Populism, Identity Politics, and the Archaeology of Europe

European Journal of Archaeology 2021, page 1 of 37 This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial reuse or in order to create a derivative work. Forum: Populism, Identity Politics, and the Archaeology of Europe

1 2 3 ̌4 DANIELA HOFMANN ,EMILY HANSCAM ,MARTIN FURHOLT ,MARTIN BACA , 5 6 7 SAMANTHA S. REITER ,ALESSANDRO VANZETTI ,KOSTAS KOTSAKIS , 8 9 10 HÅKAN PETERSSON ,ELISABETH NIKLASSON ,HERDIS HØLLELAND AND 11 CATHERINE J. FRIEMAN 1Department of Archaeology, History, Culture Studies and Religion, University of Bergen, Norway 2Amsterdam Centre for Ancient Studies and Archaeology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 3Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History, University of Oslo, Norway 4Department of Archaeology, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia 5Department of Environmental Archaeology and Materials Science, The National Museum of Denmark, Brede, Denmark 6Department of Ancient World Studies, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy 7Department of Archaeology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece 8Sydsvensk Arkeologi AB, Kristianstad, Sweden 9Department of Archaeology, University of Aberdeen, UK 10Department of Heritage and Society, Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research, Oslo, Norway 11School of Archaeology and Anthropology, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

(a war crime if carried out), or a right-of- INTRODUCTION:ARCHAEOLOGY AND centre UK politician using a prehistoric POPULISM henge monument to argue that Britain’s Daniela Hofmann and Catherine future should lie outside the European J. Frieman Union (Brophy, 2019). These kinds of developments are generally described as The kind of liberal and open-minded ‘populist’, a term that refers to the simpli- society on which most academics rely to fication of complex problems and appeals to freely conduct their research is increasingly broad sectors of the population. Here, we under threat, even within democratic soci- follow Müller (2016:3–4) in arguing that eties of long standing. The past is by no ‘populism’ also implies exclusionary and means neutral in this, whether this be the polarizing identity politics in which differ- then American president threatening to ence and dissent are treated as moral fail- attack the antiquities of Iran in early 2020 ings rather than questions for compromise.

Copyright © European Association of Archaeologists 2021 doi:10.1017/eaa.2021.29 Manuscript received 31 January 2020, accepted 14 June 2021, revised 22 February 2021 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.202.126, on 02 Oct 2021 at 03:44:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eaa.2021.29 2 European Journal of Archaeology 2021

This frequently includes an element of pervasive populist debate that threatens anti-elitism. Such a discourse has often the discursive foundations on which (though not universally) been associated rational argument is possible. How should with the right of the political spectrum, we respond? How can we deal with the and many authors in this contribution thus sometimes uncomfortable limelight that is begin by tracing its roots in nationalism increasingly being trained on our discip- (e.g. Martin Furholt) or directly addressing line? What can be done when the public’s national populism (e.g. Elisabeth Niklasson expectations, or the use of the past by and Herdis Hølleland). However, as Martin various actors, run counter to our own Bacǎ reminds us, this is not the only populist convictions (and/or what can be reasonably strand there is, and we have not imposed an inferred from the available data)? overall definition on our authors. Their argu- There are no easy answers to these mentswillalsobeapplicabletoother questions, but our authors go some way situations. towards demonstrating the variety of the Yet,whilesimplisticelectionpromises problem across different archaeological sound convincing to increasing numbers of fields and in various European regions. people at both ends of the political spec- While this is first and foremost a call for trum, there is also a growing market for greater engagement and debate across the popular histories, including internationally discipline, we would argue that a con- chart-topping works by Yuval Noah Harari certed response to such developments (e.g. Harari, 2015) and others. Books on entails a two-pronged approach that archaeological topics can also reach a wide begins both at a high level of generality audience, with, for example, volumes on and at the level of daily working routines. the Nebra Sky Disc and on archaeogenetics ending up on the German Der Spiegel’s non-fiction bestseller list in 2019 (Meller The banality of evil &Michel,2018; Krause & Trappe, 2019). In addition, social media allow us (and Taking their cue from Hannah Arendt’s other interpreters of the past) to reach ever (1963) famous analysis of the 1962 greater numbers of people. Eichmann trial, several contributors (most The majority of the texts collected here directly Martin Furholt and Emily were first presented at a session of the Hanscam) point out that the basic tools of European Association of Archaeologists’ archaeological classification and interpret- conference in Bern in 2019, which ation already come with methodological attempted to address this dual develop- baggage. Foremost among them is the ment as it has gathered pace over the last culture concept, widely critiqued in a decade. While political engagement in variety of research traditions (e.g. Binford, archaeology is nothing new—and amongst 1962; Clarke, 1968; Wotzka, 2000) but others includes a long history of feminist astonishingly persistent in large swathes of scholarship (e.g. Conkey, 2002), strategies Europe. Using ‘culture’ as a foundational for democratization (e.g. recently Milek, concept is always in danger of succumbing 2018; Nilsson Stutz, 2018), and calls for a to methodological nationalism (Wimmer greater relevance of archaeology in envir- & Glick Schiller, 2003) since the concept onmental and social debates (e.g. Kiddey, assumes the homogeneity and internal 2017; Kohler & Rockman, 2020)—here unity of the entity under study and stresses we are particularly concerned with the very its separation from others. Yet ‘cultures’ current problem of an ever more vocal and are the basic chronological building blocks

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of prehistory in many countries (Roberts & connected by arrows, immediately convey Vander Linden, 2011; Ivanovaitė et al., a raft of unconsidered assumptions, such 2020). Radiocarbon dating, an obvious as the idea that the movement of people alternative, is sometimes explicitly mis- in the past involved large groups moving trusted, and typological systems seen as pro- once from a clearly defined origin to a viding greater chronological precision. In a determined end point (see discussion in self-perpetuating spiral, this means that few Wiedemann, 2017: 145). Such convenient good-quality 14C dates are available to build visual simplifications hide the complexity secure absolute chronologies (the allegedly and diversity of the underlying processes, well-studied Linearbandkeramik is a case in but play to our present perceptions of, for point, as the protracted exchange among example, migration. Technologies for Jakucs et al., 2016; Bánffy et al., 2018; making more dynamic maps exist; but, in Strien, 2017, 2019 illustrates), effectively many cases, it remains difficult to find and forcing researchers to continue using encode location data, or to deal with often ‘culture’ designations, with all attendant coarsely dated sites spread across databases problems intact. in multiple countries using incompatible Recent aDNA studies have been criti- recording systems. Such very basic struc- cized for perpetuating and biologizing this tural problems are serious challenges to unsatisfactory model through the use of Big Data or synthetic approaches, and ‘culture’ names to refer to groups of there are no quick fixes. samples (Frieman & Hofmann, 2019; for Similarly, Panich and Schneider (2019) first steps towards a solution, see detail some of the challenges they encoun- Eisenmann et al., 2018). Again, this hides tered in trying to document Native diversity, both in the past and in the use American post-1492 persistence in parts of modern-day reference populations of California when there is no consistent which, depending on the aim of the ori- way in which this can be recorded in heri- ginal study from which they are derived, tage management databases. The resulting can often lump very large and heteroge- casual erasure of Native American voices neous national groups (e.g. ‘the French’) continues to affect heritage decisions and into a single dot on a graph. This ‘geneti- the presentation of Indigenous history to a cization of notions of citizenship and wider public. Reversing this trend requires belonging’ (Pálsson, 2007: 113), as well as the large-scale modification of databases erroneous ideas of ‘isolated’ indigenous and the re-entry of records, as well as a populations (Pálsson, 2007: 157), is wide- substantial financial commitment to spread, for instance in the creation of using absolute dating methods. In a databases for medical purposes, and is now European setting, and with multiple also being uncritically imported into past nations involved, this kind of project settings, where it compounds our own would not come easy. It is expensive, but methodological weaknesses. not the kind of glamorous research that Even where ‘culture’ names have largely attracts substantial funding. Yet, if we disappeared from use, problems remain, want to finally leave behind conventions for instance in the way archaeological that are deeply rooted in the nationalist entities are often represented on static past of our discipline and create stan- maps with clear boundaries (critiqued e.g. dards and protocols fit for addressing in Anderson-Whymark & Garrow, 2015). new kinds of questions, we must begin Amongst other problems, these clearly with the inherent biases of our everyday bounded coloured blobs, occasionally working tools.

Bright new futures do not want, but much worse at deciding what they want instead. Indeed, when At the opposite end of the scale is the reacting to populism there is more than question of what kinds of ideas or narra- one valid strategy, as the contributors to tives we can offer our varied publics, and this forum show. But all agree that more whether simply telling them, as opposed communication is central. Although to involving stakeholders throughout the archaeologists such as Gordon Childe and research process, is even enough (see Mortimer Wheeler were once part of more debate in Thomas, 2015; and here particu- or less explicitly political but very vibrant larly Samantha Reiter and Kostas public debates about history, civilization, Kotsakis). Contributors to this forum have and culture (see e.g. Moshenska & addressed this from many angles, but Zuanni, 2018; Thornton, 2018), today there are many more to be covered; the relatively few of us direct our work at contributions to this volume represent popular audiences. Of those who do, neither every corner of Europe, nor all many are professional television presenters experiences of European populism. rather than active researchers, or they are First is the pervasive idea, evident across (frequently early career) academics active many contexts, that heritage sites are pri- in science communication on social media marily about presenting the identity and (e.g. the excellent work on Twitter by continuity of a closed group, however Flint Dibble (@FlintDibble), Sarah defined (e.g. national/ethnic origin, pro- Parcack (@indyfromspace), and Kristina fessional, gendered, religious, etc.), rather Killgrove (@DrKillgrove) among many than envisaged as spaces for dialogue and others) and a huge variety of international encounter more generally (see e.g. contri- blogs and online initiatives, some run by butions in Holtorf et al., 2019). This is archaeology students (such as https://anar- explored here by Herdis Hølleland and chaeologie.de/ or https://www.miss-jones. Elisabeth Niklasson, Håkan Petersson, de/). Nevertheless, this is manifestly not and Alessandro Vanzetti. enough to shift wider public discourses Heritage practitioners have long argued regarding issues such as a personal connec- for non-static and diverse notions of a tion to the distant past or the biologiza- heritage that is above all engaged in gener- tion of identity. ating a future (e.g. Holtorf & Högberg, We would argue that changing the rou- 2015). Many examples of good practice tines of our daily practice and finding the already exist (e.g. Synnestvedt, 2009; courage to leap into wider social debates Perry, 2019), but the next step is a con- are unavoidable, and that our discipline certed pan-European effort to lastingly will be harmed if we put this off any change the agendas of national heritage longer. There is an obvious role here for bodies and funders, and to challenge some international organizations like the EAA, of our publics into broadening their ideas particularly because wider structural about what ‘heritage’ can be. Emily change is required. University reward Hanscam, Martin Furholt, Samantha systems and the demands of many arch- Reiter, Martin Baca,̌ and Kostas Kotsakis aeological jobs across Europe actively dis- variously offer critique and solutions along courage spending time on communicating these lines. with the public, which competes with As one contributor to the original writing the academic papers needed for session discussion pointed out, archaeolo- promotion and is not rewarded by the gists are very good at knowing what they coveted ‘publication points’ which are the

