“DE-/SECURITIZING” DURING A TIME OF CRISIS: ANALYZING ITALY’S AND GERMANY’S NARRATIVE

AS A Thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University 7j o \°l In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

In

International Relations

by

Joshua William Jose Salazar

San Francisco, California

Fall 2019 Copyright by Josiiua William Jose Salazar 2019 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read “De-/Securitizing” During a Time of Crisis: Analyzing Italy’s and

Germany’s Narrative by Joshua William Jose Salazar and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in International Relations at San Francisco State University.

Amy Skonieczny, Ph.D. Associate Professor

Professor “De-/Securitizing” During a Time of Crisis: Analyzing Italy’s and Germany’s Narrative

Joshua William Jose Salazar San Francisco, California 2019

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Italy’s and Germany’s contrasting, discursive and physical responses of today’s “European refugee and asylum-seeking crisis.” While some argue that Europe is a full-fledged, securitized garrison, others argue that it is liberalizing and embracing cosmopolitan liberal ideals. This thesis argues that the European Union is doing both. Particularly, it dissects both Angela Merkel’s and Germany’s desecuritization narrative as well as Matteo Salvini’s and Italy’s securitization narrative vis-a-vis the “European refugee and asylum-seeking crisis” between 2016 and 2019. Italy’s liberalism crisis has led to the securitization of refugees and asylum seekers; in contrast, Germany’s spreading of cosmopolitan liberalism had led to the desecuritization of refugees and asylum seekers. The purpose of examining these two approaches is to help us better understand the geopolitical divergences within the European bloc. This thesis develops from the Copenhagen School and supplements their existing de/securitization theories with proximization theory. Last, via both contextual and narrative analyses, this thesis also examines identity(s) (i.e. German-ness/Italian-ness), and how ontological, physical, cultural, or economic (in)securities engender the de-/securitization of immigrant bodies.

I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this Thesis u/rj-wi 1 Chair, Th^isA Committee Date “De/Sekurisation” Wahrend der Krise: Analyse der deutschen und italienischen Erzahlung

Joshua William Jose Salazar San Francisco, California 2019

In dieser Studie werden Italiens und Deutschlands gegensatzliche Reaktionen auf „Europas Fluchtlings- und Asylbewerberkrise“ sowohl auf der Sprach- als auch auf der Handlungsebene untersucht. Wahrend einige Europa als hermetisch abgeschottete Gamison sehen, betrachten sie andere als liberalisierend und kosmolitisch-liberale Ideen verkorpemd. Diese Studie zeigt, dass die Europaische Union beides tut. Es werden insbesondere sowohl Angela Merkels und Deutschlands Narrativ der Desekurisation analysiert als auch Matteo Salvinis und Italiens Narrativ der Sekurisation hinsichtlich „Europas Fluchtlings- und Asylbewerberkrise“ zwischen 2016 und 2019. Italiens Liberalismuskrise fuhrte zu der Sekurisation von Fluchtlingen und Asylbewerbem, wohingegen der sich in Deutschland ausbreitende kosmopolitische Liberalismus zu der Desekurisation dieser fuhrte. Durch die Analyse dieser beiden Herangehensweisen konnen wir die geopolitischen Unterschiede innerhalb Europas besser verstehen. Diese Arbeit basiert auf dem Ansatz der Kopenhagener Schule und ersetzt ihre Theorien der De/Sekurisation mit der Theorie der Proximation. SchlieBlich werden durch kontextuelle und narrative Analysen Identitaten (also Deutsch-Sein und Italienisch-Sein) untersucht. Auch wird aufgezeigt, wie ontologische, physische, kulturelle oder wirtschaftliche (Un)Sicherheiten die De/Sekurisation von Eindwanderer erzeugen. “De / Cartolarizzazione” Durante un periodo di crisi: analisi della narrativa italiana e tedesca”

Joshua William Jose Salazar San Francisco, California 2019

Lo scopo di questa tesi e di esaminare le risposte contrastanti, discorsive e fisiche dell'Italia e della Germania dell'attuale "crisi europea in materia di rifugiati e richiedenti asilo". Mentre alcuni sostengono che l'Europa e a pieno titolo, un territorio sicuro, altri sostengono che si stia liberalizzando e che stia abbracciando ideali liberali cosmopoliti. Questa tesi sostiene che l'Unione europea stia facendo entrambe le cose. In particolare, analizza la narrativa sulla profanazione di Angela Merkel e della Germania, nonche la narrativa sulla cartolarizzazione di Matteo Salvini e dell'Italia nei confronti della "crisi europea in materia di rifugiati e richiedenti asilo" tra il 2016 e il 2019. La crisi del liberalismo in Italia ha portato alia cartolarizzazione dei rifugiati e richiedenti asilo; al contrario, la diffusione della Germania del liberalismo cosmopolita aveva portato alia profanizzazione di rifugiati e richiedenti asilo. Lo scopo di esaminare questi due approcci e di aiutarci a comprendere meglio le divergenze geopolitiche all'intemo del blocco europeo. Questa tesi si sviluppa dalla Scuola di Copenaghen e integra le teorie di de / cartolarizzazione esistenti con la teoria della prossimita. Infine, attraverso analisi sia contestuali che narrative, questa tesi esamina anche l'identita (le identita tedesche / italiane) e il modo in cui i titoli ontologici, fisici, culturali o economici (in) generano la dei corpi degli immigrati. ACKOWLEDGEMENTS

While the scope of this thesis initially grew out of my earlier research on immigration, I owe it to Professor Ellis for helping me to navigate the complex theories on immigration studies. Second, I owe it to Professor Banerjee for igniting an interest within me to consider constructivism for the research on identity(s). Third, I owe it to Professor Skonieczny for introducing narrative analyses to me. Finally, I would like to thank my advisors Professors Banerjee and Skonieczny, as their insightful comments and suggestions have helped to actualize and complete this research.

I would like to express my utmost gratitude to both my family and friends for their constant support on this project. However, I would like to personally recognize Florence and Lauren for their endless laughs, support, and insight.

All of this goes without saying that I am indebted to all of my fellow undergraduate and graduate students and professors. This fulfilling, intellectual, academic, and professional journey would not have been possible without them. LIST OF FIGURES

Figures Page

1. Figure 1: Coded Network for Salvini-Sackur Interview...... 105 2. Figure 2: Coded Network for Salv’ni’s Live Broadcast...... 106 3. Figure 3: Coded Network for Salvini’s Rally in M ilan...... 107 4. Figure 4: Coded Network for Merkel’s NYE Address...... 108 5. Figure 5: Merkel’s First Bundestag Address...... 109 6. Figure 6: Coded Network for Merkel’s Second Bundestag Address...... 110

viii TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures...... viii

Chapter 1 Introduction: The Turn of an Immigration Crisis?...... 1

Chapter 2 Methodology...... 6

Methodological Departure Point...... 10

Qualitative Data: Speeches...... 11

Qualitative Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis...... 13

Qualitative Approach: Semiotic Analysis...... 15

Qualitative Approach: Context Analysis...... 16

Quantitative Data: Public Opinion Polls, Voting Trends, National Project and Agencies...... 17

Quantitative Approach: Lexicometric Analysis...... 18

Methodological Research Limitations...... 20

Chapter 3 Literature Review...... 23

Narratives...... 23

The Copenhagen School...... 24

Desecuritization...... 26

Securitization...... 27

Cosmopolitan Liberalism 30

Criticism...... 32

Chapter 4: An Analysis of Italy’s Securitization Narrative...... 36

Sackur-Salvini Interview...... 36

Salvini’s Live Broadcast...... 40

Salvini’s Rally in Milan...... 45 Chapter 5: An Analysis of Italy’s Securitization Context...... 51

Convincing the Public to Securitize Immigration...... 51

Further Changes in Leadership...... 54

Linking Immigration with Terrorism...... 54

Securitizing Projects...... 57

Public (In)securities vis-a-vis Immigration Influxes...... 59

Public Securitizing Immigration...... 62

Italian Media...... 64

Chapter 6: An Analysis of Germany’s Desecuritization Narrative...... 68

Merkel' s 2016 New Year’s Eve (NYE) Address...... 69

Bundestag Address #1 by Merkel...... 72

Bundestag Address #2 by Merkel...... 76

Chapter 7: An Analysis of Germany Desecuritization Context ...... 82

Labor and Employment...... 82

Public (In)securities vis-a-vis Immigration Influxes...... 86

Public Desecuritizing Immigration...... 89

German Media 90

Refugee and Asylum Seeker Backlash...... 92

Chapter 8 Conclusion...... 98

Recommendations for Further Research...... 98

A Thesis in Review...... 99

Some Final Thoughts...... 103

Bibliography...... I ll Chapter I: The Turn of an Immigration Crisis?

People have immigrated for millennia—for food, for better job or healthcare opportunities, for political protection, and or simply for a better life. Not only is immigration not a new phenomenon, the discourse around immigration has varied over the past century, albeit especially over the past decade. The topic of immigration also continues to spill over into other discussions vis-a-vis national budgets, funding, political rights, and ethics. Immigration-specific topics (i.e. immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers) continue to dominate the media. Not only is it the greatest political hurdle reverberating within legislative bodies worldwide, it is arguably the most contentious ethical hurdle facing humanity today.

The European Union (EU) has since become one of the most sought out places in the world for its job availabilities, healthcare opportunities, and lower presence of volatile economic uncertainties. Salazar (2017a) points out that the European discourse surrounding immigration during the 20th century was largely centered around internal migration as a result of the implementation of the single market, and that it was not until the breakup of former Yugoslavia in 1989, whereby EU policymaking elites began to focus on external immigration (86). Since then, the legislation, the number of agencies, and the amount of funding dedicated towards handling immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees have expanded many-fold. It is no coincidence that it has also increased alongside the rise in the number of Right-wing leaders, human rights violations, corrupt governments, unstable welfare systems, as well as the increased presence of environmental degradation, and unemployment.

1 Today, Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans, Nigerians and Pakistanis have been the largest

demographics seeking asylum (i.e. protection) within the EU (Eurostat, 2016). While

closely examining the push factors for those seeking asylum in the EU is not the scope of

this thesis, it is nevertheless important to consider some of the reasons why these

individuals embark on such deadly exoduses in the first place. In other words, climate

change, the lack of social and political protection, and the absence of economic

opportunities are both the realities of and the primary reasons for why those from

Southwest Asia and North Africa (SWANA) are seeking asylum in the EU (see Docherty

and Giannini, 2009: Foster, 2007; Salazar, 2017a).

According to the Geneva Convention of 1951, “refugee status” is granted to

someone who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political views. In other words, an

asylum seeker seeks “refugee status” (i.e. protection and or material assistance) from

another country based on their well-founded fear of persecution (for the aforementioned

reasons) back in their home country.

EU countries have borne different immigration pressures simply due to their

inevitable, geographic placement—namely southern, Mediterranean, and eastern EU-

border countries: Spain, Italy, Greece, Hungary, or Hungary, for example. While some

EU countries have responded to the increasing immigration influxes reluctantly or with

hostility, in contrast, others have responded eagerly or with open arms. Examining both the discourse and the actions of these EU countries, albeit specifically Italy and Germany,

of the recent immigration waves is the focus of this thesis.

2 To be unaware of the de/securitizatiun of refugees and asylum seekers in

Germany and Italy is to be deaf to European politics. Over the past decade, in particular,

since 2013 sharp cleavages have emerged within the European Union (EU) over the

handling of asylum seekers and refugees. At the root of this contention are different

goals, desires, and narratives.

An examination of the German and Italian discourse vis-a-vis immigration will

also permit us to examine two different narratives. For the purpose of this research,

examining the abstract nature of identity is also important. That is also to say that, through examining these different immigration narratives (that is, in German and Italian

discourse), we can also gain a more informed understanding of the present national

identity(s) at play. Understanding the abstract importance of ontological, physical, and

economic (insecurity is equally important for understanding how this engenders the

de/securitization of refugees and asylum seekers in public spaces. I will closely dissect

such facets in the thesis to come.

Additionally, when we examine the 2016 to early 2019 German Prime Minister’s,

Angela Merkel, and Italian Deputy Prime Minister’s, Matteo Salvini, discourse on

immigration, we can also gain a more holistic understanding of a country’s opinions,

hopes, desires, and fears—all of which are important factors for determining an asylum

seeker’s acceptance (or rejection) into/within a country. All of this is to say that,

examining such narratives, identities, and (in)securities are the second tenet of my thesis.

Further, understanding their linguistic proximizations is critical for understanding how

this engenders the de/securitization of refugees and asylum seekers. Understanding and

exploring these loci have become especially important in today’s contentious political

3 era, whereby refugees and asylum seekers are treated as dehumanized pawns amidst

policymakers political games.

This research project aims at unveiling how identity(s) emerge vis-a-vis refugees

and asylum seekers in German (e.g. Angela Merkel) and Italian (e.g. Matteo Salvini)

discourse. It also tries to explore how immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers are

(re)presented in the media and legislative documents, by locals and by policymaking

elites. In other words, it also examines Italians’ and Germans" sentiments towards

refugees and asylum seekers. Although this thesis primarily uses Germany and Italy as its

case studies, and because it is too ambitious of a task to examine the entire textual

corpora of the whole EU bloc, this thesis will make occasional attempts to situate events, texts, bodies, and or identities in relation to Europe.

This project would of course be incomplete if I failed to look at how Germany

and Italy have treated refugees and asylum seekers. My hope is that by 1) examining

German and Italian “European refugee crisis” discourse and; 2) by looking at how refugees and asylum seekers are treated socially, physically, economically, or medically, readers will gain a more holistic understanding of how they are presently treated as a whole in Germany and Italy—a topic seldomly covered in the media and less commonly explored among international relations scholars. Step two is an example of context analysis (see page 23).

Speaking on a more macro level, and conducive to my research purpose, I hope to shed light on the geopolitical shifts taking place within the European bloc—a phenomenon not endemic to the EU—which has clearly signaled a retreat from

4 traditional liberal orthodoxy—and whichis also a potentially important political warning sign (see Meny and Surel, 2002: 15). Last, my hope and goal of this project is to help international relations scholars, political scientists, policymaking elites, and readers understand the consequences, costs/benefits, and trends that is making up and behind the

“European refugee crisis.” And with such knowledge, my hope is that we can encourage the work towards finding and implementing a more common, speedy, and effective solution for handling refugees and asylum seekers in Europe.

I first became interested in this research project due to my own curiosity for the

“European refugee crisis.” What is it per se, and why does it continue to dominate the media worldwide? Why do Right-wing, populist leaders continue to include asylum seekers and refugees in their rhetoric? Are they a tenet to their success? More specifically, why have two, strong, EU member states and their leaders (i.e. Germany’s,

Angela Merkel and Italy’s, Matteo Salvini) diverged with how they have narrativized and handled refugees and asylum seekers? These questions were paramount in both the actualization and writing process of this thesis.

This paper argues that there is both de/securitization of immigration taking place within the European bloc. In other words, this thesis argues and explores the recent politicization (i.e. de/securitization) of refugees and asylum seekers within Germany and

Italy. It looks at how Germany (i.e. Angela Merkel) and Italy (i.e. Matteo Salvini) have curated and spearheaded two contrasting, albeit widely supported, narratives and approaches for handling refugees and asylum seekers. It will make its case for one specific time period: January 2016 to May 2019—approximately a three-year block. In looking at discursive linguistic constructions, and developing from the Copenhagen

5 School (CS), this thesis also argues that the dominant narrative within Italy at that time

was that refugees and asylum seekers needed to be securitized and, on the other hand,

within Germany, the dominant narrative was to push for their desecuritization. The

successful prevalence and presence of cosmopolitan liberal ideology has led to refugees’

and asylum seekers’ desecuritization; in contrast, in Italy, the crisis of liberalism has led

to refugees’ and asylum seekers securitization. Second, native Germans and Italians’

ontological, cultural, physical, and economic (in)security continues to engender the

production and reproduction of their de/securitization practices (e.g. narrative) towards

refugees and asylum seekers.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Merkel’s and Salvini s opposing narratives are the perfect case studies to examine

here. While the two countries are presently both engaging in de/securitizing practices,

speaking on a more macro level, the two leaders and countries have diverged in opposite

directions, as they try and make sense of—that is narrativize—and act in relation to the

recent refugee and asylum-seeking influxes.

To be clear, what my thesis is trying to help readers understand is how and why

these de/securitization narratives vis-a-vis refugees and asylum seekers have gone from

extreme to mainstream in Germany and Italy. On the one hand, it examines how the securitization narrative has constructed a dichotomizing discourse of “terror/crisis” and,

on the other hand, it dissects how the growing desecuritization narrative continues to

challenge the existing securitization theories and practices. Thus, by dissecting and

conceptualizing how states develop these particular narratives, we can also unveil how

6 states make sense of, act in, and define the world around them. Further, by examining these practices and narratives, we can understand how and which agents feel about an

Other (e.g. refugees and asylum seekers in Germany and Italy). As will be outlined later, my methodological innovation aims at supplementing de/securitization theory with proximization theory.

Allow me to summarize my methodology. First, I will primarily look at six different speech texts between 2016 and 2019 and perform a critical discourse/narrative analysis. Three of the texts are from German Prime Minister, Angela Merkel (two speeches addressed towards the German Parliament or Bundestag and one New Year’s address); and three of them are from Italy 's Deputy Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini (one interview one live broadcast; and one speech at a rally in Milan). How I chose this speech data is explained in my methodology section below (see pages 16-18). I will employ both semiotic and lexicometric analyses, whereby I will look at the frequency of de/securitization words, themes, or phrases and explicate how certain narratives can have political intentions/goals. I will also make occasional attempts to situate Merkel’s and

Salvini s discourse with other Germans and Italians (e.g. party leaders, state officials, and citizens) as I make my case. By looking at their linguistic constructions, I hope to illustrate how successful cosmopolitan liberal ideology has fueled the desecuritization of immigration. Conversely, I also hope to illustrate how Italy’s crisis of liberalism has fueled the securitization of immigration.

Second, I can actualize my research and compliment my findings that refugees, and asylum seekers are being actively de/securitized via a context analysis (see Tuval-

Mashiach, 2014). A context analysis will help me to look not only at de/securitizing

7 discourse but also the actions undertaken by both locals and policymakers vis-a-vis refugees and asylum seekers. Examining voting trends, political shifts, national budgets, local projects, and agencies will also prove fruitful in outlining how refugees and asylum seekers are being de/securitized in Germany and Italy.

I will then input these speeches into the Atlas.ti software—one of the most common and multivariate computer programs for performing qualitative research—where

I will then code the speeches (i.e. words, phrases, or complete sentences) that contain de/securitizing implications or inferences. In particular, I can use the search function to quickly locate de/securitizing words or to locate the context which imply the de/securitization of refugees and asylum seekers: “threat-[s]”; “border”; “illegal”;

“terrorists”; “crime”; “as “terr-[or]/[ists]”; “destroy”; “harm”; “safety”; “preservation”;

“defend”; “close”; or “protect.” For example, Nabers (2009) employs a similar technique, albeit into Microsoft text-to-Batch, whereby he searches for opposite, signifying words

(i.e. “terror”-“freedom”) to examine Bush’s overlexicalization and production of a dichotomous, freedom-fighting-terrorist narrative. Nevertheless, by no means are the former words exhaustive. After locating these words or phrases, I will then be able to make my case and explicate how actors are suggesting the securitization of immigrants. I can also create visual representations with this software, too (see Figures 1 - 6).

