UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Inflection Points: Agenda Setting and American Foreign Policy toward Islamist Groups Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/00x9c4r2 Author Halvorson, Leah Amelia Publication Date 2013 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Inflection Points: Agenda Setting and American Foreign Policy toward Islamist Groups A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Leah Amelia Halvorson 2013 Copyright by Leah Amelia Halvorson 2013 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Inflection Points: Agenda Setting and American Foreign Policy toward Islamist Groups by Leah Amelia Halvorson Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles 2013 Professor Steven L. Spiegel, Chair This dissertation addresses why U.S. foreign policy toward Islamist groups has varied over time. Although recent scholarship has improved our understanding of how non-state actors, particularly terrorist groups, operate, not enough work has attempted to understand how states devise policies toward non-state actors. It builds on previous work to go beyond analyzing U.S. policy toward the broad concept of “Political Islam”, and instead addresses U.S. policy over time and toward specific groups. I examine two militant and two nonmilitant case studies: the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian Hamas, and Lebanese Hezbollah. Employing John Kingdon’s garbage can model of agenda setting, I argue that variation in U.S. policy toward these groups is a function of policy entrepreneurs linking a new solution (ranging from engagement to confrontation) to a problem (the Islamist group) in the context of policy windows of opportunity. These agenda setting processes explain why U.S. policy toward Islamist groups appears to change suddenly after periods of stasis. ii The dissertation of Leah Amelia Halvorson is approved. Joel D. Aberbach Carol Ann Bakhos Deborah W. Larson Jonathan Zasloff Steven L. Spiegel, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2013 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1- Applying John Kingdon’s Garbage Can Model of Agenda Setting……………..……1 Chapter 2- The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood……………………………………………….…53 Chapter 3- The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood……………………………………………..…112 Chapter 4- Hamas………………………………………………………………………………166 Chapter 5- Hezbollah…………………………………………………………………………...224 Chapter 6- Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….310 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………330 iv TABLES AND FIGURES TABLES 2.1 U.S. Policy toward the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood………...…………………….……...56 3.1 U.S. Policy toward the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood……………………………………115 4.1 U.S. Policy toward Hamas………………………………………………………………….169 5.1 U.S. Policy toward Hezbollah………………………………………………………………227 FIGURES 1.1 The Garbage Can Model and U.S. Policy toward Islamist Groups………………………….27 2.1 Congressional Hearings Mentioning the Muslim Brotherhood……………………….……..90 2.2 Congressional Hearings Mentioning Islamic Fundamentalism…………………….………..90 2.3 Media Attention to Islamic Fundamentalism………………………………………………...91 4.1 Congressional Hearings Mentioning Hamas 1987-2000 ……………………….……….…198 4.2 Media Attention to Hamas 1987-2000……………………………………………………...199 4.3 Congressional Hearings Mentioning Hamas 1987-2011………………………….………..217 4.4 Media Attention to Hamas 1987-2011……………………………………………………...218 5.1 Congressional Hearings Mentioning Hezbollah 1983-1999……………………..................274 v 5.2 Congressional Hearings Mentioning Hamas, Hezbollah, or the MB 1987-1999…………..274 5.3 Media Attention to Hezbollah 1982-1999………………………………………………….275 5.4 Congressional Hearings Mentioning Hezbollah 1999-2011……………………..…………295 5.5 Congressional Hearings Mentioning Hamas, Hezbollah, or the MB 1987-2011……….….296 5.6 Media Attention to Hezbollah 1990-2011……………………………………………..…...297 vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are so many people who have helped me during my time at UCLA. Professor Spiegel, my dissertation advisor, has been especially supportive and generous with his time. His mentorship has meant so much over the years. My committee members all provided extremely helpful insights. Thank you to Professors Aberbach, Bakhos, Larson, and Zasloff. I would particularly like to thank Professor Aberbach for introducing me to the model I employ in this dissertation. The UCLA Center for Middle East Development helped fund my graduate studies by hiring me as a Graduate Student Researcher. I had marvelous experiences working for CMED and to this day I appreciate the opportunities they gave me. I would also like to thank Florence Akinyemi, Eric Bordenkircher, Stacey Greene, and Chad Nelson for all of their excellent