JANUARY FEBRUARY 1975 DiToR~ r~L NATIONAL DEFENCE HEAD~UARTERS 5 DIRECTORATE OF FLIGHT SAFETY ~~~ ,01~ ., ornmen t~ ~ COl R . D. SCHULTZ ~ ~3Vti DIRECTQR OF FLIGHT SAFETY Would you believe an added cause factor assessment MAJ F.K . lAWIaR ICOI F. G. VIIIENEUVE on an aircrafit incident that reads Personnel - Other Netdion ~d aedlrsis IevesttpoNae oea pnvnNee Personnel/Clerk Admin/Judgement . Well it's true . A CF 104 pilot found that the left tip tank yas cap cover was missing when he returned from a training trip . The investiyation revealed that the cap was lost in fliyht . Both pilots stated that on the external check the caps were definitely secure . Further checking at the unit revealed that twelve caps had Flying Time is Precious-Don't Waste It badly worn male dzus fasteners which could cause the loss 2 rationalization of a cap. All the worn fasteners were replaced and an Each time the financial belt tightens one of the areas usually affected instruction was issued from NDHQ calling for a check on is the flying time allotted to air training and operations . An immediate and the dzus fastener condition before each flight . However, the 5 good show often emotiondl res~onsef is that o ur operational capability will be degraded message containing the direction arrived at the base while and fliyht safety will be cor~ipromised . the S q uadron was awa Y on exercise . A clerk filed the 8 on the dials Such a reaction message and rt was not received by the Squadron, Sure is understancfable when well established values are enough, shortly after another CF 104 lost a tip tank cap chancfcd but are we being as honest with ourselves and the system as we because of a worn dzus fastener . When one remembers that 9 treat your engine like a friend should be? The answer is not simple nor are there any absolutes. There are the difference between an incident and an accident is a so many variables that each situation has to be assessed objectively in difference of degree and not kind the old adage thai "fliyht 10 aeromedevac relation to our collective experience with that weapons system, its role and safety is everybody's business" certainly holds true . the exf~ertise of the people involved . Provided we do our homework well at all levels anci recognize that the 12 helicopte~s and weather variables are constantly chanying then we should be able to counter any Most military personnel take some form of first~aid training adverse effect on o F~eration a I std~ ~ n dards and flight safety . The most during their careers but very rarely have to use it . This 16 vs 880 important factor in this exercise is a constant awareness that while Head- account of an incident that happened recently in a U .S . quarters assiqns the tasks and Commands set the basic standards, it is at the Naval aircraft highlights the importance of first-aid training sc 1 uadron level that the fl y in y ti ~rr~-e allotted will or will not be effectively for aircrew . 18 pressing ti~e attack C~ utilized . In fact, it is the individtial pilot, or crew, who carry the greatest "During descent from 17,000 ft in a C-9B, responsibility for getting the maximum benefit out of each and every sortie . the crew chief complained about feeling ill and 20 keep it clean By our own arguments each minute is important so there can be no went on 100 percent oxygen . Passing 12,000 ft he cfuestion of wasting time on ur~productive flying. This means that we can no suffered conuulsions, The aircraft commander, 23 gen from 210 lonr.i er afford t o d o so~ m e of those things that arc~ .> takcn> for granted in tirnes assisted by a fliyht attendant, removed the crew of relative F~lent y n o r c~a~ n wc allow pilots or crews to dt.cide when tht.y can chief from his seat and placed him in the forward relax . Our capat~ility and credibility depend on flying records reflecting how entrance way. At that time it appeared that he had 24 letters qood we are - not how ood we should be . stopped, breathing, His mouth was forced open, a g chest massaye beyun, and oxygen administered ,y ~,ua, D `~r ~~cc..wrt after which normal breathing resumed . An emergency was declared and an , uneventful approach and landing was completed . Editor Maj. F. K. Lawlor The aircraft was met by an ambulance which took Art and layout J. A. Dubord the crewmember to the hospital," DDDS 7 Graphic Arts
Flight Comrnenl is produced by the NDHQ Diracto " ---- rate of Fliqhr Safety . The contents do no1 neces " ' , ~a~~t DFS produces a variety of posters which are usually sarily reflect official policy ond unless ofherwise , distributed via the monthly FSO Info Kit . The ideas for stated should not be construed as repulations, L posters come from many sources but there is always a need orders or diredives . Contributions, comments and for new material, li you have any sugyestions which we criticism are welcome ; the promotion of fliyht safety might use for our regular posters or in the is best served by disseminating ideas ond on-the- iob experience . Send submissions to: Editor, Flight COL R . D. SCHUITZ RotortipslTiedowns series please send them alony . You're Comment, NDHQ~DFS, Ottawa, Ontario, K 1 A OK2 . DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT SAFETY closer to the action than we are so help spread the good Telephone: Area Code (613) 995-7037 . Subscrip- word around . tion orders should be diraded to Information Conoda, Ottawa, C>ntario, K1A 059 . Annual sub- scription rote is 51 .50 for Canoda and 52 .50 for other couatries . Remittonce should be mode pay- able to the Receiver General of Canada .
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r~i~ ~ ~c.4.~ Capt B_l. Meindl AMDU fFB Trenton ~a~ a~ . Suppuse yuu uwncd a ileet ot ~0 ainraf~t, what total tlyin~ huurs. maintcnance actiun wauld vuu take tu ensure th ;rt vuur ~lnothc+r appruach mav be tu accept the inspection 1 ~eu f >le alun t,~ with .vuur invcstntent--did not fall uut uf tltc: parameters su~~estedrr by~. the ~manufal'turer ; 11~- fur a -ve ;rr ur T` suv sun Si1P sl.v' Yuu rui;:}tt cunsidcr inspcctiun at rcgular intervals su thnt twu while accumulating rnaintenance datct, lhen rall upun an ri~ D ~;rnv lhint' was deteriuratint; it could be re 1 ~laced cn re { ~aired urgartization I~tuwn as Maintenancc Svstcms Ucvclopm<<~ r hefurc it raused trouble. Ilovvever, since the purpuse u1~ your Brartch to RrtTlO ;~'`,-a LILf' .vuur ins P cclic+ii s~. stcnt. fleet is to transport car~u and passengers ~~ou will lusc rnunev MSllB is a Br~nch uf the !1laint~n~n~e Lm~iucerirt~ if tiuur air~lanes1 are not u P erational, so the 9 uestiun arises : 'fe~hnulugy Division ~i AMUI` ;rnd has ;rs une ui~ its tasks the .o "I luw utten shuuld this aircrait he inspected'' " Yuu would "Rationalir:rtiun" ++f~ ;rll C;fnadian l~url:cs ;~ircrull 1laintcnurtcL want to inspect uften enou~Jt so that the safctv ul flikht is Schedulcs . "Ratiunaliz;rtiun" is bcst dcsrrihcd a5 a as~ured but .vuu would not want tu uver ins p ect because c:umhrehensive rc~vicw uf un ~ircraft rnaintenanl`c schedule prufits would clwindle . lt is possible to set two extremes and with a vicu~ tu providin~ an uptimurn inspcrticur prul ;ranr . .g , sumcwhere in between is the ideal inspectiun frequcncy . but tahing intu ~ceuuni the ;urcr;rft's scrvic~e role an~ upcrating 1 ltow is ii dc~termine~? experience. l~he end prurJuet is a tr~uintenance packape wlti~h , E uptimizes safctv uf tli~;ht in aircr;rft use and effe~~tivhness uf PlviN(~ MUUHS SWCf_ 145t 1NS~tCTION t -f-- 1 , m~inten ;utre eif~E~rt . z~ eo a~, ,Do ieo teo Tlte r;itic~n ;iliz;rtion pruccss is rrlalivrlv simplc' in thcurv ~ I I I I I I hut lun~, un eflurt which is cx P ended in tftrer m;rin areu, : This graph displays the statistical trends for unserviceabilities encountered between major inspections on a typical aircraft . a . Plunnint; : Note that immediately following the inspection the defects are high Iline 1) decreasing rapidly from 0 to 20 hours. Line 2 shows h . Uata ~;rthenn~~ ancl an ;rl~ sis: ;rnd the cyclic trend as the aircraft flies to and from supplementary inspections, while line 3 indicates that the overall defect rate is still ~ . Nreparatiun c+f ;i new maintcnancc s~h~~dule . ~lnuthcr yucstiun you mikht ask is "Whal parts shuuld decreasing at the time of the next major inspection. The ideal time to inspect this aircraft would be the hour at which line 3 begins Planning is ;i mustering of fi+rres, thc assi~nmcnt u1~ a bc inspcrlccl'' " l lerr a:;ein thcrc secrn tu bc Iwo cxtrcmcs with , an upward swing. study tc;rm, a llctcrrninatiun uf air~r;rft rulc, numbcrs und thc ideal sumcwhcrc in bctwccn bul how would _vuu arrivc at munthlv (lvinp r:rte and the ~onvening uf a iunfercnce wltich il'.' lnli~nttatiun Svstern (AMMIS) . T}te systcnt is used tu ussemble or mure detailecl inspection could have prevented the failure . invulvcs NDHQ, CHQ, Unit and Ah1llU persunncl . '~hc iechnieal data P crtainin~i; to the air~raft's f:rilure ;md The whole proc~ess is a time ~onsunting operatiun bccausc cach eunference reviews the e~isting aircralt inspectiun srheclule, scrviceability histury . Th~ MSDB study team ~,ut be uf the thou~tnds uf parts that comprise an aircrai~t is studird . cunsiclers UnsatisfaciE+rv CunCiIlIEln Repurts and acl:ident ;tntl conl'runted with fifteen thuusancl ur mure maintcnance repurts When the data analvsis has been ~ompleted the cxisting 111CIllellt rcpurts havint; insperlion sl:hedule 5it;nil'iran~c . 'fhe which tirst must be sorted into eyuipment groups . h.;rch maintenance sehedule is-sub'ectedI to a f ~enetratin~~ review . cunicrencc ulsu provides A!~1UI' with '~ll11Q . Cummand and air~raft part is thcn analvzed in detail tu deterntine huw lung it Sumc inspertiun items are eliminaied and inspectiun uscr unit views un suspe~ted ~~r knuw'n prf>blrm :rrras. u P erated p ru P erlv: before it recuired1 tttuurtcnanc~c altention, if 1~rcyuenr~~ uf mure sensitive items is increased . ln three out of Fc~lluwimn tltc runference. all signific :;nt aircraft any . l:;rCll f;rilure report is exarnined tu determine vvhethcr the fuur instances the uverall ma~orI ins~ec_tion frecuenrv tur the lerhni~' ;il d;ita r,~, c.c~ Ilect, e 1cr~+ ~a ,~, , I 1 . Y'uu rtrilatt ,zet answers from the airrrafi builder, or from d P redeterntincd E I cr,rlm f;rilure was discuvered during inspection ur while the aircraft aircraft is decreased with nu change in system reliabililv . ?eriud usuallv in exress of - anutlrcr cumpunti~ tlyin~, thc same aircrait type ; huw~ever . I . l0 ,0U0 ilv. in~,hc tu r-~` t n Ir~ E+v uie a uas airburne . !~1ost important, each fault rttust be analv~eci to Durin~, the Data Analysis and the Maintenance Schcclu(c lcl~, ...rts r e .v u t rr o l ~era t'onr r's di s t'netr ti ~uur r'de~rl a c~r u l }t'mumr mav let;itintatc s;rnt 1 ~lr cncutn p assim~~ ~t~ ll r~ ~ I c~~ .rs~r~r~ ~ ~~~ t-cie tE+ thc det~rmine its ef~fect un safetv. . The u I ~eratiunal rulc ancl the rcview, the retention of operational capabiht~', the assuran~c .