In contrast, I can replicate the aforementioned process, albeit for desecuritizing words or phrases. In addition, to searching for securitizing rhetoric in German textual corpora (which I expect to be little to non-existent), I will also examine Merkel’s speech data for desecuritizing rhetoric, too. Again, by no means is the following list concrete or exhaustive: “help”; “assist”; “integrate”; “responsibility”; “duty”; “open”; “unity”;

8 “stability”; or “together.” By being able to identify the disproportionate presence of these desecuritizing words in Merkel’s textual corpora vis-a-vis Salvini’s textual corpora, and because the two lead in the polls, I will then partially be able to make my case that

Germany is curating and spearheading a narrative of immigrants desecuritization, and vice versa for Italy. In other words, by being able to code German and Italian text for de/securitizing words and phrases, I can illustrate how the two continue to engender and reproduce narratives which suggest that refugees and asylum seekers need to be de/securitized. Examining how Merkel and Salvini discursively situate German(s)-

/Italian(s)- ness is important for understanding how this can cause certain policy discourses, too.

To reiterate, claiming that immigrants are “terrorists,” “threats,” or “burdens” according to the CS and framing theory implies that they need to be securitized—an intentional speech and political act. And if, on the one hand, what I am trying to do here is 1) illustrate how Italy’s, Salvini, continues to curate a narrative which suggests that immigrants need to be securitized, or 2) illustrate how Italy is undertaking securitizing practices, then I will be able to easily do so via discursive coding, that is, with the help of

Atlas.ti.

This technique of discursive coding is a mode undertaken by many fields: linguistics, sociology, feminism, and much recently, international relations and political science. Social scientists have coded speeches for rhetoric that is ‘racist’ (Weaver, 2011);

‘divisive’ (Kelley, 2018); ‘terrorizing’ (Dixit, 2016); ‘securitizing’ (Buonfino, 2004); or

‘desecuritizing’ (Hansen, 2012). What all of these scholars have in common is that they are all coding speeches for particular themes, narratives, or social constructions. In other

9 words, they are all examining how actors frame, situate, or narrativize particular events,

people, places, or things. It has only been until much recently that the scholarship began

to examine immigrants de/securitization (van Munster. 2009; Walters, 2010).

To be clear, this paper fills a void where the scholarship examining immigrants

de/securitization remains slim. Second, to my knowledge, this paper is the first to conduct

a discursive, cross-comparison analysis between Germany’s and Italy’s de/securitizing

narratives. Some of the earlier studies have honed in on only one country (Castaneda and

Holmes, 2016; Bocskor et al., 2018). This approach is not only parochial, it is

problematic because it fails to situate the discourse in the larger European context or

other EU countries, in general. Third, it supplements existing securitization theory with

proximization theory.

Methodological Departure Point

Before delving into the heart of my research, it is first important that I further

demarcate the methodological frameworks from which I am developing from and writing

within. Although the “European refugee crisis” has only recently developed, albeit

especially 2013 onwards, the literature on it and the methodologies undertaken by

international relations scholars remain fruitful and abundant: ethnographic studies; case

studies / context analyses; content analyses; discursive coding / framing analyses; or

narrative, semiotic, lexical, and lexicometric analyses. With the help of both lexicometric

and context analyses, we can examine both the linguistic content and the environmental

context of German and Italian public spaces and textual corpora. That is also to say that, we will be able to better understand how immigrants become de/securitized both

10 discursively and actively (see also Nabers, 2009; Cap, 2014; Salazar, 2017a; Baamhielm

et al., 2017; Hercowitz-Amir et al., 2017).

Kane looks at the competing narrative during the Irish Land War of 1879-1882

and explicates how different Irish groups who, would not normally align, came together

under a similar narrative. She takes a linguistic category, such as “land” and reworks it

within different groups, in order to show how competing groups, define it. In summary,

she writes that, “Competing groups often refer to the same event but narrativize it

differently to promote their own discursive position” (Kane, 2000:318; see also

Alexander & Smith, 1993; Battani, Hall, & Powers, 1997). I plan to use Kane’s study as

my departure point for my case analysis. That is to say that, my paper—like hers—is trying to conceptualize how and why two groups (i.e. German liberals and Italian national populists) are competing to define their reality (i.e. refugee and asylum seeker influxes)

around them, albeit in two polarizing narratives—that is, via de/securitization.

Henceforth, narrativizing certain “crises” is an intentional act that is expecting something

in return. And this is precisely where and what my paper is picking up on.

Qualitative Data: Speeches

In order to actualize this research, I will primarily be examining six different

speech transcriptions between 2016 and 2019: three from Angela Merkel (two addresses to the Bundestag and one New Year’s Eve address') and three from Matteo Salvini (one live broadcast, one speech from a rally in Milan, and one interview). In looking at such

speech data, I will employ a narrative analysis and see how the two give both policies and

(in)securities meaning.

11 I chose to examine the time period between 2016 and 2019 because I wanted to examine the short, albeit entire, time frame of the European refugee crisis. Henceforth, it made the most sense to find speech data from the entire three-year block. It is also particularly this three-year block whereby both Merkel and Salvini began to vie with one another on an international level. I also wanted to see the changes (if any) in narrative not only by Merkel and Salvini, but also vis-a-vis one another from the turn of the “crisis” to today.

Deciding which speech data that I was going to look was the hardest and longest obstacle that I faced. For the purpose of this paper I used Google Video and YouTube as my primary search engines for speech data. I used their advanced settings’ capabilities to filter the videos by date and by duration. I chose to examine longer videos

(approximately 10+ minutes) for the purpose of providing more fruitful results in my critical discourse/narrative analysis. It was difficult finding complete videos of the two leaders, as many of the videos were incomplete clips or commentary from other news sources. I used key words such as “refugee crisis”; “refugees”; “asylum seekers”;

“Merkel”/“Salvini”; “immigration”; “speech”; “rally”; “interview”; “address” to filter through the video results. I used these keywords for the purpose of finding videos whose content fit the scope of this thesis. I have translated and transcribed the speeches into

Microsoft Word—incorporating all of the phrases referencing or alluding to immigration, refugees, and asylum seekers—followed by coding these transcriptions via Atlas.ti.

Given my own fluency in Italian, I have translated the three talks by Salvini. I have tried my best to translate his discourse, albeit some phrases were unable to be translated quite literally. Any mistranslations are solely my wrongdoing. Conversely,

12 Merkel’s New Year’s address was translated by DW her first address to the Bundestag was translated by Euronews; and her second address to the Bundestag was translated by

Google. I have crosschecked all these translations with Bing Translator for accuracy.

Qualitative Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis

A CDA on the “European refugee crisis” narratives (as posited by Salvini and

Merkel) is the most effective vehicle for explaining how identity, concerns, or desires engender certain actions or narratives, such as the de/securitization of refugees and asylum seekers. In other words, a CDA will allow me to probe and track the elements of the de/securitization narratives (e.g. symbolic projects, rallies, speeches, interviews, events, foreign and domestic policies), as well as see how they change over time and with(in) one another.

Critical discourse analyses examine textual corpora and view speech text as an intentional, social practice. Norman Fairclough (1999; 2013) and Ruth Wodak (2015) are the pioneers of CDA who examine both linguistic and sociopolitical contexts. Blommaert and Bulcaen put their widely applied method succinctly: CDA examines “issues of power asymmetries, exploitation, manipulation, and structural inequalities” (Blommaert and

Bulcaen, 2000: 451). They further conclude that CDA have since expanded to examining

“political discourse” (Wodak, 1989; Chilton et al., 1998); “racism” (van Dijk, 1987,

1991); “immigration” (Martin Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999);

“economic discourse” (Fairclough 1995); “commercial advertisement” (Slembrouck,

1993; Thomborrow. 1998); “media language” (van Dijk, 1991; Kress, 1994); “gender”

(Caldas-Coulthard 1993, 1996); “institutional discourse and practice” (Wodak, 1997;

IB Hall et al., 1997) (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 450-451). To be clear my paper fits in

with and adds to the existing CDA literature, as formerly noted. However, my paper is

one of the few (if not the first) to conduct a CDA which compares the German and Italian

discourse on the “European immigration crisis.”

A CDA will enable me to study hegemony or inequality, as it is enacted in

varying “social and political contexts” (van Dijk, 2001: 352). Some scholars have

undertaken the aforementioned methodology and applied Gramsci’s theory on hegemony

(see Holmes & Castaneda, 2016). Their CDA is unique because they use this “war of

position” as a lens for understanding the bipolar narratives of the “European refugee

crisis.” The Gramscian approach is conducive to my case because it can help us

understand how and why actors vie with one another in a war of position, as they try to

narrativize the refugee and asylum-seeking crisis, and as is the case between Germany

and Italy.

In summation, to make my case, I will build off of the existing CDA approaches.

This is the most fruitful and conclusive tool, as it lets me to do more than simply define

what a narrative is. Via a CDA, I will be able to anatomize the ontology of such

narratives, as well as dissect its meaning, importance, implications, language,

demonstrations, policies, and cognition. In other words, by studying discourse, we can

examine both an actor’s identity and desires—both of which are loci to narratives and

actions. Thus, in doing so, I hope to 1) demarcate what these de/securitization narratives

are and 2) explain how and why states de/securitize refugees and asylum seekers during times of “crises.”

14 Qualitative Approach: Semiotic Analysis

I can also briefly perform a semiotic analysis, whereby I can explicate how language is used as a means for executing political goals, in order to show how the two leaders are trying to posit and spearhead de/securitization narratives which carry political intentions, too.

Conversely, other scholars have deviated from mainstream CDA analyses and performed more nuanced approaches. To be exact, the following scholars have performed semiotic analyses in order to explain the rise and fall of narratives. Caronjn van Noort studies the BRICs narratives in order to explain how political communication is persuasive and effective. As data, she uses the 2009-2016 BRICs joint communiques— identifying its implicit and explicit objectives (i.e. the who, when where, what, how and why questions)—to show how they give meaning to the international system (van Noort,

2017). In particular her qualitative research design “uses the theoretical framework of strategic narratives to examine how their political communication is persuasive” (van

Noort, 2017: 122). Furthermore, her documentary methodology not only illustrates key narratives drawn up in the communiques, it reinforces the importance that documents have in international affairs. Although van Noort undertakes a different case study, her conclusions are still conducive to my analysis, as it affirms that this type of methodology is effective at explaining how language is strategically used to structure a narrative that can carry out political goals.

Moreover, while there has been a blossoming of general literature explaining— via semiotic analyses—how language is used as a vehicle for political intentions (see

15 Chaban et al., 2015; Lantis and Homan, 2019: 162-163; Mugeny & Perez, 1991; Beck,

2017). there has not been as much been literature for the “European refugee crisis” case.

Though, to be fair, this could be for a few reasons: 1) the discourse is still fairly new (and ongoing at that); 2) there has not been much interest; 3) scholars have simply overlooked the necessity to research this case. Therefore, my CDA and semiotic analysis of the de/securitization narratives within Germany and Italy aims at filling this small, albeit important, void.

Qualitative Approach: Context Analysis

In order to grasp a more thorough understanding of the de/secur ization of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany and Italy, it is important that I conduct a context analysis, too. A context analysis (also referred to as case study analysis) examines the environmental context or setting of a particular place. Aside from examining discourse, context analyses examine changes in policy, programs, relationships, or funding among different actors (Kendon, 1990: 16).

Balzacq (201 la, 2015) puts it simply, albeit within the context of securitization, and argues that securitization is not only a speech act, it is a practice too, which can be witnessed, traced, and examined in public spaces. To be clear, this approach is both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Context analyses examine changes in physical spaces, not just discursive or abstract spaces.

Salazar’s (2017a) context analysis of the EU examines the bloc s de/securitization of immigration. On the one hand, he illustrates how supranational bodies (e.g. European

Council and Parliament) have securitized immigration by quantifying the increase in

16 funding for and the number of border control operations. On the other hand, he also argues that some states have desecuritized immigration due to their support for less exceptionalist policies, which cast immigrants as threats. He chooses to examine both national and supranational agents* actions because he wants to best make his case that immigrants are becoming de/securitized continent-wide—that is, not only discursively.

My paper aims at employing a similar methodology because it can explicate the environmental context of a particular place, which may (or may not) be friendly towards immigrants. In other words, in order to further reinforce and triangulate my claims that

Germany and Italy are de/securitizing immigrants, I can look not solely at Merkel’s or

Salvini’s discourse but national or local actions, too. My paper bridges both the CDA literature and the context analysis literature. To my knowledge, my paper will be the first to employ both a CDA and a context analysis of Germany’s and Italy’s de/securitization of immigrants.

Quantitative Data. Public Opinion Polls, Voting Trends, National Projects and Agencies

Although this paper primarily looks at qualitative data, this paper will make attempts to include some quantitative data as it tries to understand how, why, and where the de/securitization of refugees and asylum seekers is taking place. For example, as should be expected, public opinion polls will not only parallel the examined speech data, it will support my assertion that refugees and asylum seekers are de/securitized—a tenet also argued using the speech data. Examining national, state, and local elections results will help us better understand the sentiments, (in)securities, and voting patterns of Italian and German natives. Looking at national budget allocations, as well as quantifying

17 integration and border-control projects or agencies will also help us conceptualize how

Germany and Italy are fueling the de/securitization complex of refugees and asylum

seekers, too.

Quantitative Approach: Lexicometric Analysis

Though, to be even more precise, other scholars have performed more

quantifiable semiotic analyses. Lexicometric approaches examine the frequency and

connotations of signifiers—i.e., the physicality of a symbol—vis-a-vis textual copra.

Lexical analyses are examinations of vocabularies, word choice, and definitions. In short,

some have hand-selected and coded a few speeches or interviews in order to trace both

changes in narrative and recurring themes (Caviedes, 2015). Other scholars, however,

have recognized the importance to examine a plethora of texts in order to complete a

more conclusive examination on narrative. In other words, some have undertaken more

intensive, quantifiable techniques and examined thousands of textual corpora to trace

specific keywords as they try to understand dominant narratives (see Colombo, 2018;

Nabers, 2009). Nabers employed a computer program called Microsfit Word-to-text batch

converter (similar to Atlas.ti’s coding features), which allowed them to process and

search Bush’s speeches for significant words. Here, Nabers examines language as a

meaningful act (independent variable) in order to show how hegemonic discourses and

narratives (dependent variable) are created. In doing so, Nabers argues that Bush was

able to lead the public to war—that is, post 9/11—by carefully curating a narrative of

“terror” via his overlexicalization and his contrasting of “freedom” with

“fear/war/terror,” that is, by looking at empty signifiers as clarified by their opposition

(see also Foyle, 2004). By anatomizing and quantifying textual bodies down to its

18 keywords and phrase/themes, readers can easily trace not only what hegemonic

narratives, but how they are framed, created, and reified within public discourse.

In short, applying a lexicometric analysis on textual corpora will help me best

make my case because, with the help of computer programs (e.g. Microsoft’s text-to-

batch or Atlas.ti’s auto-coding), 1)1 can quickly and efficiently sift through (i.e. quantify)

the textual corpora for dominant themes and keywords and; 2) show how the prevalence

(or disproportionate presence) of these words, phrases, or themes yield a dominant

narrative, which may—or may not—become reified (i.e. reproduced) within subsequent

public discourse and actions at the micro-, meso-, or macro- levels.

Similarly, Cap’s (2014) article also looks at Bush’s speeches and takes a micro­

level, linguistic technique in order to look at the construction of the discursive space of

the post-9/11 narrative. He draws up a set of linguistic categories (noun-verb phrases) and

uses this as raw data so readers can look at the discursive space that Bush is creating: terror versus freedom. Second, he also applies the theory of proximization—very similar to securitization—where he shows how something that is distant in space, time and value

is narrated or where is it situated inside (or outside) of a groups deictic center (17). It is this construction between two referent agents that is important to this thesis. In fact, I posit that Cap’s theory of proximization and micro-level, linguistic rigor can yield a more

fruitful understanding of how language is constructed and how it can create a perception which justifies action. Skonieczny (2001) illustrates now such myths can cause policy discourses—an important tenet for context analyses. Cap’s article supports my posited methodology here, as it proves that, if one is conducting a critical discourse analysis or is trying to show what or how narratives reify physically then such quantitative techniques

19 can still yield conclusive results. I can build off Cap’s earlier study and more effectively and quickly examine German and Italian textual corpora with the help of computer programs, such as Atlas.ti. Put alternatively, I will replicate a similar methodology, albeit primarily under the purview of Merkel’s and Salvini’s discourse.

Methodological Research Limitations

As with any great research project, methodological boundaries must be drawn.

While this is not to purposefully invite any lacunae in my research per se, it is simply an inevitable and methodological hurdle all researchers face.

The largest and most obvious research limitation that I face is my inability to perform any of my own ethnographic research in Germany and Italy. Due to time, financial, and distance constraints, I am unable to conduct any ethnographic research on the refugees and asylum seekers being de/securitized abroad. Pulling from some of the existing ethnographic studies will help me 1) to compliment my own research hypothesis and 2) to give agency to the millions of asylum-seeking and refugee voices silenced every day.

For example, Orsini (2016) partook in a six-month long ethnographic study where they examined local Lampedusan’s sentiments surrounding the refugee crisis. The purpose of their study was to examine how sentiments engender narratives and, hence, certain kinds of (de/securitizing) behavior. The sentiments that locals have towards immigrants acts as their independent variable; and the de/securitizing rhetoric and action undertaken by locals acts as their dependent variable. In short, these two variables allowed them to examine the important relationship that locals’ sentiments can have on

20 their discourse and de/securitizing actions. By examining the two variables we can understand why certain actors and states de/securitize immigrants in the first place—the focus of my study. I can apply such ethnographic results to compliment my proposed research project here.

Further, Baamhielm et al. (2017) diverge from the existing social science ethnographic research on immigrants (and international relations literature in general).

Their study is a medical examination of refugees' and asylum seekers’ mental status in

Europe. They construct the aforementioned variables after pulling from earlier psychological studies in juxtaposition to their transculturalpsychiatric method. This is a summative, sociological approach that aims to conduct a more holistic examination of refugees’ mental health and which considers the fact that the current methodological approaches for assessing refugees’ mental health are not a one-size fits all. Including some of the existing ethnographic, medical literature on refugees and asylum seekers will serve as a fruitful and insightful addition to my thesis.

Fieldwork can help document the sentiments or experiences at the local levels from natives, refugees, and asylum seekers. And relative to my thesis project, it can deduce the practices or effects yielded by de/securitization. Therefore, if what I am trying to do (aside from my speech and context analyses) is map out the most complete picture of the “European refugee crisis,” then I also need to demarcate how de/securitization narratives affect local populations, too. Put alternatively, with the help of those scholars who have had the resources to go to Italy and Germany to conduct in-person interviews or psychological analyses, I will be able to incorporate some of their findings as I 1) try

21 to recount the narratives at the local levels; and 2) highlight the effects of such narratives on refugees or asylum seekers (e.g. health, integration, or lack thereof).

22 Chapter 3: Literature Review

This ambitious research project aims at understanding how and why refugees and asylum seekers are de/securitized both in discursive and public space. It seeks to unveil

Italy’s crisis of liberalism, which has contributed to the securitization of immigration, as well as Germany’s widespread cosmopolitan liberal ideology, which has contributed to the desecuritization of immigration. The following literature reviews aims at situating readers within the current academic and political debates.

