An Analysis of Foreign Policy Motivation in the Peloponnesian War

Home , 433 BC, Helorus

Review of International Studies (2001), 27, 69–90 Copyright © British International Studies Association ‘Chieﬂy for fear, next for honour, and lastly for proﬁt’: an analysis of foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War

WILLIAM O. CHITTICK AND ANNETTE FREYBERG-INAN

Abstract. This article applies a three-dimensional framework for the analysis of the role of motivation in foreign policy decision-making to the foreign policy decisions of individuals and cities in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. First, the authors brieﬂy intro- duce their framework for analysis. Using the speeches in Thucydides to explicate the motives and goals of individuals and cities, the authors then trace the relationships between the motivational dispositions of foreign policy actors and their foreign policy behaviour. In so doing, they demonstrate both the relevance of a concern with individual motivation for foreign policy analysis and the usefulness of their analytical framework for studying the impact of the relevant motives. The authors also show how ideological statements can be analysed to determine the relative salience of individual motives and collective goals, suggesting a relationship between ideological reasoning and motivational imbalance which can adversely affect the policymaking process. In conclusion, they brieﬂy assess the theoretical and normative as well as practical policy implications of their observations.

Introduction

The study of foreign policy entails the analysis of human reactions to the threats, challenges, and opportunities presented by the international environment. However, foreign policy decision-makers do not react directly to situations or events. Instead, they react according to the ways in which they perceive and interpret those situations and events. Moreover, perceptions and interpretations of foreign policy situations are partly affected by actors’ preferences concerning the outcomes or consequences of possible courses of action. Such preferences are shaped by actors’ motives, those basic psychological driving forces which determine which particular goals the actor will pursue. The principal approaches to the study of foreign policy employ highly parsi- monious assumptions concerning decision-makers’ motivation. As we have shown elsewhere, realist and neorealist theories rely almost exclusively on the motive of fear and the corresponding goals of power and security. Liberal and neoliberal theories concentrate on the motive of ‘proﬁt’ and the goal of prosperity; and sociological institutionalist and constructivist theories are concerned primarily with the motive of social recognition or the goal of community.1 All of the above approaches may be useful in cases in which the assumed motivation does indeed represent the decision-

1 See William O. Chittick and Annette Freyberg-Inan, ‘Fear, Pride, and Profit: A Three-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Basic Motivation on Foreign Policy Decisions Concerning the Use of Force’, in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia (eds.), Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (London: Routledge, 2000). 69 70 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan maker’s relevant preferences. However, we believe that in most foreign policy decisions, all three of the motives mentioned above: fear, ‘profit,’ and social recognition, play a significant role and that it would therefore make sense to base attempts at explaining foreign policy behaviour on a more complete assessment of the decision-makers’ motivation. Using survey data, Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis have shown that a three-factor solution in which all of the above motives are included separately, better accounts for the foreign policy intentions of individuals than either a one-factor or a two-factor solution.2 Here, we investigate whether all three motives are equally useful in accounting for the actual foreign policy behaviour of historical decision-makers. Elsewhere we have more fully developed a framework for incorporating a concern with all three of these motives into the study of foreign policy.3 That framework associates each of those motives—fear, ‘profit,’ and social recognition—with one general foreign policy goal—security, prosperity, and community, respectively. We posit that systematic differences among individuals form one primary dimension of variance for each of these basic goals. This dimension is described in terms of polar differences (1) in an actor’s basic perceptions concerning the relevant characteristics of its environment, (2) in the actor’s choice of strategic goals, and (3) in the actor’s choice of strategic means. In the following, we will briefly summarize the most relevant characteristics of our framework. The motive of fear compels human beings to seek security in the form of protection from and advantage in conflicts with others and ensures immediate physical survival. Actors perceive their security environment to be more or less competitive. We hypothesize that the more competitive an actor perceives the relationship between its community and those threatening its security, the more salient the motive of fear. Vice versa, the more cooperative an actor perceives the relationship between its community and those representing potential threats, the less salient the motive of fear. The positions foreign policy actors take towards possible security threats depend on whether they perceive the relationships between themselves and the relevant others as essentially competitive or cooperative. Actors’ choice of strategic security goals thus reflects preferences analogous to the cooperative–competitive perceptual dimension. We hypothesize that if an actor perceives a potentially threatening situation to be highly competitive, then the actor is more likely to seek superior relative power, domination at the extreme, as its strategic goal. If the actor perceives a potentially threatening situation to be less competitive, then the actor is more likely to seek a mutual understanding or even accommodation as its strategic goal. An actor’s choice of strategic security goals also affects its preferences for the means used to obtain security. If a foreign policy actor believes that domination of a potential enemy is necessary for its security, that actor will be more prepared to use or threaten force, that is to adopt militarist policies. If an actor seeks accommodation, that actor will prefer non-coercive, non-militarist methods of dealing with security issues.

2 William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis, ‘A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs’, International Studies Quarterly, 39 (1995), pp. 313–31. 3 Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, ‘Fear, Pride, and Proﬁt’. Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 71

Whereas the motive of fear arises from a perception of threats, the motive of ‘profit’ arises from a perception of, or need for, opportunities. This motive inspires the pursuit of all those resources which, as for example, money, education, or personal rights, are expected to better human beings’ life circumstances. It is thus to be understood not in a narrow, strictly material sense, but, analogous to liberal conceptions of individual preferences, as a broader conception of the national interest. Those perceptions most relevant to the pursuit of ‘profit’ concern an actor’s own status and capabilities relative to those of the other relevant actors. We hypothesize that, generally, if an actor perceives itself as superior to those others, then the actor will be prepared to interact with them. If an actor perceives itself as inferior in capabilities to those others, then it will be hesitant to interact. Foreign policy actors’ responses to opportunities for ‘profit’ depend on their perceptions concerning their relative strength. Such perceptions thus affect the strategic goals actors pursue with respect to the basic foreign policy goal of prosperity. We hypothesize that if an actor perceives itself to be inferior in capabilities to relevant others, it will be more likely to pursue a foreign policy of isolation. Vice versa, if the actor perceives itself to be in a superior position, it will favour a foreign policy of interdependence. The socioeconomic goals of isolation on the one hand and interdependence on the other also affect the relevant strategic means preferred by foreign policy actors. An actor who pursues an isolationist policy will be more likely to employ protectionist policies. An actor who favours a policy of interdependence, on the other hand, will strive for active involvement in the free trade of goods, services, money, and ideas. The motive of social recognition inspires actors to attempt integration into a community, which can provide more protection and comfort than any actor would be able to secure for itself. In order to be part of such a community, actors accept and internalize, at least to some extent, that community’s norms and rules of behaviour and, in turn, become able to shape the nature and conduct of the collectivity. Those perceptions most relevant to the pursuit of social recognition concern the conditions for communal identification with other relevant actors. Actors perceive their communities to be more or less exclusive. We hypothesize that if an actor emphasizes those values which make its own community unique, then that actor will feature an exclusive identity that clearly separates the community from its environment; if an actor stresses values its community holds in common with others, that actor will exhibit an inclusive identity which accentuates the similarities between the community and the environment. With respect to their strategic goals, foreign policy actors who portray more exclusive identities will be more likely to seek recognition through independence. Those actors who hold more inclusive identities will be more likely to pursue integration, unification at the extreme. In terms of strategic means, foreign policy actors who seek independence tend to prefer unilateral initiatives. Foreign policy actors who seek integration into a larger community instead tend to act on a multilateral basis. We contend that all three of the above basic motives need to be taken into account in order to explain actors’ decisions concerning any foreign policy issue. While not all three motives may be equally salient on any given occasion, it is important to explore actors’ positions with respect to all three basic foreign policy 72 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan goals, since the relative salience of motives and the resulting ranking of goals itself contains information valuable for the explanation of the resulting policies.

Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War

The ‘History’

This study uses the above framework to examine the impact of decision-makers’ motivation on their foreign policy choice within the particular context of the Second Peloponnesian War, fought between 431 and 404 BC between the Athenian empire and the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League. This war is described in detail by the Athenian general and historian Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War.4 In his effort to, as Francis Cornford has put it, ‘record what was said and what was done as accurately and literally as possible’, Thucydides employs both a narrative and a series of dramatic speeches.5 As part of his effort to explain the course of the war, he explores the role played by human motivation in the conduct of international relations and the making of foreign policy. Psychological explanations involving the motives behind particular strategies and decisions ﬁgure prominently in his attempts to shed light on the events of the History.6 The speeches he recounts in particular are valuable because of the emphasis they place on ‘the motives of individuals and the characters of cities’.7 As Luis Lord has put it, ‘the most important purpose that the speeches serve is to indicate “what was proper to the occasion”, that is, the motive from which the subsequent actions spring’.8 The speeches are thus of central importance for an understanding of the lessons of the History, especially of its political psychological lessons.9 It is widely believed that Thucydides’ rendering of the speeches should be considered historically accurate. According to Lord, ‘the words may not be those actually spoken, but the thoughts are those which ﬁt each of the critical situations

4 Thucydides, Hobbes’s Thucydides, Richard Schlatter (ed.) (New Brunswick, NJ: 1975, c.a. 400 BC). The English translation of Thucydides used throughout this study is the one by Thomas Hobbes. Three other translations (see bibliography) plus the etymological, morphological, and semantic commentaries on the original text, which are accessible through Gregory R. Crane (ed.), The Perseus Project (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu, accessed Feb. 9, 1999) have been used to provide confirmation for the interpretations given here. For etymological commentaries see also Arnold W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1945) and Simon Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1991). 5 Francis M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus (London, 1965), p. 130. 6 The treatment of motivation plays a large part in the actual text. Mabel Lang points out that Thucydides comments in his narration on the motives of forty-two different individuals, attempting to explain 145 different actions. See her ‘Participial Motivation in Thucydides’, Mnemosyne 48:1 (1995), pp. 48–65. 7 Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus, p. 64. 8 Luis E. Lord, Thucydides and the World War (New York, 1945), pp. 196–7. 9 The importance of the speeches is emphasized by virtually all Thucydides scholars. Prominent among them is Antonios Rengakos, who emphasizes that Athenian attitudes towards the pursuit and use of power in politics are made clear almost exclusively through this medium. See his Form und Wandel des Machtdenkens der Athener bei Thukydides (Stuttgart, Germany, 1984). Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 73 which these formal orations invariably mark’.10 Thus, Thucydides’ penchant for accuracy and his interest in the psychological causes of political decisions make his presentation of historical data ideally suited to our purpose of showing how the decision-makers’ motives relate to their actual behaviour. We will attempt to show the extent to which actors’ motives, as presented by Thucydides, need to be taken into account in order to understand their behaviour, and to shed some light on the extent to which these motives are sufficient to explain them. While the entire text of the History contains twenty-eight different speeches, this analysis will concentrate on eight debates and one dialogue which mark crucial turning points in the war. No established protocol exists for the analysis of the speeches. However, we follow standard interpretations of the History in order to ensure that our assertions may be plausible to those familiar with Thucydides’ work as well as its historical context. More importantly, however, we expect our framework for analysis to produce not only a historically defensible but also a theoretic- ally guided understanding of historical events. Such an understanding should then enable us to abstract from the immediate historical context to suggest general regularities linking basic motivation to foreign policy decision-making. In order to do so, we make use of a correspondence between our own theoretical framework and a famous passage in the History, which is often referred to as the ‘Athenian thesis’. Before the outbreak of open hostilities between Athens and Sparta, an Athenian delegation at Sparta defends the imperialist ambitions of Athens in the following manner: They claim that they have been ‘forced to advance [their] dominion to what it is, out of the nature of the thing itself; as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit’.11 They explain further: ‘… Though overcome by three of the greatest things [sic], honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men’.12 The term used by the Athenians for the concept of fear, deos, indicates a lasting state of alarm as opposed to a sudden fright. It can also mean the possession of a reason to fear or of a means to inspire fear in others, thus pointing to perceived requirements of preparation for the possibility of conflict (paraskeue).13 While the exact meaning of the term, as it is used by the Athenians, is, of course, debatable today, one can safely say this much: Thucydides has the Athenians acknowledge that fear is one of the main psychological driving forces in relations among states. States try to protect themselves from others. They also try to inspire fear in others, so as to deter them from attacking.

10 Lord, Thucydides and the World War, p. 197. The accuracy of the speeches in Thucydides is also defended by most other commentators, prominently among them: Juergen Gommel, Rhetorisches Argumentieren bei Thukydides (Hildesheim, Germany, 1966); David Grene, Greek Political Theory: The Image of Man in Thucydides and Plato (Chicago, 1965); Marc Cogan, The Human Thing: The Speeches and Principles of Thucydides’ History (Chicago, 1981); and John Huston Finley, Thucydides (Ann Arbor, MI, 1963). 11 Thuc. 1.75. Hobbes’s Thucydides,p.70. 12 Ibid., p. 70. 13 Crane (ed.), The Perseus Project. In a study of the concept of preparedness (paraskeue) in the History, June W. Allison ﬁnds that Thucydides uses the word 104 times, compared to the eleven times it appears in the combined works of his contemporaries. She shows that an understanding of the role of paraskeue, which includes the dynamic elements of gaining, actualizing and demonstrating power, plays an important role in Thucydides explanations for the war. See her Power and Preparedness in Thucydides (Baltimore, MD, 1989). 74 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan

The next important motive operating in relations among states, according to the Athenians, is the desire for ‘profit’. The term used by Thucydides, ophelia, can mean as much profit or material advantage as well as a source of gains, especially of gains made in war.14 However, and especially in Thucydidean usage, it also refers to material aid or support in war, meaning that the Athenians may have tried to indicate that they were not just greedy for riches but that they were trying to gather allies so as to make themselves more secure.15 This interpretation makes sense, given the fact that the purpose of the Athenian speech was to excuse Athenian expansionism in the eyes of her rivals. Clearly, defensive motivation must have been considered less objectionable than offensive motives for imperialistic policies. Once again, it is possible to establish an interpretive minimum consensus: the Athenians acknowledge the role played in interstate relations by the realization that security has an economic component. States need a minimum of resources simply to survive. Moreover, a quest for greater security inspires the search for material advantage, since such an advantage is a component of superior power. The third motive acknowledged by the Athenians defies straightforward translation. The term used for ‘honour’, time, clearly has normative as well as material connotations.16 In the normative sense, ‘honour’ here can refer to the public esteem or elevated official position acquired through actions which contribute to the success and glory of the community. For a leader of an Athenian people which identified communal glory with their city’s position of hegemonic sovereignty (arche), giving up the pursuit of hegemony, in this sense, clearly would have been a dishonourable thing to do. However, it is likely, given the double meaning of the word, that such a normative argument was at the time not clearly semantically separated from the idea that part of the reason for the pursuit of hegemony are the ‘honours’ it brings in the form of material rewards and further increases in authority. As the Athenian citizen required the recognition of his fellows in his pursuit of civic honours, so did the status of Athens depend on the recognition which such pursuits, through force, persuasion, propaganda, or example, afforded her in the world of Greek city states. The three motives brought forth by the Athenians as an explanation for the sum of their foreign policies preceding the war are broadly analogous to the basic motives on which our analytical framework rests. It thus appears promising to examine the usefulness of our framework in the context of this conflict. Since we believe that, generally, all three motives play a role in foreign policy decisions, it is important for us to determine the relative salience of motives on any given occasion. In order to do so, we rely primarily on an examination of the statements of value and the statements of fact attributed to the relevant decision-makers. We are particularly interested in those statements of value which are disguised as statements of facts, that is in ideological statements. As will be shown, they are most helpful in discerning the speaker’s perception of the relevance of various motives in the particular context. Before we can begin the chronological analysis of the debates, it will be necessary to establish the historical context of the war in light of our theoretical framework.

14 The various semantic connotations of the concept of ophelia add up to an idea surprisingly similar to the modern concept of rational self-interest. 15 Crane (ed.), The Perseus Project. 16 Ibid. Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 75

We can establish the relevance of the suggested basic foreign policy motives and goals by examining the reality of the Hellenic world in the ﬁfth century BC.

Security, prosperity, community: foreign policy goals in historical context

Around the time of the Peloponnesian War, the Greek world is made up of small, autonomous city states, which are largely incapable of defending themselves against outside threats. Cooperation between the city states consists in trade and occasional defensive alliances under threat of foreign invasion. Soon after the battle of Plataea (479), in which a Spartan-led pan-Hellenic army defeats Persian invading forces, the Spartans, who possess the strongest land army, withdraw from active defence preparations to concentrate on domestic problems. This prompts a number of cities to ask Athens, an important naval power, to assume leadership against Persia. In 477, this leads to the formation of the Delian League, which, over time, is transformed by Athens into an empire. As the Athenian empire grows, clashes of interest with the Spartan-led Peloponnesian, or Lacedaemonian, League become more frequent. In particular, the two largest naval powers, Athens and Corinth become increasingly suspicious of each other’s intentions. The security of many city states is further threatened by the danger of revolt or revolution from within. Political divisions between democrats and aristocrats as well as between various factions within those two camps complicate issues of external security, since the different factions often seek support from opposing outside forces. The possibility of internal war, or stasis, is frequently an important concern. Given the tense inter-city atmosphere and the vagaries of domestic politics, the Hellenic city states typically can neither feel truly safe from military attack nor calculate its effects on the polity. Rising tensions in this highly competitive interstate environment only serve to strengthen the priority of security as a foreign policy goal, which fuels Athenian expansionism and motivates Lacedaemonian resistance. By the mid-fifth century, trade among the Hellenic city states is extensive, particularly within the existing alliances. Within the Delian League, Athens has assumed the character of an imperial power, enjoying favourable trade conditions and demanding considerable tribute payments from its subject cities. While land- locked Sparta has traditionally worked to ensure its agricultural self-sufficiency, the naval power Athens relies more heavily on trade and has protected access to its port, Piraeus, by means of a walled-in corridor. Generally, Sparta, protective of its agricultural base and forced to supervise a large population of disenfranchised field workers, avoids interventionist economic policies, while Athens, conscious of its superior trading position, pursues imperialistic expansion. Athenian prosperity is not more secure than that of Sparta, since, as Donald Kagan points out, ‘the Athenian economy [is] increasingly dependent upon trade, a large part of it in the Aegean and in the Hellespontine region’.17 However, the expansion of Athenian political influence increasingly contributes to the unease of its potential military rivals.

17 Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, NY, 1969), p. 39. 76 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan

The third important foreign policy motive in fifth century Greece is that of ‘honour’, or recognition by one’s community. According to Michael Palmer, the traditional Greek view of honourable conduct, as it is exemplified in the Athenian leader Pericles, perceives of ‘honour’ as the greatest good an individual can achieve.18 The only way to achieve such ‘honour’ is to devote oneself completely to the common good, the interest of one’s community. The primary community of reference for the Greek foreign policymaker is usually his city state, but could conceivably also be a political grouping or a larger alliance. Religion and ideals of citizenship hold communities together, but prove fragile under the pressures of war, hunger, and desperation. Norms of inter-city conduct include the right to self-defence against attack as well as an unspecified principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states. In addition, the Thirty Years’ Peace Treaty of 446, which officially ends the First Peloponnesian War, lists the members of both alliances and bars each side from recruiting allies from the other. It furthermore specifies that disagreements should be settled by arbitration. However, allegiances are not written in stone and frequent disagreements erupt over the treatment of cities not mentioned in the treaty. In order to determine whether other cities should be treated as friends or enemies, the criteria of type of government, racial background, or records of past favours or quarrels are increasingly employed in addition to, or instead of, formal treaties and informal traditional allegiances. This leads to considerable insecurity concerning a city’s status in the eyes of other communities and contributes to a political climate in which distrust and military readiness seem essential to survival. Thus, when the Athenian delegation at Sparta refer to a quest for ‘honour’ as the third driving force behind Athens’ imperialism, what is meant is not only that the Athenians are determined to cater to their own pride, but also that they realize that a reputation for determined leadership can be a valuable asset in their quest for power and security. Athens will come to learn, the hard way, that to be recognized by one’s allies, the members of one’s extended community, is just as important as to be feared by one’s enemies. In the following section, a chronological analysis of important foreign policy decisions during the Peloponnesian War will reveal the operation of the previously stipulated three foreign policy motives and goals. It will also shed light on the impact of an increasing influence of ideology in the decision-making process, which, as the conflict progresses, affects the balance among basic foreign policy motives.

The beginning of the Peloponnesian War

The eight debates and the one dialogue which will be analysed in this section occur at three critical turning points in the war. Our purpose in examining each of these occasions in some detail is both to determine which attitudes towards which foreign policy motives and goals were expressed on each occasion and to understand how the relative potency of motives helped determine decisions and actions at these critical junctures.

