Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 1998 Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion Daniel Richman Columbia Law School,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Daniel Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1998). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/746 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION, AND ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION Daniel C. Richman Much of the literatureon federal criminal law bemoans the extent to which Congress has abdicated its legislative responsibilities and left enforcement deci- sions to prosecutorialdiscretion. Many critics have sought to compensate for the absence of appropriate legislative specificity by proposing other devices for limit- ing prosecutorial power, many of which would centralize enforcer authority. Guided by recent work in positive political theory, Professor Daniel Richman argues that such claims of legislative abdication overlook the attention that Con- gress has given to the organization and activities of the federal enforcement bureaucracy. By showing the extent to which Congress balances concern with enforcer accountability against suspicion of presidential power, the Article cau- tions against reform proposals that would undermine considered political deci- sions about the allocation of criminal enforcement authority. INTRO DU CTIO N ......................................................................................................... 758 I.