Narratives

Before moving forward, allow me to first begin by defining what a narrative is, how it relates to us, how they operate within public discourse, and how we can dissect/use them to make sense of policy changes, such as the de/securitization of refugees and asylum seekers. Simply put, narratives are the frame from which we all operate in. No matter how large or how small, there is always a narrative at play. They are familiar to us all. Not only are narratives social constructs (meaning, they can rise and fall at any time), they are the stories which identify not only “what once was, but for what ought to be [such as expectations, interests, or behaviors]” (Subotic, 2015: 3, 4; Katsell and Wertsch, 2000: 518). Moreover, they help us to make sense of the world and allow us to cast meaning on particular events, people, or symbols. Understanding narrative representations allow us to “explain actions situated in a historical sequence” (Baneijee,

2015: 275). Thus, in relating back to my case studies, by dissecting narrative representations we can understand why actors undertake a particular mode of behavior.

23 Narratives are also reflective of one’s identity(s). Tautologically speaking, you have to be something—be that Italians or Germans, and so forth. And this notion cannot be disregarded. That is also to say that, narratives affirm, challenge or stretch out our own identities, too (Skonieczny, 2019; Somers, 1994: 606). Though, it is just as important to remember that the aforementioned narratives are not static. When we examine narratives, we can also see how certain identities “shape and drive policy stories” and which also give “abstract policy issues personal and emotional meaning” (Skonieczny, 2019: 15, emphasis added; see also Skonieczny, 2001).

As noted earlier, narratives are always rising and falling, albeit over time (see also

Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Additionally, when a “crisis” is presented in public discourse (e.g. “European immigration crisis”), this can undermine, falsify, and vacate fairly elaborate systems of belief. This can also create situations where whoever moves first to articulate a narrative (i.e. “desecuritization” or “securitization”) that makes some sense, has a bit of an advantage, especially political. And this is precisely where and what my paper is picking up on. That is, examining these bipolar narratives which continue to challenge one another.

The Copenhagen School

It is as important that I briefly demarcate the primary theoretical Daradigm from which I am operating from: the Copenhagen School (CS). This securitization school is often referred to as social constructivist. Originating from the University of Copenhagen,

Jaap de Wilde, Barry Buzan, and Ole Wasver make up this School and they have been at the forefront for pioneering de/securitization theories, albeit often converging and

24 diverging with other sects: Welsh School (Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones),

Paris/Aberystwyth School (Didier Bigo), and International Political Sociology School.

However, as with any school of thought, that is not to say that their models have not been subject to any scrutiny either In fact, some scholars have argued that the CS’ definition of security has remained unchanged since the 1990s (Knudsen, 2001). Others contend that their security framework is Janus-faced—being too myopic for some and too hypermetropic for others (Balzacq, Leonard, S.. & Ruzicka, 2016: 506);

“undertheorized,” hence only obfuscating the coherence of the securitization literature

(Strizel, 2014: 181; Balzacq, 201 la); “Eurocentric” (Wilkinson, 2007: 7); too heavily focused on semantics (Neumann, 1998); gender-less (Hansen, 2001); and “rotten in the state of Denmark” (Moravscik, 1999).

Though, to be fair, the CS has since acknowledged some of its academic lacunae and has tried to reconcile these gaps since their seminal writings in the early 1990s, albeit diverging at times with one another too (see Buzan and Wasver, 2003: 16-17: Buzan and

Wasver. 2009). Nevertheless, however, as with any paradigm, there will always be its critics, henceforth accounting for and reconciling every academic critique is impossible for any one model to encapsulate. Thus, our goal here is to simply use the CS as a concise vehicle or paradigm for understanding how de/securitization reifies in public discourse.

Alternatively, despite desecuritization as being the opposite of securitization,

Wasver contends that there are three ways for an issue to become desecuritized: first, it is not speaking about an issue as a threat at all; second, it is managing securitization so that it does not spiral; third, it is moving a securitized issue back down into normal politics

25 (2000: 253). The CS, German cosmopolitan liberals, and human rights activists support the desecuritization of refugees and asylum seeker because it “is the optimal long-range option, since it means to not have issues phased as ‘threats against which we have countermeasures ’ but to move them out of this threat defense sequences and into the ordinary public sphere” (Buzan et al., 1998: 29).

Desecuritization

To reiterate, the CS contends that at the root of securitization regimes or apparatuses is the establishment of a referent object (e.g. immigrants) as an existential threat. They also hold that securitization discourses are a “failure to deal with issues of normal politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Henceforth, the identification of this threat demands an extraordinary response. Developing from the CS, Taureck writes that desecuritization can be defined as the reversal of securitization whereby “issues are moved out of ‘the threat — defenfsle sequence and into the ordinary pub i sphere’ where they can be dealt with in accordance with the rules of the (democrat*") political system” (2006: 55; Buzan et al., 1998: 29).

Embracing cosmopolitan liberalism in Germany has become a leitmotif in

Germany’s foreign and domestic policy. It has even become a marker of their identity or culture. Germany has since moved beyond traditional, territorially-bounded ideas of identity towards more transnational concepts of belonging, citizenship, identity, and responsibility. Germany has even coined a word that means welcoming, respectful, and open to all: Willkommenskultur. This is critical because a country s transcendence from territorial notions of identity yields the recognition and/or the possibility of multi-national

26 identities to exist in a host society. In other words, transnational or multicultural concepts of identity and citizenship yields the acceptance of another—particularly someone of different ethnic, national, linguistic, racial, or religious descent, for example. I cannot underscore these former points enough. Although the “European refugee crisis” is still quite contemporary, international relations scholars have wasted no time outlining how

Germany and Merkel have undoubtedly been the most vocal and active at desecuritizing refugees and asylum seekers. However, these scholars have diverged in terms of their theoretical frameworks, methodologies, and conclusions.

Some scholars have taken cultural approaches to argue how Germany has desecuritized refugees and asylum seekers. Willkommenskultur is a German concept which connotes a friendly attitude towards non-natives. Holmes and Castaneda write that this multicultural concept has become embraced by Germans and that it has led to refugees’ integration into society—that is, desecuritized (2016: 19). Others argue that the multilateral spreading of Willkommenskultur has led to refugees becoming desecuritized in the public discourse (Orsino, 2015: 4). Quantitative studies argue that refugees’ integration into the labor-force suggests that they have become desecuritized (OECD,

2017: 34). Dingott Alkoopher (2018) undertakes a constructivist approach—influenced by the writings of Rumelili (2015)—and finds that Germany was in a state of asecurity

(2018: 327. emphasis added). Further, they argue that Germany’s “open-door” response to the refugee influx, their omission of “securitized” language, and their embracing of humanitarian responsibilities yielded refugees and asylum seekers’ descuritization

(2018: 327).

Securitization

27 Conversely, supranational, cosmopolitan, and transnational concepts of identity, citizenship, and belonging can backfire. Throughout Europe, far-Right populist parties have gained (and continue to gain) considerable traction legislatively, domestically, and internationally. For example, Vitktor Orban (Hungary), like Geert Wilders (Netherlands) and Marine Le Pen (France) have not only undertaken a rhetoric of securitization, they have also mobilized their citizens or militaries to support acts of securitization. Their received level of support has grown considerably, which should not be overlooked either!

Further, it is important to add that the birth of these (ethno) nationalist-populist parties indicates a clear departure from liberal, EU paradigms—something that should not have happened, nor which can be explained under traditional liberal orthodoxy.

This paper adds to the literature on securitization studies. However as noted earlier, scholars have diverged on what they mean by securitization and what it looks like to securitize an issue. However, some have tried to reconcile their differences in security studies (see Floyd, 2007). The CS defines securitization merely as a speech act where the mere labeling of something as issue makes and becomes a security issue (Waever, 2004).

In other words, issues become securitized or treated as matters of security as a result of these speech-acts, thus, demanding that something be done (Waever, 1995: 55).

Additionally, it is worth adding that the CS continues to receive wide academic support and saliency vis-a-vis security studies (see Huysmans, 1997: 186). Luca Mavelli adds that, “Security s not simply about survival in the face of existential threats, and therefore not just about a politics of the exception, but also, and possibly more importantly, about the management o f risk” (2013: 174, emphasis added).

28 Put alternatively, securitization is a process by which certain issues are framed as

threatening to the public. However, this is where I precisely build off of the CS’

definition as well as the existing securitization literature which view securitization not

only as a speech act, but also a practice situated in discursive legitimation, too (see Bigo,

2002; Williams, 2003: 512, 2007). Further, I add to Williams’ (2011) study to show how

securitization is catalyzed by fear. As Realists would posit, securitizing issues or

undertaking hegemonic positionalities can solve the security dilemma by reducing the

uncertainties or insecurities as posed by an ambiguous threat such as refugees or asylum

seekers. Balzacq’s (2015) article also explicates securitization as more than speech-act,

but also a practice whereby:

heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions,

etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build

a coherent network o f implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical

vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and

actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura o f unprecedented threatening

complexion that a customised policy must be immediately undertaken to block it (Balzacq, 201 lb:

3).

Additionally, he draws a framework whereby, if we are looking at securitization, then we should pay equal consideration to audience, power relations, and context. In other words, these findings are conducive to my paper because I will show how

securitization is not only a speech-act (as it is portrayed in Merkel’s and Salvini’s discourse) but also how it becomes inter subjective knowledge among securitizing actors

and Italian natives. Conversely, and applicable to my study here, is Rumelilf s

constructivist approach to securitization. She, like the CS, contend that securitization is a

29 definition of threats based on identities (Rumelili, 2015: 53). As I intend to do, other scholars have illustrated that the way in which we speak about immigrants affects how they are treated (e.g. inclusion or exclusion). Donelly’s (2017) study holds that we should broaden our understanding of the implications of these narratives on refugees and asylum seekers.

Further, the literature on Italy’s securitization of immigrants remains fruitful and diverse. Salazar (2017a) takes a macro-level approach and examines the legislative shifts and dialogue between the European Commission, European Council, and member states regarding the handling of asylum seekers. He argues that Italy’s voluntary military and financial support for border control operations (e.g. Operations Mare Nostrum, Triton,

Hermes) indicates that securitization narratives are resonating among Italians and, more generally, within the EU (2017: 89. 94) This is also an example of a context analysis—a technique that I will employ for Germany’s and Italy’s and case.

Dixon et al.’s (2018) study is particularly noteworthy for my case analysis because they recount and trace Italian’s sentiments towards refugees and asylum seekers.

In short, they find that although many Italians support the humanitarian support of refugees and asylum seekers, the majority still feel that they are threat to their national security, national identity and cultural heritage. Last, it is important to interpret and incorporate these statistics because such graphs will help me to understand the relationsbp between thought and action.

Cosmopolitan Liberalism

30 The topic of cosmopolitan liberalism remains a contentious tenet among postcolonial scholars. Broadly speaking, cosmopolitan liberalism is defined as or

characterized by “one-humanity, liberal values and cognitive frameworks individual

liberal rights, liberal-democracy, the promotion of peace through international economic

liberalism, the development of liberal universalist international law and institutions”

(Gowan, 2000: 2). However, the trope has been subject to much scrutiny over the years

for being Western or Eurocentric (Godrej, 2011). Though that is not to say that others

have defended the paradigm and argued that it is, in fact, not imperialist (Hall and

Hobson, 2010) or that it is completely dismissible per se (Fine, 2011: 153). Nevertheless, the notion of cosmopolitan liberalism remains much more unique vis-a-vis the EU.

The EU has a particularly unique geography and history because although

member states may have been around for centuries, and although citizens may continue to

embrace their own national identities, many also identify with and promote a common

European identity or responsibility, too (see Pichler, 2009). In retrospect, the EU is a

relatively new concept, agency, identity and political actor (b :ng only 30 years old,

albeit it grew out of the European Economic Community founded in 1957). Schlenker

(2013) points out that more and more Europeans continue to align with a common,

supranational EU identity. It is no coincidence that the increased identification with an

EU identity has increased alongside the increased expansion of the EU and increased

importance at an international level.

The concept of a common EU identity has spilled over to and been embraced by

German society, whereby it is referred to as “Willkommenskultur” or a welcoming

attitude towards foreigners (Castaneda and Holmes, 2016). This abstract concept is

31 continuously reified in discursive and public space. As noted earlier, this movement from traditional, territorially-bounded ideas of identity towards more transnational concepts of belonging, citizenship, identity, and responsibility allows for the recognition and/or the possibility of multi-national identities to exist in a host society. Conversely, others have also outlined that this cosmopolitan liberal push has also backfired—leading to a retreat from liberal paradigms and an increase in Right-wing populism, in general (see

Schlenker, 2013; Fligstein et al., 2012). Exploring this backfire or liberalism crisis is another departure point of this thesis, as it is still largely unknown to international relations scholars. To be clear, this paper adds to the literature exploring cosmopolitan liberalism. In particular, it aims at exploring the continued push for cosmopolitan liberalism among Germans, and the retreat from it among many Italians.

Criticism

As with any developing work, that is not to say that my former hypothesis—or those similar to mine—have been immune or not subject to any criticism. Applauded works rarely hold without the company of scrutiny and disapproval. Despite my former, complimentary remarks that Germany and Merkel have been largely curating a desecuritizing narrative of refugees and asylum seekers or that Italy and Salvini have been spearheading a volatile narrative of their securitization, other scholars have approached this contemporary discourse and argued the contrary, albeit from varying theoretical and methodological frameworks.

First, some scholars have applied economic theory in order to conceptualize and solve the “crisis”. While it has certainly not been as popular as what the latter economic,

32 migration, or security theorists are suggesting (see Buzan et al., 1998: 29; Castles, 2004:

2010; Cortes, 2008; de Haas, 2010; de Haas and Plug, 2006: 614; Walton-Roberts, 2011) others have tried to make their case: securitizing immigration and pursuing nativist economic policies are the optimal long-range option for a host country’s economy.

Hatton contends that the EU needs to tighten border security in order to solve the

“immigration problem” (Hatton, 2017). I, on the contrary, as well as the CS would argue the exact opposite. In fact, undertaking such an agenda only engenders concerns or insecurity, creates and perpetuates an agenda of securitization, obfuscates the management of the crisis, falsely criminalizes immigrant bodies, and allows the crisis management to continue to spiral.

Second, other scholars have undertaken similar positionalities and posited that there has been an absence of securitization directed towards refugees and asylum seekers or that political elites have not done an effective job at curating a securitization narrative.

To start, Messina argues that, within elitist discourse, there has been a failure to construct a convincing securitization narrative to the public (2014). Additionally, they even develop from the CS and argue that elite speech-acts have had no effect on citizens viewing immigrants “as an economic, sociocultural, and/or physical threat” (2014: 553).

However, other scholars (such as I) have picked up on and refuted the former claim entirely. Orsini argues that, “[T]he cure—more security [(e.g. greater EU military presence, tighter external borders, or more border control operations)]—seems to generate the symptoms—more insecurity” (2016: 144, emphasis added). The former point is important, and it should not be overlooked too quickly. As I will later outline,

Salvini has done not only an effective job, but a successful job at brewing a securitized

33 narrative. Conversely, within Germany, Merkel has remained unequivocally effective at

casting a desecuritization narrative.

Further, other scholars have even undertaken more ambiguous or more radical positions and have argued that there has even been an absence of securitization within the

European bloc since 9/11. First, Freeman et al.’s (2009) chapter holds an ambiguous positionality regarding the immigration crisis. Their writings do not confirm nor deny that immigration has become a securitized concern. Put simply, my paper holds a

concrete positionality and argues both via-a-vis the EU. It has been true, as I intend to

illustrate, that immigration has become securitized and desecuritized at net positive rates.

Second, Boswell’s (2007) article opposes my theory because it argues that there has been

an absence of securitization vis-a-vis immigration. His paper overlooks an entire sect of

securitization discourse that continues to gain net positive support. Additionally, this thesis, on the other hand, argues that while it has been true that immigrants have become

a desecuritized concern over time (in Germany, for example), in other European states

such as Italy (Matteo Salvini), Hungary (Vitktor Orban), France (Marine Le Pen),

Netherlands (Geert Wilders), Romania (Victor Ponta), Poland (Mateusz Morawiecki),

Slovakia (Robert Fico), and United Kingdom (Theresa May) narratives of securitization

as well as anti-immigration, authoritative, populist leaders have gained—and continue to

gain—considerable traction at net positive rates, thus continuing to undermine EU

principles of solidarity, responsibility and, more notably, the Schengen Agreement

(Salazar, 2017a: 92-93). To be clear, not only does immigration continue to be a major

securitized concern throughout the European bloc, it continues to challenge EU inter­

diplomacy, in general. To reiterate, this paper refutes the ambiguous and one-sided

34 writings of earlier authors. The remainder of this thesis shall be dedicated to explicating how Salvini’s securitization was widely popular among most Italians between 2016 and

2019. In contrast, it will also be dedicated to explicating how Merkel’s desecuritization remained widely supported among many Germans between 2016 and 2019, whereby immigration was not a matter of concern or security.

35 Chapter 4: An Analysis of Italy’s Securitization Narrative

The following sections are dedicated to dissecting three different types of text/speech data from Matteo Salvini: his interview with Stephen Sackur at the

Ambrosetti Forum, his live broadcast on Facebook and Instagram, and his speech at a rally in Milan. The follow section will dissect Italy’s liberalism crisis and Salvini’s securitization discourse in order to support this thesis’ hypothesis that native Italians were physically, economically, ontologically, or culturally insecure between 2016 and early

2019, hence their securitizing practices vis-a-vis refugees and asylum seekers and their support for Matteo Salvini.

Please refer to Figures 1-3 to see a more visual representation of Salvini’s de/securitization discourse. With the help of Atlas.ti., I have coded the three corpora and created networks of his de/securitization words, phrases, themes, or inferences vis-a-vis immigration.

Sackur-Salvini Interview

Although Merkel and Germany are largely spearheading the desecuritization of refugees and asylum seekers, in Italy, Salvini and many Italians are reproducing a terror, securitization complex (see also Rana, 2016). However, Salvini’s discourse is not entirely securitizing; in fact, he does appear to bring the topic of refugees and asylum seekers back down to normal politics—a tenet of desecuritization (see Figure 1 for a coded network of the speech).

The 25-minute long interview begins with Sackur discussing Salvini’s short time in office and his agenda, albeit not once does he mention the topic of immigration

36 (Vooke, 2018). Salvini immediately rebuts and says that immigration is one of the biggest “issues’ that Italy’s economy faces, which they must “control.” Here he begins to further securitize immigration because he calls the influxes a “huge [Italian] economic, legal, and social problem,” and “stopping immigration” should be Italy’s “priority,” and it is certainly his priority. It is precisely this close linguistic proximization or construction of immigration being an ‘issue” that is important, as it justifies a particular (political) response. In fact, he views his anti-immigration solution as the only solution to re­ launch/save Italian economy and life. Desecuritization and immigration scholars would refute this approach entirely because it disregards the economic benefits that immigrants yield (see Buzan et al., 1998: 29; Castles, 2004: 2010; Cortes, 2008; de Haas, 2010; de

Haas and Plug, 2006: 614; Walton-Roberts, 2011). However that is not to say that refugees and asylum seekers are a disposable pawn or panacea to Italy’s economic problems either.

Nevertheless, premising that anti-immigration policies are the only way to save

Italy is one example ;ilustrat ig how Salvini is allowing the securitization complex/narrative to spiral—a tenet from the CS. Salvini’s parallel of immigration to

Italy’s “social and economic problems” is also a sign of economic, cultural, and ontological insecurity. It suggests or implies that immigrants (i.e. refugees and asylum seekers) are so culturally different that they are incapable of coexisting alongside Italians.

In fact, what Salvini is also doing is creating a deictic center whereby refugees and asylum seekers are not a part of it. He is excluding and refuting any possibility of cohabitation between natives and foreigners. He is also explicitly reinforcing and alluding to a sort of Italian-ness (i.e. identity or citizenship) which can only be achieved jus

37 sanguinis or by right of blood. This type of discourse of is especially dangerous and tangent to refugees’ and asylum seekers’ desecuritization. Ultimately, in borrowing from

Gramsci s theory on hegemony (Castaneda and Holmes, 2016), what Salvini is trying to do is not only curate a hegemonic narrative whereby these immigrants are so culturally different that they do not fit within Italy’s deictic center of Italian-ness, he is also engaging in a “war of position” and challenging those who are pushing for their desecuritization.

