Institutionalised Consensus in Europe's Parliament
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Institutionalised Consensus in Europe’s Parliament Giacomo Giorgio Edward Benedetto College: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis for the University of London Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government 1 Abstract Embedded consensus has characterised the behaviour of the European Parliament since its foundation in the 1950s. This research tests the path dependence of consensus during the period of 1994 to 2002, in the light of the changing institutional powers of the Parliament. It challenges existing theory and empirical evidence drawn mainly from roll call votes that has concluded that the European Parliament has become more competitive internally in response to increased institutional powers. There are three causal factors that reinforce consensus: the need to reconcile national and ideological divisions within a multinational political system; the pull of external institutional factors such as institutional change or the separation of powers; and internal incentives for collusion between political actors influenced by the need to accommodate the interests of the national elites present at the level of the European Union. Switzerland, a multiple cleavage system of decentralised federalism that includes consociational characteristics and a separation of powers, provides a comparative reference point for institutionalised consensus. The hypotheses of institutionalised consensus are tested empirically in four ways: 1) by roll call votes between 1994 and 2001, focusing on procedure, policy area, and the cut-off point of the 1999 elections; 2) competition and consensus in the distribution of policy-related office in the Parliament; 3) by Parliament’s use of its powers of appointment and censure over other institutions; and 4) by the internal consensus on the preparation of Parliament’s bids for greater powers when the European Union Treaties are reformed. In adapting the theory of path dependence to a multinational legislature, the methodology presented in this thesis can be applied in furthering the understanding of other comparable institutions. 2 Contents Page List of Tables 5 1. Introduction 7 1.1. The History and Powers of the European Parliament 10 1.2. Competition, Consensus, and Path Dependence 15 1.3. Plan of the Thesis 17 2. Increasing Returns: Competition, Consensus, and Institutional and Partisan Change 21 2.1. Challenging a Theory of Competition 22 2.2. What Makes the European Parliament Consensual? 26 2.2.1. Consensus: A Method for Containing National and 27 Ideological Divisions 2.2.2. Consensus: The Result of External Institutional Design 30 2.2.3. Consensus: The Result of Internal Constraints and 42 Consensus 2.3. The Increasing Returns of Consensus 49 2.4. Operationalisation and Research Plan 55 2.5. Conclusion 59 3. Consenus in Legislative Voting, 1994-2001 61 3.1. The Co-decision and Co-operation Procedures 62 3.2. Legislative Behaviour in the European Parliament: 67 What We Know Already 3.3. Theory 71 3.4. Data 75 3.5. Discussion 98 3.6. Conclusion 100 4. Competition, Consensus, and Office Distribution 103 in the European Parliament, 1994-2002 4.1. Why Consensus? From Office to Policy 104 4.2. The Parliamentary Bureau and Left-Right Competition 106 4.2.1. The President of the European Parliament, 1994-1999 107 4.2.2. The Vice-Presidents and Quaestors 111 4.2.3. Substituting Liberals for Socialists in 1999: 113 Competition or Continuity? 4.3. Competition and Co-operation for the Assignment of Committee 117 Chairs 4.4. Positions within and between the Political Groups 129 4.4.1. Committee Co-ordinators 129 4.4.2. Office within the EPP and PES Groups 131 4.5 Conclusion 136 3 5. Competition, Consensus, and the Appointment of Rapporteurs, 140 1994-2002 5.1. Cause for Consensus: Appointment and Powers of Rapporteurs 141 5.2. The Distribution of Rapporteurs 145 5.3. Discussion and Conclusion 156 6. Party Consensus and the European Parliament's 160 Powers of Appointment, 1994-2002 6.1. Consensus, Appointment, and Censure of the European 162 Commission 6.1.1.The Rise of Jacques Santer 169 6.1.2. The Threat of Censure and the Resignation of the Santer 176 Commission 6.1.3. Hiring and Firing the Executive in Switzerland 182 6.1.4. After Santer: The Appointment of the Commission of 184 Romano Prodi in 1999 6.2. The Other Supranational Institutions 200 6.2.1. The Ombudsman of the European Union 201 6.2.2. The Court of Auditors 203 6.2.3. The European Central Bank 207 6.3. Conclusion 211 7. From Turin to Laeken: Constitutional Reform and Consensus in 214 the European Parliament 7.1. The Evolution of Parliament's Constitutional Reform Policies 216 7.2. The Road to Amsterdam 231 7.3. The Leftovers from Amsterdam 239 7.4. Post-Nice and the Return of the Leftovers 250 7.5. Conclusion 252 8. Conclusion 254 8.1. The Findings of the Research 254 8.2. Institutionalised Consensus or Party-Based Competition? 