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Operations in Afghanistan House of Commons Defence Committee Operations in Afghanistan Fourth Report of Session 2010–12 Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Additional written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/defcom Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 6 July 2011 HC 554 Published on 17 July 2011 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £24.50 The Defence Committee The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies. Current membership Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chair) Mr Julian Brazier MP (Conservative, Canterbury) Thomas Docherty MP (Labour, Dunfermline and West Fife) Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) John Glen MP (Conservative, Salisbury) Mr Mike Hancock MP (Liberal Democrat, Portsmouth South) Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend) Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North) Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Bob Stewart MP (Conservative, Beckenham) Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham, Edgbaston) The following were also Members of the Committee during the Parliament: Mr Adam Holloway MP (Conservative, Gravesham) Alison Seabeck MP (Labour, Moor View) John Woodcock MP (Lab/Co-op, Barrow and Furness) Mr David Hamilton MP (Labour, Midlothian) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/defcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume. The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Alda Barry (Clerk), Georgina Holmes- Skelton (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Inquiry Manager), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Miguel Boo Fraga (Committee Assistant) and Sumati Sowamber (Committee Support Assistant). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson on 020 7219 1589. Operations in Afghanistan 1 Contents Report Page Conclusions and recommendations 5 1 Introduction 12 Our inquiry 12 Background 14 Armed Forces casualties in Afghanistan 15 Priorities for operations in Afghanistan 15 Communication of the Mission in the UK 16 Defence Committee scrutiny of the MoD 17 2 Operations in Helmand in 2006 18 The decision to move into the South of Afghanistan 18 The objectives of the Mission 20 Intelligence 21 Planning 23 Challenges faced by the initial deployment 25 The move to north Helmand and the development of the ‘Platoon Houses Strategy’ 26 Turnover of key personnel 29 Increased troop numbers and further support 29 Continuation of the Mission to 2009 31 3 Military operations since 2009 33 McChrystal counter-insurgency strategy 33 Command and control arrangements in an international coalition 35 Command and control arrangements for UK Forces in Afghanistan and the role of the Permanent Joint Headquarters 37 Armed Forces personnel 39 Harmony guidelines 39 The Airbridge 40 Support for operations 40 Close air support 40 Helicopters 41 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 42 Force protection 42 Funding and costs of operations in Afghanistan 43 Financial cost of operations in Afghanistan 44 4 Training of the Afghan National Security Forces 46 Afghan National Army 46 Afghan National Police 47 Afghan National Security Forces 49 2 Operations in Afghanistan 5 The impact on the civilian population 51 Civilian casualties 51 Strategic Communications 52 The work of the Provincial Reconstruction Team 53 Governance and justice 53 Relationship of the UK PRT with US and UK Forces 56 The role of women in Afghan society 57 6 Transition and withdrawal 60 Formal Minutes 66 Witnesses 67 List of printed written evidence 68 List of additional written evidence 68 List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 69 Operations in Afghanistan 3 4 Operations in Afghanistan Operations in Afghanistan 5 Conclusions and recommendations Introduction 1. We wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military and civilian, who are currently serving or have served in Afghanistan but, in particular, to those who lost their lives in Afghanistan, and the many more who have sustained life-changing injuries as a result of the conflict there. We also express our deep gratitude for the vital contribution made by the families of Armed Forces personnel. We are mindful that some of the conclusions in this Report, because they are critical of the actions of successive Governments and their senior military advisers, may be interpreted as a criticism of the men and women who have served in extremely hazardous, hostile and difficult conditions. We wish to place on record that no such criticism is made. The Armed Forces and civilian personnel in Afghanistan have our full support in tackling the challenges before them. (Paragraph 1) 2. Communicating with the UK population about the purpose of any mission involving UK Armed Forces is crucial. We have found that the Government’s descriptions of the nature of the mission and its importance to UK interests have varied throughout the campaign, lacking a consistent narrative. Whist MoD polling data has shown some limited improvement in the public’s understanding of operations in Afghanistan, we have observed some confusion in the communications on Libya which reminded us forcefully of earlier stages in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 14) 3. We disagree with the MoD decision not to give us sight of documents which are now over five years old. Refusal hinders our Parliamentary scrutiny of the MoD. (Paragraph 15) 4. In future, we expect MoD to come to give evidence to the Committee briefed and prepared to be frank and open about matters where the provision of information would not put the Armed Forces at risk. (Paragraph 16) Operations in Helmand in 2006 5. Given the demanding nature of the situation in Iraq, we do not consider that the implications of the decision to move UK Armed Forces into the South of Afghanistan in early 2006 were fully thought through, in particular, the potential risk to UK Armed Forces personnel. We consider that this criticism applies equally to the international decision to deploy into the South, in that all decisions made at such a level inevitably involve tensions and delay, which contributed in this case to the difficulties subsequently encountered. (Paragraph 28) 6. Notwithstanding our recognition of the limitations on intelligence in situations such as Helmand in 2006, we are concerned that the MoD did not anticipate that the presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might stir up a hornets’ nest especially as much of the intelligence was contradictory. We consider that if, because it was essential to support improved governance in Afghanistan, the deployment could not have been deferred or delayed until the end of the fighting season in 2006, senior 6 Operations in Afghanistan military advisers should nonetheless have raised serious concerns about the unpredictable nature of the conflict on which they were embarking. This briefing should have drawn clear attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict. We believe that such concerns as were raised by the Armed Forces were inadequate at best, and that they were not raised, as they should have been, to the very highest levels of Government. (Paragraph 36) 7. Whilst we recognise that senior military staff have a role in determining the level of resources needed on specific operations and that this might mean moderating the demands of commanders in the field, nonetheless, we are disturbed by the fact that the Secretary of State was being told that commanders on the ground were content with the support they were being given in Helmand when clearly they were not. We regard it as unacceptable that hard pressed Forces in such a difficult operation as Helmand should have been denied the necessary support to carry out the Mission from the outset, and that this shortage had not been brought to the attention of Ministers. (Paragraph 41) 8. We consider it to be unlikely that this fundamental change to the operation was put to Ministers for a decision as to whether to proceed. We cannot be more certain on this because we have been denied sight of the relevant minutes (see paragraph 15). As the change put the lives of Armed Forces personnel at much greater risk, it should surely have gone to the Cabinet for endorsement. Subsequent to the decision, the new Secretary of State was told in retrospect but we do not believe that senior military advisers briefed their Ministers with sufficient force as to the strategic implications of the operational change which had already been made. The MoD should tell us how relevant lessons have been learnt. (Paragraph 55) 9. The significant transfer of such senior key personnel, both political and military would increase risks in the administration of the Armed Forces at any time but, in 2006 at such a crucial stage in both the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it gave rise to unacceptable risks.
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