Additionally, Salvini’s connection or conflation that all immigration is a

“problem” fuels a narrative which politicizes and securitizes immigrant bodies—the contrary to the CS’ theorv of desecuritization. This rhetorical construction is not only dangerous, it is objectively unfounded and it creates an exclusive deictic center. This proximization also distances immigrants further away from being handled as a matter of normal politics and from Italians/Italian-ness. He says that Italy will only welcome its doors to the “small number” of authentic immigrants fleeing war. and for all others, the doors are “shut.” This rhetoric is also similar in his live broadcast (see Figure 2). Salvini also acknowledges the importance of addressing the root causes for the immigration nfluxes—suggesting lateral economic “agreements” or “aid” to these developing countries. While this is one attempt whereby Salvini, prima facie, desecuritizes immigration, he is actually securitizing immigration because he is perpetuating a narrative that preemptively assumes and treats nearly all immigrants as “illegals” or unworthy of Italy’s help or protection.

Further, he implicitly further securitizes immigration because he says that “[Italy] need[s] to change the rules,” such as the EU’s open-door policies, which Germany

38 supports. His retreat from pro-immigration policies, states (e.g. Germany), governments, and institutions (e.g. EU) explicates how Salvini is allowing the immigration securitization complex to spiral away from normal politics. In other words, in this instance, he is not only securitizing immigrants, he is also plaguing pro-immigration supporters as threats to or the core of Italy’s problems (see also Figure 3). And it is this rhetoric and treatment of immigrants and liberal ideology which we must be especially critical of. Salvini even justifies Italy’s exceptionalist response to the crisis—a tenet of securitization—claiming that “[Italy] will do it themselves.” This suggests an explicit departure from EU solidarity, cosmopolitan liberalism, cooperation, and desecuritization.

Moreover, Salvini calls these immigrants “fake refugees” or “clandestines” and says that they all they do is bring “weapons and drugs into Europe,” hence justifying why he has “imprisoned immigrants,” “stopped” and “held” boats in Italy’s ports. This rhetoric is an example of physical insecurity. This narrative also mirrors that of the

United States President, Donald Trump. His essentialist treatment of immigrants as health and security threats further reproduces the securitization narrative towards immigrants.

In short, lexicometrically speaking, what I find in Salvini’s interview is a disproportionate amount of securitization themes/words vis-a-vis desecuritization themes/words. While at times, he does appear to desecuritize immigration by empathizing with those refugees “fleeing war,” and while he suggests that Italy is prepared to offer them “aid” and “development;” his treatment more so suggests that immigrants need to be more securitized than desecuritized. For instance, Salvini repeatedly and explicitly essentializes immigrants as mostly “illegals” or “fake,” and too implies that they are health and security threats. He reinforces a deictic circle which

39 immigrants do not and cannot fit because they are nationally, culturally, linguistically, racially, religiously, and ethnically different than native Italians. This narrative not only suggests an exceptional response, it demands one whereby Italy must secure its borders and deny all immigrants. Salvini couches his determination that ridding the country of all

“illegal immigrants” will solve Italy’s “crime problems” (see Chapter 5 for a more insightful discussion on this). Ultimately, this cultural, economic, physical, and ontological insecurity is underpinning Salvin ’s linguistic proximization between him/Italians and refuge/asylum seekers, hence justifying a type of action which demands an exceptional, exclusive, and securitizing response.

Salvini’s Live Broadcast

As would be expected, Salvini’s live broadcast presented a disproportionate amount of securitization inferences than desecuritization inferences (see Figure 2 for coded network of speech). Shortly after President Mattarella signed a strong anti­ immigration law in September 2018—also dubbed the “Salvini Decree,” which was heavily pushed for by Salvini and his party at the time (Lega Nord)—Salvini livestreamed a video via Facebook and Instagram explaining it and his anti-immigration policy goals, as the then Minister of Interior at the time. It is worth noting that there were approximately 10,000 people watching his video live on Facebook and 20,000 watching it live on Instagram (see Cassius, 2018). To be clear, both the “Salvini’s Decree” and his video securitize immigration, refugees, and asylum seekers. It is this live broadcast and it is this “Salvini Decree” which neatly exemplifies Italy’s liberalism crisis. The following paragraphs, however, will closely examine his discourse throughout the live broadcast.

40 He begins his broadcast with a cheerful spirit addressing his audience, albeit lamenting the long three-month period that it took to get his “law of security and immigration” passed. Condescendingly, he even calls himself “the bad guy”—referring to the dissent that he continues to receive from the “Left,” “humanitarian associations/ ’ or

“social centers.” He argues that it is ludicrous or “laughable” to think that those from other countries or that “[supranational] bureaucrats” (i.e. EU and President Juncker) should be able to “give advice” to Italy’s direction. This linguistic proximization is a departure from EU solidarity. This linguistic construction also justifies and demands a unilateral response. Further, Salvini’s distancing from any notion of EU-ness reflects a type of ontological insecurity, whereby Italians fear that any embracement or encroachment of EU guidance could erase their unique Italian-ness. This also reflects a departure from cosmopolitan liberalism. The remainder of his broadcast primarily securitizes immigrant, refugee, and asylum-seeking bodies.

Salvini repeatedly curates a narrative which casts asylum seekers as dangers to society. Underpinning this conflation, however, is physical insecurity or fear (see also

Williams, 2011). This explicit labelling that asylum seekers are dangerous to society is the first tenet to the CS’ theory on securitization. Further, this image is particularly dangerous because it allows the securitization complex and narrative to spill over into other sectors in society, namely policing practices. To be clear, this is not solely a speech- act; it is also a strategic political act too. Salvini is carefully mobilizing an audience to construct a seamless and volatile network of implications about refugees and asylum seekers (see Balzacq, 201 lb: 3).

41 Salvini asserts that granting Italian citizenship to these asylum seekers will increase the likelihood of “Islamic terrorism.” Such discourse is not only securitizing, it is culturally racist because it reproduces structures of domination on essentialist categories of culture; it also creates racist characterizations or stereotypes of Muslims

(see also Omi and Winant, 2014; Naber, 2008; Arjana, 2015). This close proximization between refugees (many of who come from Islamic countries) and terrorism demands a securitizing response. And this is precisely what Salvini and insecure Italian want, as they believe that it is this exclusive response which will bring them cultural, ontological, and physical security. Further, this type of narrative is creating a type of Italian identity that is

(and can only be) ethno-nationalist. Positing such a myth erases any possibility for refugees and asylum seekers to be accepted into Italian society. These narratives are yielding a particular, securitizing and political response. Salvini explains that they are also going to more thoroughly check those that have already been granted “humanitarian protection.” As noted by the CS, this type of management is precisely what allows the securitization complex to spiral, as it justifies and suggests an exceptional response. He further explains that Italy is going to stop assisting refugees with 35 euros a day. Cutting this aid to refugees and asylum seekers, or what he dubs as “guests,” is an example of financial insecurity. Pivoting Italian, economic success on the cutting of financial support to refugees and asylum seekers is not only deadly, it is a securitizing act. In short, this narrative is both a speech- and political-act—underpinned by Italians’ physical and economic insecurity.

Salvini cites nis visit to Naples—the third-largest municipality in Italy—and the

“great desire of law, order, and security” which Napolitanos expressed, as justification

42 for increasing the securitization towards refugees and asylum seekers. He explains that he

is proud “to lead a security system” which eradicates the “purveyors of death”: refugees,

asylum seekers, as well as the Mafia, the Camorra, and the Ndranghetta. Grouping

immigrant bodies with crime-type syndicates fuels a narrative which suggests that the two populations are the same. The two groups are not the same—not even close. While it

is true that some refugees and asylum seekers do commit crimes, it would be a gross

misrepresentation to say that the majority of those seeking asylum have a core interest in

inciting crime or violence or in bringing drugs and weapons, such as the Mafia, Camorra,

or Ndranghetta. This type of discourse only plays with/on Italians physical insecurity.

In his live broadcast, Salvini explains that Italians need to have greater and legal

self-defense protections due to the influx of refugees and asylum seekers. Again, this is

another example of Salvini painting a preemptive and essentialist narrative that all

immigrants are dangerous—a tenet of securitization. This linguistic proximization divides

Italians with refugees and asylum seekers. It suggests that refugees and asylum seekers

will never fit the Italian-way, Italian-ness, or in Italian society because they are so

dangerous. And this throws out any possibility of refugees and asylum seekers from ever

fitting within Italians’ deictic circle. Suggesting that the urban police need to have 5,000

tasers for “self-defense” is an example of how this securitization narrative is reifying in public space/action. In other words, stating that refugees are dangerous is both an

intentional, speech and political act which demands and justifies a securitizing response,

such as the equipment of 5,000 tasers to the urban police.

Salvini does, however, make an attempt to desecuritize immigration, albeit

minimally. For example, he recognizes and accepts those who are “fleeing war,” or who

43 have “serious illnesses,” or who are victims of “sexual violence or trafficking.” However, this is the only attempt (in his 12-minute long broadcast) whereby he desecuritizes asylum seekers. This is important because it does show how Salvini is partially respecting

international, asylum-seeking law. On the other hand, he ends his broadcast stating that

the “party is over for everyone else”: (economic or climate change) immigrants or those

seeking political asylum. Lexicometrically speaking, there is a net positive amount of

securitization inferences than desecuritization inferences. This discourse suggests that

Italy is not economically, culturally, physically, and ontologically secure enough to

accept refugees, or asylum seekers.

The most startling part of Salvini s live broadcast is the end. It is this part where he is the most vocal and explicit about securitizing immigration. He asserts that he “will not budge on “increasing the deportations”; “stripping citizenship”; “checking [those

already granted] humanitarian permits” and those currently residing in support housing;

“hiring 10,000 extra police,” and that he is proud to be a minister that has a “heart for the security and future of Italians.” This doomsday allegory—a populist tenet—suggests that

Salvini has the best interests in mind for the Italian people. Underpinning this speech act

;s an explicit ontological and physical insecurity which resonates with so many Italians.

Italians fear that accepting and integrating these foreign immigrants will erase their

ancestry, culture, language, and way of life. And Salvini is precisely playing off of these emotions/insecurities among Italians by constructing a narrative that refugees and asylum

seekers are too < stant, too dangerous, too culturally, linguistically, ethnically, and racially different from Italians deictic center. At the same time, he is also both reinforcing an environment and constructing an exclusive identity which excludes those

44 of a different linguistic, ethnic, racial, or national descent or background. This is

particularly dangerous because it brings immigrant bodies away further away from

normal politics—that is, it securitizes them according to the CS—and it leaves them

helpless in a dangerous and endless waiting game.

Put succinctly, Salvini couches his political success via the securitization of both

refugees and asylum seekers. His discourse separates them from normal politics because

he claims that they are a physical threat to society—an insecurity and fear which

resonates among so many Italians, especially in the South. The second main tenet

underpinning this live broadcast is ontological insecurity. Salvini claims that

accepting/integrating these immigrants would undermine and jeopardize the future of

Italian-ness, hence they need to undertake exclusive measures. By preemptively grouping

refugees and asylum seekers with crime or terrorist syndicates (e.g. the Mafia), Salvini is

creating, conflating, perpetuating, vilifying, and essentializing a securitizing and

culturally racist narrative. It is exactly this false narrative wl :h reflects Italy’s liberalism

crisis, and which continues to lead to refugees’ and asylum seekers’ securitization.

Salvini’s Rally in Milan

18 May 2019—one cloudy and rainy day, on the eve just before the EU’s

Parliamentary elections—Salvini held a political rally alongside fellow Right-wing populist leaders Marine Le Pen (France) and Geert Wilders (Netherlands), in one of

Italy’s most historic and largest squares: Piazza del Duomo in Milan, Italy (see Ruptly,

2019). With his voice loudly reverberating against the tightly packed walls of the 600-

45 year-old center, Salvini could be neard positing a securitization narrative to over 60,000 people.

The majority of his speech centers around Salvini casting jaundiced images of the

EU, refugees, and asylum seekers (see Figure 3 for coded network of speech). He emphasizes that Italians, above all things, “love [their] children and [their] values.” He argues that the “extremists,” “racists,’' and “fascists” of Europe are not he and his pro-

Italian supports (“prima gli italiani,” which means “Italians first”) but are the “EU bureaucrats, Macron, and Merkel.’' And it is because of them that Italy (and Europe, in general) has an “out-of-control immigration problem.'’ According to the CS, explicitly claiming that immigration is an “out-of-control problem” is when it precisely becomes a securitized problem. It not only demands and justifies an exceptionalist response, it both incites fear and draws on native Italian insecurities. In other words, abstract concepts of identity insecurities, and linguistic proximizations can reify and reinforce itself in public space and action.

Salvini draws attention by playing off of Italians ontological insecurities or

Italians' lack of security. He states that Italians need to “rediscover [their] roots” and find those who “betrayed [them],” alluding to the influx of refugees, asylum seekers, and supranational powers which have stolen Italian-ness away from Italians. He also posits that, “no good state can be dictated by rules of Brussels.” This retreat from the EU reflects an ontological insecurity because it suggests that Italian-ness is getting lost amidst the EU’s oversight and cosmopolitan liberalism.

46 As noted with the former speeches, Salvini’s narrative suggests that refugees and

asylum seekers (like the Mafia) are the “strongest pushers and smugglers” of illegal

activity in Italy, and “those with barges buy arms and drugs.” This narrative suggests that

they are a physical threat to public safety. And once one claims that a referent object (e.g.

refugees and asylum seekers) are a threat to society—inciting fear and drawing upon

native insecurities—it then justifies a particular (i.e. exclusive or securitizing) response.

He argues that the more people fight against his political goals (e.g. his narrative), the

more he is going to fight back and “defend [his] country’ and the “right to Italian life.”

Salvini’s speech is overtly racist. Salvini pleads to his audience: “opening the

doors to the Eurabian” and “accepting] the different” will spell the end for Italians.

Salvini even casts refugees and asylum seekers as bringers of “ghettos;” and he also

asserts that “we don’t want slaves.” Referring to refugees and asylum seekers as “the

different” or “slaves” or bringers of “ghettos” is not only dehumanizing; it is insulting

and racist. Salvini also exclaims that immigration can be facilitated, albeit “rather than

immigration from Islamic countries, [is is] immigration [from] countries more culturally

close to [Italy]”. He defends himself saying that he is “think[ing] of the descendants of the millions of Italians who emigrated to the rest of the world and who are welcome if they want return to their cities and their countries.” In short, these linguistic proximizations call for the securitization of refugees and asylum seekers. It is also this type of racism that is grounded in fear (see also Rana, 2007). It is this type of discourse that also incites that leads to immigrants' exclusion, expulsion, and exploitation (see also

Bayoumi, 2006). And it is this dichotomy that Edward Said drew upon in his (1978) seminal text, Orientalism, whereby he explores the Occident and the orient (see also Omi

47 and Winant, 2014). Nevertheless, this linguistic proximization establishes an inferiority

complex whereby Italians/Italian-ness are superior to refugees and asylum seekers; it justifies racialized and securitized practices/projects; it justifies hegemonic

positionalities; it criminalizes refugees and asylum seekers; it reifies imperial intentions;

and it essentializes immigrants as violent monsters (see also Aijana, 2015; Feldman,

2011; Smith, 2015; Naber, 2008).

It is worth noting that Salvini s securitization speech also incorporates an historical and religious element. And it is no coincidence that Salvini incorporated these religious hues in his speech. Italy stands at the center for the Catholic Church and over

80% of the population identifies as Christian, albeit predominantly Roman Catholic

(CIA, 2019). Henceforth, he justifies the securitization of refugees and asylum seekers by citing an ancient Catholic cardinal who once stated that, “everything must be done so that all men can stay in the country where they were bom.” In other words, he uses the catechisms of the Catholic Church as justification for excluding immigrants. Salvini even states that he is willing to defend his approach/discourse “with a smile and [with] the knowledge of being in the right.” This sadistic remark underscores how Salvini grounds his satisfaction in harmful, exclusionary, or securitizing politics.

Salvini ends his speech by targeting refugees, asylum seekers, NGOs, and liberals. He argues that the “policies] [under the current] government is leading to more dead in the Mediterranean Sea” and that no more “[NGO ships] will enter an Italian port.” This reflects Salvini’s attempt to posit a narrative which implies that Italians need to turn away from liberal approaches. To reiterate, securitizing refugees and asylum seekers and preventing NGO ships from operating in the Mediterranean Sea does not

48 save more lives. Not only does this narrative allow the securitization complex to spiral,

according to the CS, it brings immigrant bodies further away from normal politics and,

ultimately, from being accepted and integrated into a host society. Abstractly speaking, this narrative reinforces an identity which excludes immigrants. In short, Salvini s

discourse acts also as an intentional political act. For example, he claims that the only

way to “reduce the dead in the Mediterranean” is to reverse “the policy of open doors and ports. ’ And he rebuts that it is his “policy of rigor and solidarity” that has led to “less than 1,000 victims on the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea.” Salvini, however, wishes to

bring his securitizing approach EU-wide, hence the support and presence of Marine Le

Pen and Geert Wilders at his rally. He exclaims, “We can bring it all over Europe . . . no

one else comes in here without permission.”

Although Salvini primarily securitizes immigration, and although he casts NGO

organizations and the EU as the bete-noir, he does make a few attempts to desecuritize

immigration. He states that Italy is a “nation of peoples” and that they “welcome those

who come from afai.” He also adds that he does not “want [any more] mass deportations”

and that he wants “peaceful coexistence.’1 These were the only explicit instances in his

30-minute speech where he brings the topic of immigration down to normal politics. To

be clear, however, this is certainly not the focus of his speech. The disproportionate presence of securitization inferences, such as the explicit labelling of immigrants as

physical, economic, cultural, and ontological threats, suggests that Salvini s focus is on

securitizing refugees and asylum seekers.

With securitization, there is no objective knowledge of a threat. Underpinning

Salvini"s 2016 to 2019 (culturally) racist narrative/political approach is fear and

49 insecurity, which resonate with so many Italians. Salvini, in short, is curating a narrative which suggests that their identity is at stake. In other words, Italians’ own belief in the self is unstable. And this is precisely one tenet grounding the Conte-Salvini coalition: the loss of cultural Italy or Italian-ness. It is this same narrative which also reinforces an ethno-nationalist identity or Italian-ness. Chapter 5 will examine the environmental context in Italy vis-a-vis refugees and asylum seekers. It will briefly explore the physical treatment that refugees and asylum seekers have experienced in Italy, as well as explore how Salvini’s discourse has reified in public space.

50 Chapter 5: An Analysis of Italy’s Securitization Context

Although the CS posits that securitization is a discursive act, it is much more than

that. Securitization is also a practice situated in discursive legitimation. Not only does the

securitization complex spiral discursively, it can reify and reproduce itself physically and

multilaterally, too. It is political and it can lead to policy discourses. The follow sections

will examine both native Italians’ sentiments and discourse around immigration, voting trends, public national projects, and agencies vis-a-vis refugees and asylum seekers.

Convincing the Public to Securitize Immigration

In retrospect, the former analysis has argued that Salvini’s 2016-2019 narrative

was centered around securitizing immigration. This speech act has also convinced Italians to securitize immigration. Salvini, however, is not alone when it comes to securitizing

immigration. He is one of many Italian leaders who continue to gain significant political, public, and electoral traction for their anti-immigration approach and narrative.

