House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

Iran’s nuclear programme

Oral and written evidence

Tuesday 5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari, Director, Institute of Iranian Studies, University of St Andrews and Dr Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council; Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Shashank Joshi, Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 5 February 2013

HC 952-i Published on 26 June 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £7.50 The Foreign Affairs Committee

The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies.

Current membership Richard Ottaway (Conservative, Croydon South) (Chair) Mr John Baron (Conservative, Basildon and Billericay) Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat, North East Fife) Rt Hon Ann Clwyd (Labour, Cynon Valley) Mike Gapes (Labour/Co-op, Ilford South) Mark Hendrick (Labour/Co-op, Preston) Sandra Osborne (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford) Mr Frank Roy (Labour, Motherwell and Wishaw) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Rory Stewart (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

The following Members were also members of the Committee during the Parliament:

Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (Labour, Coventry North East) Emma Reynolds (Labour, Wolverhampton North East) Mr Dave Watts (Labour, St Helens North)

Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including news items) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/facom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the front of this volume.

Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Kenneth Fox (Clerk), Peter McGrath (Second Clerk), Zoe Oliver-Watts (Senior Committee Specialist), Dr Brigid Fowler (Committee Specialist), Louise Glen (Senior Committee Assistant), Vanessa Hallinan (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer).

Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6105; the Committee’s email address is [email protected].

List of witnesses

Tuesday 5 February 2013 Page

Professor Ali Ansari, Director, Institute of Iranian Studies, University of St Andrews, and Dr Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council Ev 1

Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Shashank Joshi, Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute Ev 14

List of written evidence

1 Written evidence from Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies Ev 24 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 1

Oral evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday 5 February 2013

Members present: Richard Ottaway (Chair)

Mr Bob Ainsworth Andrew Rosindell Mr John Baron Mr Frank Roy Sir Menzies Campbell Sir John Stanley Mike Gapes Rory Stewart Mark Hendrick ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Professor Ali Ansari, Director, Institute of Iranian Studies, University of St Andrews, and Dr Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council, gave evidence.

Q1 Chair: May I welcome members of the public to to turn the trajectory of the relationship around, away this session of the Foreign Affairs Committee? It is a from the gravitation towards confrontation that now one-off, topical evidence session on the foreign policy seems to be taking place. consequences of Iran’s nuclear programme. The session is split into two groups. The first is focused Q2 Chair: Do you think it is too late? very much on what is going on inside Iran at the Dr Parsi: I don’t believe it is too late. In fact, I don’t moment, and the second is more about the believe that diplomacy is anywhere near being negotiations and consequences of the programme. exhausted. Attempts have been made in good faith, Our first two witnesses are Professor Ali Ansari, who but this is not too different from other conflicts that is no stranger to Parliament. He is director of the have taken several years of negotiation to find full Institute of Iranian Studies at the university of St resolution. Obviously, I understand that such patience Andrews. Professor Ansari, welcome. It gives me or time may not exist, but I believe that in the shorter particular pleasure to welcome Dr Trita Parsi, term diplomacy can bring the two sides away from president of the National Iranian American Council the brink of military confrontation, and that in and of who has come over from the United State especially itself is worth pursuing. for this session. Dr Parsi, we are particularly appreciative; thank you very much for making the Q3 Chair: Do you think there is a deal that can be effort to come. done? May I start with a general question? What do you Dr Parsi: I certainly do. think it would take for the west to reset the relationship with Iran at the moment in the current regime? Is it possible, particularly if we are going to Q4 Chair: What would it look like? try to restore good faith in what is becoming an Dr Parsi: If we focus specifically on the nuclear issue, increasingly difficult situation? there is gravitation towards an understanding that at Professor Ansari: I would say that with the current the end of the day the contours of the deal will entail stellar cast in Iran it would probably be quite difficult the Iranians having to accept that they must have a to reset the relationship. Many people in Iran are programme that is much more inspected than probably waiting for the presidential election that is currently. That means additional protocol and other supposed to take place in June to see whether a new verification systems that will provide the international team comes into place. My suspicion is that the community with some form of, not a guarantee—that problem lies with the opinions of the Supreme Leader, may be too strong a word—but the best possible and his opinions are fairly cemented in one direction. firewall to prevent the Iranians from being able to Some of the things they have required, certainly from transform an enrichment programme into a weapons the Americans—it might be even tougher with the programme. British—are quite extraordinary. I don’t think the On the other hand, from the western side there must Americans can achieve some of the things they want be acceptance that at the end of the day, enrichment in terms of resetting the relationship. In terms of below 5% is impossible to do away with at this point. having a better relationship, there are means and ways The nuclear-specific sanctions will have to be looked of approaching that, but it will be a slow process. at to see what can be done to get rid of them to obtain Dr Parsi: I tend to agree. This is not going to be an some compromises from the Iranian side. The easy negotiation or a process that will be quick in any structure of that is more or less set. The real task is to shape or form. I certainly believe that it is possible, find a path towards achieving that objective, and but it will require a tremendous amount of patience finding the political will on both sides to be able to and persistence from both sides, and so far neither weather all the storms that will besiege the two parties side has shown the sort of persistence that is needed on the path towards that solution. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 2 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi

Q5 Chair: Do you agree with that, Professor Ansari? respond to overwhelming pressure—a line of thought Professor Ansari: In broad terms, but my view is that that is very common in Washington but in the opposite until there are some serious changes in the political way, saying essentially that Iran will only respond to landscape in Iran, it will be very difficult to achieve a tremendous amount of pressure. anything meaningful, certainly in the medium term. From their end, which is the more hard-line end, looking at the regional developments I think their Q6 Chair: You are quite a good watcher of what goes view is that if they don’t believe that Iran can make a on there. Do you think that saving face by the regime deal in this more compromised position, they are is important? Do they have to be seen to be going to be waiting or playing for time, in order to be achieving something? able to get some kind of a game-changer on their side. Professor Ansari: Yes. My view is that there is a deal And their regional dimensions are going to be very to be done. I don’t think at the moment the sort of important for them in order to be able to regain the pressures they are under have really squeezed them momentum, particularly Syria, and some of those enough to make them contemplate the sort of deal developments are likely—the cards that they are they need to contemplate. But when they do, I think looking at—to be able to regain the regional EU3+3 needs to be in a position basically to respond momentum and strengthen their position in the to that in a constructive way. I think if there was a negotiations. degree of gloating to come out in certain quarters, it certainly wouldn’t be helpful. They need to find a way Q9 Mike Gapes: Do they see the discussion with the out that isn’t going to be utterly humiliating for them. Russians that they are currently having about possible At the moment I have to say that, with the state of the solutions or arrangements with regard to post-Assad economy and the way things are going, things are not succession as a potential way for getting support from looking good for them. So I think it’s a question of Russia, as regards the Security Council putting less patience, as Trita rightly said, for the time being; but pressure on them in the future? sooner or later I would guess that there are going to Dr Parsi: Well, the Iranians have been turning be some serious moves coming from Tehran. towards Russia and China for quite some time, to try to break the P5+1 unity or the EU3+3 unity as it’s Q7 Chair: Do you think saving face is important, called over here. But at the same time, I think it’s Dr Parsi? quite clear to them—I don’t think they really trust the Dr Parsi: I certainly agree with Ali that saving face Russians, or really feel that they can count on the is critical, and frankly I think it’s quite important to Russians, because at the end of the day Russia has both sides. By now there is so much pride and other sided with the United States and the EU in signing on types of psychological factors being invested in this to most of these resolutions. It has watered it down that it is clearly going to be an element in making sure and created a lot of carve-outs for itself, but at the end that a deal will be politically acceptable on both sides. of the day it has gone along with the multilateral In the United States, there clearly are political sanctions. obstacles that render President Obama’s Professor Ansari: In terms of the regional dynamics, manoeuvrability somewhat limited, precisely for I think that Syria has been a monumental mistake for these factors. them. They have invested a huge amount of time and effort into it, largely through the IRGC, to which they Q8 Mike Gapes: In the internal dynamics of the way have basically delegated foreign policy in that respect. that Iran perceives its position in the world, is it more They have invested a lot of time and effort there and likely or less likely to be responsive at a time when it I don’t think it’s working out. It’s causing them some sees what is happening in Syria and potentially what problems, and there’s also a lot of domestic criticism could happen in other parts of the region? that money, effort, blood, sweat and other things are Dr Parsi: Let me put it this way. If one were to being poured into a problem that really isn’t theirs. simplify somewhat, one could say that there are However, there are people in the regime at the perhaps two schools of thought in Tehran right now moment who see this as a great struggle against the on how to handle this. I think there are elements who west; one that, as long as they maintain that struggle recognise that Iran’s regional influence has been rolled in Syria, will not come to their own borders. It’s back to a certain extent, partly because of the policies similar to what they perceived the Iraq war to be of the EU and the US but largely because of regional about—you keep the fighting at one arm’s length developments that were probably not in the control of away from your own borders. But there are criticisms anyone, particularly the civil war in Syria. And they domestically that this is not really the way forward are waiting to see what type of offer the west is and is draining resources. willing to make, in order to capitalise on the fact that To be frank about it—people have commented on this, Iran’s influence has been reduced. They are looking to but I think it’s certainly true—in terms of their own see if the west is willing to meet their bottom lines, security, there are measures they could take because their bottom lines are not particularly domestically that would shore up the stability of the different from the more hard-line perspective, and the regime which they haven’t done. In fact, they have more hard-line perspective is not particularly different taken measures that have been utterly counter- from the perspective that exists in Washington—a productive to the domestic stability of the regime. So perspective that essentially says that the only way the in the sense that they might feel pressure or otherwise west will make a deal with Iran is by Iran pressuring from abroad, I think they probably do, but they have the west into making a deal. The west will only stuck their neck out and their foes are obviously not cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 3

