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VOL. 46 No. 10 the Medal Collector 25 Decree of April 19, 1945. AlexanderM. Vasilievsky, 1895-1977, Marshal of the Soviet Union, awarded a second Order of Victory. Decree of April 26, 1945. Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, 1898-1967, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Commander, Eighth Guards Army; Commander, Southern and Southwest Fronts; Figure 8 Marshal Alexander M. Vasilievsky, wearing two Orders of Victory. VOL. 46 No. 10 The Medal Collector 25 Commander, Third Ukrainian Front; Commander, Second Ukrainian Front during offensive operations in Ukraine, Romania, Hungary., Austria and Czechoslovakia 1943-45; Commander, Transbaikal Front in the war with Japan 1945. Commander, Far Eastern Military District; Commander-in-Chief Soviet Forces in the Far East 1945-46. Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin, 1894-1949, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Commander 57th Army -- Stalingrad; Commander, Southern Front; Commander, Fourth Ukrainian Front; Commander, Third Ukrainian Front; Commanded the Caucasus and Crimean Fronts. Liberated the Donbas and Crimea from German occupation. Skillfully organized battle operations with the Armies of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and liberated Belgrad, Budapest, Balaton and Vienna. Decree of May 31, 1945. Leonid A. Govorov, 1897-1955, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Commander of Moscow Defenses 1941; Commander, Army Group North; Commanded the defensive forces of the Leningrad through out the war. In 1944 he began offensive operations and broke the blockade of the city. lie commanded the Second and Third Baltic Fronts in the liberation of Estonia. Decree of June 4, 1945. AlexeilnnokentyevichAntonov, 1896-1962, Army General, Chief of Operations, Soviet General Staff, from December 1942. From April 1943 he served simultaneously as First Deputy Chief of Staff. Chief of General Staff February 1945-March 1946. Semyon Konstaninovich Timoshenko, 1895-1970, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Commander, Western Front; Commander, Southwest Front; Commander, Rostov Counter Offensive 1941; Overall Commander of Stalingrad Front; Supreme Command of the West and South-West; Commander North Caucasus Front. Decree of June 26, 1945. Joseph (Iosiy’) Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili Stalin, 1879-1953, Political Leader of the Communist Party and Soviet State, awarded a second Order of Victory. 26 The Medal Collector VOL. 46 No.10 Decree of September 8, 1945. Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, 1897-1968, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Commander, Volkhov Front and led the breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade; Commanded the Karel Front which liberated Karelia and the Soviet Polar Region into Northern Norway; Commander, Transbaykal Front- Mongolia; Commanded First Far East Front into East Manchuria and North Korea. Foreign Recipients: G. K. Zhukov in his book"Remembrances and Thoughts" described the awarding of the Order of Victory to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, General of the Army, Dwight David Eisenhower and the Commander of the British Army, Fieldmarshal Bernard Law Montgomery: "On June 5, 1945, D. Eisenhower, B. Montgomery, and J. Delatr de Tassinie came to Berlin for the signing of the Declaration of the Surrender of Germany and the assumption of power in Germany by Soviet, American, English and French governments. "Before the meeting, Eisenhower came to me with his staff and awarded me the high.est military award of the United States, the Legion of Merit, Chief Commander. After they left, I called Stalin and reported the incident to him. He said, ’In our turn we must award Eisenhower and Montgomery the Order of Victory, and Delatr de Tasinie the Order of Suvorov, 1st Class.’" That same day Zhukov presented Eisenhower and Montgomery with the Order of Victory. This was also the first time Zhukov had met Montgomery. Decree of June 5, 1945. Dwight David Eisenhower, 1890-1969, General of the Army, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. Commanded forces in North Africa and Mediterranean area before becoming overall Allied Supreme Commander. Elected 34th President of the United States, 1953 - 1961. Also awarded the order of Suvorov, 1st Class, No. 118. Bernard Law Montgomery, 1887-1976, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, British Field Marshal, Commander of the Twenty-first Allied Army Group in Europe. Evacuated British troops from Dunkirk. Commanded British 8th Army against Rommel in North Africa and the invasion of Sicily and Italy. Commander of British forces at Normandy and into Belgium, Netherlands and Northern Germany. VOL. 46 No. 10 The Medal Collector 27 .
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