Public opinion polls and voting trends suggest that the support for securitizing

immigration (e.g. raising of borders, Right-wing leaders, border control operations) remain quite high and widespread throughout Italy. According to a one-year long, Italy- wide, 2000-participant ethnographic study (e.g. phone and online surveys) conducted by

Dixon et al. (2018), one of their questions ask respondents how strongly they agree with the following statement: “[Italy] must close [their] borders entirely— [Italy] cannot accept refugees at this time.” They conclude that 60% of the Italian public strongly agreed with the statement, compared with 40% who strongly disagreed with the statement. Closing the borders is not only a speech act per se undertaken by Italian elites, such as Salvini, it

is also an example of physical securitization and physical insecurity, too. The net

51 positive, majority agreement to the survey’s question suggests that more Italians believe that securitizing immigration is the right answer, albeit it is not. Salvini’s speech at his

2019 Milan rally argued that his securitization approach is leading to less dead in the

Mediterranean Sea. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2019) shows that during 2018 (pre-Salvini approach) there was 3.5% mortality rate among SWANA

immigrants; however, as of April 2019 (post-Salvini approach), there were 257 dead or a

12% mortality rate. The data suggests that securitizing refugees and asylum seekers has

no correlation in reducing the mortality rate for SWANA refugees and asylum seekers

crossing into the EU.

There are two leading parties in Italy who have argued for the securitization of

immigrants: Lega Nord (Right-wing populism), headed by Matteo Salvini, and

Movimento 5 Stelle (both Left- and Right-wing populism), headed by Luigi di Maio.

According to an August 2019 (b) survey conducted by Polls of Polls—a private EU data

initiative—they find that Lega Nord (Northern League) received the highest support of all the Italian factions, with 37%; followed by Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), with

23%; and Movimento 5 Stelle (5-Star Movement), which received 18% of the public’s

approval. As of August 2019, Forza d’ltalia (Italian Force) and Fratelli d’ltalia (Brothers

of Italy)—center-Right, anti-immigrant, nationalist coalitions—held a combined 14%

approval rating among the public (Polls of Polls, 2019b). These public opinion results

suggest that the rules or ideas put forth by these anti-immigrant parties are not completely

null and void but valid and salient among the Italian population. The public opinion

results also suggest that more of the public is supporting both the securitization narrative

and the physical act of securitizing immigration (e.g. raising/closing borders).

52 The EU Parliamentary elections was a watershed year for both Salvini and Italian

Right-wing coalitions, as they gained a significant number of Parliamentary seats. Initial projections for the May, Italy-EU Parliament election expected Salvini’s alliance to gain

20 seats; whereas the progressive democratic parties were expected to lose 23 seats (Polls of Polls, 2019a). What these public opinion polls suggest is that securitizing speech acts, which both Salvini, Berlusconi, Meloni, and di Maio (the leaders of the leading anti­ immigrant political parties) have repeatedly posited, as well as acts of securitization, are resonating among Italians. This, of course, goes alongside a decline in support for liberal coalitions. Nevertheless, Polls of Polls projections, however, were too modest. Salvini’s

Lega coalition gained 28 seats (34.33% of total); Partito Democratico gained 19 seats

(22.69% of total); Movimento 5 Stelle gained 14 seats (17.07% of total); Forza d'ltalia gained 6 seats (8.79% of total); and Fratelli d’ltalia gained 5 seats (6.46% of total) (Polls of Polls, 2019b). Partito Democratico lost 12 seats or 18.1% of the total—making them no longer the majority party. Alternatively put, Italian politicians who focused on identity, conservatism, and reform gained 28 seats; whereas those focusing on socialism, cosmopolitanism, and democratism lost 22 seats (Polls of Polls, 2019b). The important statistic to take note of is the support for politicians who focused on identity politics and reform. The increased electoral support for these politicians suggests that many Italians are in a state of ontological insecurity. And because these securitization speech acts/practices are resonating among Italians, it is leading to Salvini’s, Berlusconi’s,

Meloni’s, and di Maio’s increased/increasing support. In other words, their stable support base is also a reflection of the public’s approval for securitizing refugees and asylum

53 seekers. I hypothesize that Italians believe that if they support these securitization-driven leaders, it will bring a state of asecurity or ontological security to native Italians.

Further Changes in Leadership

The changes in leadership also suggest that Italians still widely support anti- immigrant narratives and leaders. Dixon et al. (2018) find that 57% of Italians agree that

Italy needs a “strong leader willing to break the rules”; 42% of Italians believe that is too dangerous to accept refugees because “[they] are a major threat of terrorism.” According to one 2018 poll, 58% of Italians view Salvini as the real leader of Italy, juxtaposed to

16% who see Conte—the current Prime Minister—as the leader of Italy (Pullella, 2018).

Not only do Italian natives agree with elites’ securitizing narrative and actions, they support leaders who are more willing to break the rules and who spearhead an Italian-first path—that is, without cosmopolitan ideals or immigration.

Although Salvini was ousted from power in late 2019 he still harbors much support among Italians (de Maio, 2019). Salvini, in other words, may be down but he is certainly not out of the political game. He remains an effective force for driving the securitization agenda and narrative (Barry, 2019).

Linking Immigration with Terrorism

Both Italian natives and policymakers have tried to make their case that immigration is a catalyst to terrorism. Underpinning this fearmongering discourse is physical insecurity. Spearheading this type of narrative is not only a political act that demands an exceptional and securitizing response, it is ultimately dangerous. The CS would also add that it is bringing immigrants further away from normal politics. This securitization approach is creating a crisis not solving it.

54 Chebel d’Appollonia (2012) explicates that immigration has long been securitized

and that policy elites repeatedly frame matters of immigration—a normal issue (Wasver,

2000)—as an extraordinary, terrorizing, and physical threat issue due to ontological

insecurities (see Togral 2011: 219; Phizacklea, 2011: Huysmans, 2006). It is worth

adding that the vilification, proximization, conflation, and connection between

immigration and terrorism especially proliferated in the post-9/11 era, alongside Bush’s

anti-terror/war-on-terror narrative (Naber, 2008; Nabers, 2009; Rana, 2007). A 2017 ISPI

study found that of the 1.5 million immigrants that have entered Europe since 2014, only

0.0005% were connected to terrorist networks (Vidino et al., 2017). Immigrants should

not be treated as nor be preemptively viewed as (potential) terrorists. This treatment has

no objective basis.

Nevertheless, however, some Italians have tried to make their case: immigration

and terrorism are unequivocally linked. For example, in a radio interview in April 2019,

Matteo Salvini called the rise of immigration on Italy’s southern shores an “Islamic terrorist infiltration” (Pe, 2019). This immigration-terrorist narrative was also noted in his

2019 live broadcast. Not only is this culturally racist and essentialist, this narrative is

divisive, and it is a sign of cultural insecurity. Further, Salvini has since prohibited the

docking of any NGO rescue ships carrying immigrants—claiming that their arrival would yield a “high risk of terrorism” (Politi, 2018). In short, Salvini continues to curate and reify a narrative that immigrants are terrorists. His painting of immigrants as terrorists

continues to receive a majority support among those who are/feel ‘left behind,’ the

culture defenders, the hostile nationalists, or who are concerned for their physical security

(see also Skonieczny, 2018: 2). It is this securitizing narrative which has circulated in the

55 media discourse and which the public consumes prima facie. For insecure Italians, the solution seems to be to support anti-immigrant leaders for ontological, physical, or cultural security. Further, it is the elites’ linking of immigration and terrorism which lead natives to undertake nationalist and hostile attitudes.

According to a 2016 Pew Research Center study, they find that 60% of Italians believe that immigration will increase the likelihood of terrorism (Wike et al., 2016).

When asked the same question in 2018, 60% of Italians still held the belief that immigrants increased the risk of terrorism—a net zero change (Wike et al., 2019). Thus, this suggests that the immigration-terrorist narrative is still widely supported in Italy.

Additionally, in recounting Dixon et al.’s (2018) study, they asked participants if they agreed with the following statement: “It is too dangerous to let refugees into Italy as there is a major threat of terrorism from people coming to Italy as refugees.” They find that

78% of the participants believed that increasing the amount of immigration in the country will increase the likelihood of terrorism. The 2018 Global Attitudes Survey find that 60% of Italians believe that immigration increases the likelihood of terrorism (Gonzalez-

Barrera and Connor, 2019). What this data suggests is that the immigrant-terrorist narrative has resonated among Italians. It also reflects Italians’ physical and cultural insecurity. And according to the CS, it also reflects the spiraling of securitization. Last, this belief leads to the sexualization, vilification, radicalization, racialization, alienation, exclusion, expulsion, and extermination of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. It also falsely conflates/categorizes refugees and asylum seekers as “terrorists” and it reproduces a volatile terror-industrial complex.

56 Schm’d's (2016) study concludes that 1) immigration control has repeatedly been

framed as a terrorism issue; 2) this framing fosters xenophobia and hurts “hurt bona fide

migrants and legal foreign residents more than mala fide terrorists” (5); 3) the number of

reported terrorist crimes vis-a-vis mass immigration influxes has historically been low.

Groppi (2017) adds that the threat from jihadi terrorism is growing more acute in Italy.

The Counter Extremism Project (2019) argues that while it is not immigrants that are

committing terrorist acts per se, it is their (feared) presence which is inciting far-Right

extremism and domestic terrorism in Italy. They further add that it is 1) the arrival of

refugees and asylum seekers and 2) the decline in employment opportunities/economy,

which have incited domestic terrorist groups such as Ordine Nuovo (New Order) or

Ordine Nero (Black Order). Although policy-making elites continue to posit the narrative that immigrants are terrorists, the data suggests that it is not refuges and asylum seekers

which we should be worried about, but it is the native, domestic terrorists which we

should be worried about.

Securitizing Projects

Securitizing projects can reify securitization rhetoric. Through their actions, both

policymaking elites and native Italians can suggest that refugees and asylum seekers are a

threat which should be feared, securitized, and or neutralized appropriately. Securitizing

projects can take shape in a variety of ways: raising borders, establishing border control

agencies, stopping NGO ships or immigrant barges, rescinding humanitarian grounds for

asylum permits, refusing to integrate refugees or aid asylum seekers.

The creation of FRONTEX—the EU’s external border security agency—and

RABIT (Rapid Border Intervention Team)—the EU’s special operation assistant agency

57 to member states facing immigration pressures—are two examples illustrating how securitization discourse is reifying in public space. Their establishment suggests that immigrants are a securitized concern. These agencies have also led to the spillover of immigrant-securitizing operations: Operation Triton, Operation Hermes, Operation Mare

Nostrum, Operation Poseidon (presently Poseidon Rapid Intervention), Operation Sophia.

While these operations may claim that they are “saving” refugees lives by attempting to squash human trafficking networks, their primary concern is curbing irregular migration—that is, monitoring external borders, detaining those immigrants and asylum seekers who are en route to Europe, and putting them in holding camps. In other words, these operations and agencies act on the premise that immigrants are threats, hence they need to be treated as securitized concerns.

The Italian Navy coordinates many of the aforementioned border patrol missions due to their unique geographic placement: the EU’s southernmost tip and often the first point-of-entry into the EU for asylum seekers. The Conte Administration of Italy has not only refused NGO refugee rescue ships from docking, it has also passed a law that

“eliminates humanitar'in grounds for granting protection to refugees” (Scherer, 2018).

Even under the new administration, the Italian government continues to refuse NGO ships from docking in Italian ports, such as the “Alan Kurdi”—a German-operated NGO ship which rescued five immigrants fleeing Tunisia (Tondo, 2019b). Forty percent of immigrants arrive via rescue ships (Horowitz, 2019). Henceforth, implementing a new law which prohibits and fines NGO-refugee-rescue ships from docking in Italian ports reflects both explicit securitization and an attempt to stop immigration entirely. The

Italian government has also increased the number of asylum-seeking denials, up from

58 24.27% in 2015 to 31.25% in 2019 (Abelian Matamoros, 2018; Tondo, 2019a); cut the

spending for refugees from 35 Euros to 15 Euros a day (Wallis 2018); allocated an

additional 3.5 million Euros for repatriations (Wallis 2018); increased the amount of

detained asylum seekers (Global Detention Project, 2018); and closed immigrant

reception centers (Paynter, 2019).

Speaking on a more macro-level vis-a-vis the EU, currently, there are 16 EU

member states that have Right-wing nationalist-populist parties in office (BBC, 2019).

Additionally the proposed EU budget for 2021-2027 quadrupled the funding for securing

its external borders from 5.6 billion Euros to 21.3 Euros (Villa, 2018); meanwhile,

funding for integration remained relatively the same. Anti-immigrant parties continue to

gain significant electoral traction and popularity with regards to promoting anti-EU and

or anti-immigration legislation, rhetoric, and actions. Put alternatively, elites who are

undertaking securitizing actions towards immigration is not a practice endemic to Italy

and, in fact, it is not only EU-wide, it is both a global phenomenon and problem. In other

words, Italian elites’ actions at the executive and legislative levels continue to suggest

that immigration needs to be securitized.

Public (In)Securities vis-a-vis Immigration Influxes

Another way to gauge whether or not the Italian public is insecure regarding the immigration influxes is by looking at a variety of public opinion polls and their discourse.

The results suggest that the Italian public was ontologically, culturally, physically, and economically insecure in relation to refugees and asylum seekers between 2016 and

2019.

59 According to a 2018 study by Dixon et al., they find that 50% believe that if the

immigration continues, then Italians should start protecting their shores, borders, and themselves. Further, they find that 39% of Italians believe immigrants are a “health risk”

to Italian society and 44% believe immigrants make no efforts to integrate into Italian

society. A 2018 study Pew Research Center study found that 71% of Italians believed

that they should allow few/none immigrants—20% higher than the median average

(Wike et al., 2019). A following survey found that 44% of Italians believed that

immigrants were more responsible than any other group for crime in the country (Wike et

al., 2019). More surprisingly, 61% of Italians believe that immigrants want to be distinct

in society and that they do not want to adopt Italian customs or their way of life (Wike et al., 2019). This high number suggests that Italians believe that accepting foreign

immigrants could jeopardize Italian-ness—a tenet of ontological insecurity. Conversely,

Kostakopoulou’s study explicates that immigrants want to and do learn the ropes quite

quickly as far as assimilating to a country’s way of life (2010: 838). This further proves

how natives’ fear that immigrants want to be distinct in or infiltrate society is unfounded

on any real objective basis.

In another poll, they asked Italians if they agreed or disagreed with the following

statement: “Italy should start sending the people smugglers’ boats back across the

Mediterranean, even if that causes the loss o f lives'" (Dixon et al.. 2018 emphasis added).

Their national average suggested that 32% agreed with the statement. What these

sentiments suggest is that Italian natives perceive immigrants to be health, physical

safety, and cultural safety threats. It is a zero-sum game for Italians. Italians feel as

though their life, identity, well-being, and sociocultural stability would be placed at risk

60 vis-a-vis the presence of immigrants, hence this has led to their securitization and expulsion of immigrants.

In a 2018 poll commissioned by Ipsos, they asked 2,000 Italians to what degree they believed immigration influxes was good for the Italian economy (e.g. bringing new skills or opportunities). In short, 52% of the respondents disagreed with the statement

(Juan Torres Gonzales, 2018). A 2018 Pew Research Center study found that 54% of

Italians believe that immigrants are a “burden on [their] country” (Gonzalez-Barrera and

Connor, 2019). In retrospect, a 2014 Pew Research Center study concluded that 70% of

Italians and Greeks believed that immigrants were a burden—taking their jobs and benefits (Salazar, 2017a; Geddes et al., 2016: 14). Despite the little drop, aggregately speaking, 1) Italians still hold negative perceptions towards immigrants, and 2) they view their acceptance as a zero-sum game. These results suggest that Italians are economically insecure. This sentiment of feeling behind is a sentiment that many populist leaders, such as Salvini, try and tap into.

The discourse at the local levels also suggest that natives are culturally and ontologically insecure about immigrants, too. In other words, Salvini’s discourse is not astray to that of other Italians. Attilio Fontana, President of the Lombardy region—Italy’s richest and most populous region—said that the immigration influxes are threatening to wipe out “our white race” (Giuffrida, 2018). He also said that accepting asylum seekers

“isn't a question of being xenophobic or racist, but a question of being logical or rational.

.. [Italy] must decide if our society should continue to exist or if it should be wiped out”

(Liso, 2018). Silvio Berlusconi—former Prime Minister of Italy, Italian media tycoon, and current member of the European Parliament—said that, “The result is that today we

61 have almost 630,000 immigrants, of which only 30,000 have the right to stay here because they are refugees ... another 600,000 are tantamount to a social bomb ready to explode, because they live by the expedient of committing crimes” (d’Emilio, 2018). And in an interview with TIME magazine, Salvini laments the old EU-way and “Christian-

Judeo roots” with their current government (Walt, 2018). These remarks all reflect a

“prima gli Italiani” (Italians first), essentialist and racist attitude. The aforementioned discourse not only suggests a sort of physical, cultural, and ontological insecurity, it also suggests that Salvini’s securitization narrative is reproducing itself. These remarks also reflect an attempt to perpetuate a single, white, Christian, ethno-nationalist, and conservative identity (see also Salazar, 2017b).

To reiterate, what these Italian public opinion polls and discourse suggest is that

Italians do not just view immigrants unfavorably per se, they believe that they are a threat to their country’s health, culture, and economy—a tenet to both securitization theories and narratives. More importantly, their actions show that one third of Italians are willing to turn immigration boats away (even if that means the loss of life) because they are a risk to Italian society. All of this is to say that the Italian public, in general, is becoming more insecure regarding the imm 'ration influxes, and they are not afraid to turn to hostile measures.

Public Securitizing Immigration

The public can securitize immigration by reifying the securitization discourse from the executive levels via their actions. Aside from electing anti-immigrant leaders who enact anti-immigrant policies, and aside from furthering securitization discourse on

62 Twitter (see Sanguinetti et al., 2018), many Italians have become more hostile and less welcoming towards integrating and assisting refugees into public spaces.

CasaPound is an Italian neo-fascist, anti-EU, far-Right political coalition that has gained significant traction over the past few years. Although they do not hold any seats in the Parliament or Chamber, their support base has steadily increased (especially in

Rome), albeit it was not until 2010 when they began to grow more prominently.

CasaPound has been arousing public sentiments and curtailing immigration policies.

They have also campaigned for and even celebrated asylum seekers' eviction from housing. In 2003 they had one known center; as of 2017, there are 110 known establishments. They have 280,000 likes on their official Facebook group page, and there are 25,000 magazines in circulation (Jones, 2018). Their supporters are primarily white, young-males ages 16-30 (Chandler, 2019).

Second, hate crimes and discrimination have increased exponentially vis-a-vis refugees and asylum seekers. The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe writes that in Italy in 2010, there were 56 hate crimes targeting immigrants reported by the police. As of 2017, that number is now 1,048—a 1800% jump (OSCE 2010a, 2017c)!

Moreover, a cross-sectional, 500-participant study conducted by Napolitano et al. (2018) finds that 61.1% of the Italian refugees or asylum seekers “reported that they [had] experienced at least one episode of violence with racial discrimination”; 58.1% of those employed reported some form of economic violence; and 53.2% reported psychological violence—the most common form. What these findings illustrate is that Italian asylum seekers and refugees are more likely to experience discrimination or be attacked than those residing in Germany. The disproportionate number of attacks in Italy could be

63 attributed to the rise of nationalist and xenophobic sentiments, the growing popularity of

security narratives, the rise of Right-wing leaders/political parties, and insecurity.

