, who are most threatened by the thought of releasing millions of migrants.95

The fact that so much of Turkey’s national security efforts has been focused on their southern border has meant that their attention has not necessarily been focused on the Black Sea. This has allowed Russia to largely operate with impunity, because Turkey is the only riparian state with a navy large enough to offer a meaningful counter force to the Russian Black Sea fleet.

Additionally, Erdogan has internal security concerns. The failed 2016 coup d’état attempt to oust Erdogan has had ripple effects for Turkish domestic and foreign policy. Since the coup attempt, Turkish policy toward Russia has softened in many ways. The most obvious example is the Turkish purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense missile system. Erdogan explains this purchase as an alternative to the Patriot missile system, which is fully compatible with

94 Turak, N. (2019, October 10). Turkey's Erdogan threatens to release millions of refugees into Europe over criticism of Syria offensive. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/10/turkeys-erdogan-threatens-release- of-refugees-to-europe-over-syria-criticism.html. 95 Beesley, A. (2016, November 25). Erdogan threatens to let 3m refugees into Europe. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/c5197e60-b2fc-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0. 50

LINK-16 tactical data network used by NATO, arguing that the United States did not offer an adequate deal and thus he had to look elsewhere. This has been disputed by the United States which has on many occasions offered up the Patriot system as an option. The most likely reason for the S-400 purchase is that following criticism for his handling of the coup attempt, Erdogan fears potential U.S. control of the Patriot system. Not wanting to trust the U.S. government,

Erdogan may expect that the United States could simply turn off the system in the event of another coup attempt if they wanted him removed from power.96

The concerns over the purchase and operation of the Russian S-400 has led to Turkey being effectively removed from the F35 fighter program. From the time that Turkey announced that it was exploring the purchase of the S-400, the United States and NATO made it clear that operating the Russian system was incompatible with the F35 program, as the Russians would have a direct line of intelligence through the system, which could then be used to exploit any weaknesses in the F35’s stealth ability. While the S-400 is an incredibly capable air defense system, it currently can be destroyed by an F35 before it can detect an F35’s presence. Turkey received their first shipment of S-400 systems in mid-2019.97 Apparently they chose this path as more secure despite the continued threat of expulsion from the F35 program and warnings from both the United States and NATO that operating the S-400 would damage the integrity of the alliance.

Turkey is willing to gamble with their standing in the eyes of the international community in order to achieve their goals because they know they are needed by each of the major players.

96 Whitmore, B., Hodges, B., & Jensen, D. N. (2019, September 20). The Power Vertical Podcast. An Allied Sea. Retrieved from https://www.cepa.org/an-allied-sea 97 Fahim, K., DeYoung, K., & Ferris-Rotman , A. (2019, July 12). Turkey takes first shipment of Russian S-400 air- defense system in defiance of U.S. and NATO warnings. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkey-takes-first-shipment-of-russian-s-400-air-defense- system-in-defiance-of-us-and-nato-warnings/2019/07/12/d9f446c2-a00b-11e9-83e3-45fded8e8d2e_story.html. 51

Russia is happy to provide military hardware to the Turks because it solidifies their relationship in terms of continued access through the Straits. The Russians won’t put up too much of a challenge to what the Turks want to do because they simply cannot lose their access. Even with the recent Turkish incursion into northern Syria, the Russians will at best issue words of concern, but would never directly challenge the Turkish military, even to defend their ally Assad. Turkey is also willing to test the limits of the NATO alliance and their relationship with the United

States. The Turks believe that the joint airbase at Incirlik is so valuable to the United States’ foreign policy that it would be unlikely that the United States would jeopardize their continued presence there by cutting Turkey out of the F35 program.98

This assumption has been challenged in recent years, with Turkey pushing the limits of the patience of the United States. While the Incirlik airbase is indeed important, the reality is that the base does not hold an equivalent level importance that a base like Sevastopol holds for the

Russians. Similar to threatening to cut off access to the Turkish Straits to the Russians, Turkey has used access to Incirlik as a pressure point for negotiations with the United States.99 This tactic may however prove to be too much of a gamble as the United States does have other regional options for air bases. U.S. air power can be projected from other locations in the Middle

East, or other locations within the Black Sea region such as Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base in

Romania, or Vaziani Military Base in Georgia. Both countries have expressed a desire for deeper bilateral military cooperation with the United States. Romania has been eager to host a permanent U.S. military base on their territory as it would be viewed as a major boost to their

98 Johnson, K., & Gramer, R. (2019, July 19). Who Lost Turkey? Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/19/who-lost-turkey-middle-east-s-400-missile-deal-russia-syria-iraq-kurdish- united-states-nato-alliance-partners-allies-adversaries/. 99 Pawlyk, O. (2019, July 23). Turkey Hints at Cutting Off Access to Incirlik if US Is 'Hostile' over S-400 Purchase. Retrieved from https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/07/23/turkey-hints-cutting-access-incirlik-if-us-hostile- over-s-400-purchase.html.

