ARCHIVES 4$ S V :+ .At , CGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KAN

,;g - a

Lc1:+i . ,.I i 'a<; Q; ==;: ;w, ARCHIVES 4$ S v :+ .at , CGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KAN

ACCESSION NO_ PO REGISTRY or-;mmand & General Staff College" SSchool of logistics Ocean Transportation Requirementain Future WWarfare,

Dwight EJohnson J ajor TC

Ocean transportation requirements in furure warfare, by Maj D. E. Johnson.

-1477L&9ck7~~8I

IS A HOLDING OF THE j 2 1 19( ARCH VE SE CTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT IEVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NOf-212,110 COPY NO. ff

CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 13 Mar 51 Mar 52-5M

em711 . r p ' ,t ej ri ';,, tsixs5SS 1

ug ow 0

SDIKtCTIVE

COMMAND ..ND GENIRAL STAFF COLLGE L-4021. SCHOOL OF LOGI TI]

OCEAN TRAiNPOT TION RQUIREM6NTS IN FUTURE WaBRFAE

28 November 1947 4-15 7D~te) T ubject Number)

SUBJECT: OCEN TRaIPORTATION REUIEMENTS' IN FUTUR E WA~FR RE.

PURPOE- To analyze requirements of the various ocean vessel types needed in logistical support of future overseas operations.

SuOPF: 1. Analyze the cargo and personnel vessels used in V 11 to include;

a. Establish numbers and tonnage totals of major types required.

b. Deficiencies in design or construction an in availability of vessels for practical military use as determined by past experience.

2. Analyze probably new vessel requirements and use of existing vessel type in ovesea operations in a future emergency.

a. Compare requirements in W1 11 ;ith probable future requirements in design and capability.

b.. Study the practical value of the existing fleet in military operations of the predict- a ble future.

c. Analyze cargo and passenger vessel tonnage re= quirements in a future war.

3 Recommend:

a. Modifications of existing vessel types necessary to meet military requirements of the future.

b. Tonnage and vessel type requirements: (1 On standby basis. 2) For construction in event of emergency.

CO-ORDINATION tITH OTHE SUBJECTS:

Number Title

4-3 Use and Control of Ocean Shipping For Military Purposes.

8-7 Future Trends in Logistics.

,(W~~1~^ iiiiiM -| I, in1 .iaM^ D^^ «'

: La ii i nYp L UnaD Ports of Embarkation and Related Agencies.

8-11 Logistical Support of amphibious Operations in atomic and Guided Missile Warfare.

M--1018 Utilization of vessels in supply of theaters.

S-15263 Planning use of War Shipping.

H03 a N GENEJALED STaFF COLLEGE U.2 1 1965

SCHOOL OF LOGOITICS FOR aVKN. O.RTH

_ ___sL-402l _ _

SUBJECT: OC EaN TRaNSPORTaTION R ;UIR MnENTS IN FUTURE ''A.RF.RE

1. Problem;-

To analyze requirements of the various ocean vessel types needed in logistical support of future overseas operations. 2. Discussion.-

a. Historical background of our maritime industry.

(1) The United States has been totally unprepared to log-

istically support its armed Farces with its own ocean

transportation throughout our history as a nation.

(2) Foreign Competition and our National policy were ad-

verse factors in enabling our Maritime industry to main-

tain an adequate and balanced Maritime Fleet.

'(3) Because of cheaper foreigh maratime competition a nd

the failure of our national policy to provide adequate

assistance to the American Maritme Industry, Amerthan ocean transportation has been grossly inadequate to meet

our Armed Forces logistical requirements during two major

conflicts within the past twenty five years.

(4) Adequate Logistical planning by the Armed Forces for ocean transportation requirements had not been accom-

plished prior to World War E.

b. Our Maritime Position during and after World War 1.

(1) No National policy was established to provide for an

adquate Maritme support to our armed Forces requirements.

(2) Congress passed the Shipping act of 1916, to build a ,,bridge of ships", because of our National necessity.

(3) Because of our Maritime unpreparedness all our troops and supplies were transported to foreign soil on vessels

of our sorely pressed allies.

pa~02~ (4) The 2300 "bride ofi Ships" constructed by our shipyards

during World War 1 resulted in a National Maritime liabil-

ity.

(5) The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, called the Magna

Charta of our Maritime Industry, established our National

policy. c. Our National Maritime experience of Torld War 11.

(1) a shipbuilding program was in effect upon our entry

into war.

(2) Upon our entry into war, our maritime fleet available

to support our armed Forces consisted of a bout 1100

vessels of w:hich approximately 1000 were obsolete.

(3) Through implementation and acceleration of our ship

building program, our nation, through an all out effort,

broke all world records in types and tonnages of ships

constructed during the period 1939 to 1945.

(4) Construction procedures of simplicity of aesign,

standardization, and production line assembly methods re-

sulted in a large fleet of predominately Liberty-type

vessels which are outmoded in design, slow in speed, ex-

tremely vulnerable to attack, and uneconomical for post

war commercial operation.

(5) Although our nation spent over 15 billion dollars

and built 5171 vessels totaling over 54 million deadweight

tons during 1939 to 1945, our post war fleet remains out

of balance, being deficient in passenger vessels and ineff-

icient in adequate designs and speeds for cargo vessels,

suitable to satisfy our commercial requirements or as

auxillaries to our armed Forces.

(6) Our National Policy for the disposition of our sur-

plus vessels was established by Congeessiai.al action in

(2)

Ip H the passage of the Ship Sales Act of 1946 whereby Amertcan

operators and our Allies received purchase priorities of

our surplus vessels.

(7) Our National Policy for disposition of our surplus vessels

wa s predicated on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of our Armed Forces to the Congress.

d. Measures required to maintain our Maritime integrity.

(1) Long range ship construction to assure a retention of a

bala nced fleet and. elimination of obsolete and overiged

vessels.

(2) Initiation of construction'to effect a balanced commercial Maritime fleet.

(3) Strategic planning for ship design and construction re-

quirements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinated with

the Maritime Industry and our National leaders.

(4) Ocean Transportation requirementslemaintained by current pla nning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. That

revision and implementation of such planning be effected

and in consonance -ith research and development and logis-

tical requirements of the Armed Forces and Industry.

(5) Retention of a suitable laidup fleet from our current surplus vessels to be available for emergency utilization

by our Armed Forces.

(6) Strategic planning by Joint Chiefs of Staff be implemented fully by legislation submitted to the Cong ess for appro-

priate action.

3. Recommendations.

a. That our active seagoing Merchant Marine Fleet consist of

a minimum of 1000 vessels of approximately 1~009000 dbad- weight tons, composed of a properly balanced fleet of

passenger, dry-cargo and tanker vessels of the latest de-

sign and speed capabilities. b. That our active fleet be supported by a reserve of inactive

'M~ C:; .~Wb a ships balanced.as to type and maintained in a state of

reasonable preservation and readiness, and dispersed in

strategic points on all our costal areas.

c. That the size and composition of our reserve fleet should be established in accordance with the recommendations of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. That they reserve fleet be placed under the administration

of the Secretary of Defense with the Department of the Navy responsible for inspection, maintenance and repairs of the

floating reserve.

e. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiate strategic plans for

a long range ship building program based on strategic con- cepts and/or mobilization plans; these plans should envisage

phased construction periods in consonance pith phased mobili-

zation periods and the calculated vessel losses expected

during such phased periods. f. That the long range strategic plans for ship construction

be reviewed at least annually and be kept current by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

g. That proposed legislation covering the strategic ship con-

struction plans be submitted to the Congress at an early date

and that Congress be kept currently informed of any proposed

changes in plans -where legislative action is indicated.

h. That Annex 3 be dispatched to the Director, Logistics Divi- sion, General Staff, Department of the Army, forwarding this

report.

ANNEX 1 Analytical Study g . 0 son SNEX 2 Bibliography Majo TC "NN~X 3 Draft of Transmittal ANNEX 4 MERCHANT Vessels,Design & Construction 1939-1945

(4) _ --. e D. ,JOHNSON ' . a MAJOR TLN 1

I. Historical Background of our Maritime Indusrty.

1. Merchant ships have long been looked upon as auxillartes of

a country's Armed Forces as well a s vessels of trade. The Honorable James Forrestal, Secretary of National Defense,-has

stated that, "a vigorous merchant marine is essention to our

national safety". President Truman's Committee on Universal Military Training, in outlining the principles of a basic pro-

gram for national security, said; "The functions of merchant

ships is not limited to their commercial activities and industrial potential, but is intimately related to national security".

2. a ma tion's Merchant Marine or Commercial Fleet consists of

all its vessels engaged in water-borne trade, bosh ocean-going

and coastwise. It is not a part of the Navy, :which is some- times known as the Naval or Armed Marine of a nation.