Italian Media

The media plays an important role in the process of securitizing immigration.

Generally speaking, Chaban et al. (2017) finds that the media plays a fundamental role in affecting both the public’s opinion and perception of a certain event or referent object

(see also Naber, 2008; Nath, 2017; Puar and Rai, 2002; Cacho, 2012). The media also has the ability to decide what is reported and what is not. Henceforth, this may lead to disproportionate themes being produced—that is. both negative and positive vis-a-vis immigration, for example. Additionally, in many cases, political elites work very closely, albeit sometimes too close, with the media to curate or frame certain narratives which support their political goals (see also Foyle, 2004; Marsh, 2014). In short, the media is the mode by which a lot of the public receives both political and ubiquitous information.

Henceforth, they play a critical role in shaping the public’s opinion, knowledge of, and perception regarding different objects (e.g. immigrants) or events (e.g. “immigration crises”). Berry et al. (2015) put it succinctly:

[I]t is impossible to ignore the role o f the mass media in influencing public and elite political

attitudes towards asylum and migration. The mass media can set agendas and frame debates. Thev

provide the information which citizens use to make sense o f the world and their place within it (4).

While it is true that some Italians may not consume any media at all, the outlets by which most natives stay informed with and consume political narratives continue to expand: social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram), newspapers (e.g. Corriere della Sera, Repubblica, II Giornale, Libero, Gazzetta della Sport), radio channels (e.g.

RAI 1 RAI 2, Canale 5, Rete 4, LA 7), and television. The Italian media has historically

64 casted negative representations of immigration (Tsoukala, 2005). In particular, the Italian media has associated images of war, terror, and disease with immigrants, hence justifying securitizing and exceptional measures (see Quassoli, 2013; Gattino and Tartaglia, 2015).

Additionally, they have used prejudiced, nationalist, racist, and culturalist rhetoric to

(re)produce securitization narratives. A Pew Research Center (2018a) study found that

34% of Italians consider the media to be very important to society; 50% of Italians read the newspaper at least once a week; 64% of Italians get their daily news from Facebook; and 76% hold trust in the media.

Berry et al. (2015) examined articles over a three-year period and found that 11% of the articles in Italy presented refugees and immigrants as national security threats;

10% presented them as a threat to cultural or communal cohesion; 4.3% presented them as a health risk; and 5% linked them to crime. The Italian press primarily presented refugees and asylum as “illegals,” “without documents,” “foreigners,” and “clandestine”

31.7% of the time. Bruno (2016) finds that the three most common frames are the immigrant as a “security threat,” the landing issue/emergency or “invasion,” and the threat to Western or religious continuity. These negative thematic representations and constructions of immigrants influence how natives make sense of the “immigration crisis” around them. Further, it also directly (mis)leads natives to hold jaundiced views of and towards immigrants. Berry et al. (2015) find that Italian media used the term

“refugee” or “immigrant”—a positive-neutral—in 15.7% of the press. The low presence of these positive-neutral references suggest rejection and evoke insecurities among natives. Refugees were presented as national security threats in 2.3% of the press; themes

65 regarding integration was present in 7.6% of the articles; ana more security was present n 1.4% of the analyzed press.

In summary, the media has the ability to influence the public’s understanding of the reality around them. Not only can the narrative bring success (i.e. security) to its survivors, it can help them remember their complex realities. The polls imply that the majority of the Italian public hold trust in and consume the media both for ubiquitous and political knowledge. Moreover, the media (re)produces de/securitizing narratives, frames, or themes. I say “(re)produce” because the media both produces its own images of immigrants/immigration as well as reproduces the de/securitizing narratives produced by elites. In either case, these narratives 1) resonate among natives; 2) which then engender natives’ anxieties, fears, and or (in)securities; 3) and hence lead natives to support anti-

/pro- immigrant/immigration leaders and policies.

The former chapter has tried to briefly explicate Italy’s recent past and current treatment of refugees and asylum seekers vis-a-vis Salvini’s securitization narrative. It has explored native discourse, public opinion polls, voting trends, changes in political leadership, national project, agencies, operations, and the media in order to illustrate 1)

Italy s liberalism crisis and 2) how the Italian public was largely ontologically, physically, culturally, and economically secure between 2016 and early 2019. It is no coincidence that Salvini’s securitizing speech acts have proliferated alongside the increase in support for anti-immigrant measures, discourse, and leadership. In contrast, the following two chapters will illustrate a different story. It will explore how this same refugee and asylum-seeking crisis has been largely handled via desecuritizing practices and discourse. It will juxtapose German Prime Minister, Angela Merkel’s discourse, as

66 well as Germany’s current treatment of refugees and asylum seekers with that of Italy and

Salvini.

67 Chapter 6: An Analysis of Germany’s Desecuritization Narrative

In 2015, the EU faced one of the largest asylum-seeking influxes in their history.

Despite them having focused on external immigration three decades ago as a result of the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the sheer magnitude of 21st century external asylum-

seeking influxes were not something that the EU had prepared for.

Angela Merkel (Germany’s Prime Minister since 2005) remains the EU’s most

outspoken leader for desecuritizing immigration. She has since been praised for her open-

door responses of accepting refugees and asylum seekers. In 2015, TIME Magazine

named this “Chancellor of the Free World,” Person of the Year. Merkel continues to

challenge the existing securitization theories, practices, and narratives due to her ongoing

attempts to bring the “refugee and asylum crisis” back down to normal politics. However,

she has also received backlash for her open-door response too—something that should

not have happened, nor which can be explained under traditional liberal pedagogies— hence leading to her demise in popularity.

As noted earlier, when a “crisis” is presented in public discourse (e.g. “European refugee and asylum-seeking crisis”), this can undermine, falsify, and vacate fairly

elaborate systems of belief and can create situations where, whoever moves first to

articulate a narrative (i.e. “desecuritization” or “securitization”) that makes some sense, has a bit of an advantage, especially political. Merkel and the rest of Germany took to the

side of (largely) desecuritizing refugees and asylum seekers. This goes alongside the widespread prevalence of cosmopolitan liberal ideology in Germany.

68 The following chapter will examine three textual corpora of Merkel: 2016 New

Year’s Eve address, 2016 address to the Bundestag (Germany’s federal parliament), and her 2018 address to the Bundestag and explicate Merkel’s desecuritization narrative from

2016 to 2018. Please refer to Figures 4 - 6 to see the specifically-coded networks (i.e.

quotations) for each speech.

Merkel's 2016 New Year’s Eve (NYE) Address

Angela Merkel rings in every new year with an address broadcasted on national television. While the addresses have varied over the years, each address is often

underpinned by one overarching theme. Despite Merlel’s 2016 NYE address touching on the economy and employment, the whole of her address revolved around immigration:

how to integrate refugees and asylum seekers or why Germany should help (DW News,

2015). Simply put, Merkel made clear that German identity rests upon a general

responsibility to help all people in society despite their origin. Empathetically speaking,

Merkel dedicates the rest of her address to bringing the “refugee crisis” back down to

normal politics (i.e desecuritization).

Merkel begins by recollecting all of the work that Germany put forward as they

assisted in the integration of refugees and asylum seekers during 2015. She challenges the

securitization narrative, theory, and practice when she states that, “it’s natural to help

[refugees and asylum seekers] and to take in those who seek refuge with us.” Stating that

it is natural to help refugees illustrates how she is trying to bring the issue back down to

normal politics—a tenet of desecuritization. It this close linguistic proximization which

illustrates how Merkel is positing a narrative that immigrants are not threats nor burdens

69 on society. And this remark also alludes to a political act which demands that Germany must mobilize and assist refugees and asylum seekers. She thanks Germany for the

“overwhelming wave of generosity and support,” such as the “countless volunteers for their warmth of heart and readiness for action.” (This “generosity” will be outlined in chapter 7). She further argues that the “important task” is “integrating those who remain here permanently” and “mak[ing] make illegal migration legal.” Merkel’s discourse on refugees and asylum seekers is kept very close to the notion of integration. It is this empathetic treatment of immigrant bodies which demands desecuritization. In other words, here we see her desecuritization discourse not only as a speech act, but as a physical/political act, too. It is this type of discourse which reflects physical and ontological security—polar to Italy’s and Salvini’s securitization discourse. However,

Merkel’s takes this sort of desecuritization discourse a step further when she states that

“they underpin [German] society.” Stating that refugees and asylum seekers underpin

German society suggests that they are not just normal, but important aspects of German life. She follows by saying that Germany’s value of embracing everyone is (and has been) “the fundamental requirement for everyone in our country to live together with mutual respect.” Cap’s (2014) lexicon would note that multi- cultures, nationalities, ethnicities, languages, religions, and races are within Germany’s deictic center. In other words, it is normal for them to be present and to flourish within German society.

According to the CS, something such as immigration can become securitized when someone demands that it needs to be securitized. They may claim that immigrants/immigration are catalysts to economic failure or terrorism. Though, to reiterate, there is no objective knowledge of a threat. Therefore, Merkel’s positing that

70 Germany needs to continue integration and assistance efforts suggests that they are not a problem nor are they a threat to society. Henceforth, this suggests ontological, physical, cultural, or economic security.

Merkel challenges the securitization myth and narrative by repeatedly underscoring the many benefits that immigrants bring with them (see also Buzan et al.,

1998: 29; Castles, 2004: 2010; Cortes, 2008; de Haas, 2010; de Haas and Plug, 2006:

614; Walton-Roberts). However, to reiterate, she is not asserting that they are disposable pawns nor a panacea to Germany’s economic, demographic, or labor problems either. For example, she explicates, “Countries have always profited from successful immigration, both economically and socially.” As a result of accepting and integrating immigrants (e.g. refugees and asylum seekers), she explains that Germany has “grown together as a nation” and that they now “have lower unemployment and more people working together than ever before in a united Germany.” Moreover, “united Germany” refers to the unification of multi- cultures, nationalities, ethnicities, languages, religions, and races in and within German society and identity. In order to prove her seriousness about how and why Germany should continue to support refugees’ integration, she exclaims, “I’m convinced that today’s challenges of accepting and integrating so many migrants is an opportunity for tomorrow.” Accepting and integrating both refugees and asylum seekers is poly-faceted: it brings the crisis down to normal politics; it saves refugees who are seeking protection/assistance; it benefits German society both economically and socially; and it perpetuates a welcoming culture of empathy, sincerity, and love (e.g.

Willkommenskultur). Merkel tries to keep immigrants close both to German identity and

71 society as she repeatedly parallels how Germany’s historical acceptance of them has brought many positive yields.

Merkel’s speech ends by calling for everyone’s solidarity and cooperation for embracing, supporting, and integrating immigrants. The following statement underscores how Merkel is refusing to accept and spearhead a narrative that immigrants are threats or chat the refugee and asylum-seeking influxes will divide society or put an end to German life:

We can’t allow ourselves to be divided, not between generation, nor socially, nor Detween long­

time residents and new citizens. We can’t allow ourselves to follow those who, with cold­

heartedness or even hate, claim Germany for themselves alone and try to exclude others. For the

future, we want a country that is self-assured and free, compassionate and open to the world...

[Refugees and asylum seekers] will further strengthen our social market economy.

Merkel refuses to embrace Leitkultur. a German word which connotes jaundiced views against pluralism, multi -culturalism/-lingualism/-nationalism, and which proposes an essentialist narrative of the dominant culture. German identity rests not only upon the free-movement and acceptance of immigrants, it rests upon the solidarity and support of cosmopolitan liberal ideology among native Germans, too. German identity is about helping anyone in times of distress or in needs of protection. German identity, in other words, is ontologically, physically, culturally, and economically secure vis-a-vis the presence of refugees and asylum seekers. In fact, they are precisely what is underpinning

German identity, society, and economy.

Bundestag Address #1 by Merkel

72 Like her 2016 New Year’s Eve address, Merkel’s first Bundestag address largely

desecuritizes refugees and asylum seekers (Euronews, 2016). Her narrative begins by

underscoring the “strength,” “will,” and solidarity of everyone. Instead of framing the

refugee crisis as an existential or physical specter, her optimism calls for everyone to

look beyond the present challenges and demands “everyone’s cooperation” in order to

“tackle the root causes [of the] crisis.” The CS defines this type of discourse as

desecuritization because instead of engendering narratives and complex systems of

securitization which call for an exceptional response, she treats and views the refugee

influxes as a matter of normal politics, which can be solved without exceptional

measures. Merkel also reproduces a narrative whereby she/Germany is economy,

physically, and culturally secure or in a “state of asecurity” (Rumelili, 2015); therefore,

they do not need to fear immigrants or their integration, and that they should all work

together to find “multilateral solutions,'’ such as “security, home, food, and water”

because Europe, as a whole, will “benefit” and be “prosperous.” She argues that ‘we all

benefit from the free movement of people in the EU.” The former assertion is in direct

opposition to Salvini’s preemptive discourse that views immigrants as threats, burdens, thieves, deviants, delinquents, drug dealers, terrorists, and crime-bearers. Essentially what Merkel is doing is curating a (desecuritizing) non-terrorizing narrative, which is encouraging everyone to help refugees, and not fear them. And this is precisely the core difference between securitization and desecuritization: one narrative not only casts immigrants as threats, it justifies an exceptional (and at times hostile) and defensive response; the latter views immigrants as a matter of normal politics, whereby they should be handled/viewed naturally, sympathetically, appropriately, and empathetically.

73 Instead of reminiscing on her country’s (past and present) failures (which the

Italian discourse does)—a populist tenet—she underscores the tremendous “progress,”

“help,” and “humanitarian assistance” that Europe (e.g. Greece and Germany) has contributed to handling the refugee and asylum-seeking influxes. In other words, Merkel

(not once) conflates nor connects immigrants to crime, job theft, or gangs per se—a sign of physical and labor insecurity. Instead, she underscores the “responsibility” and work that Germany has contributed to reifying multicultural and “human values.” This is also an example of ontological and cultural security. She even calls immigration a “common challenge.” It is this type of discourse that goes in direct opposition to Italy’s claim that the immigration influxes are burdens or national security, cultural, and economic threats.

It is this type of desecuritizing discourse that has been made possible due to cosmopolitan liberal ideology in Germany. By highlighting the positive elements of refugee integration

Merkel is ultimately creating a discursive and physical space that is friendly and welcoming to refugees (i.e. Willkommenskultur). Merkel ends her speech calling for

“common” and “humane solutions” to the refugee crisis, whereby everyone must “work together,” not “leave any [member state] out, help those in need of Germany’s or

Europe’s “humanitarian assistance” because although “asylums seekers don’t have a right to choose where they choose to travel to .. they do have a right to ask for safety.”

Merkel’s desecuritizing and empathetic remarks oppose Salvini’s securitization narrative and approach. It also challenges his securitization decree which removed the

“humanitarian grounds” for asylum permits. Further, Merkel’s closing speech is not only inspiring, it suggests that humanity, as a whole, will be prosperous if they support refugees and their integration—a tenet of desecuritization. Merkel repeatedly challenges

74 the existing securitization narratives and approaches by framing and referring to the refugee and asylum-seeking influxes as a normal political issue.

In contrast, Merkel does make a few instances whereby she securitizes

immigration. For example, she states that “fewer people [need to] enter the EU illegally.”

Merkel also appears to securitize immigration when she states that they need to focus on

“reducing] the number of refugees” and that “[the] security checks and new asylum

regulations and solutions, have begun to show an effect—recounting the success of the

Balkan route closure. However, she rebuts her earlier remarks and desecuritizes

immigration—bringing it back down to normal politics—when she argues that, “Europe

[however] is paying a high price” for closing its borders, and that Europe needs to find

both “short- and long-term solutions” which do not leave others “out.” She argues that

raising borders and refusing to accept asylum seekers is only “shifting migration routes to

more complicated [(dangerous)] routes.” In this instance we begin to see Merkel’s retreat

to desecuritize immigration. To be clear, this is the focus and goal of her address to the

Bundestag.

Merkel’s tone and presentation are also worth noting, as it slightly diverges from

Salvini s. As she mentions the European refugee crisis—one of “Europe s gravest challenges”—she remains quite calm and empathetic. She speaks with poise and in a soft, motherly-like tone (“Mutti Merkel” or “Mother Merkel”). When she says that the crisis will require “everyone’s will,” she makes direct contact with everyone in the room— gesturing and pleading with everyone in the chamber. She presents herself with a sort of professionalism and sincerity due to her erect posture. When she says that “[We] (i.e.

Germany and Europe) will only be prosperous f [we] work as a whole ... and find

75 solutions . . . and provide a home and security for refugees,” her diction slows, and her

voice raises. Here she is underscoring the importance of cooperation, responsibility, and

solidarity. And, at its core, this implication desecuritizes immigration and empathizes

with immigrants. Instead of adopting a defensive and preemptive tone, her tone remains

remorseful, albeit op mistic. As she recounts the closure of the Balkan route and the

relief that it has brought to central Europeans, she pauses, vehemently raises her voice,

looks to everyone in the Bundestag, and adds that it cannot and should not continue

because it is not solving the crisis and that the closure is only shifting the immigration

pressures elsewhere (namely in Greece and southern Italy). In this instance, what Merkel

is trying to highlight here is that securitizing measures are only making the problems

worse for other fellow EU member states. As Merkel carries on in her speech, she speaks

slowly (albeit forcefully) and confidently when she references refugees, and when she

asserts that “everyone benefits” from supporting them. She repeatedly pleads to those in

the Bundestag—opening her hands flat and looking around the room—calling on her

fellow members to join in “solidarity” and work towards “common solutions.” She ends

her speech beginning in a high tone; however, her diction slows and fades as she states

that this is the “only way” that Europe will come out of the refugee crisis. It is this

confident presentation and it is this sympathetic, and inspiring tone that Merkel carries

with her as she attempts to desecuritize immigration, empathize with refugees, and bring

the crisis back down to normal politics.

Bundestag Address #2 by Merkel

Despite a two-year difference between the two Bundestag addresses, there is

much continuity. As would be expected, Merkel continues to strongly spearhead an

76 agenda that calls for the desecuritization of refugees and asylum seekers (Ruptly, 2018).

Although she acknowledges the concerns with her cosmopolitan approach—recounting anxieties or insecurities—this is not the aim of her address. In this address, Merkel becomes more vocal with fellow policymakers about the dangers behind securitizing approaches (see Figure 6).

Merkel begins her address by highlighting Germany’s continuous efforts which continuously promote the free movement and support of people. She writes that “the majority of people in Germany live and work for a good and tolerant togetherness of which ‘Tshe is] deeply convinced, and [she] see[s] it as [her] job and the job of all political leaders to support all those who pass [Germany] through every day.” She also exclaims that “society is concerned with the huge amounts of data, security, and protection [which] are completely new threats and requests to our freedom.” Further, she argues that “starting external border controls are not national competencies.” This proximization does not view refugees and asylum seekers as physical threats, therefore there is no need to undertaking a securitizing response. In these instances, we can see how Merkel is underscoring an important tenet of German identity, whereby it is ontologically, physically, and culturally insecure vis-a-vis the presence of immigrants. In contrast, German identity is both supportive and embracive of multi- ethnic, racial, and national identities/people, too. Securitization is not a part of Germany’s agenda because

Germans do not perceive refugees and asylum seekers as burdens, hence their desecuritization. In other words, immigration is also not perceived as a threat but as a matter of normal politics. She then refutes the myth that immigrants are physical threats—claiming that Germany is one of the “safest and most prosperous countries in the

77 world.” Her pleading to the Bundestag that everyone has “a great deal of responsibility”

underscores a sense of empathy—a sentiment absent in much of Italy’s securitization

discourse. She calls her open-door approach a common “responsibility for love;” and she

states that “there is no excuse and justification for the incitement of violence and to

undertake Nazi practices because of people who look different.” In this instance, we can

see Merkel explicitly challenging the existing securitization narratives and practices, such

as those undertaken by Salvini. In short, Merkel’s narrative regards a common

responsibility and duty to not only help everyone, but to embrace everyone in times of

need. This close proximization suggests that immigrants are within Germany’s deictic

center, too. To summarize, her narrative views refugees and asylum seekers not as

physical, cultural, or economic threats but as a matter of normal politics: people looking

for protection and support.

