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,;g - a Lc1:+i . ,.I i 'a<; Q; ==;: ;w, ARCHIVES 4$ S v :+ .at , CGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KAN ACCESSION NO_ PO REGISTRY or-;mmand & General Staff College" SSchool of logistics Ocean Transportation Requirementain Future WWarfare, Dwight EJohnson J ajor TC Ocean transportation requirements in furure warfare, by Maj D. E. Johnson. -1477L&9ck7~~8I IS A HOLDING OF THE j 2 1 19( ARCH VE SE CTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT IEVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NOf-212,110 COPY NO. ff CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 13 Mar 51 Mar 52-5M em711 . r p ' ,t ej ri ';,, tsixs5SS 1 ug ow 0 SDIKtCTIVE COMMAND ..ND GENIRAL STAFF COLLGE L-4021. SCHOOL OF LOGI TI] OCEAN TRAiNPOT TION RQUIREM6NTS IN FUTURE WaBRFAE 28 November 1947 4-15 7D~te) T ubject Number) SUBJECT: OCEN TRaIPORTATION REUIEMENTS' IN FUTUR E WA~FR RE. PURPOE- To analyze requirements of the various ocean vessel types needed in logistical support of future overseas operations. SuOPF: 1. Analyze the cargo and personnel vessels used in V 11 to include; a. Establish numbers and tonnage totals of major types required. b. Deficiencies in design or construction an in availability of vessels for practical mili- tary use as determined by past experience. 2. Analyze probably new vessel requirements and use of existing vessel type in ovesea operations in a future emergency. a. Compare requirements in W1 11 ;ith probable future requirements in design and capability. b.. Study the practical value of the existing fleet in military operations of the predict- a ble future. c. Analyze cargo and passenger vessel tonnage re= quirements in a future war. 3 Recommend: a. Modifications of existing vessel types nec- essary to meet military requirements of the future. b. Tonnage and vessel type requirements: (1 On standby basis. 2) For construction in event of emergency. CO-ORDINATION tITH OTHE SUBJECTS: Number Title 4-3 Use and Control of Ocean Shipping For Military Purposes. 8-7 Future Trends in Logistics. ,(W~~1~^ iiiiiM -| I, in1 .iaM^ D^^ «' : La ii i nYp L UnaD Ports of Embarkation and Related Agencies. 8-11 Logistical Support of amphi- bious Operations in atomic and Guided Missile Warfare. M--1018 Utilization of vessels in supply of theaters. S-15263 Planning use of War Shipping. H03 a N GENEJALED STaFF COLLEGE U.2 1 1965 SCHOOL OF LOGOITICS FOR aVKN. O.RTH _ ___sL-402l _ _ SUBJECT: OC EaN TRaNSPORTaTION R ;UIR MnENTS IN FUTURE ''A.RF.RE 1. Problem;- To analyze requirements of the various ocean vessel types needed in logistical support of future overseas operations. 2. Discussion.- a. Historical background of our maritime industry. (1) The United States has been totally unprepared to log- istically support its armed Farces with its own ocean transportation throughout our history as a nation. (2) Foreign Competition and our National policy were ad- verse factors in enabling our Maritime industry to main- tain an adequate and balanced Maritime Fleet. '(3) Because of cheaper foreigh maratime competition a nd the failure of our national policy to provide adequate assistance to the American Maritme Industry, Amerthan ocean transportation has been grossly inadequate to meet our Armed Forces logistical requirements during two major conflicts within the past twenty five years. (4) Adequate Logistical planning by the Armed Forces for ocean transportation requirements had not been accom- plished prior to World War E. b. Our Maritime Position during and after World War 1. (1) No National policy was established to provide for an adquate Maritme support to our armed Forces requirements. (2) Congress passed the Shipping act of 1916, to build a ,,bridge of ships", because of our National necessity. (3) Because of our Maritime unpreparedness all our troops and supplies were transported to foreign soil on vessels of our sorely pressed allies. pa~02~ (4) The 2300 "bride ofi Ships" constructed by our shipyards during World War 1 resulted in a National Maritime liabil- ity. (5) The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, called the Magna Charta of our Maritime Industry, established our National policy. c. Our National Maritime experience of Torld War 11. (1) a shipbuilding program was in effect upon our entry into war. (2) Upon our entry into war, our maritime fleet available to support our armed Forces consisted of a bout 1100 vessels of w:hich approximately 1000 were obsolete. (3) Through implementation and acceleration of our ship building program, our nation, through an all out effort, broke all world records in types and tonnages of ships constructed during the period 1939 to 1945. (4) Construction procedures of simplicity of aesign, standardization, and production line assembly methods re- sulted in a large fleet of predominately Liberty-type vessels which are outmoded in design, slow in speed, ex- tremely vulnerable to attack, and uneconomical for post war commercial operation. (5) Although