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi going to be shy in striking at it—if that is what they thinking on both sides, particularly in Iran. We should choose to do. They have not actually pursued policies not underestimate the level of ideological that in my view have been in the best interests of intransigence there is in Iran at the moment, but that the state. is not going to last. It could go on for a little longer, but I think the damage it will do to the economy of Q10 Mr Baron: If I could just focus on the triggers the country will be pretty severe. Sooner or later, that could break this diplomatic deadlock, if you like. people of common sense will have to get up and say, Dr Parsi, you wrote in your book, “A Single Roll of “We need to manage these relationships better.” You the Dice”, that there is mutual suspicion that has can see some of that with the current foreign Minister almost been institutionalised over decades. The in Iran, Mr Salehi, and others, who, having said, by Iranian view tends to be: “If we give a concession, it the way, that there will be no negotiations before the is shown as weakness. Therefore it is not in our presidential elections are over, are now saying, interest. We have responded to threats from the west “Actually, we are quite interested in having a on the ground”—because there were quite blatant negotiation fairly soon.” So there are these pushes and military threats by Israel—“and the west believes that pulls, and these people who are interested in pursuing only a threat of force, or certainly being hard in a way out. All I would say about that expectation that negotiations, will yield results.” this will be swift under the current circumstances is Yet you look back and see missed opportunities; that it’s just not going to happen. We need to be very mistakes have been made by both sides. Go back to patient, to bide our time and to almost step back a bit the mid-2000s and the offer of a 5% uranium to see how things go. enrichment limit—I think the west would probably Dr Parsi: I would tend to agree. I think you are jump at that now, but we turned it down at the time. absolutely right in pointing out that there have been a There were a series of missed opportunities. What is going to break this mutual suspicion? It is almost as lot of missed opportunities. As Ali pointed out, the though we need a gesture by one side that will not be Iranians themselves have certainly missed a lot of perceived by the other as a weakness and play badly opportunities. As much as there has been a lack of domestically, but we seem to be lacking the strategic imagination on this side, there has certainly been a overview to achieve that diplomatic breakthrough. lack of imagination on the other side as well. What are your views? What could possibly break that? One could perhaps Professor Ansari: There was a wonderful line used by make the argument that the situation has not got bad the former British ambassador—the last ambassador enough for both sides to realise that, unless they before the revolution in Iran—when the Foreign change course and find that imagination, we will all Office made its assessments of the Islamic revolution. be in a much worse situation. It is fair to say that both He said, “Our problem in Iran is not a lack of sides are in a worse position today than they were four information, but a lack of imagination.” I think that years ago. Certainly, one can make the argument that probably holds true. On all sides, certainly in the all of the sanctions have had a tremendously costly United States, there has been this sort of ideological effect on the Iranian economy; the Iranian economy is lens, which all sides have really got stuck into and not at all in the shape it was four years ago. At the find it very difficult to move out of. same time, when you take a look at the progression The problem has been that, if you go back to the of the Iranian nuclear question—we have looked at Obama presidency—Trita can talk to this better than everything from the LEU count and so on—it is I can—Obama did write two letters to the Supreme essentially a straight line upwards. All of the counter- Leader, and the Supreme Leader took it in a slightly pressures from the western side have not had any different way. He didn’t take it quite in the way that significant impact on the trajectory of the programme. was perhaps intended. I know there was a complex So both sides are essentially doubling down again on dynamic going on there, with sanctions and other pressure. That is not necessarily an element that things, but I think for an American President to write cannot, or should not, be part of this, but when it is at two letters to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic the centre of the effort, there is clearly a lack of Republic of Iran was quite a bold move in many ways, imagination. certainly one that would have brought him, as I think There will be some political opportunities and it probably did, lots of criticism in the United States windows coming forward, and that is going to be itself. critical. As with all other major conflicts that have I suppose there needs to be intelligent creative been resolved after decades of festering, it is leadership shown on a number of different sides. I ultimately leadership and the willingness to take think that missed opportunities have taken place on political risks on both sides that will be the decisive both sides; I know that lots of opportunities were missed during the Khatami Administration. There is variable. no doubt in my mind about that. Even current diplomats and military officials from the United States Q11 Mr Baron: On the issue of evidence of a nuclear I have talked to have said, “We wish we were back in weapons programme, we all know there is a difference a time when we had someone more amenable to deal between capability and possession of nuclear with, in some ways.” It is a difficult question. weapons. Can I bring you back briefly to the point I don’t think the problem would actually be that about status? I sometimes think we underestimate the difficult to reconcile if certain things fell into place. importance of status in the region. Why did Saddam As I said at the beginning, one is that you get fresh Hussein not deny having WMDs? Because it was in cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 4 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi his interests not to do so; it is the bomb-in-the- member state. You’ve got to put that political basement argument. What part do you think that is hinterland into context and see how they’re doing it. playing on the Iranian side? Dr Parsi: I agree with Ali that, at the end of day, Given the lack of concrete evidence—even western status is very much central to this. It lies as part of intelligence services are saying they do not think Iran the Iranian identity, whether it is this regime or the has made a decision to go for a nuclear weapon—why previous regime, that Iran has a natural role as a pre- are we not listening more to that on our side to try to eminent power in the region and has some very strong bring a rational approach to these negotiations? There historical roots. As a result, symbolic gestures and seems to be a wilful wish to ignore the evidence on symbolism are more important than they would be in our side. The western intelligence services have other types of conflicts and they certainly do not make clearly stated there is no evidence of a nuclear this an easier conflict to resolve. weapons programme; they do not think they have When it comes to what they are doing in the nuclear evidence of a decision to go for a nuclear weapons programme, does it really make sense or not? I am programme. The much-touted 2011 report included not a nuclear physicist either, but I tend to agree with lots of ifs and maybes, but there was no concrete Ali that there are many different things that do not evidence and very little that was new. So, on our side, seem to make sense if their programme is strictly for why did we not pay more attention to that? On the the purposes that they are saying. One can draw the Iranian side, is status playing a role in the difficulty conclusion then that there is something that they are in negotiating? hiding and something nefarious going on, and that Professor Ansari: I think status is absolutely central likelihood is clearly there. to it. This is a prestige project—that is what it is. It is There is also another likelihood that we have to take the same with the much-vaunted space programme into account, which may also help explain this. These they recently announced. Iran is not really in a are not necessarily competing explanations, but position to have a space programme, to be perfectly complementary ones. In this game of pressure and honest, but they want to show how technologically counter-pressure between the west and Iran, there are advanced they are, and that is what they are trying to very few variables that they can play with. On the do. The nuclear programme is part of that. From western side, the variable that we have primarily talking to people—the two witnesses after us will focused on is sanctions and trying to isolate Iran and probably be able to speak to this better—we know to increase the costs for the Iranian state to continue the technology that is being used is actually quite old with its programme. On the Iranian side, what are the technology; it is not new technology, but it gives the different variables that they play with when it comes impression that they are technologically advanced and to countering that pressure or putting pressure on the scientifically ahead of the game. The Islamic republic west? It is primarily regional efforts, such as what is has to convince its own people that it is an Islamic taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan, but besides that state that is scientifically advanced; that is part of the is exactly what they do on the nuclear programme. In things they want to do. some of the interviews I have had with officials from In terms of the evidence and the doubts, I am of the the Iranian Government, they made it very clear that view that the decision has not been taken to some of the steps that they were taking, such as weaponise, but they are putting in the infrastructure to increasing enrichment and the stockpile and going to give them the options they need, should they need to higher levels of enrichment—and even contemplating take them. This emanates from the time of the Shah, going further, up to 60%—is their way of countering by the way. It is not necessarily new; this is something the pressure and creating an imagery in the west that that they have had since then. sanctions and pressure will only yield a worse Obviously, there are questions they have left hanging response from the Iranian side. on their nuclear programme. Again, I am not a What is the western reaction to that? Obviously we physicist, but I am told that there is no reason to have find that very unacceptable and we double down on a heavy water reactor. Why do they have a heavy sanctions. Then they double down on doing things on water reactor? Why do they need to stockpile so much the nuclear programme that, as Ali said, probably do enriched uranium? This idea that they might like to not make any sense from a nuclear perspective. Both go and sell it to other people as a business is all a bit sides are forced into this straitjacket of escalation and of a nonsense. There are some fairly basic questions counter-escalation. There is an absence of political they could answer which they don’t and have left will and imagination to find a way to break free from hanging. It is those doubts and questions that people that, so we will continue down this path, and that is are asking about. where it gets really dangerous. The other aspect, which we should not ignore, is that As you correctly pointed out, intelligence in the US the political rhetoric that comes out of Iran vis-à-vis and the EU, and I believe also in Israel, agrees that Israel and other countries is not helpful. As one there has not been a decision to build a bomb. Clearly, former Iranian Minister said to me, “If you’re going there is some evidence that elements of a to have a nuclear programme, you don’t talk about the weaponisation programme have existed, at least prior holocaust. That’s politics 101.” It’s nonsensical. Other to 2003, but the crucial decision to weaponise has not countries might get away with developing a nuclear been made, according to all the important intelligence programme that may in some ways be more advanced services. If this game of escalation continues—Europe than Iran’s, but they’re not coming under scrutiny. At has already run out of a lot of the sanctions that it can the same time, they’re not flinging rather pointless impose; I don’t know whether there are additional rhetoric, in my view, in the direction of another UN steps that we can take—what escalatory steps can the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 5

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi west can take, and what escalatory steps can the Q13 Mark Hendrick: You both mentioned missed Iranians take? We are reaching a point where the opportunities and a lack of imagination, but could Iran escalatory steps are fewer and more dangerous. be pursuing a masterplan based on creating nuclear Perhaps even worse, the de-escalatory steps are fewer. weapons capacity on the basis of subterfuge and This is a dangerous trajectory. cunning in the same way that North Korea did? Or is it just lack of leadership and imagination? Q12 Sir Menzies Campbell: If any proposals are on Dr Parsi: In general, I would not believe that there is the table, does Israel have to save face? To put it a masterplan in Iran on almost anything relating to slightly differently, does Israel have anything this issue. I would not give them that credit. I would approaching a veto on a settlement that might also say that I do not think that we on the western recommend itself to Iran, the so-called west and the side have a strategic plan; I think that too many tactics United States in particular? are not well-connected. I believe that for the Iranians Dr Parsi: On the one hand, I think involving more to be as isolated as they currently are is extremely countries and their particular interests can complicate difficult for them to accept. It completely contradicts the situation further. There is a viewpoint in the region their self-image. You cannot achieve the objective of that it is not just Israel that should have a say in this having the status of being a pre-eminent power in the or a veto, as you put it; Saudi Arabia also has some region if you are just isolated. So this is clearly a very strong views on this issue. On the other hand, position that they do not want to be in. The question it is difficult to imagine a sustainable solution unless is: is there a way out? Is sanctions relief, de-isolation regional states also feel that they have a stake and an and de-containment, on the table right now? In the last interest in seeing that solution survive. At some point, rounds of negotiations, it wasn’t. we have to be able to square that circle. We need to Going back to what I said earlier, I fear that the bring in the interests of other states and make sure escalation game will reach a point at which there will that they find the outcome acceptable—perhaps a be voices in Iran who will say that Iran already faces Congress of Vienna of 1815, or something along those the type of sanctions and pressure that it would face lines, if we are still capable of pulling off that type if it had weaponised, so it might as well weaponise. of diplomacy. Professor Ansari: First, I would concur with Trita. I Sir Menzies Campbell: As long as it is not the don’t think there is a masterplan. There are people in Congress of Versailles. Iran who think they have a masterplan, but I don’t Dr Parsi: Let me put it this way. From the Israeli side, necessarily think there is one. They are much more there has been a systematic effort to create some form reactive and short-term than they used to be. So I of virtual veto on this issue. They are interested in don’t think there is necessarily a masterplan there. The avoiding a situation in which the United States problem that pervades many Governments in some primarily strikes a deal with the Iranians that enables ways is that they perhaps think that there are elements some level of enrichment to remain in Iran. In the who think they are cleverer than they are, so in their Israeli interpretation, that would mean that Iran dealings with the international community they will becomes a virtual nuclear power, which could be often think that they can manoeuvre. They have come sufficient to shift the balance of power in the region to believe in the myth of Persian cunning—let me put in and of itself. That would essentially reduce— it that way—just as they obviously like to believe in although not eliminate—US-Iran tensions. At that the truth of British cunning. Everyone likes to think point, the Israelis would ask themselves an important that they are probably a little bit more intelligent— and valid question: if there is a certain reduction in and their foes are obviously much more intelligent and US-Iran tensions as a result of the deal, is it cunning in a masterplan than they are. accompanied by a proportionate reduction in Iranian- Dr Parsi: All sides are giving each other a little bit Israeli tensions? If the answer is no then the Israeli perspective is that Israel will be relatively worse off too much credit. in the region. It will still face a hostile Iran, but no Professor Ansari: Yes. That’s basically it. I think that longer with the automatic support of the United States, would be the case. because the US will move on with plenty of other issues that are taking place globally that it is more or Q14 Mark Hendrick: OK, if there is no masterplan less responsible for. and things are escalating, whether they want them to Ultimately, for something sustainable there has to be or not, do they realise how high the stakes are in terms a need to go beyond the nuclear issue. Here, I think of a possible invasion from Israel? Are they frightened that the western singular issue may be counter to our of a military strike? interests. As long as that is the only focus and we do Dr Parsi: I don’t believe the Iranians are. Obviously, not take into account a lot of the other regional in public they probably downplay it even further, but aspects, I find it difficult to see a sustainable solution. looking at their behaviour, there doesn’t seem to be a An interim solution, perhaps, and that is valuable in lot to indicate that they take the Israeli military threat and of itself. However, a sustainable solution requires particularly seriously. Not in the sense that they don’t much more than that. think it possible, but in the sense that they wouldn’t Professor Ansari: Just to reinforce what Trita said, view it as something that would be particularly but to put it in more black and white terms, if Iran devastating for their programme. In some aspects, recognised the right of the state of Israel to exist— there may be elements within the regime that would this goes back to the leadership question—that would perhaps even think of it as a blessing in disguise, solve a lot of problems. particularly if there is an attack that ends up not being cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 6 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi particularly successful. They can draw a lot of benefits surgical military strike on their own. Let us put it that from that. way. If the Iranians provoke something, that is For instance, if you have an Israeli military attack different, but we are not at that stage yet. against the nuclear facilities that does not achieve Dr Parsi: Just to put an emphasis on the point that their objective and does not even set back the Ali made, there have been plenty of Israeli red lines programme a year or so, it would create a completely and the Iranians have walked through each and every new dynamic. The Iranians could potentially play the one of them without any overt military response from victim card. They could potentially be able to break the Israelis so far. the international consensus for sanctioning Iran, perhaps even quicker than they could through Q16 Sir Menzies Campbell: To some extent, you negotiations. We cannot forget part of the reason why may have answered some of these questions by so many, particularly Asian, countries have gone inference, as much as anything else, but who actually along with the sanctions regime, mindful of the fact runs this programme? Who makes the day-to-day that there is no UN mandate for these unilateral decisions about the nuclear programme? Is it an sanctions. It is because of a combination of pressure official, does it go to the Supreme Leader or is there from the west and the caution that, unless these some other rather shadowy collection of people who countries go along with these sanctions, there may be have responsibility? an Israeli attack on Iran that could lead to a much Professor Ansari: I always take the Iranian larger war. Government, inasmuch as we can describe it as such, If the Israeli attack has already taken place, what basically as a high table. A number of people sit round additional incentives do some of these Asian countries it; Ayatollah Khamenei is the primus inter pares and have in continuing a sanctions regime that is costing can adjudicate and make decisions. A number of their economies quite a lot? So it would perhaps create elements are contributing to the nuclear programme a tremendous amount of variable situations: or have an influence and a say in it. There is the challenges but also things that the regime in Iran may official side, the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, but see as opportunities. That is part of the reason why, then clearly there is also a military dimension to it in from the Obama Administration’s perspective, there the sense that the Revolutionary Guards clearly have has been a very firm position against any Israeli an influence. military adventures. Professor Ansari: I think there are elements in Iran Q17 Sir Menzies Campbell: I was going to ask who would welcome an Israeli attack. It would be the about that. They have an influence? solution to a lot of their problems. Their calculation Professor Ansari: Oh yes. There is an angle to it. It is that a surgical strike is manageable—it is as simple is obviously part of the problem that we do not know as that—and the Israelis cannot do more than a enough about what exactly is going on. At the end of surgical strike. What a number of them are worried the day, the decisions are made ultimately by the about is an American participation in any military leader and the leader’s office, but I suppose the confrontation. There are probably sufficient people question that we have to ask ourselves is to what within the military in Iran, including the extent is the influence pressurised on and so forth by Revolutionary Guards, who are fully aware what an various other players around that high table, who American military strike would entail and would like would influence him. It is a fairly small group. It is to avoid it as far as possible. An Israeli one they don’t decreasing. really take too seriously. As Trita said, they think it Many of the people who would have been prominent would be something that might garner them the in the nuclear programme, like Hassan Rohani and support that they require in the international others who were in five or six years ago, are no longer community. really players. That is why they are now releasing Israelis themselves are basically calculating that, if wonderfully detailed books about their accounts and they strike, they would be able to bring the Americans when they were negotiating, and why everyone else in, by the way. They are not thinking that they would has done it wrong since they left or were sacked. You do it on their own. From an Israeli perspective, it will find that there is a very limited circle, but a would be a monumental mistake. number of different influences are certainly there.