3. Shipping is vital to a nation's transportation ~:nd trade, for no nation in the world has rithin its. own borders all that it needs for modern life. Switzerland, though hundredsof miles

from the sea, has merchant ships of her own..

4. In most countries, merchant ships are operated in peacetime

by private individuals or companies uhaier government supervision. The private operators may own the ships outright or charter

(rent) them if they are owned by the government. In some coun-

tries the government itself operates merchant ships as general

practice, in others, only under special circumstances, as the United States is doing now in the emergency food and passenger

program between the United States and Europe. 5. In war, shipping assumes special importance. No country has

within its own borders all that it needs for fighting a was.

War production requires a stepped up and continuous flow of materials, many of which can be brought into the country by water

only. In addition, troops, weapons and supplies must be trans-

ported to various theatres of action over vast ocean areas. 6. No na tion in history has been able to mintain a position

of leadership or -orld importance without Naval and Merchant sea

power, ancient Phonecia and Carthage, 15th century Portugal and

16th century Spain became dominant through powerful Naval and

Merchant fleets; but each of these countries, as its sea power

ebbed, lost its place as a major nation. The defeat of the

Spanish Armada by the British in 1588 tumbled Spain from world

leadership. Britain, for more than three centuries, has been a

leading world power, largely because of her great Naval and Mer-

chant Fleets. hen the Japanese made their bid or world promi-

nence and lea dership in the Pacific, they concentrated on build-

ing shi-s, merchant as well as NaVal. In "'orld War II, our Allies

staved off the Axis for two years ;hile we built, amoung other

things, the merchant fleet in which we were so deficient and so

vitally needed.

7. The history of American shipping and our Merchant Marine has

been a story of ups and downs. From the Revolution to the Civil'

War, our population was concentrated aroung sea and river ports.

Se were dependent on Europe for manufactured products in ex-

change for our raw materials and agricultural products. There was

a vast supply of timber close to the sea for building the wooden

ships of the times. as a result, the American flag sonn flew in

almost every known port of the world.

8. To preserve our Maritime rights on the high seas, we fought

the war of 1812. From 1840 to 1860, in the era of the rakish Clipp-

er ships (an American development) we led the iorld in the

quality and speed of our merchant vessels. In volume of trade,

we ere second only to Great Britain.

9. During this early period, government backing was given to

to American ship builders and operators by laws keeping foreign

ships out of strictly American trade, that is, trade up and down

our coasts. Aid was also given in the form of tariff protection

and, for a short time, through ma.il-carrying contracts. However,

the industry 'was under private ownership and the ships privately

own e d . r

(2) 10. With the Civil War and after, imnerican foreign ~

suffered a sharp decline. The chaos of this war drove most of the

operators out of business. Some of the vessels were lost as ,,prizesT at sea. Others, registered under foreign flags for protection during the war were not permitted to return to United States Registry,

thereafter.

11. In addition, wooden ships, that we could build cheaply and

easily, began to be replaced by steel-hulled na steam-driven

vessels that we ;ere not equipped to build as cheaply as could Eng- land and other European nations. Consequently, American shippers foun it difficult to compete with foreign shippers or to attract

American investors.

12. At the same time, our push toward the west after the discovery of gold, together with the internal expansion following the Civil

War, offered opportunities for investment in business enterprises yeilding large and sure financial return, Private capital was

further alienated from ship building and ship operation. The

nation's interest -=as mainly internal rather than external, and our merchant fleet declined t a point where it was hardly worthy

of the name. 13,. In 1898, at the start of the War with Spain, for example,

we were compelled to hire ships from other nations to supply our

forces in Cuba. Fortunately,. we were able to do this because other nations just happened to be at peace at the time and were in a

position to divert their shipping to our needs for ;which they were

compensated at an excessive maritime profit due to the extra

assumed wattime shipping hazards involved.

14. The Spanish War experiences did not sink in or exercise a

realistic effect upon our nation from the standpoint of an adequate

maritime fleet for security to a national defense. In 1908, Presi-

dent Theodore Roosevelt sent ourNavy on a orld tour and it was necessary to charter merchant ships from other nations to carry

our necessary Naval Supplies on this venture. He warned the nation

then, regarding the dangers of not having a substantial merchant

marine, but the warning went unheeded and had little or no effect upon our national leaders. A2~p; a 15. ltogether 19 presidents of our country, represening all

political parties, have advocated a strong merchant marine.

Thomas Jefferson in 1793, said, 'The marketing of our products

will be at the mercy of any nation which has possessed itself

exclusively of the means of carrying them; and our policy may

be influenced by Shose who command our commerce.,A s a reaggce

for defense our navigation (shipping) will admit neither neglect

nor forbearance.

(4) II Our Maritime Position During and After World War I.

1. By 1914, although Congress had pa ssed a number of laws de-

signed to develop and encourage merchant shipping, not only Great

Britain, but Germany, Norway anL France were ahead of us in mer-

chant ship tonnage. Only 9 percent, of our commerce with other

nations was being carried in American owned and operated ships.

Share of water-borne United States foreign trade carried

in AmeriCan flag vessels;

Year Percent Year Percent

1900-1904 9.3 1932 35.5

1910-1914 9.4 1937 25.1

1921 51.3 1939 22.2

1927 40.5 1940 28.7

Bureau of the census, Statistical abstract of the United

States, rerrinted from The Post War Foreign Economic Policy of

the U.S. House Report No. 541, 79th Cong., 1st session.

2. When World Tar I broke out in 1914 and our shipping needs

became-desperate the country was aroused to positive corrective

action. This time we did not escape uhharmed. During the three

years before we entered the war, the foreign ships on which we

ha d depended for carrying our commerce, were mobilized in the

service of their own governments and could no longer operate for

us. Even when there was a bit of shipping space available on a

foreign vessel, rates were extremely high and in many cases pro-

hibitive. tmericn ports became glutted with export cargo for

=hich no ships could be obtained. Our cotton growers and other

producers who had to ship their entire output were almost ruined.

3. In this crisis, Congress passed the Shipping Act of 1916,

by which we embarked upon a ship building program calling for a

2300 vessel, "bridge of ships1 t. But this program got under way

slowly. When we entered World War I in 1917, we were forced to

rely mainly upon the already overburdeded British and French

fleets to carry our troops and supplies overseas. Only a few of

the ships built under this program ever saw service during the

war. However, our merchant fleet grew om 8 percent of the

-' ~ r~~.ltr*~(-. ~Pt l ,,( 15 .. ;' F; world's total in 1913 to 30 percent in 1920. By 1921 about 51

percent of our ater-borne foreign commerce :as being carried in

U.S. ships, as compared with 9 percent in 1914. Three Billion

(3,000,000,000) dollars of an"Emergency Nature" bad been spent

beginning in 1916 to bring about the end result.

4. After the armistice was signed, the fleet started during the

-ar -- began to come off the "ways" in quantity. The ships were

by this time, of outmoded design, too slow and inefficient for

peacetime use. However, it was felt necessary that some return

be obtained from our misadventure in shi- building. These vessels

were sold at scrap prices, as low as 10 c ts on the dollar --

to bargain hunting operators ho had little interest in, and no

knowledge of, long range shipping. The examle set by these ships

accounts for the gneral nessimism, in part, about American ship-

npig that prevailed in the 1920's. The superior equipment and

experience of foreign flag competitors, and then a world aide

depression, made the .orld War I Merchant Fleet an ex ensive

and nearly useless item on our nation's books.

5. In 1936 Congress passed the Merchant Marine act, regarded

as the Magna Charta of the Merchant Marine. Thisect =as designed

to encourage the construction, maintenance and operation of a

merchant fleet to serve our needs. It laid down a definite policy

in the following words.

,It is necessary for the national defense and development of

forign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have

a merchant marine;

(a) sufficient to carry its :,water-borne commerce and a sub-

stantial portion of the export and import foreign commerce of the

United States and to provide shipping service on all routes

essention for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign

water-borne commerce at all times.

(b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxillary

emergency. in times of war or national wagAi~r (c) owned and. operated under. the United 9 a~ssi

citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable, and (d) composed of the best equipped, safest an- most suitable

types of vessels constructed in the United States and manned with

a trained and efficient personnel.

It is hereby,declared to be the policy of the United States to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such

a merchant marine.

6.' Specific provisions of this act established the United States

Maritime Commission of five menbers to organize and supervise Merchant Marine operations, including the training of personnel.

It authorized the government to build vessels and rent them to

commercial steamship lines on essentin1 trades routes when private--

cpmpanies *-ere either un illing or unable to provide the necessary ships. Perhaps of greatest significance, it authorized direet

government aid, called subsidies, to private ship-operating companies engaged in foreign trade.