our nation spent over 15 billion dollars and built 5171 vessels totaling over 54 million deadweight tons during 1939 to 1945, our post war fleet remains out of balance, being deficient in passenger vessels and ineff- icient in adequate designs and speeds for cargo vessels, suitable to satisfy our commercial requirements or as auxillaries to our armed Forces. (6) Our National Policy for the disposition of our sur- plus vessels was established by Congeessiai.al action in (2) Ip H the passage of the Ship Sales Act of 1946 whereby Amertcan operators and our Allies received purchase priorities of our surplus vessels. (7) Our National Policy for disposition of our surplus vessels wa s predicated on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of our Armed Forces to the Congress. d. Measures required to maintain our Maritime integrity. (1) Long range ship construction to assure a retention of a bala nced fleet and. elimination of obsolete and overiged vessels. (2) Initiation of construction'to effect a balanced commer- cial Maritime fleet. (3) Strategic planning for ship design and construction re- quirements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinated with the Maritime Industry and our National leaders. (4) Ocean Transportation requirementslemaintained by current pla nning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. That revision and implementation of such planning be effected and in consonance -ith research and development and logis- tical requirements of the Armed Forces and Industry. (5) Retention of a suitable laidup fleet from our current surplus vessels to be available for emergency utilization by our Armed Forces. (6) Strategic planning by Joint Chiefs of Staff be implemented fully by legislation submitted to the Cong ess for appro- priate action. 3. Recommendations. a. That our active seagoing Merchant Marine Fleet consist of a minimum of 1000 vessels of approximately 1~009000 dbad- weight tons, composed of a properly balanced fleet of passenger, dry-cargo and tanker vessels of the latest de- sign and speed capabilities. b. That our active fleet be supported by a reserve of inactive 'M~ C:; .~Wb a ships balanced.as to type and maintained in a state of reasonable preservation and readiness, and dispersed in strategic points on all our costal areas. c. That the size and composition of our reserve fleet should be established in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. d. That they reserve fleet be placed under the administration of the Secretary of Defense with the Department of the Navy responsible for inspection, maintenance and repairs of the floating reserve. e. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiate strategic plans for a long range ship building program based on strategic con- cepts and/or mobilization plans; these plans should envisage phased construction periods in consonance pith phased mobili- zation periods and the calculated vessel losses expected during such phased periods. f. That the long range strategic plans for ship construction be reviewed at least annually and be kept current by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. g. That proposed legislation covering the strategic ship con- struction plans be submitted to the Congress at an early date and that Congress be kept currently informed of any proposed changes in plans -where legislative action is indicated. h. That Annex 3 be dispatched to the Director, Logistics Divi- sion, General Staff, Department of the Army, forwarding this report. ANNEX 1 Analytical Study g . 0 son SNEX 2 Bibliography Majo TC "NN~X 3 Draft of Transmittal ANNEX 4 MERCHANT Vessels,Design & Construction 1939-1945 (4) _ --. e D. ,JOHNSON ' . a MAJOR TLN 1 I. Historical Background of our Maritime Indusrty. 1. Merchant ships have long been looked upon as auxillartes of a country's Armed Forces as well a s vessels of trade. The Honorable James Forrestal, Secretary of National Defense,-has stated that, "a vigorous merchant marine is essention to our national safety". President Truman's Committee on Universal Military Training, in outlining the principles of a basic pro- gram for national security, said; "The functions of merchant ships is not limited to their commercial activities and indust- rial potential, but is intimately related to national security". 2. a ma tion's Merchant Marine or Commercial Fleet consists of all its vessels engaged in water-borne trade, bosh ocean-going and coastwise. It is not a part of the Navy, :which is some- times known as the Naval or Armed Marine of a nation. 3. Shipping is vital to a nation's transportation ~:nd trade, for no nation in the world has rithin its. own borders all that it needs for modern life. Switzerland, though hundredsof miles from the sea, has merchant ships of her own.. 4. In most countries, merchant ships are operated in peacetime by private individuals or companies uhaier government supervision. The private operators may own the ships outright or charter (rent) them if they are owned by the government.