Q15 Mark Hendrick: Do you think that the Israelis Q18 Sir Menzies Campbell: Does Ahmadinejad see it that way? have any real influence over this, in spite of the fact Professor Ansari: Yes, I do, because every time that that he is always rushing off for photo opportunities we get close to it, they then announce that actually in a white coat? they are not going to nuclearise for another two or Professor Ansari: I think that Ahmadinejad has three years. Now the latest figure is 2016, I think. probably been a lame-duck president for the better There is enough opposition in Israel. It is very vocal. part of a year. I do not think that he is finished. He is We tend to pick out among our strands—I think that certainly going to fight, but he has other things to they are very good at getting their point across. They worry about at the moment. are very good at getting our attention, and they are Dr Parsi: I like Ali’s metaphor saying that there is a very good at getting the sanctions they wanted decision-making table. We have to be humble. We imposed. They have achieved their aims in the post- know very little about that table or the process. We Arab Spring set-up. They have played the game very have some hints of who is and who no longer is at the well, but I do not think that there is the stomach for a table, but the real important thing is the composition cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 7

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi of that table beyond Khamenei. Without knowing all people who might not be part of the very deeply hard- the details, it is relatively fair to say though that the line establishment. I do not think he will be allowed. composition has increasingly become limited, more hard-line and more along the views of what I Q21 Mr Roy: And anyone from the Green mentioned earlier: people who tend to believe that the Movement? west will only respond to pressure. Professor Ansari: No. They cannot risk going through what they went through in 2009. And they are scared Q19 Mr Roy: In relation to the forthcoming of it coming back. If you look at the parliamentary elections, can an agreement be made before June? elections last year, that was a perfect show. They put How significant will the result of the election be on it on, it came through with very little fuss and they the nuclear issue? even told us what the turnout was going to be three Professor Ansari: I will lead on that. First, I would months before it happened. It worked very well, and not even dignify it with the term “election”. I don’t nobody fussed, nobody was interested. Anyone that think that it will be an election. It is going to be an tells you—and this is another one of the press TV appointment. They have already ratified certain rules crowd I’m afraid—that Tehran is buzzing with interest restricting what was a restrictive process even further. about the presidential election—nobody is interested. In order to stand for election now you have to be Why would you be? There is no competition, so why nominated by 100 great men, self-professing great would you be? What people in Iran are interested in political leaders who have to sign up for your at the moment is the economy; that is what they are candidacy. They have been so blunt about it now— interested in. what is wonderful about this is how open they are— Mr Roy: But not the election. and they have actually said that the role of the Dr Parsi: I would not go so far as to say that whatever Revolutionary Guards is to engineer elections. For the outcome in June it will be inconsequential. I do those of us who had even any illusions that these tend to agree with Ali that, at this point—well, let me things were remotely free and fair, I think they have say this first. We should not underestimate the even admitted it themselves. Iranians’ ability to be as self-centred and self-focused I think the decision is interesting. There has been a as other countries are. Just seeing what happened in certain amount of spin coming out of certain the Parliament two days ago, if they have this really quarters—the sort of press TV crowd as I like to call strong discipline of being able to unify and resolve them—who basically say that nothing can be done internal differences or make sure there are no internal until the presidential election is over. If you look at it, differences in the face of the pressure that they are there is a wonderful way in which Iranian politics faced with right now, then I suspect that we would not likes to mirror and echo American politics. Because be seeing images like that. But we did, and they were the Americans said “We can’t do anything until our very real and they were quite unprecedented. They are presidential election is over” all of a sudden the busy with themselves; I do not think there is any doubt Iranians have said “Well, we can’t do anything until about that. our presidential election is over”. Lo and behold, they actually can; they are going to have a meeting before When it comes to what will happen in the elections, their presidential election is over. I think part of it on the one hand, if there is a different face, I do not reflects the fact that the presidential election is think that will be inconsequential because the political completely inconsequential. I do not think it matters toxicity of someone like Ahmadinejad, particularly that much who wins because at the end of the day, the mindful of his holocaust theories, should not be decision will have to be made by the Supreme Leader underestimated. I do not know if it is as decisive here and he will have to ratify a deal. There may be a new in Europe as it is in the United States, but it was face at the front, who may come and be slightly more certainly a factor that rendered things very difficult for pleasant to engage with, certainly than Ahmadinejad, the Obama Administration. The photo opportunity but the candidates they are talking about at the that, by accident, the President could have with moment might make Ahmadinejad actually look President Chavez he could never have with rather nice. Ahmadinejad. Having different people being the face of it can create certain political flexibility or openings Q20 Mr Roy: Who do you think would be the that will increase their manoeuvrability on many candidates then? different sides. Professor Ansari: Well, Larijani I think is one of As to the question, can a deal still be made, or can them, but Jalili has been suggested who is hardly the some negotiations take place, the Iranians are very most inspirational figure. Another one is Haddad- discontented with the package that has been put in Adel, who is the former speaker, but he is also related front of them. They are using various types of tricks to the Supreme Leader—I cannot remember but I and tools to play for time to make it very clear that think his son is married to the Supreme Leader’s this package is not something that they will accept. I daughter or something. This is a very tight inner circle think they have a calculation to try to figure out what that is being chosen. There are a couple of outliers the cost is of playing for time and what the cost is of that I think are being touted, possibly to raise some going to another round of talks that ultimately will fail interest, including the current mayor of Tehran, but and which they will be blamed for. Is it better to go he, in order to basically make himself acceptable to and have those talks and get blamed for the failure? the powers that be, has had to say some pretty Or is it better to push forward, push forward and use obnoxious things about reform, liberals and others; the excuse of the elections etcetera to find a way to cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 8 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi deflect any of the criticism that will be directed we are deeply offended that anyone might think that against you? we would not adhere to it. Then you raise the Rushdie Professor Ansari: Can I just come back on that? This fatwa and say, “Well, you didn’t actually implement is where I slightly differ from Trita, I’m afraid. Those that, did you?” And they go, “Well, yes, but that is four or five people who are currently touted as being not really a fatwa.” So what is a fatwa? The problem potential replacements for Ahmadinejad do not differ is they get themselves tongue-tied because for 10 from him in any substantive way on their ideas on the years and as far as this country is concerned they said holocaust. This is a very small group of people. There Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa—let us face it, Ayatollah are many other people in the Iranian system who do Khomeini was in a different category from the current not share those views. Whether they would be allowed incumbent—could be ignored. Yet this one, to run for president is another matter. This is our apparently, cannot be ignored. That one, I think, had problem. The pool of talent is rather restricted at the something written about it. There are dubious moment. Ahmadinejad is a very “What you see is comments about whether it was a fatwa, a decree or a what you get” type of guy and he will come and shout hokm, or whatever they call it, but none the less it is it out. But the others are not paragons of liberalness generally accepted to be a fatwa. They are caught; it or anything. They are highly conservative in their is like someone who does not think through the logic own ways. of what they are saying. If the fatwa against nuclear weapons sticks, I presume Mr Rushdie ought to go Q22 Mike Gapes: The Committee went to Iran in the into hiding again. last Parliament and we had intensive discussions with The point is that you cannot have it both ways, and Mr Jalili who had just become the chief negotiator on they need to articulate this in a slightly more coherent nuclear issues. He emphasised—I have heard Iranian form. At present—I wrote a piece about this, which I people and people who purport to speak for them in am happy to send you if I can dig it out—I looked Press TV and elsewhere claiming this—that a fatwa quite extensively even on the Supreme Leader’s has been issued by Ayatollah Khamenei against website and other sources and there is no written nuclear weapons. How significant is that fatwa and fatwa. They will tell you until they are blue in the face does it have any bearing on whether there is really a that there is one, but my answer to that is, “Show me.” prohibition on seeking a nuclear weapon? Dr Parsi: If I can just add to that, I am not a religious Dr Parsi: I would put it this way. Under no scholar so I would not be able to tell the difference circumstance can a fatwa replace the type of between a hokum and a fatwa, or anything like that. inspections and verification programme that is To emphasise how one can use even contradictory necessary to create the type of transparency needed to things like this in order to use the imagination that Ali ensure that there is no weaponisation effort in Iran. also called for to find solutions, imagine if we were The fact that there is a fatwa, however, can be used, in a situation in which the Iranians actually said that cleverly, in the way that the Obama Administration they wanted a nuclear bomb. Fatwa or no fatwa, did about a year ago. That is to say that it is good to imagine if we were in that situation. Where would be hear that Iran not only says that it does not seek a the touching points? Where would be the opening nuclear weapons but it also says that it has a fatwa points in order to be able to find a solution? against it. Now help us translate that fatwa into an We have to be imaginative and clever, and say, “Okay, objective mechanism that we can feel faith in, that we they say they do not want it, and at least on the face can have any confidence in, mindful of the fact that a of it that is a positive thing. Now let us find a way religious fatwa only tends to be applicable to people that we can find confidence and mechanisms to verify who belong to that religion. So if that type of that what they say is what they do.” We have a much approach can be utilised then perhaps this is part of trickier situation with North Korea and we lost that that face-saving exercise that both sides need in order one. Here at least they are saying something along to come to a more secure place. But in and of itself, I that line. Whether it is a hokum or fatwa, written or would not find particular value in it. not, is more of an academic conversation. The Professor Ansari: I will go a little bit further and say question is how we can use things of this nature that there isn’t a fatwa. There is a series of statements. imaginatively to get out of this trajectory towards confrontation. Q23 Mike Gapes: It is not written down? Professor Ansari: There is nothing written down. It Q24 Rory Stewart: Welcome, and thank you both depends what you define as a fatwa. If a fatwa is very much for coming. Just to go back to negotiations something which in traditional Shi’a norms would be at the beginning of the Obama Administration, there a written judgment, properly referenced to scripture, seemed to be two very different descriptions of what then that does not exist. What you have is a series of happened in that negotiation. One version is that the speeches and a number of announcements by Obama Administration were extremely generous and Ayatollah Khamenei that he thinks these things are imaginative; they proposed a solution where they were un-Islamic. Fine, and as Trita says, that is a basis on prepared to take a back seat and allow others to go which one can build, but trust and verify, as you put forward, and they proposed imaginative paths to it. Where the pure incoherence of this becomes civilian enrichment. I suppose Sayyid Ali Khamenei apparent is when you probe a little further. I talked to is accused in this version of not knowing what to do, a number of people—Trita and I were at a conference of being paralysed in the negotiation, of producing on this—and when you probe a little further on their random anecdotes and of not responding. That is one fatwa they say that this is a religious injunction and version. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 9

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi

The second version is that the United States was being with does not mean that it is irrational. We know too slightly disingenuous, and that all along America were little about the Iranians to be able to have an accurate doing this just to prove that they were making an estimation of how they calculate their interest. If we effort so that they could swing to a harder-line don’t know how they do that, how do we make a position and excuse themselves by saying, “Well, we determination as to whether their actions are rational did make an offer but you did not take it.” Which of in terms of maximising that interest? We know too those is the correct account of what was going on? little, and we will know even less, mindful of the fact Dr Parsi: I would subscribe to the first view. I believe that the diplomatic connections and interactions are that the Obama Administration were genuine in becoming fewer and fewer. seeking to find a solution. They used a certain degree of imagination to try to find some openings. They Q26 Rory Stewart: Just to push you a little bit broke some long-standing American taboos, such as harder on this, we in Britain see the attack on our writing a letter to the Supreme Leader, agreeing to embassy as another example of completely counter- bilateral conversations with the Iranians and showing productive, irrational behaviour, or short-termism. up at the P5+1 conversations, which the US did not What is your view? do during the Bush years. Dr Parsi: Without a doubt, that was an absolutely At the same time, the Obama Administration had a disgraceful act on the Iranian side, and they are paying very limited time period in which that approach could a price for it, but we also have to be careful to be pursued, mindful of what was earlier referred to as understand the broader actions of the regime and not institutionalised enmity. Here, I think that the political just singular incidents. Singular incidents everywhere space that the Administration had was essentially can be deemed to be counter-productive, and the eaten up by several different factors. The most Iranian regime has quite a long résumé of having done important one is what happened in the Iranian counter-productive things, but to take that step and elections in 2009, with both the fraud and the very say they are irrational is quite a leap. Those who are negative image that was being projected from Iran, making the argument that this is a completely but also the fact that the Iranians became paralysed ideological, irrational regime have to ask themselves and the in-fighting was so intense that they really what are the consequences if we accept those could not move forward. There were also other assumptions—I would call them assumptions more factors, such as pressure from Israel and pressure than conclusions. from Congress. If you have an entity on the other side that is irrational The very genuine effort, in the words of a very senior and completely ideological, and then you add another American Obama official whom I interviewed, was concept that has been thrown around in the debate, such that the entire negotiation strategy ended up which is to say that they are suicidal, you have just becoming a gamble on a single roll of the dice, eliminated two of the most obvious policy actions, the meaning that it had to work right away or not at all. first being diplomacy and the second containment and There was not enough time to pursue it in the manner deterrence. If the other side is irrational, ideological that any successful negotiation has been pursued. The and suicidal, neither diplomacy nor deterrence will fact that the Administration became so successful in work, so what are you left with? You are only left implementing an unprecedented sanctions regime on with pre-emptive military strikes. So I would say, in the Iranians has fuelled the belief in some circles that the absence of clear convincing evidence, the that was the objective from the very beginning, assumptions about irrationality seem more politically because the diplomatic effort became somewhat short- driven towards pushing the west in a certain direction. lived In my estimation that analysis does not really correspond to the facts, mindful of the fact that a big Q27 Rory Stewart: But doesn’t your argument cut portion as to why so much time was lost was because both ways? If they are in fact not suicidal, and are of the Iranian elections and the fraud in them and the rational, perhaps we should not be so worried that paralysis in Tehran, not because of lack of willingness they will get a bomb, because they will then act like on the US side. other nuclear powers—because it is suicidal to drop a bomb on someone—so the effect on the Iranian Q25 Rory Stewart: Briefly to follow up on that, regime of having a bomb will not be an immediate there are two versions as to the rationality or attack on Israel in the Middle East. otherwise of the Iranian regime. One version says that, Dr Parsi: I don’t think the primary concern about broadly speaking, the regime is relatively pragmatic Tehran getting a bomb is that it will immediately use and rational, and the other view is, no, no, they do it. It is about all the other consequences of having the some genuinely crazy things; they have plots to try to spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Will assassinate the ambassadors in the United States; they there be a domino effect of other states taking that get involved in completely irrational support for the path? Will a nuclear weapon in Iran embolden the Syrians. Instinctually, what is your sense as to what Iranians to do more of the destabilising things that extent this is an irrational, ideologically driven have taken place in the past? Will it give it a certain regime? For example, Emanuele Ottolenghi stresses level of protection against such things? That is the this kind of thing, but do you see them as a more primary concern about them getting a nuclear weapon. rational element? Beyond that, even if they are rational, the principles Dr Parsi: I think the term “rationality” has been and values of making sure that there are less nuclear confused with a concept of agreeability in some of the weapons in the world rather than more stand on their discourse. Just because they do things that we disagree own. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 10 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi

Q28 Rory Stewart: Can I, finally, then, bring in weapon in Iran. I think we should be careful not to Professor Ansari on that? Could you develop the idea believe that it is inevitable or that the cause has been of what the effect might be on the regime itself if it lost. It is quite possible to prevent it peacefully. were to possess a bomb, in terms of its ideological However, if that scenario were to occur, the biggest character? Would it strengthen particular factions strategic losers would be the Iranians themselves. within the regime? How would it affect the behaviour Look back at how the Shah reasoned. The programme of the regime? That is assuming it had managed to started during the time of the Shah, through some end up with it. encouragement from Dick Cheney and Donald Professor Ansari: The interesting thing is that there Rumsfeld during the Ford Administration, in which has not actually been a very clear debate, certainly not they thought Iran could not become a modern country voiced publicly, about the consequences of developing unless it did have a nuclear energy programme. a nuclear weapon. There have, on the other hand, been The Shah was pursuing a programme that had energy a number of private discussions and admissions by purposes but he was clearly pursuing an option to diplomats and other specialists in Iran. ensure that he could weaponise, if the security In the 2009 election one quite striking thing was that environment in the region deteriorated. He was the subject came up in debates. People commented on convinced that the United States would not come to how useful the weapon was for them, and whether it Iran’s aid if the Soviets attacked, for instance; that the would institutionalise their power and make them feel US would not risk a war with the Soviets for the sake more secure and stronger. Or they asked—and this of Iran. As a result, he wanted the option. He didn’t was the model that always came up—whether they want the weapon, he wanted the option. He recognised were going to go the way of the Soviet Union, so the strategic negatives for Iran in making itself such a basically, “Are we bankrupting ourselves on a real target and increasing the perception of a threat from flight of fancy?” That debate is there. People are Iran that is so widespread throughout the region, saying, “We don’t know whether developing a particularly on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. weapons capability will make us more secure at all.” The more Iran does this the more it will undermine its Unfortunately, there are elements—not unique to ability to have true peace in the region by having a Iran—who equate weapons of this nature with relationship with the neighbours that is not based on strength and power. This is what they want. They their constantly allying themselves with external think it will make them more secure. They take a very powers in order to contain and deter the perceived simple and straightforward analogy of, say, Iraq, threat from Iran. North Korea or Libya. They say, “Look at what Libya did. They compromised and look what happened to Q31 Mr Baron: And you think they appreciate that? them.” They take these examples and use them to Dr Parsi: I believe there are elements in the Iranian justify it. regime that appreciate it. You can also take a look at Others have said, “On the contrary, this is making us the programme that they have. This is not a less secure. We would never be able to build up a particularly quick programme. Gary Sick has pointed weapons capability that would be remotely out that this is trundling along very slowly. It is not at comparable to what the Israelis might have, or all the Pakistani quick dash for a bomb. Again, there certainly what the Americans have. Actually, our is a complex web of interests and nuances on this security would be better achieved if we had alliances, issue, and the better we understand it, the better we for instance, or actually had some friends in the can find openings to utilise an interest on the Iranian region.” There is that sort of argument. There are side not to weaponise. If we make an assumption that people within the regime who believe that acquiring the Iranians are no different from the Pakistanis, who that sort of capability would make them stronger. said they would rather eat grass and still have the bomb, we are eliminating our options in being able to Q29 Rory Stewart: And your assumption is the address this effectively and peacefully. Revolutionary Guard is one of those factions. Professor Ansari: Just to come back on the issue of Professor Ansari: Yes. Again, it is difficult to paint rationality and irrationality, we talk about the with too broad a brush. There are certainly elements irrationality of the Iranian regime, but they operate there who believe that would be the case. within certain rational norms of their own; they have a world view and they take actions which they think Q30 Mr Baron: Briefly, to follow on with one are rational within a particular perspective that they question. Separating rhetoric from action, we have all have. As Trita quite rightly says, they have made heard the rhetoric from the Iranian side and, likewise, mistakes and misjudgments. They can explain certain there has been rhetoric on our side. Do you have any actions according to their perspective. I certainly do evidence? People such as Sir Richard Dalton, the not believe that they are suicidal—frankly, they former ambassador, and Paul Pillar, the CIA believe they are going to inherit the world; they do intelligence officer in the Middle East, said there was not want to eliminate it—and they do not want to do no evidence of irrational behaviour from the Iranians. themselves down either. Let’s speed forward a few years and assume they get What you have seen over the last five to six years is the bomb, do you think that would change, or is there a level of incompetence, possibly, in Government in real irrationality at the heart of the regime that they Iran, because they have promoted people to jobs who are doing well to disguise? simply are not capable of doing them. You can see Dr Parsi: First, it is important to note that there are that with the diplomatic corps. If you think back five plenty of options, time and space to prevent a nuclear to six years to who was representing Iran in the UN, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 11

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi in London, in Paris and in other places, these were avoid being in that world just by mustering that often very sensible people: they could mediate, they political will—of course, the other side has to do it as could talk to you and you could have a conversation well—and mustering the imagination, I am convinced with them. These days, it is pretty difficult, actually, that we will push that conversation into the academic to get anything commonsensical out of them, because world and never actually have to have a definitive they are either too worried about the ideology—I can answer to it, because we simply will not experience see the Chairman waving his pen, so I will cut down it. If the EU has managed to be in this unprecedented my comments very quickly—or they simply have period of peace since world war two through that sort nothing to say; they are either too scared or they are of imagination—it won the Nobel prize for it last very ideologically committed to a particular view. year—I am pretty sure that that is also achievable They rationalise it in their own mind, but that does when it comes to this issue, as long as all sides not necessarily mean that it is in the country’s best commit the type of political will and imagination that interests. is required. Dr Parsi: Another example of where both sides are giving each other perhaps too much credit is that we Q33 Mr Ainsworth: Let us return to what would be see mismanagement and incompetence, and we think needed in order to try to avoid the problem. You have that there is something more profound there, whereas, both given us evidence that Iran’s policy has gone in reality, it may just be mismanagement and backwards. Over the past few years there have been a incompetence. number of setbacks, not least the Syrian disaster. If Syria falls, Iran is then more isolated, more paranoid Q32 Mr Ainsworth: Notwithstanding what you have and more vulnerable, and the chances of them said, let us continue for a moment with this scenario pursuing a nuclear weapon are surely hugely where the bomb has been achieved. It is regularly increased. What, practically, can we do at this stage, bandied around in the House of Commons that that without taking the pressure off, to avoid that state of will cause an almost automatic escalation throughout mind—that the only way to security is the attainment the region—Saudi Arabia will want one, Egypt will of nuclear weapons—becoming inevitable? want one and Turkey will want one—and that that will Professor Ansari: One of the things that I would say inevitably embolden Iran in its foreign policy. Do you is that we are assuming there, of course, that there is a buy into that? Let us just try to think through the cohesion internally that is moving towards a particular probable Iranian policy post the achievement of a position. I think that as the situation becomes worse nuclear weapon. for them—both regionally and domestically—you will Professor Ansari: One of the main worries we have find that there will be a breakdown, almost, in the at this end in terms of policy is what would happen to system. It will not be quite as clear-cut. the NPT; that is what people are concerned about. I In terms of giving them the message, I suppose it has am not sure about the escalation argument. It has been to be made clearer to the Iranians that there is nothing used widely, but I am not convinced that the Saudis, in what the west is arguing that says that they will not the Turks and others will all suddenly decide they be able to have their rights under the NPT—there is want to go that route, but it is certainly an argument nothing that says that they cannot have civilian that is made. nuclear power—but they simply must adhere to In terms of emboldening the Iranian regime—yes. It certain norms, and rules and regulations. Of course, would be an achievement, and that is something that would make them feel more secure. In feeling more they will counter that that is unfair, because it is secure, they would probably behave in a manner, that double standards, and that the west is setting them a was, perhaps, even more grandiose than it has been higher standard. Well, yes, one element of that is true, recently. I certainly do not think that they would ever but that is partly because of the hinterland of the move to use anything; they are not in that league. As political landscape that I mentioned earlier. We wish I have said to people, the only existential threat the they could approach the region and their international Iranian regime poses is to Iran, not to anyone else. To relations in a different and more constructive way. go back to the prestige, this is something that will That message has to be got across to the Iranians— make them feel good and bring out, perhaps, the worst and I mean all Iranians, by the way, not just the in their character. regime; we are talking about public opinion and hearts Dr Parsi: I am not an expert on that literature, and and minds in Iran as well. That needs to be our two colleagues who will testify afterwards are emphasised. probably much more knowledgeable about this. But I know the subtext is regime change—I know there is there seems to be an interesting questioning of some that subtext in the United States, certainly—but previous views, when there was a belief that there was actually, if, given half a chance, the west were able to an automatic risk of a domino effect. People are achieve a solution, I do not think that we would be pointing to the fact that North Korea weaponised, and particularly keen on having another piece of real we have not seen the Japanese or others do it so far, estate in the middle east going topsy-turvy. I can’t see so perhaps we should not be as unquestioning of that that. They play on that a lot—they say, “This is all notion. about regime change.” My argument to the Iranians, Regardless, I would personally like not to risk it. Why over and over again, is, “If you are worried about be in that world? This is not a particularly technically regime change, hold an election that is free and fair. complex question; it is an issue about political will. If That will sort you out.” we can peacefully achieve a resolution to this, and Dr Parsi: That will bring regime change. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 12 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi

Q34 Mr Ainsworth: I can’t remember which one of single person who thinks that that is a good idea—but you it was, but one of you said that by concentrating it is impossible to move them. on the nuclear issue we are in many ways missing Chair: We have just one more group of questions. As out on any opportunity that there is for a sustainable we are already nearly quarter of an hour over time, we settlement. What are the other elements that need to would be grateful if you could keep the answers short. be pursued in order for any settlement to be sustainable? Q35 Mark Hendrick: Is it possible at the moment to Dr Parsi: The first thing I would say is that whenever assess Iranian public opinion on the regime’s nuclear one pursues a pressure-centric approach, which is programme and whether the general public feel that it clearly what we are doing, one has to be careful that is a good move? Is it popular with the Iranian public? one doesn’t become the victim of that policy because Professor Ansari: It is very difficult, certainly since it is not nimble enough or adjustable enough. At least 2009, to have any sort of assessment of public opinion on the American side, the sanctions tool is a rather in a realistic way. What we have been able to see is clumsy one, mindful of the difficulty that exists in the the comments coming out, either during the election United States in being able to put that option on the itself in 2009—there were clear disagreements as to table, and say, “If the Iranians stop 20%, or if they do the direction of policy—or from individuals who talk x, y and z, sanctions can be lifted.” That is not a very about the way in which policy has become very convincing argument from the US side, mindful of the confrontational of late, and say that perhaps the way tremendous difficulties that exist. to achieve things would be to take different Part of what has motivated the strategy is the belief approaches and to assess things more realistically. that Iran does not give into pressure, but into I don’t think you will find much dispute over Iran’s tremendous amount of pressure. We have been right to have a civil nuclear programme, because they looking at the 1988 example, where, after the Iranians just see that largely in economic terms; it is partly for suffered tremendously in the Iraq-Iran war, Khomeini the diversification of energy. But I dare say that, given finally had to break his vow and end the war, even various difficult choices, the adherence to the nuclear though his slogan had been “War, war, war to victory”. programme would probably wither and decline. He likened that step to being worse than drinking a We had a similar question when they made a bit of a cup of poison. This has been one of the motivating mistake and put forward a poll on one of these Iranian factors for bringing the very strong sanctions regime news channels. It was a phone-in poll—this is not, I on Iran. think, something you can scientifically predict. They But there are several different things that are missing asked, in the face of US and international sanctions, if we are looking at this analogy. The first is the moral what should we do? A: compromise; B: shut the question of bringing about that type of pressure on a Straits of Hormuz; or C: resist till the end. Something country in which clearly, large portions of the like 78% said compromise. That was not actually the result they wanted, so they changed it and went for population are quite unhappy with the regime in the something else. first place and have no influence over the nuclear You can see that when the situation changes, if there programme anyways. I want to get back to that later. is a cost, people have different priorities. There is that The other things is that in the option that Khomeini indication that it is probably more fluid than the had—he ultimately decided to drink that cup of regime would like to let on. poison—he knew that if he drank that cup, the war Dr Parsi: Ali is right that there is some difficulty in would end. It wasn’t an “if” or “maybe, perhaps, one knowing. It is fair to say that it is not the priority of day that will happen”—it was very clear cut. He also the vast majority of Iranians, but, again, they tend to knew that Saddam Hussein could deliver on his end be supportive of the right. This was an internet poll, of the bargain. so Ali is right in saying it was not a scientific poll, On these two questions, which are extremely central but what is implicit in that question and the answer is to making sure that the pressure campaign can work, compromise in order to get the sanctions lifted. As I think there are significant question marks in the long as we have gone out of our way to declare that Iranian mind. The Iranians do not know exactly what sanctions relief is not on the table, then that 78%— would happen if they were to capitulate on the issue. assuming that that is the proportion of the The offers that have been on the table are that perhaps population—are not going to understand the purpose at some point there can be sanctions relief, or perhaps of a compromise if the sanctions are not lifted. This at some point there can be an enrichment programme is where the nimbleness of the pressure tactic has to in Iran. There is nothing quite concrete. be configured in such a way that we have those Secondly, to President Obama’s credit, he is no abilities. Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein did not have to I would like to turn to some of the things that are deal with viewpoints from Iraq’s allies. He did not happening on the ground in Iran that we should be have to deal with the pesky Congress. So there are aware of, mindful of the fact that this is not a new question marks on the Iranian side as to whether the phenomenon. The sanctions, particularly the financial US can deliver. When that exists, that renders an sanctions, have made it very difficult for people to escalation and a pressure tactic quite problematic. It get access to medicine. Medicine is exempt from the can very well end up in a situation, as we have with sanctions but because of the financial sanctions, the United States vis-à-vis Cuba right now, in which hardly any banks are willing to handle the the sanctions are there—I have been in Washington transactions. That has created an acute shortage in for more than a decade, and I have not come across a Iran, which would not have happened to the same cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 13

