House of Commons Defence Committee

Operations in Afghanistan

Fourth Report of Session 2010–12

Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence

Additional written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/defcom

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 6 July 2011

HC 554 Published on 17 July 2011 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £24.50

The Defence Committee

The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.

Current membership Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chair) Mr Julian Brazier MP (Conservative, Canterbury) Thomas Docherty MP (Labour, Dunfermline and West Fife) Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley) John Glen MP (Conservative, Salisbury) Mr Mike Hancock MP (Liberal Democrat, Portsmouth South) Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend) Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North) Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Bob Stewart MP (Conservative, Beckenham) Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham, Edgbaston)

The following were also Members of the Committee during the Parliament: Mr Adam Holloway MP (Conservative, Gravesham) Alison Seabeck MP (Labour, Moor View) John Woodcock MP (Lab/Co-op, Barrow and Furness) Mr David Hamilton MP (Labour, Midlothian)

Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/defcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.

The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume.

Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Alda Barry (Clerk), Georgina Holmes- Skelton (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Inquiry Manager), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Miguel Boo Fraga (Committee Assistant) and Sumati Sowamber (Committee Support Assistant).

Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson on 020 7219 1589.

Operations in Afghanistan 1

Contents

Report Page

Conclusions and recommendations 5

1 Introduction 12 Our inquiry 12 Background 14 Armed Forces casualties in Afghanistan 15 Priorities for operations in Afghanistan 15 Communication of the Mission in the UK 16 Defence Committee scrutiny of the MoD 17

2 Operations in Helmand in 2006 18 The decision to move into the South of Afghanistan 18 The objectives of the Mission 20 Intelligence 21 Planning 23 Challenges faced by the initial deployment 25 The move to north Helmand and the development of the ‘Platoon Houses Strategy’ 26 Turnover of key personnel 29 Increased troop numbers and further support 29 Continuation of the Mission to 2009 31

3 Military operations since 2009 33 McChrystal counter-insurgency strategy 33 Command and control arrangements in an international coalition 35 Command and control arrangements for UK Forces in Afghanistan and the role of the Permanent Joint Headquarters 37 Armed Forces personnel 39 Harmony guidelines 39 The Airbridge 40 Support for operations 40 Close air support 40 Helicopters 41 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 42 Force protection 42 Funding and costs of operations in Afghanistan 43 Financial cost of operations in Afghanistan 44

4 Training of the Afghan National Security Forces 46 Afghan National Army 46 Afghan National Police 47 Afghan National Security Forces 49

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5 The impact on the civilian population 51 Civilian casualties 51 Strategic Communications 52 The work of the Provincial Reconstruction Team 53 Governance and justice 53 Relationship of the UK PRT with US and UK Forces 56 The role of women in Afghan society 57

6 Transition and withdrawal 60

Formal Minutes 66

Witnesses 67

List of printed written evidence 68

List of additional written evidence 68

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 69

Operations in Afghanistan 3

4 Operations in Afghanistan

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Conclusions and recommendations

Introduction 1. We wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military and civilian, who are currently serving or have served in Afghanistan but, in particular, to those who lost their lives in Afghanistan, and the many more who have sustained life-changing injuries as a result of the conflict there. We also express our deep gratitude for the vital contribution made by the families of Armed Forces personnel. We are mindful that some of the conclusions in this Report, because they are critical of the actions of successive Governments and their senior military advisers, may be interpreted as a criticism of the men and women who have served in extremely hazardous, hostile and difficult conditions. We wish to place on record that no such criticism is made. The Armed Forces and civilian personnel in Afghanistan have our full support in tackling the challenges before them. (Paragraph 1)

2. Communicating with the UK population about the purpose of any mission involving UK Armed Forces is crucial. We have found that the Government’s descriptions of the nature of the mission and its importance to UK interests have varied throughout the campaign, lacking a consistent narrative. Whist MoD polling data has shown some limited improvement in the public’s understanding of operations in Afghanistan, we have observed some confusion in the communications on Libya which reminded us forcefully of earlier stages in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 14)

3. We disagree with the MoD decision not to give us sight of documents which are now over five years old. Refusal hinders our Parliamentary scrutiny of the MoD. (Paragraph 15)

4. In future, we expect MoD to come to give evidence to the Committee briefed and prepared to be frank and open about matters where the provision of information would not put the Armed Forces at risk. (Paragraph 16)

Operations in Helmand in 2006 5. Given the demanding nature of the situation in Iraq, we do not consider that the implications of the decision to move UK Armed Forces into the South of Afghanistan in early 2006 were fully thought through, in particular, the potential risk to UK Armed Forces personnel. We consider that this criticism applies equally to the international decision to deploy into the South, in that all decisions made at such a level inevitably involve tensions and delay, which contributed in this case to the difficulties subsequently encountered. (Paragraph 28)

6. Notwithstanding our recognition of the limitations on intelligence in situations such as Helmand in 2006, we are concerned that the MoD did not anticipate that the presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might stir up a hornets’ nest especially as much of the intelligence was contradictory. We consider that if, because it was essential to support improved governance in Afghanistan, the deployment could not have been deferred or delayed until the end of the fighting season in 2006, senior

6 Operations in Afghanistan

military advisers should nonetheless have raised serious concerns about the unpredictable nature of the conflict on which they were embarking. This briefing should have drawn clear attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict. We believe that such concerns as were raised by the Armed Forces were inadequate at best, and that they were not raised, as they should have been, to the very highest levels of Government. (Paragraph 36)

7. Whilst we recognise that senior military staff have a role in determining the level of resources needed on specific operations and that this might mean moderating the demands of commanders in the field, nonetheless, we are disturbed by the fact that the Secretary of State was being told that commanders on the ground were content with the support they were being given in Helmand when clearly they were not. We regard it as unacceptable that hard pressed Forces in such a difficult operation as Helmand should have been denied the necessary support to carry out the Mission from the outset, and that this shortage had not been brought to the attention of Ministers. (Paragraph 41)

8. We consider it to be unlikely that this fundamental change to the operation was put to Ministers for a decision as to whether to proceed. We cannot be more certain on this because we have been denied sight of the relevant minutes (see paragraph 15). As the change put the lives of Armed Forces personnel at much greater risk, it should surely have gone to the Cabinet for endorsement. Subsequent to the decision, the new Secretary of State was told in retrospect but we do not believe that senior military advisers briefed their Ministers with sufficient force as to the strategic implications of the operational change which had already been made. The MoD should tell us how relevant lessons have been learnt. (Paragraph 55)

9. The significant transfer of such senior key personnel, both political and military would increase risks in the administration of the Armed Forces at any time but, in 2006 at such a crucial stage in both the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it gave rise to unacceptable risks. We conclude that these risks were realised. We recommend that the Government should avoid moving so many senior military personnel at a time when Ministers are being moved as well. (Paragraph 56)

10. What is particularly worrying is that the much increased requirement for additional resources and support, in particular for additional troops and helicopters, was not acted upon quickly enough. Whilst we accept that it is not possible to prepare and train soldiers quickly to reinforce those on the ground when circumstances change, we are, nonetheless, concerned that no strategic reserve had been trained and prepared in order to be readily available, particularly as this Mission had been planned for some considerable time. There should always be a contingency reserve available with the resources to support it. If it is used, immediate plans to restore it should be in place. (Paragraph 62)

11. Armed Forces personnel achieved the best tactical outcomes possible in very difficult circumstances in no small measure due to the high quality and training of the troops themselves. But it must be acknowledged that the force levels deployed throughout 2006, 2007 and 2008 were never going to achieve what was being demanded of the Armed Forces by the UK, NATO and the Afghan Government. We view it as

Operations in Afghanistan 7

unacceptable that UK Forces were deployed in Helmand for three years, as a result of a failure of military and political co-ordination, without the necessary personnel and equipment to succeed in their Mission. (Paragraph 67)

Military operations since 2009 12. We welcome the adoption of the counter-insurgency strategy by the coalition and recognise that, for UK Forces, it was a continuation of its previously adopted strategy although this had been badly under-resourced. It seems to us that the two crucial aspects of the revised strategy are the decision to put the security of the local population at its core and the acceptance of the need to hand over responsibility for security to the Afghan Government and the ANSF. We also recognise that the McChrystal Strategy could not work without the accompanying surge in troop numbers. (Paragraph 71)

13. We consider that it is vital that NATO, ISAF and UN Missions and the international alliance succeed with this latest strategy in both political and military terms. We note the progress already made and that training and support arrangements may have to continue for some time after the withdrawal of combat capability. [See Part 6 for further discussion on withdrawal and transition arrangements.] (Paragraph 78)

14. We welcome the introduction of the role of the UK National Contingent Commander and the “two star” headquarters for Regional Command South. We also conclude that the command and control arrangements for operations in Afghanistan in 2006 were deficient. Following the review of the operational role of PJHQ, we require a clear description of the revised command and control arrangements for Afghanistan including the role of the PJHQ and its relationship with headquarters in theatre. We recognise the importance of having a readily available and capable “two star” headquarters for these types of deployments and are concerned about the reduction in the number of such headquarters following the SDSR. (Paragraph 88)

15. We recommend that the MoD make greater efforts to reduce breaches of harmony guidelines for all personnel and take these breaches into account when deciding which trades and groups of Armed Forces personnel should be subject to redundancies. (Paragraph 90)

16. The MoD does not record centrally how many Armed Forces personnel have been on multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and other operational theatres. Such information is vital to allow the Armed Forces to judge the load on individual personnel. We recommend that this information is collated and should be considered alongside breaches of harmony guidelines when judging the pressures on the Armed Forces, and on individuals when deciding on posting. (Paragraph 91)

17. We look forward to seeing the results of the work being done to improve the effectiveness of the airbridge. In the meantime, we recommend that the MoD negotiate with allies to permit the use of their resources to plug any gaps in the airbridge. (Paragraph 93)

18. We recognise the importance of close air support and the skill and bravery of those providing it. We would like confirmation from the MoD that the Armed Forces in

8 Operations in Afghanistan

Afghanistan now have access to sufficient and timely close air support. (Paragraph 95)

19. We are conscious that our predecessor Committee was told in previous inquiries that UK Forces have enough helicopters only to discover subsequently that this was not true. We are not convinced that UK Forces yet have access to sufficient helicopter hours. We recommend that, in response to this Report, the MoD set out how the new helicopters delivered into theatre have impacted on the availability of helicopter hours, any outstanding delivery of helicopters and how much reliance and use we are making of helicopters from the USA and other countries. (Paragraph 97)

20. We recognise that the Taliban continues to change its tactics and methods and that the extent of the use of IEDs has changed and developed since 2007. However, we believe that the MoD did not respond quickly enough to these challenges as they developed. We continue to be concerned about the time taken to get a suitably capable vehicle fleet into theatre. Protecting Armed Forces personnel is a critical duty of the MoD. We recommend, in its response to this Report, the MoD explains how current equipment levels are providing the Armed Forces with the necessary protected vehicles, body armour and counter-IED support. The MoD should prioritise the protection of personnel when considering the funding of such needs that emerge in the future. (Paragraph 102)

21. We recognise that civilian contractors provide valuable support to the MoD. We require that the MoD should monitor and report on casualties of contractors working on behalf of the UK Government. (Paragraph 103)

22. It seems to us that the convention under which all additional costs of operations should be met from the Treasury reserve has been breached with the introduction of the concept of ‘urgent defence requirements’ and the requirement to pay back expenditure on UORs over the estimate. We recommend that the classification of UDRs be dropped permanently and that the MoD be not required to pay back expenditure on equipment needed on operations. We would like confirmation that all additional costs for Afghanistan are being met and will continue to be met from the General Reserve. We seek a similar confirmation for the costs of the Libya operation. (Paragraph 105)

23. Whilst we recognise that the MoD cannot calculate accurately the full cost of operations, we nevertheless ask the MoD to provide us with a broad estimate of the total costs of operations in Afghanistan. We also ask the NAO to do a study into the level of costs of Afghanistan. (Paragraph 108)

Training of the Afghan National Security Forces 24. There have been significant improvements in the training of the ANA but there is much progress yet to be made before the ANA is ready to take over responsibility for security in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. We welcome General Richards’ assurance that the aim of a sustainable ANA is being aggressively pursued but the MoD must maintain its focus on training the ANA, in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. (Paragraph 116)

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25. There is much progress yet to be made before the ANP is sufficiently reliable to take on its share of the responsibility for security by the end of 2014. The UK should continue to insist that the international coalition maintain the momentum on training the ANP and, in particular, on reducing the level of corruption in the ANP. (Paragraph 122)

26. We recognise that much hard work has gone into the training and partnering with the ANSF, in particular, in enabling the physical and conceptual components of fighting power but we remain concerned that the training and development of what the British Army calls the moral component—leadership, discipline, culture, ethics and anti-corruption—is crucial to ensure the long term professional capability of the ANSF. (Paragraph 125)

27. We are of the opinion that the ANSF will require significant support after the transition. We await with interest the assessment of the success of the transition of the first seven areas, in particular that of Lashkar Gah. (Paragraph 126)

The impact on the civilian population 28. We welcome the reduction in the number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF and ANSF Forces despite the increase in operational tempo. We recommend that UK Forces maintain their focus on reducing civilian casualties whether these are caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces or by the insurgents. We require that the MoD should monitor, or encourage NATO to monitor, civilian casualties caused by insurgents as well as those caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces. (Paragraph 130)

29. We recommend that the MoD ensure that information and influence operations are sufficiently resourced both in Afghanistan and in future operations. Influence operations in Afghanistan should make extensive use of the informative reports commissioned by the US Forces on the Afghan population in specific areas of the country. If no such reports are available for relevant areas, UK Armed Forces should commission reports independently. (Paragraph 133)

30. Generally, polling data on the views of the Afghan people does not present a coherent picture over time although some indications are that the local population are seeing some improvement in security. (Paragraph 134)

31. We recommend that the MoD put into place proper planning for language skills in theatre for future operations. (Paragraph 135)

32. We accept that it would not be possible, even were it desirable, to turn Afghanistan into the type of modern democracy to be seen in Europe. It would be preferable — and more likely to be successful—to build on local traditional structures which are accepted by the people of Afghanistan. These structures are not for ISAF to determine. (Paragraph 146)

33. We understand that the relationship between the UK PRT and the US Forces took some time to bed down and we commend all parties for making this work. (Paragraph 148)

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34. The UK-led Helmand PRT has been held up as a model of how a PRT can work. We commend the work of the PRT and the way in which civilian and military personnel have worked together. We also look to the MoD to continue to provide the appropriate resources and capabilities in support of the PRT and to prepare for a smooth transition in transferring PRT responsibilities to the Afghan authorities. (Paragraph 150)

35. If Afghanistan is to become a stable and even partially functioning society, it is vital that women are involved in the process and feel they have a stake in it. If, as feared, women are largely excluded from peace negotiations, coupled with the re- engagement of the Taliban in government, then the progress made so far could easily unravel. UN Resolution 1325 requires that in all peace negotiations in regions affected by conflict, women’s voices must be heard to ensure the long-term stability of any negotiated settlement. Afghanistan is no different. (Paragraph 151)

36. We recognise that progress in the development of the role of women is important to the evolution of a democratic state in Afghanistan even if the form of democracy it takes is one more suited to Afghan traditions than to Western models. (Paragraph 155)

37. We do not think that the MoD has taken the needs of women in Afghanistan as seriously as it should. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government provide a progress report on the number of female engagement officers currently in Afghanistan and on the development of relevant pre-deployment training on cultural awareness including the role of women. We recommend that the MoD takes a more comprehensive view of the issues relating to women when it develops its training. (Paragraph 157)

Transition and withdrawal 38. We are concerned that, as any refocusing of US Forces is planned, any redeployments should be properly sequenced with UK planning for the withdrawal of UK Forces in the South of Afghanistan, and that UK Forces are not left exposed. (Paragraph 168)

39. The Government’s room for manoeuvre regarding the number of troops that could be withdrawn from Afghanistan as part of an immediate transition is necessarily limited. The withdrawal of a few hundred troops in support roles is feasible and would not significantly affect the combat capability of those remaining. A more significant drawdown, however, would have to involve a complete battle group. Weakening any battle group to withdraw numbers would be a dangerous move. A troop withdrawal that involved numbers in the low thousands, therefore, would depend on a geographical reorganisation of the battle groups and the withdrawal from combat duties of at least one of them. (Paragraph 169)

40. We believe that the NATO ISAF “conditions-based approach” to withdrawal is a suitable one. Withdrawal must have due regard to the circumstances at the time. There are still many challenges facing the ANSF and Afghan Government before proper transition can take place. (Paragraph 170)

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41. While we recognise that the Government believes that the UK public would like certainty as to when UK Forces will be out of danger, we also recognise that some level of uncertainty is inevitable. It is important that the Government’s clear determination to withdraw combat forces should not undermine the military strategy by causing the Afghan population to fear that the international coalition might abandon them or by allowing the Taliban and others to think that all they have to do is bide their time until ISAF Forces withdraw. (Paragraph 171)

42. We recognise that much progress has been made towards the development of governance arrangements but have yet to be convinced that the arrangements are sufficiently robust, transparent or accountable in terms of their capacity to take on the full range of responsibilities that will fall to them after 2014. Added to this is the uncertainty as to how these governance arrangements will develop following the end of the second constitutional term of President Karzai. It is essential that a comprehensive approach is taken to the transitional arrangements that will need to be put in place leading up to 2014 and beyond. UK Government Departments other than the MoD will also have a part to play in helping to build the capacity necessary to ensure that stability is maintained under Afghan control. We have seen some evidence of such a comprehensive approach but feel that more emphasis needs to be placed on capacity building within the political system if long-term success is to be achieved. (Paragraph 172)

43. We expect the Government to set out in a timely fashion, the milestones it expects to reach and the progress it expects to make against them as 2014 approaches. We will continue to scrutinise closely developments in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 173)

12 Operations in Afghanistan

1 Introduction

1. We wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military and civilian, who are currently serving or have served in Afghanistan but, in particular, to those who lost their lives in Afghanistan, and the many more who have sustained life-changing injuries as a result of the conflict there. We also express our deep gratitude for the vital contribution made by the families of Armed Forces personnel. We are mindful that some of the conclusions in this Report, because they are critical of the actions of successive Governments and their senior military advisers, may be interpreted as a criticism of the men and women who have served in extremely hazardous, hostile and difficult conditions. We wish to place on record that no such criticism is made. The Armed Forces and civilian personnel in Afghanistan have our full support in tackling the challenges before them.

Our inquiry 2. The Defence Committee announced an inquiry into Operations in Afghanistan on 28 July 2010. We decided that the inquiry would have an operational focus and would examine progress in Afghanistan within the strategic framework of Afghanistan and Pakistan1. We wished to examine the success of military operations in providing security to local nationals; the stabilisation and reconstruction work of the Provincial Reconstruction Team; and the training of the Afghan National Security Forces. We also decided to consider the provision of support to the UK Armed Forces including equipment and logistics.

3. As this Report focuses on the work of UK military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan, it naturally concentrates on their work in Helmand. We recognise that Helmand is not necessarily representative of the rest of Afghanistan, parts of which are stable. We also recognise that a long term solution to the situation in Afghanistan requires a political solution which must involve the whole region including Pakistan. During this inquiry, we have also been mindful of the recent report on the UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan by the Foreign Affairs Committee.2

4. During our inquiry, we decided to extend our investigation into looking in some detail at the deployment of UK Forces to Helmand in 2006. We did so because, in our first evidence session on 26 October 2010, we asked General Messenger about his experience commanding forces in Helmand and he revealed that the deployment in Helmand had been short of troops until the surge in 2010:

I came back in April ’09, so we’re about 18 months since then. At the time, insufficient resources were being allocated to the challenge in Southern Afghanistan. I commanded a brigade, alongside an Afghan brigade commander, that was stretched and not able to go to certain key areas where we knew we would ultimately

1 HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward, April 2009 2 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2010–11, The UK’s foreign policy approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan , HC 514

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have to go to secure the population. What has happened since has been an enormous inflow, principally American but also from other NATO nations, and a huge upsurge in the number of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police who are in the line providing that security.3

5. We subsequently asked other Ministry of Defence (MoD) witnesses on 10 November 2010 about the deployment to Helmand in 2006 including the size of the deployment and the intelligence on which it was based. The answers we received were far from satisfactory: we were left with the impression that the MoD intended to minimise what we were told about how decisions were made to deploy to Helmand in 2006 and then to expand the deployment. As a result we decided to take evidence from those responsible at the time and had four further hearings —which, unusually, we held in private—from former Secretaries of State and retired senior military personnel. These evidence sessions were extremely informative. The redacted transcripts of these hearings are attached to this Report and are published on our website. We then had a further hearing in public with serving senior personnel— the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS)—where the witnesses were open and provided much better evidence than some of the earlier witnesses.

6. We have taken oral and written evidence from a wide range of witnesses and have had several informal briefings by the MoD and others about Afghanistan and the surrounding region. The MoD provided a Memorandum to the Committee at the start of the inquiry and further information in response to our detailed questions which arose in the course of the inquiry. These two sets of information are published with this Report. We took oral evidence from the following groups of witnesses:

x 26 October 2010 Major General Gordon Messenger, Strategic Communication Officer for the Armed Forces and formerly the Brigadier commanding UK Forces in Helmand; Commander Stephen Tatham, former director of advanced communication research at the Defence Academy; Nick Gurr, Director of Media and Communications in the MoD; Matt Tee, Permanent Secretary for Government Communications in the Cabinet Office; and Colonel (retired) Christopher Langton, conflict research analyst and formerly of the British Army.

x 3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Professor of War in the Modern World, King’s College London; Colonel (retired) Richard Kemp, formerly of the British Army; and Professor Anthony King, Professor of Sociology, Exeter University researching military transformation, working with the Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

x 10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron, former Head of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand and NATO Senior Civilian for Regional Command South-West; Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chief of Joint Operations; Major General David Capewell, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Operations; Peter Watkins, Director of Operational Policy, MoD; and Karen Pierce, Policy Director for South Asia and

3 Q 6

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Afghanistan, and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

x 17 November 2010 General Sir Nick Parker, Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces and formerly Deputy Commander of ISAF and the UK National Contingent Commander; and Brigadier Simon Levey, Director of the Royal Armoured Corps and formerly Combined Training Advisory Group Commander dealing with Army training in Afghanistan.

x 17 November 2010 General (retired) Sir Graeme Lamb.

x 15 December 2010 Dr Liam Fox Secretary of State for Defence; Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chief of Joint Operations; and Peter Watkins, Director of Operational Policy, MoD.

x 8 February 2011 Lord Reid, former Secretary of State for Defence; and General (retired) Sir Robert Fry, former Deputy CDS (Commitments).

x 15 March 2011 Brigadier (retired) Ed Butler, Commander of 16 Air Assault Brigade, the first brigade to deploy into Helmand; and General (retired) Sir Mike Jackson, former Chief of the General Staff.

x 29 March 2011 Lord Browne, former Secretary of State for Defence.

x 4 May 2011 Air Chief Marshal (retired) Lord Stirrup, former Chief of Defence Staff.

x 11 May 2011 General Sir David Richards, CDS (in 2006 he commanded the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Afghanistan); General Sir Nicholas Houghton VCDS (in 2006 he was Chief of Operations); and General Sir Peter Wall, CGS— head of the Army (in 2006 he was deputy Chief of Operations).

7. Additionally, prior to the start of this inquiry, we questioned the Rt Hon Liam Fox, the Secretary of State for Defence, on operations in Afghanistan at his first appearance before the Committee in July 2010. We visited Afghanistan in January 2011. We also discussed operations in Afghanistan with US military commanders at CENTCOM, USA and with senior politicians and officials in Washington on a Committee visit to the United States of America in April 2011.

Background 8. The previous Defence Committee last reported on operations in Afghanistan in July 2007: UK operations in Afghanistan.4 Many of the issues raised in the Report remain of concern today. One of the Committee’s primary concerns was that the international community should focus on establishing security:

4 Defence Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2006–07, UK Operations in Afghanistan , HC 408

Operations in Afghanistan 15

Afghanistan has experienced thirty years of conflict. ISAF and the international community must focus on establishing security and denying the Taliban and al- Qaeda the environment in which to operate.5

Another concern was the need for effective strategic communications in Afghanistan and within the UK:

The Government is not communicating key messages to the British or Afghan public about the purpose of its operations in Afghanistan effectively enough.6

9. The previous Committee considered operations in Afghanistan as part of its inquiry on the Comprehensive Approach in 2009-10. In particular, the Committee recognised the importance of having a clear strategic intent for missions with sound planning underpinned by an understanding of the context and nature of the challenge faced and the desired end state. To achieve any measure of success, the strategy should be owned by all relevant Government Departments and the Armed Forces. The Committee also recommended that training and education on the culture, history and politics of the area be given to both civilian and military staff working there.7

Armed Forces casualties in Afghanistan 10. The worst aspect of operations has been the loss of lives and the number of people receiving very severe injuries. From the start of operations in Afghanistan in 2001 to 15 June 2012, 371 British military personnel were killed with a further 586 very seriously or seriously wounded. Over 5,000 troops were admitted to the field hospital of whom 1,712 were wounded in action and the remainder had a non battle injury or disease. Some 4,700 personnel were evacuated back to the UK by air.8 We wish to pay tribute to the dedication of the Armed Forces and the sacrifices they and their families have made.

