SECTION 6.4 PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR A POST-SADDAM HUSSEIN IRAQ, MID-2001 TO JANUARY 2003 Contents Introduction and key findings ....................................................................................... 114 Pre-conflict management of information on Iraq .......................................................... 115 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office ................................................................ 116 The Iraq Planning Unit ........................................................................................... 120 The Joint Intelligence Committee .......................................................................... 120 The Defence Intelligence Staff ............................................................................... 122 The Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat ......................................... 123 The Ad Hoc Group on Iraq ..................................................................................... 124 The Department for International Development ..................................................... 124 US and UK planning machinery ................................................................................... 126 The US approach to nation-building ............................................................................ 126 Initial UK consideration of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq ................................................. 128 Preparations for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Crawford, 6 April 2002 .... 135 Post-conflict issues after Crawford .............................................................................. 144 The DFID Iraq programme ........................................................................................... 168 UK and US organisational changes ............................................................................. 172 The potential scale of the post-conflict task ................................................................. 181 FCO paper: ‘Regional economic consequences of military action against Iraq’ ..................................................................................................... 181 Treasury paper: ‘What would be the economic impact of war in Iraq?’ ........... 182 SPG paper, 4 September 2002: ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’ ........ 183 Mr Blair’s commitment to post-conflict reconstruction .................................................. 185 Initial analysis of the issues and the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq ......................................... 195 FCO paper: ‘Iraq – Consequences of Conflict for the Region and Beyond’ .... 197 FCO paper: ‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after Saddam’ ............................ 199 State Department paper on lessons of the past .............................................. 207 SPG paper, 30 September 2002: ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’ ...... 208 111 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002: ‘International Terrorism: The Threat from Iraq’ ......................................................................................................... 211 Possible models for administering a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq .................... 212 FCO paper: ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ ............................................ 218 DFID paper: ‘Iraq: Potential Humanitarian Implications’ ................................. 219 DFID paper: ‘Central/southern Iraq humanitarian situation analysis’ .............. 220 UK strategic policy objectives for Iraq ............................................................. 222 AHGI stocktake of contingency planning ......................................................... 223 FCO paper: ‘International Administration for Iraq: what, who and how?’ ........................................................................................................ 225 War crimes and the creation of an international criminal tribunal for Iraq ....... 227 UK military options: war-fighting and reconstruction .................................................... 230 Growing concern about post-conflict planning ............................................................. 232 DFID contact with the US and UN ................................................................... 232 JIC Assessment, 23 October 2002: ‘Iraq: The Kurds and Shia’ ...................... 237 Cabinet Office paper: ‘Iraq: Models and some questions for post-Saddam government’ ..................................................................................................... 237 FCO paper: ‘Economic issues in Iraq after post-Saddam regime change’ ...... 242 Treasury paper: ‘Economic Impact of a War in Iraq’ ........................................ 243 Government contact with UK academics ........................................................ 244 SPG paper, 6 November 2002: ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’ ......... 247 First round of inter-agency talks, Washington, 6 November 2002 ......................... 251 Post-Saddam Hussein oil contracts ....................................................................... 256 UK military options ................................................................................................. 258 Parliamentary debates on resolution 1441, 25 November 2002 ............................ 260 Domestic contingency planning ............................................................................. 262 DFID engagement with Whitehall .......................................................................... 263 FCO preparation for handling an “all-out crisis” ..................................................... 267 FCO report on Saddam Hussein’s crimes and human rights abuses ............. 269 FCO paper: ‘Interim Administrations in Iraq’ .................................................... 272 FCO paper: ‘Iraq: Security Sector Reform’ ...................................................... 274 FCO paper: ‘Islamism in Iraq’ .......................................................................... 275 Iraqi opposition conference, London ...................................................................... 277 Military preparations gather pace .......................................................................... 280 SPG paper, 13 December 2002: ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’ ....... 281 112 6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003 Invasion plans take shape ........................................................................................... 286 UK objectives for post-conflict Iraq ........................................................................ 286 UK military focus shifts to southern Iraq ................................................................ 289 Cabinet, 9 January 2003 ........................................................................................ 295 DFID involvement in UK military planning ............................................................. 296 The decision to deploy UK forces .......................................................................... 297 113 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Introduction and key findings 1. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 consider the UK’s planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq between late 2001 and March 2003. 2. Section 6.4 covers the period up to Mr Blair’s decision on 17 January 2003 to deploy UK forces to support US military preparations. 3. Section 6.5 covers the 10 weeks between the decision to deploy UK forces and the first post-invasion meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush at Camp David on 26 and 27 March 2003. 4. The two parts address: • the development of UK post-conflict strategy and objectives; • planning and preparation to implement those objectives; • UK civilian and military planning machinery; • UK influence on US planning and preparation and the impact of US planning on the UK; and • Parliamentary interest in post-conflict planning and preparation. 5. The two parts do not consider: • military plans for the invasion, which are addressed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2; • intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or preparations for the post-invasion search for WMD, addressed in Section 4; • the financial and human resources available for post-conflict administration and reconstruction, addressed in Sections 13 and 15; and • the outcome in post-conflict Iraq, which is addressed in Sections 9 and 10. 6. Descriptions of US preparations for post-conflict Iraq in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are mostly taken from Hard Lessons, Mr Stuart Bowen’s account, as US Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, of the US experience of reconstruction between 2002 and 2008. 7. Key findings for Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are listed below. 8. The Inquiry’s conclusions relating to Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are at the end of Section 6.5. 114 6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003 Key findings • Before the invasion of Iraq, Ministers, senior officials and the UK military recognised that post-conflict civilian and military operations were likely to be the strategically decisive phase of the Coalition’s engagement in Iraq. • UK planning and preparation for the post-conflict phase of operations, which rested on the assumption that the UK would be able quickly to reduce its military presence in Iraq and deploy only a minimal number of civilians, were wholly inadequate. • The information available to the Government before the invasion provided a clear indication of the potential scale