DOCSLIB.ORG

Case 1:21-Cv-03503 Document 1 Filed 06/22/21 Page 1 of 183 Pageid #: 1

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Case 1:21-Cv-03503 Document 1 Filed 06/22/21 Page 1 of 183 Pageid #: 1 Case 1:21-cv-03503 Document 1 Filed 06/22/21 Page 1 of 183 PageID #: 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK STEPHANIE ZOBAY, individually, and for the estate of STEPHEN S. EVERHART, LINDSAY M. EVERHART, ABDUL GHAFFAR MUGHAL, SITORAI KHASANZOD, KHALID MUGHAL, HAMID MUGHAL, ANGELA MUGHAL, N.M., by and through her next friend Abdul Ghaffar Mughal, M.M., by and through his next friend Abdul Ghaffar Mughal, WAYNE NEWBY, THERESA HART, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED NATHAN NEWBY, JASON RZEPA, CASSANDRA RZEPA, C.R., by and through his next friend Cassandra Rzepa, K.R., by and through his next friend Adrian Davis, TYLER N. OGDEN, WILLIAM M. CHINN, Case No.: 21-cv-3503 SEAN M. NIQUETTE, LAUREN NIQUETTE, THOMAS NIQUETTE, MARY NIQUETTE, ED ELLIOTT, BRIAN C. ALLDRIDGE, JOANN ALLDRIDGE, RONALD ALLDRIDGE, DIANNA ALLDRIDGE, TODD JEFFREY ALLDRIDGE, ANDREW MAJOR, ASHLEY MAJOR, ALYSSA MAJOR, MARCUS JAMIL SULLEN, DAVID EUGENE HICKMAN, VERONICA HICKMAN, DEVON F. HICKMAN, TAMMIE FROST, individually, and for the estate of RUSSELL FROST, MADISON FROST, CRYSTAL FROST, AMANDA FROST, WAIEL EL-MAADAWY, BILQIS AIDARA ADJEI, ALEXIS GRANT, MALIK ELMAADAWY, G.E., by and through his next friend Latasha Elmaadawy, ZEINAB EL-MAADAWY, IHAB EL- MAADAWY, TAMER EL-MAADAWY, MOHAMMED EL-MAADAWY, MUSTAFA EL- MAADAWY, AMR MOHAMED, BRENDA MOHAMED, Plaintiffs, v. MTN GROUP LIMITED, MTN IRANCELL, MTN DUBAI LIMITED, ZTE CORPORATION, ZTE (USA) INC., and ZTE (TX) INC., Defendants. Case 1:21-cv-03503 Document 1 Filed 06/22/21 Page 2 of 183 PageID #: 2 COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT Ryan R. Sparacino (pro hac vice forthcoming) Eli J. Kay-Oliphant (EDNY Bar No. EK8030) SPARACINO PLLC 1920 L Street, NW, Suite 535 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: 202.629.3530 [email protected] [email protected] Case 1:21-cv-03503 Document 1 Filed 06/22/21 Page 3 of 183 PageID #: 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 DEFENDANTS .............................................................................................................................. 5 A. The MTN Defendants ............................................................................................. 5 B. The ZTE Defendants ............................................................................................... 6 JURISDICTION AND VENUE ..................................................................................................... 6 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ......................................................................................................... 7 I. SINCE THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN 1979, THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, INCLUDING THE QODS FORCE, HAS FOMENTED AND SUSTAINED ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORISM .............. 7 A. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, has long supported anti-American terrorism as part of Iran’s foreign policy ............... 7 B. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, has historically relied on fronts, operatives, and agents to fund, arm, and operationally support Iran’s anti-American terrorist proxies ................................ 17 II. DEFENDANTS TRANSACTED BUSINESS WITH FRONTS, OPERATIVES, AND AGENTS CONTROLLED BY THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, INCLUDING THE QODS FORCE ........... 20 A. An Iranian-backed Shiite terrorist alliance comprised of Hezbollah, Jaysh al-Mahdi, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, waged a deadly terrorist campaign against Americans in Iraq .................. 21 1. Hezbollah ........................................................................................................ 26 2. Jaysh al-Mahdi ................................................................................................ 30 3. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a Jaysh al-Mahdi Special Group ....................................... 33 4. Kataib Hezbollah, a Jaysh al-Mahdi Special Group ....................................... 34 B. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s, including the Qods Force’s, control of Iran’s telecom, information technology, and communications sectors ................................................................................................................... 