Priorities for operations in Afghanistan 11. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, New York, on 11 September 2001, Afghanistan became the centre of world attention. The USA concluded (and the UK agreed) that Afghanistan was harbouring al-Qaeda terrorists, including its leader Osama Bin Laden. In alliance with the Afghan Northern Alliance, the USA, supported by the UK, launched a military campaign to drive out the ruling Taliban regime from power. The Taliban were defeated through a combination of US air power and ground operations by the Northern Alliance.9

12. The Taliban regime fell in late 2001. Since then, the international community, through organisations such as the United Nations, the G8, the World Bank, NATO and the EU, has sought to stabilise and reconstruct Afghanistan. It was the then Government’s view that the

5 HC (2006–07) 408

6 Ibid. 7 Defence Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2009–10, The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace, HC 224 8 www.mod.uk 9 HC (2006–07) 408

16 Operations in Afghanistan

UK had a strategic interest in bringing security and stability to Afghanistan, and it is in pursuit of this strategic interest that UK Forces operate in Afghanistan.10

13. The MoD told us that the ISAF Mission is:

ISAF, in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and acting under UN Security Council Resolution 1890, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency; support growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan national Security Forces (ANSF); and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable by the population.11

Other commentators told us that NATO was buying time to allow the Afghan economy to grow12 and to support the development of a coherent non-corrupt political regime and a reduction in criminal networks to an acceptable level.13 There are major obstacles to progress in all of the above areas.

Communication of the Mission in the UK 14. Communications with the UK population are crucial, not only to secure their consent to operations in Afghanistan but also to avoid radicalising young people. Professor King suggested that the argument should be that we are on a stabilisation mission with regional political importance rather than one of counter terrorism.14 Polling commissioned by the MoD in 2010 and earlier showed increased support by the UK public for operations in Afghanistan—from 43 per cent in September 2006 to 52 per cent in March 2010 albeit with an increase in those opposed to operations from 37 per cent to 41 per cent in the same timeframe. The number of people who felt they knew why the Armed Forces were in Afghanistan went from 29 per cent in September 2006 to 50 per cent in March 2010.15 Support for the Armed Forces is, however, greater than that for operations in Afghanistan.16 Communicating with the UK population about the purpose of any mission involving UK Armed Forces is crucial. We have found that the Government’s descriptions of the nature of the mission and its importance to UK interests have varied throughout the campaign, lacking a consistent narrative. Whist MoD polling data has shown some limited improvement in the public’s understanding of operations in Afghanistan, we have observed some confusion in the communications on Libya which reminded us forcefully of earlier stages in Afghanistan.

10 HC (2006–07) 408 and HC Deb, 26 January 2006, col 1529 11 Ev 155

12 Q 2 13 Q 67 14 Q 87 15 Qq 18–19 16 Q 30

Operations in Afghanistan 17

Defence Committee scrutiny of the MoD 15. We asked the MoD to give us sight of the Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes in order to understand the decisions taken about operations in Helmand in 2006. The Secretary of State refused this request. Some MoD witnesses referred to these minutes in their testimony. The minutes clearly would have helped us to understand the situation in Afghanistan in 2006 and the military perspective on events and to clarify the timing of deployments and the move to the north of Helmand. We disagree with the MoD decision not to give us sight of documents which are now over five years old. Refusal hinders our Parliamentary scrutiny of the MoD.

16. As discussed in paragraph 5 above, we were not satisfied with the quality of the evidence given by some MoD witnesses, in particular, on the deployment to Helmand in 2006. To understand the decision-making processes and the background to the deployment in 2006, we had to take evidence from former Secretaries of State and retired senior military personnel. In future, we expect MoD to come to give evidence to the Committee briefed and prepared to be frank and open about matters where the provision of information would not put the Armed Forces at risk.

18 Operations in Afghanistan

2 Operations in Helmand in 2006

The decision to move into the South of Afghanistan 17. We attach a timeline of events connected with operations in Helmand from 2004 to 2007 at the beginning of this Report.

18. We asked General Fry about the background to the deployment to Southern Afghanistan in 2006:

On the precise chronology, I cannot give you exact dates, but to the best of my memory, we first started thinking about a reinvestment in Afghanistan probably in early 2004. At that stage, it was very clear that a number of things were happening in Afghanistan or, more pointedly, not happening. The NATO campaign looked completely moribund at that stage. It was obvious that Stage 2, which was the movement into the North and the West, was taking place, but there was no appetite that it was possible to discern anywhere in NATO for taking the campaign into the South, Stage 3, which was then to be followed by Stage 4, which was the East of the country, [...]17

19. General Richards said that the decision to go into Helmand was part of a more important NATO decision fully supported by Britain:

[...] the decision to go into Helmand was on the back of a much bigger and more important decision for NATO to go into the South and East. Britain had been absolutely supportive of that decision in principle, which, for what it’s worth, I thought at the time was right, because the campaign needed gingering up.18

20. General Fry told us why it was of concern that there appeared to be no appetite in the international coalition to move into the South:

[...] we had embarked on a campaign in Afghanistan in the first instance to deny ungoverned space for malevolent purposes. It seems to us that if NATO was only successful in pursuing its writ through half of the country, and that part of the country was almost completely coincidental with the Northern Alliance, in effect, there was the possibility of creating a semi-autonomous Pashtunistan, which would be adjacent to Baluchistan and Waziristan and create a Pashtun belt that not only would be ungoverned, but in many ways would be more autonomous that it ever had been previously. Therefore, not to do this would for the alliance, and for us in purely national terms, be a complete failure of strategic intent.

There was also the fact that if NATO ran out of fuel [political will] after half a mission, and the easiest, most benign half of a mission, question marks would be placed against its efficacy and its future role.19

17 Q 397 18 Q 670 19 Q 397

Operations in Afghanistan 19

21. We were told by Air Chief Marshal Stirrup and General Fry that, in 2004 and 2005, the USA was predominantly focused on the conflict in Iraq and its anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan to search for al-Qaeda (Operation Enduring Freedom).20 In particular, General Fry said:

[...] it seemed to a body of Whitehall opinion that there was a clear and pressing need to revivify the NATO campaign in Afghanistan and to try and draw American eyes back to Afghanistan, which had been fundamentally distracted by events in Iraq.21

22. General Houghton told us:

On the question of whether it was right to go to Southern Afghanistan at all, that was, in many respects, a strategic and political level decision, the genesis of which was within the UNSCR and a discussion at the political level in NATO to galvanise the nature of both the international community and NATO, on the international community’s behalf, to bring about strategic change within Afghanistan—in terms of it being an unsafe place that was host to international terrorism and for which the delivery of good government and governance was essential. In terms of going, the genesis of that, from an international political level, was right.22

23. General Fry defended the move into the South of Afghanistan in 2006:

[...] Had this not happened, there is a chance that NATO would never have gone into the south of Afghanistan, with untold consequences for the alliance. We would also have created, de facto, the very ungoverned space that we went there in the first instance to deny. What we as a nation achieved during that period was a very large, bold and imaginative stroke, which has been lost because of subsequent events.

I would even make one greater claim. I think that we probably made the Americans think more about counter-insurgency than counter-terrorism. If you recall, in 2004 and 2005, they were just beginning to make the intellectual leap from counter- terrorism into counter-insurgency, which later bore fruit in Iraq. I think that our insistence on approaching Afghanistan as a counter-insurgency operation played a role in the general intellectual mindset of America, with consequential results in Iraq and the possibility of consequential results in Afghanistan as well. If I sum this up, I thought it was the right thing then, and I think it was the right thing now, and I make no apology for having been involved in it.23

24. By the end of 2004, it had been decided that the UK, Canada and the Netherlands would move into the South of Afghanistan. Canada wanted to play a dominant role in the move and wanted its forces to go to Kandahar. The Netherlands took on Uruzgan.24 General Peter Wall told us that the UK taking on Helmand was consistent with the UK’s

20 Qq 398, 462, 599, 604 21 Q 398 22 Q 670 23 Q 462 24 Qq 408–409, 670

20 Operations in Afghanistan

role in counter-narcotics (held since July 2005).25 On 10 February 2005 at NATO, Geoff Hoon, the then Secretary of State, announced the UK’s intention to move forces from the North to the South of Afghanistan.26

25. There have been some suggestions in the media that the British Army was “spoiling for a fight” and that it wanted to show what it could do in Helmand. Lord Reid’s view was that this was not true, although once the decision had been taken to deploy, the Armed Forces, understandably, wanted to take on tasks commensurate with their abilities.27 General Jackson told us that it was not true that the Army was looking for a new operation as they withdrew from Northern Ireland.28

26. We asked if it had been sensible for the UK to go into Helmand when the Armed Forces were still so heavily engaged in Iraq. Lord Reid told us that he had been assured by the MoD that going into Helmand was not dependent upon the withdrawal from Iraq although there might be pinch points such as logistics and helicopters.29

27. General Houghton expressed doubt as to whether it had been the right time to go into Helmand:

Was it the right time? That is the only thing over which I might hesitate because, in terms of strategic decision making relating to committing at that time, some of it— certainly from my knowledge in 2005—was based on a realistic but subsequently optimistic view of what our level of commitment in Iraq would be by then. In actual fact, the level of reduction in commitment to Iraq that had been forecast and hoped for in 2005 had not actually materialised in early 2006, but I sense that there was an irreversibility, given the political and international level of the decision, and it was at no detriment to the selection of the most robust force package.30

28. Given the demanding nature of the situation in Iraq, we do not consider that the implications of the decision to move UK Armed Forces into the South of Afghanistan in early 2006 were fully thought through, in particular, the potential risk to UK Armed Forces personnel. We consider that this criticism applies equally to the international decision to deploy into the South, in that all decisions made at such a level inevitably involve tensions and delay, which contributed in this case to the difficulties subsequently encountered.

The objectives of the Mission 29. The UK’s objective for Operations in Afghanistan was to conduct security and stabilisation operations within Helmand and the wider Regional Command South, jointly with Afghan partners, other Government Departments and multinational partners. The intention was to support the Government of Afghanistan in improving governance and

25 Q 670

26 Q 401 27 Q 409 28 Qq 409, 537 29 Qq 445, 450 30 Q 670

Operations in Afghanistan 21

development. The initial objective in 2006 was to establish a central “lozenge of security” around Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and Camp Bastion and then move out from there as conditions permitted. The intent was that UK Forces would gain intelligence and a cultural understanding of the environment and, by developing a local envelope of security, would be able to help create the right environment for governance, build Afghan capacity and create a capacity for economic growth.31

Intelligence 30. We recognise that there are always limitations to intelligence gathered in complex, unfamiliar areas. In his Committee’s report on the review of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Lord Butler set out at length many of the weaknesses of intelligence and the problems in analysing and assessing such information.32 Lord Reid said that intelligence was always less than comprehensive and that it was difficult to assess the impact of the presence of the Armed Forces would have on the enemy.33

31. The only military activity on the ground in Helmand prior to 2006 was the USA counter-terrorist operation — Operation Enduring Freedom—which focused on the search for al-Qaeda and attempted not to intimidate or alienate the local population or the Taliban. And the US Forces acted in what General Fry described as “a profoundly live and let live” way.34 Intelligence from such an operation was limited.

32. General Wall, the then deputy Chief of Joint Operations, admitted that there had been a failure of intelligence before the deployment of UK Forces into Helmand:

I absolutely accept that what we found when we had forces on the ground was starkly different from what we had anticipated and hoped for. [...] We were ready for an adverse reaction, but to be fair we did not expect it to be as vehement as it turned out to be.35

33. General Wall stressed how seriously Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) had viewed the collection of intelligence especially since this had been one of the things that had not gone “terribly well in Iraq”. He explained what PJHQ had done to gather sufficient reliable intelligence including sending in a preliminary operations team. He said that they had recognised there would be a need to supplement this information when troops were on the ground. In short, he said that they had anticipated the Taliban’s potential intent but not their capacity.36

34. However, Air Chief Marshal Stirrup told us that, when planning for Helmand, senior military staff had been aware that Helmand was a hostile environment and had halted

31 Qq 415, 479, 611, 672 32 Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction , 14 July 2004, HC 898

33 Q 440 34 Q 401 35 Q 672 36 Ibid.

22 Operations in Afghanistan

planning for a time because of this. They had resumed planning when they came under pressure from NATO:

I can recollect a number of discussions around the Chiefs of Staff Committee table that essentially were along these lines—I have used these very words myself, so I can recollect them well—“We don’t know much about the South, but what we do know is that it’s not the North. It’s real bandit country.” We had a number of intelligence briefings, of course, from the Chief of Defence Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Staff, but one must remember that the international presence in the South, particularly in Helmand, had been very thin on the ground right up until the deployment of British troops. There were something like 100 members of the US special forces, for example.

[...] I personally said, “We need to call a halt to our planning. We cannot possibly deploy UK Forces when we don’t know what the environment is going to be like and we don’t know who will be in the adjoining provinces, so we don’t know what the total picture will look like.” We did halt for a time, but then concern grew within NATO, the Dutch resolved their difficulties and then at that stage we were seen by NATO as holding up the whole process. We were asked to step forward again, which we consequently did.37

35. Brigadier Butler, the first Commander of UK Forces in Helmand, told us that it had been assumed that they would deploy into a permissive environment which turned out not to be so:

What happened was that there was an assumption—I had a difficulty with this, [...] that we were just going to deploy the Force into a permissive environment and when we had reached full operation capability in July 2006 then we would go out and start engaging with the people.

As soon as we arrived in those conditions—and as I have said the Province was already in some form of crisis; they were certainly ready and waiting—of course they wanted to engage us. We used to say that there would be a reaction to our size 12 Boots going into Helmand Province, whether from the Taliban, from the opiate dealers or from the warlords, because we were threatening their very existence. We were trying to turn a failed state into a steady and successful one, which was contrary to all their aims and objectives. We knew full well, as reasonably experienced military men, that we were going to have a reaction.38

36. Notwithstanding our recognition of the limitations on intelligence in situations such as Helmand in 2006, we are concerned that the MoD did not anticipate that the presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might stir up a hornets’ nest especially as much of the intelligence was contradictory. We consider that if, because it was essential to support improved governance in Afghanistan, the deployment could not have been deferred or delayed until the end of the fighting season in 2006, senior military advisers should nonetheless have raised serious concerns about the unpredictable nature of the

37 Q 599 38 Q 481

Operations in Afghanistan 23

conflict on which they were embarking. This briefing should have drawn clear attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict. We believe that such concerns as were raised by the Armed Forces were inadequate at best, and that they were not raised, as they should have been, to the very highest levels of Government.

Planning 37. Brigadier Butler told us that that the Mission was far from clear and straightforward because of the many players involved and there was a split planning effort; the American plan, including Operation Enduring Freedom, and planning by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, PJHQ, the MoD, the FCO, DfID and Brigadier Butler’s headquarters plus those of allies.39 He also told us that they had not known enough to come up with a coherent, long- term campaign plan, especially as Helmand was in turmoil before their arrival.40

38. The deployment was originally agreed for three years with force levels capped at 3,150 troops at an estimated cost of £808 million.41 At the planning stage in 2005, the Armed Forces were being asked to set in place arrangements for one deliberate operation and three or four reactive ones a month. Brigadier Butler told us that he had very strongly contested these force numbers with PJHQ and others but was told he had to manage within the cap of 3,150.42 He contrasted this with 30,000 troops in Helmand in 2011 and the greater understanding of the environment.43

39. Brigadier Butler said that he had also raised with the MoD shortages of some of the enablers such as helicopters, force protection, ISTAR and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to undertake the tasks being asked of him in the early stages of the deployment.44 When asked if there had been enough helicopters and other equipment when he first deployed to Helmand, he replied:

No, we didn’t. [...] Going back to my earlier point: steady state, one deliberate operation a month and three or four reactive operations—we could do that within Helmand itself. Everything else you asked us to do above it, or if the enemy had a vote, which we knew they would, we were going to be very short. We knew that we were going to [be]short: by May we could actually say it for sure, but we were saying it in 2005. We were some 20% over our hours for support helicopter—Chinooks— we had six of them. We were already 11% over on our attack helicopter hours. The C-130s were operating at 92% of their maximum output, so there was the resultant impact on spare parts, crew fatigue and everything else. We staffed back in May a requirement for a 30% uplift on all air and aviation capability. We had the hard facts by that stage; but we knew them already from our estimate process beforehand.

39 Qq 473–4

40 Q 477 41 Ibid. 42 Q 490 43 Qq 491–2 44 Qq 493–3

24 Operations in Afghanistan

We also knew before we deployed that we had something in the order of a 45%—on average—shortfall of vehicles. We had already identified that Snatch was not an appropriate vehicle for the desert. We wanted WMIKs and Pinzgauers, logistical vehicles, DROPS, container vehicles, equipment support vehicles, the small Scimitar CVRTs. It was on average a 45% shortfall across the fleet. That was compounding the manoeuvre problem that we had. All those things were identified and staffed into PJHQ.45

40. This contrasts with the testimony from Lord Reid on helicopters:

On 13 March 2006, just before we went in in the April, a letter went to the interlocutor [...] about the forthcoming deployment to Afghanistan, “I undertook to get back to you in respect of the three points that you raised. The first one was helicopters” and I was able to say that “On the matter of helicopter availability, I am reliably informed that the commanding officer of the helicopter force is content with the number of flying hours available to him for the prosecution of the mission. Of course, in common with existing practices in Iraq, there will be regular force-level reviews of the Forces in Afghanistan, and this may lead to adjustments to the size and nature of the forces deployed.”46

41. Whilst we recognise that senior military staff have a role in determining the level of resources needed on specific operations and that this might mean moderating the demands of commanders in the field, nonetheless, we are disturbed by the fact that the Secretary of State was being told that commanders on the ground were content with the support they were being given in Helmand when clearly they were not. We regard it as unacceptable that hard pressed Forces in such a difficult operation as Helmand should have been denied the necessary support to carry out the Mission from the outset, and that this shortage had not been brought to the attention of Ministers.

42. Lord Reid told us that he delayed the deployment into Helmand until three specific conditions had been fulfilled but then he had come under pressure not to hold the deployment up:

First, any troop configuration that the Chiefs decided was necessary for the mission had to be met and financed in full by the Treasury. Secondly, the external troop configuration that NATO said was necessary for us, including Canadians to the east and the Dutch to the north in Uruzgan, was met. That wasn’t the case by the time of our proposed entry, by the way, in September. That is why I delayed through September, October, November and December, until the Dutch finally agreed that they would go into Uruzgan, before we deployed. During that period, I was under immense pressure—sometimes indirectly—from some people in the military, [...] that I was holding up the preparations and asking why wasn’t I going in. [...]

The third thing was that we had sufficient resources from DFID so that we did not have a situation that had developed sometimes in Iraq where we did not have the

45 Q 493 46 Q 456

Operations in Afghanistan 25

capacity and resources for what Rob [Fry] has called nation-building, by getting DFID to redeploy its money towards our strategic objectives.

So those three conditions were laid down at my first meeting, and we did not go in until they were met. On the third one, we had a long series of meetings in the Cabinet Office under an Afghanistan group to try to focus the DFID effort, because I am afraid my view of DFID throughout that period was that it was sometimes pursuing objectives which, however worthy they were in themselves, did not always accord with the rest of the British foreign policy, including where we were putting our military emphasis.47

These conditions were finally met in early 2006.48

Challenges faced by the initial deployment 43. General Houghton pointed out that a number of factors came together to make the situation particularly difficult in the early months:

x Poppy eradication—the fear of locals that their livelihoods would be taken away, which was fuelled by Taliban propaganda;

x Some of the 200,000 casual labourers who migrated from Pakistan for the poppy harvest had stayed behind as guns for hire;

x In preparation for the arrival of UK Forces, the Americans had conducted a number of kinetic operations culminating in Operation Mountain Thrust which had stirred up the local population; and

x The removal of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada as Governor and his replacement by Governor Daoud had destabilised the tribal balance and the balance of power within northern Helmand.49

44. Brigadier Butler told us that he had barely enough troops to do the tasks required of them at the start of the deployment.50 He also told us that the necessary delay, whilst waiting for the Dutch to deploy, had meant UK Forces deployed nearer the fighting season and that the initial operational capability (late April 2006), when deployed, struggled to cope. The Taliban and drug lords were waiting to engage with UK Forces as they arrived.51 The UK Forces were not at full operational capability until July 2006.52 Governor Daoud was frustrated by the late arrival of UK Forces and by the dawning reality that he was not getting 3,000 “warriors” but rather 600 paratroopers—the actual number of fighting troops —with all the support elements.53

47 Q 408 48 Q 412

49 Q 674 50 Q 490 51 Q 481 52 Q 497 53 Ibid.

26 Operations in Afghanistan

The move to north Helmand and the development of the ‘Platoon Houses Strategy’ 45. General Fry said that the key question about the events of 2006 was how did UK Forces get from the original plan to provide security in a small area to “fighting for their lives no less than two months later in a series of Alamos in the north of the province”.54

46. It is clear from the evidence we received that, once in theatre, UK Forces came under pressure from Governor Daoud and President Karzai to provide security in a wider geographical area. We fully recognise the pressures on Brigadier Butler to support development of governance and to win what the MoD described as the totemic battle of the flagpoles—preventing Government flags from being replaced by those of the Taliban.55 Brigadier Butler told us that Governor Daoud had said:

“We need you to support governance. We need you to protect us. You need to give us the freedom of movement. You must support me to be allowed to go round my own constituency. If I can’t do that, why are you here?” [...] “If the black flag of Mullah Omar flies over any of the district centres, you may as well go home because we’ll have lost our authority to govern in Helmand, and if we lose our authority to govern and our ability to govern, then that will threaten the south. Kandahar will be next. We’ll lose the south before you’ve even started. What are you going to do about it?”56

47. Lord Reid said that, prior to the original deployment, the MoD had considered that any demands placed on UK Forces to move further or faster than planned should be resisted. He also believed that the move into the north of Helmand had come about as the result of an operational decision which had changed the strategic nature of the Mission:

Just prior to me leaving the MoD, I recall being briefed that, while Permanent Joint Headquarters regarded Governor Daoud, the Governor of Helmand Province, as an honest man, he needed to be strongly discouraged from making gestures—for example, the idea of a forward operating base at Sangin—that were unsustainable. Not long after this, I left the MoD for the Home Office. You can imagine that when, five weeks later, sitting in the Home Office, I heard that we were fighting for our lives in Sangin, I could not entirely understand it.