7. One kind subsidy paid to our ship lines in foreign trade was

rI called an operating subsidy. It was calculated to do no more than

put our ship companies on an even footing with foreign competitors

by making up the difference between operating costs of our shippers and lower foreign operating costs.

Another kind, called a 1tConstruction" differential subsidy,

was intended to equalize American and foreign shipbuilding costs

so that American steamship lines would order their new ships from

American yards instead of from foreign yards, here building costs

were actually lower. This type of subsidy was also intended to

keep a nucleus of American shipyards operating.

8. Subsidy contracts were not at all one way arrangements. The

Government and the people received valualbe benefits in return.

For example, service of a specified type and frequeney:was required of companies eceiving Government &id. Tankers built by such com-

panies were required to be fast enough to serve as oilers for the

Na vy. Overall construction had to satisfy United States Coast

Guard safety regulations and standards - the 'orld's highest. In> aadition, a subsidized line had to pay es rea

sury one-half of its profits over 10 percegt of the capital invest-

ed. Under this provision, more that half of the 51 million dollars

in subsidy payments,has been recaptured, - that is, returned to

the United States Treasury.

9. Under this act of 1936 a program calling for the con;:truction

of 50 freighters a year for a period of 10 years was started. The

program wa s scarcely underway ,hen the Nazis invaded Poland in

1939. Another World War was on and we were again sadly short of

shipping.

3 1c .. III. Our National Maritime Experience.ofVFo -

1. We entered this war with slightly more than 1,100 merchant

vessels. Nearly a thousand of these were obsolete. With this fleet

we faced the greatest job of ocean transoprt the orld has ever known. e had a full scale war to the East and another to the West, and we ere seperated from the combat zones by 3000 miles of ocean

on one side and 5000 miles on the other. Fortunately, this time, we did have a ship building program under way that was turning out

ships for our use.

2. . It was obvious that this program had to be and of necessity wa s stepped up for the prupose of meeting our shipping require-

ments -of global warfare. Millions of tons of steel, copper and other critical materials were channeled into ship building. Designers

and builders improvised and cut corners. Two and a half million

men and women worked in shipyards that operated at full blast

24 hours a day and 7 days a week. 3. This allout effort produced "miraclesU. During the War years ship construction in the Unted States- broke all Wbrjd records for

speed and volume. Between 1939 and 1946 American shipyards launched

over 5600 vessels - a total of 56 million "dead weight" tons. (Dead weight tonnage is the weight of the cargo, supplies and fuel

a ship can carry.) This was 60 percent of the total orld tonnage

(as compared with our 30 percent in 1920) after the end of our

construction program of World War I.

4. It is hardly possible to over estimate the contribution of our war built merchant fleet to victory in World War II. General Mar-

shall, now Secretary of State, stated while Chief of Staff of the

army: The .tremendous amount of shipping required for a modern

army is not generally understood. In computing initial shipping requirements, an average of six tons of cargo space per man is

required. Maintenance requirements (thereafter) average one ton

perman per month". (Bix tons of cargo will completely fill the

average kitchen; one ton will fill a large closet.) 5. Statistics indicate some of the shipping job's magnitude. (1) ILA2~r On V-J Day American ships were unloading supplrJ ~t-

all Over the world at the rate of 8500 tons an hour. During the war our merchant fleet hauled more than 7 million men and 268

million tons of other cargo, If this amount of cargo were loaded

into railroad cars, 50 tons to the boxcar, it would make up a

freight train long enough to circle the world at the equator (3)

three times.

6. In its role as an auxiliary to the ..rmy and Navy, the Merchant

Marine wa s everywhere, doing a variety of necessary jobs. Merchant

ships made the freezing and dangerous run to Murmansk, Russia, in the early months of the war, transporting vitally needed war

material to our allies, hen convoys were uIsitting-ducksI for

German Junkers and Heinkels of the Norway based ,TLuftwaffe, . Hundreds of merchant ships were in the tahk forces that hit North

AfYica, Normandy, Okinawa and Leyte. Fast tankers sailed as oilers with Admiral Halsey's Task Force 58 and refueled the fighting

fleet at sea, sa ving the hole force the long run tack to a fleet base for fuel. Supplies needed by the troops ashore in Nommandy

were so vast that they required the exclusive service of 1501l00-

ton cargo Liberty ships. shuttling bad and forth between British

ports and the French coast.

7. Merchant ships brought in materials to advance bases and

beachheads. They also had the job of bringing from abroad raw

materials meeded for our production. If our aircraft factories were to turn out thousands of planes, they would need large quan-

tities of aluminum. Aluminum is smelted from Bauxite ore. Our

major source of Bauxite ore was in Brazil. The only way Ywe could get Bauxite ore from Brazil to the United States was by ship.

This as true for a long list of our essential items needed in war production. Seventy million tons of war cargo came into our ports

in American ships.

8. The two orld wars have again shown the vital import-nce of merchant shipping.

In World War I one of Germany"s supreme efforts was the

launching of allyout submarine warfare against allied merchant

shipping. The campaign almost succeed ie cutingte allies ocean supply lines. It was a very- narro egcape. fiiy , Aoxd

Germany's own ships were blockaded and driven from the seas: a defeat that fugured heavily in the final surrender.

In World War II, Naval and merchant shipping - and lack of it- played an even more vital role. Official Nazi records anearthed by our intelligence after the surrender, reveals that Germany urged the Japanese to attack us in the Pacific, because it was known that we lacked adequate shipping. another document disclosed that Hitler disregarded the possibility of our entry into the war because he was advised that we did not have sufficient ships to land an army on the European Continent.

* In a conference between Hitler and his advisors, in Berlin on November 10, 1937, (Document 386PS), he emphasizes the unpreparedness of those he was about to attack.

* Document 1834PS reveals that Von Ribbentrop, on 13 February

1941, (10 months before Pearl Harbor), was urging the Japanese ambassador Oshima, that Japan could enter -he war and entirely discount the ability of the United States to traverse the ocean spaces between America and the two battle fronts of Europe and Asia.

* Hitler himself, (Document 1831PS) solemnly assured Matsuoka on 4 April 1941 that the German program against American merchant tonnage and transportation was such that he could guarantee the utter impossibility of our landing a single American group in Europe

* Extracted from an address by Mr. Frazer a. Bailey, Pres.

National Federation of Shipping, at the second annual convention of the army Transportation Ass'n, at the Hotel Pennsylvania, New

Yokk, N.Y. on 9 October 1947.

Near the middle of the war after Dunkirk, it was lack of shipping, on the one hand that compelled Hitler tobndon :-hat might have been a decisive cross channel assault against England.

Just as in orld var'I, moreover, Germany's desperate effort to keep her sea lanes open for her shipping failed again - by a hair's breadth - in World War II. The German submarine wolfpack's unre- strained war against Allied convoys also failed. On the other hand, our tremendously expanded Naval and merchant fleets, and those of

(3) e~PIl~~~ ; our Allies, enabled .us eventually to ttack almost here -e

pleased, -.ithout regard to distances. In the summer of 1944,

for example, our shipping strength was a vital factor in the

launching of simultaneous attac:ks in the Marianas and Normandy

although the beaches were on opposite sides of the globe.

9. Certainly, shipping often turns the balance in was. In

Yorld War II, it was one of the decisive factors. In both wars

we narrowly escaped dis/aster that could have resulted from

initial shortages in merchant tonnage.

10. When the fighting stopped, our Merchant Marine 'faced new

and serious problems. home of them remain to be solved. Our

problem grey out of the huge size of the war fleet itself,

which on V-J Day consisted of 5500 ships, hundl/eds of freighters

and tankers of the latest and fastest cargo design, but hundreds

of others were too slo: to compete against4e~ ships in world

trae. The question was, how should we keep our great wartime

a sset from becoming a peacetime liability. The answer to this

question was of international as well as domestic importance.

By agreement with Great Britain we had taken over all construction

of merchant ships during the War and had thus cut into her post

war fleet. Other European conntries as well as England were de-

pendent upon shipping for their national existence and would

certainly be unhappy if we kept our entire wartime fleet in

active peacetime service. hen we had once met our own needs for

shipping, any attempt on our part to crowd other maritime nations

off the seas ould certainly be met with restrictive trade laws

on their part. Furthermore, without income from their own ship-

ping, the ability of other maritime nations to buy our products

would be seriously reauced.

11. In partial solution of this problem Congress passed The

Merchant Sales act of 1946. Under this act, foreign governments,

United States ship-operating companies cn individual United

States citizehs hvye been permitted to buy surplus was built

ships an. have agreed to pay a million dollars into our treasury

';" -'K for them. Foreign countried hove bought princip ship Liberty fleets as a stop gap until they can rebuild their o:n fleets.

american citizens, who have preference under the act, have been

allocated the largest number of the most desirable ships.

