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The Battle of Stalingrad

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The Battle of Stalingrad The Battle of Stalingrad The Bloodiest Battle in Recorded History Garrick Phimister Sid Grover Ziyi Zhang Ben Redfern William Kesten-Orange 8th December 2016 Abstract This material was extracted from the DH100 wordpress website at http://wludh.ca/dh100/2016/T3/G2/M3/. Contents Contents i 1 Aspects of The Battle 1 1.1 Timeline ............................... 2 1.2 Media ................................. 5 2 Significance of The Battle 9 3 Fun Facts 11 3.1 Russians ............................... 11 3.2 Germans ............................... 12 4 Conclusion / Aftermath 15 5 Axis / Soviet Strategies 17 5.1 German ................................ 17 5.2 German Operations ......................... 18 5.3 Soviet Union ............................. 18 5.4 Soviet Operations .......................... 19 Bibliography 21 i 1. Aspects of The Battle On the eve of July 17th, 1942, a war within the war began as the Germans make their stand in claim of Stalingrad (now Volgograd). From that day until the sun set upon the night of February 2’nd, 1943, many men had fallen, and many in- nocent lives were lost. As both Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin understood the key significance of Stalingrad for both its transportation and industrial us, they each had purpose to claim the land as their own. As the Russians had success- fully defended their city from German forces, the battle is now considered to be the single most crucial battle of the Great Patriotic War. This was the battle in which initially stopped the advancement of the Germans and eventually aided in the victory of the allies. German forces had been rallying and claiming land in and around the Aksay River, Kuban River, Kalach, Armavir, Yeysk, and Krasnodar. All of these claims made before August 25th, 1942, when Stalingrad was officially and formally declared under siege from the German Army. By September 3rd, 1942, the Ger- man 6th army had reached the outskirts of Stalingrad. While working their way into and through the city, they had fought their way through the streets, killing many innocent lives of women, children, and men. By mid-September the Swastika flag had been raised in the center of the city, this to indicate the Germans advancement and minor victories thus far. The Russians saw this battle somewhat like a campaign, and had eventually moved into the southernmost corners of their country to further rally troops and col- lect support from its people. With this now larger supply of troops, the Soviets claimed their place along the Volga River, in a perfect vantage point for attack- ing the Caucasus troops of the Germans. As it is highly regarded as the bloodiest battle in recorded history with rounding 2 million casualties, each side of the battle seemed to have their own opinions of what had truly happened. The Russians regard the battle as the Greatest Battle of the Second World War, while the German people seem to remember the battle as a Rattenkrieg, or Rat War. Many tactics were used throughout, 1 1. Aspects of The Battle for example an attack focused upon encircling the enemy, replication that of Hannibal in 212 B.C. when he had initially sought after war with the Romans. Throughout the battle, many moments occurred to support the German memory of a Rattenkrieg. The Soviets surrounded the army of General Paulus in order to claim their surrender, but instead slaughtered the group, much alike swine in a slaughterhouse. However it was not only the Russians using well proven military strategy. On the 25th of November 1942, the Germans, low on supplies, ammunition, and in need of troops calls upon the Luftwaffe to airdrop supplies as well as men for larger squadrons to be forged on land and by air. In doing so, the Ger- mans had hoped to take Stalingrad quickly (within a few days), however when the 4th German Panzer army launched Operation Winter, the Soviets had built a defense too strong for the Germans to penetrate. In saying this, the operation failed miserably resulting in the death of hundreds of troops. Once the winter had approached battle conditions worsened, as did the troops. The German 6th army was promised Arial support, warmed shelter, and food provided they leave their post briefly. However, although tempted, Hitler would not allow the troops to stand off guard for even a moment. Do to this series of events, upon the earliest hours of morning on February 2nd, 1943, 91,000 men were forced to surrender, while nearly 150,000 had died in a final stand of defiance. From this point on, Stalingrad remained on the offensive for the rest of the war. 1.1 Timeline 1942 July 28th – Joseph Stalin issues “not one step backward” to his troops and Generals. 1942 August 4th – Elements of the German Army cross the Aksay River toward Stalingrad. 