I understand from inquiries that I made then and subsequently that the matter was not referred to the Secretary of State for Defence who succeeded me. It was never brought to his attention, except in retrospect. Undoubtedly, in my view, it was an operational decision which may or may not have been right. Let us assume that the commanders on the spot got it right; but it was an operational decision that changed the strategic nature of the mission, and when you change the nature of a mission,

54 Q 415 55 Q 676 56 Q 497

Operations in Afghanistan 27

there is an obligation to change all sorts of things such as the force configuration, the resources and so on.57

48. General Richards said that the move to the north of Helmand was not a change of mission but a change of tactics.58 But General Wall said that UK Forces had ended up in a situation that turned out to be strategically very different from the one that was anticipated.59

49. There has been some speculation in the press and elsewhere that Brigadier Butler and the other commanders on the ground made the decision to deploy out from the security lozenge in isolation from those above them in the command chain, thereby changing the nature of the operation. Brigadier Butler told us that General Wall, his immediate superior, was with him during one of the key meetings with Governor Daoud. He also told us that he wrote daily reports and weekly assessments and conducted video conferences with General Houghton, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) and with his deputy General Wall.60 General Wall told us that he was on a programmed visit to Helmand at that time:

[...] I was on a programmed visit to Lashkar Gah at the point when this crisis started to unfold. The timing of it was driven because the Taliban had the district centres in Northern Helmand under pressure. On Governor Daoud’s perception, particularly bearing in mind his lack of tribal influence, [...] that he was not able to pull this off with behind-the-scenes politicking.61

Brigadier Butler also commented:

[...] in terms of the command and control arrangements in theatre we had the Helmand Executive Group and the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gah. They were privy to all these discussions. They were represented at the same meeting with myself, Colonel Knaggs, Tom Tugendhat, who was Governor Daoud’s adviser, Department for International Development representatives and Foreign Office representatives. We had the same representation at Kandahar, but the Southern Afghanistan Group was not really established at that stage. It spent more of its time in Helmand. We had the Kabul Steering Group, chaired by the Ambassador, with cross-Government representation. We then had the Afghan Steering Group in London. And we had weekly tele-conferences with London.62

50. General Houghton agreed that this was not a decision taken by Brigadier Butler alone. Both he and General Wall recognised the considerable pressure coming from Governor Daoud and President Karzai to support the local government and governance. They also

57 Q 415

58 Q 676 59 Q 684 60 Q 497 61 Q 676 62 Q 497

28 Operations in Afghanistan

thought that failure to support Governor Daoud would have resulted in “a political failure and significant credibility problems in terms of the UK initiative in the South”.63

51. Lord Browne, former Secretary of State, said that a tactical decision was made to deploy forces beyond the lozenge. He told us that he was briefed about this retrospectively and informed by those in command that, in military terms, this was an operational decision.64 Lord Reid said that no decision had been taken to move into north Helmand while he was Secretary of State:

[...] Just prior to me leaving the MoD, I recall being briefed that, while Permanent Joint Headquarters regarded Governor Daoud, the Governor of Helmand Province, as an honest man, he needed to be strongly discouraged from making gestures—for example, the idea of a forward operating base at Sangin—that were unsustainable.65

He left the office of Secretary of State for Defence just three days after he was briefed as above.66

52. Air Chief Marshal Stirrup, on the other hand, said that he thought that Lord Reid would have been involved in the discussions on the move to the north of Helmand although in his role as CDS, he had only overlapped with Lord Reid for a matter of days.67 Air Chief Marshal Stirrup went out to visit UK Forces in Afghanistan on his appointment, approximately three weeks before the move North occurred and so held discussions with key players including Brigadier Butler.68

53. General Houghton told us, from his rereading of the Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes, that Brigadier Butler had briefed the Chiefs of Staff on 24 May 2006 on the platoon house concept69. He had also noted in the minutes of 3 May that there might be a requirement for an earlier than planned and more significant deployment to the north of Helmand to support the governance of Governor Daoud. The actual moves to the north of Helmand took place in late May—on 26 to 27 May to Sangin and 28 May to Musa Qala and Now Zad—although there had been a presence in these areas and some fighting in the build up period.70

54. General Houghton told us that, at that stage, it was proposed to do that move for only one month to see if the new disposition would work. It was subsequently decided to remain in Sangin but to leave Musa Qala and Now Zad.71 We are not clear that the decision to deploy for only one month was briefed to ministers, even though it seems very important.

63 Q 676 64 Q 582 65 Q 415 66 Qq 415, 421 67 Qq 641–6 68 Q 642 69 Platoon house concept is the defence by the Armed Forces of small isolated and fortified bases 70 Q 676 71 Q 678

Operations in Afghanistan 29

55. Whilst the top level objective of the Mission might not have changed, the operation clearly changed radically with the move into the north of Helmand. It appears to us that this radical change was not referred back to the Secretary of State or the Cabinet for endorsement until after the move into the north of Helmand, including deployments into Sangin and Musa Qala, had happened. We consider it to be unlikely that this fundamental change to the operation was put to Ministers for a decision as to whether to proceed. We cannot be more certain on this because we have been denied sight of the relevant minutes (see paragraph 15). As the change put the lives of Armed Forces personnel at much greater risk, it should surely have gone to the Cabinet for endorsement. Subsequent to the decision, the new Secretary of State was told in retrospect but we do not believe that senior military advisers briefed their Ministers with sufficient force as to the strategic implications of the operational change which had already been made. The MoD should tell us how relevant lessons have been learnt.

Turnover of key personnel 56. In 2006, there was a significant changeover of senior staff in the Armed Forces and in the ministerial team. John Reid was replaced by Des Browne as the Secretary of State in early May 2006. The Chief of Defence Staff changed from General Walker to Air Chief Marshal Stirrup in April 2006. General Houghton replaced Air Marshal Torpy as Chief of Joint Operations in March 2006. All these changes took place within a few weeks when much of the attention and most of the resources were focused on Iraq. The significant transfer of such senior key personnel, both political and military would increase risks in the administration of the Armed Forces at any time but, in 2006 at such a crucial stage in both the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it gave rise to unacceptable risks. We conclude that these risks were realised. We recommend that the Government should avoid moving so many senior military personnel at a time when Ministers are being moved as well.

Increased troop numbers and further support 57. The UK increased the number of troops by 1,300 in Autumn 2006, several months after the initial deployment to the north of Helmand, when the second brigade was deployed. Lord Browne told us that, retrospectively, it was clear that there were still not enough troops.72 General Fry said any change in the deployment would result in different resource and equipment needs:

[...] We were completely dislocated geographically from where we went in, thereby placing a hugely greater emphasis not only on the fighting power of the troops but on the requirements for things such as protective mobility, autonomous logistics and aviation. You can only fight in as many places as you have the ability to extract your casualties from.73

58. Lord Reid said:

72 Q 581 73 Q 415

30 Operations in Afghanistan

[...] Let us assume that the commanders on the spot got it right; but it was an operational decision that changed the strategic nature of the mission, and when you change the nature of a mission, there is an obligation to change all sorts of things such as the force configuration, the resources and so on.74

59. In describing the deployment to the north of Helmand in the middle of 2006, Air Chief Marshal Stirrup told us that the majority of the force became fixed and the issue became resupplying it rather than manoeuvring it and limitations on support helicopters and protected mobility restricted the options available to the commander on the ground.75

60. General Wall said that he saw the original force size of 3,150 as a constraint and the Armed Forces did not have resources such as combat units or enabling activity standing by capable of deploying to Afghanistan.76 He also told us that it would not have been easy to find extra troops who could be deployed quickly or additional equipment:

[...] it was not easy for us to find a net theatre-ready uplift instantaneously. I cannot remember the airlift situation, but it probably would not have been easy to get it there either, in an acclimatised and suitably trained way. [...] On enablers, however, which were the critical drivers here—as Ed Butler has told you—this was going to be incremental. Not quite a game of inches, but incremental. It was not about more airframes; it was about more hours. It was about more spares, more fluid ammunition supply, and logistics and that sort of stuff.77

61. General Houghton said that he had discussed the necessity for additional resources with the Chiefs of Staff on 31 May 2006:

At the following meeting, on 31 May, I was able to report that the platoon house concept was bedding down well. There had been a good local reaction to it. I think at that time I raised the first concern. The Chiefs had previously persuaded themselves that this would probably be resource-neutral. I said, “No, if this is to be sustained over time, it will put additional pressure on our logistics and sustainability in manpower terms.” That was reinforced a week later—on 7 June—when I said, “Yes, and there’s a helicopter dimension to this.” At that stage, it was proposed to do it for only one month, due to the initial political concern that Engineer Daoud’s governorship would be undermined [...]there was a sensible conversation that the nature of the platoon house concept would be resource-intensive. To the tactical commander and to me—and I think to David [General Richards], with whom we were having conversations off—the bigger concern was that it would come to a situation where too great a percentage of the force was fixed in place, rather than being able to manoeuvre. The narrative and dialogue of whether we were over-fixed and needed to manoeuvre more played out during the summer and informed various troop uplifts.78

74 Q 415 75 Q 636 76 Q 684 77 Q 683 78 Q 677

Operations in Afghanistan 31

62. What is particularly worrying is that the much increased requirement for additional resources and support, in particular for additional troops and helicopters, was not acted upon quickly enough. Whilst we accept that it is not possible to prepare and train soldiers quickly to reinforce those on the ground when circumstances change, we are, nonetheless, concerned that no strategic reserve had been trained and prepared in order to be readily available, particularly as this Mission had been planned for some considerable time. There should always be a contingency reserve available with the resources to support it. If it is used, immediate plans to restore it should be in place.

Continuation of the Mission to 2009 63. The UK Armed Forces have made valiant efforts to provide security in Helmand and have worked closely with civilian colleagues to secure improvements in the area and have had some measure of success in operations such as Operation Moshtarak79. Professor Farrell described his analysis of the planning and conduct of Operation Moshtarak and reported on its success in winning local support for the operation and defeating the local Taliban insurgency.80

64. Forces in Helmand were able to clear certain areas, such as Musa Qala and Now Zad, but did not have sufficient forces to hold them. However, had UK Forces not been able to clear these areas, the situation in Helmand could have been much worse. As General Wall said:

We could be having an even more difficult conversation about this had our soldiers not stepped up to the plate and delivered in a situation that turned out to be strategically very different from the one that was anticipated.81

65. When asked, Air Chief Marshal Stirrup agreed that without overwhelming force in such circumstances, there were likely to be more casualties. He also agreed that there had needed to be an immediate assessment of the resources devoted to the operation.82

66. General Messenger told us that when he was commanding in Helmand in the six months to April 2009, he had insufficient resources:

I came back in April ’09 [...] At the time, insufficient resources were being allocated to the challenge in Southern Afghanistan. I commanded a brigade, alongside an Afghan brigade commander, that was stretched and not able to go to certain key areas where we knew we would ultimately have to go to secure the population. What has happened since has been an enormous inflow, principally American but also from other NATO nations, and a huge upsurge in the number of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police who are in the line providing that security.83

79 Operation Moshtarak was a three phase regional operation to provide security in central Helmand and Kandahar and to enable freedom of movement on main routes. Phase 2 began in February 2010 and was planned and conducted by the ANSF in partnership with ISAF. 80 Q 71 81 Q 684 82 Qq 637, 649 83 Q 6

32 Operations in Afghanistan

67. It is clear that the situation in Helmand did not develop as envisaged. Armed Forces personnel achieved the best tactical outcomes possible in very difficult circumstances in no small measure due to the high quality and training of the troops themselves. But it must be acknowledged that the force levels deployed throughout 2006, 2007 and 2008 were never going to achieve what was being demanded of the Armed Forces by the UK, NATO and the Afghan Government. We view it as unacceptable that UK Forces were deployed in Helmand for three years, as a result of a failure of military and political co-ordination, without the necessary personnel and equipment to succeed in their Mission.

Operations in Afghanistan 33

3 Military operations since 2009

McChrystal counter-insurgency strategy 68. In June 2009, General McChrystal, the then US Commander of ISAF in Afghanistan proposed a new counter-insurgency strategy:

NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counter- insurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment.

To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance. We must also prioritize resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment to see it through to success. Finally we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.84

69. President Obama approved the strategy and the deployment of more troops in November 2009. The revised counter-insurgency strategy subsequently approved by NATO emphasises security of the local population and the ultimate need to hand over responsibility for security to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). To deliver the strategy, troop numbers were increased by 30,000 US personnel and 10,000 personnel from other members of the coalition (including 500 from the UK), bringing the total ISAF force to some 150,000 by the end of 2010. In June 2010, General Petraeus replaced General McChrystal as Commander of ISAF Forces but continued to pursue his predecessor’s strategy. He will be replaced as Commander by General Allen in July 2011.

70. The strategy was formally adopted by Afghanistan and the coalition at the Lisbon summit in November 2009.85

71. We welcome the adoption of the counter-insurgency strategy by the coalition and recognise that, for UK Forces, it was a continuation of its previously adopted strategy although this had been badly under-resourced. It seems to us that the two crucial aspects of the revised strategy are the decision to put the security of the local population at its core and the acceptance of the need to hand over responsibility for security to the Afghan Government and the ANSF. We also recognise that the McChrystal Strategy could not work without the accompanying surge in troop numbers.

72. Air Marshal Peach told us in November 2010 that the UK Forces had the correct force levels and that they were working closely with the ANSF:

84 General McChrystal: Commander’s Initial Assessment, 30 August 2009, www.media.washingtonpost.com 85 NATO Lisbon Summit declaration 2009

34 Operations in Afghanistan

We have the correct force levels now in terms of what we call force density for the tasks that we are undertaking in central Helmand in three key districts, where the force level, [...] is around 9,500. Those tasks have evolved since 2006, when it was an initial deployment. As that deployment has developed, so has the geography. There has been a steady increase in the number of troops deployed; there has been a steady increase in the understanding of where we are and what the local conditions are; and there has been a steady increase in force density to understand what we need in that counter-insurgency for that part of Afghanistan. That assessment varies by district; it is quite different across the whole of Afghanistan.

We can honestly say that we have the force density for the tasks that we now need, [...] The task is now increasingly to bring this partnership—this integration—of not just civil and military effect, but of leadership of the Afghans. That has grown from mentoring at unit level, through support at battalion level, to support at brigade level in the past year. There has been a steady process of evolution since the Afghan Forces started to be developed a few years ago. I am very confident of that assessment. Of course, situations change, and the situation could change again in future, and we must be cognisant of that.86

73. General Richards told us:

Have we learned the lessons of 2006? Force ratios87? We had 3,000-odd in 2006, today it is just under 11,000, as the Secretary of State for Defence recently said in Parliament. Britain has the best force ratios in Afghanistan at the moment—indeed, we are the envy of the Americans, which is worth reminding ourselves of as they increasingly have a very difficult challenge in the east of the country.88

74. General Parker told us that the UK Forces had the right number of troops but needed the ANSF to complement UK efforts:

Yes. From an ISAF perspective, the South has just about got it right, but we mustn’t be complacent. The effective growth of the ANSF is critical to start to complement what we have. As far as the British are concerned, exactly the same philosophy applies: we must continue to grow an effective ANSF. I could not commend highly enough the Afghan National Police training organisation in Helmand. These are really important to continue to put as much high-quality Afghans among our people as we can.89

75. The USA, as part of the surge, has 30,000 troops in Helmand and some improvements are starting to materialise. But, as all admit, ISAF still faces huge challenges. General Petraeus, Commander ISAF, has stated that they have got the inputs right but that challenges still remain.90 In March 2011, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), ISAF Regional Command (South West) and the Regional Platform (South West) of the US

86 Q 164 87 Force ratio is the ratio of troop numbers to population 88 Q 694 89 Q 257 90 General Petraeus’ talks to RUSI 23 March 2011 and 15 October 2010, www.rusi.org.uk

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Mission to Afghanistan jointly prepared a report entitled the Helmand Annual Review 2010. The report stated that in Helmand:

Challenges remain, and the situation is still fragile. With ISAF and ANSF working together, security forces have sufficient numbers and capabilities to prevent the insurgents from destabilising the central Helmand districts, but a small number of insurgents can exercise a disproportionate influence on the public through intimidation and assassination.91

76. General McChrystal and others have made it clear that the military surge has to be accompanied by a political surge. We have not taken evidence on the political and diplomatic work in Afghanistan and in the surrounding region but we recognise the intimate relationship between the political and military parts of the strategy.

77. General Richards told us he was optimistic that the conditions were right for success in Afghanistan although he stressed the need for political engagement:

The enemy—the Taliban—will continue to attack. The question is how we respond to it and increasingly can the ANSF shoulder the burden? So far, things are looking good, although I am sure there will be setbacks during the year.

I know we are often charged with being overoptimistic. What we have always said is that if you resource the operation properly, then you have a chance of succeeding. We can only set the conditions for other actors, but particularly in the political sphere, and I personally have been banging on about the need for strong political engagement for years—we have all known this. But it will not be until September, October, November, after this full year of the surge on the back of a pretty active winter campaign, that we will really be able to see whether it is beginning to come good. All the indicators as we sit here seem to be positive, but we are the first to be cautious and not to want to fall in the trap of over-optimism.92

78. We consider that it is vital that NATO, ISAF and UN Missions and the international alliance succeed with this latest strategy in both political and military terms. We note the progress already made and that training and support arrangements may have to continue for some time after the withdrawal of combat capability. [See Part 6 for further discussion on withdrawal and transition arrangements.]

Command and control arrangements in an international coalition 79. There are significant complexities involved in working in an international coalition, especially one of 47 countries who provide varying numbers of troops within a NATO chain of command. The role of NATO is crucial in Afghanistan. Whilst the USA is effectively the lead nation in the coalition as it supplies the most troops and the most military assets, the contribution of other nations is fundamental to success both politically and militarily. When asked about how such a large coalition works, General Parker said the following:

91 Helmand Annual Review 2010, www.mod.uk/aboutdefence/corporatepublications 92 Q 699

36 Operations in Afghanistan

It is important to recognise that in military terms the US is effectively the lead nation. Therefore, automatically, there is a deferral to them, because they bring the greatest amount to the operation. Having said that, because the military culture is pretty consistent across all those nations, people fit into that well. Provided they believe that they are reasonably represented, there is no great challenge in the military sense in managing the Coalition. However, it is something that one has to work on all the time.

Working on behalf of both General McChrystal and General Petraeus, I have found that getting nations to reflect their grand strategic policy inside the theatre-strategic decision-making process was quite difficult. I would hold fortnightly meetings—I chose to—with the senior national representative of the eight principal nations, and it was sometimes difficult to get a dialogue going with them over things where we needed to understand what their capitals were thinking in order to be able to shape the military theatre decision making. It works much better than it might appear, because there is a lead nation. There are eight principal nations that we need to corral, but that is hard work and we need to do it better.93

80. Professor King told us that there had been an incoherence and lack of power in the centralised NATO command from 2006 to 2009.94 General McChrystal’s introduction of an ISAF Joint Command in 2009, to give greater clarity to the command and control arrangements, allowed him to tell people what to do rather than to ask and co-ordinate forces.95 General Parker also told us that the introduction of the ISAF Joint Command had been an important development:

On the system, he introduced the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, [...] and importantly the ISAF Joint Command. He broke the theatre strategic and operational levels apart to give greater clarity to the command and control that was necessary. That was manifested in a much more directive command. He told the people what to do and where to do it. He elected to undermine the insurgency in the South. His predecessors had only ever been able to co-ordinate and ask. That was absolutely nailed by the introduction of additional forces [...] that gave General McChrystal the opportunity and the ability to operate in a more aggressive and forceful way in those areas where he wished to do so. That was when he started to undermine the insurgency in the South.96

81. Professor Farrell told us there had inevitably been tension between the US Marines and the UK Forces in Helmand but these had been resolved by the Commander of Regional Command South West.97 General Richards told us that UK military relations with the USA were central to success in Afghanistan and were excellent although he had had some concerns about their relationships with the US Marines in Helmand, which have now been resolved:

93 Q 236 94 Q 94 95 Q 229 96 Q 239 97 Q 93

Operations in Afghanistan 37

US relations are excellent. You have three officers here among many in the British Armed Forces who have been engaged in sustained military operations for 10 years. I know Dave Petraeus, Bill Caldwell and Jim Mattis. They are all friends of ours, so, at the very highest level, relations could not be closer. I and CGS had General Mattis in our offices yesterday, and General Rodriguez, who is the IJC Commander, is a very good friend of ours, too.

At the lower, tactical level, the US Marines have been outstanding in the way that they, first of all, went into Helmand alongside us, and now are running that regional command. The relationship between our forces and theirs, which we were a bit worried about at one stage, because we were not certain about it, is also outstanding, so I have absolutely no worries about our relationship. Indeed, it is very important to us to preserve that relationship as a strategic requirement, because its strength is central to our ongoing success.98

Command and control arrangements for UK Forces in Afghanistan and the role of the Permanent Joint Headquarters 82. General Parker was sent to Afghanistan as the UK National Contingent Commander and the deputy Commander of ISAF in September 2009. General Parker said that the post of UK National Contingent Commander had been created to achieve a greater understanding of the critical nature of influence in Kabul. But he had not been given sufficient resources to do the job as actively as he would have wished:

My professional opinion is that we do not yet understand the theatre-strategic level clearly enough in the British Armed Forces. There needs to be a greater understanding of the importance of the decision making that takes place, in this case in Kabul. The linkages between Kabul and the grand strategic or military strategic decision making in London need to be clearer and better understood. I believe that that was a reflection of why I was sent out as the National Contingent Commander, although I don’t believe I was given sufficient resource to do the job as actively as I needed to. There is a need for greater understanding of the critical nature of pulling levers in Kabul because you can pull as many levers as you like in Helmand, but it won’t make any difference to the way that the campaign is being run by the big command level. That is very important.99

83. When asked about how the UK chain of command works, General Parker said that he believed that there was a role for PJHQ to deploy, sustain and recover forces but not a command relationship—command should rest in Afghanistan:

I was not in a position to deploy, sustain and recover a very complicated British Force. There is no way that that could have been done effectively in Kabul. In my current job, where I am generating the land element of this force, I need to feed it through an organisation that can consolidate it, can ensure that what is being done is correct, and then deploy it and sustain it effectively. I firmly believe that there is a

98 Q 694 99 Q 240

38 Operations in Afghanistan

role for the Permanent Joint Headquarters to deploy, sustain and recover, and it needs to understand what’s going on, but I think we should look carefully at its true pure command relationship because it cannot influence decisions that are made inside the Coalition in Kabul.100

84. Air Marshal Peach, Chief of Joint Operations at PJHQ explained that operational control is now delegated forward to Afghanistan:

Operational control of the force is delegated forward to Afghanistan, so command in that sense is exercised in Afghanistan through the national contingent. That is held, [...] by a British three-star general forward in Kabul, who is also double-hatted as the deputy commander of the international force. Operational command sets the conditions and enables command.101

85. General Parker said that he felt that the UK Armed Forces misunderstood the importance of hierarchy and the need for clarity in the chain of command:

My professional observation is that we misunderstand the importance of hierarchy. I am concerned that we may have allowed brigadiers to make decisions that are beyond their capacity or capability. I feel very strongly that, when we operate in a coalition environment, we must still make sure that there is a hierarchy of wisdom within the UK commitment that ensures that the right decisions are made. We did not have such clarity at the two-star level in the chain of command during our early days in Afghanistan. [...] I think that it is very important that we support the perspective that allows us to make really difficult military judgments about capability and tasks.102

86. Professors Farrell and King both reported that the introduction of a “two star” command of Regional Command South, in the person of General Carter, had improved the command of operations in Helmand:

Professor Farrell The point [...] of my previous study, “Appraising Moshtarak”, was that we tend to lose sight of the fact that we deployed a proper divisional headquarters for 6 Division in RC South. RC South was then the centre of the whole campaign, it was the main effort. We had, for the first time, a proper divisional headquarters running the campaign. There is clear evidence [...] of command leadership going down into Task Forces. So you invariably had tension between the Marine Task Forces and Task Force Helmand, the British Task Force, over who would do what and who would get which resources. For the first time, instead of the Task Force commanders sorting that out between them, you would have General Nick Carter, who was the superior commander, coming down to say, “No, that is what’s going to happen.”103

100 Q 240 101 Q 137 102 Q 261 103 Q 93

Operations in Afghanistan 39

Professor King There was an incoherence, a lack of power, in the centralised NATO command from 2006 to 2009. The centralisation of power into the regional commands has been extremely important. For a clear example of that, compare Operation Panther’s Claw last summer with Operation Moshtarak. [...]

Overwhelmingly, the Helmand [...] is operating in accordance with the overarching campaign plan that really General Carter developed, and predominantly autonomously.104

87. In our inquiry into the Strategic Defence and Security Review, we asked General Wall about the provision of “two star” headquarters following the cuts in the SDSR, he told us

We would certainly be able to do one at a relatively high readiness. Generating a second to take over from it will, in future, require a bit more warning than was required in the past.105

88. We welcome the introduction of the role of the UK National Contingent Commander and the “two star” headquarters for Regional Command South. We also conclude that the command and control arrangements for operations in Afghanistan in 2006 were deficient. Following the review of the operational role of PJHQ, we require a clear description of the revised command and control arrangements for Afghanistan including the role of the PJHQ and its relationship with headquarters in theatre. We recognise the importance of having a readily available and capable “two star” headquarters for these types of deployments and are concerned about the reduction in the number of such headquarters following the SDSR.

Armed Forces personnel

Harmony guidelines 89. The Armed Forces have been involved in the two major theatres of Iraq and Afghanistan since the early 2000s. They have been operating above the previously determined Defence Planning Assumptions for much of that time. This has necessarily put pressure on Armed Forces personnel. Harmony guidelines106 have been breached significantly for many years. We recognise that the percentage of personnel for whom harmony guidelines have been breached has been falling since the withdrawal from Iraq, however, such guidelines are still being breached for some pinch point trades. And with operations in Libya, pressure will again mount on Armed Forces personnel.107 The numbers of personnel for whom harmony guidelines are being broken (as at October 2010) are six per cent for the Army; three per cent for the Royal Air Force and one per cent for the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines. These average percentages are still high in most Services and the levels for some pinch point trades are considerably higher.108

104 Q 94 105 Oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee on 11 May 2011, HC 761-iii, Q 238 106 Harmony guidelines are the MoD’s desired maximum time that Armed Forces personnel should spend away from home on operational deployment within a given timeframe. The definition is different for each Service. 107 Qq 173–174 108 Ev 198–199

40 Operations in Afghanistan

90. We recommend that the MoD make greater efforts to reduce breaches of harmony guidelines for all personnel and take these breaches into account when deciding which trades and groups of Armed Forces personnel should be subject to redundancies.