The middle and end of Merkel’s address continue to call for the desecuritization

of refugees. She calls this political approach “normative peacekeeping” and an

“obligation of state authority,” as “the dignity of humans is inviolable.” This illustrates

Merkel’s attempt to prevent the refugee and asylum-seeking crisis from spiraling. To be

clear what is not a part of Germany’s deictic circle is xenophobia. Merkel alludes that

Germany’s identity is physically secure when she “demand[s] no security forces from the

independent courts.” She also refutes the prison-terror-industrial complex which targets refugees. Merkel casts “shame [on] the executioner ... prosecutor ... and also the

employees who do service in detention facilities.” However, the most explicit example of

ontological, cultural, and physical security happens when Merkel rebuts that “Jews and

Muslims are just as much the Christians as atheists are to our society. They are in our

78 schools, in our parties, and in our social life. I am thankful for everyone that everyone’s

children are together.' ’ She even applauds how Germany is “well on the way with

accepting people, and [how] this also applies to Africa and its neighboring continent.”

This narrative reflects how German identity is physically, culturally, ontologically, and

economically secure. This also underscores how multi- ethnic, national, racial, and

cultural people are (and should be) embraced both physically (i.e. in public space), as

well as abstractly (i.e. identity). She argues that handling refugees and asylum seekers is

not about handling threats or burdens but about handling “everyone’s social cohesion”

and it is about “fight[ing] for peace, freedom, and prosperity.’ And these approaches of

solidarity, she argues, are the “interests for a strong Europe, ” which she is “ready to

crystallize continent-wide.” These are all explicit examples demonstrating how Merkel is

fostering and spearheading a cosmopolitan-liberal approach to the refugee and asylum-

seeking influxes. German identity and Germany’s political approach rests upon

accepting, helping, and integrating immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

In order to remain critical of Merkel’s discourse, we also need to look at the few instances where she securitizes immigration, too. She argues that while many “are concerned about the cohesion of all,” and while many are outraged by some of the crimes committed among refugees, we must be cautious about creating blanket, racist and xenophobic “judgments [(or narratives)] made about whole groups,” as they are “[not only] wrong . . . [they are] completely inappropriate.” While she “thank[s] all [those] who work for [the police force],” “solv[ing] the problems of putting us all together” is at the forefront of “all political efforts”—that is, not “seclud[ing] whole groups and

79 marginalizing] them in society.” And it is this open-door, desecuritizing, and empathetic approach that Merkel calls not only her “thesis” but her “will.”

The following chapter has just tried to explicate how Merkel’s desecuritizing discourse in her three speeches is underpinned by physical, ontological, cultural, and economic security. Merkel’s narrative is repeatedly embraced and reified among many

Germans simply because most natives do not perceive refugees and asylum seekers as threats or burdens in society, hence the absence of exceptional, essentialist, or exclusive measures. In other words, Willkommenskultur is not an abstract idea, it is something that is practiced. The desecuritization of refugees and asylum seekers goes alongside the presence of cosmopolitan liberal ideology in German space. Her narrative is not only a desecuritizing speech act, it is a desecuritizing political act which calls for the handling of refugees and asylum seekers normally—that is, without hostility or exclusive measures— a tenet of the CS’ theory on desecuritization. While she continues to challenge those calling for immigrants’ desecuritization both domestically and internationally due to her cosmopolitan, open-door, and liberal approach, she has also faced a great deal of backlash and hostility, too. This is not something that should have happened, nor can it be explained under traditional, liberal paradigms. Nevertheless, however, she shall be remembered as the pioneer who fearlessly spearheaded an open-door agenda amidst a growing, wide-spread climate of Right-wing populism. Willkommenskultur is not an abstract idea, it is something that is practiced vis-a-vis the immigration influxes both discursively and physically, Germany is one example.

80 The following chapter (such as chapter 5) will closely examine Germany’s context with respect to refugees and asylum seekers. It will look at how these marginalized populations are treated in physical spaces vis-a-vis native Germans.

81 Chapter 7: An Analysis of Germany’s Desecuritization Context

The following chapter will examine Germany’s desecuritization context vis-a-vis

refugees and asylum seekers. By looking at public presets as well as public sentiments, I

hope to further make my case that Merkel’s 2016-2019 desecuritization narrative has

been quite popular and has, thus, reified in public space, discourse, and action alongside

cosmopolitan liberal ideology. In contrast, I also hope to illustrate the backlash that

Merkel has received due to her open-door approach/discourse.

To reiterate, securitization is not only costly, it is both a deadly and myopic

approach for handling the refugee and asylum-seeking influxes. There is also no

objective knowledge of a threat. In using the CS’ lexicon, desecuritization “is the optimal

long-range option, since it means to not have issues phased as ‘threats against which we

have countermeasures'' but to move them out of this threat defense sequences and into the

ordinary public sphere” (Buzan et al., 1998: 29).

Labor and Employment

In retrospect, during the mid-twentieth century Germany. the UK, and France all

welcomed immigrants due to their labor shortages. Joppke writes, “In a guest-worker

regime, such as [early] Germany’s, the state at one point actively lured (de facto)

immigrants into the country” (1998: 271). It is important to underscore that economic theory strongly posits that accepting immigrants (via as guest-worker programs) is an

optimal vehicle to industrialize and grow. Though once countries reach an equilibrium in relation to business and labor, they often stop such neocolonial contracts. The acceptance

of refugees often curtails the decisions of state leaders. In particular, their acceptance into

82 the country generally rests upon economic considerations, humanitarian concerns, and anti-Muslim sentiment, too (Bansak et al., 2016: 218). And this is precisely what Teresa

Hayer (2015) argues or. n other words, where we must move beyond. She writes,

“Abolishing controls should not be an economic decision, but the reality is that refugees and migrants add to a country’s prosperity and public finances.”

Germany has had many reasons to desecuritize refugees and asylum seekers.

Stephen Castles writes, “Fertility rates will continue to plummet in rich industrial countries . . . leading to aging population and shrinking labor forces” (2002: 1163). This also goes alongside Germany’s increasing ageing population; whereby older populations yield a decrease in productivity (i.e. economic output) due to a labor shortage. In other words, the literature strongly suggests that Germany needs to desecuritize refugees for the sake of their future economic prosperity. However that is not to say that refugees and asylum seekers should be viewed solely as a panacea to Germany’s labor, demographic, or employment problems either (Lee, n.d.). Nevertheless, this is precisely the approach that Merkel and Germany have taken.

The fiscal cost in accepting and integrating refugees is very slim, albeit the benefits are plentiful. Since 2015, Germany has accepted and integrated more than a million refugees. The German Employment Agency write that “the integration of more than one million migrants who arrived in Germany since the start of 2015 is working better than some had expected” (Specht, 2018). The International Monetary Fund (IMF)

(2016) has also said that Germany—the country with the strongest economy in the EU— has countered negative growth projections and stimulated both private consumption and investment by integrating refugees. On the one hand, speaking of refugees as not just

83 non-threatening, but vital to the German economy and, on the other hand, employing

refugees is precisely what has moved this securitized issue back down to normal politics.

That is to imply that, refugees are becoming desecuritized. In a statement addressed to

Parliament, Germany’s Economy Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, argued that “If we manage to

quickly train those that come to us and to get them into work, then we will solve one of

our biggest problems for the economic future of our country: the skills shortage.” (Bellon

and Capoley 2015). A 2019 study by the World Education News and Review (WENR)

concluded that since Merkel’s 2015 open-door approach, Germany has “enjoyed

substantial economic growth, record low unemployment rates, as well as record federal

budget surpluses” (Trines, 2019).

Although the majority of refugees are employed (i.e. integrated) in low-skilled jobs, many (especially those literate in German) are employed in high-skilled jobs, too.

Refugees do not steal natives’ jobs. Liz Alderman (2015) parallels the former notion

when she writes, “Germans and other European nationals were not filling those jobs

because they did not have the right experience or education or, the case of low-skilled

work, because they did not want the jobs.” Put simply, the reason why German

companies have accepted refugees is because they fill national labor gaps—ones that

natives are reluctant to fill. Although Germans may be reluctant to admit it, refugees of

all skill level benefit the German economy because they lead to innovation via research

and development. Integrating refugees in the labor force underscores how Germany is

moving beyond a state of securitization and towards a state of cosmopolitan

liberalization.

84 A study by the Institute for Employment Research shows that German refugee unemployment rates have dropped from 50.5% to 40.5%, and that one in four are employed in some sort of work (Buck, 2018). According to the Institute for Employment

Research, by the end of 2018. some 400,000 refugees had jobs in Germany (Local DE,

2019a); and some 44,000 refugees were enrolled in apprenticeship programs (Witte and

Beck, 2019). For those refugees who are employed, 50% are employed in skilled work

(Local DE, 2019a). What this data suggests is that refugees have integrated in a variety of employment sectors in Germany. And not only does this improve refugees’ livelihoods, as formerly noted, such integration also supports Germany’s economy and further reinforces the desecuritization of immigration. German companies continue to invest in projects which promote refugees’ employment and civic integration. According to a 2016 study by the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry, it found that 11% of companies already employ refugees, and 10% of companies intend to hire refugees within the next two years (Buck, 2018). Surprisingly, 86% of employers have found little to no difficulty employing refugees (OECD, 2017). This shows that German companies continue to actively integrate refugees due to the ease of skill acquisition/assimilation.

Additionally, it also shows how W '' (kommenskultur is repeatedly reifying itself in the public sphere. And last, it parallels Kostakopoulou’s study which finds that immigrants want to and do learn the ropes quite quickly when it comes to blending into a country's way of life (2010: 838).

Both the executive-level’s discourse and actions clearly illustrate Germany’s desecuritization approach to the recent immigration influxes. Germany has helped offset both their ageing populations and lower fertility rates—catalysts to economic attrition—

85 by accepting asylum seekers and integrating refugees. This approach has led to both widespread economic success and desecuritization.

Public (In)Securities vis-a-vis Immigration Influxes

The widespread acceptance and reproduction of Merkel’s desecuritization narrative/approach suggests that the German public is much more economically, culturally, and ontologically secure than Italy is. For example, a 2016 Pew Research

Center study found that 31% of Germans (compared to Italy’s 65%) viewed refugees as burdens on their country (Wike et al., 2016). In retrospect, the European Social Survey

(2014) finds that 55% of Germans believe that immigration is good for the economy

(Talo, 2017: 4). This response underscores natives’ labor and economic security, which suggests that they do not view refugees as job or benefit takers. Put succinctly, these positive sentiments of refugees suggest that native Germans are economically secure, as they do not view foreign immigrants as threats to their way of life. Only 35% of Germans

(compared to Italy’s 47%) viewed refugees as more to blame than any other group for the crime in their country (Wike et al., 2016). A 2018 follow-up study finds that 44% of

Germans believe that immigrants are no more to blame for the crime in their country

(compared to Italy’s 27%) (Wike et al., 2019). This statistic goes in parallel to the 29% of

Germans (compared to Italy’s 69%) who hold negative views of Muslims (Wike et al.,

2016). This suggests that Germany is more culturally and ontologically secure. In other words, more Germans view Muslims as part of their deictic center than Italians do. Wike et al.’s (2019) last finding concludes that Germany follows Sweden at 60% below the EU median (compared to Italy’s 24%) where speaking the national language, sharing customs, being native bom, and being Christian is unimportant to their national identity.

86 This illustrates how German identity embodies the values of cosmopolitan liberalism or

Willkommenskultur. This is critical because Germany’s transcendence from territorial notions of identity has fueled the recognition, integration, and hybridization of multi­ national identities (e.g. languages, ethnicities, cultures, religions, etc.) to exist in society.

Merkel continues to push for a cosmopolitan narrative, hence Germany’s favorable views of and good relationship to the EU. In other words, this cosmopolitan liberal narrative directly translates to a greater acceptance of multiple nationalities, cultures, languages, ethnicities, and races in the host society. This liberal type of identity and belonging goes in direct opposition to territorially bounded ideas of citizenship and belonging. It is no coincidence that Germany’s acceptance and reproduction of this cosmopolitan liberal approach has led to the widespread desecuritization of refugees and asylum seekers. According to a 2019 Pew Research Center study, they found that 62% of

Germans held favorable views of the EU (compared to Italy’s 43%) (Wike et al., 2019).

German cosmopolitan values of acceptance, in other words, parallel the EU’s progressive values of liberalism. Germany’s desecuritizing approach also mirrors the EU’s increased efforts to promote a common, speedy, moral, and responsible solution for handling asylum seekers and for bringing the crisis back down to normal politics (see Salazar,

2017a). Wike et al. (2019) later find after surveying 10 EU countries that 81% believe that Germany is playing a more important role in world affairs. This positive finding suggests that more Europeans are acknowledging Germany’s increased leadership in international affairs. In short, we can infer that more Europeans applaud Germany’s increased responsibility or handling of refugees and asylum seekers (e.g. accepting nearly two million refugees since 2013).

87 Anti-immigrant sentiment remains much lower in Germany than it does in Italy.

This implies that more Germans do not feel as threatened (i.e. insecure) by refugees and asylum seekers’ presence than Italians do. It is no coincidence that these German sentiments go alongside the increased prevalence/presence of both a desecuritization narrative and cosmopolitan liberal ideology. For example, whereas 23% of Italians believed that accepting immigrants should continue, 42% of Germans believed that such acceptances should continue (Wike et al., 2019). One of the starker polls shows that 59% of Germans believe immigrants make their country stronger (compared to Italy’s 12%)

(Wike et al., 2019). Despite having accepted nearly two million refugees since 2013, 82% of Germans still support taking in refugees (compared to Italy’s 56%) (Wike et al., 2019).

Liebe et al.’s (2018) study confirms the aforementioned hypothesis: German sentiment has not changed significantly since 2015, and most still hold strong humanitarian views.

In fact, Eurobarometer (2017) finds that German positive sentiments towards foreign immigration increased between 2014 and 2017 from 30% to 39% (Talo, 2017: 3;

Eurobarometer. 2017). What all of these polls show is that most Germans are physicallv, culturally and ontologically secure vis-a-vis refugees and asylum seekers. In fact, the former discourse and sentiments suggest that Germans are more secure with refugees’ and asylum seekers’ presence than without their presence, as they underpin their society, economy identity, and moral values. Refugees and asylum seekers are a part of

Germany’s deictic circle, society, and identity.

Some scholars have also explicated that the anxieties surrounding immigration

(e.g. culture, language, assimilation, security, or lifestyle) decreases once natives come in contact with immigrants (Talo, 2017: 5; Dixon, 2006; Ha, 2010). This finding is

88 particularly optimistic for those who hold jaundiced and pessimistic reservations vis-a-vis the future integration of refugees and asylum seekers in the host society.

Public Desecuritizing Immigration

Desecuritizing immigration can take place not only discursively but physically too within public spaces. Desecuritizing immigration is both an intentional and political act that brings the topic back down to the circle of normal politics. This can take shape in the form of local, regional, or national projects. The CS and I both argue that this is the optimal, long-range solution for handling the immigration influxes. Germany continues to reify Willkommenskultur via their open-door and friendly approach (i.e. accepting a highly disproportionate amount of asylum seekers and quickly integrating these refugees into society). Nevertheless, Germany has spearheaded for refugees linguistic, economic, civic, and societal integration—a challenging, albeit important, task for desecuritizing immigration, which demands both a multivariate approach, compassion, and patience.

In 2016, Germany spent over 20 billion euros on refugees (Dearden. 2017). These welfare funds go to support a refugee’s most basic needs: shelter, food, clothing, or funds for communicating back home (Bierbach, 2017). The increase in funding for refugees underscores natives’ economic security. Linguistically speaking, Spiegel writes,

“Between 2015 and 2016, some 15,000 refugee projects launched in Germany . . . many of them focused on helping newcomers learn the language” (Dianhangard, 2017). The data suggests that 50% of refugees are a part of integration courses (Romei et al., 2018).

Germany’s nonprofit Goethe-Institut also supports refugees in social, cultural, educational, and civic integration. The language barrier is the most difficult obstacle for

89 refugees and asylum seekers, hence Germany’s focus on language integration programs.

It is no coincidence that the decrease in refugee unemployment goes alongside the increase in language integration projects.

Germany’s mull faceted integration approach is underpinned by natives’ cultural, physical, and ontological security. In other words, these immigrants are not viewed as threats but as people in need of support and protection. In short, one of the main keys to integration is German language proficiency, hence the majority of these integration projects tend to focus on language assistance. Promoting integrations projects, raising the economic assistance for refugees, and erecting housing accommodations for refugees and asylum seekers are just a few examples illustrating how Germany is desecuritizing the immigration crisis. These humanitarian approaches highlight how Germany is managing the crisis and bringing it back down to normal conflicts—that is, refuting the myth that refugees are an existential or physical threat to society.

German Media

Exploring how the recent immigration influxes are presented in the media can shed light on how the de/securitization narratives are playing out on other discursive levels. Van Dijk (2000) illustrates how the media is an important agent for reproducing stereotypes. Further, Santa Ana (1999) and Erjavec (2003) explicate how the media may use dehumanizing metaphors for inciting ‘moral panic’ (Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti,

2016: 266). Understanding this literature is important for understanding how the media is an equally important agent for creating, reproducing, and reifying de/securitizing environments.

90 As would be expected, the following examination of the German media confirms my hypothesis: Merkel’s desecuritization narrative is reproducing and reifying itself both widely and multilaterally. Not only is this approach bringing the crisis down to normal politics, it is challenging the existing securitization approaches and myths, and it is also saving immigrant bodies.

Examining the subtle, albeit important, linguistic nuances in the media is important for understanding different narrative (and hence, identity) constructions. Berry et al. (2015) find that German media used the term “refugee” or “immigrant” in 91% of the press (compared to Italy which used the terms 15.7% of the time). These more positive-neutral connotations/references can evoke a sense of empathy and welcoming­ ness among natives. Fotopoulos’ and Kaimaklioti’s (2016) study parallel the former findings, too. After examining 1,380 articles, the German media referred to refugees and asylum seekers as “illegals” or “illegals” 1% of the time, and that the German media was more likely to include contextual information such as immigrants’ country of origin or the environments within asylum-seeking camps. By refraining from negatively charged words (e.g. “clandestine” or “illegal”)—a tenet of the CS’ theory on desecuritization— one is curbing both a securitization narrative and approach, hence preventing the issue from spiraling volatilely. Further. Berry et al. (2015) write that refugees were presented as national security threats in 2.3% of the press (compared to Italy’s 9.2%). Second, themes regarding integral m were presented in 19.7% of the articles (compared to 7.6% in Italy); more security was presented in 1.4% of the articles. The German media (86.5% vs Italy’s 69.6%) was also more likely to include information on refugees’ country of origin. This contextual background knowledge is important because it can help situate

91 readers, force them to consider immigrants reasons for seeking asylum in the first place, and at best, catalyze a sense of empathy among readers.

These results show that the benefits or the positive representations of refugees were more prevalent in the German media than in the Italian media. The German media was also more likely to include background information on the immigration (e.g. presenting refugees and asylum seekers as helpless and desperate victims caught amidst a

civil war). Despite the recent negative representations of immigrants in the media, Berry

et al. (2015) conclude that the far-Right still lacks a political voice and significant representation in the Bundestag.