12. another question closely connected -ith future of our Merchant

Marine - how much ofit should we keep - that is 4hether air trans-

portation and the atomic bomb have reduced the usefulness of the

merchant ship.

Naval and Military strategists say "No". They feel that for

some time, at least, the atom bomb as a ,weapon will be reserved

for large and vital targets. A few of the largest convoys can be

reduced in size so that an atom bomb attack would be unrrofitable.

Moreover, although the big plane supplements the ship as a

passenger or cargo carrier ;,hen great speed is desired, it does

not replace it entirely. Ships carry materials by +he hundreds of

tons and troops by the thousands at a cost of a fraction of a cent

a mile per ton. The plane, on the other hane, still measures its

load by the pound and counts its passengers in f ns, at a cost

per ton-mile nearly a hundred times that of a vessel.

Actually, the mechanization of armies, ith increasing numbers

of automatic weapons, heavy ,eapons and other specialized eqgip-

ment, makes military shipping moe important. The addition of the

air arm means that millions of gallons of high test gasoline and

tons of ammunition and bombs mu.t be delive ed to advance air bases.

New weapons ith a higher rate of fire means that more ammunition

must be hauled to the combat theaters. Practically, every advance

in military equipment imposes new demands on the workhorses of the

military supply line - the freighter and the tanker. So for the

forseeable future, we shall be needing our merchant ships as war

fleet auxiliaries for a long long time.

13. Another problem of our merchant fleet has to do ith the balance

between types of ships. Merchant ships are classified according to

purpdse as passenger ships, cargo ships and combination ships.

Cargo ships are either tankers (for carrying bulk liquids, such as

fuel oil or gasoline, in their holds) or @ry cargo ships. Different

types of cargo require different kinds of storage and handling

facilities. Passengers needsspecial space and equipment. 4 good

I' fP~ ~ fleet needs the appv/opriate number of each kind of ship for the same reason that a combat team needs the appropriate number of the various kinds of weapons. Shipping men call this factor "Balance".

Our present tAmerican Merchant Marine fleet, a s it now-floats is

out of balance. It is very short of passenger ships and has only half

the combination passenger-cargo vessels the experts think we requird.

The reason for this shortage is relatively simple. Building a passen-

ger vessel is complicated and difficult, requiring far more man hours

and larger quantities of materials than a freighter or a tanker. During the War we couldn't spare the time or the materials to build

paasenger vessels. More than two-thirds of those we had were either

sunk during the war or so worn out as to be ready for the scrap heap.

Since V*J Day, only two ne large passenger liners a#nd 18 combination vessels have been built. Thus we now have only a fraction of the pass-

enger fleet we had in 1940, and what we do have is now 7 years older. 14. This lack of passenger vessels is our most serious maritime

security problem, for passenger vessels are the troopship reserve.

They are the only ships capable of properly handling large numbers of persons. During World War II the services were forced to make-

shift with converted cargo vessels. TWe got by with them, but conditions in transit were, in the main, grossly substandard. Overcrowding was not only a physical discomfort, but a sanitary risk and a serious threat to safety.

15. Less serious is the shortage of refrigerator ships and some

other special type vessels. The merchant fleet could do with out them,

but with them its efficiency and effectiveness vould be increased. 16. Shipping technicians ha ve another problem - the "bunching" of vessels in age groups. In ordinary language this means that in the

early 1960's 90 percent of our war built vessels A:ill become obeolete

all at once. (a cargo vessel's useful life averages 20 years). Experts

feel that we should plan now for a gradual @thdrawAl and replacement of our aging ships. This would spread replacement over a large number of years instead of concentrating iteintor or 3 years. It would also

reduce the average age (and therefore increase the efficiency) of the

fleet. Further it would assure American shipyards of steady work and allow them to keep their organizations intact.

_il 17. AS an initial move toward providing adequate supplementary merchant shipping for any future emergency, the Army, Navy and Maritime Commission have established a fleet reserve. Roughly 1500 vessels

have been laid up in "moth Balls" and plastic covering so that they

will be quickly available in case of need. Some of the places selected

for these reserves are located at James River, Suisun Bay, California;

Mobile River, Alabama; Astoris, Oregon; Olympia, Washington;Beaumont,

Texas; Hudson River, Tarryton, NeA Yolk; gilmington, Deleware; Bruns- wick, Georgia.

18. President Truman, last year, appointed an advisory committee, headed by Mr. Kent T. Keller, of the Chrysler Corporation, to meet

with the various responsible agencies in government and private indus-

try and to make recommendations concernimg the future of our Merchant

Marine. This committee has made its report and the President has said that he will bring it to the attention of our Congress.

19. After reviewing the history of American merchant shipping and pointing out the "twice within the span of little more than 20 years

this country has been forced to embark on emergency shipbuilding

programs of proportions", the Committee stated its belief that the

aicfst Stmeht~bf National Policy set forth in the Act of 1936

should be continued tobe followed and that it should be backed up by specific legislation which it recommended later in its report.

It reported, that while we, as the richest nation in the world could set nut to build a merchant fleet to dominate world trade,

such a program would probably be looked upon by other nations as a

threat to world peace, and would inevitably lead to retaliation in

the form of trade barriers by countries more dependent than we are

upon shipping and the sale of shipping services.

20. The recommended genera 1 principles of the committed are that we should maintain a merchant fleet

(a) large enough to keep our foreign trade routes open and carry all our domestic waterCommerce;

(b) large enough to meet emergency or wartime demands for Naval and military auxiliary vessels;

in organization and personnel; (d) backed by a balanced reserve fleet, and (e) supported by an a ctive shipbuilding and ship-repair industry.

21. It further recommended that the fleet and inaustry should be

privatilowned a ndpprivately operated on a paying basis, and[ that

it should receive financial assistance from the Government to put it on a fair competitive basis in its foreign trade routes and pro-

tect it in domestic trade,

22. The Committee's first outstanding specific recommendation was that the United States should start now to build and maintain a

fast, modern merchant fleet of 46 passenger liners and approximately

1000 cargo vessels (totaling about 12 million deadweight tons) and that we should keep that fleet modern and competitively efficient

and its personnel well trained.

23. The number 46 for passenger liners is based upon our great deficiency in passenger ships for peacetime use and upon the National

Military Establishment's estimate of our needs for troop transports

in an emergency. Two of.the liners would be huge luxury ships for the run from New York to the E glish Channel. One smaller liner

would be for the New York-Hamburg run, another for the Boston-London

run, and other smaller liners would operate around the world and up and down tthe coa sts. If this plan is carried out, United States

passenger ships will compete for the first time in decades with the best Luxury service that any foreign competitor can offer. 24. The number 1000 for total cargo ships assumes that all of our.

domestic commerce and at least half of our foreign commerce should

be carried in ships flying our flag. 24. A second recommendation of the committee is that the 46 passen-

ger vessels be built within the next 4 years, that within the same

time a substantial beginning be made on the 1000 cargo vessels, and

that vessels to replace them be built at the rate of 50 a year.(A

cargo vessel's life averages 20 years.)

25. A third remommendation was that we maintain a reserve merchant

fleet of a size and make-up determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the Secretary of National Defense.

26. The committee pointed out that after sales of ships to private

individuals and foreign countries uncer the ship sales act is completed, the Government will hold title to probably more than 2000

ships available for "lay-up" in the reserve fleet.

27. A final important recommendation is that, for more efficient administration, the Merchant Marine (excluding the reserve fleet)

should be placed under a single executive instead of a commission.

He would be an Under Secretary of Commerce. The present 5 menber Maritime Commission would become a policy making Board.

28. Cost will be an important factor in this or any other program.

The President's Committee gathereda figures showing that during 25

peacetime years preceding 1947 a rough average of 40 million dollars

a year was spent by the Government on the Merchant Marine. This sum was a very small faction of Government expenditures on other financial aids, and the Cmmittee estimates that this will continue to

be the case. Congress will have to measure the cost of the plan, and perhaps others, against theproduct hoped for - an intelligent and

well-planned Merchant Marine program providing the Nation with a first cla ss merchant fleet that is adequate in peace and ready for any national emergency.

The cost of maintaining reserve vessels - once they have been

decommissioned and laid up - is estimated at less than $1500.00 per ship per year. A Liberty could thus be maintained for 20 years at

an expense of $30,000.00. The most expensive part of the process is

getting the ship ready for lay-up. Even with this expense - and

taking into account every possible contingency, including periodic drydockings - the total cost for a 20 year period should not exceed

$50,000 per vessel. This is.less than 37 of the average cost of a

Liberty. Moreover, in case of necessity, we would have ships avail-

able immediately instead of 2 or 3 years later.