91. The MoD does not record centrally how many Armed Forces personnel have been on multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and other operational theatres. Such information is vital to allow the Armed Forces to judge the load on individual personnel. We recommend that this information is collated and should be considered alongside breaches of harmony guidelines when judging the pressures on the Armed Forces, and on individuals when deciding on posting.

The Airbridge 92. Transporting troops back to the UK, for mid-tour leave and at the end of their tour, is very important. The role of the airbridge is also critical in deploying the force and providing equipment and supplies. The MoD recognises that there have been problems with the effectiveness of the airbridge. Air Marshal Peach said that the MoD took the return of troops to the UK very seriously. During the volcano ash cloud in 2010 it had, for example, deployed ships to get troops back and few people had been delayed.109

93. General Capewell told us that the performance of the airbridge had improved but there was still a gap caused by shortage of aircraft:

[...] The joint commander has just conducted a major relief in place between two brigades [...] In broad terms, if the judgment of whether this airbridge is successful is the achievement of the transfer of military authority at the right time and the right place, that mission was a success.

In so far as the downstream replacement of VC10 and increasingly obsolete Hercules aircraft, there is SDSR work in place now to address the spending round requirements to look at that gap. Some of that gap is to do with the delivery from commercial contracts of new aircraft, which can be solved by spending. Some of that gap is to do with the retrofitting of theatre-entry standard defensive aids suites, which I am not prepared to go into. Some of that gap is simply to do with the management of the fleet across the national requirement, so it is being looked at.110

We look forward to seeing the results of the work being done to improve the effectiveness of the airbridge. In the meantime, we recommend that the MoD negotiate with allies to permit the use of their resources to plug any gaps in the airbridge.

Support for operations

Close air support 94. Close air support in Helmand is being delivered in an integrated approach from the Royal Air Force, the Army Air Corps and the Fleet Air Arm, with the US Marine Corps.

109 Q 198 110 Qq 197–198

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Air Marshal Peach told us that the UK’s contribution could be singled out for its accuracy and precision and is being used with discernment in line with the policy on courageous restraint:

Close Air Support by aeroplanes and Close Air Support by aviation helicopters are complementary. The Close Air Support delivered by the Apache helicopter in an integrated fashion with the US Marine Corps—with their own helicopter gunships— is important, as is air. The UK air contribution is delivered by the Tornado. The Tornado has a range of options of weapons; [...] the Close Air Support delivered by Tornado has been singled out a number of times for its accuracy and discretion. I mean discretion in the sense of being able to discern what is going on on the ground before lethal force is applied. I know both of those statements would be supported by NATO commanders.

[...] So, it is a team effort; it gets better all the time; and it is applied with discernment, not only in the sense of rules of engagement, but in the sense of understanding what is going on on the ground before lethal force is applied. In other words, there is courageous restraint being applied from the air to the ground. I think the UK’s contribution can be compared to any in that regard.111

95. We recognise the importance of close air support and the skill and bravery of those providing it. We would like confirmation from the MoD that the Armed Forces in Afghanistan now have access to sufficient and timely close air support.

Helicopters 96. Helicopters are a critical component of operations in Afghanistan. General Capewell told us that the UK Forces had sufficient helicopters in Afghanistan, in particular, with the delivery of further Chinook helicopters:

If you spoke to any commander today on the ground they would say the same as I am about to say. There are sufficient aviation assets across the whole range of helicopter requirements to deliver the mission.112

97. The MoD told us that since November 2006, it has doubled the number of battlefield helicopters and increased the number of helicopter flying hours by 140 per cent (October 2010) – achieved through an increase in the number of aircraft and improved logistic support. Further helicopters have since been delivered to theatre.113 We are conscious that our predecessor Committee was told in previous inquiries that UK Forces have enough helicopters only to discover subsequently that this was not true. We are not convinced that UK Forces yet have access to sufficient helicopter hours. We recommend that, in response to this Report, the MoD set out how the new helicopters delivered into theatre have impacted on the availability of helicopter hours, any outstanding delivery of helicopters and how much reliance and use we are making of helicopters from the USA and other countries.

111 Q 195 112 Qq 184–187 113 Ev 183

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Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 98. Our predecessor Committee has raised concerns about the availability of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability. When we asked General Capewell about the availability of ISTAR he told us that the MoD was making substantial efforts to ensure that the ISTAR requirement was properly resourced and that the networks required to handle the increase in information and intelligence were also increasing. He also said that the intelligence architecture was properly centralised and controlled by the Americans as its capacity and technology was substantially greater than the sum of the other nations. He also told us that bandwidth was increasing but that it was never possible to have enough bandwidth.114 General Parker said that bandwidth had been an issue up to 2009:

There have been some remarkable advances. In 2009, when I came in, it was poor. I think we have shown a capacity to increase our bandwidth, thank goodness, which allows us to operate in a much more effective way. Fusing information in order to stay on top of it is critical. I believe that the culture of communication in my part of the Armed Forces is wrong. We have to take a very different approach to communication [...] and it is in that culture and that attitude, the willingness to use the sorts of technology that are available to allow us to communicate today, that we have to change the way we do our business.115

Force protection 99. The tactics and equipment required in any campaign are to some extent dictated by the methods of the enemy. General Jackson explained that the Taliban had moved from direct fighting to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which had changed the need for equipment:

[...] If you recall, in the first two summers the Taliban took us on, basically using fire and manoeuvre—small arms, basically—and each and every time, they were defeated tactically. We can discuss whether any operational-level progress had been made, but they were defeated tactically. It took them rather longer, looking back, than one might have expected, but they obviously thought very hard, particularly after the second summer, 2007, and said, “We’re not going to get anywhere taking on the British soldiers at what they do best; ergo we will find another way.” That brings us to the IED. That changes priorities on our side. Armoured vehicles suddenly go right up in terms of priority, because that is the way you protect the force. As I’ve already touched on, the dispersion put a greater premium on helicopters. Tactics and equipment will vary according to the operational circumstances. One has to respond. Ideally, you need to be one foot ahead, but that’s not always possible.116

114 Q 202 115 Q 270 116 Q 536

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100. General Capewell told us that the IED had become the weapon of choice for insurgents and terrorists globally and that the UK took the threat very seriously:

[...] I think it is also fair to say that it’s only in the last four or five years that we have institutionalised an approach to this internationally. I can give you an example: there is a counter-IED Task Force in NATO now. Each nation has a counter-IED Task Force. It is institutionalised across NATO and, particularly in the US and the UK, we have very regular sharing of expertise and technological exchange, which deals with this not only in a technological sense, but in an upstream threat sense— the intelligence required to deliver against this—as well as the defensive techniques required in theatre.

The Prime Minister announced £67 million in June [2010] for the counter-IED piece. £40 million of that has gone to EOD teams and the Mastiff vehicles. £11 million has gone to remote control vehicles and some of the residue has gone to military working dogs.117

101. We were told by the MoD that the Warthog, a tracked armoured vehicle which is better protected, was delivered into Afghanistan in 2011. The Warthog replaced the less capable Viking which had less capacity.118

102. We recognise that the Taliban continues to change its tactics and methods and that the extent of the use of IEDs has changed and developed since 2007. However, we believe that the MoD did not respond quickly enough to these challenges as they developed. We continue to be concerned about the time taken to get a suitably capable vehicle fleet into theatre. Protecting Armed Forces personnel is a critical duty of the MoD. We recommend, in its response to this Report, the MoD explains how current equipment levels are providing the Armed Forces with the necessary protected vehicles, body armour and counter-IED support. The MoD should prioritise the protection of personnel when considering the funding of such needs that emerge in the future.

103. The MoD told us that contractors provide valuable support to the Armed Forces on operations and that they have shown impressive resilience. Despite the reliance on contractors, the MoD does not collate figures on contractor injuries or fatalities.119 We recognise that civilian contractors provide valuable support to the MoD. We require that the MoD should monitor and report on casualties of contractors working on behalf of the UK Government.

Funding and costs of operations in Afghanistan 104. Conventionally, the financing of the additional costs of operations, including urgent operational requirements (UORs), has always been met by the Treasury from the General Reserve. In 2009–10, the MoD and the Treasury agreed that any expenditure above the estimate for UORs predicted before the start of the financial year would have to be repaid

117 Q 181 118 Ev 200 119 Ev 200

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to the Treasury two years later. The MoD did not overspend in 2009–10 and so need not repay any money in 2011–12.

105. In 2010–11, the MoD and the Treasury defined a new concept - urgent defence requirements (UDRs). The MoD told us that UDRs were requirements which met most of the UOR criteria but were not theatre specific and will have an enduring utility to Defence. It also told us there were no plans to extend the arrangements for UDRs into 2011–12. For 2010–11, the Treasury provided the MoD with £150 million for UDRs which it will have to repay in full in 2012–13. To date, the MoD has approved £53 million to be spent on upgrading Chinook helicopters, improving information and communications services and procuring additional surveillance and target acquisition equipment.120 It seems to us that the convention under which all additional costs of operations should be met from the Treasury reserve has been breached with the introduction of the concept of ‘urgent defence requirements’ and the requirement to pay back expenditure on UORs over the estimate. We recommend that the classification of UDRs be dropped permanently and that the MoD be not required to pay back expenditure on equipment needed on operations. We would like confirmation that all additional costs for Afghanistan are being met and will continue to be met from the General Reserve. We seek a similar confirmation for the costs of the Libya operation.

Financial cost of operations in Afghanistan 106. The MoD does not know the full financial cost of operations in Afghanistan. The additional costs of operations in Afghanistan such as required equipment, allowances and fuel are met from the Treasury Reserve. Other costs such as salaries and training are met from the MoD’s budget.

107. Expenditure on additional costs by year from the start of operations in 2001–02 to 2009–10 are set out in the table below. The MoD estimates that a further £4,436 million was spent in 2010–11 of which £1,496 million were capital costs. This brings the total estimated additional costs of operations in Afghanistan to 31 March 2011 to some £14 billion.121

120 Ev 206 121 Ev 179

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Table: Additional costs of Afghanistan since 2001–02 to 2009–10

2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008-09 2009–10 £m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m £m

Resource 187 236 36 58 148 560 1,071 1,655 2,330

Capital 34 75 10 9 51 178 433 968 1,491

Total 221 311 46 67 199 738 1,504 2,623 3,821

Source: MoD memorandum122

108. The MoD does not collate financial information by activity and, therefore, cannot accurately calculate the full costs of operations. However, we do not accept that it is not possible for the MoD to estimate the full costs of operations in Afghanistan. Whilst we recognise that the MoD cannot calculate accurately the full cost of operations, we nevertheless ask the MoD to provide us with a broad estimate of the total costs of operations in Afghanistan. We also ask the NAO to do a study into the level of costs of Afghanistan.

122 Ev 179

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4 Training of the Afghan National Security Forces

109. A critical component for a successful handover of security to the Afghan Government will be a well trained and prepared Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We recognise that considerable progress has been made in training the ANSF since the introduction of the NATO Training Mission in November 2009 following the adoption of the McChrystal Strategy. Much greater resource has been put into training the ANSF with 1,300 more trainers being provided by 32 countries. Another 17 nations are contributing supplies and other assets.

Afghan National Army 110. The number of recruits to the Afghan National Army (ANA) has increased. The ANA grew by 58 per cent from November 2009 to November 2010 to 137,000 but attrition rates [the proportion of those recruits leaving the Forces] are still high though decreasing. Retention levels of the ANA (that is those remaining in service) have been over 60 per cent since November 2009 peaking at 86 per cent in May 2010 and standing at 61 per cent in May 2011.123 General Richards told us that the recruitment and training of the ANA was going well, ahead of planned targets:

We are ensuring that the ANSF grows in the very aggressive time frame that an outstanding American General, Bill Caldwell, is leading on. [...] Bill has told me that the 31 March target for the ANA was a total of 155,000. On 31 March, the total was standing at 159,000, so it is ahead of its numbers [...]The police target was 122,000, and the total stood at 125,000 at the end of March. The targets for 31 October are 171,600 and 134,000 respectively, and [...] they are ahead of them.124

111. The composition of the ANSF needs, as far as possible, to reflect the composition of Afghan society. Southern Pashtuns are still underrepresented in both the ANA and the police although recruitment is targeted on increasing the number.125 The number of female recruits to the ANA is very small—approximately 30 a year—but increasing.126

112. On 5 July 2011, Prime Minister Cameron and President Karzai announced the creation of the Afghan National Officer Academy. The institution will be modelled on the UK army academy at Sandhurst and will aim to produce high quality platoon leaders. It will open its doors in 2013, and accept 1,350 recruits annually with some 120 UK military personnel involved in the training.127

123 Ev 202 124 Q 695 125 Qq 238, 695 126 Q 247 127 Prime Minister’s statement on Afghanistan 5 July 2011, www.Number10.gov.uk

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113. In addition to training the ANA to be competent fighting soldiers, the NATO Training Mission has started to train the ANA for support operations such as logistics.128 Brigadier Levey told us that the ANA was being trained in the laws of conflict, religious and cultural affairs, looking after civilians and the moral component. Leadership is an issue for the training of the ANA especially at NCO level.129

114. Literacy rates amongst recruits are still low for both the ANA and the ANP at some 14 per cent. Training of the ANSF has focused on improving the literacy of soldiers and the police to a basic level to improve the quality of the personnel and of their training.130

115. The Helmand Annual Review 2010 lists challenges in the ANA as “a lack of leadership across the chain of command, poor literacy levels, slow construction of improved facilities, difficulties resupplying and maintaining equipment, and limited support capabilities, including aviation, intelligence, counter-IED and medical facilities”.131 General Richards said that the jury was still out on whether it was possible to institutionalise the necessary qualities in the ANA to sustain it beyond 2014 but that General Caldwell and many British officers were aggressively pursuing that aim.132 Partnering with ISAF Forces is seen as a crucial element in preparing the ANSF to take over responsibility for security.

116. There have been significant improvements in the training of the ANA but there is much progress yet to be made before the ANA is ready to take over responsibility for security in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. We welcome General Richards’ assurance that the aim of a sustainable ANA is being aggressively pursued but the MoD must maintain its focus on training the ANA, in qualitative as well as quantitative terms.

Afghan National Police 117. There are five main pillars of the ANP:

x The Afghan Uniform Police provide community policing, traffic policing and the fire service;

x The Afghan National Civil Order Police provides civil order patrols, an anti-riot capability and a crisis or counter terror response capability within urban areas;

x The Afghan Border Police facilitates freedom of movement, encourages the development of commerce, prevents illegal border crossings and polices airport points of entry;

x The Afghan Anti-Crime Police provide specialist police expertise, counter terrorism, counternarcotics, Major Crime Task Force (governance and anti- corruption) and forensics; and

128 Q 245 129 Qq 242–243 130 Qq 154, 158, 245 131 Helmand Annual Review 2010, www.mod.uk/aboutdefence/corporatepublications 132 Q 694

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x The Ministry of the Interior enablers such as logistics, medical, training and education.133

In addition, in July 2010, the Afghan Government announced a new initiative agreed with General Petraeus to train and recruit some 10,000 personnel as local, community police separate from the ANP.

118. There has been increased training for many recruits to the various branches of the Afghan National Police (ANP) but attrition rates are still very high especially in the Civil Order Police.134 The various branches of the ANP stood at some 125,000 members in March 2011, ahead of the target of 122,000.135

119. The establishment of the Helmand Police Training Centre in 2010 and the Joint Security Academy Shoarb in early 2010 in Helmand has aided the training of the ANP – 2,700 police have attended the 8 week basic police training course. A training course for NCOs was held in Helmand for the first time in 30 years at the Helmand centre. 136 There are some 1,000 women in the police force and the Minister of the Interior has set a target of a total of 1,200 new women recruits a year.137

120. Lindy Cameron told us that she had seen an improvement in the behaviour of the police in Helmand albeit from a very low base:

[...] we are not going to be over-optimistic about this. We are starting from an extremely low base. Indeed, when I went to Helmand a year ago, one of my biggest concerns was actually the reputation of the police force at local level in areas like Marjah where, for example, the historic corruption of the police force was one of the reasons why that area turned to the Taliban in the first place.

You are talking about a slow-building confidence, but the fact is that people now see a police force that they have confidence in. They have confidence that they have been drug tested. They can have confidence that they have been trained in how to hold their weapons and in how to man a guard post effectively. There was a visible difference in the way that police behave. You were talking about a police training centre both in Lashkar Gah and the one in Camp Shurabak in a way that is slowly building people’s confidence. The reason why I am sure of that is, because when you talk to people in Marjah about what they want, they no longer say, “We want anybody but the local police force.” They say, “We want you to recruit and train police from our area who understand us.”138

121. The Helmand Annual Review 2010 states that “the lack of trained officers and poor literacy rates within the police inhibit the police’s transition from a paramilitary force into a police service that supports law enforcement”. It also states “the legacy of abusive and

133 Ev 203

134 Ev 202 135 Q 694 136 Q 158 137 Ev 202 138 Q 157

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corrupt police hinders efforts to improve the population’s perception of the police, although a survey noted a rise in public confidence in the police in the last quarter of 2010”.139

122. There is much progress yet to be made before the ANP is sufficiently reliable to take on its share of the responsibility for security by the end of 2014. The UK should continue to insist that the international coalition maintain the momentum on training the ANP and, in particular, on reducing the level of corruption in the ANP.

Afghan National Security Forces 123. One of the crucial components of transferring full responsibility for Afghanistan to the Afghan Government is the transfer of security to the ANSF as a whole including the ANA and the ANP. General Parker told us how important the relationship between the ANSF and the Government would be:

The general loyalty of the Afghan National Security Forces is something that we need to help. We need to nurture it. The relationships that the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior have with President Karzai and with that close-in group of people, the Cabinet, are something that we must not undermine. In my job, I was very conscious that one needed to sustain the confidence of the President and the Cabinet in his armed forces so that they felt that they were doing what was right for the country. We need to continue to do more to that so that the Security Forces have the confidence of the higher level of Government.140

124. General Parker also stressed the need to build capacity in the ANSF as well as its size and that the capabilities of the ANSF were still thin:

[...] The high-level point is that we have grown—we have done “growth”; what we have not done is “capacity”. Are we doing sufficient to build capacity inside that growth? Yes, we are starting to, but we are doing it in phases. We have a lot of what they call attrition. Now we are starting to build better offices, better schools, and better cycles, so that people come off the front line. All those things are being built and they will take time. You can build the number to 137,000 in the year, but have you got the capabilities? No, that is thin and we need to continue to build that.141

125. We recognise that much hard work has gone into the training and partnering with the ANSF, in particular, in enabling the physical and conceptual components of fighting power but we remain concerned that the training and development of what the British Army calls the moral component—leadership, discipline, culture, ethics and anti-corruption—is crucial to ensure the long term professional capability of the ANSF.

126. General William Caldwell, Commander of the NATO Training Mission believes that they will reach the target for the ANSF of 305,000 personnel and that the ANSF will be ready to take the lead for security by the end of 2014. The success of the transfer of

139 Helmand Annual Review 2010, www.mod.uk/aboutdefence/corporatepublications 140 Q 242 141 Q 244

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responsibility for security in the first seven areas will highlight outstanding issues and problems.142 We deal with transition arrangements in more detail in Part 6. We are of the opinion that the ANSF will require significant support after the transition. We await with interest the assessment of the success of the transition of the first seven areas, in particular that of Lashkar Gah.

142 Speech by Lieutenant General William B Caldwell, Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, at Chatham House on 12 April 2011, www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/1047/

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5 The impact on the civilian population

Civilian casualties 127. Air Marshal Peach and Karen Pierce both stressed how seriously the UK take any civilian casualties caused by the international coalition.143 The number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF Forces has decreased by 30 per cent from 2009 to 2010. The number of civilian casualties linked to anti-government forces increased by 53 per cent from 2009 to 2010. Insurgents were responsible for some 76 per cent of all civilian casualties. Overall, the number of civilian casualties has increased overall by 31 per cent due to the actions of insurgents.144

128. General Messenger said that some of the reduction in civilian casualties caused by ISAF resulted from greater rigour when using air-delivered weapons, including greater scrutiny and oversight.145 Lindy Cameron said that, in Helmand, Governor Mangal had very much welcomed General McChrystal’s increased focus on preventing civilian casualties.146

129. For the civilian population, any increase in civilian casualties, even caused by insurgents, undermines the confidence of the local population in the Afghan Government and NATO as they feel security is poor and the ANSF and ISAF are failing them. Colonel Langton pointed out that Afghans regard all civilian casualties, even those caused by the Taliban, as a failure of the international coalition:

General McChrystal’s declared aim of protecting the population, which is what he said, was welcomed by everybody. As General Messenger said, he put in place some fairly stringent rules of engagement—cutting down on the air power being used and so on. The trouble is that, in Afghanistan, a casualty caused by somebody in a foreign uniform, which includes the Afghan National Army, is 10 times worse than a suicide bomber from the Taliban, who actually gets some credibility because he is a martyr. Also, the Taliban are very quick to apologise when they get it wrong. That was brought out in a web message at the time of one particular disaster—I think it was in Kunduz—when civilians were killed by the Taliban’s own action. Basically, the message, as I understand it implied, “You can see that McChrystal’s strategy is failing because he isn’t protecting the population.” The message wasn’t so crude as to say, “We are still killing them,” but you get my message. Civilian casualties resonate in a much deeper way in Afghanistan, perhaps, than in many other conflicts with which we may all be familiar.147

130. We welcome the reduction in the number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF and ANSF Forces despite the increase in operational tempo. We recommend that UK

143 Q 152 144 UNAMA Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2010,unama.unmissions.org 145 Q 43 146 Q 151 147 Q 44

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Forces maintain their focus on reducing civilian casualties whether these are caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces or by the insurgents. We require that the MoD should monitor, or encourage NATO to monitor, civilian casualties caused by insurgents as well as those caused by ISAF or ANSF Forces.

Strategic Communications 131. The UK Armed Forces have yet to incorporate fully strategic communications and “information and influence” operations into their campaigns, although they have recognised that communication with the local population is crucial. The Armed Forces’ understanding of the Afghan people has improved but could still be better. The MoD provided us with some good examples of detailed analyses of elements of the Afghan population (commissioned by the USA) providing a rich contextual understanding of people in particular areas.148 We were also impressed by examples of how, as when Brigadier Mackay commanded the UK Forces in Helmand, the Armed Forces could work more extensively with the Arab media. Commander Tatham told us:

I think they [Taliban] had a very successful period between 2006 and 2008, when they were very proactive with the media. They had embeds from Muslim and Arab TV stations. They improved their web presence. There was a whole host of other measures that saw their message resonating more widely than it had before. However, looking back on that now, it was probably a bit of a blip. I don’t think their message has much resonance in the international community at all. We’re well aware of the inaccuracy and, to be honest, the downright lies that go into many of their press releases, certainly about Coalition casualties. But it’s important to distinguish between those who support and those who sympathise, and there is undoubtedly sympathy, particularly in the Muslim world, for some of the aspirations of the Taliban, if not their methods. I think it’s finely balanced. I think we are much more persuasive in our information campaign in the international community, but we have a cunning adversary who may yet bounce back.149

132. Commander Tatham told us that as yet the Armed Forces did not have a written doctrine for information and influence operations or the right training to support such operations although it was being looked at in the MoD.150

133. We recommend that the MoD ensure that information and influence operations are sufficiently resourced both in Afghanistan and in future operations. Influence operations in Afghanistan should make extensive use of the informative reports commissioned by the US Forces on the Afghan population in specific areas of the country. If no such reports are available for relevant areas, UK Armed Forces should commission reports independently.

134. Anecdotal evidence and some polling data suggest that most Afghan people, in areas of high insecurity, want, as priorities, safety for themselves and their families and the ability

148 Q 50 149 Q 34 150 Q 61

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to go about their normal lives. Over time, polling data has shown varying levels of confidence in security and the acceptance of international forces in Afghanistan with no consistent trends.151 Witnesses reported that the Afghan people did not trust the international coalition and were worried that the international community might abandon them, leaving them at the mercy of the Taliban. General Messenger said that more than 70 per cent of the population in Helmand were in areas where there was an improving security situation.152 Generally, polling data on the views of the Afghan people does not present a coherent picture over time although some indications are that the local population are seeing some improvement in security.

135. In trying to work closely with the local population, it is important for military personnel to be able to communicate directly with people rather than through an interpreter. This places a great deal of importance on acquiring the right language skills quickly.153 We recommend that the MoD put into place proper planning for language skills in theatre for future operations.