basis for resource allocation in many term global impact is becoming increas- departments. Similarly, heritage bodies ingly apparent. It is evident that research and museums operate within governmen- about the past has great potential to influ- tal funding structures and constraints, ence the present; not only can our work as meaning that even carefully considered archaeologists directly reinforce contem- outreach and education initiatives can fall porary structural inequalities such as prey to local politics or perceptions of eco- gender, race, and class but, once we nomic need (discussed here, amongst produce knowledge about the past, it can others, by Håkan Peterssen and and will be used by anyone, in support of Alessandro Vanzetti). While there are a range of political agendas (Bonacchi steps we can take as individuals, expecting et al., 2018; Brophy, 2018). The relation- single scholars and heritage professionals ship between archaeology and the contem- to constantly redress much larger imbal- porary world must not be understood as a ances in resource allocation and power matter of the degree to which research is structures is not a viable strategy. From affected by politics, despite the ease of campaigning for more media training and remaining inside a dualistic perspective more concerted institutional support in that views research on the past as ‘biased’ dealing with any resulting controversy, to or ‘objective’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The reality demanding structural recognition for out- is that all research concerning the past is reach work and forcing critical reflection influenced by politics and contemporary on the impact of open access policies on perspectives. different university departments, there is a Our world has seen rapid change over mountain to climb. the past few years, caused by the swift rise The pieces collected here are intended of nationalism and reactionary populism, as a call to arms for further reflection on which has proven itself capable of winning the problems facing us right now, as well political power, frequently appealing to an as offering initial suggestions for solutions. idealized view of the past: Trump won the They are loosely arranged from those with American presidency with the slogan a more reflexive focus on archaeological ‘Make America Great Again’. As of late concepts and on biases within and outside 2020, the political tide in the United the discipline to those tracing specific pro- States has shifted towards rejecting blems (and reactions) in concrete situa- Trumpism, but it is likely that the nativist tions, although there is of course plenty of movement he inspired, and the white overlap. We hope that together they will supremacy he legitimized, will haunt the stimulate thought and action. US long into the future. Archaeology is, therefore, becoming even more relevant for questions of identity than ever before. THE POSTNATIONAL CRITIQUE – And, as Gardner (2018: 1) points out, this ARESPONSE TO REACTIONARY is a good thing: it gives us the ability to POPULISM? weigh in on public debates regarding the Emily Hanscam use of the past to inform modern identities. The problem is that strict categories of Introduction identity like nationality, religion, class, gender, and ethnicity have become The entanglement between archaeology entrenched; Appiah (2018: xvi) calls them and politics is old news, but the sheer per- the ‘lies that bind’. They are valuable and vasiveness of this relationship and its long- powerful because they allow people to

accomplish things together as groups, but Political engagement in archaeology it is crucial to remember that all these categories were invented (Appiah, 2018). Global politics have undergone a dramatic This does not change the fact that the transformation in the past few years, and a experience of social belonging is powerful number of archaeologists have recently and leads to actions causing ‘imagined been calling, myself included (Hanscam, origin[s] [to] be translated into social 2019), for a more politically engaged reality very quickly’ (Sommer, 2011: 173). archaeology (Brophy, 2018; Gardner, Nevertheless, we need to be persistent in 2018; González-Ruibal et al., 2018; Popa, exposing flaws in our thinking that lend 2019; Kiddey, 2020). Given the current national and nativist narratives legitimacy. climate of resurging reactionary populism Here, methodological nationalism, i.e. the and far-right nationalism, it is vital that idea that ‘national identification is a fun- archaeologists, as producers of knowledge damental aspect of human nature’ about the past, take an active stand against (Vasilev, 2019: 3) is key. The nation is its political misuse. As crisis after crisis popularly seen as one of the most pre- unfolds, the voices calling for a more eminent forms of collective humanity. explicit engagement with the political side And yet, the nation was never intended to of archaeology are growing louder. be ‘the final’ solution (Cannadine, 2013: Is this current the result of a long-term 87); the nation is neither inevitable, nor trend or does the movement in favour of a ‘natural’. politically engaged archaeology represent The idea of one ethnic group with a more of a watershed moment? It certainly shared language, religion, ancestry, and appears to be gaining traction, but it was also culture occupying a specific territory has rejected only a few years ago, in an article colonized thinking so effectively that the originating from a group discussion panel nation is both accepted as the ‘default’ at the 2015 European Archaeological mode of human organization and pro- Association annual meeting in Glasgow. jected back into history. In reality, homo- In the forum article ‘What is ‘European geneous national identities occupying archaeology’? What should it be?’ Babić exclusive national spaces are non-existent. and Robb warn against political alignment, Yet they persist in the popular imagin- stating that ‘[for archaeologists] to build an ation, in part because of the power of emotive commitment to European identity national myths. The nation-state as a pol- is a bad idea’ (Babićet al., 2017: 6). It may itical body is volatile and problematic, but be that those who rejected a politically nationalism itself is imbued with a sense engaged archaeology in 2017 still do today, of timelessness, giving it jurisdiction over and it may be that those who are now interpretations of the past (Cinpoes,̧2010: calling for archaeologists to become polit- 18). We are, therefore, left with the sense ical actors have long held these views. that human societies are destined to be Kristiansen (2008), for example, has been segregated into different nation-states. arguing for years that archaeologists should This leaves archaeologists, and other explicitly build a narrative for Europe. scholars of the past, with a choice: once we The point I wish to highlight here is recognize the continued power of national- that in five short years (2015 to 2020), the ism over history and over contemporary idea of a politically unengaged archaeology identities, do we attempt to minimize its has become untenable. It used to be a impact on our work, or do we explicitly question that inspired rousing discussion engage with the politics of the past? —I was in the audience of the 2015 group

discussion panel at the EAAs that inspired contexts, and to contemplate how that Babić and colleagues (2017), and past might, nonetheless, have the potential I remember being impressed by the variety to advocate for more inclusive understand- of opinions represented, and the strength ings of human relationships and identities. of the conviction behind many. Now that Methodological nationalism remains we are all painfully aware of how quickly embedded within archaeological research geopolitical climates can shift, I believe because it is not explicitly denied. the discussion should change from ‘should Meanwhile, archaeology has rightfully we?’ to ‘how best can we become political hesitated to create authoritative narratives actors?’. The latter question is not easily since this can perpetuate the power imbal- answered, but I think that an essential first ances critiqued by postcolonialism. Like step involves questioning the assumptions postcolonialism, the postnational critique we continue to make because of the power aims to dismantle power structures, but we of methodological nationalism. must consider that nationalism has grown in power in part because of aspects of postcolonialism. For the past few decades, The postnational critique multivocality, or allowing multiple voices to come through, has been a popular The postnational critique can help us means of addressing this imbalance. Yet question our assumptions. The theory of multivocality does not allow us to combat postnationalism, first developed in the the alternative narratives of extremist early 2000s, was initially linked to global- groups, such as those on the far right, ization because scholars believed that a which have become increasingly influential postnational, or completely globalized, since 2016 (González-Ruibal, 2018a). We world was inevitable (Özkirimli, 2005). must find a way to combat these narra- Some argued the world was in a postna- tives, since, as we have discovered with the tional state in the late 1990s or early Brexit process and the Trump presidency, 2000s, with the move towards multi- allowing them to remain unopposed has national bodies like the European Union consequences which were unimaginable (Habermas, 2001). The theory of postna- only a few years ago. Furthermore, right- tionalism also acted as a tool to critique wing accounts in particular draw on nationalism (Appadurai, 1996: 158), linked archaeological sources of information to to theories of hybridity and new ways of construct their narratives (Bonacchi et al., understanding relationships (Sutherland, 2018; Hingley et al., 2018); from a certain 2012: 45). My use of postnationalism perspective, it is our responsibility to aligns most closely with these two critical provide an alternative. definitions because I do not see postnation- The postnational critique involves two alism as inevitable. Postnationalism is used steps: first, to understand how nationalism here as a means of disrupting ‘natural’ is created and sustained in a particular assumptions about the status of nations context and, second, to study the past to and national identity. identify what themes emerge through the The postnational critique is one poten- application of a postnational lens. The tial way forward for political engagement postnational critique is also a vision; it is a in archaeology. It encourages us to over- vision of how our understanding of cat- turn assumptions owed to the influence of egories of difference (identities) might nationalism, to examine how our view of change, if we can critique the assumptions the past is constrained in particular on which they were built. It is also a