52 own security situation.100 Georgia has also expressed a desire to explore the idea of permanent basing, though feels it must carefully balance the security situation with Russia on its northern border and the already contested Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions.101

On October 14th, 2019, the New York Times reported that the United States was considering removing the estimated 50 nuclear warheads it stores at Incirlik Air Base as part of the response to Turkey’s military incursion into northern Syria. The weapons have been stored there since the

Cold War as a deterrent first to the Soviet Union and then to Russia. These weapons are rightly viewed as the cement holding the alliance between Turkey and the United States (and by extension NATO) together. In discussing the possibility of removing the weapons from Turkey in an interview with the Times, officials said that “To fly them out of Incirlik would be to mark the de facto end of the Turkish-American alliance.”102 While these weapons could be moved to an alternate base within the NATO alliance for continued deterrence against Russia, removing them from Turkey would send a series of signals that would be a dramatic change to the international status quo, and have series ramifications for Turkey’s security, not only in their current Syrian conflict, but in the Black Sea as well.

Because Erdogan has largely made challenging the West a hallmark of his foreign policy, he has made few friends or even defenders in the EU, the United States, or the NATO alliance.

Whether threatening to flood Europe with refugees, threatening to restrict access to bases, or buying the Russian S-400 system, Erdogan’s Turkey has developed a reputation of being an irritating but necessary actor on the world stage. While no formal proposals of removal have

100 Romania Insider. (2018, February 5). Romanian defense minister wants permanent US presence at local military base. Retrieved from https://www.romania-insider.com/us-presence-local-military-base. 101 Kubiak , M. (2019, May 13). Does Georgia Seek U.S. Military Presence? Retrieved from https://warsawinstitute.org/georgia-seek-u-s-military-presence/. 102 Sanger, D. E. (2019, October 14). Trump Followed His Gut on Syria. Calamity Came Fast. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/trump-turkey-syria.html.

53 been made by any member of NATO, there are members of the alliance who believe that they would be better off without Turkey.103 While there are many difficult legal considerations that would be involved in removing a member from the NATO alliance, it is not unreasonable to assume that if Turkey continues its unilateral actions in opposition to the international community, they may find themselves no longer affiliated with NATO.

Western Perspective

The West has a variety of both interests and obligations in the Black Sea region. When

Romania and Bulgaria became members of the European Union in 2007, the larger border of the

EU was extended to the Black Sea. While the economic exclusion zones of Romania and

Bulgaria do not amount to significant portions of the Black Sea, as of 2007 a portion of the Black

Sea was decidedly European. As evidenced by the above discussion of Turkey’s contemporary security situation, there are a variety of overlapping and competing concerns between the West and Turkey. The EU is dependent on the transit of energy through the Black Sea region and has an interest in ensuring stability. Western corporations have a variety of financial interests in the region, such as the London-based BP-operated oil pipelines and transfer terminals from the

Caspian Sea to the Supsa terminal on the Georgian Black Sea coast.

Energy security became an extremely important issue following Russia’s action of cutting off gas flow to Ukraine in 2009. Seeing the power that Russia held over not only Ukraine, but over a sizable number of EU members, much of the EU began to seriously pursue alternative energy sources. This effort has been hindered by diplomatic concerns and infrastructure issues.

Liquified Natural Gas is a viable option for reducing or even eliminating dependence on Russia energy sources, but it would require a receiving and re-gasification terminal to be built at any

103 Sari, A. (2019, October 15). Can Turkey be Expelled from NATO? It's Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent. Retrieved from https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-from-nato/. 54 location wishing to take part. Ukraine has been at the forefront of these efforts in recent years; however, Turkey has suggested that it views allowing LNG tankers passage through the

Bosphorus to be problematic and potentially dangerous.104 While these tankers would be sailing extremely close to Istanbul during transit of the Bosphorus, which in theory could be very dangerous if an accident were to happen, the safety and environmental concerns Turkey has cited are secondary to Turkey’s desire to establish its own LNG terminal and corner the market on a potentially lucrative infrastructure investment. Indeed, from initially signaling it would block