5 February 2013 Professor Ali Ansari and Dr Trita Parsi extent but for the mismanagement and incompetence these are the variables that have to be included to get of the regime. a deal on the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, the variable that brought it to a crisis is Professor Ansari: On the sanctions issue, we are the sanctions. We are starting to see early phases where we are. Unfortunately we are where we are similar to what we saw with the sanctions on Iraq 15 because of decisions that were made on both sides. I or 20 years ago. We should be very careful in asking also do not think we can neglect the way in which the about the Iranian population’s viewpoint on these Ahmadinejad administration has basically not taken issues. If we have a medical or humanitarian crisis in the situation as seriously as it should have. Serious Iran, the ultimate direction is more likely to bring the sanctions only really came in over the last year, and it population closer to the regime rather than the is those banking sanctions and also the EU oil opposite direction, beyond all the other moral embargo that have hit them hard. questions we have to ask ourselves. To give you an example, in the past five or six years when all this has been talked about there has been a Q36 Mark Hendrick: I was going to come on to tendency for Iran to say that the EU and others are sanctions from the other angle. Dr Parsi, you made bluffing. There has been no shortage of warnings the point that the Iranian public might not want a about where the situation was heading, and I suppose compromise while the sanctions were still there. that for me the most striking example was the oil Might not the Iranian public have been pushed into embargo. It was announced in January that this would wanting a compromise because of the sanctions? come in at the end of June or July. The Iranians took Dr Parsi: That raises a very important question: was no measures, really, to counter this. The reason is that it necessary to go to this level of unprecedented they thought that the EU was bluffing, or alternatively sanctions to get a compromise? I think we answered that the EU economy was in such a pitiful state that that question earlier—no, because both sides have there was no way the EU would forgo the pleasures missed opportunities. But at this point getting a of Iranian oil. As it turns out—and it seems to have compromise would necessitate both sides doing away come as some surprise to some of them—European with some of the added things—the facts on the and American diplomats were working overtime to ground that have been created in the last four years. ensure that the oil market would not suffer from the On the Iranian side, that certainly includes enrichment withdrawal of Iranian oil. Perhaps another shock to to 20%. On the western side, it certainly includes the system was the fact that the two countries actually some of the financial sanctions and other things. doing rather well out of the oil embargo are Iraq and Absent that, there cannot be any solution any longer. Russia, which are meant to be Iran’s friends. I think Four years ago, it was easier to deal with this issue all this has been a bit of a body blow for the Iranians, because neither side had as many facts on the ground which partly goes to the fact that they have not as it does today. prepared themselves. It is worth bearing in mind the staggering figure that, Q37 Mark Hendrick: As a practical solution, do you as the Iranians themselves admitted, over the last 100 see the possibility of a de-escalation by gradual years—or since 1908—43% of the total oil revenue removal of sanctions coupled with gradual earned by the Iranian state has been earned since backtracking in the way they are moving in their 2005. That is an enormous amount of money. They nuclear policy? should be sitting pretty at the moment on an enormous Dr Parsi: I do, but I believe that the step-by-step oil sovereign wealth fund. Although in 1908 the oil approach needs to be enriched, perhaps, in the sense was trickling out, nonetheless the point is that because that there is an asymmetric situation between the oil prices have been so high, in the Iranian mindset it Iranian proposal and the American or P5 proposal. puts in a little bit of perspective the achievements that Both sides are essentially asking for a lot and offering were made previously. Since 2005 Ahmadinejad has very little. It is very politically difficult to improve had an enormous cash flow, and that has disguised that type of small step package. Perhaps it is better what is basically incompetence. That is what it has to move towards a larger package in which more is done. It goes back, I think, to the incompetence that demanded but more also can be offered. In that Trita was talking about regarding the medical scenario—the going big option as it is referred to in management and other things, but the sanctions have Washington—clearly there has to be backtracking on now crystallised this. enrichment in Iran, particularly on 20%, how to deal Chair: We will leave it there. Thank you very much. with the stockpile and things of that nature, combined Clearly we could have gone on much longer, but we with the Iranians agreeing to inspections and very much appreciate your taking the time to come verification, combined with sanctions relief. How we and see us. sequence this is part of the trick, but make no mistake, The sitting is suspended for two minutes. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 14 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Shashank Joshi, Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute, gave evidence.

Q38 Chair: May I welcome everyone to the second purposes. Will you set out your concerns about the session, which will focus more on the current state of amount of 5% that they have? Iran’s nuclear programme? Our two witnesses are Mark Fitzpatrick: The 5% stock pile now amounts to Mark Fitzpatrick, the director of the non-proliferation about five weapons-worth, if it were further enriched and disarmament programme at the International to 90%. An effort to enrich it further above 5% to Institute for Strategic Studies—Dr Fitzpatrick, weapons-grade 90 involves much less effort than welcome—and Shashank Joshi, research fellow at the getting to the 5% point. There is a lot of emphasis Royal United Services Institute, whom we have today on 20% enrichment because, as Mr. Joshi said, already heard on the radio this morning. Welcome. the time to get it to weapons-grade is shorter. May I start with a general question? Given what we However, getting from 5% to 90% adds only a couple know now, how far away is Iran from having the of months. We cannot forget the basic problem of that capacity to produce a nuclear bomb? Are we now 5% enrichment. Yes, it has a potential civilian use, but talking months? for what? Russia has promised to provide the fuel for Mark Fitzpatrick: Sir, you phrased the question— the lifetime of the only reactor in Iran that works “How far away are they from having the capacity?”. today. Iran talks about building another reactor at I have to say they have the capacity today. Darkhovin or somewhere else, but it would take 10 or Chair: But you need the ability to produce. more years to build it, and it would be very unsafe if Mark Fitzpatrick: If they make the decision to they tried to build it by themselves. They do not need produce a nuclear weapon, they could probably to produce this much low-enriched uranium today—it produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon is like producing gasoline before you build an in a few months. Then, it would take another several automobile. months to put it in the form of a weapon. But then it Shashank Joshi: And, of course, nor do they, strictly would take at least another year to be able to mount speaking, need to produce more 20%, because they it on a ballistic missile. So if you’re talking about a have enough to run the Tehran research reactor for 10 weapon that could hit anywhere in Europe, it would years or so, so I broadly agree with that. When be a couple of years, but if you don’t care about what looking at any interim settlement, the focus on 20% the delivery system is—if you were willing to is simply because that is of much greater concern with transport it via suicidal truck drivers—theoretically, regard to the potential dash for a weapon, but it is less than a year. really a prioritisation. The 5% does matter, and the Security Council has asked Iran to stop enriching to Q39 Chair: Do you agree with that, Mr Joshi? 5% as well, but in the grand scheme of things, that is Shashank Joshi: Yes; if I could add just a couple of going to be a very low priority when it comes to the small points. First, the answer to that is heavily various things that we would like to see from Iran. dependent on data to which we will have access only later this month, in so far as the IAEA releases its Q41 Chair: Does Iran have sufficient stocks of quarterly reports. It depends, for the last report, on uranium or yellowcake inside the country for its how much uranium enriched to 20% Iran has peaceful nuclear energy programme, or will it have to produced since November; and, really importantly, import more? how much of that it has then depleted or run down by Mark Fitzpatrick: For a peaceful programme to be converting to fuel. So that will make a difference to able to produce fuel for a reactor, they would need far how close they are to the point at which they would more yellowcake than they have today. They do have have sufficient uranium enriched to 20% to then turn a mine that can produce uranium, although not of very that into weapons-grade. good quality, so they may be able to sustain a very The other point is that there are really two stages: small nuclear programme based on their one mine, but enriching to weapons-grade and then producing a not the kind of programme that they envisage with 10 usable nuclear device, and probably a deliverable or 20 nuclear power plants. device—Mark explained that subtlety. We can calculate the first one with reasonable precision. The Q42 Mark Hendrick: Is there a thin red line second one, at least without classified information, between Iran’s having and not having a nuclear depends on a host of parameters, such as the extent of weapons capacity, or is it more of a thick grey line? their pre-2003 weapons research and how much data Has Iran already crossed into that grey area? Mr they receive from countries such as North Korea that Fitzpatrick, when I saw you briefly at a meeting last conduct nuclear tests. That would affect how reliably year, you predicted that the Israelis would attack Iran they can then manufacture a device, and the time before Christmas. Obviously, that has not happened, could be longer or shorter than that period we just so do you still think that it is coming through? heard about. Mark Fitzpatrick: I am not sure that I said they would attack before Christmas; I said they would attack if Q40 Chair: Mr Fitzpatrick, you have expressed Iran crossed the line from capability to production and concern about the amount of uranium at 5% actually started to build a nuclear weapon, or if the enrichment, but that could be just for peaceful line that separates capability from building becomes cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 15

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi so faint, grey or invisible—white—that it is could get. The issue there is: does there come a impossible to judge when it has been crossed. At that point—maybe in a year’s time or so, or over a year, point, I think that Israel would feel the need to attack. or potentially sooner if there are changes in the I hope that I expressed it in that way, and I still centrifuges—at which the time it would take Iran to believe that. acquire one significant quantity of weapons-grade Mark Hendrick: But I thought you thought that they uranium shortens to below the time you have would get to that point before Christmas. between inspections? Mark Fitzpatrick: They did not get to that point. That is not going to occur any time soon—it almost certainly won’t occur this year—but that is a different Q43 Mark Hendrick: What do you think the type of red line, where you can’t be sure whether you differences are with the red line? Are they getting to will catch Iran or whether detection will occur with the grey line now? reasonable certainty. We are a long way away from Mark Fitzpatrick: It is clear that Iran has the basic that, but that is another red line. Iran is not near either capability, so it is a matter of whether they would of those lines, but we will have more clarity later make a political decision to do it, how much time it this month. would take and whether it would make any sense to dash for nuclear weapons by producing one of them. Q44 Mr Roy: Can I ask about the time limit of mid- I do not think it would make any sense. They would 2013, as set by Israel? Bear in mind the election in want to have several of them, and that would lengthen June; a new Iranian President won’t actually take post the time. And they would be exposed if they made until maybe near the end of August. What are the that decision. ramifications for any particular deal then—based on The IAEA inspections at Natanz are twice a month those two dates—this year? and at Fordo they are four times a month. If they tried Mark Fitzpatrick: Being cautious not to make to divert that stockpile, they would be noticed. predictions that will be proven wrong—I hope that I However, as they build up the stockpile and enhance have never been quite so uncautious—I think that their capability, including with the more effective there is a possibility that we could be in a dangerous centrifuges that they recently announced, then that time frame this summer, before Iran’s political timeline for being able to know that they have crossed circumstances are such that they could make the kind becomes shorter, and that will heighten sensitivities in of compromises that the last panel discussed. But their Israel and Washington—and, I presume, in London programme so far along depends on, as Shashank as well. Joshi said, how much 20% enrichment they make and Shashank Joshi: Can I just add one point to that? It how much of that they convert to a form that cannot is that there are multiple lines here. The one that has be very quickly reconverted to gasified form, and the attracted a lot of attention since the end of last year capability—how many of the more effective or so has been the point at which Iran acquires enough centrifuges do they introduce? I could foresee a uranium enriched to 20% to suffice for one bomb; the circumstance this summer where the Israeli political shorthand for this is one significant quantity of and military calculus is that they have to act. I am not uranium enriched to 20%. That is the line that was set saying they will, but I think that there is a possibility out in front of the UN General Assembly by Binyamin that we can’t ignore. Netanyahu, with his famous speech and his famous bomb diagram—a sort of ACME bomb. Shashank Joshi: What is interesting is that Iran knew According to Netanyahu’s own calculations, the fear what it was doing last year when it converted its was that Iran would hit that point about the spring or stockpile of 20% to fuel. It knew what it was doing; summer, based on its earlier progress of enrichment. it was a safety valve. It was stepping back slightly, What happened last year is that, over the course of the and Israel recognised that. year, Iran converted about half its stockpile of 20% Ehud Barak gave an interview with the Telegraph last enriched uranium to fuel, which can be reversed but autumn and said that it had delayed the moment of takes a while to do so. This goes back to my point at reckoning by eight to 10 months. The central question the beginning about our needing the data coming out is will they continue to show the same caution. The later this month. problem is can they continue to stack up capacity— It may be that Iran has now stopped converting its new cascades, adding numbers of centrifuges and 20% stockpile to fuel and is simply accumulating this potentially adding more advanced centrifuges—and up and up and up—15 kg a month or so, depending refrain from using any of that capacity without on how it has changed things. If that is the case, and appearing weak. There may also be bottlenecks in the we don’t know if it is the case, it would hit that Israeli process of conversion from the stockpile to fuel, red line in about April, May or so, depending on its which occurred at the end of last year. rate of production. If, on the other hand, Iran has If I had to guess, I would say that Iran would not quite continued to convert its stockpile to fuel, that would want to test Israeli resolve, unlikely as I think Israel slow it down. And it could keep doing that—thereby would be to strike unilaterally; I think Iran would staying below Israel’s red line—indefinitely. So that is know what an incredible risk it would take. The one side of it. problem is that that is only one line. There are all However, there is another red line, which Mark manner of other actions Iran could take, which may mentioned at the end and which is not to do with appear innocuous to Iran, but may appear much more stockpiles—it is not to do with how much stuff it dangerous to other parties, such as hindering weapons has—but to do with capacity and how much stuff it inspectors or suddenly increasing capacity. I cannot cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 16 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi think of many other areas of ambiguity that may Sir Menzies Campbell: So that each year was better prompt something like this. Can you, Mark? than the previous one. We enter a very dangerous period from the second Shashank Joshi: Right. But I think it is safe to half of next year, just after June, when, even if Iran assume that there is some sort of adaptation to these stays below that line and does not cross the 240 kg of various covert efforts. One exception may be in the 20% enriched uranium that has been identified and missile programme, which does seem to have suffered repeatedly articulated by the Israelis as the magic severe, debilitating setbacks—Mark has written about point, there are all manner of other lines that it could this—partly as a result of covert efforts, from which still inadvertently cross. it does not seem to have recovered.