36 1. The Bonyad Mostazafan ................................................................................. 36 2. Iran Electronics Industries .............................................................................. 43 i Case 1:21-cv-03503 Document 1 Filed 06/22/21 Page 4 of 183 PageID #: 4 3. MTN Irancell .................................................................................................. 44 4. Telecommunications Company of Iran ........................................................... 45 5. The Akbari Front Companies .......................................................................... 47 III. DEFENDANTS’ TRANSACTIONS WITH FRONTS, OPERATIVES, AND AGENTS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, INCLUDING THE QODS FORCE, PROVIDED FINANCING, WEAPONS, AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS ............................................. 48 A. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, raised funds, purchased weapons, and obtained operational support through illicit corporate transactions in the telecom, communications, and IT sectors ............... 48 B. Defendants made illicit deals with fronts, operatives, and agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Including the Qods Force ........................... 51 IV. DEFENDANTS KNEW OR RECKLESSLY DISREGARDED THAT THEIR TRANSACTIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, INCLUDING THE QODS FORCE, FACILITATED TERRORIST ATTACKS ON AMERICANS IN IRAQ ................................................................... 53 A. Defendants’ transactions directly funded, armed, and operationally supported terrorist attacks on Americans in Iraq .................................................. 53 B. Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their transactions with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including Qods Force, fronts, operatives, and agents aided terrorism .................................................................. 59 V. EACH DEFENDANT ENGAGED IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS THAT IT KNEW OR RECKLESSLY DISREGARDED WERE STRUCTURED TO FINANCE, ARM, AND/OR OPERATIONALLY SUPPORT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, INCLUDING THE QODS FORCE, AND THEIR TERRORIST PROXIES HEZBOLLAH AND JAYSH AL-MAHDI ................................................................ 66 A. The MTN Defendants ........................................................................................... 66 1. MTN secured its joint venture with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, in MTN Irancell through bribes and a contractual promise to aid Iran-backed terrorism ........................................ 66 2. MTN knowingly assumed a financial and operational role in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s, including the Qods Force’s, terrorist enterprise ........................................................................................... 81 a. MTN assumed a financial role in the terrorist enterprise ............................... 84 ii Case 1:21-cv-03503 Document 1 Filed 06/22/21 Page 5 of 183 PageID #: 5 b. MTN assumed an operational role in the terrorist enterprise ......................... 87 3. MTN’s joint venture with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, comports with its historical business practices in international markets ................................................................. 102 4. MTN’s joint venture with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, had a substantial nexus to the United States ....... 104 a. MTN’s conduct targeted the United States ................................................... 105 b. MTN’s conduct relied on American contacts ............................................... 109 B. The ZTE Defendants ........................................................................................... 112 1. ZTE knowingly assumed a financial and operational role in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s, including the Qods Force’s, terrorist enterprise ....................................................................................................... 112 2. ZTE’s assistance to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, comports with its historical sales practices in international markets ..................................................................................... 