18 Michael Palmer, ‘Love of Glory and the Common Good’, American Political Science Review 76:4 (1982), pp. 825–36. Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 77

Three of the eight debates occur in the year prior to the beginning of the war. The essential issue in the presentation of these occasions is the question which events and attitudes led to its eventual outbreak. Thucydides himself takes the position that ‘the truest quarrel, though least in speech, [was] … the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war’.19 While Thucydides appears to stress the motive of fear as the ultimate trigger of warfare, some historians, such as, for example, Francis Cornford, argue that the quest for ‘profit’ was in truth the main source of hostility between Corinth and Athens. 20 The Athenians themselves, by mentioning ‘honour’ second and, later, first among their motives, seem to assert that the desire for recognition was equally important in leading them to expand their empire.21 We believe that all three motives should be taken into account to provide for a comprehensive inquiry into the causes as well as the course of the Peloponnesian War. It is important to realize that, in 432, Sparta was reluctant to go to war with Athens, and would probably not have done so, had it not been for the entreaties of Corinth. The latter made a number of specific allegations in order to persuade Sparta that a war with Athens was inevitable because Athens was not keeping the Thirty Years’ Peace. Corinth, an important power on the isthmus between Attica and the Peloponnese, felt its power position threatened by the ever-expanding Athenian empire, and was desperate to put an end to this threat. The very first debate in the History deals with the first allegation Corinth uses to try to bring Sparta into the war. The debate takes place in Athens. Its participants are the Athenians, representatives of Corinth, and representatives of Corcyra, a city- state on the island of Corfu, which, after Athens and Corinth, is at the time the third leading naval power in Greece. The Corcyreans, themselves a colony of Corinth, have become embroiled in a conflict with Corinth over an even smaller colony, Epidamnus, which has ties with both Corinth and Corcyra. The conflict began when Corinth decided to intervene in a civil war in Epidamnus on the side of the ruling democrats and Corcyra, in turn, felt justified in coming to the aid of a group of exiled oligarchs who were attempting to take the city back. Surprisingly, Corcyra has won the first naval engagement with Corinth, and Corinth is now preparing a counterattack on Corcyra with a much larger force. In anticipation of the coming struggle, Corcyra seeks the help of Athens.

The debate over the Corcyrean Alliance (I: 32–44), 433 BC

Before the Athenian assembly, the Corcyreans, who are neutrals under the Thirty

19 Thuc. 1.23. Hobbes’s Thucydides, p. 42. The term translated here as fear is not deos but phobos, which may also be translated as panic, or acute fear. The term used to indicate what Hobbes translates as necessitated is a form of the word ananke, an expression of determinism. See Crane (ed.), The Perseus Project. For a linguistic discussion of this particular passage see also John D. Noonan, ‘Thucydides 1.23.6: Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Scholion’, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 33:1 (1992), pp. 37–49. 20 See especially the discussion of economic motives for expansion in Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus, pp. 50–1. 21 See Clifford Orwin, ‘Justifying Empire: The Speech of the Athenians at Sparta and the Problem of Justice in Thucydides’, The Journal of Politics, 48 (1986), p. 77. 78 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan

Years’ Peace agreement, argue that Athens should not risk alienating the third largest navy in Greece at a time when it can reasonably expect to become involved in a war with both Sparta and Corinth. Instead, Athens should come to the aid of Corcyra now in order to ensure that Corcyra will, in turn, be inclined to help the Athenians in the future. The Corcyreans are appealing to both the motive of profit and the motive of fear in order to persuade Athens that it is in her own interest to ally herself with Corcyra. First, an intervention in the situation in form of an alliance with the powerful Corcyra would offer Athens new opportunities. In fact, the Corcyreans argue that Athens would be better off making new friends than keeping old ones, if her new friends can be more useful to her. Second, having the Corcyrean navy on her side would improve the Athenian security position in an eventual conflict with Corinth. The Corinthians, who are still legally ‘friends’ of Athens according to the treaty, do not question the facts as presented by the Corcyreans. However, they argue that if the Athenians want to remain on good terms with Corinth, Athens must not ally itself with Corinth’s enemies, the Corcyreans. Thus, the Corinthians argue for non- intervention based on the ‘honour’ motive. They attempt to sway Athens in their favour by pointing out that they should be ‘friends’ because that is the way things have been and that is what is written in the treaty. They further contend that Athens owes them a favour, since they did not intervene in favour of one of Athens’ subject cities, when it revolted against Athens. The Corinthian argument thus implies that Athens and Corinth can remain on friendly terms only if both states abide by the principle of non-interference established, and the alliance structures prescribed, by the present treaty. At the end of the first day of debate, the Athenian assembly is evenly divided. If the war could be avoided, Athens should try not to alienate Corinth. However, if war was inevitable, then it would not be wise to allow Corinth to destroy the Corcyrean fleet. On the second day, the Athenians stop short of deciding in favour of a full alliance with Corcyra. Athens here proves to be partly constrained in her actions by the honour motive, as represented by her treaty obligations and the arguments of Corinth. Instead of being able to take full advantage of the prospect of a complete alliance, they agree only to a defensive alliance with Corcyra. This defensive alliance is primarily justified through the security goal: The Athenians feel that they cannot afford to watch Corcyra lose its navy without risking too much of their own power position. The debate over the Corcyrean alliance illustrates the operation of all three foreign policy motives as well as the balancing of motives which is a necessary part of rational foreign policy decision-making. By deciding on a defensive alliance with Corcyra, the Athenians in effect try to gain a friend without making an enemy, while at the same time protecting their other community, security, and prosperity interests. As will be seen, such rational balancing will become increasingly difficult as the war continues.

The two debates at the Lacedaemonian Congress (I: 68–86), 432 BC

The second and the third of the debates analysed here occur at the Congress in Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 79