Q45 Sir Menzies Campbell: If you cannot negotiate, Q48 Mr Ainsworth: How much of the capability that an alternative policy is disruption. As you know, there Iran has—and will need in the immediate future to see are allegations of the assassination of scientists, this programme through to completion, if that is their unexplained explosions and an allegation of the use intention—is indigenous to the country? How much of the Stuxnet virus. I am not going to ask whether help, if any, do they need from the outside, both for you think these are all true, but assuming that they the development of a bomb and for the development have taken place, has the option of disruption by of delivery systems? something of the same kind passed, or is there still Mark Fitzpatrick: It is hard to answer that question. scope for it? I do not have access to classified material. What I do Mark Fitzpatrick: The disruption that has occurred to know is that Iran has been very active in the date has not slowed the programme; it has not set it international black markets, seeking to acquire various back. They produce more enriched uranium every components and materials for both its nuclear and year than they did the previous year. For a period of missile programmes. That does not necessarily mean time, the Stuxnet virus knocked out 1,000 centrifuges, that they cannot do it themselves. If they are not able so that put a hiccup in the programme. They have not to acquire foreign material, they could perhaps rely on obtained the results they wanted, and I think part of less worthy domestic-produced material. They have that is because of some of the disruption programmes. been able to introduce centrifuges in larger numbers By the way, I think the assassinations have stopped. than I thought was possible. At some point, I probably The last one was in January last year; you may said that they could not go beyond 10,000, and they remember that after it, Secretary of State Hillary now have 14,000. They either acquired a larger Clinton very forcefully denounced it and said that the amount of some of the materials that they cannot United States had nothing to do with it. I notice that produce themselves, or they are finding some way to it has not happened since then. I do not doubt that get them. other forms of disruption are being contemplated in It is in the missile programme that Shashank just certain circles; one could think that theoretically it alluded to that they are facing graver difficulties. The could be a way of stalling the programme, but I do most capable missile is the solid-fuelled Sejil-2, which not think it could stop it entirely. they have not tested for two years. We assess that that is probably because they have not been able to Q46 Sir Menzies Campbell: Are those responsible establish a reliable source for the ingredients for the for the programme alive to these possibilities? Do you solid fuel. In that sense, sanctions have probably been know of any evidence to suggest that they are taking effective in slowing down their missile programme. precautions designed to prevent the sort of impact these things have caused in the past? Q49 Mr Ainsworth: Where are those ingredients Shashank Joshi: They have certainly beefed up available? personal security for scientists involved in the Mark Fitzpatrick: With globalisation, they are programme. That is very clear from press accounts. available in many countries. Many of the materials Following the assassination attempts, they have that Iran gets come through China, but they are not responded. necessarily manufactured in China. They can be manufactured in a variety of countries. Q47 Sir Menzies Campbell: Cyber? Mr Ainsworth: Routes via China. Shashank Joshi: The short answer is that I don’t Mark Fitzpatrick: Many of the routes are via China, know. It seems reasonable that they have sought to try but that is not the only route. There are various routes to plug some of the gaps. Stuxnet worked first of all in black marketing. Dubai used to be a favourite port, because it was an incredibly sophisticated piece of but that has tightened up. Istanbul became a favourite code once it was in, but it also had to cross the air port, but Turkey has tightened up, although there is gap to the enrichment facilities. It had to be taken in overland transit. Iran has a very active black market there by a human being, or something had to be acquisition programme. They try every route that plugged in. It could not just have remote access. they can. It is a very difficult to replicate weapon in any case, Shashank Joshi: Can I just add two points to that? but going back to your first question about its First, much of the external help has already occurred effectiveness, it did take out 1,000 centrifuges and over the past 25 years ago, in terms of the acquisition Iran only had 5,000 centrifuges at the time. It only of centrifuge designs and the potential acquisition, if took out about a fifth, and the net effect was virtually you believe American accounts, of a warhead design negligible because they simply ramped up production from the AQ Khan network. at exactly the same time. Mark Fitzpatrick: Actually, the IAEA said so too. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 17

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi

Shashank Joshi: The IAEA said so too—of a Q52 Mike Gapes: So far we have been talking about warhead design? Right, in the November 2011 report. the uranium enrichment process. What about the A lot of that transfer of the know-how in design option of going for a plutonium-based weapon? As I information has already occurred. understand it, there is the Arak facility, which the My other point is that an interesting litmus test of this Iranians have been developing for some years, but so will be whether Iran can follow through on its plans to far it is not in operation. Could you tell us about that, introduce thousands of second-generation centrifuges. and what is the potential for a plutonium route to The current generation is from the 1970s and is much creating a nuclear weapon? slower. For 10 years they have been insisting that they Mark Fitzpatrick: It is very important to remember will introduce new and all-improved centrifuges that the plutonium route. Every country that has pursued can increase the pace of enrichment, and therefore nuclear weapons has pursued both plutonium and breakout capacity, by three or four times. The new highly enrichment uranium, and Iran is no exception. centrifuges require material that we have presumed The heavy water reactor at Arak is supposed to come Iran has not been able to get access to, such as certain online next year—Iran says the beginning of next types of steel and certain types of carbon fibre and year, but it is probably more likely to be at the end of other small components that you need to get in bulk. the year. When it is online, Iran will be able to The assumption from analysts has been that although produce a weapon’s worth of weapons-grade Iran acquired much of the stuff it needed for its plutonium every year. That will be another red line, existing thousands of centrifuges perhaps 10 years ago among these various red lines that we have posited, when sanctions were a bit looser and weaker, it could that could trigger a sense of crisis and military action not do so now. It will be interesting to see whether if it is not somehow stalled or very heavily inspected Iran surprises us and follows through on the to prevent Iran from pursuing that path. announcement to the IAEA that they will put in place Shashank Joshi: The thing is, once it goes these new centrifuges. I am pretty sceptical on that. operational it would be extraordinarily destructive to That question is very significant in terms of answering bomb it. It would be a very, very bad thing. the other question of how, if the programme was I want to quickly mention that in order to produce destroyed now, it could be reconstituted. Virtually all plutonium from the heavy water reactor at Arak, it of the know-all, expertise and engineering skills are would need a reprocessing facility of some sort. There there within Iran. There would be question marks over are various forms that that could take, but that is just a lot of types of materials, although as Mark pointed worth stating as well. out, activity on the black market is so intensive that you could not rule out the programme being Q53 Mike Gapes: So why does Iran need a reconstituted somehow anyway. plutonium plant? Mark Fitzpatrick: Well, it is for the production of Q50 Mr Ainsworth: What you are effectively saying isotopes, and that is a legitimate purpose. One might is that if there was an effective military strike against question why they need a 40 MW thermal reactor for the capability that did considerable destruction to it, it producing isotopes, because you could do it with a could be replaced. much smaller reactor. The size of the reactor happens Shashank Joshi: It could be replaced. There would to be rather similar to reactors that some other states be big question marks over obtaining certain that have newly produced nuclear weapons have used materials, but I think that over time, it could be for their programmes—I am talking about Israel, India replaced—not on the same scale, but with sufficient and North Korea. One can question that about Arak, secrecy. and I think that is why the UN Security Council, in its repeated resolutions, has mandated that the Q51 Mr Ainsworth: How long? construction be suspended. Shashank Joshi: I couldn’t offer a time. I’d have to Shashank Joshi: There is one other thing to say on come back to you on that after thinking it through. that. One of the most interesting suggestions that I Mark Fitzpatrick: I think it’s fair to assume that Iran have heard about potential deals or compromises, or has already put in place redundancy capabilities, and engaging with Iran, is that the heavy water reactor that they probably have facilities they have not should be converted to use not natural uranium but announced. Their policy is not to announce facilities, low-enriched uranium. That would reduce by two and it would make logical sense for them if there was thirds or so the amount of plutonium it could annually a military attack to have those. produce, because of the way it operates. That could Shashank Joshi: The risk of that, of course, is that then also serve as a useful pretext or basis for trying every one of their past undeclared facilities has been to place some limits on Iran’s uranium enriched to revealed, so if they did have plans for such secret below 5%, which has obviously been escalating for redundant facilities, you would question whether at many years. It could be an interesting avenue to this time, given that the risk of bombing was so high pursue. last year, they would not have wrapped those up and Again, the plutonium route has not been a priority or completely eliminated them. You cannot rule it out, top of the agenda in talks, because there are many and if we are talking about redundancy, I think there more pressing areas, but it does highlight the point may be other types of redundancy—stockpiling that we will have to come back to this. It is not materials and suchlike. something that can be shoved aside. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 18 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi

Q54 Mike Gapes: Are you saying that once the Arak I am talking about a very substantial body of evidence facility becomes operational, it could be a way to on possible military dimensions. I do not agree with getting a negotiated solution? the way you characterised it earlier on. It has to be Shashank Joshi: Not once it becomes operational. confident that, in the process of doing so, its The whole thing would have to be converted to run revelations would not then be used as a pretext for on a different type of fuel. That is a big step. I do not further punishment. know whether that is even something that is on the We are very much with Trita’s point that it has to be agenda. It is vaguely feasible, but it is an option to able to see a way out; to see the end of the tunnel. In consider perhaps much later down the line. the process of negotiating, it would help if it could be made much clearer that if it comes clean, if it is giving Q55 Mr Baron: May we look briefly at the secretive information—inevitably new bits of illicit activity will nature of the Iranian regime? There is a view among come to light—there will be an undertaking that it will western intelligence services that it has not reached not be used to entrench sanctions. It will instead not the decision about weaponisation yet; that seems to be necessarily be rewarded, but met with recognition that confirmed. We hear a lot about the additional it is fulfilling what we have asked of it, and we will protocols, but it did not ratify them, so it had every not use that to punish it further. right to withdraw from them. But there is a constant Does that make sense? retort from the Iranians that what is lacking in the Mark Fitzpatrick: I would agree with that point. As western approach is the idea of reciprocity—that there part of a negotiation, that would be a card to play. is not any give and that if they give something, it is deemed to be a sign of weakness. There does not seem Q56 Mr Baron: Do you think that there has been to be anything certain on the other side. That is fault on both sides, in many respects? One of the key something our two previous guests referred to. What points, if not the key point, is 20% enrichment, but importance do you attach to reciprocity in the we tend to put it at the end point of a deal. Would negotiations? focusing on that from the start perhaps be a better Mark Fitzpatrick: It is a matter of common sense that way? a negotiation has to have a sense of reciprocity; it Shashank Joshi: We have. We have put it at the cannot be all give on one side. The western partners beginning. Throughout last year, we recognised that. in this—we cannot call them talks because they are Although the IAEA was simultaneously pursuing a not happening. When I have spoken with officials in discussion with Iran on its so-called “structured London and Washington, they clearly recognise that approach” to try to resolve its own grievances and any deal has to be something that Iran’s negotiators issues, the P5+1 did focus on the so-called “stop, shut can sell back home. Clearly, there has to be and ship.” Stop 20% enrichment, ship out your reciprocity. The question would be what to offer for existing stockpiles and so on. what. As the last panel said, what has been asked on both sides is a lot for a little. The issue that you raised Q57 Mr Baron: Can I therefore press you on what at the beginning of your question is a matter of then is going to be the trigger point to break the secrecy and what Iran’s responsibilities are. Iran has diplomatic deadlock? I think Trita said earlier that part sought to use what I believe to be its responsibility to of the problem from the Iranian point of view is that address IAEA questions of transparency as leverage you are not sure that concessions are going to bring for diplomatic gains from the P5+1. Having signed any rewards. In the past, they have often been seen as the NPT, it is obliged to accept safeguards and to a sign of weakness, and the west is understandably address the question that the IAEA has posed about suspicious. What is going to break this deadlock? the past weaponisation activities to get to the bottom Mark Fitzpatrick: I think what would get negotiations of it. It is not obvious why it should be given a reward under way is if both parties came to the table in a for complying with its responsibilities. transactional mode; if they came ready to negotiate Shashank Joshi: I have some sympathy for that view and give for something. I think that the P5+1 would and for the view that reciprocity should be central and be ready to do that. They have not flagged in advance has not been. Iran also tabled some fairly absurd the kind of sanctions relief that Iran would be looking suggestions last year; that should be noted. I have for, because they want to hold that as negotiating said, and I continue to believe, that we should go into leverage, but I am quite sure that, if negotiations got talks next month in Kazakhstan as a negotiating block under way, there are several points on which the P5+1, with a view to providing some meaningful sanctions after consultation among themselves, would be ready relief in exchange for meaningful caps on the uranium to give and take. programme. That is a form of reciprocity that does I have not seen any readiness on Iran’s part to engage matter. The P5+1 has spoken of reciprocity; we have in this kind of transactional give and take. They have agreed on that as a principle. It is not something that played a pretty good PR game, saying that they are we feel should be unilateral. Again, we should offer ready to do this, that and the other thing, but in the better, upgraded concessions next month, and we talks last summer they were only ready to do one should therefore test Iran’s sincerity. thing: suspend 20%, for which they wanted Mark spoke about Iran using the issue of coming clean everything—all sanctions removed and a recognition to the IAEA as leverage. It has done that, but one of the right to enrichment. That is not being in a thing Iran may be afraid of is that process of transactional mode. I spoke with one official who transparency, of re-implementing and ratifying the AP, compared Iran with the case of North Korea. As hard and providing documents and personnel information. as the North Koreans are to negotiate with, they do cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 19

