On the Proper Scope of Philosophy of Religion
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On the Proper Scope of Philosophy of Religion Ali Pirhayati and Zeinab Rezaei (Tehran) Abstract Diego Bubbio criticizes the current debate between the “new the- ists” and the “new atheists,” arguing that philosophy of religion has been reduced to a kind of inconclusive debate between atheistic naturalism and theistic natural philosophy. He calls for a revision of the criteria de- fining the scope of philosophy of religion and believes that the post- Kantian philosophy (particularly contemporary continental philosophy) can help set a proper normative criterion for redefining the scope of phi- losophy of religion. In this article, we elaborate on some other aspects on which continental philosophers can have a role in setting a proper scope for the philosophy of religion. 1. Introduction In “Metaphilosophical Reflections on Theism and Atheism in the Current Debate” (2009),1 the Italian philosopher Diego Bubbio ques- tions the current definition of philosophy of religion as encompassing the works of new atheists such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Quentin Smith, on the one hand, and the works of new theists such as Alvin Plantinga, William Lane Craig, and Robert Koons, on the other hand. The new atheists try to replace supernaturalism and theism with an alternative worldview in which natural science is able to efficiently ex- plain all the facts about the origins of the Earth, the meaning of human life, and ethics. The new theists, in contrast, try to provide “rational proofs for the existence of a personal God and supernatural/religious ex- 1 Diego Bubbio, “Metaphilosophical Reflections on Theism and Atheism in the Current Debate.” In P. A. Quadrio & C. Besseling (eds.), Politics and Religion in the New Century: Philosophical Reflections (Sydney University Press, 2009), 354-381. 68 ON THE PROPER SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 69 planations for scientific phenomena.”2 These two positions can be called “enemy twins” who “fight each other vigorously but [...] need each other as both of them build their identity in opposition to their adversary.”3 They appear to be adversaries, but they use the same logical framework and accept the game rules of each other. Bubbio asks whether these approaches should normatively be con- sidered as philosophies of religion. He believes that such a conception of philosophy of religion is based on the following criterion: “any philoso- phical questions that arise in connection with religion properly belong to philosophy of religion.”4 Alternatively, he tries to present a historical account of the emergence of philosophy of religion and develop what he considers to be a “more reasonable” normative criterion.5 He argues that philosophy of religion as a specific discipline was born when modern philosophy underwent an anthropocentric conversion: It “stopped focus- ing on the ‘whole’ and started focusing on the human being.”6 Then, for example, the question is no longer whether we can know the essence of God, but whether we can know how the human being can have a rela- tionship with the sacred.7 Kant was at the vanguard of this conversion by removing “reli- gious claims from the realm of theoretical reason and referencing their significance to regulative and symbolic meaning.”8 Kant put forward a kind of perspectivism according to which the world cannot objectively be examined by the human subject; the world cannot be known in itself, but only as far as human knowledge can reach. Bubbio believes that the continental tradition has accepted this perspectivism and understands philosophy of religion as analyzing “only the questions that arise in connection with the regulative and symbolic meaning of religion.”9 Conversely, the analytic tradition has rejected post-Kantian perspectiv- ism.10 2 ibid., 364. 3 ibid. 4 ibid., 358. 5 ibid., 359. 6 ibid. 7 ibid. 8 ibid., 363. 9 ibid. 10 ibid. 70 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW We agree with the main point of Bubbio’s article, i.e., that the cur- rent trends in philosophy of religion are abortive and should be changed. However, in what follows we provide a critique of Bubbio’s ideas and mention other insights from continental thought that seem to us to be more powerful arguments to be used against the current theism/atheism debate. 