reminder that we cannot allow movements present. In emphasizing the absence of a such as far-right nationalism or reactionary restrictive overarching paradigm through populism to drown out our voices and which history is understood, the postna- authority, especially if we can demonstrate, tional critique allows us to highlight the clearly and persistently, that these narratives numerous encounters and negotiations are built on false assumptions about the past. between people, thereby showing the Postnational themes, therefore, vary infinite possibilities the past contains. depending on the context. In Romania, for In recognition of the consequences of example, a key theme is to recognize the inaction, let us use approaches like the long-term impact of migration on the land- postnational critique which help us in the scape of south-eastern Europe. Present-day age of the Anthropocene to ‘rearm to face Romania consists of a territory that has a capitalism that no longer requires scien- served as the crossroads between Europe, tific legitimacy’ (González-Ruibal, 2018a). Asia, and the Near East since the Let us become political actors, engage Palaeolithic, with sustained periods of with the politics of the past, and build a movement like the ‘Age of Migrations’ in more inclusive future. Late Antiquity and the early medieval period. The fact that the Romanian national narrative has persistently empha- ETHNIC ESSENTIALISM,CLASH OF sized an autochthonous population CULTURES,BIOLOGIZATION OF (a population allegedly originating in the IDENTITIES:HOW FLAWED CONCEPTS Iron Age with the Romans and Dacians) AFFECT THE ARCHAEOGENETICS has fostered a national narrative that recog- DISCOURSE nizes the diversity of encounters and the Martin Furholt peoples present but does not allow for their agency in the foundation of the Romanian Perhaps due to the fascination of the nation. This narrative is heavily entangled powerful, cutting-edge technology and with Romanian archaeology (Popa, 2015; sophisticated modelling applied in ancient Popa & Hanscam, 2019–2020). DNA (aDNA) studies, there seems to be Through the postnational critique, we a widespread misconception that the infor- can shift from a territorial definition of the mation provided by molecular biology past to one of connection: we can high- should be objective, inherently unbiased, light the encounters taking place, for and trustworthy, i.e. ‘hard’ scientific facts example, in the region of modern as opposed to the ideological, potentially Romania, rather than contrasting migra- biased interpretative frameworks of the tory peoples against the survival of the social sciences (Frieman & Hofmann, ‘autochthonous’ population. Viewing 2019). Yet, scientific categories are socially the past in terms of connections is not the constructed and thus subject to the influ- only way to understand history, nor is it ence of socio-economic interests, ideo- argued to be the ‘correct’ way; rather, it logical agendas, and cultural preferences. demonstrates that we must recognize the While there is no doubt that DNA ana- undue influence nationalism continues to lyses are measuring real phenomena, at have on our understanding of history. It is every step of the analytical process, and also vital that we critique the projection of especially so when creating units of ana- modern national borders backwards into lysis and using those units to reconstruct the past, and the subsequent use of this past human conduct, we are clearly within nationally bounded past to legitimize the the field of premises and culturally

determined preferences. Unfortunately, in accordance with Kossinna’s fascist world- the context of the breakthrough of archae- view, were seen as clearly bounded, static, ogenetic methodologies in the last decade culturally and racially distinct, and homo- (Allentoft et al., 2015; Haak et al., 2015; geneous. Agency is assumed to be collect- Olalde et al., 2018, 2019), too little effort ive (expressed by a strong male leader), was put into scrutinizing the categories and any kind of change is primarily por- applied in modelling prehistoric social trayed as playing out between these col- processes. In fact, the most outdated and lective units. The concept was created flawed concepts of social group organiza- with the intention of proving the superior- tion and migration, dating back to the ity of one or some of these ‘cultures’ to early days of culture historical archaeology, justify territorial claims, and cultural and were chosen. The idea of ‘archaeological militaristic imperialism. This was criticized cultures’, representing closed and static early on (e.g. Wahle, 1941), and its ideo- groups as well as distinct biological popu- logical closeness to Nazi ideology was lations, and the corresponding idea of col- widely recognized after the Second World lective mass migration as the main driver War (Veit, 1989; Härke, 1995). of change, has long been debunked. For Overall, the concept of archaeological third-millennium BC Europe, the result cultures has been utterly deconstructed time was the simplified narrative of ‘the Yamnaya and again (Childe, 1933; Clarke, 1968; people’ (represented by the ‘Yamnaya Lüning, 1972;Hodder,1982; Shennan, culture’) ‘migrating’ from the Eastern 1989;Wotzka,1993;Müller,2001; European steppes westwards, there creating Roberts & Vander Linden, 2011). Yet, the ‘Corded Ware people’ and later the many scholars (e.g. Childe, 1933; Lüning, ‘Beaker folk’ (represented by Corded Ware 1972), probably the majority, claim that it and Bell Beaker ‘cultures’). may be possible to maintain the archaeo- The archaeological culture is not a logical culture as a useful heuristic tool for neutral tool to classify archaeological classification, stripped of its ideological material, but a version of an anthropo- connotations. This has now, I would argue, logical concept stemming from a colonial terribly backfired. The ideological baggage and culturally narrow mindset (Tylor, of the archaeological culture is so strong 1871), later adopted by archaeology; it is that it continues to contaminate the arch- based on a specific view of human nature aeological discourse today, as illustrated by and sociality permeated by right-wing two recent examples. ideologues in a nationalist, chauvinist, and To move the discussion about third- racist Zeitgeist during the late nineteenth millennium migration forward, Kristiansen and early twentieth centuries. Its leading and colleagues (2017) proposed a more proponent, Gustaf Kossinna (who wrote sophisticated migration model than the on the origins of the Germans in 1911), one initially constructed (Allentoft et al., famously saw prehistoric archaeology as an 2015). This is a good piece of academic ‘outstandingly national science’ (the sub- work. It discusses social processes of human title of his 1912 work) (Veit, 1989; movements, features specific migrating Trigger, 1989: 163). This concept has a groups as subunits of ‘Yamnaya’, uses nefarious power that is contaminating our anthropological models, and explicitly the- current discourse (Furholt, 2018, 2019a, orizes what effects migratory processes 2021; see also Hanscam here). Baked into would have on the archaeological record. it is the premise of a monothetic configur- It does, however, take the ‘archaeological ation of social groups, which, in cultures’ of the third millennium BC

(Yamnaya, Corded Ware) as a starting targeted attack on the humanist core of point, although these do not play a central the humanist Enlightenment project (e.g. role in the model Kristiansen and collea- Mason, 2019). Such a portrayal of prehis- gues present. Nevertheless, the conceptual tory as a ‘clash of cultures’ scenario with baggage comes to the fore when all racist and sexist undertones, would lead a nuance is stripped away in the model’s regular newspaper reader to gain the (erro- popular adaptation (Barras, 2019), which neous) impression that this fascist world- presents a simplified narrative not far from view is supported by hard science and the one criticized above: hordes of young archaeological knowledge (Frieman & men from the east, who are referred to as Hofmann, 2019). both culturally and biologically distinct, Clearly this is not the intention of the invade Europe, kill all the local men and geneticists and archaeologists involved. It mate with the local women. Likewise, a is instead the result of a structural scientific paper concerning the population problem, brought about by the ideological history of the Iberian Peninsula (Olalde baggage ingrained in the tradition of arch- et al., 2019) was used by the popular aeological thinking, most clearly encapsu- media to present a simplified narrative of lated in the dominant concept of the invasion and genocide, prompting a con- archaeological culture. The archaeological certed critical response by a larger group culture does not only, as many works have of archaeologists (Valera et al., 2018). demonstrated, blatantly misrepresent the In both cases, good and genuine scien- archaeological material (Müller, 2001; tific work was too easily turned into narra- Vander Linden, 2006; Furholt, 2009), it tives of culturally and genetically distinct also has never been and can never be a groups collectively acting and fighting neutral tool for classification because it each other to extinction. Such narratives presupposes a monothetic structure of are troublingly close to the worldview of human groups, which is an ideological many far-right, anti-humanist ideologues, credo of the political right wing. Using the and are already being exploited by such concept predetermines the outcome, which actors (as discussed in Frieman & is a prehistory made up of monothetic Hofmann, 2019). At the core of most units, easily translated into the idea of a neo-fascist or white-supremacist ideologies prehistory consisting of distinct peoples. is the belief that today’s socially con- As we have seen, this is re-emerging in structed, historically situated identity the new archaeogenetic studies. It shows groups (nations, ethnicities, races) are the concept reproducing itself. based on biological differences, and that More than fifty years ago, David Clarke these biological differences entail differ- (1968: 300) suggested polythetic classifica- ences in characteristics and abilities, tion as a feasible alternative method. This making one group superior to others. avoids the ideological, monothetic premise Additionally, women are seen as inferior and is much better suited to identify all to men, and as less important social agents kinds of settings in the archaeological (see Frieman & Hofmann, 2019). record. It can create units of different Furthermore, this ideology is built on the shape, connected to different intersecting belief that there was and, indeed, should spheres of social practices and things, and always be, competition between these identify sharp or blurred borders between groups and that the superior group should units; it is thus much less susceptible to prevail and survive at the cost of the the erroneous equation of archaeological others. This worldview represents a units with a specific bounded group of