LNG tankers from transiting the Bosphorus in 2013, as of 2019, Turkey operates four re- gasification and storage terminals and is emerging as a major player in the LNG trade.105

104 Polityuk, P. (2013, February 6). Ukraine's plans for LNG imports face Turkish resistance. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-turkey-lng/ukraines-plans-for-lng-imports-face-turkish-resistance- idUSL5N0B65Y320130206. 105 Erșen, E. B. (2019, March 22). Turkey to leverage strengthened LNG infrastructure in gas trade. Retrieved from https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2019/03/22/turkey-to-leverage-strengthened-lng-infrastructure-in-gas-trade. 55

Chapter 5: Implications and Conclusions

This paper has established that the Black Sea has played an important role in Europe and

Eurasia throughout much of recorded history and has been highly prized by empires as a source of geopolitical power. Competing interests over time have meant that the region has been in a state of perpetual conflict, either militarily or along other lines of geopolitical power. The Black

Sea will continue to play an important role in global politics throughout the 21st century. This chapter will conclude the paper by exploring the likely trajectory of the Black Sea in the foreseeable future based on research and on geopolitical trends. Any proposed policy recommendation in this chapter have two purposes unless otherwise noted: they are directed at the United States and aim to maintain the status quo in the region.

The research shows that Russia has an established history of failing to uphold treaty obligations if not outright breaking treaties in the Black Sea region. Curiously, the Russian history of regional treaty violations begins with Catherine’s annexation of Crimea, and at least until another treaty is broken, ends most recently with Putin’s annexation of Crimea. This pattern of behavior on the part of the Russians must be carefully considered in any future diplomatic negotiations regarding any part of the region. In reviewing treaties prior to the

Montreux Convention discussed in chapter three, the Russian modus operandi seems to be that treaties are used as convenient tactical pauses in a long game of conflict, giving the Russians time to regather their strength. Russian behavior over several centuries would suggest that the

Russian government, in whatever form it has taken, has never given up the expansionist aspirations of the Russian Empire.

When Putin annexed Crimean in 2014, the Russians violated the 1994 Budapest

Memorandum, which was an agreement between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United

States and the United Kingdom. The very first article of which says that all parties will respect the “independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine.”106 The history of the

Russians following treaties only when it suits them and breaking treaties when it does not is likely to continue moving forward into the future. Article One of the Budapest Memorandum may on its surface appear to not be compatible with Russian strategy, considering their need for a warm water port. The Budapest Memorandum also came with Ukraine’s agreement to divest themselves of the enormous stockpile of Soviet-era nuclear weapons which had long been stationed in Ukraine during the Cold War. This suited Moscow because in the confusion of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a neighboring country with what was the third-largest stockpile of nuclear warheads was a frightening concept.107

The most likely treaty to be challenged in the near future is the Montreux Convention. As it nears its centennial of being in effect, it may be untenable for it to continue in perpetuity. The most likely party to offer challenge to the convention is Turkey. Turkey’s geopolitical moves over the last decade have led some analysts to speculate that Erdogan may be trying to restore the Ottoman Empire.108 Challenging the Montreux Convention is in keeping with the concept of neo-Ottomanism, as part of restoring the empire would be restoring the ancient Ottoman rule of the Straits. Arguably, Turkey has already begun to weaken the principle of freedom of navigation as laid out in the Montreux Convention by imposing a variety of new regulations for maritime traffic in the Straits. Several safety incidents in the Straits gave Turkey the cover it

106 Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Budapest, 5 December 1994 (1994). Retrieved from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No Volume/52241/Part/I-52241-0800000280401fbb.pdf 107 Oliynyk, K. (2019, January 9). The Destruction Of Ukraine's Nuclear Arsenal. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/the-destruction-of-ukraines-nuclear-arsenal/29699706.html. 108 Kiper, C. (2013, April 5). Sultan Erdogan: Turkey's Rebranding Into the New, Old Ottoman Empire. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/sultan-erdogan-turkeys-rebranding-into-the-new- old-ottoman-empire/274724/.

57 needed to impose these regulations without anyone claiming they are violating the freedom of navigation clause. The most recent round of new regulations went into effect on September 1st,

2018, which on the surface appear to be reasonable safety considerations.109 The reality of these regulations violates the spirit of freedom of navigation as defined by the Montreux Convention, though no signatory of the Convention has been willing to challenge them, preferring to maintain the status quo. It is likely that Turkey will continue to restrict maritime traffic in the Straits as it attempts to complete the Kanal Istanbul project.