1942 August 6th – The German Army crosses the Kuban River near Armavir 1942 August 7th – Elements of the German Army attack Soviet forces near Kalach. 1942 August 9th 2 1.1. Timeline – The German Army captures the strategic post of Yeysk and Krasnodar on the Sea of Azov. 1942 August 14th – German forces cross the Kuban river near Krasnador. 1942 August 19th – German General Paulus and his 6th Army is ordered to attack the Soviet city of Stalingrad. 1942 August 25th – Stalingrad is officially under siege by the German Army. 1942 September 1st – German Army elements, backed by Romanians cross the Kerch Straits. – The Germans establish a bridgehead over the Terek River. 1942 September 3rd – The Germans enact an offensive aimed at the heart of Stalingrad. 1942 September 6th – The strategic Black Sea port city Novorossiysk falls to the Germans. 1942 September 15 – The Soviet Army is Unleashed on Voronezh. 1942 September 24th – The German Army makes headway toward Tuapse. 1942 October 6th – Malgobek falls to the German Army. 1942 October 9th – The Soviet government hands all military powers to the Soviet Army. 1942 October 14th – Adolf Hitler stops all further offensives against Soviet targets in the region for the year and orders his commanders to hold their positions until 1943. 1942 October 18th – The German drive against Tyapse is stopped by the Soviets. 1942 October 25th – The Germans enact a new offensive in the Caucasus. 1942 November 1st – The Caucasus town of Alagir is captures by the Germans. 1942 November 2nd – The Caucasus town of Ordzhonikidse is captured by the Germans. 1942 November 19th – The Soviets push forward a new two-part offensive – Operation Uranus – 3 1. Aspects of The Battle north of Stalingrad and break through the Romanian-held defenses. 1942 November 20th – Part 2 of Operation Uranus is enacted at the southern end of Stalingrad. – German General Manstein is appointed the commander of Army Group Don. 1942 November 22nd – Two elements of the Sovier Army meets at Kalach, effectively encircling the German 6th Army at Stalingrad. 1942 November 25th – In an effort to resupply their troops, the German Luftwaffe is called upon to exercise airdrops of vital supplies to the German Army. 1942 December 12th – While Hitler rejects any Plea from the German 6th Army to retreat from their position, the 4th Panzer Army is used through Operation Winter Storm in an attempt to relieve the beleaguered German troops at Stalingrad. 1942 December 16th – The Soviet Army puts Operation Little Saturn into effect and attacks Rostov. – The Italian Army goes into full retreat from the Soviet Advances – German Army forces are called off from further offensives at Tuapse. 1942 December 21st – Soviet relief forces and supplies header for Stalingrad are stopped at My- shkova. 1942 December 23rd – All further attempts to relieve Stalingrad are put on hold, indefinitely. 1942 December 24th – The Soviet Army launches a fresh attack at Kotelnikovo, routing its Romanian defenders and putting them into full retreat. 1942 December 28th – German Army Group A is given the official order to retreat from the Cau- casus region. 1943 January 1st – German forces at Terek retreat. 1943 January 8th – Soviet generals send in the formal request fo surrender of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, a request which is formally rejected. 1943 January 10th – Soviet General Rokossovsky unleashes hell on the German 6th Army through thousands of artillery cannons and Katyusha rockats. 4 1.2. Media 1943 January 12th – Soviet troops make headway against the defensive lines at the Don River by Hungarian and Italian troops. – German Caucasus elements make it to their bridgehead over the Kuban River. 1943 January 13th – German Army elements at Terek retreat to the Nagutskoye-Alexsandrovskoye position. 1943 January 14th – In an effort to replenish and build up their army ranks along the East Front, German Generals proposed conscription service of the Baltic people for service. 1943 January 17th – The German Panzer Corps at the Don are officially surrounded. 1943 January 25th – A Soviet offensive splits the German 6th Army at Stalingrad. – German forces at Armavir retreat. – German forces at Voronezh retreat. 1943 January 31st – German General Paulus formally surrenders his southern Stalingrad army to the Soviets. 1943 February 2nd – The German Army north pocket at Stalingrad formally surrenders to the So- viet Army. – The liberation of Stalingrad is officially over. 1.2 Media 5 1. Aspects of The Battle 2.jpg 2.bb 1.jpg 1.bb Figure 1.2: German soldiers in September of 1942 reload- Figure 1.1: A monument to the ing their weapons as they pil- Battle of Stalingrad constructed lage through the streets of Stal- in the years between 1959-67 ingrad, Russia. (In The Streets (Monument 2016) 2016) 6 1.2. Media 3.jpg 3.bb 4.jpg 4.bb Figure 1.3: September 17th 1942, when the Swastika flag was raised in the middle of the city of Stalingrad to sig- Figure 1.4: German troops nify German victories thus far.
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