comments and suggestions. Additional thanks go to Herman Sievering for helping me with my charts. My family, as always, stood by me. My mom and dad both read drafts and helped edit this dissertation. They have been unconditionally loving and believed in me from day one. My brother Seth has been an outstanding mentor and friend. He gave me invaluable advice and was always willing to listen to me or read anything I sent him. I could not have asked for a better role model. And to my wonderful husband Eric, I want to express my deep appreciation for all of his love and enduring support. Thank you for having faith in me. vii VITA B.A., Religion 2001 Reed College Portland, OR M.A., Political Science 2009 University of California, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA C.Phil., Political Science 2011 University of California, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA viii CHAPTER ONE Applying John Kingdon’s Garbage Can Model of Agenda Setting 1 Introduction Combating Islamist groups became a major American policy priority following 9/11. However Political Islam was on the U.S. policy radar long before the attacks and it was not always cast in negative terms. Sometimes it was viewed as a strategically valuable force for advancing American interests. After World War II, The U.S. embassy made numerous friendly contacts with key Islamic leaders in Egypt in the normal course of obtaining information about local political conditions. A U.S. embassy official worked with Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and talked about the possibility of cooperating against the communist threat.1 The U.S. relied on Islamist groups during the Cold War against the spread of Communism, supporting the Afghani Mujahidin against the Soviets in Afghanistan.2 President Carter also reached out to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during the Iranian hostage crisis, in hopes that the General Guide could convince Khomeini to release the hostages. Relations with Islamist groups became more complicated and contentious during the 1980s, although the Reagan administration was still committed to the Cold War binary that distinguished between “good” (meaning anti-communist) and “bad” (anti-U.S.) Islamists. Lebanese Hezbollah, for example, fell into the latter category, as it was responsible for numerous terrorist attacks, including the 1983 bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut, which resulted in the deaths of 241 Americans. As more Islamist groups formed and began to spread across the Middle East after the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. feared that Islamic 1 Khalil Al-Anani, “Is ‘Brotherhood’ with America Possible?,” Arab Insight 1 (2007): 12. 2 Maria do Céu Pinto, Political Islam and the United States: a Study of U.S. Policy Towards Islamist Movements in the Middle East, 1st ed, Durham Middle East Monographs Series (Reading [England]: Ithaca Press, 1999). 2 radicalism would sweep across the region. Arab governments like Egypt, attempting to bolster their own power, often used the specter of Islamic radicalism as a way to convince the U.S. to increase economic aid, and give them a free hand to repress domestic Islamist rivals.3 As the fear of Islamists increased and became a higher policy priority, one might have expected a more uniform Political Islam policy to emerge in the U.S. In reality, the U.S. treats each group differently. Sometimes American policymakers have engaged with a moderate Islamist group, and sometimes not. The U.S. has engaged in low level talks with one militant Islamist group, while consigning similar group to pariah status. As a result, variation in U.S. foreign policy toward Islamist political groups has been inconsistent. Groups that share organizational characteristics and ideological commitments are often treated very differently. For example, in recent years (before the Arab Spring revolutions of early 2011) the U.S. occasionally engaged with the nonmilitant Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but rarely and usually in an unofficial capacity. The U.S. has had more contact with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood through its political wing, the Islamic Action Front. U.S. policy has also been aggressively focused on containing Hamas and Hezbollah, two militant Islamist organizations, although the approach to each group is quite distinct. In the case of Hamas, the Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda” insisted on open elections, which inadvertently contributed to a political crisis in which Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election. Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration backtracked on Middle East democracy promotion, opening the door for regional allies to crack down on moderate Islamist parties such