~rl~~ . + lc~, drstin~t~, . . Yu t r nu~l't~ ti lan~ d ;~rn d i,-rke nff nture Etfte rt , ctr aircr;rft . Uata eathrrin 2 Flight Comment, )an-Feb 1975 3 ^ ,r, r~ ~.Inc~ ~Vith the adjustn]ents completed a new maintenance aircraft have heen or are beinc ';tudicd a~ indi~ated un the p acka'e~ is 1~re p ared titr review bv. ~'DFIQ, CHQ and the user c}tart sun]nlarv . flle ~'hart summarv i; a simple 5tatement oF . unit~- Thi, packa~e in~ludes prupr~sed inspectiun publicatiuns, the direct results uf tlte s~. h edule d Inaintenance r~ltr< (1 n.lll z',ltl tlr ] r 9 ui p Inent lifine~ uhedull"s and an E':c1 ui P ment Codes and pru£r,rn] . T7~csc results tr,rnsl:tte into subsi ' ` '~1~-~.~tl Sr-~ow lnspection Kequirernent~ Manual . The end produet is a murc ;rircrutt down timc, . :s~oo'D rc:du~~~~d m3intenancc tnanlr . e1't~ertivc and efficient inspectit~n ,chedule whi~h is sent tu cunsumptiun uf ntateriel . impruvcd inspertion tcl'hni~ :~ :~, . uper;(tin~~ uniis fur their use. s;lfer aircraft o terali(~ns . Fetiv otl]er Canadian Fulres ~ru~:r;u I 1 _ f G.1 . CUFFORU .4NG CPL UJ . F15HER Cpl J .R .R . Boulerice Kutinnaliiation uf~ s~heduled aircraf~t maintenanee is a ~ould puint t('' eyurlll~r uut5tandin~ benefits ~~r return ~~rl Clifford and Cpl Fisher were manning the nev~r enclin~' ~v~le and everv three or tuur ~'ears the sarne tleel investrnent as has hren prudu~ell h~~ the Aircraft '~taintenun~e Lt Cold Lake Control Tower when they received a weak will t;~~ t}rruu~h tlrc sarne pro~~css su thal its ntaintcnancc Srlledule EZatlunalii ;~tiun I'rulramt, ~onduct~d b~- tl]e tlirrraft requ~rements will eontinually reflect its oper;ltin^ e~perienee tilaintenanec Develitpment Lrnit, and garbled distress call on 121 .5 MHZ, The pilot of a anil rurrenl inspectu~n requirentents. ~~t present l~',~nt~ light aircraft reported he was "squawking, disoriented and wondering if anyone could bring him in" . Lt Clifford immediately responded and established radio contact with the aircraft . He requested a frequency 41ACRAFT 1-IAINTEti1NCl- Lt G-J . Clifford arxt Cpl ll.J, Frsher R1Tr04~11-rZ :1TI0N SIIEIMIRY fll RISIII,Tti change and then imposed radio silence on other 11RCRYFT iIlAVfrS IV INSPECTION ITIrIS CIIAVCfS IV Rl`URKS traffic while Cpl Fisher alerted RATCON, Edmonton PFRIO~iCS f1rLrTF'P fRFQ fRl-,Q RLI'IIASEII .1~II'NUEII ADnfU 5f'RYICII'G ~ICRFASr 1!JCRf,ASF (',IIA!Vfrrl 41TH(111 Lr!4'r.l and Winnipeg ACCs, Saskatoon terminal and 42 Radar Squadron . Lt Clifford passed numerous DF Cpl ,a .D. S~'me iF101'Ii~J~ '~one 68/105 81!11 : 8n/'~n 5/rr '~ane 'Increa~c from :~~rr- steers to the pilot and Cpl Fisher kept RATCON 3r'r~ hrs . ~ot accepted informed of these bearings . RATCON, however, was iTll~ TUTnR :n0-3D0 Ilrs 158 181 15 1~ AR (:heck In- iroduccd I'I unable to locate the aircraft on radar due to thunder deleted . showers in the area . Shortly after establishing radio I'Fln~ 1i~(ip0(~ 1I10-]50 Hrc ±hh 1'1 3 . 11 contact, Lt Clifford discovered that the aircraft had fCll' fILCh\' ISI?-:~0 Hrs 12a 51 d .' 4h h9 PI extended rrum ' : hrs only thirty minutes of fuel remaininy . Twenty-three to ~ da,s, minutes after the pilot first called for assistance, he CH113 L1RR~POR 15L1- :Ofl Ilrs ?3 1J I SA la reported he had the airport in siyht and made an - CH1131 f01"SGFIIR 150-?~(~ llrs 'j ;~1 1 5R I ; uneventful landtng. CH1 :~ ara kI~G ~n8 ~~ ;n al l~ Flexible 'la~ntenance Lt Clifford and Cpl Fisher reacted to this _ . . . . ~'7..d~ Ko~+ lnspection, tpl ll . Larscn - emergency in a prompt and professional manner CP1 :1 TR~ICAER :5 ; increasc 1'9 I' al In= a~ ,hanged from rlexible in periodicitv to (en>altdated . which undoubtedly contributed to the saving of the applied the brakes, bringing the aircraft to a halt =~ Snp CP10" IR(115 0-41'n rlrs 4~,1 lmi nD Formerlv :OC : work pilot and his passenger. before it contacted the rear hanyar doers, ;ards-no~ 1 :31 . Cpl Boulerice's decisive and knowledgeable I~1Z ii 1"n (:ns'~,' ~-ql IJ Pr ectemied Ileleted 5upp Check . response to this emeryency prevented a costly ground 3 da~ s to '. ('PL C'.A. WICKS accident . His actions in dealing with a situation not er extended Progre,cc~ve insp While supervising the towing of a Tutor into the " m ' ; hrs Schedrrle produced Eor relating to his primary trade as a weapons technician '~id r-ast . hangar for a snag rectification, Cpl Wicks, an airframe emphasize the concern and professionalism of the technician, heard an unusual noise coming from the small section of aircraft support personnel at CFS Val left main wheel . The wheel was inspected and damage d'Or. was found on thc brake disc . The assemf.~ly was removed and the technicians discovered that a brake disc key had broken, causing damaye to the wheel CPL .4.D . SY~1[ bearinq housing and brake unit. Cpl Syme, a flight engineer, was concfucting a Fi~~ r~ Cp- I Wick's vi g ilance and concern which led to prefliyht inspection of a Cosmopolitan aircraft when the investiyation undoubtedly prevented a total wheel he found a set of wire crimpers in the rear access failure, compartment of the water separator cjnd heat L~ exchanye turbine. The wire crimpers, approximately in an What is a pilot? What is an air traffic controller? CI'L 1 .R .It . BOULERICE te n in c hes lon y and wei g hin g ei g ht ounces , were area which is not normally included in the preflight Cpl Boulerice, a member of the Val d'Or A Pilot is an Individual of Immeasurable Superiority to An Air Traffic Controller is a Person of Solomon's inspection, Weapons Loading Team for Call Shot 74 at CFB his felluw creature5 in the street, a Master of the Air wherein Wisdom sitting in an Ivory Tuwer, from whence he Sees All, Since the crimpers were close to flight control Chatham, was waiting in the QRA alert bay while a he flies his Underpowered, Poorly-instrumented, Misaligned Hears All, and Contuses All through equipment of Mongrel cables, Cpl Syme's conscientious approach to his CF101 was backed into the hangar, The aircraft and and Multi-patched Aircraft under DubiousControl in complete Manufacture, Erratic Serviceability and Random Maintenance, duties may have prevented a scrious inflight problem . contravention of the instruction he ftas at some time received chosen to be only suitable for traffic conditiuns duriny a Solar tow bar suddenly separated from the mule and from his Flyiny Instructors and yuite contrary to Regulations Eclipse on a Friday Afternoon, a Procurement continued rolling into the hangar. Cpl Boulerice, by Officer CI'L H . L:VZSEN published for his confusion by Government Officials, much to whose knowledge is derived from Advertisc:rnents of Irrelevant seeing that the man in the cockpit was pumping the the Distress and Damnation of an ulcer-ridden group of Subjects inrended to Mislead and Confuse, sponsored by a brakes to no avail, quickly decided that the Cpl Larsen was carrying out a daily inspection individUals known as Air Traific Controllels, Foreign Manufacturer in a Foreign Aviation Publication, emergency brake handle- which must be activated for in the cockpit area of a CF5D and was checkiny the heard unusual sound . rt ll(7()II NC11"S the brakes to function when the aircraft is not under rudder mechanism when he an its own power hadn't bern hlulled, He promptly Closer inspection revealed that the canopy jettison climbed the ladder to the cockpit and correctly cable was rubbing on the right hand brake pedal flight Comment, Jan-Fe6 1975 5 1 .- - ~r CPL R. BUwNESS Sydney VOR . When attempts to locate the aircraft Just after coming on watch Cpl Bowness within the Summerside radar coverage area failed, noticed that the port propeller of a Tracker aircraft MCpI Deveau provided the pilot with the frequencies ~,oao SHOw was overlapping the next aircraft . Although Cpl for both the Charlottetown and Moncton VORTACS wness was not a member of an aircraft moving and requested radial information from these two quadrant . Cpl Larsen advised his supervisor and a ew, he knew that the aircraft was scheduled for an facilities . Working on the radial information obtained, special inspection was initiated ; a similar condition evening takeoff and that the propeller would have to MCpI Deveau fixed the aircraft's position at twenty was found in one other aircraft . be aligned to clear the next aircraft . On his own miles north east of the Charlottetown airport . He was Cpl Larsen's thorough inspection and attention initiative, he decided to perform this task. While then able to provide the pilot with heading to detail prevented a possible canopy malfunction aligning the propeller, he heard a distinct hiss, After information which eventually led to a safe recovery which could have caused serious inflight problems . Cpl L .E . Irving Cpl L.S . Monlc moving the propeller further to determine the of the aircraft at the Charlottetown airport. r approximate location of the sound he then The Cessna was an estimated sixty miles off CPL L .L. IRVING summoned his supervisor. Together they determined track and the pilot was unquestionably lost . Through his actions, MCpI Deveau demonstrated a high degree While dismantling a Quick Engine Change that the number eight cylinder of the port engine was of initiative and professionalism and set an excellent (QEC) kit from a JT3D engine for shipment to cracked from the spark plug to the intake valve, Cpl Bowness is commended for his initial example for his fellow servicemen . overhaul, Cpl Irving found one clamp bolt loose and -~1r1 ~r~'"; ,.~. one missing from the N1 tachometer cannon plug . conscientious action and subsequent follow-up The loose bolt was found in an area where it could investigation which prevented a possible engine CPL R.11. CONLEY 3y,.~ failure. have caused possible damage to the inlet fan section Cpl Conley, an airframe technician employed of the engine. When a number of cannon plug clamps 1 on CH135 helicopter second line maintenance, was were found loose during inspections on other aircraft assigned as tech crewman on a CH135 during night Cpl Irving suggested that a self locking nut be Cpl P. Hennesey flying operations . Although a D I had been done installed on all N1 cannon plug clamps to prevent a during the day, Cpl Conley decided to do an recurrence of this problem. Cpl J .A.D . Cloutier additional panel security and fluid systems check . On another occasion Cpl Irving's initiative led This check was done on the flight ramp in adverse Notwithstanding to the discovery of cracks under the doubler plates of the possibility of further light conditions just after sunset . While checking the explosions and fire, Cpl Monk ran to the oxygen cart, three aircraft engines. Cpl Irving suggested, through level of the fluid in the No 2 hydraulic system shut off the oxygen bottles and disconnected the submitting a UCR, that the fleet be checked ; seven reservoir with a flashlight, Cpl Conley noticed an servicing hose. He then moved the cart from the engines were found to have cracks under the inlet away abnormal discoloration of the fluid . He immediately aircraft . case doublers on three of the four aircraft checked . climbed to the roof deck, removed a cowliny, opened Investigation of the oxygen cart by Base Safet Cpl Irving's alertness and professionalism in the reservoir cap and physically checked the personnel revealed that the ruptured fitting, these instances are indicative of the pride he takes in tee plus condition of tne hydrnulic fluid . His initial suspicions three Cpl R. Bowne,~ MCpI ll.R. Ueveau his work, more tee fittings at pressure gauges, were made of flu~d discoloration and contamination were of