people (Furholt, 2019b). To give an and well-structured political parties. These example, in the case of the third-millen- populist parties are more than just vehicles nium BC mobility discussed above, only a for votes (Steenvoorden & Harteveld, polythetic approach can show that the new 2017); their supporters share an ideology genetic component (steppe ancestry) iden- (Golder, 2016) which is often fuelled by tified in burials labelled Corded Ware and falsely constructed narratives of the past Bell Beaker is actually connected to a new and the future. While populists in the past set of burial expressions rather than spe- pioneered the misuse of mass media, espe- cific forms of material culture (Furholt, cially radio and films, today’s populists are 2019a). This provides a more detailed skilled manipulators of social media such as insight into processes of mobility and Facebook and Twitter (Wodak, 2015). social change than the monothetic model. Social media are full of hate and the misap- Although Clarke’s polythetic classification plication of language and vocabulary. Their has been cited and recommended repeat- management is ruefully weak in making edly (Eggert, 1978; Lüning, 1979), its their environment safe from harmful narra- application is more rarely seen (Müller, tives which are often constructed and fabri- 2001; Vander Linden, 2006; Furholt, cated by anonymous entities. It is now fully 2009). It seems that this lack of impact is recognized that Brexit was heavily influ- owed to the more complex picture that enced by this particular weakness of the emerges from this kind of analysis even social media; the mythical narratives of the though it is probably closer to the com- past directly involving the topics covered by plexity of social reality (Furholt, 2019b). archaeology were part of the Brexit movement discourse and were misused for con- structing political identities (Bonacchi et al., EASTERN PROMISES:ARCHAEOLOGY AND 2018). POPULISM ON THE PERIPHERY Once again, we are reminded that, Martin Bacǎ whether we like it or not, archaeology is and always will be political (Shanks & Populism has become mainstream again in Tilley, 1987; Trigger, 1989 [2006]) and the liberal democracies of Europe. It is the past is prone to misuse. I fully agree certainly not hot news in the eastern part with the effort of my colleagues to directly of Central Europe, but it was only after engage archaeologists in fighting populism populism had its first major victories in the (Gonzáles-Ruibal et al., 2018; Popa, anglophone milieu that academics in the 2019) but, even if the menace is the same, humanities and social sciences finally woke the battlefield is rather diverse across up and started sharing their opinions on the Europe. I suggest, and will explain here, subject (Cox, 2017). Archaeologists are no that some countries of the former Eastern exception here and are appealing for radical Bloc, exemplified here by former action in defence of liberal democracy in its Czechoslovakia, are fighting this war on a full sense (González-Ruibal et al., 2018), different footing. critically analysing Brexit, predicting the post-Brexit era (Schlanger, 2018), or fighting to save the project of the European Basic framework Union (Popa, 2019). Populism today is no longer an amalgam In What is populism, Jan-Werner Müller of masses disillusioned with liberal democ- (2016) provided a useful methodological racy. Today, it is organized by well-funded tool for identifying populist agendas in

contemporary political, social, and aca- society, to rebuild the pillars of liberal demic discourse (see also Taggart & democracy once again. Kaltwasser, 2016). The key attributes of populism, according to Müller, are criti- cism of the elites, anti-pluralism, moral Implications for archaeology superiority, and identity politics. Most of the populism we see corrupting Voters who are socially frustrated are liberal democracies today is linked to attracted to the nostalgic nature of popu- various far-right movements and far-right list ideologies (Golder, 2016; political parties (Golder, 2016). In their Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2017) and reactionary nature and the mythical and often exploited by far-right movements idealized version of the past they pursue, and political parties that provide false nar- they are dauntingly close to Fascism. ratives of a great past. This phenomenon Far-right populism is, admittedly, not is understood in archaeology mostly the only type. Former Czechoslovakia pro- through the prism of nationalism (Brück vides us with a clear example. Although a & Stutz, 2016). While this is certainly beacon of liberal democracy during the also true for Slovakia (Krekovic,̌2007), interwar period in Central Europe, populist narratives both there and in the Czechoslovakia was sacrificed first to Nazi Czech Republic are also especially nostal- Germany and then to the communist gic of the communist era. It is a shared Soviet Union. While people were not phenomenon typical of post-communist widely exterminated as in the Nazi era, the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, con- enemies of the state, of ‘the people’, were stantly fuelling utopian dreams of a new, still named, hunted, and persecuted. The better tomorrow (Velikonja, 2009). While chief goal of the communist regime in Western liberal democracies are seen as Czechoslovakia was the same as that of suspect and the USA as a dangerous entity Nazi Germany: to control, oppress, by a significant percentage of the popula- impose, and dictate the official state doc- tion, there is relatively high praise for the trine. Both regimes feared the free aca- ruling Russian government in former demic institutions as much as they feared Eastern Bloc countries (Globsec, 2018). the free press and free cultural institutions. Many people are thus prone to believe A free-thinking intellectual was an enemy official state propaganda of pan-Slavic ten- ̌ of the state, and free speech was feared the dency, pseudoscientific movements (Cižik most. The language of the academy there- & Masariková, 2018) and ‘antifascist fore had to be the language of conformity, populism’ that has nothing to do with real of empty praise to the regime, of empty anti-Fascism. Finally, and most import- praise of the people, and of hate towards antly, this holds true not just for the popu- others (Krekovič&Baca,̌ 2014). But more lation who remembers the communist era, important than what was said was what but also for the young who did not experi- was not and could not be said; intellectuals ence the communist regime at all. It is in unfree regimes had to be made to most significant in countries which are believe what the state wanted them to already governed by populist parties with believe and speak only as the state allowed totalitarian attributes, such as Poland and them to speak. Hungary (Globsec, 2018). Imagine you endure this for decades, for A key task for archaeologists is to almost half a century. Imagine, further, engage against populism on multiple how much time it takes to heal such a fronts. First, it is necessary to realize that

populism is related to a crisis of political We must banish the growing antagon- identity (Müller, 2016). In the eastern ism. We can no longer allow populists to periphery of the EU, the recent past dominate the political discourse with con- brings back multiple traumatizing memor- cepts borrowed from the humanities ies, including: the Holocaust; the displace- (Laclau, 2005), in our case archaeology. We ment of whole population groups who had need to replace the concepts that are abused lived there for centuries (i.e. Germans in by the populists with new, human-friendly former Czechoslovakia); the restriction of content (see also Rybár, 2020). So, when freedom; collectivization; the uncontrolled archaeologists speak, they will also speak and brutal entry of capitalism after the fall with the language of the forgotten. of communism, which led to increasing Finally, archaeologists from the former poverty and organized crime; the aban- Eastern Bloc countries should remind donment of Roma people; and environ- other countries what happens when aca- mental issues. These events left unhealed demic freedom is lost to populism. It is an scars which we must bear in the increas- invaluable experience and should be dis- ingly faster-moving and more globalized closed whenever necessary. twenty-first century. The past, the present, and the future are intertwined and the same applies to Conclusion archaeology. Ideological restriction and non-existent freedom of speech and/or It may seem that archaeologists are research led to a theoretically underdevel- engaged in a hopeless fight against this oped archaeology. I believe that this theor- tsunami of populism in the early twenty- etically underdeveloped archaeology has first century. Milan Kundera (1984), in an serious limitations for sufficiently explain- influential essay titled ‘The tragedy of ing the many sensitive issues of the twen- Central Europe’, wrote that the real tieth and twenty-first centuries to the tragedy of Central Europe was not the general public (see also Gramsch, 2011). Soviet Union but Europe itself, because it It is unacceptable for archaeologists, who no longer perceives itself as a value. Not are among the most competent at explain- so much has changed and the European ing the past, to leave this field to amateurs Union, which should represent the essence and politicians. Beside a more developed of what it means to be European, is theoretical archaeology, studies dealing increasingly seen as a burden. The current with the age of modernity are largely situation is, therefore, not the fault of gov- missing. We need to better understand the ernments outside the European Union, struggle against Fascism in the 1940s and who may or may not support the populist the extent of collectivization in the 1950s. parties in Europe. It is our fault. We need to remind ourselves about the Former Czechoslovakia is a typical German minority that significantly con- example of an atmosphere in which popu- tributed to the culture of eastern Central lism was reaching its final stage. Contrary Europe. We need to acknowledge the to most Western countries, both countries Roma people, another forgotten but ever- of former Czechoslovakia have direct present ethnic group with a seriously experience with two totalitarian regimes broken identity. In the eastern periphery known for their heavy populist agendas of the EU, we finally need to acknowledge lasting almost five decades, as have sur- women and other marginalized groups, be rounding countries such as Poland and they of race, faith, or sexual orientation. Hungary. Half a century of populism has

left its mark on the population, which terms’. By doing archaeology at the trowel’s eagerly listens to the populist agendas of edge (Hodder, 1999:92–98), we have a today. Contemporary populist narratives in hand in manufacturing the past. By these countries are a mix of far-right and making history, we contribute to the far-left ideology and vocabulary. Therefore, building of nations. It is well known, when new narratives of eternity (Snyder, therefore, that archaeology is and always 2018)emerged,somewereshockedbecause has been political (Trigger, 1984; they remembered the past, and some lis- Kristiansen, 1993; Rowlands, 1994). Yet, tened closely because this is exactly what since the Second World War, some sub- they wanted to hear again. fields of archaeology have allowed them- Attacking academic freedom should be selves to be crippled by the abuses to seen as an act of violence against democ- which it was put during that era (Arnold, racy. Maybe we should again shame and 1990; Veit, 2002; Brather, 2008). Since discourage governments that flout aca- then, many scholars have locked them- demic and political norms which are selves away from the political world, crucial for liberal democracies. A free aca- claiming that they want to ‘just do archae- demia is one of the pillars of liberal dem- ology’. Unfortunately, this professed policy ocracy and it loses its legitimacy when the of non-interference is both ineffective (e.g. populist agenda attacking it is not coun- Wilks, 1985) and hugely detrimental to tered. As history has taught us, every time archaeology’s relationship with the greater there is a move against academic institu- socio-political communities of which it is tions, the humanities and social sciences a part. suffer the most. A recent study of European citizens While there are hundreds of well- showed that this professed ideal of polit- written papers dealing with the social and ical non-involvement runs directly counter cultural welfare of people, and while aca- to the public’s expectations of what demics around the globe are working hard archaeology should be: ‘The role of for a better understanding of humanity archaeology is clearly associated [by the and for a means of fighting populism of public] with understanding the present any sort, most of their papers are hidden and passing down this knowledge to behind paywalls. Capitalism is stronger younger generations’ (Marx et al., 2017: than ever, while the pillars of democracy 2). While the material subject of archaeo- are systematically being undermined. The logical study may be the past, its input is papers and slogans that are harmful to both expected and sorely needed in the democracy are free and available to every- present. An archaeology that exists in iso- one through social media. Academia is lation from modernity will soon make the living in its ivory tower while most people discipline obsolete but, as González- out there have forgotten we even exist. Or Ruibal (2014: 44) puts it, ‘an archaeology in the worst case: are we the elites they are that is relevant helps us to think and prob- fighting against? lematize society (past and present)’. This is not to suggest that archaeologists should act as a kind of moral gatekeeper (see THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL VOICE Popa, 2019) since ‘the choice between all Samantha S. Reiter the potential arguments that history can potentially provide ultimately depends on Hobsbawm (1992: 3) wrote ‘nations the values and principles that individuals without a past are a contradiction in and groups decide to sustain and the