Sparta in 433 BC, where the Corinthians have come to persuade Sparta to go to war with Athens. The second debate begins with an exchange between the Corinthian delegation and a group of Athenians, who happen to be in the city at the time. As Donald Kagan22 and Laurie Johnson have explained,23 the Corinthians aim the brunt of their criticism at the appeasement strategy pursued by the peace party which has been in power in Sparta. The Corinthians invoke the ‘honour’ motive by arguing that the Athenians have an insatiable aggressive character and, in an attempt to put the Spartans to shame, comparing that character with the passive nature of the Spartans in general and Spartan pacifists in particular. Using the profit motive, Corinth argues that it is in Sparta’s interest to intervene in order to halt the expansion of Athenian influence. Finally, using the fear motive, Corinth attempts to portray Athens as an acute military threat. The Athenians counter first of all by denying that they behave any worse than other states in matters of interstate politics. After all, they point out, ‘it hath been ever a thing fixed, for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger’.24 Considerations of ‘honour’ and justice, the Athenians claim, play a role only in relations among equals, where power relations are not decisive. In light of this reasoning, the Athenians have shown more mercy in their dealings with subject cities than they had to. While it is only natural to dominate those who are less powerful by exerting one’s authority, Sparta is most definitely not considered inferior, much less subject to Athens. Thus, Sparta can expect Athens to abide by the rules of conduct among equals. The Athenians deny that they pose any offensive threat to Spartan security. At the same time, they are attempting to deter Sparta from military action. Extolling their own virtues and emphasizing their own power, the Athenians explain that although they do have a powerful alliance, it is not the result of unchecked greed and untempered passions, but rather the natural outcome of an interstate situation which compelled Athens to respond by expanding its empire. That empire grew gradually at first, at the request of allies who were fearful of Persia when Sparta was not willing to exert itself on their behalf. Subsequently, it continued to grow when the Athenians began to fear that former allies might harm them by breaking away. It is clear that Corinth and Athens do not disagree on the nature of the international situation nor on the fundamentals of interstate politics. In the words of Laurie Johnson, ‘by blaming the Spartan’s lack of initiative more than the Athenians grasping for empire, the Corinthians sanction as natural both the endless pursuit of power and the defense against it’.25 The Corinthians also agree that Athens is not merely striving for material profit, but also for military power and for glory. Rather than attacking Athenian motivation or the claim that Athenian behaviour is natural given the circumstances, the Corinthians confirm the Athenian thesis by accepting it as the ‘natural law’ of politics and by following its line of reasoning. In the second debate at Sparta the Spartan citizens debate the issue among themselves. The fact that the Athenian interpretation of the situation is shared by some Spartans as well is shown by the fact that Archidamus, king of Sparta, repeats

22 Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. 23 Laurie M. Johnson, Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism (DeKalb, IL, 1993). 24 Thuc. 1.76. Hobbes’s Thucydides,p.70. 25 Johnson, Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism, p. 32. 80 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan the argument that the perception of Athens as a threat is a function of circumstance rather than an exceptional situation which requires immediate military intervention. Archidamus emphasizes the motive of ‘profit’ or rational self-interest. He urges his fellow-citizens not to be ashamed of their deliberative and prudent character and not to let themselves be drawn into a war Corinth is trying to start in its own particular interest. However, more Spartans share the view of Sthenelaidas who contends that Athens must be stopped now before it takes over the Peloponnese. Sthenelaides emphasizes the motive of fear in the form of the Athenian military threat. The fact that it took Sparta some considerable time after the Congress both to call its allies together for a formal declaration of war and to send an army into the field suggests that the city remained divided on the issue. Partly, the different interpretations of the Athenian threat stem from different views of the moral character of Athens’ behaviour towards both allies and enemies. The Athenian delegation argues that, even while expanding its empire, Athens has always acted with proper restraint. Its alliance with Corcyra is purely defensive and its relations with its allies are based on law rather than brute force. In opposition, the Corinthians argue that Athens has subjugated its allies without their consent and that it is fully prepared to act solely according to its own self-interest rather than with any consideration for justice and other common norms. In a sense, the Corinthians argue that Athens, by its own actions, has removed itself from the community of civilized city-states as it had been formalized in the Thirty Years’ Peace treaty. The perception of Athens as an enemy requires the allies of Corinth to stress the differences rather than the similarities between their own cities and Athens. Thus, different beliefs with respect to community concerns can be seen to influence the perception of other problems, such as the potential security threat which is the leading issue at the Congress.

The rise of ideology

The next cluster of debates occurs in the fifth year of the war. Sparta has launched attacks on Attica, but, as foreseen by Pericles, the resulting battles prove not to be decisive. Although both sides are still determined to win the war, they are becoming increasingly aware of the enormous risks and costs involved in a prolonged conflict. The strategy of Pericles, leader of Athens during the early years, was to avoid fighting the powerful Spartan army on land, which means that the land around the city walls of Athens, with all the products of its fields, has been lost to the enemy. Athenian access to the sea is protected by the walls which connect the city to the Piraeus, but the Athenian treasury is depleted and the city, overpopulated because of refugees from the surrounding farmland, is suffering greatly from disease. On the other hand, Sparta has yet to win any major victory in the war. Military leaders on both sides search for popular support to continue a war which has already lasted longer than had been foreseen. As Paul Woodruff points out, it is clear in retrospect that, ‘as long as Athens conceded the land to Sparta, and Sparta the sea to Athens, there was no hope of either side’s bringing the war to an end’.26 It

26 Paul Woodruff, Thucydides on Justice, Power, and Human Nature: The Essence of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1993), p. xviii. Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 81 was not until much later, when Sparta received Persian support to build a navy, that the balance of power shifted enough to allow for the defeat of Athens. One of the most serious threats confronting Athens at this juncture is the danger of revolt by subject states in the empire. The Athenians discover that the ruling oligarchs in Mytilene, an independent ally on the island of Lesbos, are plotting to rise up against Athens. This constitutes a serious challenge, because the Mytileneans, unlike most other allied cities, have been allowed to maintain their own navy. The fact that even a city which has received such preferential treatment is ready for revolt is alarming to the Athenians, who are careful to make an example of Mytilene in order to dissuade other subject cities from a similar course of action. The Athenians fear that if they are to lose important segments of their empire, they will lack the resources to resist Spartan invasions. The Mytileneans seek the help of Sparta, and in an effort to justify an alliance between themselves and the Peloponnesians they claim to share customs with the Peloponnesians that they do not share with Athens.27 This is the first time that the racial differences between Dorians and Ionians are portrayed as irreconcilable. From this point on, the racial differences referred to in the History seem to take on a new meaning and traditional definitions of Greek community gradually break down. The war is partly transformed from a power struggle between the Spartan alliance and the Athenian alliance into a racial war between Dorians and Ionians. When the revolt of the Mytileneans is finally put down, a thousand prisoners are brought back to Athens for punishment. A debate is held before the Athenian assembly in order to determine the fate of the Mytileneans who betrayed Athens and the empire.

The debate over Mytilene (III: 37–48), 427 BC

Cleon, a skilled demagogue and leader of the Athenian war party, presents the view that all males in Mytilene, not only the one thousand prisoners, should be put to death as a deterrent to other subjects who might be tempted to revolt. Diodotus argues against him that Athens ought to spare the democrats in Mytilene and put to death only the oligarchs, because it is in Athens’ interest to side with the many against the few. Although the debate between Cleon and Diodotus is ostensibly concerned with justice or morality, it is evident that the real question before the assembly is how Athens can best serve its strategic self-interest by deterring future revolts in the empire. More so than Cleon, who most likely appears vengeful to the Athenian citizens, Diodotus seems to argue purely from expediency. His argumentative strategy implies, as Laurie Johnson has put it, that ‘a great power must counter human’s natural compulsions with power, not with argument or judicial pro- cedure’.28 The fact that the outcome of this particular debate is a relatively merciful punishment for Mytilene is coincidental and depends solely on extraneous calculations of Athenian interest. The overriding motive at work here is proﬁt or rational

