The father of the RAF was one of the first to grasp that aviation would radically change warfare. Trenchard By Rebecca Grant at the Creation

EFORE Hap Arnold, before Tooey Spaatz, before Douhet and de Sever- sky, even before Billy Mitchell, there was Britain’s Hugh M. Trenchard. Yet, Trenchard today rates barely a Bfootnote in most histories of air- power. When mentioned at all, he is remembered mainly as an advocate of an independent and as the first true practitioner of . In his day, Trenchard was known as the father of the — a gruff and forceful patron saint of airpower. He trained and organized the RAF for , then led it into battle, pioneering many of the concepts central to air warfare today. Trenchard the aviator was a domi- nating presence. He was described by American airpower legend Billy Mitchell as “decided in manner and very direct in speech.” The stern and uncompromising officer who even- keeping his distance from Army bu- tually found his niche in the Royal reaucracy. His passions were polo Flying Corps started off slouching and military tactics, and he cared through his military career. (The little for social graces. RFC, which was formed in April Trenchard first saw combat in Sep- 1912, joined with the Royal Naval tember 1900 in South Africa during Air Service on April 1, 1918, to be- the Boer War. His time in Africa ended come the Royal Air Force.) after he and the Australian horsemen He twice failed the under his command pursued Boer rid- entrance exams. However, by age ers into a valley. Trenchard, charg- 20, he slid through, became a lieu- ing in ahead of most of his men, led a tenant, and was posted to India, where small party assaulting the farmhouse he met a fellow officer, the young where the Boers were holed up. He Winston Churchill, in a polo match was hit by a Boer bullet that pierced a in 1896. lung and grazed his spine, knocking Early on, he gained a reputation him out of the war. for flouting military authority and Sent home to England as an in-

76 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2004 most of the officers for the land-based branch of the . He also earned the nickname “Boom” for his bluntness and loud voice. (British Prime Minister Chur- chill would later jokingly say Boom should be changed to “Bomb.”) Trenchard was one of the first to grasp the radical impact aviation would have upon land warfare. The revelation came in September1912, when he flew as an observer with Longmore during Army maneuvers. In less than an hour, Trenchard was able to locate the opposing force. He and Longmore reported back to head- quarters, then set out again to find their side’s cavalry and redirect them. Trenchard realized that no army could maneuver in secret, with air- A rough landing while tobogganing apparently fixed a spine injury that planes to spot them. From 1912 on, Trenchard suffered in the Boer War. Never very impressive as a junior officer, he was convinced that aviation would he found his calling late in his career, as an air tactician and strategist. change the conduct of war. Horatio H. Kitchener, the war min- valid, he could not walk without a thur Longmore, who had two years’ ister, and Churchill, running the admi- cane. A benefactor paid for him to go flying experience. ralty, were both believers in aviation— for the air to the Alpine resort of St. Fortunately, Trenchard found his Churchill the more so. But the real Moritz, where Trenchard took up the niche at the new Central Flying man to impress was Gen. Douglas Haig, toboggan. Miraculously, it restored School, which needed an adjutant to commander of Britain’s First Army, him. One morning, he took a down- put it in order. Despite his tendency in the World War I trenches in France. hill curve too fast and flew off the to be abrupt and gruff, Trenchard, Trenchard soon got his chance. He toboggan, landing hard 30 feet down during his Army years, had devel- went to France in November 1914 as the hill. Rather than causing more oped not only the knack of listening commander of one of the Royal Fly- damage, the jolt jarred his spine in but a keen sense of human nature. ing Corps’ three operational wings. such a way that the half-paralysis He set the curriculum for trainees His observation of the war to date dissipated. He got up out of the snow, and emphasized discipline and skills, convinced him the corps was too cau- able to walk with no impediment. such as map reading, signals, and en- tious. Trenchard believed it was vital His biographer Andrew Boyle gine mechanics. In the two years re- to fight for air ascendancy, not just wrote, “He had cured himself by vio- maining before World War I broke undertake routine patrols and recon- lence.” out, Trenchard’s courses turned out naissance. Summoned to a meeting Unfortunately there was no tonic for his career in the Army. After another 10 years of postings in places like Nigeria and Ireland, Trenchard, as a major at age 39, had an undistin- guished record and few prospects. It was at that point that Trenchard Hulton Picture Library determined he would learn to fly.