260 8.3. Significance and Application of the Findings 266 8.4. Future Research on the Institutionalisation of Consensus 268 Appendix: Descriptive Statistics 271 Bibliography 276 4 List of Tables Page 2.1. Legislative powers granted to Parliament at Maastricht 32 2.2. New legislative powers granted to Parliament at Amsterdam 34 2.3. Party strengths on the Santer and Prodi Commissions 35 2.4. Party strengths on the European Council 35 2.5. State of the political groups in the EP, July 1994, and their role in 36 government and opposition 2.6. State of the political groups in the EP, July 1999, and their role in 37 government and opposition 3.1. Mean percentage size of parliamentary majorities 76 3.2. Incidence of the groups of the EPP and PES voting together according to 78 legislative procedure, majority requirements, reading, or full or part text, across the 1994 and 1999 Parliaments 3.3. Logistic regression of collusive or competitive voting behaviour according 83 to 3 models of alliance pattern, by procedure, reading, Parliament, full or part text, and policy area, 1994-2001 3.4. Logistic regression of collusive or competitive voting behaviour under the 88 co-operation procedure, by reading, full or part text, and policy area, 1994-1999 3.5. Logistic regression of collusive or competitive voting behaviour under co- 89 decision I, by reading, full or part text, and policy area, 1994-1999 3.6. Logistic regression of collusive or competitive voting behaviour under co- 90 decision II, by reading, full or part text, and policy area, 1999-2001 3.7. Logistic regression of collusive or competitive voting behaviour on 94 economic policy, by procedure, reading, Parliament, and full or part text, 1994- 2001 3.8. Logistic regression of collusive or competitive voting behaviour on 95 environment policy, by procedure, reading, Parliament, and full or part text, 1994-2001 3.9. Logistic regression of collusive or competitive voting behaviour on social 96 policy, by procedure, reading, Parliament, and full or part text, 1994-2001 4.1. Assignement of office on the Parliament's Bureau, according to political 107 group and national party, 1994-2002 4.2. Votes cast in the election for President of Parliament, January 2002 116 4.3. Logical attribution of committee chairs to political groups and national 122 delegations in 1999, according to number of seats, calculated by the D'Hondt formula 4.4. Committee chairs assigned to political groups and delegations by order of 124 preference in 1999 and 2002 4.5. Committee chairs assigned to political groups and delegations by order of 127 preference in 1994 and 1997 5 4.6. OLS regression of EPP and PES office holders according to national party 135 delegation, 1994-2002 5.1. OLS regression of rapporteurs to political group and national party 149 delegation 5.2. OLS regression of rapporteurs to member state, national party delegation, 150 continuity, attendance, and ideological location 6.1. Vote on the nomination of Jacques Santer as Commission President, 173 15 July 1994 6.2. Vote on the approval of the Santer Commission, 18 January 1995 174 6.3. Vote of censure against the Santer Commission, 14 January 1999 181 6.4. Party representation in Swiss Federal Assembly, October 2003 183 6.5. Election of the Swiss Federal Council by Federal Assembly, 183 10 December 2003 6.6. Vote on the nomination of Romano Prodi as Commission President, 186 4 May 1999 6.7. Vote of approval of the Prodi Commission until 2005, 15 September 1999 198 6.8. Votes cast in the election for Ombudsman, July 1995 and October 1999 202 6.9. Votes of approval for Members of the Court of Auditors 205 7.1. Content of Institutional and Constitutional Affairs Committee Reports, 218-222 1994-2001 7.2. Percentages and correlations of national delegations represented on the 227 Institutional and Constitutional Affairs Committees in 1997 and 2002 7.3. Mean responses to constitutional questions in the MEP Survey of 2000, 228 according to issue and membership of political group or AFCO 7.4. New legislative powers granted to Parliament at Nice 246 8.1. Consensual and competitive models of the distribution of power in the 265 European Parliaments of 1994 and 1999 A1: Distribution of co-ordinators within the EPP Group, 1994-2002 271 A2: Distribution of co-ordinators within the PES Group, 1994-2002 272 A3: Distribution of office within PES and EPP groups by national party 273 delegation, 1994 and 1997 A4: Distribution of office within PES and EPP groups by natonal party 274 delegation, 1999 and 2002 A5: Distribution of rapporteurs by political group, member state, and 275 national party delegation 6 1. Introduction ‘No group, not even the largest, holds a majority in the European Parliament.