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MOMENT OF TRUTH | 1 MOMENT OF TRUTH The potential and limits of the US military’s counter-LRA deployment JUNE 2012 Moment of Truth: The potential and limits of the US military’s counter-LRA deployment JUNE 2012 Table of Contents Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 4 Part I: Shifting sands: The advisers’ dynamic operating environment in central Africa ......................... 6 The dysfunction of the regional response to the LRA .......................................................................... 6 The LRA’s exploitation of regional geopolitical tension ........................................................................ 8 Part II: Into the lion’s den: The initial phase of the US counter-LRA deployment ..................................... 12 Information-sharing and civil-military relations ..................................................................................... 13 Pursuit and protection operations by regional military forces............................................................... 14 Encouraging defections and ensuring LRA returnees reach home safely .......................................... 15 Part III: Calibrating a balanced approach: Practical strategies for addressing the LRA threat ................ 16 Military operations and negotiations as strategies to end LRA violence .............................................. 17 Assembling a more targeted, comprehensive policy toolkit ................................................................. 18 The need for President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s personal leadership ....................... 18 More effective and strategic use of military force .................................................................. 19 Four ways to leverage Caesar Achellam’s removal to weaken the LRA................................ 19 Conditional negotiations and diplomatic efforts to deny the LRA safe haven ........................ 20 Defeating the LRA with development and governance ........................................................................ 21 Part IV: Recommendations .............................................................................................................................. 23 For US military advisers deployed in LRA-affected areas .................................................................... 23 For President Obama ........................................................................................................................... 23 Heat Map of Reported LRA Attacks: June 1, 2011 - May 31, 2012 ................................................................ 25 Cover photo: Lindsay Branham of DTJ Moment of Truth: The potential and limits of the US military’s counter-LRA deployment Executive Summary his departure from the LRA also can be leveraged to In October 2011, President Obama announced the encourage the defection of other rebel commanders deployment of nearly 100 US military advisers to and combatants. central Africa to assist Ugandan and regional military forces in defeating the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), However, the LRA remains a grave threat to civilians a Ugandan rebel group that has committed atrocities across a vast swath of central Africa. The LRA against civilians in the region for over two decades. committed at least 53 attacks on civilians in the first While just over half of the 100 advisers are based in three months of 2012, including a spike in attacks in Uganda, where the LRA has not operated since 2006, southeast CAR following Ugandan military pressure on the rest are deployed to four bases in Central African the LRA there earlier in the year. The political situation Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo is equally worrisome. The governments of CAR, Congo, (Congo), and South Sudan, all countries where the South Sudan, and Uganda are distracted by escalating LRA continues to threaten civilians. conflicts in the broader region, particularly resurgent violence in Congo’s Kivus region and the threat of war In the first seven months of their deployment, the between Sudan and South Sudan. Uganda, whose advisers have had a significant impact.1 They have forces remain the keystone of the current counter-LRA helped streamline logistical and intelligence support to strategy, continues to place a very low priority on ending Ugandan military forces, now authorized by the African LRA violence and lacks the capacity to protect civilians Union (AU), that are primarily focused on pursuing from LRA raids. It has reportedly withdrawn all but senior LRA commanders in southeast CAR. This has 800 troops from LRA-affected areas. To escape their led to more intense military pressure on LRA groups and pursuers, senior LRA commanders are now gravitating enabled more LRA combatants there to escape. The towards areas where Ugandan forces are not currently advisers have established operations and intelligence allowed to operate or have limited logistical capacity “fusion centers” in forward operating locations. They to follow them, including northern Congo, northeastern have also worked with State Department field staff CAR, and Sudan’s Darfur region. dedicated to counter-LRA efforts to improve cross- border information-sharing on LRA activity among both Unless further steps are taken to address shortcomings military and civilian actors, and to strengthen civilian in existing efforts, Achellam’s removal is likely to be a protection efforts. US advisers and civilian staff have positive outlier in the midst of years of inconclusive also played a key role in expanding “come home” military operations instead of an indication that messaging distributed through leaflets and FM radio counter-LRA efforts are finally turning the tide against broadcasts to encourage defection of LRA combatants the rebel group. Dismantling the LRA’s command in southeast CAR. structure is the key to decisively ending the LRA threat, but no single approach will achieve this goal. In May 2012, Ugandan forces struck the first significant Policymakers must strategically utilize a range of blow to the LRA’s senior command structure in over strategies, including military operations, “come home” two years by taking Maj. General Caesar Achellam messaging, conditional negotiations with specific into custody after weeks of tracking him through the LRA commanders, and diplomatic engagement to forest. His removal demonstrates that targeted military ensure LRA commanders find no safe haven in the operations can still be effective as a tool to weaken the region. Enhanced civilian protection measures must LRA’s command structure. Information that Achellam be incorporated into all of these efforts to mitigate the shares will provide Ugandan forces with better insight LRA’s violent backlash in response to failed military into the LRA’s inner dynamics and strategies, and operations or negotiations processes, a pattern seen repeatedly in the past. 1 This report is based on research conducted between Far from locking the US into an inflexible military February and March 2012 in Bangui, Djemah, Obo, and strategy, the deployment of US military advisers in the Zemio, CAR; Yambio, Nzara, and Ezo, South Sudan; Dungu, field has improved the capacity for regional counter- Congo; Kampala and Gulu, Uganda; and Addis Ababa, LRA efforts to utilize the full range of measures Ethiopia. Interviews were conducted with directly-affected communities, civil society leaders, regional government outlined in President Obama’s comprehensive LRA officials, international diplomats, and US military advisers strategy, released in November 2011. The LRA’s stationed in Dungu, Obo, Djemah, Nzara, and Kampala. dispersion across the region and Achellam’s removal RESOLVE | theResolve.org MOMENT OF TRUTH | 5 will likely weaken Kony’s influence over remaining The State Department should also assign at least one LRA commanders, opening up opportunities for additional counter-LRA field staff member to ensure a combinations of different approaches to capture or greater civilian presence in LRA-affected areas. The encourage the surrender of remaining LRA forces. field staff already in place has played a critical role in Key to the success of any counter-LRA efforts will be counter-LRA efforts, in part because of their unique tailoring them to specific LRA groups and commanders. mandate to travel to the field and national capitals in all LRA-affected countries. They have helped US advisers However, more must be done to utilize the skills establish positive relations with local communities and and expertise the advisers bring to the regional humanitarian actors, expanded civilian protection and forces pursuing LRA commanders and protecting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) civilians. US advisers are currently restricted in their programming, and coordinated a more united response movements, limiting their ability to understand patterns from relevant US embassies. in LRA activity and help regional forces respond effectively. They should be allowed greater freedom of Equally important, President Obama must implement movement and more leeway in authorizing the rapid elements of his comprehensive LRA strategy to help deployment of mobility and intelligence resources to protect civilians and reduce the space in which the LRA react to reports of LRA activity. US advisers should can operate. This should include expanded funding also expand on current efforts to

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