The Airman His commanding officer told Tren- chard that he was too tall and too old. The infant Royal Flying Corps of 1912 accepted no one over 40. Undeterred, Trenchard got two weeks’ leave and paid for his own instruc- tion. Thirteen days later, he soloed, af- ter a grand total of one hour and four minutes of flying time. In truth, Trenchard was never a good pilot. According to Boyle in Trenchard, Winston Churchill (in flying helmet) returns from a flight in 1915, greeted by a Man of Vision, he was described as crowd of well-wishers. Churchill’s enthusiasm for aviation aided Trenchard in “indifferent” by Lt. Ar- his push to expand resources and responsibility for Britain’s fledgling air arm.

AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2004 77 with Haig in early January 1915, Trenchard learned of secret plans for a March offensive at Neuve Chappelle and offered his view on what air units

could do. Imperial War Museum

Abandoning Caution “I explained rather badly about ar- tillery observation (then in its in- fancy), reporting to gun batteries by Morse and signal lamps, and of our early efforts to get wireless going,” Boyle quotes Trenchard as saying. Scouring maps of the front with Haig, Trenchard explained where his squad- rons would be. He convinced Haig. According to Boyle, Haig told him: “Well, Trenchard, I shall expect you to tell me before the attack whether you can fly, because on your being able to observe for the artillery and Gen. Douglas Haig was receptive to Trenchard’s ideas for the use of air in World carry out reconnaissance, the battle War I. Here, Haig confers wih British war minister David Lloyd George (right), as will partly depend. If you can’t fly French minister Albert Thomas and French Gen. Joseph Joffre look on. because of the weather, I shall prob- ably put off the attack.” again asked Trenchard to provide British assaults of 1915, yet senior In February, Trenchard’s airmen aerial reconnaissance and bombing military leaders recognized the value scored a coup that justified such con- of targets behind enemy lines. of the aerial support. The Battle of fidence. Trenchard had encouraged In August 1915, Trenchard became Loos brought Trenchard a promotion them to replace sketch pads with commander of all British air forces to general and, far more important, a cameras for reconnaissance of Ger- in France. One month later, at the citation from the British Expedition- man trench lines. One set of photo- Battle of Loos, Trenchard’s fliers ary Force commander in chief, Field graphs uncovered German lines around sketched out for the first time a cam- Marshall John D.P. French, praising a brick factory. Trenchard briefed paign recognizable as full-scale sup- the Royal Flying Corps for its work, Haig’s ground commanders, who, port to a land commander. It began especially the railway bomb attacks, using the aerial photos, took the again with meticulous mapping of which disrupted enemy communica- brickworks in daylight. Now Haig enemy strong points, giving British tions. wanted the aviators to not only map heavy artillery targets in advance. Trenchard’s practical insights had the whole trench line but also stage Haig hoped to break German lines made airpower a partner—albeit a an aerial bombardment, in conjunc- at Loos at a narrow point then pour junior partner—among the combined tion with the artillery barrages that infantry reserves through the gap. To arms. Next, Trenchard sought air su- were to precede the offensive. He aid the plan, Trenchard’s squadrons periority. approved an elaborate scheme link- carried out three days of bombing of The technically superior German ing aerial observers and artillery. rail junctions and other targets to Fokker, with its synchronized ma- Haig summoned Trenchard to his hinder movement of German reserves chine guns, dominated the western headquarters at midnight on March into the gap. The ground attack began front in late 1915. Following soar- 8 and asked him to send up a pilot at Sept. 25, 1915. Airmen once again ing Royal Flying Corps losses in dawn for a weather report. Despite spotted for artillery, but Trenchard, November and December, Trenchard lingering low clouds, the fliers took for the first time, held some squad- imposed a new rule on his pilots: to the air in perhaps the first instance rons in reserve, dispatching them Any aircraft flying reconnaissance in which air support was directly where needed, as the heavy fighting must be escorted by at least three linked to a major ground assault. shifted. They were to survey the lines other aircraft, and all the aircraft Unfortunately, the Neuve Chappelle at low level and to update positions must fly in close formation. Forma- assault was not a success. The Ger- of enemy and friendly forces for the tion flying thus became a fundamen- mans regrouped and repulsed the at- artillery. Communications were in- tal tactic, along with taking the of- tack. Haig did not fault his air sup- adequate, so he pulled some pilots fensive to establish air superiority. port. Instead, he reprimanded his out of their cockpits and assigned Trenchard’s tactics worked so well artillery commanders for ignoring them to the ground troops to signal that the French, under pressure at aerial signals. patrolling aircraft during the battle. Verdun in February 1916, began to Trenchard realized, however, that Reconnaissance, interdiction, close borrow his style of concentrating air- the aerial bombing raids were too air support, air liaison: the Battle of power and fighting for air superior- piecemeal and, in some cases, had Loos featured them all, and it was ity. Trenchard coached the French air failed altogether. Haig continued to Trenchard’s handiwork. forces—through his French-speaking look to Trenchard for support, though, The operation as a whole was no aide-de-camp, Capt. Maurice Bar- and, for the spring offensives, Haig more successful than any of the other ing—over Verdun as they battled back