The work of the Provincial Reconstruction Team

Governance and justice 136. The Secretary of State said that improving governance was one of the three main challenges facing the coalition and the Government in Afghanistan. Governance was starting to improve at both the national and local levels. Part of the problem was a shortage of educated, capable Afghans.154 In some ways the coalition contributed to this shortage by employing many of the competent Afghans and paying them higher wages. The Secretary of State said that the coalition needed to work with the Afghan Government to provide three supportive pillars:

x a working judiciary and a concept of law which applies to the governing as well as the governed;

x economic liberty within a free market;

x a concept of rights.155

137. During our visit to Afghanistan, we were told that areas where civil justice had been weak or corrupt, the Afghan people turned to the Taliban to resolve disputes. The Secretary of State said that the rule of law was important as was getting the local population to use official sources for dispute resolution:

The importance of that process lies in denying the social space, if we might call it that, to the Taliban, because many people, especially in the South, were turning to the Taliban for simple dispute resolution and it was that role that was giving legitimacy

151 BBC/ABC/ARD polling data June 2011, www.bbc.co.uk 152 Q 49 153 Q 58 154 Q 309 155 Q 314

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to the Taliban. The 2010 Asia Foundation survey showed that 42% of people were now turning to the shura for resolution and 31% were taking disputes to local government institutions, such as the district authorities, which was certainly a change, because we know that those institutions were not there before. We were still seeing some 27% of people going to senior tribal figures. So there is definitely a shift going on.

However, I think that the important point is that there are alternatives to dispute resolution through the Taliban. That is the key and I am not sure that it really matters which of these methods has a relative position in the league, if you like. However, the fact is that we are squeezing the Taliban out and denying them the legitimacy and the space in which to operate.156

138. The MoD does not know how many Afghan people are now using the formal law sector rather than that of the Taliban because it had only recently started to track these sectors.157 Peter Watkins told us it was also important to build up the informal sector as well:

[...] If you look at surveys, such as the recent Asia Foundation survey, the majority of Afghans—40%—when they have a dispute or whatever, take it to a local shura; they don’t take it through the formal process. So we are trying to strengthen both of them. [...] The informal sector is very important as well and arguably more important and so the Provincial Reconstruction Team is helping to develop community councils and four community councils have now been set up.158

139. We asked General Richards about what the mass break-out from Kandahar prison in May 2011 said about the ability of the ANSF to secure prisons. He told us that the audacious break-in and break-out did not mean that the Afghan Government was useless and incapable. He said the Afghan Government had reassured the UK that lessons had been learned and that it would not happen again.159

140. Lindy Cameron, the former head of the PRT, told us that both security and governance in Helmand had improved:

[...] significantly improved for the better. When Governor Mangal arrived, there were district governors in six of the 14 districts of Helmand. There are now district governors in 12. There are four district community councils. If you look at Nad-e-Ali as a case study, participation in governance has gone up significantly. People now engage with the district community council and the district governor in a way that is a significant change even from when I arrived last July for my recce visit. I remember sitting in Nad-e-Ali for a security shura, listening to gunfire on the perimeter that was being held. I contrast that with walking into the district governor’s office now, looking at the row of offices where there are staff from various Government Ministries in a way [...] the like of which it had not seen in any other district in

156 Q 317 157 Q 317 158 Q 314 159 Q 698

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Afghanistan, let alone in Helmand. I think we’ve really helped Governor Mangal achieve the kind of district government and district community councils that have shown a significant improvement in governance in the last couple of years.160

141. We were told in Afghanistan that it was important to assist the Afghan Government to develop a functioning non-corrupt democratic system adapted to local conditions. On elections, General Messenger told us that the Parliamentary elections had been better than the previous Presidential ones:

[...] On the elections, there was a lot of negative reporting of the Presidential Elections last year, and we had the Parliamentary Elections most recently. Going back to your previous point, I am not saying that those were entirely without mishap and incident, but the elections and the process itself were planned and delivered by the Afghans. The security was planned and delivered by the Afghans, with the international community completely on the back seat ready to deploy should it be required, but it was not. Despite their best intentions, the Taliban were unable to influence the elections to any degree. [...] there were a greater number of incidents on the day of the elections, but they took place some distance away from the polling, and were unable to affect the conduct of the elections on the day. I am not saying that it was a perfectly delivered democratic event, but the view on the ground, of the Afghans, the international forces there and the independent international observers, was that there were positive things that came out of it and considerable grounds for optimism.161

142. Professor Farrell thought that corruption and criminal networks were still an important issue for ISAF:

The second issue is corruption and criminal networks. This is now a major theme for ISAF under General Petraeus. Corruption has been referred to by the other speakers, both political corruption at the national, provincial and district levels, and economic corruption, which is endemic in that part of the world—Pakistan is full of it. There is an issue there about how much corruption we can accept and how much is normal for a functioning system, as opposed to how much is actually causing Afghanistan to grind to a halt economically and politically. Criminal networks will be the big theme for ISAF’s new military plan. [...] The big focus going forward is on criminal networks and the challenges that that is going to present in protecting the population.162

143. Professor King said that any plans to tackle corruption had to be realistic and in line with the Afghan culture:

I emphasise strongly that the regime we should realistically be looking at in Afghanistan is one that may not be particularly palatable to us in the West, namely, a patrimony, in which kin and tribal relations determine appointments and people use their offices of state as benefices. However, if the right people are appointed and take

160 Q 118 161 Q 52 162 Q 67

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responsibility for their areas, there is nothing wrong with patrimonies. They can be stable. [...] We need to be very clear about what we mean by corruption and how that informs our planning and operations in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has always been a patrimonial society, and the patrimony that has been established there is substantially a response to our interventions and to the 30-year war. There is a level of activity within the nascent political regime that is emerging that is certainly corrupt by our standards, but it is seen as legitimate and proper by Afghans. There is another form of corruption that is certainly not seen as legitimate by local Afghans, [...]such as the political appropriation of certain kinds of offices and the appropriation of land. There are massive disputes and discontent about land ownership around Kandahar, where certain power brokers have just seized land by fiat.

Of course, that leads to questions of economic corruption, and this is where we need to be extremely careful, namely in the area of narcotics. We immediately associate narcotics with corruption, and there is undoubtedly an association between the Taliban and the insurgency and the narcotics industry. It is part of the nexus of that insurgency. However, the figures that we were working on down in Regional Command South for this year show that about 80% of the GDP of the South is based on narcotics. It is not an illegal, corrupt form of economic activity, ultimately, at that level; it is just economic activity. The point is that corruption affects us as westerners very severely, and in some cases it distorts what we are trying to achieve there.163

144. Karen Pierce told us that warlords had held sway over many districts in Afghanistan for a long time and that it would take a long time for corruption to fall although some improvements were starting to be seen.164

145. In his statement in Kabul on 5 July 2011, the UK Prime Minister said:

We’re not here to create a perfect democracy, we’re not here to create a perfect country, but we are doing great things here in Afghanistan in terms of their country, their schooling and everything else. We’re really here to try to make sure that their country can look after its own security and keep terrorists and terrorist training camps out of this country.165

146. We accept that it would not be possible, even were it desirable, to turn Afghanistan into the type of modern democracy to be seen in Europe. It would be preferable —and more likely to be successful—to build on local traditional structures which are accepted by the people of Afghanistan. These structures are not for ISAF to determine.

Relationship of the UK PRT with US and UK Forces 147. Lindy Cameron told us that the working relationship between the military and civilian personnel was working well:

163 Q 68 164 Qq 141–142 165 Prime Minister’s statement on Afghanistan 5 July 2011, www.Number10.gov.uk

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I have to say that it is extraordinary. I have never seen civilian-military co-operation work this well. I think that we’ve really got to a place where we’ve got the funding, staffing and the personal relationships right. I felt very supported by the whole range of Government Departments back here in Whitehall in my role inside the PRT, and equally by the military and civilians. We’ve evolved that relationship, so we have essentially gone from being a PRT that partners only a single British brigade to being a PRT that partners a divisional-level regional command led by General Mills. In a sense, the scale of the challenge has increased, but I think we’ve managed to maintain those excellent relationships. Fundamentally, if you look at how Operation Moshtarak played out, for example, I think that my military colleagues [...] felt that they were able to rely on a PRT that was able to both plan and deliver the civilian side of that operation very effectively.166

148. With the arrival of the US Marine Corps headquarters with its civilian side in 2010, it has been necessary to develop how civilians and the military work together. Lindy Cameron told us that it had been a challenge not being collocated with the military headquarters. She also told us that it had taken six months for them to arrive at a system that was operating well.167 The civilian-military relationship is focused on supporting the Afghan Government.168 We understand that the relationship between the UK PRT and the US Forces took some time to bed down and we commend all parties for making this work.

149. Lindy Cameron said that the PRT had sufficient resources and capabilities. During Operation Moshtarak, it was supplied with extra resources on request. It also had access to international funds and the US provided significant Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds and USAID money for work in Helmand.169

150. The UK-led Helmand PRT has been held up as a model of how a PRT can work. We commend the work of the PRT and the way in which civilian and military personnel have worked together. We also look to the MoD to continue to provide the appropriate resources and capabilities in support of the PRT and to prepare for a smooth transition in transferring PRT responsibilities to the Afghan authorities.

The role of women in Afghan society 151. We recognise that Afghanistan is a culturally conservative country and that Helmand is even more so. There have been some minor improvements in the role and status of women in some parts of Afghan society since the fall of the Taliban, due in part to the involvement and resources of the international community. Nevertheless, significant problems remain, particularly in the fields of health, education, employment, security and access to justice. If Afghanistan is to become a stable and even partially functioning society, it is vital that women are involved in the process and feel they have a stake in it. If, as feared, women are largely excluded from peace negotiations, coupled with the

166 Q 122 167 Q 132 168 Q 129 169 Qq 125–126

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re-engagement of the Taliban in government, then the progress made so far could easily unravel. UN Resolution 1325 requires that in all peace negotiations in regions affected by conflict, women’s voices must be heard to ensure the long-term stability of any negotiated settlement. Afghanistan is no different.

152. We were told that, within Helmand, the role women play in Lashkar Gah is different from that in Musa Qala which is much more conservative and a rural district. Lindy Cameron told us that improvement in security was a key thing for women much like everyone. She also told us that there had been a significant improvement from Taliban times. She illustrated this with the example on a meeting for international women’s day last year when 600 women gathered together in the provincial council building. She also told us that in terms of governance women were participating: two MPs, two provincial councillors; and five councillors on the community council in Gereshk.170

153. Karen Pierce, the UK Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, told us that there was still a long way to go but that the women’s voice was getting stronger. We were told that, at the May 2010 peace jirga, a high proportion of the provincial delegates were women. Initially there were tensions between the women and the mullahs which started to dissipate by the second day.171

154. The MoD wrote to us illustrating some of the ways in which life for women had changed in Afghanistan:

x In 2010–11, 5.7 million children were attending school regularly of whom 2.1 million were girls. 46 per cent of girls of primary school age are enrolled in school but this is still far behind the average of 83 per cent for South Asia.

x A quarter of the seats in the national assembly are held by women – 68 of 249 seats are reserved for women in the Lower House and 23 out of 103 in the Upper House and one women won an unreserved seat in the Lower House in 2010.

x A quarter of births are supervised by skilled birth attendants, up from 13 per cent in 2005. There has been an increase in the availability of antenatal care but the maternal mortality rate at 1,400 per 100,000 live births in 2008 is the highest in the world.172

155. However, other reports suggest that the role of women is not being developed satisfactorily. We have heard of some worrying examples such the Afghan Government taking over the running of domestic violence shelters. We recognise that progress in the development of the role of women is important to the evolution of a democratic state in Afghanistan even if the form of democracy it takes is one more suited to Afghan traditions than to Western models.

156. In October 2010, the Government issued a revised national action plan for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1325)

170 Qq 119–121 171 Q 148 172 Ev 197

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covering the subject of Women Peace and Security. The Plan incorporates commitments to improve the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in three main areas of activity:

National action

x Gender considerations will be incorporated into training on conflict in the FCO, DFID, the Stabilisation Unit and the MoD;

x Programmes to address conflict will consider the needs of women and girls;

x Gender considerations will be incorporated into core working practices on operations, for example, the deployment of female engagement officers in support of UK Forces, to improve military engagement with Afghan women;

On Afghanistan

x Actions to support Afghan women’s civil society organisations, the influence of Afghan women in public life and to enhance their protection through support to legal reforms and other programmes;

Multilateral action

x To provide political support through the UN Security Council;

x To provide political support for measures to incorporate UNSCR 1325 into the political and operational activities of the EU and NATO.

157. The MoD reports that, whilst Armed Forces personnel do not currently get training on UNSCR 1325, pre-deployment preparation does include training on the law of armed conflict which covers such aspects as the status of protected persons including women and children. The MoD is currently developing training in line with the commitments given in the national action plan on UNSCR 1352 described above.173 We do not think that the MoD has taken the needs of women in Afghanistan as seriously as it should. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government provide a progress report on the number of female engagement officers currently in Afghanistan and on the development of relevant pre-deployment training on cultural awareness including the role of women. We recommend that the MoD takes a more comprehensive view of the issues relating to women when it develops its training.

173 UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=211370682

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6 Transition and withdrawal

158. The Lisbon Summit in November 2011 declared that the ISAF mission in Afghanistan was NATO’s key priority. It confirmed that there would be a gradual process of transferring security responsibility for districts and provinces from ISAF Forces to those of the ANSF. This transition would begin in 2011 and would be conditions-based and that ISAF troops would remain in a supportive role in those areas where responsibility had been transferred. The transition to full responsibility for security across Afghanistan should be completed by the end of 2014.174

159. Following transition, the role of ISAF will then change to meet critical security, training and mentoring requirements. The international civilian effort including that of the PRTs will evolve and enable greater Afghan capacity and leadership.

160. President Karzai is adamant that the ANSF should assume security responsibility for Afghanistan by the end of 2014. He also expects that the responsibilities of the PRT will also be transferred to Afghan authorities by the end of 2014. On 22 March 2011, President Karzai announced that the seven districts and provinces which will begin the process of transition in July 2011. One of these seven is Lashkar Gah, Helmand.175

161. The UK Prime Minister has called for UK troops to be out of the combat role in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. He confirmed that this was a firm deadline after the Lisbon Summit. We feel that the following exchange between the Prime Minister and the Chair of the Defence Committee at the Liaison Committee sets out very clearly the Government’s position on withdrawal from Afghanistan:

Q126 Mr Arbuthnot: Prime Minister, can I come back to that plan B? Let’s suppose that the targets that President Karzai has set himself and the targets that we all want to see achieved are not achieved. Do we nevertheless withdraw combat troops from Afghanistan, come hell or high water?

Mr Cameron: I am not contemplating us not having a successful strategy, but I will be as clear as I possibly can. I said very clearly that I did not want us to have combat troops or troops in large numbers in Afghanistan by 2015 for a very good reason, which is this. We have been in Afghanistan since 2001. We have been in Helmand since 2006. Britain, by 2015, will have played a huge role, made a massive contribution, made massive sacrifices for a better, safer and stronger Afghanistan, and I think the British public deserve to know that there is an end point to this— there is a point at which we won’t be in a combat role or have large numbers of troops.

That is why I set the deadline of 2015; and yes, it is a deadline. I think deadlines sometimes help to focus minds: help to focus the mind of the Afghan Government that we have to make progress, help to focus the mind of the military planners to know that this cannot go on forever. In my judgment, that’s the right approach for

174 NATO Lisbon Summit declaration 2010 175 Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition , SN/1A/5851, House of Commons Library, June 2011

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the United Kingdom. We are five years away from that point. We have a huge amount of effort to give, and we will put our shoulders to the wheel. We are the second biggest troop contributor; we are making an extraordinary contribution to that country in all sorts of ways, including aid, as we’ve discussed. But I think the British public deserve to know that there is an end point to all this, it is 2015 and that’s clear.

Q127 Mr Arbuthnot: Why do you take this view in relation to Afghanistan when you didn’t take it in relation to Iraq?

Mr Cameron: I’m in the position now of taking responsibility for what we are doing in Afghanistan, and in the end you have to make a judgment, as Prime Minister, on what strategy you want to set and whether you want to set a time limit on it, and I’ve taken the decision that we should.

They are different situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think I’ve given a pretty clear answer. We’ve already been in Helmand for four years. By the time we are not in a combat role and with much reduced troop levels, it will be more like nine years. That is a massive contribution to the security of that country, and I think we should use the fact that we have given so much, spent so much and lost so much life to encourage others in NATO and our trusted partners to make sure that, even if they can’t be in a combat role, they are in that training mission, they are helping that country.

Let me just make one more thing clear. Yes, of course we won’t be in a combat role; we won’t have anything like the troops that we have now. But should Britain go on having a relationship with Afghanistan where we’re helping that country, helping train its military, helping support its Treasury, helping build its capacity? Yes. Because I think we learned the lesson in the past of walking away from Afghanistan. I’m not proposing that, but I think the British public deserve to know that our young men will not go on in the situation they are forever.

Q128 Mr Arbuthnot: So you said what you said in Canada in order to reassure the British public. Was there some pressure coming upon you from the British public to make such a statement?

Mr Cameron: No, it’s not that— This is what I feel, having looked at the defence arguments and the foreign policy arguments and the national security arguments, and wanting to take the country through what is a difficult time—we have suffered some great losses in Afghanistan—and wanting to make sure that we can take the country in the most united way we can through this situation, for our own national good, of what we’re doing in Afghanistan, and to take people with us. I think that is actually important.

Q129 Mr Arbuthnot: You will see the twinfold risk that we might be encouraging the Taliban to think that they can just wait us out, and that we might therefore be encouraging the local residents of Afghanistan to support the Taliban rather than us. That’s the first risk.

Mr Cameron: Absolutely. Can I answer that?

62 Operations in Afghanistan

Chair: Let’s take the two risks together.

Q130 Mr Arbuthnot: The second risk is that we leave Afghanistan and leave the job of combat troops to our allies, which is not, surely, in the British tradition.

Mr Cameron: Okay. Let me try to answer those as best I can. First, I think that setting a 2015 deadline rather takes the pressure off what I think other Governments have felt, which is, “I must insist on this many troops out by that month” or “that many troops out by that month.” That is actually a more dangerous situation to get yourself into, because this transition we want to see has got to be in respect of conditions based on the ground, and we mustn’t rush it; we’ve got to get it right. So I think it’s better to set a later, firmer deadline than to try to set too many individual deadlines before.

Mr Arbuthnot: I like the notion of “conditions based”.

Mr Cameron: This is five years we are talking, effectively—well, four years. But it’s a long period of time.

Secondly, on leaving Afghanistan, what I would say is this. We have over 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. We have been in the toughest part of the country for the longest period of time. When you look at the price we’ve paid and the casualties that we’ve taken, I think we can hold our heads up high in NATO and say that we have played a huge part in trying to get this country to a better place. I think other NATO members respect and understand that and I am extraordinarily proud of what our troops have done. It’s been incredibly tough.

What I have tried to do is first of all make sure that in the mission we are involved in, we have a proper spread of troops to deliver that mission. That is why I was absolutely clear we had to come out of Sangin. We were overstretched. As well as 10,000 UK troops, there were 20,000 US troops. I wanted to make sure we were covering an appropriate amount of ground so we could deliver the job and do it properly. We have served magnificently in Sangin. Incredibly brave people did extraordinary things in that town. I have been there and seen it for myself. But I think it was right to make the decision to say, “Let us focus on Central Helmand, where we have enough troops to do the job properly, to deliver the effect on the ground,” and that is now happening. I am confident that was absolutely the right decision that I insisted was taken. That’s the first point.

The second point is, it will be a serious amount of time that we will have been there, and I think we can hold our heads up high and say we have played our role absolutely to the full and we can be proud right now of what we have done, irrespective of what we will continue to do over the next few years.

Mr Arbuthnot: With that I agree.176

162. When asked about the risks of making an announcement of such a firm date for withdrawal, Peter Watkins told us:

176 Oral evidence taken before the Liaison Committee on 18 November 2010 , HC (2010–12) 608-i, Qq 126–130

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There are both benefits and risks in doing that. One of the benefits has been that it has been quite widely welcomed by the Afghans themselves. They want to take over the lead role for security in their own country and have reacted quite positively to the 2015 date. As I said, that is simply the year after the end of 2014, which is the date that they themselves were intimately involved in agreeing. [...]

The risk is, of course, that that date might be misinterpreted by the Taliban and they might imagine that it means that the international community will leave, but of course that is not the case. As the Prime Minister, President Obama and the Secretary-General of NATO have said, we are not just going to leave. ISAF will retain—the countries of the Coalition will retain—Forces and other capabilities in Afghanistan to support the Afghans.177

163. Karen Pierce said:

[...] It would be for Ministers, not for me, to answer what might happen in the event of a situation being X or Y in 2015. What I was trying to do [...] is simply say that it is conceivable that there is one scenario in which a part of Afghanistan still requires ISAF combat assistance, and that that assistance would be provided. It does not automatically mean it has to be provided by Britain, but this is really a question that Ministers could only properly consider at the point at which it was a live question. I don’t want to give the impression that we would withdraw and leave our allies in the lurch. That’s not what I’m trying to do.178

164. When asked if the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan Forces was possible by the end of 2014, General Parker told us that it was a reasonable order to give the military but that the situation is dynamic:

I think that is an entirely reasonable order to give to the military. The resources and the plan are there. We will have to manage a whole series of risks, and we should be planning to do so, but we should stay on the balls of our feet to deal with the unexpected.179

Because I feel that with the plan that McChrystal brought in, that catalyst for progress injected something into this campaign that is starting to develop momentum and cautious optimism. It is entirely reasonable for our political masters to turn round to the Coalition and say, “Do it by 2015.” I think that time frame is entirely reasonable, even with those challenges that you talk about. I am talking about out-of-combat operations, because that is what I read in the instruction.180

165. We asked General Parker when will ISAF be able to withdraw, he told us:

That I can’t answer. I am saying as a military man that it is entirely reasonable to be told to plan to get out of combat operations by 2014 or 2015. That is an entirely

177 Q 215 178 Q 223 179 Q 272 180 Q 273

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reasonable ask, and if we cannot do so we should pull our finger out. The situation is very dynamic, however, and we need to stay prepared to react. We need to continue to plan for contingencies that are unforeseen now.181

He also told us that there was still a debate to be had about how much the UK would need to help to sustain the institutional capacity of the Armed Forces.182

166. In May 2011, the Prime Minister announced the withdrawal of 400 troops from Afghanistan by 2012.183 There are currently some 90,000 US troops in Afghanistan. President Obama announced in June 2011 that 10,000 US troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan this year and another 23,000 by the end of September 2012.184 In response, the Prime Minister said that he welcomed the announcement to draw down the US troop surge from Afghanistan:

The surge by the US and international partners, supported by an increase in the number of Afghan Army and Police, has reversed the momentum of the insurgency and created the right conditions for security responsibility to begin to transfer to the Afghans from July.

We will keep UK force levels in Afghanistan under constant review. I have already said there will be no UK troops in combat roles in Afghanistan by 2015 and, where conditions on the ground allow, it is right to bring troops home sooner.185

167. We were told that PJHQ is working on the transition plan for UK Forces and we assume that the MoD will be working with the FCO, DFID and others to prepare a Government wide plan.186 The Chief of Defence Staff has continued to say that any drawdown should be subject to conditions on the ground.

168. Professor Farrell told us that too steep a withdrawal would reduce confidence in Afghanistan.187 It appears to us that the steepness of the withdrawal of combat troops will be more of a problem than the final date for the withdrawal. On 6 July 2011, the Prime Minister announced the withdrawal of 426 UK military personnel by February 2012 and a further 500 reducing the Force from 9,500 to 9,000 by the end of 2012.188 In June 2011, the US President announced the withdrawal of 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and a further 23,000 by the end of September 2012.189 We are concerned that, as any refocusing of US Forces is planned, any redeployments should be properly sequenced with UK planning for the withdrawal of UK Forces in the South of Afghanistan, and that UK Forces are not left exposed.

181 Q 274 182 Q 273 183 MoD press release 18 May 2011 183 Statement by President Obama 23 June 2011, www.whitehouse.gov 185 MoD press release 23 June 2011 186 Q 207 187 Q 110 188 HC Deb, 6 July 2011, cols 1511–1514 189 Statement by President Obama 23 June 2011, www.whitehouse.gov

Operations in Afghanistan 65

169. The Government’s room for manoeuvre regarding the number of troops that could be withdrawn from Afghanistan as part of an immediate transition is necessarily limited. The withdrawal of a few hundred troops in support roles is feasible and would not significantly affect the combat capability of those remaining. A more significant drawdown, however, would have to involve a complete battle group. Weakening any battle group to withdraw numbers would be a dangerous move. A troop withdrawal that involved numbers in the low thousands, therefore, would depend on a geographical reorganisation of the battle groups and the withdrawal from combat duties of at least one of them.

170. We believe that the NATO ISAF “conditions-based approach” to withdrawal is a suitable one. Withdrawal must have due regard to the circumstances at the time. There are still many challenges facing the ANSF and Afghan Government before proper transition can take place.