aluminum instead of steel-which is required at confirmed . He informed the aircraft captain and this location . grounded the aircraft as unserviceable. CPL P . HENNESSEY Cpl Monk for his is commended alertness and Further investigation at the Unit revealed that Cpl Hennessey was a crewmember engaged in prompt action which prevented further damage to the the No 2 hydraulic system pump was unserviceable the post start check of a CF5 aircraft . The pilot was oxygen cart and adjacent aircraft. and had created an overheat situation within the fluid checking control movements when Cpl Hennessey system resultmg in flu~d deter~orat~on and noticed a small extrusion on the right hand elevator CPL 1 .A .U . CLOUTI[R contamination. bell crank panel . He signalled for the pilot to shut While performing an AB check on a CF101 Cpl Cpl Conley's methodical approach to prefliyht down and on closer ins p ection discovered a small Cloutier burning checks and thoroughness and initiative in following piece of FOD wedged between the bell crank and the smelled material in the area of a fuselage panel . He finding up the situation revealed a technical problem that inspection panel . touched the panel and it was opened the flag could have had serious consequences . Cpl Hennessey is commended for his attention hot, the door and saw safety Sgt W .E. Murxlen burning, Cloutier quickly burning to detail and professional attitude which quite Cpl removed the '~~~ Cpl R.H . Conlev flag, himself probably prevented a serious incident or control assured that there was no further danger SGT W .E. A1UNUEN of fire, and inforrned his malfunction. then supervisor . During a brief stopover at CFB St Hubert, Sgt Investigation revealed the aircraft ~1CPL [) .R . L)EV[:,AU no damage to . Munden, a Hercules flight engineer, noticed that a The safety flag is permanently attached to the MCpI Deveau, the Duty Radar Controller, was CPL L.S . ~10Nk fuel tender placarded 80/87 octane, was about to be door panel and is intended as a warning that the door, alerted by Summerside tower in an attempt to radar used to refuel a Dakota aircraft . Knowing that the Monk, with another yroundcrew member, Cpl though in the closed position, is not secured . When identify and provide fixing assistance to a civilian Dakota normally uses 1001130 octane fuel, $yt was servicing the high a pressure oxygen system of locked, as in this case, the flag is tucked up inside . Cessna 182 . The pilot of the aircraft, en route under Munden quickly proceeded to line servicing and CF100 at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, when a tee fitting Cpl Cloutier's conscientious inspection averted what visual flight rules from Halifax to Sydney, Nova pointed out the error which was promptly corrected . on a USAF oxygen cart ruptured, destroying the could have been a costly aircraft fire and drew Scotia, had established radio contact with Sgt Munden's awareness and response to a pressure gauge and causing an explosion and flash attention to a potentially hazardous situation . Summerside tower on 121 .5 and advised that he was hazardous situation was instrumental in preventing a fire, The groundcrew member assisting Cpl Monk Although no definite cause for the fire has been uncertain of his position . The pilot also indicated that serious inflight emergency . received first degree burns to face and hand ; his hair, determined, UCR action on the location of the safety flight visibility was restricted in haze, making visual eyebrows and eyelids were also singed . flag has been started . fixing difficult and that he was unable to receive 6 FGght Comment, Jan~feb 1975 . DN T~~ T~ P`,'~L Y ~(~TiCL~ In GPII ?09 loctk for new cftapters on On the Dials Hcliruptc~r ,Appro~t~ltes and St,tndartl Instrument In ow travels we're often iaced wilh "Hey you're an ICP, what about such- Uep,trtures iSIUSI ; tht' ~dditic~n uf CFAU ~S-lS and~such7" "Usually, Ihese questions connol be answered out of hond ; if it ( lnstructil.)ns Fc~r Uc~cluping atld Klvltilllk lnstrument wern rhal easy the question wouldn't hove been aswed in the firsf place . Ouestions, suggestions, or rebunals will 6e hopplly entertained and if not Appro~J~lt Proredurc;i : a racliusc~f turn `~r,tph and t r . onswered in prinf we shall atfempl lo gire a penonal onswer, P)eose direU any rentov,tl ui' ttmper,ttttr~ ~orre~tiuns. communicofion to: Base Commander CFB Winnipeg, Westwin, Mon. Altn : ICPS . ln c;I'rl ~04 missed approach instruclions wri be ~iel~ined to elimin;tte the confusiun that nuw exists when ,u1 air~raft ccrndutts ;t rnisstd aphrc~aeh ,itlcl h,is IY , ~"'r`' `;~.~»t ,nri., r. rr. Proposed Amendments b~en ~le~trrtl t~n route. Th~~ latest GPII '04, Vol S, 7 ~"~r_7~+a _~"-"~,,"' '~'~~ - .e~~i. . r ;'~.~ ..Y. . ' \ov 7~ ts now a )utnt rtvil~ntilitary puhlic~ttion isstted , .. s ;- :-,t,. :~t-: .N._ ~.- .,~-. . .- ~. . .'!+!^ ~~ss Therc ar~ rttany prtJpus,ils tor am~ndmc~nt~ to ~w~~ry six rnonth~ . Pe un thc~ lookuut fur special r. -s r our tlvint~ publi~ ;rtions ; CFP 100, CFP 1~8, GPH ~00 . military sections throttghout, w.--. . . r~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ y s , t~~ _U1 . ~U4 . _U., . _U,, _0 ., ~tc. Tlt~ tollowtn~r' u ii~rtts In CFP 14~ thc~ ma~ur.I chan~c5 w'ill b~ on tlte will givc you an ici~a o1 sc~rn~~ ot~ thc~ ~}tangrs to look ILS . tltc Can,tcii;tn '~olam Systtm, apprc~a~h lighting tur. systems, snd a rTtt~thoel of correctin~ altimeter ~_rrors ~ ~o ~ t Yn7 i M l~'.~n ir~.~n n / ' l~ n .,s - %a~~+~i~ In CFP l0U Catr~ur } ~ I w ill he ciefinecl as IFR duc to cold ttmperature- op~~r~tic~n dc~wn tu a ntinimum c~h'UU f~eet Ue~~isiutt In GPH ~07 thcre is a proposal to in~lude H~~it~ht fUHI uncl Runway Visu,rl R;tn~e (Rti''RI ui~ scver~tl ~~ununonlv. used tracks llc~tvn bv. rnilit ;tr y' ~(~OU fec~t crr 1 ~ _' mile visibility . Cate`Tury' 11 ~s'il~ be aircraft~, ,tn ~xam p le is the tr;3ck f r~m> Cum~x> tc r cit~fineci ct, IFR c~pt~rltiun down tc> a ntinimum ul l0U Fnd~rbv. frct DH ;tn~1 R1~'R 1 ~OU frt't. Onl~~ ('.rt II ~ertif~iecl Lc-1~r~t~' i~r~t a throwawa~" ~ GPH `?..00 . 1-h~~ l,t~ka~~i In an era of complex, expensive engines and a ~tircraft and crew; will be abl~ tn Ily tu C .It II UH . will rt~~ult in thr rim~ binder un (~PH ~Ol beiit~~ continuing need for greater economy and safety, it is Missecl ;lppro,iclt Puint IMAPI w'ill be cic~tinLd ,ts that r~~m~wcd ~tncl replaced by a new type of bintiing. GPII time to take a more critical look at engine operating limits and procedures . We are all aware of aircraft puint on tltr fin~tl ,tpproarh trach wlti~h signitieti th~ ~OU will br in two vc~lurltes , La s t '~r~ nli 11'r ~t. . operating limits such as positive and negative "g", t~~rrnin ;ttion o1 th~ f~inal ;tpprc~a~h ~tnc1 thc ~V~' ~tre alsc~ slriving to st~;lnci,trdi~c the crosswind, airspeed and a variety of handling limits, cumrn~~nccment of thc mis~~~cl apprua~'h . Hei,~ht tcrtninolu~;y attd clcfittitiuns in our 11yin~ public ;ttions and it is easy to appreciate these as they relate to the Abu~~~ Acrodrun~r IHAAI ;u~cl Hti~ht Abctv~ so lhut it will nut be necc~ssary fi~ure uut wltic~h tu structural strength of the aircraft, We wouldn't ~huurhduwn ~~ ill be cjcf'nc ~ ~ (H~1T ) t c 1 '.t5 ut ( ~~P1I .,UO- and pub t~tk~s l~r~rc~den~~~~ . intentionally exceed these limits and destroy ?Ol . Ulher ncw tcrms will be~ "landing ~.;e ;ir" versus TheSC are ur~ly ,t Cew ul lhe prUpo~als. If ~~uu , ,. an aircraft . There are also many engine operating 'unciercarria`:c ; C~lidr $lup~; lltrushulel Crctssin ;l }tav~~ any ,ug~cstictns, pass thcm tu your ICP ur ~srrii i limits which if exceeded will destroy, damage H~i;~ht (GS/~hCH) and Ground Puint uf Intcrrcptiun them ut on a I~OTI :\` ~ard ,tncl matl tu or serlously shorten the Ilfe of an englne. The iGP l l . DC!1R7 0/AIR . following topics are presented in the hope that they will be educational and thought provoking - and that some benefit may accrue. Power Effects Comple~ mudern enginrs have uper;lting limits such as maxirttum puwer, takeufl- power, milit;~ry power, nurmal puwer, rna~rrrum e?:haust or turbine tem t~eratures which 100 ~rren , t as ubviuus as ;urframe~strucaural limits since we ean't r feel the EGT or tlte Kl'M, and we ~an't see the immecliate cif~ects uf heat, stre~s fatigue, creep and wear on engine parts. 90 The accuntp~n~'ing diagram illustr~tes huw rr~urlr a tv:{ ~ieal J'ct en ~~ine's life inereases wlten normal P uwer is used W 80 irrstead of milit ;frv puwer ; tlre gr~ph ~I~u pruvides a , U cum 1 >;~risun at t)U -~cr~cnt . A similar relation~hi ? e~ists iur %r,_~ 1 1 w ~ en~ine temperatcu~c and f~rr reciprocatin~ errgirres. a 10 The real prublent ntav nut u~cur t~n vuur tlight brrt a This headband harness which is used as an durin~~t a subsec 1 uent ctnc . An erntiner th ;lt has und~r~~une.. duuble oxygen mask support can be assembled in or eveu Iri p le ;r~rin~~~ ~ (~ ue t u 1~t~ << r er,t,~.rme lr;rndlln~,)~ , will h ;la'e ;r two ways, The photo on the left shows c~ greater likcliltuod oi tailure bef~ure the next sche~luled z the correct webbing position . If your as- insperriun ur uverlta«I, w the photo on riyht sembly looks like the Altlwugh our missiuns sometimcs ~cmand ma~inunn 50 it will non-adjustatJle not answer be - the perfurmance from uur engines las ~vcll as uur ;rirframes) the if you need oxygen in a hurry . established limits and en~,ine trim ;r~.justments alluw 40 oper;ltiuns in tlte ltigh wcar region fur ~lturt periuds . It is interesting to rtote huwever that airline~ usuallv ltave consiJerablv t_0~'~ NORMAL EXCESSIVE luwcr limits - eenerally for ecunumir reasuns, I t t where custs P er rnile cuunt ~lmost as much as sai'~tv . A 1U-1 S 50 100 150 r cont'd on page 17 ENGINE WEAR, PERCENT OF NORMAL 8 Flight Comment, Jan-Feb 1975 f~~ZiiC ~~.~ I~~L~ <. ~. r~1T~Ti i T~ i ~_I11J~- 1 . . . the story of course 7404' .,r Each year, 426(T) Training Squadron at - CFB Trenton conducts six Capt Morrice "rescues" Pte MacBournie, a non- Aeromedical Evacuation Courses. The swimmer, during ditching training . course members learn to act as MCpI Dunk, 426 Sqn Safety Systems instructor, gives During our stay at Trenton we became familiar vvith all members of an aircraft crew and to instruction the pussible litter configuratiorts in life raft procedures . take special fllght factors tnto account in different aircraft types . 41any ltours were spent prcparing load platts fctr groups of when treattng patients who are being patients vvith dissimilar medical disorders. Wc learned to install evacuated by air, Course 7404 litter support deviees and to calculate and secure medical brought together three nurses and equipment for any specific medevac situation . c 0 ntne medtcal assistants from bases T An introductiun to aircraft navigatiun and metecxology ,M across the country . u This is their enabled us tu brief our l~atients un the P articular fli g ht P rofile, y account of the course . Iti'e were also nutde aware of thc problems of en route 0 0 turbulence and the possibility of delay or diversion as a result r Over a period o1 threc and a half weeks in uf advcrse met cunditiuns. a _ November-Decentber '74 . eleven Canadian Furces Medical Drills in the hase pool trained us to practise safety and 0 c Services persunnel and a Brilish ,Arnty excltange nursinr sister survival uf self, patients and crevv priur to, during and after a d ve~ere ntade aware of the ~ttany problcms and unusual situutions crash landing or ditchinl;. The reyuirements fur this part of the m that vve rnight eneounter whilst ~aring t~or patients on ;rn course included locating the safety eytupment, boardin, a life U "Aeramee3evac" . Numerorrs conditiuns were sitttulated, each raft and assistin~;, sirnulatcd p atients aboard . Ar~at~r ~r~ f one revievving or te ;tchin47 sunte aspect of patienl care or familiarization lectures detailed the position of cras}t a~es, fire aircraft procedure. We learnecl tu suc~cesslirlly cupe witlt life N extinguishers, escape chutes and emergency li~hts . *0. 