119 3. ZTE’s assistance to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Qods Force, had a substantial nexus to the United States ....................... 121 a. ZTE’s conduct targeted the United States .................................................... 122 b. ZTE’s conduct relied on American contacts ................................................. 126 VI. HEZBOLLAH, JAYSH AL-MAHDI, AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, INCLUDING THE QODS FORCE, USED DEFENDANTS’ FUNDS AND OPERATIONAL AID TO FINANCE TERRORIST OPERATIONS, BUY AND/OR BUILD ADVANCED WEAPONS SPECIALLY DESIGNED TO TARGET AMERICANS IN IRAQ, AND SUSTAIN THE JOINT CELLS USED TO COMMITT TERRORIST ATTACKS THAT KILLED AND INJURED AMERICANS IN IRAQ ......................................................................................................................... 127
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Health Sector
    Electricity Sector Project's name Location Capacity Province 1 Al-Yusfiya Gas Al-Yusfiya 1500 Mega Baghdad Station Project Watt (Combined Cycle) - Communication Sector None Health Sector No Project’s Name Type of Province Investment Opportunities 1. General hospital, capacity: (400) beds- New Baghdad/ Al-Rusafa/ 15 buildings ( 12 main healthcare construction Bismayah New City centers / (1) typical healthcare center, specialized medical center). 2. Specialized cancer treatment center New Baghdad, Al Karkh and Al- construction Rusafa 3. Arabic Child Hospital in Al-Karkh (50 New Baghdad/ Al-Karkh beds) construction 4. 3-4 Drugs and medical appliances New Baghdad, Al Karkh and Al- factory. construction Rusafa 5. 1 Sterility and fertility hospital, New Baghdad in Al Karkh and Capacity: (50 beds) construction Al-Rusafa 6. 1 Specialized ophthalmology hospital New Baghdad , Al Karkh and Al- Capacity : ( 50 beds ) construction Rusafa 7. 1 Specialized cardiac surgery hospital New Baghdad, Al Karkh and Al- capacity : (100 beds) construction Rusafa 8. Specialized Plastic surgery hospital New Baghdad, Al Karkh and Al- (50 beds) construction Rusafa 9. 2-3 hydrogen peroxide (pure New Baghdad, Al Karkh and Al- O2)Plant Construction Rusafa 10. Complete medical city New Baghdad , Al Karkh and Al- construction Rusafa 11. 4 General hospitals , capacity: 100 bed New Baghdad, Al-Karkh and Al- each construction Rusafa 12. 4 Specialized medical centers, New Baghdad , Al-Karkh and Al- capacity : (50 bed) construction Rusafa Housing and Infrastructure sector No. Project name Location allocatd Province area 1. Establishment of Housing Complex (According Al-Tarimiyah 5609 Baghdad to investor’s economic visibility). District/Abo-Serioel Dunam and Quarter.
    [Show full text]
  • Shia Strength - Iraqi Militants Adapt to the US Drawdown
    TERRORISM & INSURGENCY Date Posted: 30-Sep-2011 Jane's Intelligence Review Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US drawdown Key Points Iranian-backed Shia militants in Iraq are responsible for a disproportionately high number of the US casualties suffered in recent months. Kataib Hizbullah, the most sophisticated group, is considered a direct extension of Iran's Qods Force and could become involved in international operations in support of Iranian goals. Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Promised Day Brigades are Iraqi Shia insurgent groups, whose links to Iran peaked in 2008 and have slowly reduced since then. Iraq's 'special groups', such as Kataib Hizbullah and Promised Day Brigades, have stepped up attacks as US forces look to withdraw. Michael Knights looks at Iran's support for the Shia militants, their operations and their post-US future. The US military suffered its heaviest monthly casualties in Iraq in three years in June, when 14 of its soldiers were killed in action. At least 12 of them were killed by Iranian-backed 'special groups', prompting fresh complaints from the US that Iran was encouraging its Iraqi allies to step up their attacks as the scheduled withdrawal of all US forces from Iraq looms. The surge in attacks highlighted the threat posed by Shia militants, especially if the US and Iraqi governments sign an agreement allowing US forces to stay beyond the 31 December withdrawal deadline. Even if the US leaves as previously agreed, Iran is expected to continue to back Iraqi proxies in order to influence the political situation and retain an ability to strike Western assets in the country and possibly elsewhere.
