SECTION 9.4 JUNE 2005 TO MAY 2006 Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................. 490 June 2005 .................................................................................................................... 490 July 2005 ...................................................................................................................... 498 August 2005 ................................................................................................................. 510 September 2005 .......................................................................................................... 517 October 2005 ............................................................................................................... 535 November 2005 ........................................................................................................... 556 December 2005 ........................................................................................................... 566 January 2006 ............................................................................................................... 573 February 2006 .............................................................................................................. 582 March 2006 .................................................................................................................. 586 April 2006 ..................................................................................................................... 593 May 2006 ..................................................................................................................... 603 489 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Introduction 1. This Section addresses: • the UK role in preparing for a referendum on Iraq’s new Constitution and for Parliamentary elections on 15 December, leading to the appointment of an Iraqi Government led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki; • plans for the phased withdrawal of UK forces, and parallel decisions on the UK response to the new US “ink-spot” strategy for Iraq and on the deployment of troops to Helmand province in Afghanistan; • rising sectarian violence in Iraq and a growing UK focus on outreach to the Sunni community; and • concerns about the risks of strategic failure and civil war in Iraq. 2. This Section does not address the UK contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq and reform of its security sector, covered in Sections 10 and 12 respectively. 3. The Inquiry’s conclusions in relation to the events described in this Section can be read in Section 9.8. June 2005 4. In June 2005, Mr Edward Chaplin, the first British Ambassador to Iraq since the early 1990s, was succeeded in post by Mr William Patey. At around the same time, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad succeeded Ambassador John Negroponte as the US Ambassador to Iraq. 5. Giving evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2012, Sir William Patey said: “When I was sent to Iraq was the first time I have ever had my objectives delivered directly to me by the Prime Minister. One of the objectives he set me was to get some troop withdrawals by the following year – by June 2006. It was clear to me that we were looking for extra troops, which we did not have, to send to Afghanistan.”1 6. Section 9.3 sets out UK views on the importance of participation by the Iraqi Sunni community in the political process, and the beginning of direct engagement with some individuals in pursuit of that aim. 7. The FCO had been considering the scope for broadening its earlier contact with Sunni insurgents with a further round of talks.2 In early June, briefing on the options for further Sunni engagement was provided in response to a request from Mr Blair’s 1 House of Commons, Corrected transcript of oral evidence, 4 September 2012, ‘Securing the Future of Afghanistan’, page 4. 2 Minute senior government official specialising in the Middle East to Quarrey, 2 June 2005, ‘Iraq: Sunni engagement’ and Minute senior government official specialising in the Middle East to Asquith, Richmond and Foreign Secretary, 1 July 2005, [name of operation]. 490 9.4 | June 2005 to May 2006 Private Office. This time, the discussion would have the specific objective of agreeing a temporary cease-fire in part of Anbar province in the hope that this would help separate Sunni nationalists from foreign jihadists and act as a model for similar developments elsewhere in Iraq. It would be for the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and the Multi-National Force (MNF) to decide whether any demands made in return for such a cease-fire could be met. 8. On 6 June, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, sent a Note from Mr Blair to President Bush via Mr Stephen Hadley, the US National Security Advisor.3 9. The Note, which covered a wide range of countries and issues, was a reflection on “a huge opportunity … to leave a clear and morally powerful agenda in place when we go”. 10. On Iraq, Mr Blair wrote that: “Iraq has been tough and we all know now the reserves of political and military strength required for any military action. The international community should be united behind us, urging us on, but they’re not.” 11. A brief for the visit by Mr Antony Phillipson, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, suggested that the key point on Iraq was the need for the US to remain active and engaged in the detail, after a non-interventionist period between the election and the formation of the ITG “during which we lost valuable momentum”.4 12. In practice, that meant the US and UK should press the ITG to deliver Sunni outreach (including sensitive handling of de-Ba’athification and a media strategy for the Sunni community) and be active in reaching out to Sunnis themselves. 13. On 7 June, Mr Blair and President Bush held talks on a range of foreign policy issues in the White House.5 14. In the discussion on Iraq, Mr Blair said that a stable, secure and democratic Iraq would have a “transforming effect” on Iran and Syria. But the increasing tension between Sunni and Shia needed to be watched. He judged that: “Ultimately, without an improvement in security, little progress could be made.” 15. Mr Blair commented that the Iraqiisation process was “going OK”. Mr Blair and Sir Nigel Sheinwald indicated that the UK hoped to start reducing troops in the next 12 months, and to make a more significant reduction in Multi-National Division (South East) (MND(SE)) in the first half of 2006. It was important to stick to the political timetable, as providing security for the next round of elections was a constraint on withdrawals. 3 Letter Sheinwald to Hadley, 6 June 2005, [untitled] attaching Note [Blair] to Bush, [undated], ‘Note to President Bush’. 4 Minute Phillipson to Prime Minister, 3 June 2005, ‘Visit to Washington, 7 June’. 5 Letter Phillipson to Adams, 7 June 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s talks with President Bush, 7 June’. 491 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 16. On 13 June, Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, sent Mr Blair an update on progress towards a new Iraqi Constitution, including the procedural challenges ahead.6 17. Mr Straw reported that there had been progress. The National Assembly (TNA) had formed a Constitutional Committee, to which the UN had offered its expertise. But the detail had yet to be agreed. 18. In Mr Straw’s view, the key challenges were to ensure that the draft text was seen to reflect the views of Iraq’s three main communities (Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds) and sticking to the timetable set out in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). 19. The TAL said that a draft Constitution should be produced by 15 August, ahead of a referendum on 15 October and elections by 15 December. 20. Mr Straw described the UK urging key players to maintain momentum, while putting in place a process which would deliver a credible text on time. The UK would also provide practical assistance as necessary. 21. Attached to Mr Straw’s minute was a paper written by the IPU at the request of the Iraq Strategy Group which provided more detail on the drafting process and what could be done to improve it. 22. The paper said that the Constitutional Committee had formed sub-committees tasked with particular themes (for example, federalism) and Prime Minister Ja’afari had appointed a Ministerial Constitutional Committee. 23. Mr Nicholas ‘Fink’ Haysom, Head of the UN Office of Constitutional Support (UNOCS), had offered the Constitutional Committee UN support and guidance, and initially received a “cautiously welcoming” response. 24. The IPU paper set out the two main challenges to the process. The first was ensuring credibility, by “correcting the Sunni Arab deficit” in the membership of the Constitutional Committee and starting public outreach early. The second was keeping to the schedule. If the timetable slipped, the UN’s plan was to extend the drafting period and compress the time for consultation before the referendum on 15 October. 25. Prime Minister Ja’afari told Mr Patey that the Ministerial Committee was intended “to help drive the process forward” and so ensure completion on time.7 26. On 14 June, Mr Patey reported to the FCO that there remained no agreement on Sunni representation on the Constitutional Committee.8 Only two of its 55 members were Sunni Arabs. 6 Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 13 June 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution’ attaching Paper IPU, 10 June 2005, ‘Iraq: Improving the Constitution Process’. 7 eGram 6667/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 June