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi engage in transactional discussions—“We don’t want psychological position. There is a view that the fall of that, but how about this?” That has to begin. Assad will undermine Iran’s ability to project power to the Levant. It would remove their only formal ally Q58 Mr Baron: Any further comment, Shashank? and make them feel more isolated, but I am afraid that Shashank Joshi: No. actually it might cause them to put even more emphasis on the nuclear programme as one of the Q59 Mr Baron: Okay. Finally then, are we, and remaining ways in which they can show power. perhaps more importantly the Iranians, clear as to Shashank Joshi: A former Mossad chief wrote an what our red lines are? If you talk to the Israelis, in editorial in The New York Times last year saying that the past it has been enrichment, but they seem to be one of the reasons we should assist in toppling Assad moving now, perhaps spurred on by an election. If you is that it would lay Iran very low, leave them licking talk to the Americans, it has been weaponisation. Are their wounds and, therefore, conceding on the nuclear you clear what our red lines are, and more issue, which I think is completely untenable. A importantly, are the Iranians? weakened Iran shorn of its only formal ally and one Mark Fitzpatrick: That is the tricky thing. Nobody of its key routes to supplying Hezbollah is an Iran that knows exactly what Israel’s red lines are—I don’t may place greater value on a nuclear weapons option think the Israelis know. and be more risk acceptant in how it handles that Mr Baron: I don’t think we know what ours are. issue. Mark Fitzpatrick: Ours? I think it was pretty clear last year when President Obama and Defence Secretary Q62 Sir John Stanley: As you know, the prime Panetta said that it was weaponisation. However, in responsibility of this Committee is to scrutinise the the third presidential debate, President Obama spoke British Foreign Office. May I ask you both, if you about Iran’s programme getting to the point where you were the British Foreign Secretary and you were wouldn’t be able to tell whether they could be stopped seeking to fulfil the Government’s remit to do all we or caught in time. That is another one of the red lines can to try to prevent Iran securing a nuclear weapon that Shashank has talked about, and that is an capability, what would be your top priority? unclear one. Mark Fitzpatrick: I find no fault with the conduct of Shashank Joshi: The fact is, it has sometimes been Great Britain’s policy toward Iran. I think the priority US policy to avoid being too explicit about red lines has been working in the P5+1, starting with French for fear that Iran would creep right up to them. You and American allies, to find a position to try to bring can understand that logic—avoid setting out a line Iran into a transactional mode. Maybe there could be only to find that your adversary has taken up all the some greater way of flagging to Iran the prospect that, space short of it—but it is problematic, particularly as if they give something, they would get something of we go forward over the course of the next year. There value. I hesitate to say up front what that something are lots of issues. One significant quantity of uranium might be because it should be negotiated. To make enriched to 20% is a red line, but it is not the red line. it clear, negotiations are the policy of the respective We absolutely don’t know what we would do if, for Governments, and they are willing to talk, but Iran has example, Iran decided on some absurd pretext to to uphold its obligations. I do not think Iran should be enrich to 60%, which would have absolutely no getting something for nothing. peaceful purpose. Would we engage in military action Shashank Joshi: The difficulty is that we do not want straight away? Would we tighten sanctions? There is to do anything that might disrupt the unity of the P5+1 no public sense of this. and allow wedges to be driven between different states. Having said that, I would note two points. First, Q60 Mr Baron: Do you think that the lack of clarity to repeat a point I made earlier, I think it is very on red lines is impeding negotiations? important that we offer meaningful sanctions relief in Shashank Joshi: I don’t think it is impeding exchange for concrete, verifiable and significant caps negotiations. I think it is creating considerable risks. and restrictions on the Iranian programme, which We may find ourselves pushed to take much more should have been done more prominently last year. Of robust action than we would like simply because we course, we negotiated as a bloc, so we cannot place find Iran is undertaking a provocative step and we do responsibility just on the Foreign Office. not have a policy to deal with it. Of course, the most Secondly, as a significant ally of the United States provocative step of all at this stage would be the within the P5+1, we should be doing all we can to expulsion of inspectors or the hindering of their work. encourage the new Administration and its new That would be a very significant step against our national security team to take as many risks as they visibility into the programme and, therefore, our can—I think they have done so courageously—in reassurance. Do we have a policy? Maybe in private pursuing direct US-Iran talks as a supplement to the we have a policy. Maybe the Government of this P5+1 process and as a way of reinforcing that track. country and P5+1 member states have policies, but We should also use our leverage with Gulf allies to there is certainly very little public articulation. So if ensure they also support that process and do not feel we do not know, how does Iran know? as though they are being pushed aside by any future US-Iran talks. We must push very hard for that within Q61 Chair: Could the fall of President Assad affect the context of our alliance. the Iranian negotiating position? Mark Fitzpatrick: I don’t know that it affects their Q63 Sir John Stanley: You say we should be negotiating position. I think it greatly affects their offering meaningful sanctions relief. What in your cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 20 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi view are the sanctions that are biting most tightly on dissuaded it from proceeding any further. If that Iran and therefore the ones that they would find most pressure had not occurred before and after 2003, I meaningful if there was the prospect of having them don’t know where we would be but I don’t think the relieved? Iranian programme would necessarily be as halted— Shashank Joshi: The ones that are biting the most as paused—as it is now. So that has been very rational. are not necessarily the ones that can be offered as It has also been extremely useful to have the visibility inducements the most easily. The unilateral US we have had. Leon Panetta said that we think we will sanctions are imposed by the US Congress and the know when an order is given from the Supreme President cannot just have them removed. It is not an Leader for a nuclear weapon to be built. As Mr Baron option, at least until a later stage. Of course they also said, intelligence agencies think that order has not yet must be on the table for later concessions and for later been given. But it is very important that they think concrete Iranian acts of transparency, for example. For they can work out if and when it is given. Again, that now, we would be looking more closely at European is the result of accumulated intelligence work. So that sanctions, things like the push to sever Iran from the is not only rational but absolutely imperative to the SWIFT network of financial transactions. That is not way we have managed the crisis. There are clearly the one that bites the hardest by any means but it is diminishing returns. Even Stuxnet itself was fairly most easily manipulable at this stage. So when I say limited in its effects. Some aspects of covert meaningful I mean more meaningful than the operations—though not necessarily by us or the inducements we offered last time which were the west—in terms of assassinations have been both provision of certain aircraft parts, which had been unethical and counter-productive in sending a under sanction, and certain forms of civil nuclear co- message to Iran as to the nature of the compromise operation, which had also been under sanction, but we are willing to brook, and how we see their civilian which were very marginal carrots. nuclear assets. Otherwise, it has broadly been rational, yes. Q64 Rory Stewart: The policy of our Governments for the last 15 years has relied to a great extent on Q65 Rory Stewart: What has Iran been up to and the idea that the intelligence services can delay the how would you simplify the Iranian position/strategy acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran until such time over the last 10 or 11 years? It looks from the as the regime changes. So there have been continual perspective of the west naïvely that we have spent boasts from intelligence agencies in the United States over a decade talking about possibly intervening in and Europe that they keep buying another four or five Iran, threatening to bomb it and setting down these years through their brilliant disruption operations, red lines. Meanwhile Iran has somehow been which achieves a situation where the likelihood of the manoeuvring its way to ending up with 6,000kg of Iranian regime falling over that time increases. Has partially enriched uranium. How has this happened? this been a rational policy? Has this been a good way What has been going on in the Iranian head? Did they of proceeding for 15 years? plan to do this from 2003, has this been a strategy or Mark Fitzpatrick: I think it is accurate that if you have they blundered into it by mistake? look at the times when Iran was seeking to acquire Mark Fitzpatrick: It has been clear for many years plutonium reprocessing capabilities, enrichment that Iran has sought a capability to produce nuclear capabilities, western Governments have impeded the weapons if it makes a decision to do so. It has not programme not just through intelligence operations been pursuing it with the speed that Pakistan pursued but through diplomacy, dissuading countries like it. As the last panel said, Pakistan took 11 years to get Argentina and China from supplying these from theft of enrichment technology to a cold test. technologies. That is why over the years when CIA Iran has been at it for, I think, 27 years. But it has chiefs have said that Iran would be able to get a been moving towards that goal, with some deviations capability in three to five years, it never came. It kept along the way, but with its eye firmly on the goal. rolling. Well, it is because they were successful in That is the fundamental problem that we face. They pushing it back. Now they are at the point where it want to have the nuclear weapons capability; the is pretty close and impeding the programme through western nations don’t want them to have that Stuxnet and other means of sabotage has not worked. capability; is there some line in between that would I don’t think any one tool in the toolbox is the be acceptable to both? That is the tricky diplomatic solution. There has to be a diplomatic solution. question. Sanctions are part of it. These other forms can be part of it. I would not rely on intelligence alone, no. Q66 Rory Stewart: Can I finally take you both up Shashank Joshi: It has certainly been rational in that on that tricky diplomatic question and put you on the if you go back to 2003 and you look at Iran’s decision spot about what that deal might look like? As Mr. to halt its programme—however we define “halt”: Joshi has said a number of times, there seem to be pause rather than eliminate—the national intelligence these potentially incompatible positions. The estimate of 2007 specifies that one of the reasons Iran objections of the Iranian Government and the did so was under severe international pressure. That concerns of the international community are not pressure partly came about through the revelation of reconcilable. What is the deal? What might it look secret sites in 2002. Pressure was added by the like? revelation of the Fordo facility in 2009. Both of those Mark Fitzpatrick: There are three variables. One is were the result of western intelligence operations the amount of capability: how many centrifuges and which kept the pressure on Iran and therefore how fast they can spin—technically, how many SWUs cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 21

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi do they have? This can tell you how fast they can now? What are they doing? Are we sure they are produce enriched uranium for weapons. That has to involved purely in peaceful purposes? be limited to the point where they could not make a If we have those three things, there is always a risk breakout for some months or maybe years. Where that Iran could then expel inspectors, ramp up exactly that is, experts would differ. Most experts production at Fordo again and call up those scientists would say that some enrichment capability has to be and use some of that pre-existing know-how. That part of the solution, otherwise Iran cannot sell it. Then cannot be eliminated, but we at least have various there has to be a level of intrusive verification to overlapping bulwarks against that. That is really the provide the confidence that they cannot do something best we can do. Iran is not going to accept a zero in secret. That has to be the application of the enrichment solution and it is not going to accept a additional protocol, plus some additional measures. solution that is utterly humiliating. It would rather, I Then there is sanctions relief, because there has to be think, ultimately be bombed than accept such an a level of sanctions relief so that Iran could again outcome. declare victory. You could play around with those That is my assessment; I could be completely wrong. three variables and try to find something. I do not The issue is not selling this to the public, who know if you could find something that would meet probably do not care in the slightest about some of both sides’ bottom lines, because we do not know these nuances in any of the P5+1 countries or Israel, exactly what Iran’s bottom line is. I’d have to stop but actually persuading bureaucracies, intelligence right there. Look at those three variables and find agencies and others who have been looking at this something where you give on each of them. programme for 10 years.

Q67 Rory Stewart: Consider what Dr Joshi just said, Q68 Chair: Do you think any progress can be made particularly on the issue of how such a deal would in the United Nations? Is there any more pressure that meet the west’s objectives. How reassuring would it can come on from the UN, or do you think that the EU be for British, American or Israeli voters to be oil sanctions and the financial sanctions are enough? presented with a deal which basically says: “We are Mark Fitzpatrick: The UN sanctions have provided a very important baseline and a basis for states to add going to check and we will freeze them in a situation on their own sanctions, and that is what has been the where it might take them six months to make a most effective. I highly doubt that Russia and China bomb”? would agree to additional UN sanctions, so the Shashank Joshi: That is probably the best we can get sanctions that are left are probably going to be— and it is something which we would and should take. United States Congress can come up with any number The point is, there are overlapping guarantees. You of new sanctions and the EU could adopt the same. have limited capability, so even if you assume Chair: As far as I can see the Russians have already complete bad faith, they are still constrained in what broken their own UN sanctions in their shipment of they can do. You need fissile material for a bomb, missiles. unless you assume there are secret sites—if you assume secret sites, it is very complicated, so put that Q69 Mike Gapes: Can I take you to the Israeli aside for a second. So even if you assume that we do perception of what is happening, and the possibility not know the possible military dimensions that they that Israel might get very frustrated by what it have conducted in the past, if you cannot produce perceives as a lack of effectiveness or action and uranium to 20% or you have capped it and undertaken consider the military option? Under what not to do so and you will be spotted if you do, then circumstances might Israel take unilateral action clearly you can assume all the bad faith you like, but against Iran? they are still capped. Mark Fitzpatrick: I think if Iran were seen to be either You then reinforce that by saying that because you crossing red lines, such as preventing inspectors from signed the additional protocol we have a much higher making their inspections, introducing many more standard of inspection, so we can catch you doing any centrifuges that can operate four times as efficiently, secret things. We have a better chance of catching you and if Israel believes that other states would not take doing secret things because we can inspect other sorts action to stop it, then I think Israel has said that they of facilities, we can inspect on shorter notice. Even if would take unilateral action. your capacity goes up and you add centrifuges in violation of an agreement, we can inspect you Q70 Mike Gapes: But would that be unilateral action frequently enough to make sure you have not slipped regardless of US attitude? Or would it be effectively something between those sessions. So you add the sanctioned unilateral action? inspection side. Mark Fitzpatrick: It is very hard to provide a clear Finally, it does come back to the possible military answer to that. I have heard Israelis offer themselves dimensions, the PMDs and the long list of the various very different answers to the question. I believe that, paragraphs the IAEA had in its November 2011 report ultimately, the Prime Minister of Israel will believe that it considers credible. We have to get a better sense and will say that Israel is a sovereign nation, and if of what Iran has done in the past, and that has to be they perceive that their national security is imperilled, part of a deal because then we know whether those they do not need the permission of anyone else. They entities, institutions or people involved in what the would seek forgiveness rather than permission. IAEA says was a functioning, structured nuclear Shashank Joshi: If there is a situation in which the weapons programme prior to 2003—where are they US is offering sanction for Israeli action, there is cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Ev 22 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi almost no reason why it would not do it itself. If it possibly could to avoid having Iran reconstitute its deemed that a red line was sufficiently significant that programme underground. It would be focusing on it should not be crossed, and that it is too high a risk, keeping the IAEA inspectors within Iran, within even it has every incentive to participate in military those attacked facilities, and ensuring that they do not operations itself so as to avoid inflicting a temporary get expelled. To do that, it would have to disassociate wound on Iran from which it could quickly recover to itself, to some extent, from any attack. rebuild its programme, as it surely would. If it thought that the red line was not sufficiently significant, and Q74 Mike Gapes: A final hypothetical question: if military action would therefore prompt the expulsion we do not succeed, if there were no military attack of inspectors, pushing a programme underground and and the sanctions regime does not succeed and Iran all manner of terrible consequences, it would have at some point decides to weaponise its capability, is every incentive very strongly to withhold that containment likely to be the only option? Could sanction. containment succeed? Could we, in effect, be in a position like that which exists now with North Korea, Q71 Mike Gapes: There has been in the recent India or Pakistan? American presidential campaign a perception that Mr Mark Fitzpatrick: You have heard President Obama Netanyahu was trying basically to interfere in the say that containment is not the policy. I think he really campaign, and that obviously did not work very well means that and, if Iran did weaponise, that the United for him, because he did not get the outcome he States and others would take military action. Let us wanted. Is there now going to be a concern from the consider the hypothetical question that the United new American Administration—the new people who States did not take action, that Iran acquired a nuclear are put in place—that the Israeli Government will try weapon, and whether it could be contained from using to bounce them into taking positions they do not want it. Several other countries have been contained from to take over the coming months? using it, but there are other aspects of Iran having a Mark Fitzpatrick: I think Israel had been trying to nuclear weapon that are hard to contain: the persuade President Obama to take positions and to set possibility that the weapon gets into the hands of a red lines that were based on dates rather than group that would be willing to use it for terrorist capabilities, and I think Israel will continue to espouse purposes, not because Iran, as a nation, decided to do that position. Having resisted it already, however, I do that, but because some individual in the Iran not know that the new American team will feel that Revolutionary Guards corps or an Iranian equivalent they are under some new pressure. of Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan took it upon himself to share it with another, or that a weapon was used by Q72 Mike Gapes: I do not like asking hypothetical mistake, as happened several times in NATO/US questions, but I am going to. If there were to be an versus Soviet Union. There are many consequences of Israeli military strike on Iran that the US Iran having a nuclear weapon that the United States, Administration was not happy about, and that strike, Great Britain and other countries are determined to given what we know about Israel’s capabilities and prevent. the dispersal of the Iranian facilities, was unsuccessful Shashank Joshi: When non-proliferation policy has in the sense of only setting back the programme for a failed, there are various ways that we have dealt with short period and allowing the main enrichment it. In the Indian case, after a long period of pushing facilities to continue to exist, what would be the result back, we rehabilitated India into the nuclear order, to of that? some extent. We have accepted its special status Mark Fitzpatrick: Obviously, US-Israeli relations outside the NPT and given it a waiver in the Nuclear would suffer, but I do not know how to quantify that. Suppliers Group. Mike Gapes: Not just US-Israeli relations— In Pakistan’s case, we haven’t done that, nor do we Shashank Joshi: There is a precedent for that. When any longer vigorously push for what used to be “cap Israel attacked the Osirak reactor in Iraq, I think the in, roll back”1—push the programme back. The US United States participated in Security Council policy has pretty much given up on that. It is focused condemnation of Israel’s actions. I cannot quite on other things. There is the North Korean case where remember whether that is accurate, but I think it did. we have actively sought to limit the programme in Of course, that action also, in some respects, resulted various ways. That would probably be the closest to a in an accelerated Iraqi programme. It did not lessen situation that you would see with a nuclear Iran. But US concern about Iraqi proliferation activity anyway, it is also worth bearing in mind that the military but the US was not happy about it and made that imbalance between Iran and its adversaries, including displeasure known. the United States and other partners in the region, is so great that a containment regime against Iran would Q73 Mike Gapes: But of course the Iraqi facility was look a little bit different to that against North Korea. a one-off facility. It was not buried under mountains or dispersed to try to counter military attacks. From Q75 Mike Gapes: But, if I am sitting in Tehran and an Israeli perspective, that could have been deemed to see that military imbalance, see, as a Shi’a Persian, have been successful, because it certainly put Iraq out the Arab regimes around me that are allied to the of the nuclear weapons field for some time. United States and see Pakistan’s bomb and India’s Shashank Joshi: Not much, but I think in that bomb, is there an argument for me to then go nuclear? situation the US priority would be less about shouting at Israel and much, much more about doing all it 1 Note by witness: This should be: “Cap, roll back, eliminate” cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:10] Job: 030521 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030521/030521_o001_Iran 1 corrected 05.02.13_Corrected.xml