Kanal Istanbul is a canal linking the Black Sea and Sea of Marmara.110 Once completed, the canal would offer a means of bypassing the Bosphorus Strait, and because it is a new and artificial body of water, would not be subject to the Montreux Convention. Using the argument of safety in the waterways, Turkey could offer a de facto challenge to the Montreux Convention by restricting freedom of navigation through the Bosphorus, while claiming they have not prevented anyone from entering or exiting the Black Sea, because of the availability of the new canal for transit. In addition, Turkey could apply a maritime toll for the use of the canal, effectively monetizing their monopoly on the Straits. If Turkey does not formally challenge the

Montreux Convention, it is likely another power will once the canal project is completed.

Turkey’s recent history of challenging both the status quo and the patience of the international community also offers insight as to what they may do with the Montreux Convention. It is not unreasonable to assume that Turkey could unilaterally back out of the Montreux Convention without a demand for a new multilateral treaty. Such an action could potentially be very beneficial to Turkey as it would then have to opportunity to negotiate a series of bilateral treaties

109 Rudd, M. (2019, April 25). Liabilities arising under the Turkish Straits clauses. Retrieved from https://www.skuld.com/topics/ship/navigation/liabilities-arising-under-the-turkish-straits-clauses/. 110 Ship Technology. (2018, April 17). Kanal İstanbul: Erdoğan's drive to build a new strait. Retrieved from https://www.ship-technology.com/features/kanal-istanbul-erdogans-drive-build-new-strait/. 58 with interested parties. A slowing global economic growth combined with sanctions over the purchase of the S-400 and actions in Syria may drive Turkey to make radical changes. Without the Montreux Convention guaranteeing freedom of navigation, Turkey could close and monetize the Straits. This could be a source of income for Turkey as it could charge foreign governments for passage of naval vessels, and tax private vessels conducting commerce on the high seas.

Any effort to back out of the Montreux Convention would likely be scrutinized by lawyers specializing in international law. It is possible that the international community would put forth the argument that in the absence of the the Montreux Convention, the rules of the U.N.

Convention on the Law of the Sea would then take over. If this were the case, the Turks would put themselves in the position of having to either militarily close the straits or simply deal with the fact that foreign navies could claim the right of innocent passage when transiting the Straits, to include submarines and even aircraft carriers. The chance that unilaterally backing out of the convention could backfire on Turkey means that while they are the most likely party to first offer a challenge to Montreux, they would have to be pushed to a point of either desperation or unanticipated outsized military and economic strength to actually do so. In the near future, warning signs that the Turks might move forward with this action are be a collapse of the

Turkish economy, the removal of the United States’ nuclear warheads stored at Incirlik air base, or a serious proposal to remove Turkey from the NATO alliance by another member state or even a request to exit from Turkey itself.

If the Montreux Convention is formally challenged it is likely that any new treaty would involve a different group of countries than the high contracting parties that took part in 1936.

The United States would likely want to be a part of any new negotiations as it has enough interests and obligations to regional allies to request American representation. Apart from the

59 obvious interests of individual member states, Romania and Bulgaria, the European Union as a whole would likely want to take part in any new negotiations as the union has economic and energy security interests in the Black Sea region on its eastern frontier. Assuming that Brexit ever becomes finalized and the United Kingdom is no longer a part of the European Union, they would likely still want to be represented at any new negotiations due to their financial interests in the region such as the previous mentioned BP oil infrastructure in Georgia. Russia would likely not want any major changes to the Montreux Convention because they would not tolerate a scenario as mentioned in the previous paragraph where the lack of rules limiting naval power could lead to an American aircraft carrier group in the Black Sea.

In the coming years, it is likely that Russia will continue to develop its security cooperation relationship with Turkey, at least in terms of military equipment sales. Following the Turkish purchase of the S-400, and Turkey being removed from the F35 program, the Russians offered to sell them the SU-35 fighter.111 Russia is happy to have another client for their defense industry, and if they can both make money, and damage the integrity of the NATO alliance in doing so, they would see this as a major win. Furthermore, Russia would gladly have Turkey out of the

NATO alliance, as they would then be able to bring their recent streak of military adventurism into the Turkish Straits without threat of reprisal from the NATO allies. It is important to remember that Russians have sought control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for literally hundreds of years, but the prize has always been out of reach. The Russians may decide that a weakened Turkey without the backing of NATO means it is finally time to accomplish this goal.