171. While we recognise that the Government believes that the UK public would like certainty as to when UK Forces will be out of danger, we also recognise that some level of uncertainty is inevitable. It is important that the Government’s clear determination to withdraw combat forces should not undermine the military strategy by causing the Afghan population to fear that the international coalition might abandon them or by allowing the Taliban and others to think that all they have to do is bide their time until ISAF Forces withdraw.

172. We recognise that much progress has been made towards the development of governance arrangements but have yet to be convinced that the arrangements are sufficiently robust, transparent or accountable in terms of their capacity to take on the full range of responsibilities that will fall to them after 2014. Added to this is the uncertainty as to how these governance arrangements will develop following the end of the second constitutional term of President Karzai. It is essential that a comprehensive approach is taken to the transitional arrangements that will need to be put in place leading up to 2014 and beyond. UK Government Departments other than the MoD will also have a part to play in helping to build the capacity necessary to ensure that stability is maintained under Afghan control. We have seen some evidence of such a comprehensive approach but feel that more emphasis needs to be placed on capacity building within the political system if long-term success is to be achieved.

173. We expect the Government to set out in a timely fashion, the milestones it expects to reach and the progress it expects to make against them as 2014 approaches. We will continue to scrutinise closely developments in Afghanistan.

66 Operations in Afghanistan

Formal Minutes

WEDNESDAY 6 JULY 2011

AFTERNOON SITTING

Members present:

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr Julian Brazier Sandra Osborne Thomas Docherty Bob Stewart Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Gisela Stuart John Glen Mr Dai Havard

Draft Report (Operations in Afghanistan), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 173 read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report with written evidence reported and ordered to be published on 26 October.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 13 July at 10.30 a.m.

Operations in Afghanistan 67

Witnesses

Tuesday 26 October 2010 Page

Nick Gurr, Director, Media and Communications, Major General Gordon Messenger DSO and Bar, OBE, Strategic Communications Officer, Commander Stephen Tatham, formerly of the Defence Academy’s Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Ministry of Defence, Matt Tee, Permanent Secretary for Government Communications, Cabinet Office, and Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton. Ev 1

Wednesday 3 November 2010

Professor Theo Farrell, King’s College London, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE, and Professor Anthony King, Exeter University. Ev 14

Wednesday 10 November 2010

Lindy Cameron OBE, former Head of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand, Karen Pierce CMG, Director for South Asia and Afghanistan and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Major General David Capewell OBE, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations), Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Chief of Joint Operations, and Peter Watkins, Director of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence. Ev 32

Wednesday 17 November 2010

Brigadier Simon Levey, Director Royal Armoured Corps and formerly part of the NATO training mission in Afghanistan, and General Sir Nick Parker, Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, and former ISAF Deputy Commander, Ministry of Defence. Ev 53

General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb KBE CMG DSO. Ev 62

Wednesday 15 December 2010

Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Chief of Joint Operations PJHQ (UK), and Peter Watkins, Director, Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence. Ev 71

Tuesday 8 February 2011

General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid. Ev 86

Tuesday 15 March 2011

Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler. Ev 102

General (Rtd) Sir Mike Jackson. Ev 111

68 Operations in Afghanistan

Tuesday 29 March 2011

Lord Browne of Ladyton. Ev 118

Wednesday 4 May 2011

Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC, former Chief of the Defence Staff. Ev 129

Wednesday 11 May 2011

General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen, Chief of the General Staff, and General Sir Nicholas Houghton KCB CBE ADC Gen, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. Ev 142

List of printed written evidence

1 Ministry of Defence Ev 154

List of additional written evidence

(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/defcom)

1 Oxford Research Group Ev w1 2 British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group Ev w6 3 Henry Jackson Society Ev w16 4 The Boeing Company Ev w21 5 Professor Anthony King Ev w23

Operations in Afghanistan 69

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2010–12 First Special Report The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not HC 347 just to win but to make a better peace: Government response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2009–10 Second Special Report The contribution of ISTAR to operations: Government HC 346 response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2009–10 Third Special Report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts HC 353 2008–09: Government response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2009–10 First Report The Strategic Defence and Security Review HC 345 (HC 638) Fifth Special Report Defence Equipment 2010: Further Government HC 898 Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2009–10 Second Report and Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic HC 686 First Joint Report Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Report for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation Third Report The Performance of the Ministry of Defence 2009–10 HC 760

Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 1

Oral evidence

Taken before the Defence Committee on Tuesday 26 October 2010

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Mrs Madeleine Moon John Glen Bob Stewart Mr Mike Hancock ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Nick Gurr, Director, Media and Communications, Ministry of Defence, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, DSO and Bar, OBE, Strategic Communications Officer, Ministry of Defence, Commander Stephen Tatham, formerly of the Defence Academy’s Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Ministry of Defence and Matt Tee, Permanent Secretary for Government Communications, Cabinet Office gave evidence.

Q1 Chair: Welcome to the Committee’s inquiry into this—so that the Afghan economy can grow in some Operations in Afghanistan. The purpose of this kind of space. particular evidence session is mostly to look at the issue of strategic communications, but could you Q3 Chair: General Messenger, is that fair? begin by introducing yourselves. I say, “Welcome Major General Messenger: That’s at the heart of it. back,” to some of you; I am welcoming some of you This is all about developing the Afghan Government to the Defence Committee for the first time, and I and the Afghan Security Forces to a point where they hope that it won’t be too traumatic an experience. can take over their own security challenges. The Colonel Langton: I am Christopher Langton, and I business of building the capacity of the Afghan am an independent conflict research analyst, formerly National Security Force and the Afghan Government at IISS. I am formerly of the British Army. is utterly at the heart of it. Commander Tatham: Steve Tatham. I am a What we are seeing at the moment in theatre is a more Commander in the Royal Navy and former senior positive picture than we have seen for a while, which research fellow and director of advanced is a result of the fact that, for the first time, we are communication research at the UK Defence seeing enough resources in place that match the Academy’s now defunct advanced research and security and other challenges that we face, and they assessment group. have been there long enough to have an effect. This Major General Messenger: Gordon Messenger. I am isn’t just about Helmand, it is about the whole of CDS’s Strategic Communication Officer with a dual Afghanistan, but in places like Helmand, which is as remit of being the principal media spokesman on bad as it gets in terms of security across Afghanistan, Afghanistan and other operations and also attempting we are starting to see far more positive indicators of to improve the awareness of the British public of both progress at the tactical level. the strategic rationale for our engagement in We are seeing good Afghan governors getting out and Afghanistan and some of the realities of what is connecting with their people, which is starting to have happening over there. an effect on the allegiance of the population. We are Nick Gurr: Nick Gurr. I am the Director of Media starting to see a much more impressive performance and Communications in the Ministry of Defence, and by the Afghan National Army, and actually better than I am responsible for the strategy and policy around all is often reported from the Afghan National Police. Defence communications. Although no one would pretend that they are at the Matt Tee: Matt Tee. I am the Permanent Secretary for same level as the National Army. That combination of Government Communications. I work at the Cabinet resources, both ISAF and ANSF, and time is having Office co-ordinating issues, particularly those that are an effect at the tactical and operational levels. cross-Government or cross-departmental, and I take a role on Afghanistan in that way. Q4 Chair: Colonel Langton, would you agree with that? Q2 Chair: May I begin with you, Colonel Langton? Colonel Langton: I certainly wouldn’t disagree. The What is the current state of operations in Afghanistan? only thing to say is to point out that there have been Colonel Langton: As an outsider looking in, so to some fairly erudite commentators and organisations1 speak, not being on operations in Afghanistan or in that have questioned the metrics that noted the the MoD, it would seem as if British Forces are, in capabilities of the Afghan National Army as being effect, holding the line in order that Afghan National over-exaggerated. On the other hand, General Security Force capability can be built behind that line Messenger’s point about the police is very relevant. to enable us, at some point, to exit and to stop fighting, but also, critically—we don’t really hear much about 1 Note by witness: Such as the International Crisis Group. Ev 2 Defence Committee: Evidence

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee

This is a very brave body of people who have suffered the need for a surge and focused that surge into the more casualties than any other. It is a little bit of a South, and that a large proportion of the uplift in mixed picture, but I would raise the flag of caution Afghan National Security Forces has also been over metrics. directed to the South is an indication of a realisation that the scale of the challenge was not matched at that Q5 Mr Brazier: Could you just repeat that? You said time by the resources allocated to it. “raise the flag of caution.” Chair: I’ll tell you the problem that I am trying to get Colonel Langton: Over judging capability using the to, which is that you are an immensely reassuring metrics, which are used to judge capability principally man. You are being very reassuring today, and we are by the Americans, but also by NATO.2 getting things right now, but it would be more reassuring if you had told us 18 months ago that we Q6 Mrs Moon: General Messenger, when you were were getting things wrong, and I cannot remember commanding the Forces in Afghanistan, did you your doing so. identify key areas where change was needed? If so, Major General Messenger: I don’t remember when I why were the changes needed, what were they and last appeared in front of the Committee. I don’t recall were they actually implemented? being asked that question. If you are talking about my Major General Messenger: I came back in April ’09, post-tour report including the fact that the resourcing so we’re about 18 months since then. At the time, of the campaign in the South did not match the insufficient resources were being allocated to the challenge that was faced— challenge in Southern Afghanistan. I commanded a Chair: Actually, it is not really about you. It is about brigade, alongside an Afghan brigade commander, what we always have from you immensely reassuring that was stretched and not able to go to certain key military chaps. areas where we knew we would ultimately have to go Major General Messenger: Okay, let me try to put it to secure the population. What has happened since has in a slightly different way. I think it is absolutely the been an enormous inflow, principally American but business of military commanders on the ground to also from other NATO nations, and a huge upsurge look at the resources that they are allocated, prioritise in the number of Afghan National Army and Afghan those resources and deliver the most important National Police who are in the line providing that elements of the campaign. That may mean that there security. are parts of the approach that we may understand need We have a situation now—forgive me for to be done at some point, but we choose not to do concentrating on Helmand, but it is something that because we do not have the resources to do them. A is reflected more widely—in which the key areas of good example would be the area of Marjah, about population in Helmand are now secured. They are at which you have heard a lot. We have known for some varying levels of security depending on how long that time that Marjah in Helmand was a bad area. If we security has been in place, but there is sufficient force were going to go into that area, we would need to do density allocated to the key areas of population, and so with sufficient resource to clear it out, but critically we are seeing things improving in a way in which we with enough resource to remain in place afterwards. would have assumed they would 18 months ago. That did not exist, and, therefore, we did not go into You asked about the things that I highlighted. In no Marjah. What I did in my time in Marjah was deal way was I the only one to highlight this. There are with Marjah in a different way by trying to contain the two key areas in the preparation of our people. The enemy in that area so that they did not feel inclined to first is the degree to which we culturally attune our export violence into the key areas of Lashkar Gah, people, and the second is the degree to which we Gereshk and elsewhere. Does that mean that I was concentrated on judgmental training of our individuals under-resourced for the totality of the challenge that rather than focusing simply on their ability to fight. I was faced? Yes. Did that mean that I was would not suggest for a second that it was the reports overstretched and putting my people in unnecessarily from me that generated a change, but what we have stretched and dangerous positions? I am not sure I seen over the past 18 months is a real emphasis on was. improving the cultural awareness of our people before they go, and building, down to the very lowest level, Q8 Mr Hancock: But General, that’s not really fair an ability to understand the importance of the lethal to us, because we’ve been told by successive force that such people have at their disposal, and to Secretaries of State that when the Commanders asked understand the dangers of miscalculation of the lethal for it, they got what they wanted, whether that was force. That is something that is inculcated at a much equipment or manpower. If what you are saying is deeper and lower level than perhaps it was in my time. true, I can’t understand why it took us so long to realise that we were so badly off, personnel-wise and Q7 Chair: You said that 18 months ago we were that the only way we were going to deal with it was under-resourced. Do you remember telling us that? by having an enormous surge from the Americans. Major General Messenger: I wouldn’t view this as a Why was it that Secretaries of State could come to national issue. I think there was under-resourcing Parliament and say, “Commanders have got more broadly in the South at that stage. This was pre everything they’ve asked for” and yet you are telling US surge. The fact that NATO commanders identified us that that wasn’t the case? 2 Note by witness: The metrics are known as Capability Major General Messenger: I am viewing this as a Milestones (CM). NATO Commander on the ground with a NATO Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 3

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee command chain above me. It was the decision and perfectly proper military determination and optimism the assessment of NATO Commanders that the area in in the evidence that we get. Now, let us move on to Southern Afghanistan required more resource and that strategic communications. is what has been forthcoming subsequently. Q14 Mr Hancock: This is to you, General and to Q9 Mr Hancock: But it took a long time for that you Mr Gurr and possibly to your Cabinet colleague. realisation to sink in. You were there 18 months ago It is about the comprehensive communications and the General before you were saying virtually the strategy for Afghanistan. Is there one? Has it been same thing. Why did it take so long for the NATO agreed through Government Departments here? Has it chain of command to realise that we were not going been agreed with our NATO allies? How does it to get anywhere in Helmand with the present force operate? levels that we had? Nick Gurr: Shall I speak on behalf of the Ministry of Major General Messenger: I don’t think I’m well Defence? I think Mr Tee will cover the cross- placed to answer that. We have to place those Government element. We do have such a strategy. decisions in the context of the Iraq commitment, There have been a few since 2006. The difference which was still large at that time, and the ability of between the one that we’re working to now and those every nation to generate forces in order to commit to that went before it is that previously we looked at Afghanistan. It is not for me to second-guess the communications very much in the context of what the decision making that went on in Brussels or military and the Ministry of Defence were trying to Washington, but I do know that the subsequent surge do, particularly in Helmand. More recently, with the was a result of an acknowledgment of the need for current strategy—I’d be very happy to pass a copy to more forces in the South if we were to go and secure the Committee—this very much sits under and the key areas of population. supports a cross-HMG strategy, seeks to deliver what that requires it to deliver, and also has been closely Q10 Mr Hancock: That is what we were sent in for staffed in consultation, as you say, with NATO and in the first place. When the Secretary of State came ISAF. The version that we’re working to at the here to tell us that we were going to Helmand, the idea moment was agreed by the Chief of the Defence Staff was that we were going there for that sole purpose. and the Permanent Secretary in November last year. Major General Messenger: To secure key areas of It’s in the process of being revised at the moment, but population. Absolutely. yes, we do have a comprehensive strategy. Mr Hancock: Yes, and it was hopelessly under- Matt Tee: If I might pick up on that, I think one of resourced and that was on day one. Can I ask you— the lessons for us on communications around Chair: Before you do, Julian Brazier has a question. Afghanistan is the importance of recognising, in the communications strategy, the overall strategy for the Q11 Mr Brazier: I wondered whether Colonel mission. That means not only reflecting progress on Langton had a comment on this. the military mission but also looking at the Colonel Langton: This is an observation, rather than governance piece and at the development piece as a result of any direct experience of what General well. Part of what I look to do in the wider strategy is Messenger is talking about. At the time General to bring together the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Messenger was there and until quite recently, the Office and the Department for International NATO Command Structure—or NATO-led ISAF Development in order to get a rounded Command Structure—across Afghanistan was communications strategy on the whole of the UK’s structured in such a way that reinforcements within mission in Afghanistan. Afghanistan could not be moved from one portion of the territory to the other due to home-grown political Q15 Mr Hancock: Do you think that President limitations back in Europe, principally. With the Iraq Karzai is the biggest impediment you’ve got in operations still going on, it was virtually impossible at dealing with the public here and around the world? the time, from my academic point of view, to reinforce Matt Tee: There are a number of challenges in the British Forces in the way that perhaps you are communications strategy. I wouldn’t single out a indicating should have happened. particular one, but I think it is clearly important within the success of the mission in Afghanistan that the Q12 Mr Hancock: Not even by the Americans? Afghans are able to take responsibility for their own Colonel Langton: The Americans had their own security and their own governance. That’s the way that operations. They were still heavily involved in Iraq. the ISAF mission runs. Within that, it is clearly Politically it would have been quite difficult for them important that the governance mechanisms in to say, “Right. We need to send more people to help Afghanistan, including the national Government, are the Brits,” in an area where the Americans were fit to take on those sorts of roles. already the only presence before the Brits got there. Q16 Mr Hancock: But if you hear what’s going on Q13 Mr Hancock: So you could say that this is three at the present time, how do you think the British years’ lost opportunity. public react to knowing that, while their sons and Colonel Langton: Yes. daughters are putting their lives on the line in Chair: The purpose of my asking these questions is Afghanistan, Iran is supplying Karzai and his crew to work out the extent to which we need to discount with bags of money one day, followed very closely by Ev 4 Defence Committee: Evidence

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee the Americans turning up with plastic bags of money Q19 Chair: Are you able to say what question was the next day? To most reasonable people in the United asked? Kingdom and, I would suggest, throughout Europe, Nick Gurr: The question was whether the people that’s a pretty corrupt way of doing business. We don’t asked supported the presence of the British Armed know where that money ends up, but it could end up Forces in Afghanistan. in the hands of the Taliban, arming them to fight the Opposition has also gone up, it’s fair to say, from 37% very people whose lives are on the line and who are in September 2006 to 41% in the March survey. It has out there on our behalf. What’s the spin that you gone up, but not by as much. The number of people would have to put on that to say that we are doing the who feel they know at least a fair amount about why right thing by supporting such a regime? we’re in Afghanistan has more or less doubled—going Matt Tee: Others may wish to pick up on this, but I from 29% in September 2006 to 50% in March. The wouldn’t see putting spin on something as my job. I number of people who agree with the proposition that think my job is to help the Government to the UK Armed Forces presence in Afghanistan and stopping the Taliban from returning to control helps communicate what they are trying to achieve. To play to make the UK a safer place has increased from into your point about the British public, I don’t think 24%—the first time we asked in early 2007—to 53% the British public think that the mission in in the last poll. That’s perhaps part of the answer to Afghanistan is an easy one. I also think the British the question you’re putting to Mr Tee. public don’t believe that what we’re trying to create in I would try and explain this by saying we’re there for Afghanistan is some sort of pure western democracy. I our own national security interests rather than to think the British people have a sense of realism about support a particular individual. what is achievable. Q20 Mr Hancock: Have either of you tried to find Q17 Mr Hancock: If you were advising a senior out today whether we’ve passed money over in plastic Minister today—maybe even the Prime Minister— bags? That would be a good journalist’s question to who had to react to this, what would your advice be ask you two, wouldn’t it? If the Americans and on somebody receiving bags full of cash, especially Iranians have done it, have the British done it? coming from the Iranians, who haven’t been Nick Gurr: Certainly not that I am aware of. particularly helpful, while saying this is a transparent way of doing business? Q21 Mr Hancock: Have you had a quick look round Matt Tee: What I would say to the Prime Minister is to see if that question’s come in? I’m amazed if you that we have a clear strategy for what we’re trying to haven’t been asked that question. Okay. achieve in Afghanistan, and sometimes things happen Would anyone like to add to that? You’ve both had that make that strategy a bit more difficult to achieve. first-hand experience of talking to the public on this But the strategy itself, I think, is the right strategy, issue. and we should persevere with it. Major General Messenger: I think that we have achieved a better awareness of what is happening in Q18 Mr Hancock: In that case, can you—maybe all Afghanistan and, perhaps to a lesser degree, why of you—tell us your assessment of how well the we’re there. I think that what should be seen as our British population understand what’s happening in main challenge as a Department, and as a cross- governmental effort, is to allow people to make up Afghanistan? How clearly do they know the reasons their minds by giving them better information, rather why the Armed Forces are deployed there? Once than to have uneducated opinions. again, drawing on the last two days’ experience, In the same way that I never crow about good polling, where it’s common practice for the Iranians to give I certainly don’t get too distracted by bad polling. I’m bags of money, and the Americans have now had to not going to get over-obsessed with it, but it is admit that they’ve done the same, that really doesn’t important that we do all we can, and continue to do go down well. so, to inform the public better so they can make up Nick Gurr: Let me have a go, Mr Hancock. We have their own minds. done some polling on this, going back to 2006, asking Mr Hancock: You answered my second two questions about how aware people are of what we are questions, which were about polling and what change doing in Afghanistan, why we are there and whether there has been. That’s helpful. Is it possible for us to they support it. That polling has been done on behalf have that in detail— of the Ministry of Defence by Ipsos MORI. It is not Major General Messenger: Yes. something we do directly ourselves. The results are Mr Hancock: Because other questions might be of quite interesting and, in some respects, given what one some interest. sees in the media at times, a little surprising. In terms of the support for the Armed Forces presence Q22 Chair: Before you move off that point, how in Afghanistan, back in September 2006 this polling often do you do this polling? showed that 43% of the British public were Nick Gurr: We were doing it twice a year, Chairman, supportive. The last round of polling that we did, but we’ve just gone down to once a year of late. albeit some months ago now, in March this year, There’s also other polling done by the Cabinet Office. showed that 52% support it. So it’s gone up during But I’m sure there will be no difficulty giving it to that period. you. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 5

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee

Q23 Mr Hancock: My final question is to you, send out very good signals, does it? It certainly does General, because your task now is to promote our not go down well with our European allies. You only activities in Afghanistan to the British public, as well have to read and understand what Holland and as elsewhere. What’s your current plan for Germany say about their wish to get out, because they communicating that? do not want to be sitting around with this guy virtually Major General Messenger: Our current plan is our taking the mickey out of them. plan and I am but one part of it, so on that point I Major General Messenger: All I would say is that at may lean heavily on the gentleman to my right. Our every level—I will just reiterate—for every bad news plan has a variety of themes and channels. The key story, for every event that might run counter to what themes are that our efforts there are seen very much we would wish, I could present 10 that portray a more in the context of the international coalition. It’s fair to positive story. say that in the past it has been portrayed and viewed as too much of a national effort and the fact that we Q26 Mr Hancock: From the Government of are one of 47 nations has been underplayed. Also, to Afghanistan? a degree, using Helmand as the lens through which Major General Messenger: It is as true in Kabul as it the British public look at Afghanistan has not always is in Helmand. I have rather hogged that question. been helpful. As we have said several times, Helmand Nick Gurr: I want to say a little more, briefly, about is the worst Province in Afghanistan in terms of levels the sorts of thing that we are trying to do to of insecurity and it is not representative of the vast communicate with the British public. majority of the country, which has much lower levels of insecurity. There are many areas that I would Q27 Chair: You helpfully sent us a memorandum equate to south Asian normality. Those are two key beforehand, which contains what you are offering us. themes. Balanced against that, it is important that we There is no need to go into, for example, the cross- continue to show the British public what a strong, Government approach in paragraph 28(1). powerful, good and sensitive job our soldiers and Nick Gurr: I was thinking more in terms of it ranging civilians are doing over there. The British public are from making sure that we have the right people with receptive to that and respond very well to it. the right training in jobs.