0 threatenink emergencies such as massive haemurrhages, tensictn The culrttinution of the first few~ weeks of lectures . drills s P neuntuthur ;tx, or carcliac arrest as vvell as h,tncilin~~ hv.p o~i~4 nd dentunstr ;itiuns was a fuur day "tnedevac" 11i,ht . Eigltt a ~!31g and airsick pacients. hurmai classroorn lectures cuvered mus ;ourse mernbers acted as patients on e;tch leg uf lhe journey of the lheur y ~ but tttaiiv. lwurs were s P ent p ractisine drills and vv~}tile the remainder worked as the flig}tt medical crew, As cmergencics in the C 130 Her~ules "mock-up" . Drn~ing the high ex p ected, we Itad more medical emer g encies lltan Bcn C ase y, WO Bryski explains altitude incio~trination (I-L~I) rnost of us vvere exhc~secl lo a ~farrus Welby, and Mcdical Centre cun~bined but our e~pertise litter restraining techniques to Capt Morrice and Sgt Moneypenny . decottt I tressiun chamber fur the first tirne and ditchin g~ drills antl training was evident bvr llte trcatrncnt of LCctl vvere re,rlisticallyr simuiatetl in the base swimming paol . Artual Kesusci-Annr, our trainin g rnanne 9 uin who underwent in flight situationti vvere,et up during a fotrr day cross-~ountry cartliu-pulmonary resuscitatiun un each leg of the tlight and tlihht in a C130 anel the p~rrticular problems anci techniques of still survived tu take in the bri g1ht s l~o ts ~at N e lhs~ Air Forcc hehcorter1 medevac vvere dentunstrated with a C11113,~1 I3ase, Voyageur frortt 450 Syn, Ottawa . After successful completiun of the course, students are Cunsitlerable im P ortancc was p laced un tlte assi g~nin g~ uf cluulified tu serve as memhers uf an aeromedical evacuation patient priorities .tnd classitications thus determining the tcant on the llercules, Roeing 707, "rvvin Otlei, Cusntopolitan degree nf ur~enev c~f the evacuatiun ;tnd the reyuisite,intount and Buffalu aircr~ft artd in personnel-~arrying helicopters, of ~are rec 1 tureci for the P atient clurin E~~ the tli g ht, Meclical , Gr~rduat~s are 9 ualifietl to l7 y~ on uther aircraft fc~llovvin~f, an equipment, its use and adaptatiun tu airtraft nurmall~ usecl tor aircraft fantiliariiation conducted in ;tccorclance vvith the On nu~devac tlir,;hts, was analher sub1 ect w hich reeeived "in .luh Tr,tininQ standard for aerornedicul cvacuatiun pcrsonncl. depth" treafmenl . Our respon5ihility tur i,ur pu~icnts vvc,uld he . frunt thc time thev were rc~eived at lhe Acrial l,rnbarkatic~n Oxygen equipment check for Cpls Patterson and Veilleux during HAI . Il~~stili ;rl . Il vvuultl bc our lask cu f truvitle all lhc nccrnial nursing c;ire ancl ln be prepared for anv in 1~ight emerkencv . Thc ;rircr:rft vvas to become "an estension uf thc' hus } tital ward" ur su vve vvere tuld . f lowcvcr, we soun realitctl itovv the lack u1 spacc, th~ absrn~c ut scnn~ cyuipmcnt nunnally fuund ;it "ground level" t~~cilities, ancl an envirnnment vvhich vvas often far Imm stable, hindered the joh o1 the ntedical tlight crew . 1=ortun,rlelv there was no shnrt.tgc ui enthusi.~sm antl ' thi~ alvvavs. hel~etlP u~ uvercurne th~ f~_rc~blents . Vunterotu pr ;rctices u(' litter luading drills and paticnt care in the CI ~0 I(ercules "mock~up" soun in~licatecl wb ;it allcavvances w~e wctuld Ir;rve lo nta),e fur irowded cc~nditions and an unfamiliar Lt Purves adjusts litter supports Cpl Hall places a patient's ~nvirunntcnt . in the C130 "mock-up". backrest in position . n ~R~ 1 G ~.~~ Because of the helicopter's unique ability to manoeuvre at very low speeds, hover, fly sideways and backwards, climb and descend vertically and land virtually anywhere, many pilots believe that rotary wing aircraft can fly in, over, under or around any kind of weath2r . This belief could be tolerated but for the fact that many are helicopter . of the believers pi lots. Of course it takes a certain amotmt of blind faith to flv helico 1~ters in the first p lace , what with all tltat whirlin g artd twirling and hoping that those vibrations you feel are all good ones. The versatilitv of the mach'vte makes it fun tu f]v in g ood conditions but when the weather starts comin g down or clusing in, the helicopter driver often has to make decisions wltich lixcd wing tliers never encounter. Our helicapters operate in many different environments and are sometimes vcry subjcct to strict operational control, but time and again "Why bother to check the weather - you're going anyway - tlre ultimate decision tu with on continue a mission falls back aren't you!" the aircraft captain who may be a 3,000 hour veteran or a 300 hour beginner . The lives of passengers and crew may we[l mishaps because most of the missions would nevcr leave t}te depend on that decision . HELICOPTEI~S ground . In the Canadian Forces, CFP 100 and Command and ~OI Hare is a report of art accidcnt which happencd nearly tcn Unit flying orders are quite explicit about the minimum ceiling Y ears a g o tu a (thcn I C;utadian Arnt Y Cll l 13A Vo Yga eur artd visibility requirements lor helicopter flight . However, helicopter : becausc p ilots know how difficult it is for a forc~~c,3stcr ~ to gr'v e "Three CH 1 l3A helicopters werc en route fram CFB and WEATHER an accurate assessment of the weather conditions close to the Rivcrs to CFB St l{ubert . On the leg from K .1. . .. versatile bt~t still vulyaerable surface there is always the temptation ta go and take a look Sawyer AFB to Kincheloe AFI3 in nurthern h4iclrigart the old "givc it a try" trick . This kind of thinking, where a the flight cncountcrcd detcr7arating ccilings and pilot '`knows" that he cart "sneak and peek" his way througlt visibility . At about the ntid-point uf the leg the flight is 7 direct corttravention of llying orders and should be treated detoured to the north to avoid an area of low cluud as suclr . A successful arrival at destination in spite oj~ the and was then ablc tu continuc cast ;ilong a main and requested a homing back to overhead. At first the \J forecast should not be hailed as a good show but rather as an lugltway . At this point the aircraft were in a loose C'ontroller asked hi-n to remain clear of the southern extremely poor example to younger, impressionable pilats trail forrnation at I l'' ntile intervals, flying at l i0-200 area of ttte airfield . A minute later the pilot was W}10 nlay lack the exper7ence of the uld-tuners. (f the VFR ft AGL . The leader reduced specd tu ~0 kts and tlren instructed to steer 0800. A call from the helico P ter limits are considered too restrictive thcn there are adequate to 60 kts as visibility decreased to 3/4 mile. Shortly pilot that he was clitubirtg to get on top "came as a channels for bringing about a change . Sunple deliance and tlrereafter the leader suddenly lost gruund contact . bit of a surprise", Further calls as he climhed through disregard of the established orders pruves nothing, improves He attempted to chrnb and ttun I ~0° un instrurnents 4000 and ~000 feet were received then some ? 1'? nothin g and J~ust erudes the frart~cwork within which that to return to t}re clcarer area . During the turn the pilot ntinutes aftcr callin i;~ " throu~h 5000' " came lhc intangible yet so desirable trait callcd "airmanship" is became disoriented ;rnd losf conirol uf the aircraft dramatic rnessa ge "Navda. y Ma Y dav. Mavdav, . . . , out developed . Fortunately flagrant disregard of flying orders is a of control" . No furthcr calls were heard and the rare occurrence among professiunal military pilots wlrich crashed u~ tall trees on a heavily woodcd hill. . . 1~'hirlwirtd crashed into the ground killing T1~e helicopter cauglrt lire artd was destroyed . The all four w Fli ght t~larrnin S when all the facilities are available is l1CC111)alltS ." fi " fire crew mernbers were in'urcd1 one fatall ~." tlterefore relatively straiglttfonvard -- simply abide by the Botlr of tltese accrdents mvolved helrcapters tnadvertently ~.~ ~C rulcs . If anything, err an the side of caution (most pilots lravc and in anotlrer countrv five years later: entering conclitions where visual contact with the ground was . . .got it wired? - you may be right . t}rcir own personal fudge factor scale) . But what about the lost. MOT and FM f'rles contain accuunts uf Itrartv Sutlll~r conditiuns are ever exactly tlte sartte artd when would yuu myriad helicupter missions that takc place far awav from the . - "Tlle pilot of a Whirlwincl helicopter dcla,ved his accidents to c~ivilian Itelicopters . Thert is nu rc,tsun whatsoever decide that you had rcached a passing gradc'? It would be like lt t~r\l N, c~- 1 rnct nt~n, 3nd, ma p s. charts and rad~rr< sco l~ es . Wh at mornin g takeuff because of P oor weather and then for CF heli~opter piluts to be compl~cent and think that it sctting up a (lying training programme for kami kaze pilots or about chcrkin g the we at} ter h y }~hu ne w~rt 1 t ~a forecaster who tuok off in the aftemoon when thc conditions wun't ever happerl agaln . It can and will unless the whole running a course for hari kari candidates . Just huw far would rnay be 500 ntiles or more awav from yuur pusitiun'? Wltat do showed some signs of intproving . He arrived overhead subject uf helicopter flying in had weather is given continual you g~~ hefore you were satisfied that the student could do it .vou do when he tclls .vuu that .vuur visibilitv. should be 1 / _' an airfield close to his destin~tion and set course for entphasis at the flyu~g schools and un the sqtu~drons. Whut properly ,~~, No, tltc, answu~ is tu avuid t,ctting into the diccy. . ntile in log yet yau can see for twenty miles. At least in tltis the exercise are,r . (Another aircraft on an approach to ilten are we advocatutg? courscs un huw to fly in had situation in the first place . Let's look at the problent from ~ase you may have gruunds for a sl~irited long distancc the airfield reported sulid doud from _'S,000 feet weather using actual cunditiuns? Do we wait for a day',vith three positions . First, the pret7ight planning phase when all the discussion un the mcrits uf his crystal ball - but what ahout down to 400 ft with embedded Cbs givirtg moderate ~0 ft torward visibilitv and take our junior pilots out for a met facilities are available ; second, those occasions when you the rnorning when yau crawl out of your tent at 740 30' north turbulence) . 'lhc helicopter was seen flying quite low navi gation tri L~'' I)o we sltuw them how to gct ovcr tele p hone are yuur own met man and finallv, the en route decision artd you're not S00 rniles frorn a forecaster but 500 miles from "100 feet" -- in pourin g rain and murk Y wires by linding t}te polc attd climbing up the side of it - or makin~. P rocess when all .