context within which they operate’ documentary he produced in association (Bottici, 2008: 54; see also Recabarren with The Craftsman Initiative entitled The et al., 2007). Indeed, the public role of Future is Handmade (The Craftsman archaeology should be one in which we Initiative, 2019) is both academically responsibly provide a historical framework rigorous and profoundly relevant to for current debate. The director of the present-day society, such as jobs, capital- District Six Museum in Cape Town, ism, and the ‘user-friendly’ movement. South Africa, Bonita Bennett, describes When I questioned him further about his the challenges of this position: collaboration on the project, he said, ‘The ‘Giving up narrative control has been… medium certainly matters. One of my a challenge. We witness the telling of popular academic papers has about 3500 uncomfortable stories which do not always views now on Academia.edu. The docu- align with our institutional identity. We mentary has over ten times that many have to be vigilant, to resist the impulse to views. That is a big difference in terms of script and sanitize—unintentionally or impact and where that impact is made’ otherwise, as we attempt to model a space (M. Kuijpers, pers. comm.). for multiple, contested narratives’ (Bennett, Fortunately, there has been a recent 2012:322). blossoming of what one might call ‘soft The role of archaeologists and of archae- science reporting’. Some scholars have also ology, however, need not and should not been active in publishing reflective docu- be merely to set the stage for others to drama-style written memoirs of their interpret the results of our research and research careers (Barley, 1983; Maples & data.Wecanandmustplayanactiverole Browning, 1994; Prentiss, 2012; in this. In recent years, González-Ruibal Willerslev, 2012; Frei, 2018; Reich, 2018), and colleagues (2018) have urged archaeol- though such accounts remain too few. ogists to rally in defence of the European These types of public outreach efforts are Union. The underlying message of this often well received by the general public landmark publication has global relevance: but all too often these kinds of publica- if we do not wish others to use our research tions are frowned on by the academic to concoct unsanctioned stories or political community. This unwillingness to engage agendas, then we need to interpret that has created a niche market for journalists research ourselves and must do so clearly who specialize in synthesizing the accounts and concisely. of a specific area within academic research, In order for our voice to be heard, the such as Zimmer’s(2011, 2018) two recent medium and language of those communi- accounts of genetic work, or Johnson’s cations should be intended for the general (2015) account of archaeology. Happily, public rather than academia (Risse, 2004; there are other possibilities for those of us Bond, 2018). Unfortunately, little media who want to engage with the public but training exists within university archaeology who lack confidence or need additional programmes. As a rule, archaeologists have journalistic support to do so. The more experience of being the subject of Conversation, for example, which includes media debate than being its driving force. articles written exclusively by researchers This state of affairs must change if we are and academics with the aid of journalist to take part in public discussion. support staff, bills itself as ‘academic One scholar who has taken dissemin- rigour, journalistic flair’. ation into his own hands is Maikel It would be hubristic and naïve to advo- Kuijpers of Leiden University. A recent cate engaging with the public and current

socio-political affairs without making we make it something to think with. How space for the conversation to flow in both we do archaeology and how we present directions. Pentz and colleagues (2019:3) the past to the public involve negotiation write that ‘it has long been recognized that with the present, and each time the results people want to take an active role in inter- of an archaeological study are published preting the past. The past presented “as it those words echo far. Archaeologists may was” through a single lens of interpretation not speak as one, but archaeology has a that excludes other voices easily becomes voice. Let us use it. arrogant’. As modern archaeologists, we are the lucky heirs to the arrival of multi- media to new museological approaches POPULISM IN ITALIAN ARCHAEOLOGY and new generations of the web (Hoffos, Alessandro Vanzetti 1992; Halpin, 1997). In addition to colla- borations between amateurs and profes- In Italy, archaeology is seemingly not par- sionals such as the Danish Danafæ and ticularly relevant for populist feelings; the British Portable Antiquities Scheme, nevertheless, some significant populist examples of the shift to user-generated entanglements exist, which intertwine content include the Danish National with longer-term political and economic Museum’s Din Ting/Vores Historie (Your trends (Pulselli et al., 2019). Things/Our History) as well as the 2020 Populism in its present-day form has En skat til Danmark (A Treasure for substantially replaced the corporate and Denmark) exhibition, the British Museum’s class struggle typical of the late nineteenth History of the World in 100 Objects and the and twentieth centuries, and populist British Museum and University College arguments were already strong in the London’s collaborative MicroPasts project growth of Fascist and Nazi dictatorships (see also discussion in Frieman & Wilkin, in Europe; they also generally supported 2016). Including the public in what we do autocratic governments of the Soviet bloc. is just as important as discussing results Sketched out roughly, populism is now openly in a public setting. Archaeology as a typical post-ideological behaviour an interface between politics and the public (Aslanidis, 2016). As a ‘thin-centred can do more than educate and entertain; it ideology’ (Stanley, 2008), it is mutable and can challenge our present ways of thinking can ‘be easily combined with very different and make us examine the entirety of who (thin and full) other ideologies’ (Mudde, we were, who we are, and who we might 2004: 544), such as Socialism, Liberalism, one day like to be as a society. Fascism, and so on. As populism relies on Engagement with the past is a dirty people, it appeals to the personal interest, business. If we want history to be relevant or sometimes selfishness (or even greed), of today, we cannot set it on a pedestal. We individuals or independent corporate groups, need to interact with it, play with it, fitting coherently within the present-day debate it, and think with it. Ideas about capitalist world. In political terms, this is the past evolve, so our engagement with the consumer-voter perspective, as a direct them should too. There must be room for (populist) relation is stimulated between the error since this is how we will collectively individual’s choice and the producer’sor learn about the past and from the past. politician’s decision (Schwarzkopf, 2011). Through our interpretations of the past— The anarcho-individualist approach (differ- and our engagement with it—we make it ent from social anarchism) is a relevant ours, we make it about the present, and populist attitude, but what principally

characterizes present-day populism is the Archaeological populism in Sardinia self-centred view of personal appropriation and defence of property. Sardinian archaeology has long been A basic aspect of populism is the stated entangled with local autonomist or separat- distinction between ‘the pure people’ versus ist issues centred on the ‘constant resist- the ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2004:543;Boeri ance’ of Sardinians against invaders (e.g. et al., 2018), whereby the ‘pure people’ are a Lilliu, 2002). Nowadays, Sardinia is a mar- loose and mobile interest group. The ginalized region with an evident divide people/elite divide is, in fact, the first ‘ideo- between the touristy coast and the impo- logical regularity’ of different populisms verished inland (Vanzetti, in press). A clear (Galli & Garzarelli, 2019). The three others contrast is visible between diverse and per- are: nationalist orientation (from separatist meable groups of local historians and to whole-nation), promotion of short-term self-claimed experts (type C attitude) and policies based on demagogy, anti-immigra- official archaeologists (represented as the tion and anti-globalization pressure. elite).Thisisparticularlyevidentintheinter- In politics, Italy is characterized today pretation of Bronze Age Nuragic society. by strong populist tensions, which have The elites are believed to hide and distort evolved over a considerable number of the evidence of Nuragic strength and great- years. They are mainly expressed by two ness, as well as proofs of early astronomical political parties: the League (formerly knowledge and writing. Consequently, dis- Northern League), which moved from a cussion of the Mediterranean connections of separatist position based in northern Italy the Nuragic Late Bronze Age is often (1989–2017) to a nationalist, sovereignist removed from the debate, as there is an (offi- Italian perspective (since 2017), and the cial) fear that it could create dangerous links Five Star Movement, founded in 2009, with the so-called fanta-archaeologists (fanta which sees itself as neither left-wing nor being an abbreviation of fantasy/fantastic: right-wing. D’Oriano, 2014). Within archaeology, four types of popu- Some popularizing experts of D-type larizing communication and practice can stress the anti-elitist divide, the most be identified, as outlined in Table 1. prominent being the journalist Sergio Frau A-type academic communication is (2002), who claimed that Sardinia could challenged by C-type arguments, which be identified with Atlantis, ultimately see institutional archaeology and history as destroyed by a Bronze Age tsunami (Evin, elite-driven and masking the truth in order 2015). Frau’s approach was taken up in the to keep control, or for mysterious goals. top-down populism of political origin (B- The B-type represents the politically- type), with support from the Sardinian driven support for some kind of historical regional government and from UNESCO identity against other choices, as a myth of representatives, who sponsored exhibitions purity, perfection, or lofty ethnic and cul- in high-profile venues such as the Maison tural values. The D-type is practised by de l’UNESCO in Paris in 2005 or Cagliari non-professional archaeologists acting as airport (2017–2018). Frau has claimed gifted interpreters, surging to the forefront support from official archaeologists and against the elite represented by official from geologists who endorse the tsunami archaeologists or historians. These inter- theory explained in his bestselling books. preters start from the bottom up, but soon In November 2020, a television pro- acquire a kind of A-type top-down narra- gramme on the Italian State Channel tive, promoting their alternative versions. RAI 3 re-hashed the theory, first

broadcast in 2002 and involving the same geologist, Mario Tozzi, as partner and supporter. II Schliemann Dan Brown Gordon Childe Kaiser Wilhelm Heinrich The Calabrian passion for purported megaliths

In Calabria, an Italian region with some of the lowest economic and welfare indicators and a strong mafia-like illegal presence c committees of aca-

ﬁ (the ‘Ndrangheta), some impressive rock torians, members of the public archaeologists demics and heritage specialists / journalists etc. = cultural interpreters outcrops have been labelled as human- Local scholars, self-taught his- Politicians and high-ranking Scienti Non-professional archaeologists made ‘megaliths’. This C-type attitude is sustained by local volunteers, historians, and scholars, sometimes even including geologists or fully-fledged archaeologists. In some cases, the megalith supporters attract the attention of the local adminis- trations in a populistic process stimulating small-scale B-type interventions, as in cial museum and archaeo- ﬁ on history / identity ically funded research / exhibition logical park interpretations, books, exhibitions Sardinia. No archaeological remains have Loose interest groups focused Political administration; polit- Communication-sustained Of Environment Actors Cultural— hero* so far—been found in connection with these definitely natural monuments (Johnston, 2002). In this case too, but less s suggestions. ’ strongly than in Sardinia, the underlying message is that official archaeology chooses to hide important evidence of other elites, populist times populist demic and new- academic populist