Q24 Chair: One of the problems with colourful Q28 Chair: We will come back to that issue later. issues, such as bags of money, is that they tend to Nick Gurr: It runs right the way through to having a obscure that particular point. single cross-Government narrative, to ensuring that Major General Messenger: That is a really good we do not start the clock again every time a new point. I will expand on it and then hand over to the brigade deploys. We are telling a story across a period gentleman on my right. It is easy to view Afghanistan of time. We are making sure that we use a variety of through one-off incidents, spotlights and the like, channels. It is not only about engaging with which are often not always good news. I have to say— newspapers—it is about engaging with people making you know this because many of you have travelled documentaries or writing books and so on. General there—that if you are looking for bad news in Messenger has mentioned looking beyond Helmand. Afghanistan, you do not have to look particularly Also, we are trying to emphasise the international hard. There are examples of things that do not go as dimension of the mission. There is also the regional well as they should in all aspects of what we do over dimension—this is not just about Afghanistan; it is there, but they tend to be isolated incidents and they about Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. Over time, are not as representative as they are portrayed to be. I we have realised that those are the things that we have hope that the point that I have made—I hope that this to do and have to get better at, and that is now part of is not viewed as blind military optimism, because that our approach. is not what I feel it is—is that the underlying trends are going the right way. Of course there will be Q29 Mrs Moon: I think the region is much bigger examples of ANP inadequacy or corruption or an than just Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would say that incident with Afghan governance and corruption that you are missing a whole patch of the region, if that is might skew our perceptions, but we should not allow your only focus. it to do so to a great extent. How do you manage not to leave a level of distress among the public, in relation to what the Chairman Q25 Mr Hancock: I do not think it does, to be fair. pointed out in terms of General Messenger, and to I think that the Chairman is wrong to suggest that. I your description of where things were in 2009 and do not think that anybody in this country has ever how they were described to the Committee in, say, underplayed the importance of the British Armed 2008? How do you create a feeling that the public are Forces. Certainly nobody in Parliament has been getting not just an attempt to frame a picture that is critical of our soldiers and civilians there, for the strong, powerful and good, but actually a picture of effort that has gone in. It is a perceptual problem, accuracy? How do you ensure that when something however, that the ongoing problem with the Head of like this happens—the bags of money—they State and his clan is seen as unchangeable. The understand it within the high tempo of the operations Americans suggested last week that it was impossible that are taking place, the complexity of the politics on to change him and that you could not stop the in- the ground and the degree of corruption that is part of bred corruption within that organisation. That does not life in Afghanistan? How do you make sure that the Ev 6 Defence Committee: Evidence

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee picture that you are painting and are using to inform progress? Is that fair? Is that an answer to the the public represents the complexity of the situation, question? rather than that being an attempt to news-manage a Nick Gurr: I think most do. positive story for MoD plc? Major General Messenger: You’ll clearly get those Nick Gurr: I would certainly like to think that when who wouldn’t agree with that but, to run the risk of we put information in the public domain, we do so in speaking on behalf of others, I think the majority of a manner that is straight, whether or not it is good people utterly recognise the value of what they do. news for us. There is tension all the time—this is They utterly see the fact that where they have been probably the single most difficult issue that we face— operating is a better place after their six, nine or 12 between trying to get information into the public months of being there than it was when they arrived. domain quickly, in a way that can help to shape a Bob Stewart: I accept that. story, or sometimes to knock a story down, and getting information into the public domain accurately. It is a Q32 John Glen: May I start with the General on the complex situation in Afghanistan and there are issue of what has driven those changes? Following the numerous levels of command involved, so getting adoption of the McChrystal counter-insurgency information on what happened in a particular incident strategy, could you describe what you think has can be very difficult. In the past, we have been in the changed on the ground since then? position where we have occasionally put out Major General Messenger: I don’t care what we call information that we have later found was not right and it—we can call it the McChrystal strategy. I think this that we have had to correct. Trying to get that balance was a strategy that developed over time in right between being speedy and being accurate is very Afghanistan. I think that General McChrystal acted tough, and that is something on which we have to extremely helpfully as a huge coalescing presence and make judgments every single day. But we are always an energising factor in developing this strategy, and trying to get information out that is accurate and he should take a great deal of credit for that. The straight. principal theme was that the campaign would stop focusing on the enemy and start focusing on the Q30 Bob Stewart: There is a disparity between the population. This is something that has changed in that support of the public for our Armed Forces and direction over time. support for the mission, is there not? I am looking at Focusing on the population has two aspects to it. First, it the other way round, where communication has an there is a geographical aspect. We will only secure impact on morale. Recently, I went to the funeral of areas in depth, with adequate force densities, in areas the 12th man in my old battalion to be killed in where the population are at their most dense. In Afghanistan; the battalion is returning now. The Southern Afghanistan, that is the Helmand river officers were not just from my battalion—six Royal valley—the Highway A01 and the river valley that Marine officers and several RAF officers were there— runs east to west to Kandahar—and the vicinity of and they said to me, “It’s extremely difficult to explain Kandahar. That is where the preponderance of our to the people on the ground that the British public security effort is. So to a degree it is driven by the support the Armed Forces, but don’t support the geography, but it is also driven by the nature and the mission.” We can nuance that here, and we are good utter acceptance that the allegiance of the population at doing that, but the point of view of the soldiers on to legitimate Afghan Government is what this is all the ground is different. One of them said to me, using about. Everything that we do needs to be conditioned these words: “The soldiers on the ground think you against that essential fact. It is something that is much are smoking dope.” I wasn’t actually, and I haven’t— more at the heart of everything that we do and the yet. But that is a difficult change to make. How can nature of what we do. you try to bring those two things together, which I presume is the mission? Q33 John Glen: Has it been effective? Nick Gurr: It’s certainly true that, generally speaking, Major General Messenger: In both cases, I think it the British public are supportive of what the Armed has been effective. We are now with some small areas Forces are doing, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or that still require investment—where we want to be wherever. There is no doubt that that is one of the in terms of the lay-down of forces across Southern factors that underpins the numbers that I gave you Afghanistan in the key areas. I have talked about earlier. To me, it is important that we give people Marjah, but I can give you any number of other within the Armed Forces the opportunity to speak districts where we have been in the last 18 months. themselves about why they think they are there and We have cleared out the Taliban and, utterly critically, the progress they feel they are making. I have found we have stayed in sufficient numbers to provide that the most upbeat assessments I get of progress in enduring security. So I think that piece has certainly Afghanistan come from soldiers, sailors, airmen and moved on. marines who are in Afghanistan doing the work on In terms of the allegiance of the population and the the ground. One of the things we are trying to do is nature of our dealings with the population, that is, to allow them to have their voice through blogging, again, showing very positive signs—less to do with us interviews and all sorts of other ways. and more to do with the emergence of capable Afghan governance at district and below level. The population Q31 Bob Stewart: So do you actually think that the in these communities now have a level of Afghan soldiers on the ground think we are making good governance at district level through which they can Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 7

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee channel their concerns, make complaints, resolve Q36 Mrs Moon: I commend you, Commander disputes, draw wheat seed and fertilizer—those sorts Tatham, on the work that you and General Mackay of things. That is now recognisable in the key districts did in working with the Arab media and ensuring that in Southern Afghanistan. If I were to highlight one Arab journalists were embedded with British forces. thing more than any other that has created this positive It appears that that was a positive step forward in feel, it would be that. getting better and more accurate information out. Is that your assessment of the success of that work? Is it Q34 John Glen: May I ask Commander Tatham still going on? How far is it being taken? about information? It has been said in the past that the Commander Tatham: The issue you allude to is the extended embedding of three pan-Arab satellite TV Taliban were winning the information war. Do you companies with British forces. We were able to think that can be said to be still the case now, or have measure the effect of that in tandem with the TV things changed? Is it a transient situation where it ebbs companies themselves. They have very active and flows? discussion forums and phone-ins—a whole host of Commander Tatham: I think they had a very metrics could be applied. We know that that was successful period between 2006 and 2008, when they extremely successful. For example, al-Arabyia, which were very proactive with the media. They had embeds is al-Jazeera’s major competitor, as you’re probably from Muslim and Arab TV stations. They improved aware, provided three daily news bulletins about their web presence. There was a whole host of other British forces in Afghanistan for an extended period. measures that saw their message resonating more As you are probably aware, some of those are on widely than it had before. However, looking back on YouTube. You can see them, and they are an that now, it was probably a bit of a blip. I don’t think extremely positive and fair reflection of the mission their message has much resonance in the international that was going on. community at all. We’re well aware of the inaccuracy The second part of your question raises a more and, to be honest, the downright lies that go into many difficult issue. Moving anything in theatre is always of their press releases, certainly about Coalition extremely difficult. Moving members of the media is casualties. But it’s important to distinguish between no different. There’s a balance to be struck in terms those who support and those who sympathise, and of whether we have British media, Pakistan media, there is undoubtedly sympathy, particularly in the Afghan media or Arab media. I don’t underestimate Muslim world, for some of the aspirations of the the challenge that that presents the logistics Taliban, if not their methods. I think it’s finely organisation in deciding who will go out, particularly balanced. I think we are much more persuasive in our when you’re very focused on UK public opinion as information campaign in the international community, well. My personal view is that we can and should do but we have a cunning adversary who may yet much more with that segment of society, but I suspect bounce back. that everybody would say that we would like to do more with the BBC or Pakistan TV for example. I Q35 Bob Stewart: Commander Tatham, following suspect the balance is probably being struck. on from that, how well do you think the MoD’s strategic communications have done? You just Q37 Mrs Moon: How critical is having that accurate outlined what happened between 2006 and 2008 on reporting going out into the Arab world in terms of the other side, but how well has the MoD done since winning and moving the mission towards a successful 2006? What have we achieved in that time? conclusion? How important is it that there is an opportunity for a different story to be told? Commander Tatham: Do you mean in the Commander Tatham: The director of Abu Dhabi TV, international community or in the United Kingdom? when I took General Mackay out to meet him, said Bob Stewart: Actually, I’m thinking internationally, that he welcomed that enormously because he thought and particularly on the ground. that people would see a different narrative that was Commander Tatham: I think there’s been a slow but not crusaders in wrap-around sunglasses and Kevlar measurable change in our performance. Committee body armour. He was the first to say that he would members may have read some of my papers, where I send a team out. That is enormously important, was initially fairly critical. We have certainly particularly in that part of the world, because the improved. We’re much better on the ground at getting prevailing narrative is, if not anti-western, certainly our message across. We still have a way to go. We critical. Although the news is fairly balanced, there still have to understand our audience better. We have are certainly plenty of opinion and discussion to understand how our message must resonate with programmes that are not so balanced and that have them—I am thinking here particularly of Afghans. very wide traction in the Arab and Muslim world. I This is a very diverse and very complex audience, and think that it was a vital step in providing an messages that are constructed here in Whitehall adjustment to that, particularly in the Gulf region, may—indeed, experience suggests, will—often not from where we know an awful lot of support for the resonate particularly well in a poppy field in Helmand. Taliban, financial and otherwise, emanates. However, the broad objectives of the strategic communication campaign and the broad objectives of Q38 Mrs Moon: Should it be taken further forward? ourselves and the international mission in Afghanistan Is enough being done now to ensure that that message are much more widely understood than was the case. and that access are available? Furthermore, who does Ev 8 Defence Committee: Evidence

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee the actual Afghan on the ground trust for accurate in. Certainly, TV and internet have almost zero information and an assessment of what is happening? penetration down there. Mobile phones are becoming Whodotheytrust? increasingly popular, particularly Bluetooth mobile Chair: Those are two completely different questions. phones, so video can be transferred. If I had to identify Commander Tatham: Could you remind me what the a single conduit, I would say that it was radio. first question was? Mrs Moon: Has the experience of embedding Arab Q41 Chair: Within that, would you say that BBC media been taken forward, and should we be doing World Service played an important part? more of that? Commander Tatham: BBC World Service is very Commander Tatham: There is a balance to be struck, popular. You can see that from some of the listening given the resources and logistics available in theatre. figures for it, particularly some of its long-running I have a special interest in the Arab media and in drama series. But I don’t think it is as important for Muslim public opinion, which has been my area of forming views and opinions as the micro stations— study for some years. I would always campaign and the radios in a box. There is Radio Tamadoon and lobby for more to be done in that particular things like that—the local ones. department. For example, the US Armed Forces placed two military spokesmen directly in the heart of Q42 Mrs Moon: May I ask one quick further Media City in Dubai for an extended period of time— question? Who are you aiming those broadcasts at? some years—to be always on hand for the Arab Are you aiming to reach out to people who might media, because the Arab media don’t find us as actually be thinking of taking up arms, trying to reach accessible in Washington or here in London. I think out to people who might be thinking about laying that was a very positive way forward. There is always down their arms or are you trying to get to key more that we can do, but I recognise the very real opinion informers? In addition, are you trying to difficulties that the MoD has in reaching those communicate with women at all? objectives. Commander Tatham: If there is an area where we could continue to improve, it is that of target audience Q39 Chair: Would you suggest that it was a false analysis. We have to understand the audience to know economy to keep journalists, both UK and Arab what it is that will interest and appeal to them and journalists, away from the embedding experiences? Is how that may affect their attitudes and behaviours. it a false economy to do less of it than we could? Typically, we look for the broadest common Commander Tatham: I’m not sure that I understand denominator. We say that they all live in a particular the premise of the question. I don’t think that we do area, such as Lashkar Gah, or they are all Pashtun or less, but I see more evidence that we are embedding whatever, and we put out messages. In the future, we more and more people. Certainly, in my time as a need to be segmenting our audience a lot more—it is spokesman for operations in Iraq we had a huge a very precise science to undertake that—so that we number of journalists embedded with us. The specific know what will particularly motivate people into question is whether we could have more Arab or particular opinions or views. At this stage, it is also Muslim organisations represented, and I think that important to differentiate the idea of an attitudinal and there is a case to be made for that. But again, there is behavioural shift. Are we trying to make them love a real balance to be struck. ISAF or GIRoA (Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), or are we just trying to encourage them Q40 Mrs Moon: Can I go back to my second not to support the Taliban or not to lay IEDs? My question? Who does the ordinary Afghan goes to? view is that we should be looking much more at Who do they trust and what is their source of behavioural aspects, rather than attitudinal, because information? we don’t necessarily need somebody to fall in love Commander Tatham: It’s very difficult to say who an with ISAF for them to stop a particular course of ordinary Afghan is, of course, because they come unhelpful action to the Coalition. from such wide ethnic backgrounds and have such wide and diverse levels of education and life Q43 Mr Brazier: To General Messenger and Colonel experience. I can home in to the community in Langton, how crucial is the impact of civilian Helmand, with which I am most familiar. There is casualties—obviously a very sad thing—on the very little modern media penetration at all there. success of operations? The figures we had been Radio is particularly important, and certainly BBC provided with by yourselves suggest that there has Pashto, part of the World Service, has tremendous been a steady rise in the number of civilian casualties attraction there, as do some of the radios in a box, owing entirely to enemy action, whereas there has which are radio stations that we and our ISAF been a fall in casualties brought about by our own colleagues run. They present the opportunity for local forces. Is that right? Is it the enemy’s fault rather than elders and people who are known to individuals ours and were fewer casualties caused by friendly within discrete geographical locations to present a forces? Has that come out of the McChrystal strategy? wider view. That is hugely important, because they We have global figures here, but we’ve only got a are individuals local people know and trust. Those comment on the trends of how the friendly/enemy micro radio stations, with a reach of perhaps only a split lies. few tens of kilometres, are actually absolutely key Major General Messenger: This was work done by opinion formers for the population we are interested the United Nations in Afghanistan—the human rights Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 9

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee element of it. You have summarised the key areas. absolutely critical that we do all we can to reduce the First, the number of civilian casualties has sadly gone risk of civilian casualties. Where such casualties have up, but the proportion of those that are caused by what occurred, and we accept that there have been are called pro-Government forces—in other words, occasions when ISAF has been to blame, ISAF and ANA—has dropped considerably. For the investigations have taken place and apologies have first six months of this year, it was about 12% of all been made. There is a real balance, and Nick touched casualties—casualties and fatalities, not simply on it earlier, between the need to be accurate in what fatalities. Of that, the most significant drop was in we say we’ve done and what has occurred, and the those caused by air-delivered ordnance. There is no need to respond in a timely fashion. When you are up doubt that the focus by General McChrystal and the against an enemy who isn’t bothered about accuracy, degree of rigour associated with the release of that can appear to be one-sided, but we do try to weapons such as that, as well as the degree of scrutiny investigate allegations as quickly as possible. Where and oversight that can be applied, has had an effect we seem to be at fault, we do what we can to minimise on reducing the number of civilians who are sadly the repercussions. caught up in the contest. Mr Brazier: The trouble is that, and this is the old Jim Callaghan point, a lie can get round the world Q44 Mr Brazier: Colonel Langton do you have before truth has got its boots on. anything to add to that? Colonel Langton: Just a small nuance, if you like. Q46 Chair: Before you move on, I have a quick General McChrystal’s declared aim of protecting the question on courageous restraint and the number of population, which is what he said, was welcomed by civilian casualties that it has prevented. Is it possible everybody. As General Messenger said, he put in to measure the extent to which courageous restraint place some fairly stringent rules of engagement— has increased the danger in which our troops find cutting down on the air power being used and so on. themselves? The trouble is that, in Afghanistan, a casualty caused Major General Messenger: It is impossible to by somebody in a foreign uniform, which includes the quantify that. For all the very sensible exhortations to Afghan National Army, is 10 times worse than a use judgment when faced with the decision whether suicide bomber from the Taliban, who actually gets or not to deliver lethal force, there is absolutely no some credibility because he is a martyr. Also, the suggestion that we should reduce the right to self- Taliban are very quick to apologise when they get it defence. When an individual or individuals feel that wrong. That was brought out in a web message at their life is threatened, or that the lives of others are the time of one particular disaster—I think it was in threatened, as a result of action by an insurgent, they Kunduz—when civilians were killed by the Taliban’s have at their disposal a graduated array of weaponry own action. Basically, the message, as I understand it that can get them out of trouble. No one is trying to implied, “You can see that McChrystal’s strategy is undermine the fundamental right to self-defence. This failing because he isn’t protecting the population.” is about making a judgment call based on the threat The message wasn’t so crude as to say, “We are still faced by an individual, or others alongside that killing them,” but you get my message. Civilian individual, and accordingly calibrating a response, casualties resonate in a much deeper way in with the local population very much at the heart of Afghanistan, perhaps, than in many other conflicts that decision. with which we may all be familiar. Mr Brazier: I just had a feeling for a moment that Commander Tatham might want to add something. Q45 Mr Brazier: Just before we move on to the Commander Tatham: No. polling data—this question might be slightly off piste, but the change in strategy stands out, although you Q47 Mr Brazier: Okay. Can we move on to the may feel that you don’t want to answer—you polling data? Polling data from early 2010 show that specifically said that the big four had been among the more Afghan nationals thought that Afghanistan was air-launched casualties. It seems extraordinary from going in the right direction in January 2010 than in the outside that—correct me if I’m wrong—a shift the previous year. That said, the picture, if you go from the use of very expensive, or mostly very back as far as 2004–05, was that it got progressively expensive, fixed-wing aircraft delivering very smart worse and recently it got steadily better. What is rather technology to the use of comparatively cheap sad is that the underlying figures—the actual practical helicopters carrying the 21st-century equivalent of questions about things such as freedom of movement sharpshooters has both led to such a big increase in and personal questions on security, where there is just effectiveness and such a marked reduction in civilian a comment rather than figures—do not show any casualties. That seems to suggest some rather odd progress. How would you describe the current view lessons for the SDSR, does it not? of the Afghan people on the security position? Major General Messenger: You are right, but I won’t Major General Messenger: Again, it is dangerous to go into that. In an earlier question, which I try to give the view of an average Afghan, because inadequately answered, you asked about the there is no such thing. It would depend very much on importance of civilian casualties in this. In a campaign where that individual lived and what they experienced that is all about taking the trust, the loyalty and the on a day-to-day basis. allegiance of the population away from the Taliban Mr Brazier: Let me stop you for a moment—let’s say and towards the broader, more legitimate side, it is the view of an Afghan in Helmand. Ev 10 Defence Committee: Evidence

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee

Major General Messenger: There are any number of understanding, with a proper target audience analysis, different types of Afghans in Helmand. It depends on of a large proportion of the population of Afghanistan. where they live—if they live inside one of the many I can go along with all that the General has said, but and growing secure areas, which are centred where I would caveat that by saying: don’t be too hamstrung population is densest, they will see a reduction in by polls, because Afghans are pragmatists. They have incidents; a fundamental reduction in Taliban learnt to answer the question in whichever way will intimidation; a greater presence and profile of a benefit them the most. government whom they can trust and lean on; and they will have an ability to go about their business Q51 Chair: What proportion of the polls on which and develop their own economic opportunities. That you rely are of women? is inside what I would characterise as the protected Nick Gurr: I can’t answer that question. areas. Chair: Could you let us have a note about that please? The predominant contest with the Taliban is going on around those protected areas and, often, in areas of Q52 John Glen: We talked a little about corruption lower density population. That contest—at its heart— and the perception of corruption, but following the has an objective of keeping as much trouble out of the elections, how has the sense that there is corruption populated areas as it can. If you are an unfortunate in the Government impacted on operations and the individual who lives in that area, I accept that your communications strategy that you’ve adopted? I daily diet consists rather more of the fight between acknowledge what you are saying in terms of pursuing international and Afghan forces and the Taliban than something and there being difficulties along the way. you would feel comfortable with, and your security What impact has it had on communications strategy? levels would not be high. Major General Messenger: The credibility of the The intent is continually to push out the secure areas capacity of the Government at every level is obviously so that more and more people fall within them, and a key part, not only of the communications strategy fewer and fewer fall within the contested zone. We but, frankly, the strategy. Their ability ultimately to have seen some dramatic shifts in that over the past take the baton and run the country and its security 18 months. themselves is at the heart of this. Those in theatre are ever watchful for things that undermine that. Q48 Mr Brazier: Colonel Langton, do you have John Glen: I had the elections— something to add to that? Major General Messenger: There is corruption and Colonel Langton: No. I could not possibly add there are elections, which is a slightly different thing. anything to that, particularly on Helmand. Most people would accept that corruption needs to be reduced as much as possible, but probably to a level Q49 Mr Brazier: I have one more question for you, rather than to zero. On the elections, there was a lot General Messenger. I should ask if there is any more of negative reporting of the Presidential Elections last recent polling information, but, presumably, you year, and we had the Parliamentary Elections most would have provided it if there was. Can you give us, recently. Going back to your previous point, I am not in round terms, a feel for the two proportions? You saying that those were entirely without mishap and say that the ink blot is spreading—has it moved from incident, but the elections and the process itself were 50:50 to 70:30? Can you give us a rough feel for planned and delivered by the Afghans. The security secure versus insecure areas now? It seems odd that was planned and delivered by the Afghans, with the there is an improvement, although these are national international community completely on the back seat figures, so perhaps they are not helpful. Can you give ready to deploy should it be required, but it was not. us a rough feel for how that is moving? Despite their best intentions, the Taliban were unable Major General Messenger: In Helmand, more than to influence the elections to any degree. If you talk to 70% of the population are in areas where there is Richard Felton, the Commander at the time, there adequate force density for the population, and where were a greater number of incidents on the day of the there is an improving security situation. elections, but they took place some distance away from the polling, and were unable to affect the Q50 Mr Brazier: How does that compare to a couple conduct of the elections on the day. I am not saying of years ago? that it was a perfectly delivered democratic event, but Major General Messenger: It was about 35%. the view on the ground, of the Afghans, the Mr Brazier: Gosh. international forces there and the independent Commander Tatham: Can I make a comment about international observers, was that there were positive the issue of polling? I do not know whether the things that came out of it and considerable grounds Committee is aware, but Afghanistan is the most for optimism. polled country on earth. You have only to do a casual Nick Gurr: As with so many other things, this comes search on Google to find out how many international back to managing expectations and giving people in organisations—NGOs et al—are busy polling. This is the UK, and perhaps elsewhere in the West, a sense a source of some concern, because it means that it is of what an election in Afghanistan is like and what it difficult to understand the audience properly. General is reasonable to expect the outcome to be, in terms of McChrystal commissioned the “Rich Contextual security, fraud, corruption or whatever. We feel that Understanding”—that was the name of the project— we did not get that right for the Presidential Elections late last year, early this year. That was the first proper last year; it was much closer to being right for the Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 11

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee elections this year. As General Messenger was saying, Nick Gurr: I do not think that there have been any the extent to which the Afghans themselves were particular lessons for the way that we communicate. responsible for the process and the security of the The leaks underlined once again the need for rigorous elections isn’t sufficiently understood, perhaps even communications discipline, but they are just another now. one of those unexpected things that we have had to deal with, and there have been many of them over the Q53 John Glen: To be clear, going back to the past few years. The important thing is that we keep Presidential Elections, are you saying that you don’t emphasising the reason we are there, what progress is think you conveyed a reasonable sense of what was like and how we are moving towards that, rather than possible, given the operating constraints of being buffeted by things such as that. Afghanistan? Nick Gurr: Yes. I think expectations were too high Q56 Chair: I said earlier that we would come back and people thought too much that it would be like a to the issue of the training of the Armed Forces that western election. We hadn’t prepared the ground are working in Afghanistan. Have we got the right sufficiently. level and the right kind of training for our Armed Forces? It is extremely complicated, and the cultural Q54 John Glen: Colonel Langton, do you have aspects of it are very complicated as well. Have we anything to add on that subject? got the right level of training? Colonel Langton: I think we can take some heart Nick Gurr: Do you mean cultural training, media from the fact that they took place. They weren’t operations training, or both? heavily criticised, they weren’t as fraudulent as last year’s presidential elections and the Independent Q57 Chair: I would say, first, working on counter- Electoral Commission, albeit appointed by the insurgency issues; secondly, cultural; and, thirdly, President, was also praised for its activities. Of course, media training. Let’s start with those three, shall we? there is some doubt about how much effect these sort Major General Messenger: I don’t think we can ever of elections have in the Pashtun heartlands of the say that we’ve got it right. I think that the training and South and the East. Nevertheless, Afghans do not preparation of our people has to be seen as a have electoral fatigue as some people have suggested, constantly evolving thing, and we are getting pretty and that is worth taking note of. adept at learning lessons, turning them around and changing how we prepare for theatre within one six- Q55 Chair: What about WikiLeaks, which in July month cycle—that is, one Herrick tour. The this year published many documents? Did that have preparation of Herrick 14 will be very different from an effect on the Afghan population? Did it have an the preparation of Herrick 12 and will be fed by the effect on the UK Armed Forces and operations? Did lessons of predecessors. we learn any lessons from that? Who would like to I think that that agility is very important, but we are take that? much more attuned in our training to the nuance and Major General Messenger: In terms of the impact on the complexity of operating in a counter-insurgency the Afghans, I strongly suspect that it had very little environment. I sweep up all those things—media impact on local communities, largely because training, cultural awareness, and judgmental ability international media penetration in those areas is very when faced with tough choices. Those are things that limited. For those Afghans who were named and our people at the lowest level are experiencing on a whose locations were given in the documents, their daily basis out there, and the training recognises that life would have changed fundamentally, and I think and is configured to try, as much as possible, to that that, more than anything, highlighted the replicate it before they deploy. I don’t think that it is irresponsibility of leaking them. perfect. If we were to say that it is perfect, we would In terms of the impact on our soldiers, other than be wrong the following day. I think this is something profound disapproval as to how the documents found that needs to keep evolving, but I can reassure you their way into the public domain, I do not think that that the agility of the process certainly exists. there would have been any radical change in Nick Gurr: On media operations training we’ve come approach. We are constantly looking at how we do a long way, but there is still quite a long way to go. things and constantly learning from incidents, events The emphasis has in the past, if you go back a few and changing circumstances in order to improve what years, tended to be on media awareness— we are doing. I do not think that this was something understanding how the media operate, rather than on that would have fundamentally altered how we techniques that help you to deliver a story or look for conduct our business. the sort of information that would be of interest to the I can say with confidence that there is no conspiracy public or the media. We have tried to move much among those who operate on the ground. There is a more, over the last couple of years, towards teaching very strong sense of self-policing, whereby those who techniques rather than just a broad awareness of how operate alongside each other are key regulators of the the media work. I think we have made some progress behaviour of others, and that is something that is on that, but I would certainly acknowledge that there’s absolutely predominant in small teams and all the way much more to be done. Also, where people have up to large teams in Afghanistan. I do not think that demonstrated an aptitude for this type of work—rather the leaks would have had an impact on how we than them coming into it once and then going off and conduct business. doing other things in a military career, so we may Ev 12 Defence Committee: Evidence