~~our P refli~ht~ P lannin graoes down the a tele p hone . You mav. be un a SAR mission or cau Y~ tt uP in a cunclitions. 7'he pilot reported llte bad weatltcr and else going undemeath at that point because that's where thc drain, - land force exercise . Whatever the circumstance s .ov u don' t annuunced that he might bc back very shortly. The wires are ltig}test'? 'fhere are manv little tricks wltich astute have a cut and dried met furecast on which to base vour risine~ g rotutd was cortve ~ in g with the cloud base P ilots have learncd ovcr the .vears as thev. Sro P ed about in the RE-FLIGHT PLANNING , , go-no-~o decision and Y ou will p rubablv. be u P en to some when tlte helicupter was last seen. The pilut thcn murk but surely there would he little pou~t in training likc Ihis lntelli gent P re-fliRhtc P lannin g would p robablv. save man Y pretty subtle pressures auned at gctting you to crank up those advised that he was 11~C ( [nstrument Met Conditions) for below litnits weather flyirtg. After all no two weather of the lives lost every year in weather rclated helicopter rotorS . cont'd on next page iz Fli~ht Comment, Jan-Feb 1975 13 Fcw piluts like tu sit aruund waitin~ for the weather to aruund would have come ;t little too late, Yuu may bclieve tJte relativel y tlat ca rp et uf tree to p s can lead to di sor'enta r tt'o n improve : they naturally want to slide behind the pule and get that you shouldn't argue with suecess but let's go back to the especially when turning . And don't get sucked into leaving on with the job . You know you have limits of 1 f ~ rttile be~inning of llris escapade and see if tltere are an,y guidelines good ground cuntact such as a lake shorelute and setting uff visibilitv but just ltow far is that'? ln une direction it seerns that we can cstahlish - a sort uf aide-mcntuire fur tlte across a wide open expanse especially if it'~ snuw covered. ntuclt hetter than a mile, ,rnd tfte sttovv is 'ust li«htr shuwers ,telico I ~ter p ilot whu runs into weathcr. Obviouslv vou should fly hi~lter as thc visibility irnproves snuw ~rains not really a visibility restriction like tlte heavv First of all, lcat~c~ a suspiciurrs nrartd. Met men don't but if Y ou are cau ~ tt out in reallv. bad cunditions i.e. . reduced wet stuff. Yuu'rc surc vuu'll. be abl~~ tu see the ~round without entionallv tell lies (usually) but you should always be visihilitv. in snow, rain ar fo then et down close tu the too much trouble. Besides, }~ou'd reallv like to make it home 1 ~re Pared far conditions other than thuse forecast . As soon as ~ruund until you can iind a place to land . toda y ~ if 1tossible, wouldn't . y ~ou, and ~the weather nti~~ tt stav. vou nuticed the luw cloud that wasn't ntentioned in the llupcfully you will ncvcr find yourself in this kind of like tltis for tlays . I'ltcn thcre's thc patient for medevac you're brietin ~ ,vou should have heen on the cr ui rb~c. The nert t~oint tight situatian . By thutking ahead and watching weather trti~in~. r to reach, ~'uu'll feel p rett y bad if ,vou don't et there irt to consider is atrt~ c~lrunge~ in .r~orrr hluttrrecl Jlight ~rrvjile. Look develop yuu should be able tu avoid it either by detouring, tlrIlt' . at it this wav. . If~ y~ou tli~~ht~ p lan from A to E3 in a strai tt line turnin .:;. back, ur landin ~ and lettin~r it ~ o bv. . If you- do ,t.;o tuo You may well be subject to peer pressure from other at an altitude of say S00 ft AGL and an airspeed of IOU kts far some day then learn from tlte experience and pass on the members of the cr~w who are equally keen to move un . "f've then . under nonnal contiitiuns, vou would expect to maintain good word . llon't assume that you are now qualified ta try ilown in wut~e tlitrrt this" you'll hear sumeune say or "so and that track, altitude and airs I ~eed . In uther wurds, once worse cunditions next time, so wouldn't think twice abcaut flying tud~y" . c~stablislted en ruute your cullective and cyclic inputs should Any discussion uf helicupter tlyin~ in weather would he I1' yuu are invulved in an e~ercise with ihe l,tnd furces Approaching the lake there are lots of visual cues . . . bc minimal. If however, yuu find that yuu are about to deviate incottt I ~lete without some mention of mountain flvin. t; artd tlten tli~ cuntmartdcr with whom Y uu arc wurkin~~ ntav. takc . . .but if you fly straight across! from yuur track, artd/ur altitude attd/or airspeed because uf helico 1 tter utstrwnent ili~~ tt . :'vlountaut o }terations are so some convincing that it isn't safe fur you to fly . Atter all, if his wead~er then thc situation is no longcr "normal" . Your cornplex that a later articlc will be devoted entirely to this trucks and AI'Cs c;ut operate in the fo~ and navigate around ~roundspecd calculations will nuw he awry and your fuel subject . But here are sume observatiuns on instrument t7ying . the ;trea then whv~ ~an't vou:' W'hat's so differcnt about a consuntptiun is going to increase dramaticallv as you sluw Icing problems effectively prevent helicopter lli~}tt in helico I~ter - it's urtl y an airbc~me truck anvwav!~ . dowtt ;utd kee p an eve. oa .your 1~usition un the ntu p , ~ti'utc~ is cloud for approximately si~ months uf the year in Canada. On 1Ultat's the answer" Well, if the answer was simplc tlterc the tune tu start taking stock - not twenty minutes latcr up a the other ]tand, clouds in the stuttrner uftcn posc ' , ; .. a hazard would be no requirement for this article and helicopter pilnts blittd vaue y~, because ~ ~w of thunderstonn activitv and the turbulence would always ntake the ri~ht decision . Furtunatelv thev do, Tlte nert twu considcrations are vitallv impurtant associated with cumulus build-u Ps . Adtl to this the inherent tnost uf tlt~ tintc , but the y still k~et suckcd in uccasiunallv- artd because neglect uf them tigures heavily in helicupter bad utstability uf thc rnacltutcs, a dearth of appropriate it's thusc ucld occasions th ;tt can lead tu ;t 1ra~~icr, accident . weather accidents. They are shc e~d and risrrul ccanlact . Speed in ut~trumentatiun and (usually) a lack of fuel to guarantee If you don't lihc the louk uf the situatiun tllen don't ~~ul deteriurating condilions is usually too hi ~ . Tltis faetor alone altematc requirements and the whole idea of helicupter 1FR Your training ,tnd experience and tlie wings yuu wear on your curttributes tu many mishaps. ('hanges in the opa~ity of 5now ilight may seem impracticable . Rut recent e~perienee has chest wrill help you make the right decision . It's also your sltuwers or of mist layers cannot he antici 1~ated in time to sluw sltown that there are tnany ucc;tsions when helicopters can prero~ative ancl cluty as an aircraft captain : when you signed down before visual cuntact with the gruund is lust . The s p ecd safcly fly 1FK even witltout sophisticatcrJ auto-pilots and ASE uut ihe aeruplane you signe~ un fur the responsibility .- ~rtrrst be reduced lon f; betiire the conditions are encountered . systems. ~llrc secret again lies in careful tlight planilJng . Wltere accept it . f not, then last secund attemhts to slow tltc aircraft invariahlv is the fi~eeeing level'' What are tlle 1c11D conditions'? W'hat is Su muclt fur Ili~ht planning : hut even tlte best furecaster csult in largc cyclic movernents with a conscc 1 ucttt attitude the ceiling en ruute? Whal turbulence are you likely ta in tlte world ur pilul with 100`,~ every yerrr on his IR~f met change ; a nuse hi;h cunditiun which gives decreascd tortvard encuuntcr'? llu yuu have an out in thc event ~f an entergency exam will still be fooled hy 19other Nature . The classic visibility - vvhen visibility is what you ure trying tu maintain . which requires you to land as soon as pussible. After all yuu . condition, tlte une we all know so wcll, uecurs when lf visual contact wit}i thc gruund is lost during thc fl,trc ccl~n' t I t a v~ a ne s~ape, systur ~n Itkt' ., your~~tlc~h~y', ~-r . ., tricnds . . everyllring is guin~ silky smooth . The furecast is reasunably tu Lill off ,urspccd llicn thc naturul reaction is tc~ attentpt tn Su lFK 1lrght s}tuuld bc loukcd upun a~ just another gctotl and yruu'rc ltahpily buuncin~ along whcn sucJdenlv lhc turn tuwards thc clcar arca just lef~t behind . This gives us a aspcet of the Itclicuptcr's versatilit~' but dun't get whule think turns to wonns. 13efore .vou know it, .vou've ot luaico P tcr with a hi ~ih nose attitude , decreasin f,~ airs f~eed ~ t nd ~a com p lacent abuut it . Takin«c chances on-icint~; cunditiurts, filinr.;. l ~rubletns, Suuncl ftuniliar'? W'ell it's I~ust not true . You alwavs. luw colle~tive setting about tu turn 1800 . t)bviously there will inlu knuwn areas of Cb activity ur liling between laycrs when havc warnin~ tltat tltc weatlter is lurning sour it's just that he c Y ~lic, cullective and I ~ed,rl in E ~uls tu accom p lish this turn . the free~ink Icvel's at the surf;~ce ;tre not re~ummended I~cause the aireraft 1 ~iluts eitlter tend to i F norc the obvious si~nsc [ P erha I ts hct p in~ is at a vcry luw altitude i .e., rm the trees, I ~atterns c~f behaviur . Our helicu I ~ters are hi ~~hlv. versatile - 1~ust it will just gu away) ur they make such sntall changes initially it is irupurtant tltat level flight be maintained. ~'~ clirub will put like thc pcople who fly tlu:ru . fiut tltcy .rre equally just as tca the tlit;ltt prutile that tltc tinal recluirentent fur a yuick you into cluuil and a ~ese:ent will drc~p yuu intu thc pinc wlncrable . I~Oc' appears tu h;tve just snuck up un them . ncedles . Now if vuu dun't think tliat's a tri~ky. task in ntarTinalb Let's take an ~~ample . You'rc flt ing alung Ff)H f fat, visibility just you cu out and trv it on a goud VFR day with dumh and Itappy) . In tlte tlistanre, perhaps Gve rrtiles away, luts uf altitude and see huw Icvel .vuu can stav!. Su rc~ r ~c°at yuu see s~~mc Ic~w cloud hanging abuut ~ rangc uf hills whi~h c1 uotc rc~ I ~eat, that airs I ~ecd has ut to be back in luts uf time . lav acruss vour tr;tck . It ,eents to he cl~ar at one end c~f dte One uf tltc cardinal sins in tixcd wing tlying is to try and range but tltat vvuulcl mcan a cunsidcrable dctour su vuu ~tcak alung under thc weather . Students at flyutg schuols arc _i.1 E deeide to trv vour luck ~etting tltruu~h one uf the vallevs . ~1s continually lectured that ii unable tu maintain VI~K thev ~~1 ' ., Fod First vuu get ~luser vuti have to descend to sta~~ under th~ stratus should turn aroun~ ur ~lintb and file II R. The turn aruund ancl thc visibilitv~. is decreasin~1, . Yutt I ~ick a v,illcv. ;md start rcconunendatiun applies to helicupters hut nut so the climb Just as the T38 pilot gave the pull~chocks signal, a youny thruuglt thc bills . Your speed ~ets sli7wer and vour altitude advice . llnless the cunditiuns are ideal helicuhter piluts shuuld airman spotted fluid on the nose steering unit . The pilot was >;cts lower and cvcntually. .vuu cnd u t ~ duins,;. .a 1 ~Oc' balf he very wary of clintbing willv-nillv into instrument ~unditiuns given the hold signal, and the airman heacled for the nose huvcrin,~ lurn desp~r,ttely trvin,. tu maintain visuul cunlart (murc on this lat~r ) . ~hu mainlain rQoud visual ~c~nt;tct the steering unit to take a closer look, As the airman passed with thc trLe~ wlticlt an trvitt ~ tu disa > >~ar intu wi~ s uf lo . ,urcraft ntust be luw . Tltis way vuu vvill be luuking ,tt your forward and below the left intake, the enyine began to vibrate . k II p , .. . . duevn vallev and take llie detuur , r~ferenc~s rather th,tn down ctn them. It's tc~a easv tc~r wis w and stall . The enyine was immediately Y'uu ba~ktra~k llte . E~~ellent ~~ ' L' . ~ n . l . shut down, and the .vou J~ust nlalte thc ri~ht~ d~~cisiun betore .vuu .