Populist, anti-aca- local greatness and a powerful past, which, populists argue, would generate income from tourists. up to top- down

From bottom- Creating a Celtic identity in northern Italy

A mythical past—this time concerning a unified Po plain identity named ‘Padania’—is foundational to the Northern theory-making League party (now League party; Individual disrupting Revenge archaeology Bottom-up Anti- academic and Politically motivated Top-down Political and some- Academic Top-down Traditional, non- Albertazzi, 2006). The party think-tanks proposed the Celtic past as the unifying national phase of northern Italy: Celts

Types of popularizing communication in archaeology. * = author settled there after migrating across the s claim ’ Alps and even defeated and sacked the hated central power of Rome in 390 BC. expert promotion communication C - Bottom-up view D - Popularizing B - Top-down Table 1. Type of popularizing communicationA - Top-down Characteristics Direction Strategy The native descent of the Padanians had

to be recognized in a proud, independent, hinterland. The idealized revivalist (and and anti-Roman people. One strategy revenge) aspirations of the local population involved the promotion of public celebra- develop in this context, where archaeo- tions of ‘Celtic’ identity, such as Celtic logical looting, aimed at finding bronzes to festivals with re-enactors, Celtic music, be sold on the illegal market, notably the and historical foods. More complex arch- bronzetti figurines, is still widespread. aeological elements, such as the variety of Calabria, by contrast, is one of the ethnic components in the Po plain or the poorest regions of Italy, with a strong different cultural history of the Venetian ‘Ndrangheta criminal element, and revival- region and its strong ties to Rome, were ist/revenge archaeological dreams (less acute downplayed. The Northern League also than in Sardinia) are likely to be connected offered a special provision of four billion with both frustration and positive aspira- Italian lire (more than two million euros) tions. Admiration for the greatness of the as part of their populist ‘Celts Project’ archaeology of Magna Graecia is strong, as (Friuli-Venezia Giulia Regional Law 2/ is the search for extraordinary findings in 2000). Although some state and university less spectacular earlier periods. Illegal exca- archaeologists were able to broaden the vations and looting are also frequent. spectrum of research beyond these narrow The pressures of B-type Celtic popu- goals, the result has indeed been a lism were stronger when the Northern strengthening of populist feelings towards League had a clearer autonomist/separatist a Celtic past, which spans only three to position. This focus has now reduced. By four centuries of local history. Indeed, in contrast, while Italian nationalist populism 2001, Trieste, the capital of Friuli-Venezia could reclaim a Roman tradition, this is as Giulia, launched the active and popular yet underdeveloped even by right-wing, Celtic Triskell Festival. This sort of popu- post-fascist parties, possibly because of the lism in the form of festivals can be under- pan-Mediterranean and European heritage stood as a mix of political top-down and of the Roman Empire. revenge bottom-up B- and C-type actions In sum, the populist forces’ relative lack (with some pseudo-Celtic feelings) and of interest in archaeology and the strength pure enjoyment. of the academic and heritage sectors have so far limited the use of Italian archaeology for populist discourses, and the Conclusions existing cases can be read through the economic lens of local development. A roughly Marxist analysis proposed some years ago regarding the populist attitudes of Sardinian (and Calabrian) revenge FROM THE NATION’S ARCHAEOLOGY TO archaeology noted the connection to ARCHAEOLOGY’S PEOPLE regions suffering social fragmentation and Kostas Kotsakis economic and cultural marginalization (Pulselli et al., 2019;Vanzetti,in press). I am writing this note in 2020, while The two situations are different: Sardinia many Brexiteers celebrate Britain’s official has an average GDP higher than the other exit from the European Union and, in the southern and island regions of Italy, but a United States, Donald Trump’s support fundamental divide exists between the does not wane despite his unprecedented towns and tourist coast and the socially obduracy to accept the 2020 presidential fragmented and economically impoverished election result and his pending

impeachment trial. These are the outward people’s initial goodwill and hospitality signs of the populism that sweeps the that attracted much positive international world, West and East. It is no longer just attention. some people believing in outrageous con- The anti-immigrant feelings, fed by the spiracy theories. Racism, sexism, xenopho- inadequate management by the state, bia, and revisionism have cast a heavy quickly led to a surge in xenophobia. shadow on politics, emphatically showing Overwhelmed by the scale of events, the that this wave leads to politically danger- local authorities failed to relieve the pres- ous waters. Between tragedy and farce, sure from this outbreak. Archaeology, in populism threatens the core of democracy, particular, was not prepared to engage the idea of an open society with a shared with people from vastly different cultural, basis, as founded by modernity. historical, and social backgrounds. The Conversely, populism’s crude outlook cele- numerous NGOs involved in educational brates the gap between the elite and the and cultural activism did not include people. Although defining populism is archaeology in their plans, nor did other notoriously complicated and falls outside institutions, e.g. the university on the the present remit (De Cleen & island. The example of Lesvos makes us Stavrakakis, 2017; Stavrakakis, 2017), here wonder whether archaeology, as practised, I define populism as the belief that the has any part in the battle against popu- world is structured along one simplistic, lism. Possibly, as Hamilakis (2018) has hierarchical dichotomy. Conspiracy theor- proposed, archaeologists should resort to ies are its inevitable product. political activism but, although I do not What can archaeology, with its elitist underestimate political action, I doubt that legacy, do against this current? it will answer archaeology’s problem. Archaeologists need to remember that the One tested and increasingly employed massive appeal of fringe ideas is much archaeological tactic of engagement revolves more than a mistake that archaeology can around ‘heritage’ (see other contributors to correct; it results from a real lived experi- this section). Like museums, which have ence of disenfranchisement and loss of evolved from national treasuries of the past dignity. These extreme views come from a into educational centres cum amusement simplifying distortion of a traumatic reality parks, archaeology has turned to cultural that directly affects people’s lives. heritage as a social obligation and an Undoubtedly, it involves a shockingly false almost mandatory way to meet the public reading of the facts but, unfortunately, this (see critical discussion e.g. in Waterton & does not make the perceived reality less Smith, 2010; Winter & Waterton, 2013). compelling. Heritage is considered a public good by The island of Lesvos in Greece can definition. The idea is that the attractively serve as a case study for archaeology’s dif- documented presentation of the past will ficulty, even bewilderment, to cope with automatically illuminate the audience. Yet local populist politics. Thousands of refu- this optimistic scenario never happens in gees come to the island every year via real life, as the proliferation of post-truths Turkey. The state puts them in open and conspiracy theories channelled through refugee hotspots, leaving them stranded the media proves. among a local population of a few tens of Like historians (Kalela, 2012), archaeolo- thousands. It is easy to see how local gists have always selected their audiences— populists exploited this dire situation for real or imagined—and archaeology has political gain, undermining the local been comfortable speaking to one assumed

unified national audience. In today’sself- informed our archaeological interpretations. reflexive spirit, the selection is neither It was a moving spectacle to see elders innocent nor straightforward; many differ- retrieve their old, unused sickle and proudly ent audiences are out there. Laclau (2005: perform a harvesting demonstration ix–x) explains why: society is not a (Halstead, 2014:77–121 and figs 3.7 and harmoniously functioning whole but a 3.8). Similarly, a Neolithic grinding stone ‘constitutive impossibility’ that contains an brought memories from childhood and endless contradictory movement. The result raised questions of gender, labour allocation, is smaller, fragile entities, which Laclau and cooking. Without resorting to elite calls demands. Demands cluster around knowledge, we engaged people of different absences—perceived or real—in social rela- ages and genders with our archaeological tions: inclusion where there is exclusion, project to benefit both. justice when there is injustice, etc. In other Meeting the challenge of identifying the words, society comprises many different ‘stakeholders’ is crucial to empower the groups of people with differing agendas. public. Lamentably, archaeology’s relations Knowing our audiences and their with its audiences have long been domi- demands is, therefore, the priority when nated by cultural elitism, in other words, dealing with a populist discourse. In the by the fetishization of expert knowledge. Paliambela Kolindros project (Chowne Cultural elitism, which disregards the et al., 2007), the aim was to involve the actual people in the present, has been local rural community in managing an sharply criticized in the heritage debate Early Neolithic site (c. 6600 BC). We first (Waterton & Smith, 2010; Winter & surveyed the local people’s perceptions and Waterton, 2013). Nevertheless, expert mentalities, exploring how they saw knowledge is still considered central by archaeology. We used questionnaires, archaeologists who feel that the communi- filmed interviews, and conducted a sys- ties’ involvement exposes them to the risk tematic ethnographic study of the popula- of becoming ‘just another interest group’ tion (Parlani, 2014). Only then were we (Smith & Campbell, 2018). At the oppos- able to target our activities to specific ite end of the spectrum stands what has groups. The diversity recorded helped us been called ‘epistemic populism’, a term think beyond the strictly archaeological with negative connotations signifying the subject and gave us the possibility to readiness to consider knowledge produced design a management plan that allocated from communities as epistemic, subaltern activities, narratives, and interpretations knowledge (Grosfoguel, 2011). As a justi- based on people. González-Ruibal et al. fied reaction to the exclusion of communi- (2018: 508–09) have rightly cautioned ties from their heritage, multiculturalism against the dangers of underestimating the and multivocality need not lead to epi- diversity of audiences with which archae- stemic populism if applied in a context of ology wishes to engage. Our experience dialogue and mutual understanding, as at with the small group of people of Paliambela Kolindros. Again, getting to Paliambela shows that defining our audi- know the audience helps overcome the ence’s diversity makes it possible to connect ethnocentric and essentializing prejudices people with the materiality of objects and of archaeology. re-establishes ties and memories of their In effect, archaeology must become less own lives. An Early Neolithic sickle blade narcissistic and renounce its urge to hege- presented to senior community members monize all discourse about the past, thereby drew out lifelong harvesting experiences and disempowering people (Stavrakakis, 2017).