(9)

1- - IV Armed Forces Strategic Planning.

1. In a farsighted memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated

9 August 1945, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval

Operations invited attention to the fact that legislation affecting the disposition of war-built merchant ships expected to be surplus

after the end of the war was then before the Congress.

2. In order that Congress might know the amount of merchant shipping

required for national defense, the above mentioned memorandum requested that a study be undertakan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine

the amount of shipping which should be retained, either active or

laid-up, for a possible future emergency or war. It was further suggest-

ed that in addition to the total tonage required, the study indicate the speeds and types of vessels most desirable to be retained for

purposes of national defense, having aue regard for the types that

would be available after the end of the war.

3. The memorandum of COMINCH and CN0 was referred to the Joint Military Transportation Committee for study and that Committee in

collaboration ith Joint Staff Planners and the Joint Strategic

Survey Committee, submitted rerort on 29 December 1945 which, with several revisions and interpretations subsequently made, is known as

the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1454 series of papers. The basic study JCS 1454/1 was an extremely valuable and noteworthy document. It was not

only valuable because of its context but in that it was available in sufficient time for consideration by the committee of Congress which prepared the Ship Sales act bf 1946 and has subsequently become of

primary influence in guiding the Maritime Commission in the disposal of ships under the Ship Sales Act made law by the Congress.

4. It is noteworthy that the study and report comprising JCS 1454/1

wa s made without benefit of specific guidance as to any future mobilization or strategic concept. In the absence of such - only broad

assumptions could be made as to the scope amdrequrements of a poss-

ible future military effort by the United States and heavy reliance

had to be placed on the experiences gained during the course of hosti-

lities recently concluded. The principal anaamptions actually used were as follows:

(a) The United States should be prepared to.exert an effort com- (I)I Ul" FBi -. parable to Wiorld War II but that its forces would be brought to bear against a possible aggressor at a more papid rate.

(b) The reinforcement of overseas bases and the capability to launch

amphibious operations by the end of the second year at latest from those ba ses on a scale comparable to that contemplated for the

initial invasion of Japan.

5. Considerations other than the foregoing were taken into account

in the study and preparation of the report; for extampe, it was con-

sidered that if a major war Should develop within the next twenty

years, it ould prove more economical to retain the hereinafter item- ized tonnages, rather than be forced to use manpower and critical materials which could well be diverted to wa making efforts other

than ship-construction, account was also taken, however, of the re-

latively slow build up on shipbuilding capacity experienced in the late 1930s and through 1941, and this, coupled %with the certain demand for ships of more modern design in another war, led to the

recommendation that a shipbuilding program on a scale approximating one-half that of World War II should be undertaken.promptly at the

outbreak of World War III.

6. Of the total 55,000,000 eadweight tonnage under United States

control at the end of 1945, the JUS 1454 series of.papers recommended

that the following be retained, either active or laid-up, for a possible future war;

TYPE NUMBER TONN GE (DEaDi.EI GHT)

Dry Cargo 2106 22,750,000

Personnel-Shipping 398(790,000 Troop 3,980,000 Lifts)

Tankers 702 10,770,000 Special Purpose (Reefers, 198 1,265,000 sea trains, aircraft transrorts,

coastal cargo) _

Total 3404 38,765,400 7. Even with the most optimistic outlook and leaning heavily on

prewar estimates of requirements, it is not probable that our future

iu) .imm and foreign shipping needs will support the active commercial

operation of more than about 1000 U.S. flag ships of approximately

11,000,000 DWT. It is anticipated for that tonnage to be distrib-

uted approximately 60% in the domestic trades, coastal and inter-

coastal, and about 40% in foreign trade. This means that about

2400 ships of 27.M DhTs out of a total of 4404 ships and 38,000,000

(plus) DWT estimated a s require; for the next ar effort will be

in a permenant lid-u r .serve until the emergency arises for their

reactivation.

8. It would be a serious mistake to conclude that the ships recom-

mended for retention in either an active or laid up status could

satisfy, even now, in all respects, the categorical requirements

previously mentioned. The most serious deficiency in this connection

applies to the category of personnel shipping which the Joint Chiefs

of Staff study and reloort indicated a total of 398 ships with a

total ift- cacity of~~90,000 should be retained. Of the total in-

ventory of about 420 such ships available at the end of hostilities,

drastic reductions have already occurred. These have been due to

the heavy cuts in and disposal of APA and AP types operated by or

for the military services and their subsequent reconversion by the

Maritime Commission and private owners to either cargo or liner

type passenger vessels, In this later category very little recon-

version has been done on that. Such peacetime reconversion do not

preclude, of course, a further reconversion for troop carrying our-

poses in the event of -a r but the time element, manpower and mater-

ial requirements for that purpose are all factors that must be borne

in mind when assessing the readiness of our shipping potential.

9. In the category of dry cargo shipping recommended for retention

in the amount of 2,106,sips with a DWT of 22,750,000 there is also

cause for concern by reason of the following;

The bulk of such war built tonnage is comprised of the slow

Liberty type vessels and (hese will necessarily constitute the main

,ortion of the national defense reserve of cargo shipping. Already

obsolete :t the beginning of World War II because of its slow speed

of 10-11 knots per hour, this tyre vessel is a poor insurance riSk

as a prospective cargo carrier for another war. Its virtue, as with (s)

(lei3IIIUl I iafe so many other munitions which had to be manuiacted after the emerg-

ency was upon us, lay in the simplicity of design and the adapta-

bility thereof to mass production methods. It normally takes about

a year to build ships of the Liberty type. The average for vessels

built at Hog Island in World War I was 11 months. Liberties were

being turned out the the peak of the World War II effort, in an aver-

age of 39 days. One ship was delivered in 14 days; another in 7 days.

All previous ideas about the time required to build ships were up-

set by the allout production line method of standard design welded

ship construction on the Liberty ship.

10. From many aspects the existence of a very considerable surplus

of merchant type shipping a.t the end of hostilities is not an un-

mixed blessing. In terms of tonnage only is It adequate to furnish

the estimated requirements of s future war. By that very fact it

will be difficult to impress upon the public mind the false sense

of security -hich the existence of that tonnage alone engenders.

Equally difficult will be the task of moulding legislative opinion

to the view that an orderly and progressive moderization of our

active merchant marine is a continuing necessity and can only be

accomplished by affording to private steamship orerators direct

government support in the form of either or both construction and 'I operating subsidies. For a relatively small amount in comparision

with the yearly costs of our Armed Forces such subsidy payments

would immeasurably strengthen our merchant marine and provide

against a black obsolesence of our active and laid-up merchant

type shipping.

11. It is a grievous mistake to conclude that the ships of the laid-

up fleet will be in a good state of readiness when the time comes

for their reactivation. The Navy had experience with the lay-up of

ships after World War I and they know how long it takes to put ships

back in shape again. The maritime commission is not equipped with

the personnel nor do they have the funds to lay up ships in the

manner performed at present by the Navy on its vessels. Everyone

view-s >;ith a great deal of apprehension the conditions of this laid-

up merchant fleet after a two or three year period. admiral Smith,

Chairman of the Maritime Commission is full aware of this situation

.. ,w -*

iWj I V and has asked for an is receiving Navy assistance for a proper in-

spection group to keep the Maritime Commission informed on the con-

ditions of this reserve fleet and to recommend such procedures as

may be necessary to improve the preserving methods.

12. The study of shipping requirements contained in the JUS 1454

series of papers was made in the closing months of 1945 and wa s

wvithout the guidance of any strategic concept of a new mobilization

plan. although it was recommended that the analysis therein be sub-

jected to yearly review, the basis therefor --as not ava ilable until recently when the Mobilization Plans of the army and Navy achieved

such status that a reworking of shipping requirements became practi-

cable. The new draft of shipping requirements is by no means in its final form but even the preliminary estimctes now rest on more real-

istic appraisal of a phased mobilization and strategic concept than

heretofore.

13. The latest estimates of shipping for purely military purposes are phased in three periods over a time covering .42 months from

M.Day. Phase I covers the period of the first 9 mosi Phase II from the 18th through the 24th month; Phase III the 25th through the 42nd

month. The maximun requirements for shipping is estimated to occur

at the end of Phase II. at that time the following needs are indicated: Dry Cargo 2058 Tankers 600

Troop Ships 424

Miscellaneous 92

3174 Grand Total.

14. It should be emphasized that this total reflects only the re-

quirements of the military services for employable ships during the

24th month of war. It does not include the requirements 'drocouracAes iyl~n LWar making economy or the need of our allies such as wa s entended dhring the recent war in the form of lend-lease aid. Neglect-

ing the requirements of our probable allies and using a figure of

600 ships for the support of our own civilian and mar making economy

there is a total need at the end of 24 months of war for 3774 merchant type ships of all categories.