~uol inlu real stratus or snow tlttrries to cume hetwecn you artd the gruund crew deplaned . trouhlc . But what if y ~uu had lost si~htr uf the rr~~ uund durin ~ it yc~u are hi~lt -- and high nteans ahuve i0 feet .l~eep features Here was the first in FOD history : The airman was a that pedal turn ur hit suntc wires tltat were strtntg aeruss thc in view which pruvide definite visual cues. Fence pust~ . young lady, and the foreign object that entered the engine was vallev ur hecome disorienteJ as vuu bankca arounci attcl If you don't slow down in time , . . tclcphone polcs, hydru lines, highways all give vertical and her wig, descended ,tnd crashed intu the trees . Y'~~ur d~cision tn lurn , . .you might really find yourself in it! ltorizcmtal referenre~ . Over a furest or vvouas in puor visibilitv AEROSPACESAFETY 14 Flight Comment, Jan-Feb 1975 15 id F}RTi C ~.. ~ in 11R tethniques assisted onlv by a lluppler radar. Certain f7ight safety related tupi~ mav be aired : any incidcnts of the p;ltruls re d nire an air~raft to u p erate without a fix from land previous month are al~u n~viewed at this timc . The squadrun f~r four ur five huurs: couple this with the always variable tlight safety ~ommittee usually rtteets the day after t}te aircrew weather and sticky situatiuns can develop. meetin~ to discuss ;mv, p rublcms hruu ~l"~ tt u p at that session . Our main suvereignty role is supplemented by secundurv ,Althou glt t h e Traeker will shortly Gnter its third decade sks suc}t ;r~ SAR, f7eet support duties, P ersunnel ;' P arts in RC~''CF service, there is every indication that it will be ~tns ort anJ uther sundrv tasks wltich P . entail launchin g of our around for a wJtile . Its avioni~s are getting a bit tired but the 'standby aircraft (four huur standby 3hS davs, per .vear) . These airfrartte remains strung and the cngines reliahle . As a cost missiuns often t;tke us tu sume pretty out uf the wuy places effective coastal patrul aircraft it has no match amung other (Saglek, Newfourtdland for example) and we may be ;rircraft pnsently on the CF inventory . The Saskatchewan additiunally ltarnpered hy a lack uf VHF Nav;1'C'ornm farmer mav never see a "Stuuf", hut it shuuld cuntinue to be a eyuipment . As a gcneral rule we are limited tu latitudes bcluw familiar sis;ht un the east coast for sume time tu come ?0'~\` and inside the area uf ~ompass reliability by the hrnitations of uur GHARS (Gyruscope Heading and Altitude ABOUT THE AUTHOR Capt Owen graduated from Refcrence System) . RMC in 1970 and received his wings at CFB Gimli in Our variuus tasks rec 1 uire an effective f1in~1 tt safct y' June 1971 . After holding at Moose Jaw for six pro~~rarn and $80 is particularly active in this ficld . The months he was posted to VS 880 in Jan 1912 . He is squadron holds ntunthly sessions fur all aircrcw at whiLh any presently employed as squadron navigation officer . cont'd from page 9 extending engine life and de~reasing nt;tintenan~e time, ~~;1Vlaritime Coastal percent redu~ti~~n in available lltntst is worth a 50-lUU per~rnt Throttle Operations bursts, while thev n~ay nut risult in ~tr be eviden~ed formation in 1951 a squadron increase in rngine life. by rum ressctr Since its as carrier based ASW p stalls . causr une thintt vuu c~n't see -- VS 880 aircraft have been a familiar sight over the waters off Capt Owen We ar~ nut advucating atlempting to get yuur air~raft uff uvertemterature1 . Turhine blade overtem pcrature shuw~s u C~ ~as ~ the pruund Canada's east coast. Five years after the scrapping of HMCS VS880 at less ihan full puwer f~or fixed wing, ur at les~ therrnal 1'atigur nr ntaterial uverstress darTtage due to nun~linear turque lhan you need in a hcli~upter, Bonaventure and a year after ASW ceased to be the squadron's fFB Sheorwaler but keep the fulluwing terupcrature graclients lexp;utsian/cuntrartion at ditferent puints in mind for enginc handling: primary role, the Trackers are still very much in evidence . At present rates) . knuw and ubscrve the ltublished limits fur '1'urbinc VS 880 is the only squadron on the east coast with a full time bladcs with varving cruss scctian thicknesses arc phase u1' Iligltt very susrchtihle tu this type ul stress in the commttment to defence prtorlty one, the malntenance of Canadian thin leading edge ~on't fly tlte engines right up to the limit whcn the sectiun . With repetitiun and in time, rracks appear and soverelgnty, and is the prlncipal unit patrolling inshore coastal waters missiun ciuesn't require it - a slightly sluwer cruise cv~ntuallv the blade brcaks du~ to these trarrsirnt peric~cls not out to the 100 nautical mile pollution control limit. unly saves ;r little fuel but signifieatttly recluces whert exhaust ~as tem > ~eraturcs are chan ~~in~ ~ rt 1~idlv : . R,rpid cncinc wear tJtruttle acreleratiuns/decclcratiuns will therefurc have a direct Althou~it the loss of the ASW rule and the demanding ,~r r e t 1 te I~ 16 Flight Comment, Jan-Feb 1975 17 f~R-~ i G ~ I-~I LL~~ " Altinteter crror. Know all there is to knaw ab~~ut altimeter lag, positiun error, etc., in the aircraft _vou flv . r US< an accurate altimeter s e ttrng- . Thrs ts partri;ularly rmportant m minimum altitude deliveries. An 20.II110/2:i.I100 ,, , outdated altimeter setting can easily introduce errors in the urdcr of'00-30U feet either up or down! I.i~/di~u~nx " Take into cunsideration the elevation o1 the target . This factur can easil~ be overlooked in making runs cm targcts of o PP ortunitti~. near sea level. Reme mber that several ltundred feet uf elevation ean spell the difference between disaster and a safe recoverv, . Beware o1 uneven terrain, particularly upslopes along the recoverv euurse . " Excessivelvy_ stee p dive an gl e s havc been unplr~atcd rn ntore than une accident-an d manv~ lc t ~- pullouts . W'hen usin~ cstablished tar K et facilitie ;, ensure that target pcrsonnel repetrt dive angles and low pulluuts to the pilots concerned when theti~ have the capability tu du su . In addition . luw pullouts s}tould bc inilicated on the cupies of scoring recurds furnished to tlre squadrons concerned. , ;14ake full use uf all instruments available during night bamhing. Ensure tar~cls are well lighted whenever possible ftut reco~nitc that disorientation is a real hazard dtuint'~? ni~lttb deliveries, even undcr the best of conditiuns . Inasmu~h as sa1'e night deliveries will depend upon instruments to a greater extent than dav dcliveries, increase rclcase altitudes sufficicntlv to allc~w for a safe recoverti' under the wurst i:uniiitiuns that mav. he encountered . Note p arti~ularl ~ t tat Shown receiving congratulations upon completiny his pinpoint lights surrounding a tar~ct at night can be a 25,OOOth GCA approach is Sgt T.A. McLennan, Radar PRESSING THE A TTA CK hazard because thev can Controller , easilv- be cunfused with stars at CFB Comox . Congratulating him is Col R .L. , , . CCl ll JP 1 <17C1)'l OllS un ;t clear night under the right condition . Mortimer, Base Commartder, CFB Comox who flew the l~inallv, and perh;if?5 must important, use can to approach in a CF 101 with navigator Capt P.K. Ott. make ~ a ,~ood entn. I rull-in ) . Accu ra ! e o rdnance Put your ordnance on target but nerer overlook deliveries require pre~ise ~ontrul uf airspeed, divc anglc. ,rltitude, etc P preparation for making a safe recovery . at the rnumcnt ui- release and a carelcss ur incc~rrect entry can needlessly cotnplicate thc prublem, lt is true that one f;tetor can uflcn he "target fixatiun" mac su~cst a hypnutic Thc term adjusted tu ~untpensatc I~ur another, e .g ., Icss specd tu conditiun bruu~Jtt un b~ luukin~ ;tt sume ieature ui tranre-like cumpensate ior a stccp dive angle . Ilowcvcr, these e .~ ., its perfect symrnetr~ . lluwever . accident thc target, adjustments rcquirc cxtra ~ttentian bv tltc pilut anii a rcpurts inilicate th<+t in realitv it is often simply a rnatter of pilc?t whu is alrc ;rdv. busv. 1terfonnin~T r uthcr tasks cunceniratin t ~ tuo much attentiun un ~~ettinc, in a favurablc assnciated with ihe run ~an easily becume overlouded mu,t i~r iniimatelv familiar with the spceds . altitudes tirin~; pusition tu thc rteglcct ut a ntc+st itnfturtant part c>f the to the pitint where hc fails to give proper attention lo anc7 G-luads invulved from entrti «ntil recoverv is burubinn?str;ifinR prublem a safc and limcl~ rccuvcr~~ . thc all-impurt,int recuvetv. ~c+it,pl~tcd . Thc~re ,ire sc~cral l u~ssible reasuns fur this . It cuuld he a l he abilitv tu accuratelv dcliver urdnance un ;r tarf;et is A knu~4~ledke of ;ili it ude reqtrired to i: f~fe~l re~uver~~ ;rfter deliberate viul~rtiun uf minirnum sai~c: release altitudes tu scure the Jtallmark uf a ~oud fi~hteriattark P ilut . COs ;tnd uthcr ur~nancc rclc~+,c is r,rrarttuunt . }~ut the methud used to a bettcr hit, ur it c:ould he uninlcntiunal . I~ur exarnhle, if ;r F aviatinn cummanders recuknize this ;rnd prescribe traininc ilctcrminc tlrr s cciiic~ rcle ;tscl'rccuvcrv ;rltitudc is eiuallvI . puur dive entrv i~ rttade, the lime avail~ble fur tra~king i~ P - wcles. whi~h p ru~'llle Inl11VIlIuaI p ilots with ;trtt I ?l~° c? 11> >-+c rtr r nrty impurtant . ()n hi};h unt;le run5 . with altendant Itiglt rclt~asc usu;~llv insul~fi~~icnt . l his ma~. ~.+u~e a 1 tilut to unintrntiunallr- to pr~ictisc: their pmfessiun, ;tltitudes, the pr~ssurc altimeler will usuallv be thc primary des~enil beluw the minimunt ~afe altitude while he is engrusscd Ordnun~c delivery is usuallv luuked un ;ts an intercsting rttethucl uf ilctermining the relc~;iscirecuverv~ pctint . In in sc+lvint; th~~ trackin~~ problem . and enjuti';rhlc ;rs?ectI uf flvink- ~ . Fur orte tltut~,E a P ilut .r ;cts tu recuvcries rrllrlIinUIll altltUde bUml)lil~, ;1 TfII ;ibIP rallar ;tltlltleti'r N~lll Rc~ ;irilless ~?f the reasuns, dclavs in initiating put his aircraft to somc ntcasurable use. Thc fl~~in~ itself is a~~idtnt ~. ar tr tt,ril v . be~urne increasingl~ imp~~rtant but thc pre»urc altimet~r will frum ilivc, cause ;+ sub~tantial number of 1- crhilaruting herause it invulves ra 1 ~icl chanr;cs ~in h~~ ;rilin t,~s, ln ;rddition . it is the susp~~ted ~ausc fartor in quite a feu~ still be a primar` referenee in must cases. There is one v~~r~ altiiudes and aititucJcs . In adiiition, cunsidcrahle cum?etitiunf Irtl turtant ~uint, hi+wever, in mininnmt altitud~ "t111dClerrnlrred ;1CCIl1CntS. f l often ~prin~s up among piluts ;tnd syuadrons . This is fine ; it is bcmbrn+ ' , strufut' ~~ ncvcr, ~ ~ la~c. ., blrnd r~han~~, '~ ~, u ~ in+ altint~t, ~, rs, I lc~w can ac~idents ;uch as th~sc be prevented'' -l here is l 1 ;in impurtanl factor in hunink thc rouJt ed~,es and adds zesl tu Shown receiving congratulations upon completing his all fur nc~ ea~~ answ~r but here are sume precautiuns : tone warninks, etc . Rather, use available instrurnents he ~ob, but pilnts shuuld never becurne so conrerned with 20,OOOth GCA approach is WO Ron Harrington, Radar dcliverv carefully, The type uf~ ~ uiiiance in determining the d«~p point but strive to develap " First, 1~lan .wur . . etting hits that they unne~essarilv cndan~er themselves ur Controller at CFB Comox . Congratulating him is Col R,L . cleliverv selected will ilc~pend upun the t~~pe c?rdnunci' seaman's et~e which will enable vou tu visuallv recu~niie thc thc~r aircraft, - Mortimer, Base Commander, CFB Comox who flew the luwest at :h a sale ?ulluut ~an a~cort> >lished . and the tar~et de1'cnscs . :1nv of several deliveries muv f ?uint whic f be f APPROACH approach in a CF 101 with navigator Capt P.K . Ott. ~ ' he ,uitahle~ in ;r ;~iven situatiun ; however . the P ilut Other impurt ;rnl puints tu ~L+nsidcr arc : . , r 18 Fl~ghf Comment, Jan~Feb 1975 6m ov~ ~d' w ~R-~~ G l 1 . ' J~ 1t,~ + huntid, dustv. ~areas ur in industrialized, snto~~v.