González-Ruibal et al. (2018:507–09) refer practices. If working with our audiences to people who, although exposed to archae- has become our primary obligation, ology and modernity, do not have an official including media and institutions notion of heritage or are entirely indifferent (Bernbeck & Pollock, 2018), but especially to it. In a pilot ethnographic field study algorithms that widely disseminate ‘post- intended to investigate attitudes towards truths’, the new mission is to know all the cultural landscape in six villages in these in depth. In this presentist objective, northern Greece (Tryfinopoulou, 2010), we a sensible strategy is to seek the cooper- found that the communities, mostly descen- ation of experts so that the archaeological dants of refugees from Anatolia who arrived task is not demoted. As González-Ruibal there one century ago, could not identify (2018b: 18) remarks, ‘it is not really useful anything of cultural significance in their to take the robes of other disciplines: region. The only exception was one specific anthropologists do better anthropology location said to be reminiscent of the fields and historians better history than us’. around the ancestral village in Turkey. Given that the scope of Greek state Given the Greek state’s tight control on archaeologists’ duties and activities are heritage and archaeology’s critical role in strongly regulated by the state, and since supporting national narratives (Kotsakis, there are no freelance archaeologists, such 1998), such a lack of interest in the official external cooperation may be our only real- heritage narrative is puzzling. istic chance. In this dystopic contemporary It may be that the hegemonic state political landscape, archaeology and control of heritage (in Greece, archaeology is archaeologists must reflect on the gambit exclusively a state service) had not penetrated between dispelling populism and a drastic these communities yet. Alternatively, local re-evaluation of archaeology’s interaction identities determined by the scale and nature with society. Otherwise, political populism of the communities’ conflicts or demands will become cultural and rapidly consume (e.g. refugees vs local people) opposed the the ‘public’ irrevocably. official narrative. Either way, exploring the public’s attitudes towards archaeological heritage is a priority (Kajda et al., 2018), COMMERCIALIZATION AND POPULISM: principally since state archaeology in Greece VIKINGS AND PUBLIC OUTREACH has so far been reluctant to abandon the ACTIVITIES IN NORWAY well-established encultured nationalism of Håkan Petersson the nineteenth century and continuing to the present day (Kotsakis, 1991; Hamilakis One aspect of populism and archaeology is &Yalouri,1996; Damaskos & Plantzos, the commercial use of archaeology by the 2008). In this respect, I believe that distan- popular cultural tourism industry all over cing from state and nation narratives will the world. In Scandinavia, the Vikings are become essential to counteract narratives more attractive than ever, particularly in that both end up reinforcing parochial relation to cruise tourism. Cruise ships are accounts or populist agendas. an essential part of the tourism sector in As archaeology’s symbolic capital in an western Norway. In Stavanger alone, a advancing global, predatory capitalism is town of approximately 120,000 inhabi- rapidly diminishing, and its ‘use’ for valid- tants, some 300 cruise ships brought an ating the national narrative is fading estimated 500,000 passengers in 2019, (populists just do not need it), archaeology generating considerable profits. To attract must redefine itself and reform its cruise ships, a port must offer unique

experiences. Tourist activities, therefore, female Viking Age grave (Børsheim & are of great political and commercial inter- Soltvedt, 2002:179–93). est as stops to compete for cruise liner traffic. To this end, exciting stories of seafaring Viking explorers and brave warriors The commercialization of national have increasingly become the focus of gov- identity and cultural heritage ernment institutions, private commercial interests, and museums in Norway. At the The focus here is not the historical accur- official institution Visit Norway, Viking- acy of the sagas, but the use of the battle related sites rank among the top tourist and Viking stereotypes as commercial attractions (https://www.visitnorway.com/ tools, that is capitalizing on history for things-to-do/art-culture/vikings/top-sites/). political and/or economic purposes. The In the Stavanger area, the focus is on the latest example of this phenomenon was Norse sagas’ description of the Battle of when politicians and tourist providers pro- Hafrsfjord. The Battle of Hafrsfjord in AD posed a new, large visitor centre on the 872 is described as a bloody sea battle shores of the bay of Hafrsfjord (Risa, between Norwegian chieftains, in which the 2018). The goal was to create a public losing side was slaughtered (Fidjestøl, 1993; arena to attract tourists to the alleged Titlestad, 2011). While most research battle site, reinforcing the importance of regards the consolidation of Norway as the region in Viking history and in the taking place about 300 years after that battle, establishment of the Norwegian kingdom, local historians (Titlestad, 2011, 2018; and emphasizing the Vikings’ political Grøsfjeld, 2018), interest groups, and other influence in Western Europe. stakeholders (Risa, 2018)paintthebattle The Viking House, a privately funded, as key to the creation of the Norwegian commercial attraction located in the kingdom, in an attempt to capitalize on the harbour next to the cruise ship disembark- Vikings for tourism purposes (Figure 1). ation point is another initiative. Here, visi- The Viking stereotype sold to the public tors can purchase souvenirs and books and focuses on a courageous, androcentric watch a VR-film presenting the history of society, steeped in violence and based on the battle based on the sagas. However, pillaging. Yet, almost everything about the these attractions are not alone. The out- battle is uncertain: its location, the way it reach activities of Stavanger’s Museum of was fought, whether it really was a battle, Archaeology also cater for what is popular, whether it was fought on land or at sea. The focusing on the Vikings. The museum’s opponents are even said to have come in Viking exhibition, while generally nuanced, knarrer, i.e. trading ships, rather than the flirts with the dominant Viking stereotypes warships one might expect. The story told while avoiding addressing the issue. Instead by the archaeological evidence is much of contrasting popular images of history more variable. There are indications of pos- with empirical facts, little explanation is sible maritime looting, in the form of Irish- offered for pieces such as a berserker made prestige artefacts, but otherwise most podium (Figure 2) placed in an exhibition of the material indicates wealthy burials, focusing on wealthy female graves. self-supporting farmsteads, local craft pro- While the exhibition was remodelled in duction, and indications of regional trading autumn 2020 and the podium moved, it sites. When considering gender issues, the is still there and the bookshelves in the region also has very rich female graves, such shop still present a traditional, androcentric as the ‘Gausel queen’, Norway’srichest view.

Figure 1. Map of major Viking Age visitor sites in Norway. Stavanger emphasized in blue (extracted from www.visitnorway.com).

The Vikings, a Scandinavian tourist narrative that has prevailed since the brand? period of national romanticism. Fifty years of modern research and archaeological dis- Even though Viking tourist attractions use covery appear to have had little impact. the same rhetoric as earlier political These Viking stereotypes are part of our nationalists, the use of the Vikings has identity and are now used by the tourist shifted from reinforcing national identity sector—government-funded organizations, to economic opportunism. What can be commercial enterprises, tour providers, capitalized on is politically and economic- and open-air heritage parks—as the cul- ally attractive, and what sells seems mostly tural brand (Holtorf, 2007) of western to be the same brutal, androcentric Norwegian history. These agencies’ goal is

Figure 2. Podium showing warriors in the rage of battle (‘berserkers’), and interpretation of female graves at the Stavanger Museum of Archaeology (photograph: H. Petersson).

to attract capital and interest to the region, based interpretations need better strat- since tourism is an important financial egies to function in an environment sector. which mostly caters for what is popular. This outreach environment is, whether This requires a more developed, critical we like it or not, forcing museum profes- methodology and theoretical awareness, a sionals to adapt. Our institutional hegem- goal yet to be achieved. Research princi- ony as interpreters and exhibitors of ples from academic fields such as history is gone. The situation is escalating, museum studies are poorly integrated in and I feel that the response of my former the collective outreach awareness, which employer, the museum, and similar insti- is built more on traditional academic dis- tutions, shows how unprepared the sector ciplines and ideals and the need to attract is to address these questions. We oppose the public. such developments and at the same time compete with new players to attract the public. Self-awareness at the museum Should we rather work with commercial outlets to ensure that a more com- The actions of museums seem to reflect prehensive image of the Viking period frustration at not being the main outlet and Norwegian history as a whole is chosen by politicians, government organi- presented to consumers? Museums and zations, and tour providers for promoting academic representatives of knowledge- Viking history, as well as showing that

they are ill-prepared for dealing with the over time, and challenging our own beliefs academic aspects of the situation. It is also and prejudices as visitors. frustrating that research-based knowledge has so little influence over what is popular. Once again, it is something museums do Final thoughts very little to resist, instead steering much of their outreach activities towards that As providers of an archaeological, knowl- same populism to compete for visitors. edge-based outreach, we need ways to Instead of the proposed new visitor popularize other images of the Vikings than centre at Hafrsfjord, the Stavanger the tradition of heroic pillaging enshrined Museum suggested using its own open-air by national romanticism. We also need historical park, Jernaldergarden (Iron Age better ways of marketing our narratives. We Farm), a reconstructed Migration-period need strategies for sustained collaboration farmstead on Hafrsfjord bay, as a centre for with commercial interests if our goal is to public outreach on the Vikings and the promote and foster a modern, knowledge- Battle of Hafrsfjord (Madsen, 2018). In based public perception of history in today’s doing this, the museum should have commercial outreach environment. reflected on what narratives are constructed We need to be at the forefront of this. when presenting mixed historical facts in The creation of The Viking House,discussed public outreach and how a knowledge- above, is an ideal example. If, instead of based accuracy in outreach activities can be being passive spectators, we had been active retained. Instead, the museum chose to use participants, we could have influenced the the farm as an arena for an increasingly outcome, ensuring a balanced presentation popular view of the Viking Age. of both archaeological evidence and the To me, it feels like territoriality. A new saga. The suggested content of the pro- Viking visitor centre only 500 m away posed visitor centre at Hafrsfjord, promoted from the Jernaldergarden would seriously solely by non-professional stakeholders and threaten attendance numbers, easily backed by political interests, would have making the attraction economically unten- served to reinforce the androcentric stereo- able. I would suggest that letting the types to thousands of visitors from all over Migration period be what it is and partici- the world. If we focus less on protecting our pating in a new Viking centre might have own existing visitor sites, and instead been a better choice. actively participate in the development of In this way, we accept the loss of our new visitor attractions outside our institu- interpretative hegemony in a new environ- tions, the storytelling presented to tourists ment of public outreach and try to work could be more comprehensive. Many of the within the framework of both the needs or stakeholders involved want accuracy, but goals of the tourist providers and our need they must also be able to capitalize on their for historical accuracy. Through close efforts. involvement, we are better placed to Therefore, rather than hoping that the balance both sides, to attract tourists while ideas of political and commercial projects contextualizing and addressing the ana- will go away, our strategy must be one of chronisms and the images of what is flexibility, integration, and involvement, with popular. One way forward could be to use a focus on guiding a project towards knowl- contrasting views or ideals side by side, edge-based presentations and interpretations. making people see things in the much We must also open a debate among the broader context of societal development different views and ideals of history both in