1.5. If no shipbuilding program were to be undertaken at the start (5)

'' l..

2- of another. war, the cumulative expected losses gould , of course,

have to be added to the total of 3774 ships to show what shipping

it would be necessary to have on hand at the beginning of war in order to meet the maximum demand at the end ot the 24th month.

Using a loss factor of one to two percent per month depending upon

the area of employment, it is calculated that at the end of Phase II

a total of 508 ships will have been lost since M Day. This figure plus the total of 3774 ships needed on M plus 24 mos. gives a grand

total of 4282 ships ,hich should be available at the beginning of

hostilities if a new shipbuilding program is to be' avoided. 1 6. Actually, the ships which might comprise the grand total, either in the active merchant marine or laid-up in the national defense

reserve, will not be satisfactory as to numbers within the required

categories or to certain other characteristics such as speed and

it is a certainty that a merchant ship building of sizeable pro-

portions must be initiated early at the onset of another emergency.

(6)

SiU1 V. Future Trends in Maritime Design and Construction Planning.

1. Lloyd Norman, Chichago Tribune Correspondent, under the date of 23 Janua ry 1948 wrote as follows;

"U.S uses azi Submarine Idea.

The German peroxide-powered submarine which can streak silently

under water at twenty-eight knots is being improved at a secret Navy laboratory at Annapmlis, Maryland as the model for the Navy's

proposed fleet of super-fast undersea raiders to challenge Russia's bid for underwater supremency.

Na val sources disclose that the Walter hydrogen peroxide engine

of the German type 26 submaring which was developed at the end

of the wa r and never operated, would be used in two new sub-

marines which the Navy is building under a 30 million dollar

research program. The experimental submarines, which will be

completed by 1951, and three others to be built for a total of

20 million dollars by 1952 will become the nucleus of the

Navy's underwater fleet.

The underwater speed of the new submarine makes them virtually

immune to present day anti-submarine arracks. The Russian Navy is known to have catrured several of the type 26 submarine and if building careful reproductions of them with the help of

German submarine experts and designers. The high under water speed of the type 26, which compares with 8 to 10 knots for

conventional American submarines, is derived from the hydrogen peroxide engine, which containd its own oxygen supply in the

peroxide, The power plant burns kerosene or any similiar fuel.

Because the engine does not yield any poisonous fumes as does the Diesel engine, the type 26 can operate under aterContinuously

without having to surface. Wcile the German type 21 submarine,

which uses a l"schnorcheln exhaust and breathing device, the

peroxide engine : quires no T"chimney, or "schnorchel, exhaust

tube. 2. Studies made by the Maritime kcommission show that hold operations

constitute the present bottleneck for the handling of cargo aboa rd ship. Means for moving both light and heavy lifts from the

square of the hatch are still under study; also other means for

reducing under-deck labor. Twin ha tches, both fore and aft and athwartship, are bing studied. Large athwa rtship hatches/also been considered in conjunction ,:ith under-deck gear for transporting

drafts to the ends of cargo spaces.

3. The handling of gargo in the shipts hold is ripe for _ thoroggh overhauling. Va rious proposals have been made for the improvement

of handling arrangements and gear on the ship. One proposal involves

the use of overhea d winches traveling on athwartship tracks arranged

to extend over the shipts side when rigged for handling cargo.

4. One of the most important factors in the working of cargo is hatch-

es. Rolling hatch beams are r.ell spoken of by people who have had ex-

perience with them. The effectiveness of these bea ms would be greatly increased if they could be moved by horsepower instead of man-power.

Therefore bridles are being designed so that the beams can be handled

with the shipts winches. Study has also been given to various types of quick-opening hatch covers, but this problem has not been complete-

ly solved. It is believed that better hatch covers can and will be designed. Improved hatch covers in conjunction with rolling beams

may be the answer.

5. One of the most deplorable deficiencies that existed during the war in our ocean shipping was the time required for vessels to dis-

charge their cargo after arrival at overseas areas. Ports left in

the wake of combat forces are seldom found intact or serviceable w without requiring extensive rehabilitation before vessels can be

berthed and their cargos discharged. Heavy lift shore equipment is usually inoperative or completely destroyed by the combatant forces.

This equipment is essentiAL for expeditious discharge of cargo from vessels, particularly deck cargo and heavy hold cargo stored in holds

which are not accessable by the solitary heavy lift boom normally

found on Liberty type vessels. Usually 'only one 50 ton boom was in-

stalled on a Liberty type vessel and this alone could discharge our

tanks and similar heavy arms and equipment which had been easily loaded at U.S. potts by our shoreside heavy lift equipment. It is

essential that every consideration in planning be given to strength-

ening the numbers and capacities of our ned cargo ships booms. In addition early transportation of heavy shoreside lift equipment to

destroyed overseas ports should be given prime consideration. Vigor-

ous and expeditious discharge of cargo from vessels at overseas oorts is essentiol to prevent a backlog of vessels being established in

port areas. ' hen this occurs, supplies fail to reach the awaiting troops on schedule; our limited and critically needed shipping space

i~ tied up without being gainfully mployed; vessels so situated are extremely vulnerable to all

kinds of enemy action; and the shipping costs for delivery of the a cargo becomes/prohibitive and unwarrented cost to the United States

tax payers.

6. Ai solution to this probability in the future might very well be

a vessel of the cargo type, designed with amidship port and star-

board watertight sideport openings, which could well facilitate the discharge of cargo in an expeditious manner in overseas ports by the

utilization of the vessels booms in the absence of shoreside heavy

lift equipment. another type cargo vessel designed with a watertight

forward bow ramp constructed similar to a lanking ship tank (L6T) , • type with an extended roller/ramp capable of discharging heavy tonnage

items over it from ship to shore, could very well be an answer to

some of the problems we experienced the last war.

Regardless of how it is achieved, we must get cargo into and out of vessels -,ith greated dispatch in time of war, both at home and in foreign ports, in order to aaassure us the maximum utilization of our

shipping and to a void backlogs of ships in port areas awaiting to

receive and discharge their cargoes. 7. With the advance of increased speeds in submarines, we may continue to expect a concerted effort by our enemies on submarine warfare

against our shipping, and our loses must be calculated to be high during the early phases of warfare. Vigorous counter measures can

be expected by our navy to eliminate and diminish this menace, how-

ever, it behooves us to plan vessel construction now with emphasis

on far greated speeds than ever before considered, if we are to pre-

vent heavy cargo and troop vessel loses. It is normally considered

that increased speeds are obtained in. vesseldesign only by a sacri-

fice in cargo capacities. Nevertheless, vessels rith a minimum convoy

speed of 18 knots will certainly only be considered practticable for future ocean transportation in warfare.

8. Convbys limited to 40 vessels of 18 knotsconvby speed, escorted by (3) faster naval vessels. designed for fire power and anti-submarine war-

fare seems the most logical solution toassuring safe delivery of our vessels in future warfare. This scheme of operation appears also ,to

be a practical solution to protection from atomic warfare since the

targets can be so dispersed as to make atomic bombing unprofitable

to the enemy. This has been fairly well borne out by our own atomic tests, ith vessels in the Pacific.

9.. The hief of Naval Operations in reply to a query, what were the

major deficiences in cargo-carrying (dry and liquid) ocean vessels during World War II, has stated; slow speed; tankers did not have

adequate fresh water distilling capacity. As a result large quanti-

ties of fresh water had to be carried aboard ship for normal ship-

board and boiler use. This resulted in an appreciable reduction in the tankers cargo carrying capacity.

In answer to the query, what .is being done or being contemplated to correct these deficiencies, it vwas stated that; as a national de-

fense measure, increased speed is built into all vessels constructed

under government subsidy by current procedure. All tankers built under government subsidy are required to have adequate distilling

plants installed under current procedure.

(4) L:,: a F Annex 2 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 american Legion Handbook, The American Merchant Marine, September 1947.

2 Armed Forces Talk #209

3 Army's Ca rgo Fleet in World 'War II, Army Service Forces, Office Chief of

Transportation, May 1945, Monograph #18.

4 Report of the Chief of Transportation, army Services Forces, World War II,

30 November 1945. 5 address by Mr. Frazer A. Bailey, President National Federation of American Shipping, New York City 9 October 1947.

6 Statements, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, The Future Employment of Naval Forces, 15 December 1947. _Shipping and Army Transportation by Frazer A. Bailey, Army Transportation

Journal, November 1947.

8.The Postwar Outlook for American Shipping; a report ,submitted to the United States Maritime Commission by the Postwar Planning Committee,

W.W. Smith, Chairman, 10 July 1946.

