THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Hegel’s Modal Ontological Argument A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy © Copyright All Rights Reserved By David Pensgard Washington, D.C. 2019 Hegel’s Modal Ontological Argument David Pensgard, PhD Director: Antón Barba-Kay, PhD A recent trend in Hegel scholarship has recognized an irreducibly metaphysical component. Unlike traditional metaphysical views, this trend, sometimes referred to as the revised metaphysical view, accepts significant Kantian influence on Hegel, but also sees a rebuttal and counter-critique. Such a Hegel avoids the excesses of traditional metaphysics, including ontotheological speculation, but does not avoid metaphysics altogether. To extend this effort to understand Hegel’s metaphysics, without suggesting an argument for the existence of God, I here point to Hegel’s ontological argument as the one, indispensable interpretational key that he himself has provided for this purpose. Unfortunately, this argument is not only hard to detect because of the way Hegel presents it, but it is also difficult to accept because it takes a very unexpected form; it is a deduction in the ordinary sense. Perhaps without exception, scholars today think that Hegel could not possibly be using a deduction because deductive logic is considered to be antithetical to his project. It is true that Hegel criticized logic’s traditional practice for being dogmatic, and he did detect oppositional themes within the method of deduction itself, but Hegel neither condemned nor abandoned deduction. Instead, he worked to redeem it by purging its practice of two errors: presupposition and finitude. This is accomplished by means of the special properties of the Disjunctive Syllogism, a deduction that Hegel takes pains to develop as a circular and self-mediating concept. Using this form, Hegel developed the science of logic in such a way that it could be understood as healing its own internal divisions deductively. This form of thought thus restores to itself its capacity to deduce. Hegel tells us that Thought thinks itself. The form of this thought is the disjunctive syllogism, the content of this form is Thought itself, and the result is an argument that unifies this concept with this object. A deduction that does this is an ontological argument. Hegel leverages this form in his bid to meet what has been called the holistic condition, the view popular in Hegel’s day that a monism could ground philosophy by overcoming Kantian dualism. This dissertation by David Pensgard fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Antón Barba-Kay, PhD, as Director, and by Timothy Noone, PhD, and Michael Rohlf, PhD as Readers. ________________________________________ Antón Barba-Kay, PhD, Director ________________________________________ Timothy Noone, PhD, Reader ________________________________________ Michael Rohlf, PhD, Reader ii CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv ABBREVIATIONS vii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I DETECTING A FORMAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN HEGEL’S WORKS 18 A. Searching for Signs of Hegel’s Ontological Argument 29 B. Educing the Latent Argument 35 CHAPTER II HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC 127 A. Hegel’s Study and Use of Past Logical Advancements 142 B. Hegel’s Criticisms of Traditional Logic: Finitude and Presupposition 169 C. Hegel’s Redemption of Traditional Logic: A Place for Abstraction and Remedies for Finitude and Presupposition 192 CHAPTER III THE PREEMINENCE OF THE DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM WITHIN HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY AND ITS CONNECTION TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 228 A. From Sublation to Universal 233 B. From the Universal to Objectivity 263 C. Summary of Chapter 317 CHAPTER IV THE MODAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HEGEL’S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 321 A. Formal Proof of Hegel’s Modal Ontological Argument 322 B. The Strategy of the Proof and its History 356 C. Hegel’s Lapse and a Suggestion for a Hegelian-Style Resolution 363 D. Conclusions 380 BIBLIOGRAPHY 383 APPENDIX ANALYSIS OF GREGOR DAMSCHEN’S NEO-HEGELIAN ARGUMENT 392 INDEX 403 iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project has become a major milestone in my life and as I think of those who made it possible, who supported and encouraged me, who gave me a chance, and even those who resisted me in a constructive way, I find that the list is longer than I expected. I am very grateful to the many who have been a part of my life, whose friendship and guidance are detectable within these pages. Though I am the author, I want the people listed below to know that they have played a major role in making this book what it is. To these fine people I offer my sincerest and most heartfelt thanks. First, to my parents, Richard