111 Reuters. (2019, September 27). Russia in talks with Turkey on possible Su-35 fighter jet sale: RIA. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-russia-jets/russia-in-talks-with-turkey-on-possible-su-35-fighter-jet- sale-ria-idUSKBN1WC17L. 60

On the north side of the Black Sea, the annexation of Crimea will continue to be an issue for the international community until the Ukrainians give notice that they have accepted that the peninsula belongs to Russia. The most likely outcome to the conflict in Ukraine is that Russia will maintain its hold on Crimea and maintain the frozen conflict in Donbas until new Ukrainian political leadership is elected that will be more willing to negotiate favorably with Russia. Any negotiations that lead to a lasting peace will likely codify Russia’s claim on Crimea in exchange for the Russians ending the conflict in the Donbas. This would likely include a provision that

Ukraine is not allowed to pursue membership in the NATO alliance, as having NATO on its flank would be an unacceptable outcome for Russia. While it is currently unthinkable that the

Ukrainian people would accept such on outcome, there will come a point where they tire of the perpetual state of conflict. For Russia, it is an inexpensive endeavor to fire a few artillery shells in Donbas every day to maintain the conflict, even they aren’t hitting any important targets.

Whether or not Crimea is ever internationally recognized as being a part of Russia is largely irrelevant at this point. Ukraine is not powerful enough to fight Russia for it, and the international community has demonstrated that it is not willing to fight Russia on Ukraine’s behalf. Russia has already won Crimea and secured the strategic warm water port of

Sevastopol. Moving forward Russia’s geopolitical ambitions will inevitably move further south into the Black Sea and toward the Turkish Straits. Russia has maneuvered a fair amount of military forces into Syria to assist the Assad regime, and at some point, that conflict will end.

Those forces will then be poised to create a southern front to attack Turkey in a battle over control of the Straits. Key indicators of a pending Russo-Turkish war in the 21st century would be the removal of Turkey from NATO, a decline in fighting or peace settlement in Syria coupled

61 with Russian forces not withdrawing from Syria, and an expansion or major modernization of the

Russian Black Sea fleet, to include a build up of troop carriers and landing craft.

Research and analysis show that the Black Sea has been a source of geopolitical power for most of recorded history and there is no reason to believe that the region will not continue to be a major source of 21st century geopolitical conflict. The situation in the Black Sea region is a delicate one. It is clear by their actions in recent years that Russia has reasserted itself as serious competitor on the world stage. In military terms, it is a near-peer competitor to the United

States, though an outright military conflict between the two leading global nuclear powers is unlikely. International relations with Russia, as always, must be approached carefully. Crushing the Russian economy through sanctions would not be a difficult task, but doing so would likely create a greater problem for the international community. An economically crippled Russia with its back up against the wall may decide they have little to lose by attempting to take as much territory as possible, and that scenario would likely manifest first on the Black Sea.

Turkey will likely continue its current trajectory of challenging the status quo. The neo-

Ottoman aspirations of Erdogan may well be outside Turkey’s current capabilities, though the

Turkish military operations in Northern Syria lend credence to the idea that the Turks are hoping to reestablish their rule over as much of the former Ottoman empire as possible. While Turkish military operations in Syria do not affect the Black Sea directly, the analysis in this paper has shown that the second and third order effects of Turkey’s actions could go so far as to see them removed from NATO, which would likely change the balance of power in the Black Sea drastically.

For the West, the best thing to do in the Black Sea may be to clearly identify which players are real allies and which are not and ensure that trade continues and that appropriate levels of aid,

62 whether economic or military are given. This process will likely be a tough pill to swallow.

This means that the United States must admit that the relationship with Turkey was born out of convenience to counter the Soviet Union, and that the interests of the United States, Europe, and

Turkey simply are not aligned. The best ally that the United States has in the Black Sea region is

Romania. The Romanians have an overwhelmingly positive view of the United States, are eager for military and economic partnerships, and can offer the Mihail Kogalniceanu air base as an excellent alternative to Incirlik in Turkey. For the United States, the strategic considerations of having a forward presence that offers deterrence to Russia would be equally satisfied in Romania as it is in Turkey. While Mihail Kogalniceanu may not be as ideal as Incirlik as a launching pad for air missions into the Middle East, this could be satisfied at any number of other locations in partner countries.

In the near term, the United States should seriously consider a reduction of forces in Turkey, and an increase in forces in Romania. Turkey should be sanctioned by the entirety of the NATO alliance for their purchase of Russian military hardware but should not be removed from NATO as this would likely encourage Russia to try to take territory, probably on the European side of the Straits. If Turkey were no longer a member of NATO, this would likely draw much of the world into a hot conflict, which would not be desirable. No matter what the great powers of the world do in the coming years, the Black Sea will a focal point for global policy in the balance of the 21st century.

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