Review of International Studies (2001), 27, 69–90 Copyright © British International Studies Association ‘Chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit’: an analysis of foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War WILLIAM O. CHITTICK AND ANNETTE FREYBERG-INAN Abstract. This article applies a three-dimensional framework for the analysis of the role of motivation in foreign policy decision-making to the foreign policy decisions of individuals and cities in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. First, the authors briefly intro- duce their framework for analysis. Using the speeches in Thucydides to explicate the motives and goals of individuals and cities, the authors then trace the relationships between the motivational dispositions of foreign policy actors and their foreign policy behaviour. In so doing, they demonstrate both the relevance of a concern with individual motivation for foreign policy analysis and the usefulness of their analytical framework for studying the impact of the relevant motives. The authors also show how ideological statements can be ana- lysed to determine the relative salience of individual motives and collective goals, suggesting a relationship between ideological reasoning and motivational imbalance which can adversely affect the policymaking process. In conclusion, they briefly assess the theoretical and norma- tive as well as practical policy implications of their observations. Introduction The study of foreign policy entails the analysis of human reactions to the threats, challenges, and opportunities presented by the international environment. However, foreign policy decision-makers do not react directly to situations or events. Instead, they react according to the ways in which they perceive and interpret those situations and events. Moreover, perceptions and interpretations of foreign policy situations are partly affected by actors’ preferences concerning the outcomes or consequences of possible courses of action. Such preferences are shaped by actors’ motives, those basic psychological driving forces which determine which particular goals the actor will pursue. The principal approaches to the study of foreign policy employ highly parsi- monious assumptions concerning decision-makers’ motivation. As we have shown elsewhere, realist and neorealist theories rely almost exclusively on the motive of fear and the corresponding goals of power and security. Liberal and neoliberal theories concentrate on the motive of ‘profit’ and the goal of prosperity; and sociological institutionalist and constructivist theories are concerned primarily with the motive of social recognition or the goal of community.1 All of the above approaches may be useful in cases in which the assumed motivation does indeed represent the decision- 1 See William O. Chittick and Annette Freyberg-Inan, ‘Fear, Pride, and Profit: A Three-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Basic Motivation on Foreign Policy Decisions Concerning the Use of Force’, in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia (eds.), Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (London: Routledge, 2000). 69 70 William O.Chittick and Annette Freyburg-Inan maker’s relevant preferences. However, we believe that in most foreign policy decisions, all three of the motives mentioned above: fear, ‘profit,’ and social recog- nition, play a significant role and that it would therefore make sense to base attempts at explaining foreign policy behaviour on a more complete assessment of the decision-makers’ motivation. Using survey data, Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis have shown that a three-factor solution in which all of the above motives are included separately, better accounts for the foreign policy intentions of individuals than either a one-factor or a two-factor solution.2 Here, we investigate whether all three motives are equally useful in accounting for the actual foreign policy behaviour of historical decision-makers. Elsewhere we have more fully developed a framework for incorporating a concern with all three of these motives into the study of foreign policy.3 That framework associates each of those motives—fear, ‘profit,’ and social recognition—with one general foreign policy goal—security, prosperity, and community, respectively. We posit that systematic differences among individuals form one primary dimension of variance for each of these basic goals. This dimension is described in terms of polar differences (1) in an actor’s basic perceptions concerning the relevant characteristics of its environment, (2) in the actor’s choice of strategic goals, and (3) in the actor’s choice of strategic means. In the following, we will briefly summarize the most relevant characteristics of our framework. The motive of fear compels human beings to seek security in the form of protection from and advantage in conflicts with others and ensures immediate physical survival. Actors perceive their security environment to be more or less com- petitive. We hypothesize that the more competitive an actor perceives the relation- ship between its community and those threatening its security, the more salient the motive of fear. Vice versa, the more cooperative an actor perceives the relationship between its community and those representing potential threats, the less salient the motive of fear. The positions foreign policy actors take towards possible security threats depend on whether they perceive the relationships between themselves and the relevant others as essentially competitive or cooperative. Actors’ choice of strategic security goals thus reflects preferences analogous to the cooperative–competitive perceptual dimension. We hypothesize that if an actor perceives a potentially threatening situation to be highly competitive, then the actor is more likely to seek superior relative power, domination at the extreme, as its strategic goal. If the actor perceives a potentially threatening situation to be less competitive, then the actor is more likely to seek a mutual understanding or even accommodation as its strategic goal. An actor’s choice of strategic security goals also affects its preferences for the means used to obtain security. If a foreign policy actor believes that domination of a poten- tial enemy is necessary for its security, that actor will be more prepared to use or threaten force, that is to adopt militarist policies. If an actor seeks accommodation, that actor will prefer non-coercive, non-militarist methods of dealing with security issues. 2 William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis, ‘A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs’, International Studies Quarterly, 39 (1995), pp. 313–31. 3 Chittick and Freyberg-Inan, ‘Fear, Pride, and Profit’. Foreign policy motivation in the Peloponnesian War 71 Whereas the motive of fear arises from a perception of threats, the motive of ‘profit’ arises from a perception of, or need for, opportunities. This motive inspires the pursuit of all those resources which, as for example, money, education, or personal rights, are expected to better human beings’ life circumstances. It is thus to be understood not in a narrow, strictly material sense, but, analogous to liberal conceptions of individual preferences, as a broader conception of the national interest. Those perceptions most relevant to the pursuit of ‘profit’ concern an actor’s own status and capabilities relative to those of the other relevant actors. We hypothesize that, generally, if an actor perceives itself as superior to those others, then the actor will be prepared to interact with them. If an actor perceives itself as inferior in capabilities to those others, then it will be hesitant to interact. Foreign policy actors’ responses to opportunities for ‘profit’ depend on their perceptions concerning their relative strength. Such perceptions thus affect the strategic goals actors pursue with respect to the basic foreign policy goal of pros- perity. We hypothesize that if an actor perceives itself to be inferior in capabilities to relevant others, it will be more likely to pursue a foreign policy of isolation. Vice versa, if the actor perceives itself to be in a superior position, it will favour a foreign policy of interdependence. The socioeconomic goals of isolation on the one hand and interdependence on the other also affect the relevant strategic means preferred by foreign policy actors. An actor who pursues an isolationist policy will be more likely to employ protectionist policies. An actor who favours a policy of inter- dependence, on the other hand, will strive for active involvement in the free trade of goods, services, money, and ideas. The motive of social recognition inspires actors to attempt integration into a community, which can provide more protection and comfort than any actor would be able to secure for itself. In order to be part of such a community, actors accept and internalize, at least to some extent, that community’s norms and rules of behaviour and, in turn, become able to shape the nature and conduct of the collectivity. Those perceptions most relevant to the pursuit of social recognition concern the conditions for communal identification with other relevant actors. Actors perceive their communities to be more or less exclusive. We hypothesize that if an actor emphasizes those values which make its own community unique, then that actor will feature an exclusive identity that clearly separates the community from its environment; if an actor stresses values its community holds in common with others,