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Democracy Report Italy

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Democracy Report Italy DEMOCRACY REPORT FOR ITALY Dr. Leonardo Morlino Dr. Donatella della Porta Ms. Lisa Francovich Ms. Serena Giusti Mr. Fillipo Legnaioli Mr. Pietro Milazzo 1 I. Citizenship, Law and Rights 1. Nationhood and Citizenship Does public agreement on a non-discriminating common citizenship exist? 1.1 To what extent does the nation and state citizenship of those who live within the territory exist? 1.1.1 Laws The fundamental feature guaranteeing the majority of our constitutional rights is citizenship, that is, the subjective status through which the Constitution gives recognition to a series of rights (especially political rights) and duties. The acquisition, the loss and the acquisition of citizenship are now regulated by Law No.91, 1992, which has definitively substituted the 1912 law, in force until then. Concerning the acquisition of Italian citizenship by birth, the fundamental principle is that of the so-called ius sanguinis, according to which anyone born (or adopted) in any part of the world from an Italian mother or father is entitled to Italian citizenship. The principle of ius soli, according to which Italian citizenship is given to those who are born within the territory of the state, applies only in residual cases and to a limited extent, particularly in the case of parents who are unknown or stateless, or in the case that the newborn cannot be attributed the citizenship of his parents owing to the laws of citizenship of the countries in which his parents are citizens. As well as acquisition by birth, citizenship may later be granted to foreigners in cases of specific individual or family situations, generally subject to defined periods of residence. Thus, citizenship can be acquired by (i) the foreign spouse of an Italian citizen, after six months of permanent residency within the territory of the state or three years of effective matrimony; (ii) foreign citizens who can prove direct second-grade descent from an Italian citizen; (iii) an adopted son or daughter of an Italian citizen, now come of age, who has lived for no less than five years in Italy; (iv) foreigners who have served the Italian state for at least five years; (v) a citizen of a Member State of the European Union after four years of residence (five in the case of stateless persons); (vi) a foreign citizen from a non-European Union country after ten years of residence in Italy. Moreover, those born outside the country from at least one Italian parent are eligible for registration as citizens when minors. With respect to the loss of citizenship, the Constitution provides that this cannot occur for political reasons (Art.22). Law N.91/92 foresees that Italian citizenship can be released either by choice or automatically when the Italian citizen residing in a foreign state does not acknowledge the order of the Italian authorities to break this legal bond. In parallel, citizenship can be reacquired after losing it – subject to the request of the interested party – when the latter carries out military service or accepts a state position, or when, within a year of having released his citizenship, he takes up residence within the Republic, or again when he relinquishes the relationship with the foreign state which enforced the loss of said Italian citizenship. Citizenship obviously gives rise to certain rights, among which the enjoyment of all constitutional rights. In itself, however, the Constitution only guarantees to all men and women (including foreigners) the inviolability of fundamental rights. Recently, however, the number of rights recognised to non-citizen residents has been increased. For example, citizens of the European Union have now obtained the right to vote in administrative, municipal and council elections of their places of residence (Par.1, Chap.14). Summarising, citizenship is inclusive and based on three main principles: 2 1) ius sanguinis i.e. a child with an Italian father or mother; 2) equality between women and men; 3) will to avoid situations of statelessness. 1.1.2 Implemention and negative indicators With the entry into force of the European Union Treaty, Italians benefit from the advantages deriving from EU citizenship, in addition to national citizenship. Every person holding the nationality of a member state is automatically a citizen of the Union. Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states. Moreover, every citizen of the Union residing in a member state of which he is not a national, has the right to vote and stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the member state in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that state. The same is also valid for elections to the European Parliament for which he has the right to vote and stand as a candidate (Art. 8b TEU). Moreover, all citizens of the Union also have the right to petition the EP along with the right to apply to the Ombudsman (Art.8d). Equality between women and men is legally granted, but the UN Human Rights Committee (1998) stressed that, despite government efforts, “structural and cultural problems preventing the full enjoyment by women of equal opportunities in public and political life and in employment remain, and that equal pay is often not given for work of equal value”.. First, in 1997 the Ministry of Equal Opportunities was instituted to remedy this de facto inequality. Some further legal measures have also been introduced, for example, a law providing for affirmative action to encourage women’s access to employment. Various financial programmes support women to set up their own small- or medium-sized enterprises thanks to state incentives. However, the real breakthrough, at least in terms of customs and cultural expectations, has been the access of women to Type 2 posts in military structures and academies. The 1998 CNEL report (Rapporto sul ruolo delle donne nello sviluppo socio-economico) revealed that, despite accounting only for 36% of the workforce (the European average is 58.1%), between 1997 and 1998, 67% of new employees were women, but that between 1998 and 1999 they had increased to 85%. This trend can be explained by the fact that, in most of the cases examined, the new jobs were characterised by flexibility and uncertainty. Women, who traditionally encounter more problems in finding a job, also accept more readily low profile jobs and short-term contracts (contratti a termine). The peak in women’s employment is recorded in the figures for self-employed work (libera professione), while the growth of women working in more “intellectual areas” is still low. Indeed, in 1993, they accounted for only 7.7%, and still now only account for 9.2% (a growth rate of only 1.5%). Instead, the number of doctors and engineers grew respectively, by 16% and 90%. Italian women are also under-represented in politics. Only 72 members out of 630 are females, a smaller share than in any European Union country with the exception of Greece and France, and accounting for approximately 11% of the seats held in the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati). In Sweden, on the contrary, more than 40% of Members of Parliament are women (see The Economist). Even in Italian local administrations the number of women occupying higher positions is low: in the 8,000 municipalities (comuni), only 6.2% of mayors and 13% of vice- mayors are women (CNEL). To sum up, the number of working women is constantly increasing, but women continue to find it difficult to reach the most prestigious positions, in which men still tend to predominate. While it is true to say that the “new economy” does help women to find initial employment, it is also true to say that it does not seem to help them move forwards in career terms. (See also 4.1 and 11.3) In recent years, Italian legislation has begun to repond to the issue of harassment against women. Norms dealing with harassment and sexual abuse against women in the workplace are, for instance, now provided for in a specific law. The judiciary has also begun to treat offences concerning the trafficking of women and others (for example, minors) for the purpose of 3 prostitution, as acts which can be likened to slavery and as contrary to international and national laws. Italy, however, lags behind other European countries with regard to homosexual rights and protection. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasised that there is little protection for homosexuals, irrespecive of the fact that, in sporadic cases, they are allowed to share benefits. There is, for example, no special legislation providing for homosexual marriage, or for their adoption of a child. In all likelihood, this is the result of the influence on the Italian state of the Catholic Church, which has never recognised gay rights. The dispute arising from the World Gay Pride Parade, held in Rome in July 2000, between the Italian government and the Vatican clearly exemplifies this issue. 1.2 To what extent are cultural differences acknowledged and minorities protected? 1.2.1 Laws Art.3 of the Italian Constitution establishes, among various prohibitions on discriminations singling out and highlighting the principle of equality, one specifically concerning racial and ethnic- linguistic belonging (for the prohibition on gender discrimination, see chapter 14, for religious discrimination, see chapter 3). The Italian Constitution protects linguistic minorities “by means of special provisions”. Thus, special status and conditions have been given to Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli- Venezia Giulia and Valle d’Aosta (Art.116). Because of the high number of German-speaking people, the province of Bolzano has been attributed autonomous law-making powers.
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