~, areas hi g h in T400{'P-400 engine an overhaul which had nut been rcgularly atmospheric sulphur content . These conditiuns are washcd . The dark trailing edge build-up is quite evident . Fig ? encnunter'eci hy ncarly all types of aircraft helic;opters, shovv, the results of vvashing this compressur . ~t tire top end fil;hters, and transpurts ;tlike . of the curves, sav. 37,000 rP m, there has been nturc Ihatl a 6 r=t's percent increase in power due to washing . ln fa~t, titr this ._ thods of Detecting Performance Degradation en;inc, ?~t dropped as ntuch us 300 rpm . ~I> as ntueh as 10c'E 1t present the mast widely used method in thr Fc~rces und SI C as much as .00> . wlren it was washed . ~Vhat is fnr ~ctectinl; a dirry cumpressor is rc~utine ruauttenance, u~ually un a periodic~ inspection, which cuuld mean as little as onc chcck everv six munths. Bv far the most eifective rnethud is en~~ine trcnd,munitorin~ (ET~1 ) . The unlv, ;tircraft l tresentlv. usin ~ this method are the C'H 13S helicu P ter. CC 1 ~fi Twin (ltter and C(' 137 Boeink 707, of which only the CH l3~ has rekular. eom p ressur cle ;tnin~ . ETM is the dai]v- eom p arison, b y means of a trend chart, of basic enkine P arameter5 to their perf~urm ;rnce baselines . ~sually, these parameters are V1,'.v~, EGT ,rnd Furl tluw. A dirtv- ~urn F ~ressor usuallv. manifests r ~tts ~elt ,~rs a~ <~radu~ ;ll rise in EGT , 1~~ and (ucl tluvv uver u p eriod ' uf several davs . ('leanirtg tends to brin~~ the trends back closer ~._,~; tct their haselint valucs . 1~'e are attem I ~tink. lo institute this ' method on more aircraft as its henetits hecurT~c known. . w';~"~, Current Canadlan Forces Compressor Cleanmg ,;,r Methods lIp tu this puint, nu nt~ntiun has beerl made Of the . . . 1l'~rSI7111~r COlll~l'C'SS01 S lJll~J'OUC'S~C'1 f01'lll«'71CC' clilterenee hetween cumpressor clcaninK und rompressor washin~ liy choice we have hruken these duwn intu pcrfirrmancc rccuverv cle;rning and anti-cctrrosion w;rshin~~ This article is a condensed version of a more Tlle ftazard which is nut readilv recc~grtizable tu en~ine re, P ectivc~lv. . 1'erfunnance re~overv. cleanutc; refers tu the lengthy technical paper presented by the author at a maintainers duc t~r its lonr~, tenn effect- is tll ;lt u p cratinn in a p erindic ~l~anim'. with citltcr a lic I ui~ or an abrasive tc+ re g ain Gas Turbine Operations and Maintenance Symposium sand y ' ur dustv- envirunmcrrt .~~raaually re;luees icr remcwes Ictst f~i+tiver caused bv- thc huild-u P ul furei~~n rnatter in Fig 1 Erusion of T400-CP-400 compressor blade held in Edmonton, Alberta, 20-23 Oct 1974, prutactive hlade e~o ;ltings le;ning unprotected blatlz surfaces cumpressur ;rir pa,sagrs wltile anti-corrusi~+n waslting refers to sponsored by the National Research Council. susce p tiblr tcr the damar"~in t," etfects of ccn~rusiun when tl~ eglrlar washlnl; with w~;rtcr or watcrjalculrul tu renwve [~ A1hAl, ~l'l'iPTAh~ C I~ATE ,IAti,l9/71 TF,ST i'ELL 14 aircr;tft returns tu a more humid or salty environment. orrosives such as salt deposits . : o ~: Rr ; r: ;vr.u ~n 0 CUh1PRF:~~UH tKA511 ~Ve htlieve erosion is a problern in Cl~ c~peraticrns ancl its En`~ineerin~ Orders detail thc prcssurc~ . fluw rates, r A}"TE:R I lave yc~u ever tvunclerecl wh ;rt happens to tlrat rotatini; r mass of metal at the frunt uf yuur enginc vvhen yuu land un a intlirect etf~ects, ~uch as alrrusion, ean be beaten wiih tlte h~lp mi~es . materials, ancl vc~lumes rc y uired for thc cflcrtive irr lly thruugh smug ur hctver over the ocean i+i rl'!,'ltlal" iOlllpl'CSSOI" 1V35111n~ . cleaninglwa,hing u1 the cumpressurs of alntust all uf uur gu5 dustv rumvay , , : ~ i~ ~ ~ . . ~ , . f se~oncl ~ind contpressur p~~riuro~ance de`,raJatictn ulrbiuc cnf,rnes . ( Ic ~~ c~amutatic~n t . rders indlc,tt eti SO mc' c lt waitin g tct l ?ull u l ~ a shi I ~wre~kecl survivur on yuur rescue Thc of }luist'' Proh ;cbly not becau~e you're tou busy . Resl as~ured i, ~c,rrusion, which is cletincd as thc i]cstru~li~+n c+f a material llre l n ~iE lema af~ r~~f arenl ',vhcn ol ~ratut~ a larfe lleci c t arrcralt , , i. .. envirunment c~f cjitlercnt r ihuuhh ; si~nteonc is concerned . 11 e in the Dirc~toratc ol by ~hemical or electruchemical reaction vvilh it~ . whi~h havc different rule~ and wltich us< 20 Flight ommenl, Jan-Feb 1975 ~i r n ~A FF70M cumparecl with those which are ~ompatihle with present wash tlte damage . ~A conscrvative estintate of ~arts . Fnr e~atuplc, the new LIZPA en~ines will require ~a GEN the cust of the incident is 540,000 . vulume and tlnw r~te much greater than that required by the 2'1 O Tlte occurrence utvestigatiun showed smaller 'f~00 . T6:~, and ('F 700 engines for which carts have CFS, FUU U:1ti1AGE ;lfter completion tltat additian;tl engine runs were made heen desigrted . )n fact, a new cart w ill have ta bc dcsigncd t~ an aircraft sarnpling inspection, a CFS without properlv identifyirtg the cause uf the LRP,A . The co-uperatiun of engine cumpanies in pruvid :raft was towed uut of tJte hangar and en~ine tluctuations, lllStrunlent readings procedures for use with uur carts and in pruvidi! Currusiun of ;en to the nonnal en":ine ;rOlrrld nut u ( t artd nuise un the initial run. Had a ertKine-mourtteei wash rings capable oi aecepling the iarts and area for pust inspectiun nm up. "17tree, cuntplete investigatiun been carried out at engine blades their fittings i5 reyuired . twu ~ngine, run u f ts were carried uut over the appropriate time, FOD daruage would Example of Typical GSE a periud of tive tlays. During the third run have heen discuvered on the right engine up engine stall indicatiuns were and further running would not have taken Fig 3 illustrates what we are attemptinK tu do . This cxpcricnced at 9?~% and 93' on the left plarc. Similar damage tu thc lcf~t engine sh~iws a wash cart w~hich has heen designed fur the and right engirtes respectively, Both could therefure have heen prevented . T~00-('N-~00 engine . Of interest are the cc~mpactness and engines were lhen removed frum the 'fhe CF_' 10 investigatiun also manaeuvrahilitv of the cart, the rinse and vvash huttles and ~ircraft . discovered that the tcchnirian was not lines, and the simple single line hook~up to the A preliminarti~ investigatiun revcaled quaGfied tu run up the aircraft . He engine-mounted wa~h rin :; connectiun . It is this sort uf design, dirmage to the compressur sections requireti re~ertitication uf run up in var~ inr sicc~, that wc advc~c;ttc fur tuturc curnpressur wash consistent with fureign object ingestion . prucedures, engine upcrating gruund suppnrt ecluipntent, A contplcte ertgine strip report characteristics and FUll precautiutts with subsequentl~ deterntined that F~D Conclusions and Recommendations a qu;tlified supervisur. appruximatel~~ O .OKO" arld 3J16" Ismall ln futurr, the use of run up screens Oper ;tting aircraft gas turbines in certain em~ironmenls rivet sire) ut diatneter was responsible for vvill be ntandatorv~ un the CF~ . can cause compressor perfnrrnant"c degradutiun in lhe furm uf erusiun, eurrosion, and foreitn ntaterial huild-up . The best prevcntative for this perfonuan~~ degrad ;tti~tn is regular UTTER, EATAL CRASH 11n Air Reserve des~~nded to a 1uw ;rltitude . compressur washirtg ;tnd action shuuld bz tuken as soon as The tow ;u~ds the inverted positiun . The wings Squ;tdrun was tasked tu suppurt militia possible to irttpletttent washing procedures un all uur engines. aircraft hanked slrarpl~~ tu the right fulded bark parallel ta the fuselagz artd units un a field exercise in tlte Swallow around one of llte aircr;tft the Lngine trend munitoring un a tlaily basi~ has proven lo parked un lhe aircraft carne to rest 196 feet frum Lakc area of ()ntario . 11tc Squadron be the best rr~ethod of eletecting cumpress~+r perfurntance strip and thus changcd dirertiun dircctlv the puint uf initial impa~ l artd was detachntent cl~pluyed tu the area with degr;tclatiun I~~~r thuse aircraf~t presently usin ; this system in luwards trees which burder lhe southent cnnsunted by a post~.rash firc . threc Otter aircraft un wheels artd Une ulr the ( ;lll ;rlll;llt Furces and shoulcl be institutrd wl~~rever edge uf thc strip . The aircraft imhacted Twu rrewmemhers esc~p~~cl with Iluats . The wheel aircraft werc assigned to the p~~ssible, trecs in a slight climb and an minur injuries ,tnd the pilut w;rs sc vcml~ ~uhp~~rt the "friendly furccs" and the The majurity uf aircrafi engine manufacturers recognir ;tphruximate tive degree right wing down In~Uied) . A l 1aSSCn l,Ttr r nt }P<~c(ilct ' 1-l~ 's se~t Fig 3 Wash cart for T400-CP-400 ellgllte ~at plane operated with the "enem,y the need for compressur cle;rning but tail tc~ stipulare th pusitiun . Buth wings scvered trees and the was un;thle to escape and died as a result ~rc~ . periudicity ;~nd also f;til in man~~ cases to provide liquid vvash aircratt then rulled sharply tu tlte right uf the craslr . clit'fi~ult is tu pruvc that ~ prograrn uf re~~ul~r anti-currusion On tlre prucedures or commun wash sulutictns, tnethod~, inhihitors, or tirst dav uf the exercise a vv;tslting will iuciecd help tu sustain power and increasc T130 . ntutihcr ul- missions were ground support equipment . hlanuf~tcturer, shnuld hc flown bv buth even when uperating in envirunments uther than salt . The 1~iendly uttd encnty approached to provtde stan~lardtzed wash prucedures and aircraft . . These engine ntentiunecl ;Ibctve speni the majurit` uf its tinte near included phuto reconnaissan~e, supply, methods fc~r all gas lurhine enkines which the Canadian horces FJmetntun, tar frum the ucean and, althuugh it proh ;tbly and "harassntent" of each uther's furces . upcratc . shuwect little puvver lttss in thc field, it Lzhihited unly m ;lrglllal Uuring sume uf dte ruissions, small Ground support rqurpnt~nt used by the Cunatllan f~urces ~erfurmanie at uverlr,tul until it w ;rs vvashed . paper-bag "(luur bombs" f in cnl~junctiun with engine compressur waclting is, titr the were droplted . l~urlltermure, even wheit vv ;tsh prucedures ;tre fullowed, Thc nczt morning the tluat Otter most part in;tdequ ;rte, p;trtly due tu a I;tck u1 gcneral the job i~ sumetintes nut elone correctlv . A common tuok nff with fuur persunnel un buard . agreement nn the ;tdvant ;tg,es of standarclizing eyuipment ur uccurrence is rusled cunt I tressor casinr, ;s causecl b y