9. Report of the President's Advisory Committer on the Merchant Marine, Mr.

W.T. Keller, Chairman, 1 November 1947. 0lice-Admiral E.S. Land, Chairman, U.S. Maritime Commission, address on

Production Problems in Shipbuilding, to the Industrial College of the

Armed Forces, 17 January 1947.

11. Specialized Logistical Instruction, C & G.S.C. R-13461 -a - 2. 12. Planning the Use of War Shipping, Rear Admiral Wm.. Ca ;aghan U.S.N.,

C.& G.S. C. Document No. S-15263.

13. U.S. Uses Nazi Submarine Idea, Lloyd Norman, Chicago Tribune, 23 January 1948.

14Deficiencies in Design and Construction of Troop Ships and Cargo Vessels as employed in World War II, Letter from Chief of Naval Operations,

dated 8 April 1948.

(1) a; / lbs"

' Ua l a 'in'

Annex 3

UOiik ND &NL G N: RL SThFF UOLLEGE

FORT LE.\T1E ;T ORTH, K .NS -s;.

Subject; QuJ 1\T TR .N SPORTI'aTION R1QUIIEMENT IN FUTi WaB~iiRE.

To; ; Director, Logistics Division General Staff

Department of the Army Washington, D. C.

1. Forwa rded herewith is a study resulting in recommendations for procedures by which the Armed Forces of our nation can most effect-

ively insure adequate ocean transportation requirements prior to our entry in any future wa rfare.

2. This headquarters concurs in this study and in the recommendations

contained therein.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENiRAL.

$aF ~ -~~RF

u, Y hft 1 ^ i~= i W ke ' ' PROUCIO OF MECHN VSES BYAEIA SHIPARD FOR THE MAITM COMSO AND

PRIAT INEET DUIN THE WAR YEARS 193 THRUG 195TYE TONG AN HORS0EPOWER- SEF-ROELED STEL 2,00 GROS TON AND OVE-Cnclde

BuleS ndNme Gros T DedeihI. Toal Hoseo r TuoHorsepowe Hospoe Hospoe Typ Deinto Ton Hospwr TrinSlcrc Rcprctn Dee

'tr ie S t e C*S ... 37 ,3 S5 11,5*(i 37 1,00 , 1).

C l- rg 3 ...-C ...... S j 3 ,S)1 5 . (, 5 1? .

YT, PECORD OF MERCHANT VESSELS COMPLETED BY UNITE STATES SHIPYARDS

SELF-PROPELLED, STEEL, 2000 GROSS TONS AND VER

Passenger-Cargo/Transport Cargo Tanker Gross Dead- Horse- Year No. Tons power No Gross Dead- H.P. H.P. No Gross Dead- H . H.P. No. Gross Dead- H.P. H.P. Tons weight Steam Diesel Tons weight St and Diesel Tons weight Steam Di

914 26 135,1641 65,125 1 2,662 800 2,500 -- 17 87,585 130,278 4 , 75 - y 8 44,917 67,222 20,450 - 915 24 128,337 173,850 109,961 3 19,987 12,600 54.620 17 88,262 131,388 45,091 - 4 20,088 29,862 10,250 - 1916 74 r__ 5541056 160,730 1 6,063 7,480 4,100 - 49 200,824 299,623 92,530 24 163,068 246,953 61,500 2, 1917 12' 951,167 273,000 1 10,206 9,940: 10,000 -- 92 413,602 627,002 181,650 2,300 32 218,312 314,225 76,850 2,200 1918 41L: .. 2,646,250 853,982 5 29,736 24,297 27,100 --- 375 1,508,003 2,282,585 734,098 - 34 231,890 339,368 92,784 -

1919 723 3,369,884 5,085,684 1,583.738 2 10,285 10,650 6,700 --- 679 3,086,207 4,680,3211.463,616 -- 42 273.392 394,713 127,422 1920 467 2,395,545 3,584,780 1,147,836 12 99,911 111,000 75,000 -" - 375 1,758,086 2,695,753 854,076 2,500 80 537,548 778,027 215,020 1,240 1921 183 1,359,426 1,886,851 694,975 22 256,436 243,380 211,400 57 316,909 485,418 156,500 7,400 104 786,081 1,158,053 318,025 1,650 1922 19 168,024 260.717 90,500 3 41,293 34,384 36,000 -- 10 78,442 155,680 28,100 6,800 6 48,289 70,653 19,600 - 1923 18 117,042 159,940 54,300 7 33,947 26,110 24,900 --- 9 67,582 110,410 22,100 - 2 15,513 23,420 7,300 -

924 12 84,302 78,752 67,300 7 43,740 19,758 53,800 - 4 34,016 48.450 4,500 6,000 1 6.546 10,544 3,000 1925 12 83,916 103,670 39,450 3 18,850 11,470 14,400 9 65,066 92,200 25,050 ------

1926 8 54,043 56,767 24,100 5 28,789 15,880 16,500 2 16,302 25,625 4,400 --- 1 8.952 15,262 - 3,200

1927 19 154,700 181,511 102,000 7 51,294 27,459 67,600 - 9 72,936 104,300 23,800 3 30,470 49,752 :3,600 7,000

1928 7 71,916 81,486 48,600 3 44,190 37,400 38,000 - - 4 27,726 44,086 2,000 8,600

1929 8 65,313 84,180 34.700 2 23,614 19,800 21,000 5 :32,603 49,200 10.900 1 9.096 15.180 -- 2,800 1930 18 16:3,500 224.488 95,950 5 50,311 39,269 51,800 5,000 2 15,824 24.000 4,350 - 11 97.365' 161.219 18.000 16,800 1931 14 150,949 154.941 141,700 9 108,968 S5,413 126,100 ------5 41,981 69.5281 4.400 11,200 1932 15 145.-170 104,372 210,300 13 129,348 82,572i 1927001 2 16,122 21.800 17,600 -- - 1 1933 4 49,527 32,367 71.900 4 49,527 :32,367 71,900 - - - - -

1934 2 1 1 29,76015.180 6,3008,000 - 2 9 544 15.180 li 300 1).352 19,02212 29,760! 8.000

T1936 8 i I I-1,860 28,600 S 63,428 104.860] 28,600 19,950 1937 15 1 11.929 58,970 ------! 15 121.852 191,929 :39.020 142,1701 227.982 61.240 10,14( 1938 24 1 284 1)82 90, 580 - 6 39,196 56.100 19 200 18

193.112 125.230 - 1939 28 241.052 d 1 1: O 3 30.063 20,4361 30.000, - 14 91,560 128.484 57.2001 :36.000i 11 119.4291 238.352 119,040 16,449! 1940 53 414,72, 2 6 (18,94:3 61,222 81,900 31 227,275 3:34,660 194.15(1 48.232 16 148,509 434.039, 1'33.390;293011 1 1941 95 7-19,1W- ';'1 6 58.107 56,515i 56,19)) 61 42:3,022 597.94:: 282.250' 57.650 28 267.979, 479,790 15.01x17 1942 724 5,392,841.1 1 ' ) 1 1101.847 81,29 )(0'1 0(l,1i001 652 4,678.880 6.842.689 1.740.5501 86.500I 61 612.121' 982,3811 15,00(,i 1943 1661 12 485 629 15,521,534 b "its: 5.U) 20 219.760 180,047190,850( 1410 10,10:3.2.1514,921,082 1,055,250 74,700 231 2,162,62413,420.405,1,426,731) l944 146 , 136,850 240 2,4S6,397 3,954.957!1,87 1,500 -

3 11.40:3.1(. 'I' ; 7,448.950 48 4111,291 330.311'452,0(10 1175 8,455.475 11.851.797 1.988.110(11 1945 1041 7 61 1,380 lb 509,163:311.016118(1.40(1 807 5.:3:36.152 7.206.2013.86495()1:328.350 188 1,769,583 2,787,3971.251.080 :33,600 120,9001 85.600 140(1 1946 83 6 ; ';6 S30 9 1 76,719 84.667 62,150 - 66 487,351 728.583 :x0 9,80' 15.700 8 81.633 1947 39 21 { l,(i20 8 73,604 68,246 73,3501 4,800 25 151,402 22'_,:399 179,05')! 28,420 3 19,261 36128 1:3,200 2,811(1

PRINCIPAL DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF VESSELS BUILT FOR THE MARITIME COMMISSION

C1-MT-BU1 C1-M-AVi C1-ME-AV6 ! C1-M-AVF CIA C1B N3 S Al N3 S A2 Lumber- Standard Modified Modified DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargo Cargoargo Full Full Full Full Deck Scantling Scantling Scantling Full Full Full

Scantling Scantling Scantling Scantling

1.ellntIi O v('r-a ll...... _ .. _ . 112'; 11;,,),. 2. '9 2.)14'!1r ;;;

