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Loosening Kony's Grip

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Loosening Kony's Grip LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP Effective Defection Strategies for Today’s LRA July 2013 a publication of authored by PHIL LANCASTER & LEDIO CAKAJ TABLE OF CONTENTS Methodology ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary and Recommendations .......................................................................................... 4 Map: LRA attacks, January 2010 – June 2013 .................................................................................................. 8 I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 9 II. The Final Chapter?: The LRA of 2013 ................................................................................................ 11 A. Composition ............................................................................................................................................... 11 B. Area of operations ...................................................................................................................................... 12 Map: Estimated location of LRA groups ................................................................................................ 13 C. Kony and LRA command dynamics .......................................................................................................... 15 D. Communications......................................................................................................................................... 16 E. Modus operandi .......................................................................................................................................... 17 III. Homeward Bound: Debating Defection Within the LRA .................................................................. 19 Map: Defection of long-term members of the LRA, January 2012 – June 2013 ............................................. 20 IV. A Region in Chaos: The Context for DDR Initiatives ........................................................................ 27 Map: Counter-LRA military bases vs. LRA area of operations ........................................................................ 28 V. The Forgotten Pillar: The State of LRA Defection Initiatives ........................................................... 34 Map: Come Home message range vs. LRA area of operations ...................................................................... 35 VI. Bring Them Home: Towards a Better Strategy for Encouraging Defection .................................... 40 A. Key considerations for Come Home messages ......................................................................................... 40 B. Shortwave and FM radio ............................................................................................................................ 43 Map: FM radio Come Home broadcast coverage vs LRA area of operations......................................... 45 ............................................................................................................... 46 D. Helicopter loudspeakers ............................................................................................................................. 48 E. Safe Reporting Sites (SRS) ......................................................................................................................... 49 F. Reintegration assistance ............................................................................................................................. 51 G. Expanding into fresh mediums ................................................................................................................... 52 VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 54 Annex I: Estimated LRA composition ...................................................................................................................... 55 Graphic: Estimated LRA composition and combatant capacity .................................................................... 55 Annex II: Approximate LRA group locations ........................................................................................................... 56 ........................................................................................ 58 LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 2 ABOUT METHODOLOGY Published The report was commissioned by The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative (The Resolve). It was researched and © July 2013 The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative - dent consultants, and edited by Paul Ronan, who also Authors contributed original research. Invisible Children also contributed funding for the research. Phil Lancaster PhD, was General Romeo Dallaire’s Mil- itary Assistant during the Rwandan genocide. After re- The authors and editor collected information contained tiring from the Canadian Army, Phil spent more than a - decade working for UNICEF, the World Bank, and the hand interviews with former members of the LRA. In UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). total, they interviewed 22 former LRA combatants or He is the former director of MONUC DDR, and led the abductees. Additional interviews were conducted with World Bank’s LRA Diagnostic Study. His work has fo- cused on LRA issues for the past several years. areas; representatives from the United Nations, Afri- can Union, and donor countries; and representatives Ledio Cakaj (@LedioCakaj) is an independent research- from regional governments and military forces. er with a focus on armed groups, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and security sector Most interviews took place in March and April 2013 during trips to Obo in the Central African Republic years working almost exclusively on the Lord’s Resis- tance Army for various organizations including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo); and Gulu World Bank, Enough Project, and Small Arms Survey. and Kampala, Uganda. Extensive information was also - collected from a review of existing literature on the lications such as Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Africa LRA crisis, as well as previous interviews in LRA-af- Report, and the Journal of East African Studies. fected areas conducted by the authors and editor. Editing and Research Paul Ronan (@pauldronan) is a co-founder of The Re- solve, and currently serves as the Director of Policy. He of Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, and South Sudan. Paul recently authored Hidden in Plain Sight: , published in April 2013. He is also a frequent contrib- think tank forums. Prior to co-founding The Resolve, he worked in the Caritas International and Franciscans Cartography and Design Kenneth Transier (@ktransier) is a Project Manager for The Resolve. He is also the primary cartographer and designer for the LRA Crisis Tracker’s periodic security briefs. Cover photo LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 3 Loosening Kony’s Grip Effective Defection Strategies for Today’s LRA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY had taken as his “wives.” He has ostracized others, The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is likely weaker endure the grueling life in the forests of eastern CAR. than it has been in at least 20 years. LRA groups are In their place, Kony has transferred operational lead- - ership to the youngest remaining generation of Ugan- ifornia, and morale among the Ugandan combatants - that comprise the core of its force is at a new low. At quency (HF) radios to improve coordination between least 31 Ugandan LRA combatants, which is approxi- groups, even though he is most likely aware that such communications may be monitored by the Ugandan army with the help of the US military. of 2013. As of May 2013, there were approximately 500 total combatants and dependents within the LRA, op- Kony has also tried, with limited success, to reach out erating primarily in Central African Republic (CAR) to former backers in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). and Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo). Of LRA groups acting on Kony’s orders have been in these 500 people, approximately 250 are combatants, including up to 200 Ugandans and 50 low-ranking enclave along the border between Sudan and South - Sudan, at least since the end of 2009. An LRA group, munities in CAR, Congo, and South Sudan. likely including Kony, was reportedly based near the Pressure from Ugandan military operations against February or early March 2013. Recent defector reports the LRA in CAR and Congo has contributed to the breakdown of morale and discipline within the ranks then. However, the SAF has so far refused to provide of Ugandan LRA combatants. Launched in Decem- the LRA with substantial military support. - ations have been unable to decisively dismantle the The apparent weakening of the LRA’s internal cohe- LRA’s command structure or comprehensively pro- sion, their long tradition of holding civilian popula- of military operations to achieve a decisive victory sug- operate in Congo and have suspended operations in CAR since the March 2013 coup there. However, over to dismantling the LRA is to encourage increased de- the past four years, the Ugandan military has protect- fections. The large majority of people in the LRA were ed major population centers, kept LRA groups on the forcibly conscripted, and most, including many Ugan- run, disrupted their communications, and made
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