our engagement with the commercial archaeologists and heritage professionals tourist sector and in our own outreach activ- for several reasons. The most immediate ities. Rather than flirting with the popular- for us is these parties’ enthusiasm for the ity of the atrocities of seafaring warriors, distant past. Through symbolic manifesta- idealized as heroic narratives and rendered tions, such as the Greek Golden Dawn’s inoffensive by the passage of time, we could annual rally at the archaeological site of contextualize these stories of slave traders Thermopylae (Sotiris, 2015), the Italian and murderers in accordance with modern Lega’s use of Celtic imagery (Albertazzi, research and modern values. In the end, 2006), and the promotion by the French what difference is there between the idea- Front National (now rebranded as the lized view of Viking raiders and modern Rassemblement National or National murderers and slave traders? The historical Rally) of medieval sites and festivals memory presented is also very short. The (Almeida, 2019), these parties claim own- Viking Age is the brief outcome of long- ership of heritage as a national concern. term processes extending over the course of When these claims are translated into the Scandinavian Iron Age and ending in actual political proposals, negotiated and medieval, urban society. The period of sometimes passed in parliaments, it revives Viking raiding was an even shorter phase an age-old dilemma: the heritage sectors within this process, so let us focus on the in most of Europe are still closely linked to whole picture and make it exciting. national governance, making them suscep- From a modern, democratic standpoint, tible to political change. National heritage and to prevent offensive populism in arch- agencies usually report to central govern- aeological outreach, overemphasized stereo- ments, and archaeological activities are types should be contrasted with the regulated by state law and frequently funded evidence from history. Deconstructing them by public funds. We are used to experien- in favour of modern, humanistic narratives cing political change through budget cuts or of history can have a long-term effect on structural reforms, but what happens when our idea of national identity. This implies expectations of the past change? How are shifting focus from national ancestral histor- we to respond when democratically elected ies to a more human-based understanding right-wing populist parties seek to reorient of the Viking Age. In this, a change in the cultural politics to focus only on the ancient historical narratives presented to the public sites, monuments, and traditions they see as is an important step in steering away from the essence of national identity? Where do more toxic forms of nationalism. we, as researchers and heritage professionals, set our limit of compliance? The scenario may seem hypothetical, but we do not have CONDITIONS OF INFLUENCE:WHAT to look further than Hungary to see how it ENABLES THE SCANDINAVIAN POPULIST could play out, with new institutions dis- RIGHT TO IMPACT HERITAGE tributing alternative narratives of the past GOVERNANCE, AND HOW SHOULD (Bánffy, 2013). Drawing on our research ARCHAEOLOGISTS RESPOND? into the uses of the past by the Elisabeth Niklasson and Scandinavian populist right wing Herdis Hølleland (Niklasson & Hølleland, 2018), we argue for a heightened preparedness in times of The ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak, 2015) exer- political polarization by means of cross-sec- cised by radical and populist right-wing torial solidarity and partnership, as well as parties in Europe ought to concern reflexivity and resistance.

As a region which has long nurtured its For Scandinavia, we identify three such image of equality, tolerance, and welfare, conditions. The first is the destabilization Scandinavia is perhaps not the first place of traditional block-politics in multiparty that comes to mind when discussing systems. With regard to heritage policy, right-wing populism. Yet, since the turn our research has shown that the most of the millennium, it has seen three anti- influential position for a populist right- immigration parties claim space in the wing party in Scandinavia is that of national parliaments: the Danish Peoples support to right-wing minority (coalition) Party (DPP), the Progress Party in governments (Niklasson & Hølleland, Norway (PP) and the Sweden Democrats 2018). From this position, it can be con- (SD). When looking in detail at their trary while still enjoying political legitim- respective cultural policies and proposals, acy and getting some carefully chosen we found that, for these parties, culture is policies passed. In Denmark, the DPP has almost synonymous with heritage successfully made it its strategy to act as a (Niklasson & Hølleland, 2018). The aim support party for conservative minority of their cultural policy is to strengthen a coalitions since 2002. This has allowed it national identity by protecting and endors- to influence heritage governance by ing sites tied to notions of national origins increasing funding for its preferred sites, and power, and to nurture rural folklife such as the Viking Age rune stones at and the (Christian) traditions of the Jelling, museums representing rural life, (ethno-national) majority population. To royal palaces, and navy ships. In this pos- implement and fund their heritage pol- ition, the DPP has managed to promote icies, they seek to steer state funds away its policies in exchange for voting with the from multicultural initiatives and institu- ruling block. More importantly, it did so tions working with contemporary art and without bearing the burden of responsibil- world cultures. More than policy content, ity or having to compromise as a govern- however, what makes their proposals dan- ing party does. In Norway, the PP lost gerous is how these parties couch them in most of its radical edge once it was ‘sani- an already established rhetoric of heritage tized’ and ‘accepted’ into a minority coali- democratization. By taking a stand for the tion in 2013, in a government that needed ‘real’ heritage of a nation and promising to votes from other support parties (Bjerkem, bring it ‘back to the people’, they co-opt 2016). The DPP’s strategy has only been the Scandinavian model of state-subsi- possible because the political establishment dized culture—meant to ensure freedom has welcomed it. SD, who is also in of expression and equal access (e.g. opposition, has not been so lucky. Due to Lindsköld, 2015)—to restrict ideas about instability, however, SD has held the role what it means to belong in Scandinavian of ‘scale master’ in the Swedish parlia- societies. While not immediately visible, ment, able to tip the scales with its vote, this can have long-term effects; and, as but it still faces a cordon sanitaire, with no archaeologists and heritage professionals, other parties willing to cooperate on a we need to generate a sense of prepared- more permanent basis. ness. More than just reacting to the popu- Stretching beyond the multiparty list right’s uses of the past, this requires system, the second condition is the reloca- identifying the political, bureaucratic, and tion of the so-called ‘Overton window’ societal conditions that enable right-wing (named after the American policy analyst populist tendencies to influence heritage Joseph Overton, referring to an idea’s pol- governance in liberal democracies. itical viability depending on its

acceptability) (Lehman, 2010). In other it can be a false move that eventually leads words, populist right-wing parties, by con- to increased political control of heritage— stantly proposing shocking measures, can a long-term policy of the PP. Thus, even reframe a society’s window of ideational if the PP is of the opinion that the state and rhetorical acceptance so that policies (rather than private owners) should carry once seen as radical become normalized. the financial burden of preserving listed In Scandinavia, the populist right has suc- buildings and funding archaeological exca- cessfully shifted the window on their core vations, the decisions regarding what is to issue of immigration to the point where be preserved should lie with ‘the people’ in other establishment parties have either the form of those elected to local and budged or introduced similar policies. county governments. Rather than viewing heritage on its own, What does this mean for researchers, we therefore need to understand how it archaeologists, and civil servants? What operates in relation to immigration pol- should we do when these conditions align? icies. While presented as a heart-warming, Our call is for solidarity, partnership, political goodwill area when discussed by reflexivity, and resistance. itself, heritage still serves as an instrument By solidarity, we refer to the need to of division. In claiming to represent and stand up not just for our own field, but also safeguard the cultural values and material for other cultural fields. When the populist remains of ‘the people’, the populist right’s right suggests cutting funds for the arts and arguments for heritage preservation help multicultural initiatives in favour of archae- shift the window towards intolerance ology and heritage, it should concern us. when used as a backdrop and contrast to By actively siding with those targeted, pol- contemporary immigration. In the visual itical goodwill and capital may be at risk, language of the parties, the former is but moral authority—a cornerstone of represented as appealing, with idealized liberal democratic institutions—is gained. images of what the future may hold with Furthermore, the heritage sector may have them in power, including blond children a good ally once the tables turn. playing in the countryside and sunsets By partnership, we refer to the relation- over ancient monuments, while the latter ship between heritage researchers and civil promises car fires and invasion if today’s servants. While relatively independent, governments are left to define the future. there are limits to what Scandinavian heri- Third, gaps left by changes in govern- tage institutions can do and what civil ser- ance should be addressed. In particular, we vants can say. Equally, there are limits to need to carefully consider the conse- what heritage researchers can know about quences of the trend to devolve authority the inner workings of heritage institutions to regional and local levels in the name of (e.g. Hølleland & Niklasson, 2020). Strategic democracy and efficiency. As the populist partnerships could improve knowledge right aspire to shift power from the elite about the contract between the nation-states to ‘the people’, neo-liberal de-bureaucrat- and their heritage sectors and increase pre- ization measures such as those recently paredness for political instability. introduced by the current coalition gov- By reflexivity, we mean not losing sight ernment in Norway (Hølleland & Skrede, of the historical legacy of archaeology, 2019) can lead to a strategic hollowing- which has taught us that we cannot easily out of expertise. Even if the national heri- dissociate racism from the concept of tage sector’s call for democratization aligns culture (see also Furholt here). When con- with populist-right agendas on the surface, sidering the policies of the populist right,

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