27 See Cogan, The Human Thing,p.48. 28 Johnson, Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism, p. 109. 82 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan self-interest, which leads to the evaluation of alternative courses of action purely in terms of the utility of their outcomes for Athens. At the end of the first day the assembly decides with Cleon to put to death all of the males in Mytilene and enslave the women and children, but this decision is revoked on the next day, when, after a second round of debate, the Athenians come to the conclusion that it would be enough to take the lives of the one thousand prisoners. The success of Diodotus’ arguments marks an important turning point in the war. From this point on, Athens adopts a deliberate and far-reaching policy of sponsoring democracies throughout the Greek world. Athens systematically implants democratic rulers in all the cities she controls and encourages democratic revolutions in the others. Thus, the war between Athens and Sparta at this time also becomes a conflict between two opposing ideologies concerned with the organization of the polis.29 Athenian motivation is imbalanced; the motives of ‘profit’ and fear have merged and clearly dominate considerations of community. Shortly after the debate on the fate of the Mytileneans, an event occurs at Plataea, a small town on the border between Attica and Boeotia, which indicates that these fundamental changes have had some effects on the Spartan alliance as well. Plataea has special status in the Greek world since its citizens fought with exceptional bravery against the Persian invaders. The city has traditionally been allied with Thebes, which is now in league with Sparta. However, the Plataeans are now an independent ally of Athens and obligated under the present treaty to support her in this war. When Athens fails to come to the rescue of Plataea, Plataea is forced to capitulate to Sparta. A small garrison of Plataeans agree to surrender to the Spartans only when they are promised a fair trial. When the Spartan judges arrive, however, they do not charge the Plataeans with any crimes, but simply ask whether the Plataeans have rendered the Spartans or their allies any service during the war. Realizing that they are going to be condemned without recourse to moral argument, the Plataeans ask permission to present a defence, and a debate ensues between the Plataeans and the Thebans.

The debate at Plataea (III:53–67), 427 BC

The Plataeans seek mercy from the Spartans on the grounds that they honour the Spartans who died in Plataea during the Persian Wars. They argue in essence that the old norms of the traditional community of united Greek cities should hold, even under the present circumstances in which the members of that community have turned against one another. From their perspective it is relevant that the Thebans once betrayed that pan-Hellenic community by consorting with the Persians. This accusation angers the Thebans, who feel that the Plataean plea must be having some effect on the Spartans, and they ask to speak so they can ensure that the Plataeans receive the most severe punishment for siding with Athens. Without acknowledging their own earlier collaboration with the Persians, the hated enemies of both Athens and Sparta, the Thebans attempt to turn the tables by

29 See Cogan, The Human Thing, pp. 56–9. Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 83 arguing that it is now the Plataeans who are in league with the enemy, Athens. They fail to acknowledge the old moral code the Plateans adhere to and instead fall back on an ideological argument in order to justify their present position. Athens is portrayed as a security threat. The Plataeans, according to the Thebans, are just as dangerous, because they have become ‘Atticized’.30 This is a new concept which suggests that the threat posed by the Athenian empire runs much deeper than previously acknowledged. Athens is not only dangerous because of its power, but also because of its way of life, which is spreading throughout its realm of influence. Athens, and all others like her, must be destroyed in order to eliminate the ideas which make her so dangerous. These two debates underscore the fact that a new ideological dimension has been added to the war. From the standpoint of Sparta and its allies, Athens has become a ‘tyrant’ city, capable of ‘Atticizing’ cities throughout her empire. Ideology is used to reinforce the perception of Athens as a security threat. Sparta now perceives the need to challenge the Athenian empire directly, and it can appeal effectively to those within that empire who have either Dorian or oligarchic sympathies. The Athenians, on the other hand, can now see themselves as leading an alliance of democratic states, which preserves the freedom of citizens all over Greece from the tyranny of the few. Although ideological appeals are more prevalent than moral arguments during this phase of the war, the ideological fervour has not yet reached the point at which negotiations are out of the question. Indeed, in the seventh year of the war Sparta offers Athens a peace agreement. The Athenians, however, turn down this offer, because they have the upper hand in the conflict at the time. In 422/421 BC Athens and Sparta finally agree to the Peace of Nicias, which is overall favourable to Athenian interests, but not before Sparta has begun to incite some of Athens’ allies to revolt. Thucydides does not consider this respite an end to the war, since he recognizes that the peace cannot hold.

Total war

The Melian Dialogue and the final three debates in the History take place approxi- mately six years into the Peace of Nicias. They are concerned with the reasons for Athens’ expedition to Sicily and with the reactions of the Sicilian states once the expedition has arrived. Together, these debates and several related speeches account for the policies which led to the renewal of the war and the final defeat of Athens. Neither Athens nor Sparta have satisfied all provisions of the Peace of Nicias. Athens, for example, has launched an attack on the neutral Lacedaemonian colony of Melos, an island near Athens to the east of the Peloponnese. Before the Athenians lay siege to the city, they confer with the Melians in order to bring them into the empire on favourable terms. The Melians request a private conference, and so this debate, which takes place on Melos, takes the form of a dialogue between representatives of Athens and the island.

30 Ibid., pp. 68–71. 84 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan

The Melian dialogue (V: 85–111), 416 BC

The Athenians, who are clearly capable of taking the city of Melos by force, offer the Melians liberal terms if they will join the empire without a fight. The Melians refuse and offer various reasons why Athens would be better served by allowing them to maintain their neutral position. They appeal to the motive of ‘profit’ or rational self-interest, even to the extent of subsuming under it the motive of ‘honour’ with its moral implications. The Athenians, according to the Melians, have an interest in recognizing them as neutral friends. However, the Athenians make it clear that they cannot accept Melian neutrality. According to the Athenian delegation, Athens is more afraid of losing her power position than of continuing to alienate Sparta and its allies. Security considerations, especially with respect to a perceived internal threat, now dominate even considerations of rational self-interest, and the Athenians cannot afford to allow city-states to stay out of the empire when this could make them appear weak to others. Thus, the traditional option of neutrality ceases to be viable, as both Athens and Sparta increasingly rely on a simple friend or foe scheme. When the Melians refuse the Athenian terms, the Athenians lay siege to the city, starve its inhabitants into submission, and eventually put all men to death and enslave all women and children. This incident, especially if compared with the earlier treatment of Mytilene, shows the extent to which, in Athenian minds, the goal of security has taken precedence over all other considerations, particularly those of justice and morality. The motives of ‘profit’ as well as social recognition have become subsumed under the motive of fear, which means that they have been reinterpreted to the extent that they do not operate effectively as independent motives at all. Shortly after the Melian dialogue, the Sicilian city of Egesta offers Athens money if she will aid her in a conflict with her immediate neighbour Selinus, which is backed by Syracuse, the largest city in Sicily. Athens is tempted to undertake the expedition on the pretext of helping Egesta, because the Athenians, blocked in the east by the Persian empire, have long had an interest in expanding their own sphere of influence to the west. An assembly is called in Athens at which Nicias and Alcibiades, the leading conservative and radical politicians of the day respectively, lead the debate.