inadec I uate The purpctse of tlte missiun was tu even utt the need for sudt eyuipment and partly duc tu thc cirving fullovvinr a wash . ()tlrer sintilar pruhlems have shuwn "harass" ;t force lucated in an ;trca three widc varicty ul pressures, Iluw ratcs, ancl vulumcs uf sulutiuns u 1 ~ un uverhaul cven un cn~ines surlt as tlte T~~~ wltich are milcs ;twar . rlppruzirnatcly IS minutes callecl up by nt ;tnufaeturers . rel;ularly waslted! Sueh things ;rs cumpressur hlacles seized in latcr the ;tircrafl pru~eeded to the gravel GSE recluirerltents shuuld be staudarclizetl for th~~ ('f{ tlteir c~asinr. ; tracks ;Ind cc~rrosiun ( +its on hlacle and vanc airiuils strip w~here tlre whe~led ()tters were and shuuld include tlte requiretnent for waslt rings mc+untecl un ;rre all thc result ul~ puc+r vv~;rslting tecltniyuc . We r;tnnut help situated anri made a p ;tss across the arca . the engines . hut he self-criti~al vvhen it ~orttes tu this lack uf adhcrence to Tlre aircr;tft then made a luuse circuit to Unce standardir;tlion h ;ls bcen ac~'omplishecl prc~pcr (~St spr~ified procedurcs . tlrc left ;rnci rctumcd ; tltis timc it fur ;tll engines be ,~1 final costlv pruhlem which we encuunter is one nf should prucured, ur preservative . t;rutuul su pp c+rt e~1 ui f nttent . With lhe esce I ~Iiun ut three inltihitur speciall~ designecl w~ash ~art5, almust all uther GSE is The third and final type ut' c~~mprcs~ur perfurm manufartured lucal(v hv h;rse persunnel, This includes clegradatiun is causccl h~ the btulcl-up ut l~~+reign materi; Runway Check! ntuditicd stirru ~ P uut + fire ezlin~uishers vvith insufficienl compressc~r blarles ;Ind housint;s . This fru-m uf c~c7ntaminati l 1 . On receipt of a reporled vulunte . pc~ur flnw r ;tte, pc~ur mi~ink, and inadcquate unc uf tltc hardest t~~ detect und, likc crusiuti . affect RVR of 200m for takPOff the aircraft was taxied to the distrihutir~n uf spra~ vvash . Our attempts at clcsigning wash engine ovc~r a lung term . The ubviuus result ~rl this huild threshold of Runway 09 . In view of the patchy nature of carts rapable uf suppl~ ing reduired vnlumes and tluw rates are lhat a clistnrtion uf desikn ;urfluw uver the bladcs ~~~ the fog the Captain decided to taxi the full length of the runway to pruve tneeting with unly linutecl su~:cess due tu the verv lar~.e span rt1 thereh~~. causin~~ the Lum P ressur to uperate in an ~+1-f-~ that visibility was consistently adequate for takeoff . I n these v;rriahles . Alth~~uKh wc~ are hursuin,~ tlte id~a uf havink all cunditiun which decreases thc sur K e ntart. ;ut and th~~ I doing so the aircraft overran the 27 threshold, damaging new purch;rse engines fitted vvith wash rings and capahlc uf uutput . two threshold lights and two tires. bcing washed usin~, une of uur present ~~rts, sonte dil~ficulty This turnt of performance degra~iatiun is r (NorrCF) ariscs when these new enkines ;Ire ~,russlv uver or undcrsi~ed founcl--at Ieasl iu c+ur experience- in ;tirLr ;ttt ~+pcrut FGght Comment, 1an-Feb 1975 ZZ 23 . a~~~~ul~~ ., v, ,,1~1`~S"A'~.i, .. . .~ , . . .asr~, .~rti~~ ~n~MErvr: EDJToK c.TT~ F fl~; P '0 I - r ,, , ---- .Sn »utch jur Flt Lt hcaclr's BIRD WATCHERS' CORNER ~' ~ ,, Comments irteidc~ttt. }'ntt arc »c~rr sentf~nc erl ti~ tx~o " ---- ' I , .. - ._ l,ti' hrrur patruls i» thc ;1ts;tcs J'or _ _ sttggestirrg that thc CFl ~-1I) ~car retracts . to the editor Jorn~ard. Alsa, x~c are rt~~l e~c~rn~ittced tlta~ the critiquirtg oj' "hair~h itrcidcnts' GOOD SHOW QUERY rcc~t~ipl t~j~ "crnttrr~r~elsial cc~rreshn»dcn~ Your first Good Shuw rcpurt in the indicator lights are servireable rtc~ccssarilr helps irt rhc Jicltl nf accidcrit --- Sep~Oct 1)74 edit ion concerning a ( LIGHTS - TEST) l rret~rrttiorr, As j 'vr l.t Col Hirtdsi~ltt, r~ttr - C F 104D with nosewheel p rohlems left c. Check landing gear control and .1 rietrds i» Ti'airtirt,~ Cbnnrra»d `ulrcarl. r me rather put.zled . landing gear indicator circuit har~e tlre serriccs rr,/ his snrr, l,t Hirtdsi,qht. P~ As 1 understand it the nuse gear of breaker - 1N irr Ihcir ,lligftt salc'rr' r»a,~a=irre Hnt l.i»c~. a 104D retracts forward and assumes .i d, Recycle gear vertical pusitiun when extended . Nuw if e. If g ear does not Icrck-down, tf»s is the casc Flt Lt Leach was in deep return gear lever to the UP DITTO trouble indeed, what with his gear 1 ~ and positiun and pull marntal landmg The first storv' in lhc Good Shuw thcn 4~ to 60 degrees aft of vcrticaL If gear release handle to full seciion of your Se .-OLt ?4 issue makes we assume that vour writer doesn't know extension (10"). Cherk hghts . p i me wonder about a point which has been tus aft from a hole in the ground then the '.VOTI~: I The landing gear lever should he in the hanunered into me since I began flying : stury begins to clear up, but arily slightly . l1P position prior to pulling manuat landurg when the landing ~ear is dovv n but W'hat concerns me even more is the gear release handle because it is rrmotcly indicatin~h unsafe, do not recvcle,- 1 don't procedure used. I am furtunate because I possible for an aircraft to ltave a misrigged wish tu belittle FIL Leach's efforts, he flv an aircraft which is largc and slow ; we landing gcar and an elcctrical ~ystem malfunction simultaneously . Under thesc ohviously deserves a lot uf credit . usually havc a few hours to figure out conditions, if thc landing gcar is placed in thc However, the writer of the storv seems to strange eu~ergencies . We can get out the DOWN position without resulting in gcar applaud two l;rntiing gear reselectrons. --9- book and hold a rc~ular conuitittee extcnsion and thc manual landing gear rclcasc This runs against rny grain and 1 suspect mceting befure we act. You puor 104 handle is then pulled, the weight of thc landing gear will rcst on the forward main gear doors. ma~° set a dangerous precedent . jocks are denied lhis luxurv and have my The pressure on the main gcar door will not 1 am certain prevrous 1~(rRltt adtniration for vour instant smarts. allow° thc door uplocks to rclease, thus Comrne»t issues havc hatl sturies such as However. isn't one of the basic rules in preventing the ~;car t~rom estending. this onr but which kept to a theme of gear malfunctions "Don't recyclc"? If NOTE 2 "leave bad enuugh alone" . Havc wc something is really screwed up recycling 'I'hc handlc is provided to release thc changed our tune'~ at best duplicates the snag and at wurst main landing gear door uplocks and thc nosc and to open the dump valves R.L. (~~.r~,~ compounds it . This rule seems to have gear uplocks which allows the landing gcar to lowcr by M;rj been violatcd in this incident and may gravity and air load forces. The gear is then VP 41 S Surnmerside,l' .E .I . serve as a poor crample to the young and locked by spring loadcd d~~wnlocks . Appro~imatcly a 10" pull to the stop is impressionablc in our rnidst . ditt0 If~ therc is a guod rationale bchind requircd tn rclcasc thcgcar. the story perhaps a more detailed f. Return gear lever to DOWN the explanatiort cuuld be ohtained in position THERMALRUNAWAY form of an article in a future eclitiun . SYMPTOMS Furtlter alung these lines would it At thc time o.1~ Flt ht 1 eaclt's be possihle to have a Wing Commander irrridettt the F,0 stated tltat bccause of Having recently completed 6-l,l? Spry type of' column similar to what vvc thc ha~ards ittvvlr~erl, partial gearnrhcllr vears as ASO with 403 and 4?7 find in Air Clues, rn w hrc' ~h the hair y lcntdirrgs sltvuld rwt bc utterttpted i» tlrc~ Sq uadruns res p ectivel )~ it has been m Y incidents are critiqued and thus inspire C'h70~1 . Rathcr than auentht a nartial ex P erience that the first s y ~m P tom of controversial correspondencc . And how Reur or hcllr 1a»clirri~it rt~as recontrnertdc~d thennal runaway is a high or increasing about a competition for our count~rpart's that the crcrt~ 1;'JF'CT. Irt riew c~h tltis, loadmeier reading. nonl de plume'' LtCol Hindsight'' rec.hclirtg the ~ear cvttld irt rto wa_l- x'urse» Should this not be inrluded un thc G,B . t3ennctt t1rP SrtUatrUll, placard shown un page ~4 of the Sep-Oct Major Subscquertt tr~ Flt Lt Lcarh's issue of Flight C'onttrtertt. VP 4l 5 Summerside . P.E .1 . incidc:»1 1he jollvu~irrg attterrr!»tc»t has R .J . Atkin heea added tu lhc CFI04 pikrt rrncrating Captain Your pvint ahout cnnrpr~tnrdiuR 11rStr'l4('trO1rS : AF.TE larrdirr,q ,qear prvhlcrtrs 6r~ recr~c'li»g is "Nose gear UP/UNSAFE . With C1~13 ('old Lake "COOPED UP CONTROLLER" ralid in K ctreraL Nott~euer, tlrc~ CFl r7a both main g ear extended and the Brrds often nest in exotic places A higlt or incrc~asirrg Ic~adttretcr . but few of our feathere d friends enjoy the luxury of a special glass house at does »ot ,/all rlrtir tltc "genera!" class nf nose gear up or unsafe, a landing the readutg is ir~deed the first s~~rnhtonr of top of a high tower . Thrs fabulous habitat is reserved for Cooped up Controller aircra.l 't. Flt Lt Leuclr's resp onsc tr~ Iri.s may be cotuidered. A touch and go . From this princely perch with its tlternral ntnarcar~ arrd pilots arc rvcll permanently percolating coffee pot Cooped u enrergertrt~ u~as quite cvrrcct a»rl hr the landing may be effective rn lucktng P Controller surve y s the g ro und cavortrng and aerral anttcs of the home- adrist~d ro rnortitor that particular dial. based flying flocks . Most of his c{tecklist which ic~c~ qttnte helur~~. the nose gear down under certain time is s P ent issuin g clearan ces and instructions intended to prevent any mid-air tUe rreglccted to tttcntiorr that the lrlacard tail tangling but he circumstances if the aircraft is is continually called awa y from the contro lled circuit chaos to cope with the twitterin ??5 irt questivrt ~rill be plaeed in the hatt g of transient a. SPEED - below 260 KIAS ( bounced on the runwav . t~irkeys who are not familiar with the rocedures at his base httettded for grotr»d P , These day-trippers, who come winging wildl Y in from KIAS CF-104D as the nuse compartntent atul is all directions, should check their P ubs before im prudentl y appearrng. Cooped up Controller is always busy with a retracts aft in the dual) Note: The ultimate decision to land or sen~icbtg trcrsonrte! as o{~hosed tct cockpit bunch of birds hopping from helr Pads or racing off run ways . Somehmes, when b. Ensure that gear position eject rests with the pilot. ncct~pa» ts. thmgs get really hectic, his heart- rending call echoes to the heavens : 24 NEED-A-BREAK-NEED-A-BREAK-IT'S-ALL-I-CAN-TAKE JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH " APRIL MAY JUNE 2 2 4 ~od shows 5 od shows 1 ot factor accidents 4 8 rsonal checklist 8 ~stick's measure 6 9 ctrolog 9 rolog 9 10 rshow p_ ictorial 10 ~ess corrosion 10 12 hoist signals 12 aster response trai 12 14 14 guenay 51 14 16 doo meets 8 ball 15 ishback 16 17 the dials 16 rse -1913 18 erstress and overspeed 11 cency? me? n 18 20 t surgeon training 19 e dials 19 22 :raft danger areas 20 from 210 20 24 22 torwash 22 24 24 JULY " AUGUST SEPTEMBER " OCTOBER NOVEMBER " DECEMBER 2 2 2 5 6 d show 6 d shows 9 olog 9 rolog 8 10 fms 10 e call 10 12 11 cold is it? 12 14 14 course 13 ~inook 18 and cirrus 16 14 ea k off 19 ~I cache 19 the dials 15 of chan 20 untain acciden 20 11 it outhori 21 rn 210 22 m 210 19 the dials 22 :kpit smoke 24 20 ound the 24 ers 22 om 210 24