78 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2004 and forth with the German airmen for air superiority. The lessons of 1916 showed that the air arm had to protect its own ability to operate—establish air superiority—

Imperial War Museum before it could assist ground forces. Trenchard managed it smoothly. Haig, who was now in overall command of British forces in France, continued to call on him for air support plans and favored Trenchard by sending him choice staff officers to relieve some administrative burdens.

Birds of a Feather Word of Trenchard’s expertise reached the ears of a US Army officer, one Lt. Col. William Mitchell, when he arrived in France in the spring of 1917, a peak time for offensives. Mitchell drove to Trenchard’s coun- By the end of World War I, Trenchard had made the RAF a critical part of an try-house headquarters and asked to integrated land-air team. Here, Queen Mary, escorted by Trenchard (on her left), see him as Trenchard was about to inspects aircraft in France in 1917.

September 1918. No doubt Trenchard’s clout and backing helped Mitchell se- cure cooperation from the British, French, and Italian Air Forces. It also may have helped boost Mitchell’s handful of American squadrons into a 1,400-airplane force. Allied aircraft patrols gained air superiority over the lines, observa- tion aircraft supported the half-mil- lion men on the ground, pursuit air- planes bombed behind German lines, and Trenchard’s bombers hit rail junctions and other deep targets. Mitchell had played it in the style pioneered by Trenchard. Despite these successes for airpower and Trenchard’s ease with Allied air- men, he often faced trouble with his superiors in London. The discord Massive in those days, the Handley Page played a pivotal role in demonstrat- reached a peak in April 1918 when ing some of Trenchard’s theories of bombing. The aircraft was built in the US Trenchard abruptly quit his post as the for Britain. Note the large bomb slung beneath the fuselage. first chief of the Air Staff after only four months in the job and just two leave on an inspection trip. Trenchard matter how bad you say things are.” weeks after formation of the Royal was brusque when Mitchell said he Trenchard admired well-placed Air Force. He blamed headquarters wanted to see all the Royal Flying brashness. Three days of inspection politics. However, within a few weeks, Corps squadrons, equipment, and sup- tours and discussions followed. he expressed shame at his behavior at plies and, of course, to hear all Tren- Mitchell left with a crash course in a time when the Germans were poised chard could tell him about air opera- the principles of airpower and a fa- to invade Paris. Returning to France, tions. Trenchard, per an account in his therly invitation from Trenchard to Trenchard took command of an inter- biography, was true to form, barking seek him out any time. Mitchell later allied independent bomber force. out: “Do you suppose I’ve got nothing wrote that never had he spent a more better to do than chaperone you and instructive time. Strategic Bombing answer questions?” Trenchard called Mitchell “a man Trenchard’s aim was to use long- Mitchell, according to Boyle, re- after my own heart,” wrote Boyle. range bombing to take more of the plied: “I don’t suppose anything, A year later, Mitchell sought out offensive to Germany itself, but the General. I just know you’ve got a Trenchard’s advice as the American French commanders, who were leery good organization here. It won’t miss planned his nation’s first major air of the independent air force, needed you if you take a day or two off, no campaign—the Battle of St. Mihiel in convincing. The father of the RAF

AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2004 79 Churchill, who became secretary of war and air, recalled Trenchard to be chief of the Air Staff, a position he kept until his retirement in 1929. During his tenure as Air Staff chief, he dealt with the impact of depleted budgets and fended off Army and Navy efforts to eliminate the RAF. Trenchard also established the RAF College at Cranwell and continued to promote training, organization, and technological advances as the solid foundations of the force. When World War II broke out, Trenchard was in his early 60s and played no major role in it. Churchill did ask him to visit the squadrons during the Battle of Britain. Many of the pilots Trenchard had helped to train now led the RAF. Not Trenchard was not a major airpower player in World War II, but he continued his least among them was Charles F.A. development of bombing theory. Here, he talks with a protégé, Air Chief “Peter” Portal, who soon became chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, who later served as deputy supreme allied commander. of the Air Staff, and Arthur W. Tedder, one of his young squadron command- faced an issue that would hound air spite of nearly overwhelming hazards. ers of 1918, who became deputy su- commanders until the end of the 20th They not only had to make deep night preme allied commander to Gen. century: the allocation of airpower. bombing raids, flying underpowered Dwight D. Eisenhower and a force Even the head of the French air ser- machines loaded with bombs weigh- behind the unified application of air- vice, Gen. Maurice Duvall, believed ing up to 1,650 pounds, but also had power in the Normandy invasion and that allocating bombers to Trenchard do it in bad weather. Trenchard, as beyond. for independent bombing equated to quoted by Boyle, later said, “My job Trenchard pushed hard for unre- making the bombing of Germany the was to prod, cajole, help, comfort, and lenting air attacks on Germany. He primary objective and relegated de- will the pilots on, sometimes to their believed the airpower rout of Ger- feat of the enemy in the field to a death.” His customary technique was man Gen. Erwin Rommel in North secondary role. to make frequent unannounced visits Africa reconfirmed the role of air The debate laid bare the essential and talk straight. Often he watched the superiority and the application of point: Armies had grown attached to squadrons take off, waiting up until airpower in land warfare. According airplanes, and the trade-offs neces- they returned. to Boyle, Trenchard wrote, “We won sary to apply airpower to theaterwide The Handley Page bomber crews the battle of the air before El Alamein objectives raised huge concerns for were Trenchard’s prized veterans, and Tunisia could be won.” ground commanders. They were not assigned the most difficult long-range British, French, and American air- soothed by Trenchard’s assurances night missions. The aircraft were also men in two wars all owed much to that he could easily divert bombers prized for the loads they could carry. Trenchard’s practical ability to mold to support missions when ground Metz, , Coblenz, , airpower into a respected weapon of forces got in trouble. and many tactical targets in Ger- warfare. That he did so in an age The 1918 campaign did not re- many felt the weight of Trenchard’s when airpower’s technologies were solve this issue; indeed, it reappeared bombers. They routinely raided cit- still sorely lacking made the feat in every major combined campaign ies up to 200 miles from their bases even more remarkable. until the end of the 20th century. in France. Steadily, their bomb ton- During and after the war, Trenchard In the summer of 1918, with all nage increased, from 70 tons dropped was instrumental in raising money eyes on his bomber force, Trenchard in June to 1,000 tons in August. for the Battle of Britain Chapel in had to produce results. His strategy Westminster Abbey and, on his death was to distribute attacks across dif- Maintaining the RAF in 1956, he was buried there. The ferent points in Germany to keep the After World War I, Trenchard formidable marshal of the RAF left a German Air Force off balance and battled for the continued existence profound airpower legacy that showed unable to concentrate against the Al- of the Royal Air Force. In 1919, itself best in those he influenced. ■ lies. Trenchard’s favorite targets were railways, since the Germans were short of rolling stock, and blast Rebecca Grant is a contributing editor of Air Force Magazine. She is presi- furnaces, because they were easy to dent of IRIS Independent Research in Washington, D.C., and has worked for RAND, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. find at night. His pilots also special- Grant is a fellow of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts, the public ized in bombing German airfields. policy and research arm of the Air Force Association’s Aerospace Education His new challenge was motivating Foundation. Her most recent article, “Dawn at Kill Devil Hill,” appeared in the aircrews to carry out the campaign in December 2003 issue.

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