Pew Research Center (2018b) find that 61% of Germany holds the media very

important and 87% hold trust in the media for news and other information. They also find that most Germans place themselves in the center-Left. This type of political association

is important for understanding Germany’s progressive approach vis-a-vis immigration. It

is no coincidence that the majority of the media outlets are Center-Left-leaning. Of

course, all of this goes alongside the wide presence of cosmopolitan liberal ideology in

public, discursive, and abstract spaces.

Refugee and Asylum Seeker Backlash

Ironically, Merkel’s and Germany’s desecuritization, cosmopolitan, and liberal

approach has backfired. For example, Germany has also witnessed an increase in hate

crime violence as well as a rise in the far-Right ethno-nationalist party: Alternative fur

Deutschland. As noted earlier, this is not something that should have happened nor can it

be explained by liberal theory. In retrospect, securitization theory posits: 1) refugees exist

92 outside the norm (i.e. homogenous, cultural, or territorial notions idenft}); 2) refugees

are an existential threat; and 3) nations need to respond to the immigration influxes via

extraordinary measures.

Germany’s southern and easternmost states (e.g. Saxony or Bavaria) have

expressed the most anxiety around the immigration influxes. Historically speaking, however, they have also received the lowest levels of refugees and asylum seekers. Horst

Seehofer. Germany’s Interior Minister stated, “Islam does not belong to Germany” (BBC,

2018). Bavarian President, Markus Soder, has also proposed very tight asylum-seeking

legislation. His legislation aims at stopping irregular immigration at the border

enhancing both deportations and the police force, establishing holding centers, and

stopping welfare aid to asylum seekers (MacGregor, 2018). What this data implies is that

Germany is securitizing and codifying volatile notions of exceptionalism or

securitization. Not only are refugees demonized throughout this securitization process, they are also stripped of their humanity in this threat-defensive game, too.

Although securitizing immigration will not solve the crisis, it can bring ease to

native Germans who feel culturally, economically, ontologically, or linguistically

threatened by refugees’ and asylum seekers’ presence. In other words, the German

securitization process goes as follows: refugees and asylum seekers are presented and

perceived as threats (i.e. they exceed the normal political discourse); henceforth, this

engenders and justifies specific, spiraling, and vicious security responses. The growing

myth that immigrants are an existential threat may help explain why many Leftists are

defecting to far-Right, anti-immigration, identity-driven, and pro-securitization political

93 parties such as AfD. Although the former point is beyond the scope of this thesis, it warrants further examination.

Populist movements are paving new ientity narratives, while at the same reinforcing and reifying old, social, economic, and nativist hierarchies—vital tenets to securitization. Leslie crystallizes my former notion when she writes, “Populists practice what is sometimes referred to as discriminatory legalism: the idea that only the ‘true’ people get to enjoy full protection of the law, while others receive only partial protection, or, occasionally, none at all” (2017: 79) The jurisgenerative production of discriminatory law is a securitizing effort which has grown in Germany. Conducive to this analysis is

Muller’s conclusions on populism. She writes, “[P]opulist[s] will often eagerly frame a situation as a crisis calling it an existential threat” (2017: 43, emphasis added). Populism is a dichotomizing, volatile, contagious, and securitizing vehicle. Skonieczny writes,

“[PJopulism resonates because it directs feelings of lack and shame towards blame of others—typically elites but also scapegoats such as immigrants, refugees and economically weak groups” (2018: 2, emphasis added). The former points underscore how populism is a vehicle for bringing ontological or physical security, which can reify itself in political discourse via its codification in law. In other words, populism’s construction of the Other as threatening, signals both a clear departure from the CS’ desecuritization theories and a specific securitizing response.

Host-hostility can take form in a variety of ways. Host-hostility is inextricably part of the securitizing process and it can have a variety of implications, such as leading to the spiraling of the securitization complex. It can be as abstract as holding prejudiced view towards refugees or holding jaundiced sentiments of multiculturalism, to blocking

94 asylum seekers at borders, to protesting against open-door policies, to simply killing

refugees. The belief that immigrants are threats directly engenders securitizing or hostile

practices. Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) recorded 2,396 crimes

against refugees (DW, 2017). Additionally, Sebastian Schelter and Jerome Kunegis

(2017) write that in 2015, there were more than a thousand crimes (e.g., arson, sexual

violence, etc.) reported in asylum shelters (Schelter and Kunegis, 2017: 278). Despite

these findings. DW (2017) adds that the attacks on asylum applicants’ homes decreased

2016 onwards.

Many natives attack refugees because they are perceived to be threats to society

or to them. In contrast, Germany’s former Interior Minister (Thomas de Maiziere) has

stated that Syrians and Iraqis are barely noticeable in society—refuting the finding that

refugees try to be distinct in society (Wike et al., 2019)—and on average they are less

delinquent if not as delinquent as the local population (WELT. 2016). BKA illustrates

that crime overall has decreased over the past three decades (BKA, 2019). BBC’s fact

check team (2018) illustrates that the total crime including immigrants dropped by 10%

and violent crimes decreased by 2.5% between 2016 and 2017.

Although there is a growing narrative that immigrants are threats in society,

between 2015 and mid 2019, most Germans held positive views both 1) of refugees and

asylum seekers and 2) of Merkel’s open-door policy. Merkel’s desecuritization narrative

and the cosmopolitan liberal approach continues to challenge securitization (e.g. nativist

sentiments, myths, and political approaches). Despite Merkel" s demise, the most recent public opinion poll (September 2019) shows that the majority of Germans (~58%) still

approve of Merkel’s leadership and that they want her coalition to complete their term

95 until 2021 (Camino Gonzalez, 2019). Although there is a growing support for Germany’s far-Right party (AfD), it remains fragmented and marginal. Local DE (2019b) also adds that AfD s support has decreased since 2018.

The former chapter has tried to explicate Germany’s largely desecuritizing context between 2015 and 2019. By examining public opinion polls, native and media discourse, and national projects, it has tried to make its case that most Germans were physically, economically, culturally, and ontologically secure vis-a-vis refugees and asylum seekers. The following chapter has also tried to outline how Merkel’s desecuritization narrative has reified and reproduced itself multilaterally alongside the growth of cosmopolitan liberal ideology in Germany. Native Germans continue to support refugees’ and asylum seekers’ desecuritization by increasing their material assistance, electing liberal policymakers, supporting Merkel’s open-door approach, employing refugees, and supporting language integration programs. Countless public opinion polls have found that the majority of Germans want to support a liberal approach to the immigration influxes. Although there is a growing support for immigrants’ securitization, the support remains fragmented and small vis-a-'' is the amount of those who support immigrants’ desecuritization. Having accepted and integrated over 1.5 million refugees since 2013, Germany remains the EU’s (if not one of the world’s) greatest frontrunners for desecuritizing immigration. Merkel’s and Germany’s desecuritizing and cosmopolitan liberal approach is admirable in today’s contentious political climate, whereby more and more immigrants are becoming securitized alongside the growth in far-Right, populist political parties and nativist discourse.

96 The following chapter aims at closing this thesis and recommends some potentially fruitful avenues worth exploring for the future research on refugees and asylum seekers.

97 Chapter 8: Conclusion

The former thesis has tried to outline two diverging discursive and physical responses to the same immigration crisis: Salvini’s and Italy’s securitization and

Merkel s and Germany’s desecuritization. In addition to summarizing this thesis’ most seminal findings, it will also recommend some other areas warranting future research.

Recommendations for Future Research

There are many tenets that would have complemented the conclusions in this thesis. First, this thesis has only hardly broken the surface with respect to analyzing the discursive corpora on immigration within Italy and Germany. While it has tried to multilaterally examine the discourse on refugees and asylum seekers, a more in-depth linguistic analysis of more textual corpora could prove to be insightful. For example, examining the representations of refugees and asylum seekers on social media—today’s preferred mode of communication—could prove promising. Second, this also goes alongside a more thorough examination of the different securitizing and desecuritizing projects within Germany and Italy. Third, this thesis has only briefly touched upon the ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious, and cultural boundaries with which the immigration crisis is probing. In other words, it would be worth further exploring how. why, where, and when particular identity(s) come into play vis-a-vis immigration. Fourth, this goes alongside exploring how certain identities can perpetuate archaic, colonial, imperial, and

(culturally) racist projects. Fifth, analyzing the ongoing changes in Italian leadership (e.g.

Salvini’s outing) may shed light upon more important political shifts within the EU.

Sixth, this thesis has only briefly touched upon Merkel’s demise and the Lefts’ defection

98 to far-Right, anti-immigration, identity-driven, and pro-securitization political parties

such as AfD; henceforth it would be worth further researching, especially because

Germany has spearheaded the desecuritizing efforts in the EU. Seventh, examining the

sweeping waves of Right-wing populism throughout the EU can help us better understand

the shifts in geopolitical leadership in Europe. Last and more importantly, I would have

enjoyed giving more agency to refugees and asylum seekers in this thesis. Unfortunately,

time, length, distance, and financial constraints prohibited me from actualizing this

ambition. Nevertheless, including their perspective such as their anecdotes or sentiments

could have helped to humanize this research on refugees and asylum seekers.

Examining these areas could help us better understand the EU’s solidarity and

cooperation. Equally important, it can help us better understand the fate of refugees and

asylum seekers in the EU. Additionally, it may also help us better understand the

geopolitical future for lack thereof) of the EU and its role on an international level. Are the EU, Willkommenskultur and cosmopolitan liberalism dying ideals? What does this

mean for the future of refugees and asylum seekers? Will Germany continue “Mutti

Merkel’s” open-door approach and narrative? Is Italy in the beginning stages of bringing the immigration crisis back down to normal politics? Exploring some of the

aforementioned areas may help us answer these questions.

A Thesis in Review

This thesis has ambitiously tried to explicate how Germany and Italy has

responded to the refugee and asylum-seeking influxes. With the help of Atlas.ti

(see Figures 1-6), I have created six visual representations which demarcated and coded

99 the de/securitizing elements of six different textual corpora between 2016 and 2019:

Salvini-Sackur interview: Salvini’s live broadcast; Salvini’s rally in Milan; Merkel’s

2016 New Year’s Eve address; and two addresses by Merkel to the Bundestag. This

thesis began by developing from the Copenhagen School (CS) in order to illustrate how

referent objects become de/securitized in discursive space. However, it then

supplemented de/securitization theories with proximization theory. Moreover, is also

explicated how de/securitization can reify itself in physical space, and how it can be

underpinned by fear or by physical, cultural, economic, or ontological (in)securities. This thesis' most seminal assertions are as follows.

Matteo Salvini continues to spearhead a narrative which suggests that Italian-ness

(i.e. identity or culture) are at stake vis-a-vis refugee and asylum seekers. This narrative has resonated with my Italians. In other words, this construction is very much like a zero-

sum game, whereby accepting immigrants can yield a loss of cultural Italy. His linguistic proximizations suggest that refugees and asylum seekers are not a part of Italy’s deictic

circle, society, and identity. Italians do not just view refugees and asylum seekers

unfavorably per se, they believe that they are a threat to their country’s health, culture,

and economy. This narrative was (and remains) quite popular between 2016 and mid

2019. An analysis of Italy’s linguistic proximizations and projects has also shown that

most Italians believe that the solution is supporting anti-immigrant leaders and practices,

as this can bring them ontological, physical, or cultural security. In the three speeches that I analyzed by Salvini, the main theme overwhelmingly regards securitizing

immigration, albeit he does make a few attempts to desecuritize immigration, too. The

securitization of refugees and asylum seekers is a result of Italy’s liberalism crisis. To

100 reiterate, securitization is a practice situated in discursive legitimation that has no objective knowledge of a threat. The securitization process goes as follows: refugees and asylum seekers are presented and perceived as threats (i.e. they exceed the normal political discourse); henceforth, this engenders and justifies specific, exceptional, spiraling, reproducing, and vicious security responses. Securitizing projects can take shape in a variety of ways: raising borders, establishing border control agencies, stopping

NGO ships or immigrant barges, rescinding humanitarian grounds for asylum permits, refusing to integrate refugees or aid asylum seekers. Moreover, Salvini’s and Italy’s securitization discourse/approach establishes an inferiority complex whereby

Italians/Italian-ness are superior to refugees and asylum seekers; it justifies racialized and securitized practices/projects; it criminalizes refugees and asylum seekers as delinquents; it reifies imperial intentions; it justifies hegemonic positionalities; it falsely categorizes them as terrorists; and it essentializes immigrants as violent monsters. It is no coincidence that Salvini’s securitizing speech acts have proliferated alongside the increase in support for anti-immigrant measures, discourse, hostility, and leadership. Presenting immigration as a matter of terrorism fosters xenophobia and hurts bona fide immigrants and legal foreign residents greater than mala fide terrorists; second, it allows the securitization- and terror-industrial- complex to spiral. Last, the securitization narrative that immigrants are threats or burdens to society leads to the sexualization, vilification, radicalization, racialization, alienation, exclusion, expulsion, and extermination of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

Angela Merkel continues to fearlessly spearhead a desecuritization narrative and political approach. An analysis of Merkel and Germany’s discourse as well as an analysis

101 of their physical responses to the immigration influxes has shown that refugees and asylum seekers are not a problem nor are they a threat to society. Underpinning these sentiments lies ontological, physical, cultural, and economic security. In the three speeches that I analyzed by Merkel, the main theme overwhelmingly regards desecuritizing immigration, albeit she does make a few attempts to securitize immigration, too. In retrospect, desecuritization is the optimal long-range option because it regards moving threats from a threat defense sequence to normal politics. The desecuritization of refugees and asylum seekers goes alongside the widespread presence of cosmopolitan liberal ideology in German spaces. Accepting and integrating both refugees and asylum seekers is poly-faceted: it brings the crisis down to normal politics; it saves refugees who are seeking protection/assistance; it benefits society both economically and socially; and it perpetuates a welcoming culture of empathy, sincerity, responsibility and love (e.g. Willkommenskultur). German identity rests not only upon the free-movement and acceptance of immigrants, it rests upon the solidarity and support of native Germans, too. German identity is about helping anyone in times of distress or in needs of protection. Public opinion polls and discourse suggest that German identity is ontologically, physically, culturally, and economically secure vis-a-vis the presence of refugees and asylum seekers. In fact, it has been explicated that they are the ones precisely underpinning German identity (e.g. moral values), society, and economy.

Refugees and asylum seekers are a part of Germany’s deictic circle, society, and identity.

Merkel’s and Germany’s discourse/actions continue to respect refugees’ integration—that is, reify cosmopolitan liberalism and Willkommenskultur. In turn, this creates a welcoming and friendly space for immigrants.

102 In Germany, the refugee and asylum-seeking influxes are treated as a matter of normal politics/people (i.e. people in need of protection and support), henceforth they can

(and should) be solved without exceptional measures. This treatment of immigrants is tangent to Italy’s securitization narrative which views immigrants as burdens, crime- bearers, deviants, delinquents, drug dealers, terrorists, thieves, and threats. And this is precisely the core difference between securitization and desecuritization: one narrative not only casts immigrants as threats, it justifies an exceptional (and at times hostile) and defensive response; the latter views immigrants as a matter of normal politics, whereby they should be handled/viewed naturally, sympathetically, appropriately, and empathetically.

Like those insecure Italians, although securitizing immigration and defecting to

AfD will not solve the crisis, it can bring ease to native Germans who feel culturally, economically, ontologically, or linguistically threatened by refugees and asylum seekers’ presence. Nevertheless, Germany has spearheaded the efforts for refugees’ linguistic, economic, civic, and societal integration—a challenging, albeit important, task for desecuritizing immigration, which demands both a mull /ariate approach, compassion, empathy, and patience.

Some Final Thoughts

The ongoing refugee and asylum-seeking influxes continue to test the strength and solidarity of the EU. Further, both the immigration influxes and the rise in Right- wing populism continue to test both the EU’s and member states" mmigration laws, infrastructure, identity(s). and patience. This raises entirely new question regarding the

103 EU’s future, as well as the relationships that member states hold both with one another

and with other international actors.

Environmental degradation (i.e. climate change), corrupt and unstable

governments, human rights violations, economic insecurity, social insecurity, and the

lack of protection are just a few reasons why people embark on deadly exoduses to places

such as the EU. Securitization is not and never will be the answer to solving rapid refugee

and asylum-seeking influxes. It is a placebo, as it only fosters greater insecurity, leads to

the spiraling of a normal and inevitable political issue and it hurts immigrant bodies. I

posit that desecuritizing immigration and embracing ideals such as Willkommenskultur

or cosmopolitan liberalism will save immigrant lives, promote economic prosperity, and

foster more inclusive, respectful, and cross-cultural spaces.

Immigrants like refugees and asylum seekers are not threats, burdens, or monsters

in society. They are like you and I and they have just as much the right to live a happy, healthy thriving, and equitable life. Many did not ask to be bom in a place without water, without fertile soil, without employment opportunities, without political protection, or without economic prosperity. Unfortunately, this is their reality. We hold a responsibility to not forget, silence, or exclude our neighbors both near and far away. This discussion does not end here, it must only continue from here.

Refugee lives matter: asylum seeker lives matter; immigrant lives matter; undocumented lives matter; black lives matter- brown lives matter; LGBT+ lives matter; queer lives matter. Their rights are human rights.

104 Figure 1: Coded Network for Salvini-Sackur Interview

In Europe we Senegal, Gambia. only have room for people genuinely ivory co o ... fleeing war

thankfully Fu cto n and Nazism wtll never return. Fascism, Nazi HD, and Jl Commurtem - any type o* regime. ..

Wa am currently abiding \ by thses rides \

Previous policies lead to 16,000 d - ' We need egreemenls that for the Include aid. remaining 90% deveto pment that are not ctearty, they fleeing war, that were not fleeing war H after just a Immigration ixtder coming h week they had commit c given up everything they but we want to These 100 we ne*d to n»duc* change tham migrants that I hersiwe we can famouaty held on to longer accept a boat for 10 day* and pay tor a< the were Imprisoned migrants met get to...

E securitization kW *-!*- T - - -T..-T-***4k with the mono! they take from J theee desperate people, the boat owner* buy weapons and fc Either Europe* ■tope In or we do . JLaucwvee The good times for the Illegals ore over It le time that they pack their

they ail have to bide by the rulea.

For all the I deport others the doors are shut

105 Figure 2: Coded Network for Salvini’s Live Broadcast

thoroughly the humanitarian I'm checking humanitarian permit* and on ft* legal Proud to bea occupation of mlrMtar that has a heart erf the continuing the J eecwttyand

aeeodaUone m the eodal canters, and! don't.. aodety, you will , go back to jraur ootrtiy, and than

* SecurlOiaUan -

I want to thank Three hundred police officers delivered a Ug We're dso Wow to the stepping up the We got 2,000, purveyor* of fight against the 3,000, 5,000 mafia, The taaeta for latoan bring more Camorra. the eeculty to the Ncfranghsta. wtth etrweta of Italy

' aaylumwMba Thara’aaaN p given to thoee that belonging to the eodal oentar that DeeecLTttlzjrtJon „ deeerve It people la roaming the n ■MoSe «* h Mwatwwiwn. k* eericutoeee. name la MedMer*.. vtot..

we are respecting the Constitution muS the Internal national conwenttona

106 Figure 3: Coded Network for Salvini’s Rally in Milan

107 Figure 4: Coded Network for M erkel’s NYE Address

108 Figure 5: Merkel’s First Bundestag Address

109 Figure 6: Coded Network for Merkel’s Second Bundestag Address

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