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 23

5 February 2013 Mark Fitzpatrick and Shashank Joshi

Shashank Joshi: But you have also seen the not got to the point when it is uniquely and transformation of one of your key Arab adversaries imminently threatened in a way that would warrant into something of a semi-ally next door in Iraq. You that perception. have also seen the Taliban, a key Sunni adversary for many years and the group that has killed your Q76 Mike Gapes: So getting the nuclear weapon is diplomats, fall—probably not to come back. You have not necessarily an advantage for the Iranian regime. also seen in many ways the destabilisation and Shashank Joshi: No, not at all. weakening of the Sunni Arab bloc in which Egypt Chair: That is a very good note to end on. I thank paid a key part. You have the Muslim Brotherhood you both very much indeed. It is much appreciated Government who in some small respects have made that you have taken your time. You have dovetailed overtures to the Iranian Government. I am wary of very well with the earlier session. arguments that Iran has either won or lost the last 15 years. It is a very mixed picture, but it certainly has cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [SE] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:14] Job: 030521 Unit: PG02

Ev 24 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

Written evidence

Written evidence from Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme International Institute for Strategic Studies To start with, it is important to note that Iran almost surely does not possess nuclear weapons, that there is no evidence Iran has made a decision to produce nuclear weapons and that Iran has a religious prohibition against nuclear weapons. Because the fatwa is oral, however, and has been expressed in different ways, it is difficult to pin down exactly what is haram. This may explain why some Iranian activities in the nuclear field have been incompatible with a prohibition on, say, “developing” - in contrast to possessing - nuclear weapons. In addition, fatwas can be overturned if circumstances change: for example if the nation were seen to be facing a mortal threat. It seems clear that Iran aims to possess the capability to quickly produce nuclear weapons should it make the fateful decision to do so. The capability has grown slowly. Some 27 years have passed since Iran embarked on an enrichment programme after it suffered chemical weapon attacks from Iraq. One should contrast this with the 11 years it took Pakistan from the time A.Q. Khan stole enrichment technology from the Netherlands to the first cold test of a nuclear device. Yet Iran’s capability is reaching the point where a nuclear weapon may be within a few months’ reach. Producing a weapon that could be delivered by a ballistic missile would take at least two years. It is possible, however, to deliver a crude nuclear weapons in other ways, eg via truck, ship or donkey cart, particularly if acquired by terrorists. It would make no sense for Iran purposely to transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group, but the possibility cannot be overlooked, just as Khan for personal profit sold Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technology and designs. This is among the reasons why the UK and its allies want to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability. Other reasons include concern over a potential nuclear proliferation cascade, the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used by accident or miscalculation, and apprehension that possession would exacerbate regime misbehaviour at home and abroad.

Status of the nuclear programme According to the latest quarterly report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran in November 2012 had a stockpile of about 6,000kg of up to 5% low enriched uranium (LEU), which may be sufficient for five weapons if further enriched to 90%. Iran also produced 230kg of 20% enriched product, which is very close to the 240kg that may be sufficient for a weapon if further enriched. Last summer, Iran converted about 100kg of the 20% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to an oxide form for use in fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). This conversion gave Israel a justification for extending its deadline for military action because the enriched uranium in oxide form cannot immediately be further enriched. It would take two or more months to reconvert it back to gasified form. Further oxide conversion of 20% enriched product is one way Iran could seek to lower the immediacy of the threat felt by Iran’s adversaries. Iran did not continue the oxide conversion in the fall, apparently because of a bottleneck in the production process. It will be interesting to see if the next IAEA report in mid-February says that oxide conversion has continued. Oxide conversion buttresses Iran’s claim that 20% enrichment is necessary for fuel rod production. The TRR, which produces radioisotopes for cancer treatment, was last fuelled in 1993 with 20% enriched uranium from Argentina. Three years ago the reactor was said to be running low on fuel. Iran’s current stockpile of 20% enriched uranium is sufficient for ten years’ worth of fuel, although there is some doubt whether the indigenously produced fuel meets safely standards. Iran thus has ample justification for stopping the 20% production. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has repeatedly said this production could stop if Iran is provided TRR replacement fuel. He is not in charge of the nuclear file, however, and probably makes such statements only to imply that he is not responsible for the economic trouble that hard-line nuclear policies have invited. Ahmadinejad must know that a security hedge is the real purpose of the 20% production.

Nuclear activity of a possible military dimension A nuclear capability should be seen as a continuum rather than a binary point. Iran already has a nuclear capability, in that it has fissile material sufficient for several weapons if further enriched and the facilities and material to carry out higher enrichment. Iran also has apparently studied all of the technologies necessary to weaponise fissile material. The IAEA’s November 2011 report detailed in 48 paragraphs the information it had obtained, from ten member states plus the agency’s own investigations, about weapons development work. This included, for example, development of exploding bridgewire detonators and experiments with multi-point initiation systems to detonate a hemispherical shell of high explosives, work that was assisted by a former Soviet weapons scientist. Most of that work apparently was suspended in late 2003, but four paragraphs of the November 2011 report refer to activities that allegedly continued afterwards. The IAEA has been trying for several years to get to the bottom of what it calls these “strong indicators of possible weapon development”. In addition to asking Iran for explanations, it has sought to interview scientists such as Mohsen Fakhrizadeh who allegedly have been involved in the suspect nuclear activities. The Agency also has asked to visit certain buildings at the Parchin military complex, where high-explosives tests of a nuclear nature reportedly took place before 2004. Indications that Iran has been sanitising the site to remove cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:14] Job: 030521 Unit: PG02

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any uranium residue add to the urgency of the IAEA’s request. Over the past year Iran has several times indicated that it was ready to take steps to address the IAEA’s questions, but Iran repeatedly put off agreement pending developments in a separate diplomatic forum. Iran wants to use the IAEA request for transparency about past activities as leverage in talks with the E3+3 (France, Germany and UK plus China, Russia and US) about on-going nuclear development.

Stalled diplomacy Talks with Iran to date cannot be called negotiations. Iran’s current stance, pretending that choice of venue is the key to resuming talks, is pre-negotiation posturing, aimed at securing concessions in advance. But even in the three formal rounds that took place last spring and early summer, in Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow, there was no real negotiation. Each side simply presented its opening position and repeated it. The E3+3 asked for a set of steps that would lengthen the time it would take Iran to make a dash for nuclear weapons. Under what was nicknamed the “stop, ship and shut” package, Iran was asked to stop producing 20% enriched uranium, to ship out the accumulated stockpile and to shut down operations at Fordow, in exchange for minor sanctions relief, although not in the oil and gas sector of most concern to Iran. The three steps asked of Iran would not resolve the crisis. They are only proposed confidence-building measures, designed to build trust in negotiations and to reduce reasons for Israel or any other country to consider military options. A later stage of negotiation would have to address the remaining issues of the stockpile of up to 5% LEU that has no civilian purpose in the foreseeable future and the research reactor in Arak scheduled to come on line in 2014 that will be able to produce a bomb’s worth of weapons-grade plutonium annually. By offering only to talk about suspending 20% enrichment, for which it seeks a lifting of all sanctions and acknowledgment of its “right” to enrichment, Iran has persuaded some observers that a solution simply awaits Western political flexibility. Some observers even advocate that such concessions should be floated up front, to signal to Iran that talks will turn out in its favour. It is true, of course, that any plausible solution will have to involve a continuation of some level of enrichment on Iranian soil. Otherwise Iran’s leaders would not be able to sell the deal domestically as a victory, which is a sine qua non for a successful outcome. But any such concession has to be negotiated. Giving in to preconditions simply for talks to begin is rarely conducive to a mutually favourable outcome. After all, the basis for talks between Iran and the E3+3 is supposed to be a step- by-step reciprocal approach. If Iran shows up for talks in a transactional mode, the E3+3 will have to consider what kind of sanctions relief would be appropriate for what Iran has to offer. To date, however, they have not had to consider seriously what sanctions relief to table. Having applied various forms of sanctions over the past two years, the US and the EU have many bargaining chips at their disposal. Although many of the US sanctions are matters of law that are unlikely to be lifted by the current Congress, other sanctions were imposed by Presidential authority and could be up for negotiation. Similarly, EU measures, such as the ban on Iranian banks using SWIFT financial communications, could be considered for selective lifting, if the 27 EU members agree. If diplomacy fails, Iran will be blamed for refusing to engage. The last talks between Iran and the E3+3 took place a half year ago, when ‘experts’ met in Istanbul in early August. During the autumn, common wisdom held that talks were pointless until after the US presidential election. It is now clear, however, that, whether before or after the US election, Iran simply has not been ready to talk. A message from the White House to Tehran after the election was not returned. Since mid-December, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton has made repeated offers of dates for talks, to no avail. Continued Iranian prevarication will stimulate more consideration in EU capitals and Washington of additional sanctions measures.

Sanctions In one respect, sanctions to date have been more successful than almost anyone anticipated. They cut Iran’s oil revenues by half, without spiking oil prices. Sanctions also succeeded in slowing some aspects of Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. It appears, for example, that Iran cannot find reliable ingredients for the solid fuel for its Sajjill-2 missile, the most potent weapon in its ballistic missile arsenal. This is probably why the Sajjill-2 has not been tested for two years. Sanctions also have contributed to Iran’s inability to replace the first generation model gas centrifuges, which are the mainstay of its enrichment programme, with newer models that are 4–5 times more efficient. But neither sanctions nor sabotage have prevented Iran from producing enriched uranium at an increasing pace and quantity. Most importantly, sanctions have not brought about a change in Iran’s policies. Nor can one any longer assert without caveat that sanctions have brought Iran to the bargaining table. It must be recognized, however, that the oil sanctions that bite the most have been in place for less than a year. More time is surely in order before a rush to judgment of failure. Let us see, for example, how the latest round of US sanctions plays out. Beginning 6 February, Iran will not be able to repatriate money from foreign oil sales. This measure is designed to deny Iran hard currency; instead oil payments to Iran will have to be kept in the foreign country in question and spent on local products, such as Indian grain and Japanese medicines. This provision may actually be advantageous to the Iranian people if, as intended, it diverts trade to consumer goods, and away from weapons technology. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [25-06-2013 17:14] Job: 030521 Unit: PG02

Ev 26 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

Prospects for Military Action and for Deterrence One argument for sanctions is that they are an alternative to premature military action, which could be tragically counterproductive. Iran would likely respond to a missile strike by putting all the resources of its economy to quickly producing nuclear weapons —and without the meddling oversight of international inspectors, who would surely be expelled. This is not an argument, however, against air strikes in any circumstance. If Iran were to be observed to be crossing the line from latent nuclear capability to weapons production, then military action that nipped this in the bud might be necessary and efficacious. Iranian production of nuclear weapons can be deterred, but only if Iran believes that any decision to cross the line would be detected and would invite military pre-emption. The problem is that Iran may attempt to advance its nuclear programme right up to the line, in the mistaken belief that it is safe as long as it does not, in the colloquial term, “tighten the last screw”. If Iran’s nuclear programme advances so far that break-out cannot be detected in time, the line between capability and production will become faint to the point of invisibility. According to some estimates, Iran’s programme is on a trajectory to reach such a point by this coming summer or next winter. Let us hope that wisdom prevails before then. 30 January 2013

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