    [Show full text]
  • UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS for the SECOND CIRCUIT August Term 2015
    Case 14-1978, Document 193-1, 07/20/2016, 1820060, Page1 of 76 14‐1963(L) Kirschenbaum, et al. v. 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT ______________ August Term 2015 (Argued: November 18, 2015 Decided: July 20, 2016) Docket Nos. 14‐1963(L), 14‐1967, 14‐1971, 14‐1974, 14‐1978, 14‐1982, 14‐1986, 14‐1988, 14‐1996, 14‐2098 ____________ KIRSCHENBAUM, ET AL. V. 650 FIFTH AVENUE AND RELATED PROPERTIES JASON KIRSCHENBAUM, ISABELLE KIRSCHENBAUM, on her own behalf and as Executrix of the Estate of Martin Kirschenbaum, JOSHUA KIRSCHENBAUM, DAVID KIRSCHENBAUM, DANIELLE TEITLEBAUM, Plaintiffs‐Appellees, ANNA BEER, HARRY BEER, on his own behalf and as Administrator of the Estate of Alan Beer, ESTELLE CARROLL, PHYLLIS MAISEL, Plaintiffs‐Appellees, STEVEN M. GREENBAUM, in his personal capacity and as administrator of the Estate of Judith (Shoshana) Lillian Greenbaum, ALAN HAYMAN, SHIRLEE HAYMAN, Plaintiffs‐Appellees, CARLOS ACOSTA, MARIA ACOSTA, TOVA ETTINGER, IRVING FRANKLIN, in his personal capacity and as personal representative of the estate of Irma Franklin, BARUCH KAHANE, LIBBY KAHANE, in her personal capacity and as Administratrix Case 14-1978, Document 193-1, 07/20/2016, 1820060, Page2 of 76 of the Estate of Meir Kahane, ETHEL J. GRIFFIN, as Public Administrator of the County of New York and Administratrix of the Estate of Binyamin Kahane, NORMAN KAHANE, in his personal capacity and as Executor of the Estate of Sonia Kahane, CIPORAH KAPLAN, Plaintiffs‐Appellees, EDWENA R. HEGNA, Executrix of the Estate of Charles Hegna, STEVEN A. HEGNA, LYNN MARIE HEGNA MOORE, CRAIG M.
    [Show full text]
  • Transnational Criminal Law
    Introduction to the Laws of Kurdistan, Iraq Working Paper Series Transnational Criminal Law Pub. 2016 Iraq Legal Education Initiative (ILEI) American University of Iraq, Sulaimani Stanford Law School Kirkuk Main Road Crown Quadrangle Raparin 559 Nathan Abbott Way Sulaimani, Iraq Stanford, CA 94305-8610 www.auis.ed.iq www.law.stanford.edu 1 Preface to the Series: Introduction to the Laws of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan Iraq and Iraq's Kurdistan Region is at a compelling juncture in their histories. In the wake of the transition to a democratic state, the country and region economy has prospered and its institutions have grown more complex. As institutional capacity has grown, so too has the need for a robust rule of law. An established rule of law can provide assurances to investors and businesses, while keeping checks on government and private powers and protecting citizens’ fundamental rights. Institutions of higher learning, such as universities and professional training centers, can and should play a key role in stimulating and sustaining this dynamic. Indeed, education is foundational. This paper is part of the Introduction to the Laws of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, a series of working papers produced by the Iraqi Legal Education Initiative (ILEI) of Stanford Law School. This series seeks to engage Iraqi students and practitioners in thinking critically about the laws and legal institutions of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. Founded in 2012, ILEI is a partnership between the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani (AUIS) and Stanford Law School (SLS). The project’ seeks to positively contribute to the development of legal education and training in Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Tightening the Reins How Khamenei Makes Decisions
    MEHDI KHALAJI TIGHTENING THE REINS HOW KHAMENEI MAKES DECISIONS MEHDI KHALAJI TIGHTENING THE REINS HOW KHAMENEI MAKES DECISIONS POLICY FOCUS 126 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 126 | March 2014 The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including pho- tocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2014 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei holds a weapon as he speaks at the University of Tehran. (Reuters/Raheb Homavandi). Design: 1000 Colors CONTENTS Executive Summary | V 1. Introduction | 1 2. Life and Thought of the Leader | 7 3. Khamenei’s Values | 15 4. Khamenei’s Advisors | 20 5. Khamenei vs the Clergy | 27 6. Khamenei vs the President | 34 7. Khamenei vs Political Institutions | 44 8. Khamenei’s Relationship with the IRGC | 52 9. Conclusion | 61 Appendix: Profile of Hassan Rouhani | 65 About the Author | 72 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EVEN UNDER ITS MOST DESPOTIC REGIMES , modern Iran has long been governed with some degree of consensus among elite factions. Leaders have conceded to or co-opted rivals when necessary to maintain their grip on power, and the current regime is no excep- tion.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
    IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Baghdad Security Plan Begins
    A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM U.S. Army Sgt. Scott Monahan, a tactical human intelligence team leader, collects an entourage of children while on a civil affairs mission in the Rabi area of Adhamiyah, Baghdad, on February 26, 2007. February 10, 2007 – March 5, 2007 Enforcing the Law: The Baghdad Security Plan Begins by KIMBERLY KAGAN This report, the second in a series, describes the purpose, course, and results of Coalition operations in Baghdad during the fi rst three weeks of Operation Enforcing the Law (also known as the Baghdad Security Plan), from General Petraeus’ assumption of command on February 10, 2007, through March 5. It describes the fl ow of American and Iraqi forces into Baghdad; American and Iraqi command relationships; the efforts of those forces to prepare positions and develop intelligence in critical neighborhoods; the limited clearing operations that the forces already in Baghdad have conducted; and operations against the so-called Mahdi army, or Jaysh al Mahdi, in Baghdad. It describes and evaluates the apparent responses of the Jaysh al Mahdi and al Qaeda to these preparations and early operations, and highlights some of the differences between this operation and last year’s offensives in Baghdad, Operations Together Forward I and II. PAGE 1 • FEBRUARY 10, 2007 – MARCH 5, 2007 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM Mission struction missions in Iraq. He requests troops resident Bush announced an increase for Iraq through the United States Central Com- in U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Economy of the IRGC's Involvement in the Iranian Oil and Gas Industry
    The Political Economy of the IRGC’s involvement in the Iranian Oil and Gas Industry: A Critical Analysis MSc Political Science (Political Economy) Thesis Research Project: The Political Economy of Energy University of Amsterdam, Graduate School of Social Sciences 5th June 2020 Author: Hamed Saidi Supervisor: Dr. M. P. (Mehdi) Amineh (1806679) Second reader: Dr. S. (Said) Rezaeiejan [This page is intentionally left blank] 2 Table of Contents Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................ 3 Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... 6 Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................... 7 Maps ................................................................................................................................................ 8 List of Figures and Tables ................................................................................................................. 10 List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 11 I: RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................................................................... 13 1.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Asaib Ahl Al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups Network
    Backgrounder #38 Asaib Ahl al‐Haq and the Khazali Special Groups Network By Marisa Cochrane, Research Manager, Institute for the Study of War January 13, 2008 Introduction Multi‐National Force‐Iraq has identified various Shia extremist groups operating in Iraq, often using the label Special Groups or Secret Cells (first described in a press conference on July 2, 2007). MNF‐I named Asaib Ahl al‐Haq (AAH, or the League of the Righteous) as an active group on August 19, 2008 and released information that AAH is “affiliated” with Special Groups. This paper evaluates how the two groups are affiliated by testing four hypotheses about the relationship between the Special Groups network, led at one time by Qais Khazali, and Asaib Ahl al‐Haq (League of the Righteous): 1) Asaib Ahl al‐Haq (AAH) is the same as the Khazali Special Groups Network (referred hereafter as Special Groups or SGs); 2) AAH was an affiliate of SGs in 2006 and its successor after Khazali’s arrest in early 2007; 3) AAH was an affiliate of SGs in 2006 and remains so today; and 4) AAH is not related to SGs. After a brief description of Special Groups and AAH, this paper will explore the evidence in support of each hypothesis. The first two hypotheses are most plausible given what is known about these two groups. Because the evidence is ample but indirect, the paper will list the assumptions or qualifications required for each of these hypotheses to be true. The third and fourth hypothesis can be ruled out given the amount of contradictory evidence, the clear connections between the leadership of the two groups, and the statements by MNF‐I.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Or Persia: What's in a Name, the Decline and Fall of a Tourism Industry?