and Linda Pensgard, who provided me with a sound foundation upon which I have been able to build all of my subsequent accomplishments. Their careful and encouraging input has made me who I am today and this work is a reflection of the creativity and courage that they first instilled in me. I thank them also for their ongoing prayers and support. To Sara, my wife and “personal academic librarian,” whose encouragement and support, both emotional and intellectual, has been instrumental in the completion and quality of this and many other projects. Her dutiful patience and loving support have lent me strength and encouragement for over 20 years. Without her, this project and the doctorate degree that it embodies, would not have come to fruition. I gladly share credit for this project and whatever benefits that may come from it with her. For the Reverend Dr. Kurt J. Pritzl, O.P., Dean of the School of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America (2000-2011), who, as one of his final acts as Dean, and in this life, generously iv saw fit to give me a chance in his school, providing admission and full tuition, two graces that have made this present project possible. I will never forget meeting and corresponding with him in my first year at the school, and I regret his passing and the fact that he did not live to see my graduation. To the current Dean of the School, my teacher and adviser John C. McCarthy, whose guidance during the earliest stages of this project proved vital to its acceptance. While he was still acclimating to his position, treading water and, in his own words, “swatting at tennis balls,” he still managed to maintain a steady hand on the tiller, to my great benefit. He has left his mark on this project. To my dissertation director Antón Barba-Kay, who not only gave excellent advice but who set a high and consistent standard. He also helped me to meet that standard while we worked together over many years on this project. His patience, I think, has been unusually great. He has helped me to collect and communicate my thoughts on Hegel’s philosophy and he has permitted me space enough to develop a new and unusual interpretation. I hope that he is pleased with the result. To Michael Rohlf, my teacher, long-time advisor, and member of my dissertation committee, who spent many hours helping me as I struggled to master German and who early steered me into a more useful topic of study than the one I had naively pursued at the start. His consistent kindness and generosity has made all the difference. To my teacher and final dissertation committee member Timothy Noone, who has proven indispensable to me through his knowledge of Scholastic logic and who has pointed me to key resources along the way. I think I have never met a professor who was more genuinely and cheerfully interested in the well-being and progress of his students. To Edward Martin, my first professor of both metaphysics and symbolic logic, and to Thomas Provenzola. Their patience in education and their own passion for these subjects allowed a newcomer to philosophy to get a solid foothold. Their work in educating me has become my v foundation in the field, and they have both been a pleasure to know. I also count it an honor to be their friend. And finally, I extend a place of special honor at the conclusion of this list to my good friend and supportive “sounding board” Sean Turchin. His feedback and friendship have put wind in my sails many times. He has listened to my theories with genuine interest and has encouraged me as I explored this and many other projects. May these fine individuals share the credit, but none of the blame, for what follows. vi ABBREVIATIONS AND WRITING STANDARDS CM The consequentia mirabilis argument; AKA Clavius’ Law. DS Disjunctive Syllogism. IDT Absolute Identity Thesis. OA Ontological Argument. UPI This abbreviation is used to refer collectively to the various relations that Hegel notices between Universal, Particular, And Individual. *** GW Gesammelte Werke. [The Collected Works of Hegel in German] Edited by the Rheinisch- Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968–. All German quotations, unless otherwise identified, will come from this set. PhG Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford University Press, 1977. This book will also be referred to as “the Phenomenology.” EL Encyclopedia Logic (1830). Translated by W. Wallace. Oxford University Press, 1975. (Encyclopedia vol. 1) EN Philosophy of Nature (1830). Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford University Press, 1970. (Encyclopedia vol. 2) EM Philosophy of Mind (1830). Translated by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford University Press, 1971. (Encyclopedia vol. 3) WL Science of Logic. Translated by A. V. Miller. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1969. VBDG Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God. Edited and Translated by Peter C.