2. The Critique of Subjectivism and Historicity The main insight of continental philosophy, which has revolution- ary implications for philosophy of religion, is the radical critique of modern subjectivism. Modern philosophy is based on the premise that the point of departure for philosophical inquiry is the self-conscious sub- ject. Heidegger rejected the subject-object relation as the fundamental structure of human understanding and tried to overcome the Cartesian distinction. He challenged the standpoint of most Western philosophers who emphasized rational contemplation, which examines the world in an objective manner. Heidegger believed that the human being’s funda- mental involvement with the world is not like that of a passive observer but rather that of an active participant who treats the world as a complex system of tools. Then there is a fundamental experience of what he calls “the being of entities” or a pre-scientific background conditioning any inquiry into the whatness and howness of things.11 Such a critique of subjectivism leads to a paradigm shift in phi- losophy of religion and displaces the traditional popular approach to proving God’s existence or analyzing the “usefulness” of religion. The analytic tradition takes for granted the subject-object dualism and is trapped in abortive discussions about the utility and danger of religion, the natural and supernatural explanations of the origin of the world, etc. What Bubbio calls “wager” (endorsing Gabriel Marcel’s ideas about the belief in the existence and non-existence of God) seems to be a totally subjectivistic idea based on the premise that the human being surveys different approaches to religion in an isolated objective manner and chooses to bet on one of them. The term “wager” emphasizes the role of the will or decision in human’s religious existence and is another 11 William R. Schroeder, Continental Philosophy: A Critical Approach (Blackwell, 2005), 159. ON THE PROPER SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 71 aspect of voluntaristic subjectivism, which, as Heidegger explains, reaches its zenith in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Moreover, Bubbio considers one of the responsibilities of philoso- phy of religion to be the interpretation of symbolic and regulative mean- ings of “religious experience.”12 The very twentieth-century term “reli- gious experience” is another sign of thinking in the context of (scien- tific) subjectivism. Another important insight of continental thought is its focus on his- toricity. According to some continental philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Baudrillard, and Vattimo, we are living in an age of nihilism in which all the traditional values and metaphysical systems have col- lapsed. The Death of God opens a huge gap between the traditional, value-based, world of faith, and the post-modern world in which there is no metaphysical support for moral values and meaning of life. It is in this historical context that the theism/atheism debate proves to be totally futile, because it cannot open a new horizon before human life. In other words, the debate over the existence of God has no rele- vance to the current historical situation of the human being and is iso- lated from the historical existence of post-modern humans. Even the strongest arguments in favor of the existence of God or meaning of life cannot trigger any kind of eagerness for the sacred among the people who live in our consumerist technological world. This futility of such philosophical debates is what Heidegger conceptualized as “the End of Philosophy,” according to which Western metaphysical thinking has reached its final stage (with the emergence of technology as the goal of human life) and no longer has the potential to launch a new era of in- quiry and struggle. 3. The Meaning of “Religion” Another approach to setting the proper scope of philosophy of re- ligion is meditating on the meaning of the concept “religion” and its im- plications. “Religion” can be used in different contexts and has manifold meanings. But which meaning is worthy of philosophical scrutiny? The following list proposes various definitions of “religion” (there 12 Bubbio, “Metaphilosophical Reflections,” 369. 72 SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW may be some overlapping between them):13 a) Religion as culture: Sometimes the word “religion” refers to cer- tain cultural or social norms and customs. They include acts of worship, ceremonies, and rituals. These customs are culturally transmitted to the next generations and there is no “authenticity” in acting in accordance with them. b) Religion as object of research: “Religion” may refer to an object of academic research. For example, the religious studies scholars or even cler- gies studying a specific religion as an academic discipline, but they cannot be said to be necessarily “religious people” or “believers,” just like someone who does research about love is not necessarily a lover. c) Religion as a set of propositions: This conception of religion is what the new atheists/theists focus on. They understand religion as a theory or a set of statements about reality and they try to prove/disprove the theory by analyzing the evidence. d) Religion as ideology: “Religion” can be used as a political or social ideology. The conception of religion as ideology is especially relevant in late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries with the emer- gence of Islamic constitutionalism (official governments) or the Jihadist groups like Taliban and ISIS. e) Religion as theology: By “theology,” we mean all the literature which claims to have a relationship with the sacred, including the Holy Scriptures, exegeses, mystic texts, and religious philosophy.