13ca(rr 1rrol(1('I1 ...... 19 11 )iU 'O ' Ii1)'O 12 '1 12'1" ill'11'" .50 11 :111'11"

D ('1)tlr innl(le(1. . . . . ; 'II" !'(i' ;: ")i 20':120',1 '21)'))''

Load draft llul(led ...... 1 2:;'(i" _';'ti" 17'1 1 17'1 1 r 1'O" '1'11"'

D eadweight tuu- . .. - .. 1,.1.E 1 1,1(1(1 9, 1Ull _,9IOO .. ,IIiO 5,11111 :(,8!111 :1,11111

(;ro s tom 6,70)) l 1!111 1,900 ::, o)) :; lion : ,tilll)

-Net tole ...... 1,1)0() 2,1))))) i O(III 1,02)) 1,1)0)) 2,11111 2,100 2,1(11)

Bale ('Ilhl(' ('alrirl(t'... . 1 . 2:.-) 117,000 "I 2 Ollll 121 1(00 I 1 i OUI1 ''',ti O(IU ' ' S 0(111 -''. ,I101j

Net refrigerated ( rlr<(rit .. 9,110O t) ,U() !),. I11)

P ro 1 rulio n ...... I)i( =rl i"rtil,. o r 1). 1'itr} . or 1). li( (i) ro(:(t R (( il) rn(: t 1>i (l.:,ft 1)irsrl (l((., I)ii (I, :rft in coal ilrg; oil aft "nrir(Ilr

Iurrrin ir nir," (Itom(- lit('Ii i t.

Ii' I V )

Ilor (1n 1e1' normal 1 111() ?();i() I,/1)))

p eed, ktut, l'' 1 1 11 1)) ] I IO? l l r ll)r

1 'Ix of t( rr . ( ra - ! ( rlri,,.r ('rui,, r ('rur i ('riri; .. ('rn!,(r j ('riu r ('rlri r

S("rew ..... 1 1 I 1

PRNCPA DSIG CHRCTRSTC OF VESL BUL FO TH MAITM COMSIN-otne

Ful Setr I Fl Shle Shle PatRfi. Rergeae Scntin Cort Dec Satg Deck Dec Ste Dec FlsDc

Leg6. e-l ...... 3 8S13 614 93 5)1 46' " 4 92I " 4 414 4l

Bea m l e ...... 5 ' "5 ' "6 '"6 ' "6 '"6 ' "(30 30

0G Det modd...... 690 50 0G 00 06 0G

Loa drf odd.. 10' 73 59 l(' 74 59 (') ('

Ded eih ton ...... 4305309201,0 0709404,0 ,2

Grs ton ...... 3,7 4,2 6,0 ,0 ,7 ,5 ,2 ,9

e tos ...... 2 10 3,0 3,0 ,S ,2 , 1 ,5 ,5

Bale cui aaiy...... 1000 2790 5600 5250 5;,,-7 5800 5700-

Ne erg rtdcp ct ...... 1 30 0----2 ,0 5 ,0

Pousio ...... isl f ei. f ubn ubn ubn ubn isl D ee

Moife Cag Cago- Carg.- Boxe EC-- Stndr Modfie

DEIG CHRCTRSTC Stndr Librt Carg Carg Cargo

Dec F s Dec Snl g raspr Snl g Satig Snlg

Legt ovral...... 4 'S" 5'12~ 4 14 16 4'" 453 5'" 453

B as. mode ...... 66S6'" 5 '0 " 5'0: 613 20 20 2

Dept...... mode 430 0s 74"3'"3'"380 s 80

Loa drf mode ...... 27S 25'9 27'8 27 8 86 86 8

Ded eih ton ...... ,5080 :1,0 1060 1104 10801,S0 1,8

Gros. .. . .tons...... 7,0 6,17 7,75,0566 076 0 ,0 ,

Neo s...... 4,59 3,85,85,303704605,0 ,1

Baecbccpct ...... 5400 0,09,0 47,0 45300 45300 43 5

Ne refigeate ca ai ...... 1150 34,0 55 - - -5 - -S

Dee Prplso ...... T rie T rie R cp ei. R cpat T rie T rie

St mtro ...... S 4 4* 4*4

PRINIPA DESIG CACTRSS OFSESLBUIL FO TH MAITM COMSINCninued

C3-S-A2~C3SA~ ~ 4SB ~ 4SA Standar a883E Standar Moife .82-D 38 S2-E S3S2BP DEINCAATEITC ag C.rg Cargoag rnpr agal

She Dec.e Shle Dec Ful Scnlig Ful .cntn I tac .tac hi

Lengt ov r-l ...... 9 ' " 47'82 ' " 5 21 1 " 4 60 2 ' "3 2

Be m m l e ...... 6."6 ' "7 ' "7 ' "5 ' "5 ' "4 0

Dept mode ...... 426 23I36 :'6 7o 7O 3

Loa d af mode ...... 8 S 7S -29 56 6O 5O

Ded eih ton ...... 123 099 ( 55 5,4 ,6 ,9,3

Gr s 0,to s ...... 0 , 3 0 7 01 , 8 -- :, 4

N et to s...... , 0 , 9 , 3 , 9 , 9

Bal cui. 33 a a iy...... ,0 5 .0 1 ,50 6 22 0 9 ,2 1 ,1 96

Ne rergea e ca aiS ...... -

Prp lso ...... T r ieui ne T r ie T r ie T r .E e t u b - lc. R cp

a T2-E-A* ,,- -E 1- .* .0* T2SEA T - -T . uls,.S DESIGNStandad T2-E-A3 T -S-A1 S-C3 T -M-BT2T3-M-Z1 M.C Hu 14 .l -9 ,T SBZ uki

CH RC E ITC Tak0M dfe akr Lbry T ne Tne 4-4 5-5 akr Tne

S.ke Take ane SankS

Leeral. g ho ...... 5 S23 S1) 16S'4 .2 ' 73, 1I4 5 0 ) X 1' .'1 17

Bea *060modd...... 8 00 G ') (89 i ' 0)

MISO AN PRIAT INEESS 193 THRUG 195SL-POELD STEL 2,500 0 S ON AN3OE

Typ Nube Grs Tons Dedeih Toa Hospwe ubo ospoe oreoe

LietC -- l250- ag - 1 ,4 ,7 274 7,0 650,000 - 6.,45.0,00. Liet-Arrf Trnp.*E2SC 362 83 1 3 79 -S9,0 00

3i et -ole-C - - W 24 15 ,3 26 ,5I6,0S6,0

Li T etyn . are - E 2SC 8I 574 87 ,1 02 ,0S-2 ,0

Brts Em re c Cag Shi 604 04 0 6 36055,0 50,0 C3 M-V and C1M-V Cag 20I9,6S,0348 3530 5 ,

*M-V Cag *,00,1 C 220---*,0 \3-SAl 9 N3S-A174316 CoatalCaro 265879 123,00 - 23,00

R VIM- Rerg .aeCag 176 ,1 28 9289 0---2 ,0

CI~~~~~~~~~~~islDie -ACro'62637 3432 19,03 9,0

Cl- Cago Turin Drv 85 5188 75583 340037,0

CI-IT3 U 3 u be -C.g 1, 3,3 ,57240- ,0

C2Cag ,Dee'rv321016 9 ,0 4 ,2 4,2

C2CagT rieDie24 17601 2,3,1 ,4,0 ,4,0

C2 Cag-erg.R-3V 63 3706 42,22 39603960

C3 Cago DislD ie43 ,4*7,03560---3 ,0

C3 Cag/ rnprT rieDie1993393,3,2 ,1,5 ,1,5

Cago Ses Shppn C. Typ 6 266 6,27 4,0 4,0

S.g-eri.Uie Fri C...... 180 600 600

Cago Vitr Tye VC -SAP 272 2,6,3 2,9,3 1,9,0 1,9,03

Cargo,~~~Vitr ye C -- P 11 10276 15410 1,1,53,1,5

Carry iy{, VC2-7,99 -AP411 ,2065,85 - -- - ,5

Cag -rnpr,3itrV 2S.331 0,5 5925 10395 ,9,5.

Pas n e - . .A eia 64 41 ,3 1 3 ,0 3 ,0

Pasne - aro P nm R.R o33006 046 3,00 3,0

PasngrCag6Msisip Shp Co337,58,23160 160

Trnsot-1S-Y 13 9204 3306 5720 5720

Trnpr -P-2L 1,0 ,98 1,0*7,0

Trnsot-3S1A 2 971 1,01870 1,0

Takr Twi Sce - 3-2A and A- 30 35,7:4,73 4600 45,0

Tanker SooyV cu Typ 11 11,87 . 6,7 13,0 136,000I- - - 3..nrT _.'RV