    Iran or Persia: What’s in a name, the decline and fall of a tourism industry? Baum, T.G. and O’Gorman, K.D. Strathclyde Business School University of Strathclyde Cathedral Street Glasgow [email protected] [email protected] Iran is a combination of Persia and Islam, it is a complicated, often confused, if not diametrically opposed mix of two ideologies; as a country it is complex and unpredictable but also, from a tourism perspective, unrivalled in the cultural attributes that it can offer to the more intrepid traveller. Historically, modern Iran has its roots in ancient Persia and therefore it is unsurprising that the contemporary nation attempts to trace its cultural heritage back for at least 5,000 years. Hegel considered the ancient Persians to be the first historic people: “In Persia first arises that light which shines itself and illuminates what is around...The principle of development begins with the history of Persia; this constitutes therefore the beginning of history” (Hegel, 1857, p. 147). However, Hegel’s historicism is questionable on two grounds. Firstly, that Persia was identifiable. As Garthwaite has commented, “‘Persia’ is not easily located with any geographic specificity, nor can its people, the Persians, be easily categorized. In the end Persia and the Persians are as much metaphysical notions as a place or a people.” (Garthwaite, 2007, p. 1) Indeed, despite the long antecedence of civilisation in the area, until the late sixth century BC, there are no known historical materials that are written by Persians identifying themselves as Persian.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, Inc. | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1273 Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, Inc. by Mehdi Khalaji Aug 17, 2007 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mehdi Khalaji Mehdi Khalaji, a Qom-trained Shiite theologian, is the Libitzky Family Fellow at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis nderstanding the impact of Washington's expected designation of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps U (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization requires knowing what role the Revolutionary Guards play in Iranian society. Apart from being a military force with naval, air, and ground components organized in parallel to the conventional Iranian military, the Revolutionary Guards are the spine of the current political structure and a major player in the Iranian economy. Backbone of the Regime In his 1988 last will and testament, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called on the military forces "to follow the regulation of non-interference of the military in the affairs of political parties" and "keep themselves away from political games." In the years since, the opposite has occurred. Once a theocratic state, the Islamic Republic has evolved into a "garrison state," to use an American political science term, in which the military dominates political, economic, and cultural life, and preserves the regime from domestic rather than external opponents. The Iranian constitution forbids the supreme leader from being fully autocratic, but Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has used his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, especially his tight control over the Revolutionary Guards, to expand his power. Khamenei has appointed many former Revolutionary Guards commanders to top political positions, blurring the line between military and civil authority.
    [Show full text]
  • RADICALIZATION DURING the ROUHANI YEARS Iran’S Political Shifts and Their Implications Contents
    ANALYSIS Political momentum in Iran now lies with the radicals. In the wake of U.S. sanctions, PEACE AND SECURITY President Hassan Rouhani’s policy of moderation has failed to produce promised RADICALIZATION economic growth. DURING THE Political shifts in Iran have up- ended the usual dynamics of inter-factional competition to not only affirm the radicals’ ROUHANI YEARS positions, but to also radical- ize the more moderate forces themselves. The hard-liners Iran’s Political Shifts and Their Implications remain a heterogenous group, with intense disputes over ideology and power. David Jalilvand and Achim Vogt (eds.) March 2021 Tehran’s nuclear and regional policies look set to become even more assertive while Iran’s progress in economic diversification renders con- cessions on its part less attractive. PEACE AND SECURITY RADICALIZATION DURING THE ROUHANI YEARS Iran’s Political Shifts and their Implications Contents Introduction 2 1 THE END OF MODERATION? SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RADICALISM UNDER HASSAN ROUHANI 4 Azadeh Zamirirad 2 RADICAL IRAN: GENERATIONAL CHANGES AND OUTLOOKS 9 Narges Bajoghli 3 IRAN’S HEZBOLLAH: A RADICAL AND DECISIVE POLITICAL CURRENT 15 Walter Posch 4 THE FUTURE OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR POLICY AND APPROACH TO THE JCPOA 23 Dina Esfandiary 5 A RADICAL IRAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE LEVANT 29 Hamidreza Azizi 6 IRAN’S RESISTANCE ECONOMY: AMBITIONS AND REALITY 36 David Jalilvand About the Authors 48 1 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – RADICALIZATION DURING THE ROUHANI YEARS Introduction At the start of 2021, the political momentum in Iranian stitutions.1 In February 2020, hard-liners constituted the domestic and foreign affairs lies squarely with the radicals.
    [Show full text]