The debate on the Sicilian expedition (VI: 9–23), 415 BC

This debate focuses mainly on the issue of security. Nicias, who played an important role in forging the peace named after him, opposes the expedition on the grounds that it is too dangerous, since Sparta and its allies are looking for an excuse to break the peace and attack Athens. Alcibiades, eager to lead the expedition himself, dis- misses these concerns, arguing that internal and external strife among the Sicilian cities offers a unique opportunity to expand the Athenian empire. Indeed, Alcibiades claims that Athens must continue to expand the empire in order to protect itself from destruction through stasis. Thucydides suggests that this new argument is of Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 85 special significance. The Athenian leaders have become so afraid of their enemies, be they at home or abroad, that their actions become almost entirely driven by this fear. The same need for security which led Athens to deny neutrality to the Melians now leads the city to launch an expeditionary force in an attempt to silence opposition at home. This debate is particularly interesting because of the way in which the speakers attack one another on a personal level. Both Nicias and Alcibiades appear willing to use any argument in order to win a majority in the assembly. They appear to be motivated by personal, not community interest. When the assembly, at the end of the first day, overwhelmingly votes in favour of the expedition, Nicias tries to make the Athenians reconsider by exaggerating the sacrifices Athens will have to make in order to see the policy succeed. Due to an earlier conflict, anti-Syracusan sentiment in Athens is high, and Nicias’ plan fails when the assembly grants him all the support he asks for. Clearly, the expedition to Sicily is motivated primarily by fear, rather than by calculations of ‘profit’ or considerations of ‘honour.’ The Athenians lose no time in sending out expeditionary forces, since they intend to surprise their enemies. They have not even reached their destination, however, when Alcibiades is called back to Athens to be put to trial for allegations of sacrilege. Even prior to his departure, it has become clear that the additional support from Athens expected by the forces in Sicily is not forthcoming. It is now even more important for the Athenians that internal dissension within the city of Syracuse will give them a decisive advantage. At this point, Thucydides allows us to assess this prospect by describing the climate of opinion within the city of Syracuse.

The debate at Syracuse (VI: 33–41), 415 BC

The Syracusans call an assembly when they hear rumours of the Athenian expedition. At this debate, the conservative leader Hermocrates urges the Syracusans to stop the Athenian forces before they can reach Sicily. The democratic leader, Athenagoras, denies the possibility of an attack by Athens and claims that the rumour of an Athenian expedition is being spread by oligarchs who want to regain power by appealing to the people’s fears. Finally, an unnamed general proposes the policy that would win the war for Syracuse: the city should bury its political divisions and act as one, doing everything necessary to overcome the threat from the outside. The general argues that such prudence is in the long-term interest of the city, thus serving the proﬁt motive. The Syracusans decide to take some precautions against a possible Athenian attack.

The debate at Camarina (VI: 76–87), 415/14 BC

After an Athenian victory over Syracuse on the Helorus Road, both cities attempt to win the support of Camarina on the southwest coast of Sicily. Representatives from Athens and Syracuse come to Camarina for a debate. The Athenians tell the citizens of Camarina: ‘We have told you that we hold our dominion yonder upon fear; and 86 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan that upon the same cause we come hither now, by the help of our friends to assure the cities here …’.31 Thus, the Athenians themselves now stress the primacy of the fear motive over the motives of ‘honour’ and ‘profit’. The Camarinans are not convinced of the non-aggressive intentions of Athens and decide to remain neutral in the conflict. Like the Syracusans, they choose prudence and moderation as being in their best interest over an active pursuit of increased military security. Both debates in Sicily provide a striking contrast between the reasoning of the Athenians, and that of the Sicilian cities. By this time, the Athenians have come to rely on ideology to justify the enormous sacrifices necessary to keep fighting the war. Threat perceptions are coloured by this ideology and Athenian foreign policy motivation is heavily unbalanced in favour of the security goal. In contrast, the Sicilian cities betray a concern with all three motives. Their motivation is more balanced than that of Athens, their reasoning less clouded by ideology. This is perhaps an important reason for their success against an Athens whose good judg- ment is becoming increasingly undermined under the strain of the war effort. From this time on, the Athenian war effort is doomed. In 413, Syracuse, aided by the Spartan general Gylippus, defeats the Athenian expedition and inflicts grievous losses on the Athenian forces. In 412, many of Athens’ allies rebel, and in 411 the democratic government of Athens is overturned in favour of an interim oligarchic arrangement known as the Four Hundred. The Athenian fleet forces a return to democracy the following year. The History of Thucydides ends abruptly at this point. It is likely that he did not live to continue his account of the war down to its end in 404, when Athens was finally defeated by Sparta. As this brief summary of the History of the Peloponnesian War shows, a consideration of all three of the stipulated foreign policy motives can enhance our understanding of the foreign policy decisions involved this conflict. One of the benefits of analysing the making of foreign policy using the suggested framework is that it helps us to understand the reasons for political decisions by showing how political outcomes are linked to the motivational dispositions of relevant actors. In addition, the in-depth study of historical developments provides some insight into how such dispositions themselves change over time in response to exterior events. In particular, the Peloponnesian War can serve as a useful illustration of the role and impact of ideological reasoning in its relation to motivational imbalance and resulting perceptual biases.

The impact of ideology

The dominant motive for the main protagonists at the end of the History of the Peloponnesian War is the motive of fear. However, security issues at the time of the Sicilian expedition are very different from what they were at the beginning of the war. In 431 BC, even the Corinthians had not viewed the very existence of the Athenian empire as tantamount to a direct threat to their survival. To be sure, they were worried by the power of Athens, yet it would have been enough to put Athens in its place, perhaps force her to tear down the long walls which protected her access

31 Thuc. 6.83. Hobbes’s Thucydides, p. 436. Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 87 to the sea. After the empire had become ‘Atticized’ and Athens had become the ‘tyrant’ city, the enemies of Athens required much harsher measures in order to feel safe. This is in large part due to the impact of ideological reasoning on both the relevant actors’ perceptions of actual situations and their ranking of different motives and goals. Ideologies are by nature expansive. While their core ideas may emerge in a certain well-defined policy area, the strength of ideological convictions combined with the human need to minimize cognitive dissonance leads to the subsumption of other issue areas under the main topic of ideological concern. A motivational balance exists when all three basic motives are considered as separate components. If any one of those motives is defined in terms of another, it is subsumed and therefore ceases to exist as a motivational force in its own right. Where the motivational balance is disturbed in this way, ideological arguments are commonly used to justify this state of affairs, leading to a further degeneration of rational political discourse. In the case of the Peloponnesian War, we can observe how first community, and later prosperity interests, were progressively redefined to allow for the absolute primacy of the motive of security, which had come to form the core of Athenian imperialist ideology. First, arguments from moral conviction, traditional norms, or a sense of traditional community began to be used more and more as mere cover-ups for real power political interests. This rhetoric served to obscure an actual trans- formation of international as well as domestic norms. At the beginning of the war, Athens, Corinth, and Sparta were careful to consider their responsibilities within the existing legal framework. Although neutrality was a tenuous principle, it was initially respected. During the Peace of Nicias, it was evident that neutrality had become less acceptable. By the time the Athenians had sailed to Sicily, third party attempts at neutrality were interpreted as acts of open hostility by both main protagonists. What is more, external threats became progressively internalized. Athenian fears of revolt within the empire gradually expanded to include heightened fears of internal revolt within Athens itself. Under the pressures of war, the politics of the city became more personalized. Reasoned debate gave way to demagoguery, and personal fears and ambitions, rather than a concern for the common good, began to drive Athenian policymaking. Eventually, Athens was to succumb to internal strife as much as to external resistance. Communities were redefined to fit the friend-foe pattern which was driving the conflict. The empire was ‘Atticized’ as Athens requested unconditional surrender from its allies. In response, enemies of the Delian League, who had previously argued that Athens acted as an imperial power which suppressed its subject cities, now claimed that once Athenian territory had become ‘Atticized’, it was perfectly acceptable to treat those subject cities as enemies, just like Athens itself. The racial differences between Dorians and Ionians, which had been meaningless during the Persian War and hardly seemed relevant at the beginning of this conflict, became essential in its later phases. Similarly, the difference between cities ruled by the demos and those ruled by oligarchs became crucial as the war developed, even though it is reasonable to assume that many Greeks realized that such differences in arrange- ments were often a function of chance or circumstance. In the end, it became possible for the participants to conceive of the war as a conflict between democratic city-states led by Athens and oligarchic city-states led by Sparta. 88 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan

In order to gain insight into the progressively ideological character of Athenian foreign policymaking, it is necessary to make note of the way in which Athenian beliefs concerning community shifted towards a more exclusive identity as the conflict progressed. As they make clear in their speech before the Spartan Assembly in 433, the Athenians perceive of justice and morality as constraining forces which limit their freedom to act in their own interest. They admit that among equals, that is within a community, such constraints are legitimized by necessity. Thus, they attempt to reduce the number of their equals by removing themselves from the community of independent city-states as it existed under the Thirty Years’ peace treaty. By increasing their own power to the extent where they can dominate all other communities, they gain freedom in their inter-city relations from community concerns such as lawfulness or morality. The underlying philosophy of the Athenian thesis is part of a political strategy which leaves the Athenians free to pursue their partial self-interest without the limitations imposed by a recognition of the needs and opinions of other members of the political realm. The argumentative strategy of the Athenians is ultimately self-defeating. The weakening of the concept of community which, in this case, goes along with its redefinition in more exclusive terms is progressive and does not stop at the city gates. The unity of the city of Athens itself is progressively lost as individual and factional interests take precedence over Athenian community concerns. ‘Us against them’ becomes ‘me against you’—a condition of manifest or latent stasis which parallels Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’. As ably demonstrated by the ‘father’ of political realism, in such a ‘war of all against all’ fear must of necessity become the dominant human passion.32 As the war progressed, prosperity interests as well began to be subsumed under and dominated by the dominant goal of security. At the beginning of the war, Corinth and Athens could be seen to calculate their power advantages in economic, military, and diplomatic terms. All these areas of interest had a bearing on security issues, yet they were also distinct from such issues and from one another. In 425 BC Athens turned down the Spartan peace offer because she expected further gains from the war. However, by the time Athens decided to undertake the Sicilian expedition, cost was no longer a major concern. The city was intent on embarking on this venture regardless of the enormous sacrifices needed in terms of resources. Unlike in the minds of the citizens of the Sicilian city-states, in the minds of the Athenians the quest for security clearly overwhelmed calculations of interest. This was at least partly the function of the decay of Athenian political discourse as it was so astutely observed by Thucydides. When the war began, states and their leaders had clearly attempted to develop war strategies which would be rational under the circumstances, in the sense that they would maximize benefits and minimize costs. The motive of self-interest was strong enough to make such an approach seem necessary. As the war continued to require greater sacrifices, politicians redefined the benefits to be gained in order to keep up popular support for the war effort. One example can be found in a speech by Pericles, in which he tells the Athenians not to be too disturbed by the loss of their properties in Attica, because the idea of Athens, which they are fighting for, is

32 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge, 1991, 1651), p. 89. Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 89 so valuable that it cannot even be assessed in monetary terms.33 Such arguments required considerable rhetorical skills, which in turn supported the rise of demagogues in the political landscape of Athens. With democratic politics in Athens at their worst, before long the war effort had become so irrational that the Athenians were in no mood even to discuss the costs of the Sicilian expedition. It is clear that ideological arguments functioned to simplify the complex reality of the war in the minds of its participants. The pressures which the war imposed in terms of an extreme scarcity of decision-time and other resources led to an increased reliance on ideological schemata as cognitive shortcuts. Under such conditions, goal- directed behaviour becomes more difficult to identify, as lines of reasoning are obscured, either inadvertently, due to a lack of cognitive resources, or deliberately, in the service of an ideology. The loss of both prudence and moral restraint which Thucydides perceives is largely tied to an increased influence of ideology in the policymaking process. As each side felt the pressures of war, it sought more effective ways of persuading itself and others to continue the war effort. Community and prosperity goals were sacri- ficed to a martial ideology which increasingly overpowered all other considerations and, in the end, led to Athens’ tragic demise.

Summary and conclusions

We believe with Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser that to understand foreign policy decisions ‘we need to combine our knowledge of types of people with types of situations and to explore the combinatorial rules of thumb by which citizens make choices’.34 However, much theoretical groundwork remains to be done in order to make possible the systematic consideration of dispositional factors, such as motivation, as well as of patterns in perceptions of situations and events in foreign policy analysis. In our attempt to contribute to this effort, we have proceeded in the following manner: We first suggested a model of foreign policy motivation which stipulates that there are three basic foreign policy motives, fear, ‘profit’ or self-interest, and ‘honour’ or the desire for social recognition, best understood in relation to three corresponding goals, security, prosperity, and community. We then analysed crucial events in the History of the Peloponnesian War in order to show that our reference system of three motives or goals can be usefully employed to further our understanding of the foreign policy decisions involved in one of the classic conflicts of Western civilization. Important theoretical, normative, and practical policy conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, our framework, which provides a more comprehensive model of foreign policy motivation than extant general theories, can contribute valuable insights into the political decisions which comprise this interstate conflict. Its application shows that the motives of fear, ‘profit’, and social recognition all need

33 Thuc. 2.60.1 to 2.64.6. 34 Richard K. Herrmann, Philip E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Visser, ‘Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework’, American Political Science Review, 93:3 (1999), p. 569. 90 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan to be taken into account as independent psychological driving forces behind foreign policy decisions. Assessing the relative potency of each holds the promise of enabling us to better explain speciﬁc positions and actions. From a normative perspective, this application of our framework is valuable because it sheds light on the consequences which ensue when we allow perceptions which are clouded by ideological motivation to dominate in the pursuit of other relevant values. We have gathered some evidence which supports the suspicion that motivational imbalance, expressed in and reinforced through the use of ideology in foreign policy decision- making, undermines the rationality of the policymaking process. Further examination of this possibility seems in order. Finally, from a practical policy perspective, our framework is useful because it encourages and can help enable policymakers to think carefully about their dispositions toward various foreign policy goals.