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee never see them again in a media environment—we’ve Major General Messenger: I don’t think this is an tried to ensure that their experience is reinvested and absolute thing, but it’s a really quite difficult thing to that we recycle them at various stages of their career train someone in Pashto, and it’s as difficult to in media-related jobs. I hope that that combination of maintain their currency. I’m surprised at the fact that things has led to an improvement. I think it has, but there are Pashto or Dari speakers out there who really the best judges are the people who deal with haven’t been tracked. We’d need to know more about them from the media. who they are. We have got, now, a Cultural Specialist Unit that is formed in the Ministry of Defence, and its Q58 Chair: Commander Tatham or Colonel Langton, principal task is to act as the sort of co-ordinating do you want to add anything to what either General point for all individuals who have either a cultural Messenger or Mr Gurr have said? or linguistics speciality, which would be relevant to Colonel Langton: Yes, I would like to add something. expeditionary operations, with a big slant towards I would actually much rather, having looked for some Dari and Pashto and general Afghan culture at the time at troops in the field, in Afghanistan and moment. That is something which has been up and previously, see the sort of comment on expertise being running now for about six months, and I would hope built in media ops that has come from my media it would answer some of the concerns that Colonel colleagues on my right be invested in language Langton has. training, which is a very low-cost, battle-winning skill; but our language training levels in Afghanistan Q61 Chair: This Committee was delighted when we have been very low indeed, and it’s no good working heard that was being set up, but I think we would like through indigenous interpreters, because a low-level to visit it at some stage to see how it’s going. That is commander doesn’t necessarily know what’s being angling for an invitation. said, and so on. I don’t need to go over that ground. Major General Messenger: It is an invitation which I We actually—and I’ve discovered this quite shall take back. recently—don’t have a proper way of tracking our Commander Tatham: Can I make two observations? linguists within the British Army sufficiently well. We The first one is on the language issue. It takes 13 can always say, “Well, it’s on our documents,” and all months to train a Pashto speaker. I think we could this sort of thing; but I’ve discovered two young make far greater use of the Afghan diaspora in this officers recently who speak the languages of country, as the Canadians do in the way that they Afghanistan. Neither of them has been approached deploy Canadian Afghans out to theatre to assist. That because of the language that they speak.3 This is a would perhaps help with the slight dilemma of the wasted asset. It’s not easy to train people to speak long training pipeline. languages for every operation, but my observation—I The second point is that two years ago, we produced hope it’s a fair one—is that we have not put enough JDP-340, a doctrine publication looking at our role in effort into that one thing. If we’re putting this sort of complex instabilities and stabilisation. In chapter 4, effort into tracking media specialists, I’d say it’s much we reinforced the centrality of influence. That was more important to look at other skills, which are articulated very clearly. This has now become a key useful on the ground, frankly. issue in all deployments to Afghanistan. Influence is built into the operational design. We appoint officers Q59 Chair: So two issues arise out of that: first, to influence appointments. The difficulty is that we language training could be increased, and secondly don’t currently have quite the right training to support that there be a proper tracking process. that. It’s a difficult issue, because there’s no doctrine Colonel Langton: Yes. to adequately explain what influence is. It’s a very rapidly evolving issue. If there is an area where we Q60 Chair: I think that is an extremely helpful pair need to perhaps turn our attention—that is happening of suggestions. General Messenger, would you agree at the moment with the Land Warfare Development with that? Group in Warminster—it is the idea of influence and Major General Messenger: Firstly, I think very the practitioners of it. It’s very difficult to say to quickly we could give you a feel for the level of somebody, “Congratulations, you are the colonel in linguistic ability that exists in the Task Force— charge of influence.” The first question is, “What’s advanced, intermediate and basic speakers. I think influence?” you’d be surprised at how many there are. Chair: I know there are several hundred— Q62 Mr Brazier: Two observations. First, you said Major General Messenger: We have had this a lot about languages in theatre, but going back to the conversation. middle part of this afternoon’s discussion in terms of Chair: We keep having this conversation and I keep the Arab networks, although I know al-Jazeera has an being astonished that the Department for International English service, the bulk of it is in Arabic. That, Development has, I think, two people who speak surely, is also a very important factor, given that the Pashto, or something. That, I’m sure, will have gone bulk of the opinion formers in the Islamic world are up now dramatically; but this is a very important Arabic speakers—at least the weight, if not the issue, and if Colonel Langton feels that language numerical numbers, in terms of finance, positions and training is insufficient, do you agree with him? so on. 3 Note by witness: I have spoken to the two individuals The second point I’d like to throw in, particularly concerned and find they have since been approached. given the point on influence, is that this surely is an Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 13

26 October 2010 Nick Gurr, Colonel (Rtd) Christopher Langton, Major General Gordon Messenger, Commander Stephen Tatham and Matt Tee area where you should be making much more use of Forces and of ISAF Forces. I know it sounds Reserve Forces, as indeed the Americans do—you unimaginative, but it will take time and more of the mentioned the Canadians using people—for three same. The progress that I hope that I put over earlier different reasons, all of them very obvious. The first will continue. is that ethnic minorities are much more likely to join The key is the capacity building piece, which has Reserve Forces than regular forces. They’re more importance at every level. I think it is very strong and likely to join the cadets than the Reserve Forces, but getting stronger, at the provincial level downward. get them into the cadets and you get them into the The key is to ensure that the apparatus in Kabul Reserve Forces. Secondly, you’ve got lots of people connects appropriately to the provincial level. with language skills for business and so on, particularly if you come back to Arabic and try to hit Q64 Bob Stewart: By 2015? that. Thirdly, influence is a civilian skill, with lots of Major General Messenger: If your point is whether people who do it for a living. One of the top men in we can transfer the combat role to Afghans in the City is a former submariner, for example. I asked Helmand, which is the most challenging Province in him whether the Navy had ever approached him for Afghanistan, by 2015, I would say yes. assistance with all the various battles going on, with SDSR and all the rest of it, and the answer, of course, Q65 Chair: Would you like to add anything to that, was no. Would you care to comment? Commander Tatham or Colonel Langton? Major General Messenger: No one, I think, gets the Commander Tatham: I think we need to think importance of influence more than I do. I am wary, carefully in our strategic communications in the future though, of generating it as an additional or peripheral about whether we are interested in attitude, behaviour strand to our business. To my mind, influence in or a combination of both. I would suggest that, counter-insurgency is what we do. It’s what everyone increasingly, we need to be looking in discrete areas does. Whether you are deploying a troop of Danish to build capacity, as the General has mentioned, for tanks or playing an Afghan soap opera over your radio example in the ANA and the ANP—to look at in a box, you’re influencing. It’s about the cognitive behavioural change as opposed to attitudinal change. behaviour of the population. That is command In order for us to accomplish that, we need to have a business. I quite agree that we need to have a group more granular understanding of the audiences. We are of specialists who understand the potential of some of getting there very slowly, but this is a difficult, the tools and mechanics of influence, but what I complex scientific process, so I would like to see a wouldn’t want to happen is for it to be in any way greater target audience analysis capability built in. sidelined: “Right, we’ve got our plan; now let’s look That might be something that we have to go for at influence.” Influence is what the commander does, external help on.4 and it’s what all his decisions need to be about. Chair: May I say thank you very much indeed to all Nick Gurr: I think it is right, though, what of you for coming to give evidence today? Commander Tatham says about there being an I should say that it is not usual for the witnesses to absence of doctrine on this. That is something that is outnumber the Committee. I apologise, but it is not currently being addressed by Shrivenham. actually our fault. The trouble has been that we have Chair: Okay. Final question. lost nearly half the Committee to Front-Bench appointments, so it is a matter of vacancies on the Q63 Bob Stewart: If we define success in terms of Committee, which will be sorted out in the next few Afghanistan being in a position to govern itself days. So, we are not uninterested in what you are properly, to look after its people and not to be a threat saying—we have been very interested, and it has been to the rest of the world, and if we can get out, what a most valuable session to start off our inquiry into more does the Ministry of Defence need to do to Afghanistan. Many thanks indeed. ensure that we do that as soon as possible? Of course, 4 we have a 2015 deadline, but what more should we Note by witness: Our exit from Afghanistan is predicated on the ability of ANA/ANP and GIRoA to 'take up the slack'. be doing to help our Armed Forces and other agencies We therefore need a much more focussed strategic to achieve success as I have defined it, which is communications campaign (based on behavioural change not ensuring that the place is not a danger to the rest of attitude. i.e. how do we increase ANA retention, how to us and that it governs its people properly? reduce ANP corruption, instead of 'let’s make Afghans love ISAF' or 'love Karzai'). To undertake this we must stop Major General Messenger: The first thing that I undirected attitudinal messaging (the type of message 'fired' would do is to put that into an international context out to Afghanistan) and instead focus on targeted behavioural and point out that the bits that we have been entrusted messaging (i.e. find what factors influence ANA to leave or with militarily— ANP to be corrupt). To do this we must undertake Target Audience Analysis (TAA) which the military have no organic Bob Stewart: Okay, within our remit. capability for, therefore we must buy it in and then use it Major General Messenger: What we need to do, properly. I gave the example of the Rich Contextual militarily, is to deliver those three districts and play a Understanding Study (RCU) commissioned for General strong role in developing the capacity of the Afghan McCrystal that challenged prevailing wisdom (i.e. the Taliban are against schools) and properly explained why National Security Forces across Afghanistan. particular views held traction and then how they could be We are where we want to be in central Helmand in ameliorated. I have provided an example of a detailed TAA terms of the allocation of Afghan National Security to the Committee. Ev 14 Defence Committee: Evidence

Wednesday 3 November 2010

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Mr Dai Havard Thomas Docherty Mrs Madeleine Moon Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Penny Mordaunt John Glen ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Professor Theo Farrell, King’s College London, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE,and Professor Anthony King, Exeter University, gave evidence.

Q66 Chair: Welcome to our meeting on Operations Command South, the issue is fundamental and simple: in Afghanistan. Could I ask you all to introduce it is the politics. In so far as we get the politics right yourselves? Professor Farrell, would you like to start? in Afghanistan, in so far as we identify a coherent Professor Farrell: My name is Theo Farrell. I am political regime that we can support and generate over Professor of War in the Modern World in the thenextthreetofive to 10 years, we will be Department of War Studies at King’s College, successful, and in so far as we fail to prioritise the London. For the past few years, I’ve been researching politics of the Afghan environment, we will fail. the British military campaign in Afghanistan, and I Obviously, one of the sub-points there is that in so far provide advice to the British Army, the Ministry of as we prioritise a certain kind of military activity Defence and ISAF on military operations in before political analysis and political understanding, it Afghanistan. will be very difficult for us out there. I think huge Colonel Kemp: I’m Richard Kemp. I was an Army progress has been made in the last 12 months or so in officer for almost 30 years and served in Afghanistan terms of our political understanding of that theatre and as Commander of British Forces in the latter half of of that country. It is plausible to have some optimism 2003 and I worked for the Joint Intelligence that precisely the regime focus is coming into view Committee assessment staff on international terrorism, now. I hope that the work that Regional Command including aspects of Afghanistan from 2002 to 2006, South did under Nick Carter will help that and that excluding that period in 2003 when I was actually in that will be taken forward by his successor; 10th Afghanistan. I’ve been out of the Service since 2006, Mountain Division took over on Monday, and perhaps and I keep a close interest in what is happening in we are moving into a plane now of political Afghanistan. I make occasional comments in the sophistication that may be successful. media and I write articles about the subject. Colonel Kemp: There are three areas I shall touch on, Professor King: I’m Anthony King. I am Professor of if I may, and obviously I am happy to expand on any Sociology at Exeter University. I’ve been working of them if you wish. First, I completely agree with over the last few years on the Armed Forces. I’ve just Professor King about the need to address the political finished a book on European Military Transformation. situation. As far as I can see, we are far from where As a result of that book, I have been developing close we should be in terms of having an effective non- links with the British Armed Forces and, indeed, corrupt Government in Kabul replicated right the way armed forces in Europe and a little bit in America. down to the lowest levels of Government. Without That has resulted in certain bits of advisory and that, I don’t think any other progress that is being consultancy work, including spending some time out made will be sustainable in the long term without a in Regional Command South under General Nick continuous presence from NATO Forces. Carter this year in the Prism Cell, providing some Having said that, at the tactical level in Afghanistan, advice and analysis for him there. from what I have seen—I haven’t been out there for a Chair: Colonel Kemp, is it you who has to leave by while, but I have been following events on the ground 3.30? closely—the American troop surge is getting towards Colonel Kemp: If that is at all possible and does not its final point of build-up, which I believe it is not at inconvenience you, yes. yet, but since we have had a significantly increased Chair: We’ll rattle through, I’m sure. But if there is number of forces in Helmand, in particular, ISAF anything you need to come in on, please indicate and Forces have been making considerable progress we’ll try to get you in early on anything you need against the Taliban. They are at the tactical level on to say. the ground. It is my estimate that some time during Colonel Kemp: Thank you. the course of next year, probably the early part, we will probably see some significant progress and Q67 Chair: Could you all begin please by telling us evidence of the situation being turned around against from your different perspectives what you think the the Taliban. But I would stress that that is on the key issues in Afghanistan are? Who would like to ground, tactical and still dependent on the political begin? position. Professor King: Sure. For me, and this is based on I think the other area within that is the actions of my experiences working in Kandahar for Regional Pakistan. History probably shows that no insurgency Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 15

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King has ever been defeated while it retains a safe haven in Government institutions and Afghan Security Forces. a neighbouring country. I stand to be corrected on that, That affects directly, for instance, their ability to but I think that is a pretty big factor. While elements absorb development assistance and other forms of of the Pakistan Government, particularly, the ISI and assistance from us, and it is the critical factor that’s the Pakistan Army, continue not just to tolerate the going to shape our ability to transition districts and Taliban but actively to support Taliban operations into provinces in the coming couple of years. Within the Afghanistan, there is not much chance of really national Government there are all sorts of problems, getting fully on top of the Taliban in Afghanistan. So not least competition between key Ministries that are that is another area of focus. That is really the first supposed to be co-ordinating co-operation, and also issue. within the Afghan Security Forces. I shall make a The second issue—and I will be briefer on these other couple of obvious observations. One is that there has two—relates to support for the campaign back here in been a huge increase in the forces. For instance, the the United Kingdom. That is absolutely fundamental. Afghan National Army—ANA—now stands about I am told by the Ministry of Defence that that support 130,000 strong. That was the October target, and they is not waning and that a substantial element of the hit it by the summer. So the growth is looking really British public support our operations in Afghanistan. good but, as you might appreciate, if you grow an Now I’ve not done any scientific analysis of this, but army that quickly you can’t grow the structures to certainly from the people I speak to, that is far from sustain it as quickly. So, there is a sustainability the truth. The people in this country just don’t problem as regards the Afghan National Army. With understand why we are fighting there. They don’t the Afghan National Police, the main effort this understand why we have body bags coming back coming year for ISAF is the mentoring and partnering through Wootton Bassett on a regular and frequent basis. I think that that must be explained much more of the Afghan National Police and the Afghan convincingly to the British people in order to get their Uniform Police, and that is a profoundly difficult support. Frankly, to expect our Forces to carry on problem. The level of public support for the Afghan fighting there without that support is asking a hell of National Police is chronically low. If you get the a lot because it has a big effect on their morale. public to accept the police, let alone support them, I’ll make just one point on that which, again, I’m that is a good thing, but in most districts they don’t. happy to expand on. Something that people are always So, that is the first issue. saying to me is, “Yes, we see British troops and The second issue is corruption and criminal networks. British bodies being flown back in, but what damage This is now a major theme for ISAF under General are we doing to the Taliban?” There is a very big story Petraeus. Corruption has been referred to by the other to be told there without going down the route of the speakers, both political corruption at the national, Vietnam body bag or kill count. We should be putting provincial and district levels, and economic out more about the score that is taking place, not just corruption, which is endemic in that part of the our own losses but what we are doing to the Taliban. world—Pakistan is full of it. There is an issue there The final area that I would mention is support to our about how much corruption we can accept and how Forces in Afghanistan. Over recent years we have much is normal for a functioning system, as opposed seen inadequate levels of support provided from the to how much is actually causing Afghanistan to grind UK to the troops in Afghanistan. We’ve seen a to a halt economically and politically. Criminal significant improvement in that, particularly since the networks will be the big theme for ISAF’s new casualty rates started getting very high and the media military plan. It was signed off two weeks ago, but I started applying pressure on the Government to don’t think it’s been made public just yet. The big support their forces. We’ve seen improvement, and I focus going forward is on criminal networks and the hope it will continue. challenges that that is going to present in protecting However, I am concerned about what I consider to be the population. a peacetime attitude back here to supporting a war. The third issue is international practices—our These figures might be completely wild, but I think practices as international players in Afghanistan—and that in 1940 the British defence industry produced 900 in particular the creation of parallel structures. When Spitfires in one month, never mind the others. The we go in as international community actors—NGOs Ocelot Armoured Vehicle, for example, sounds like a and IGOs—we drain off a lot of the valuable human really great vehicle. It’s a replacement for Snatch, and sounds really good from what I’ve seen. We are resource that should be in the Afghan Government; talking about perhaps delivering it some time in 2012. they come to work for us instead. Or, for instance, That’s great if you’re manufacturing family saloon different donors require different reporting cars, but we should gear up our war industry—our mechanisms, or they just bilaterally interact with defence industry—to support our forces on a wartime Afghan Government agencies, and so what you get is footing, and not a peacetime one. So, let’s quadruple a gross disunity of effort, and that is now a major the effort that we’re putting into manufacturing the problem. Ambassador Mark Sedwill was supposed to vehicles and get them out in a quarter of the time that take a grip of this problem, but so far he has not really we’ve got planned. been able to do it, as far as I can see. Professor Farrell: I’d highlight four issues. The first Chair: I think that he has stopped being ambassador, issue is Afghan capacity, and that is something that hasn’t he? I think it’s now Sir William Patey. people in the field and everyone agrees on. The major Professor Farrell: Has he stopped? He’s no longer obstacle to progress is the capacity of Afghan the senior civilian— Ev 16 Defence Committee: Evidence

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King

Chair: Ambassador Mark Sedwill has now become immediately associate narcotics with corruption, and the new Richard Holbrooke, as it were, or the new there is undoubtedly an association between the Sherard Cowper-Coles. Taliban and the insurgency and the narcotics industry. Professor Farrell: As the NATO Senior Civilian It is part of the nexus of that insurgency. However, the Representative, obviously he’s got a very full plate figures that we were working on down in Regional and he’s achieving a lot—he’s very impressive as the Command South for this year show that about 80% of new SCR. But one of the areas that he has to focus the GDP of the South is based on narcotics. It is not on—and on which I’m sure he intends to focus—is an illegal, corrupt form of economic activity, more unity of effort on the civilian side. PRTs function ultimately, at that level; it is just economic activity. differently, are structured differently and report The point is that corruption affects us as westerners differently. This is one of the areas that I looked at very severely, and in some cases it distorts what we two weeks ago when I toured all the major regional are trying to achieve there. commands in Afghanistan, and we discovered quite a I suggest that we try to create a plausible, stable degree of disunity of civilian effort. patrimony in which certain kinds of activity, such as Lastly, obviously, there is the insurgency. The key the expropriation of land or political and economic thing to focus on in that regard is freedom of resources, are stopped, but where certain forms of movement. The insurgency creates all sorts of typical patron-client relations continue, and where the problems, but ISAF must focus on getting more drugs are perhaps not seen as an immediate problem freedom of movement, particularly for Afghans, of corruption, but as a problem of economic because that will free up the economy, and economic development. If we situate our understanding in such growth is really the centrepiece. a way—those are the kinds of points that Colonel Kemp and Professor Farrell have also alluded to— Q68 Chair: Professor King, you had only one shot at we will be in a position to achieve our objectives in that. Do you want to come back on that? Afghanistan, not only for our benefit, but for the Professor King: One thing I will qualify, in response benefit of the Afghans. to and building on what my colleagues have just said. Chair: Thank you very much. When I talk about getting the politics right—this links into the issues of corruption—one error I would Q69 John Glen: I have a question for Colonel Kemp. certainly identify in past attempts, which are now When you were in Afghanistan back in 2003, did you maturing, by the international community and NATO identify at the time key improvements that needed to to stabilise Afghanistan is the vision of creating some be made and why they were needed? Could you tell centralised state that we, as western people who live us a bit about the situation you found then? under such structures, would recognise. Colonel Kemp: It was extremely different from what I emphasise strongly that the regime we should it is now. In 2003, British Forces were exclusively realistically be looking at in Afghanistan is one that pretty much in Kabul and in Mazar-e-Sharif in the may not be particularly palatable to us in the West, north. We had a Provincial Reconstruction Team up namely, a patrimony, in which kin and tribal relations in the north. We had combat troops of about battalion determine appointments and people use their offices strength in Afghanistan plus various logistic elements, of state as benefices. However, if the right people are staff and an RAF C130 Detachment. It was a much appointed and take responsibility for their areas, there smaller scale operation than it is now and, apart from is nothing wrong with patrimonies. They can be some special forces—counter-narcotics activity stable. Most of the world operates on a patrimonial basis, including parts of Europe. That leads directly to further south—we were not anywhere much south of Professor Farrell’s point about corruption, which I Kabul. agree with. We need to be very clear about what we At that time, we were attempting to contain some mean by corruption and how that informs our forms of terrorist attack in Kabul. There were a planning and operations in Afghanistan. Afghanistan number of suicide bomb attacks, and a number of IED has always been a patrimonial society, and the attacks against ISAF in Kabul, but the attacks were patrimony that has been established there is relatively limited. It was a question of containing the substantially a response to our interventions and to the situation rather than much else. At that time, in respect 30-year war. There is a level of activity within the of the insurgency, we were seeking to increase our nascent political regime that is emerging that is intelligence gathering and surveillance capacity, but certainly corrupt by our standards, but it is seen as when that is compared with the scale of operations legitimate and proper by Afghans. There is another that exist now, it is not particularly relevant to dwell form of corruption that is certainly not seen as on it. legitimate by local Afghans, and which Professor The other areas that we were working on quite heavily Farrell rightly talked about, such as the political were disarmament and the reintegration of former— appropriation of certain kinds of offices and the probably current now—warlords. We were working a appropriation of land. There are massive disputes and lot on that, and training the Afghan National Army. It discontent about land ownership around Kandahar, was the early days of training the Afghan National where certain power brokers have just seized land by Army and Police, and we were involved in that fiat. activity as well. Again, that was on a very small scale Of course, that leads to questions of economic compared with what is taking place now. Up in the corruption, and this is where we need to be extremely north, there were relatively modest economic careful, namely in the area of narcotics. We redevelopment efforts in the Provincial Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 17

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King

Reconstruction Team. So it would probably be wrong the Taliban out—getting them on board before to try to draw— pushing in. That is incredibly important. At the same time, there was lots of messaging back to Q70 John Glen: Your experience is too short in time Whitehall and Westminster to explain that this was not to draw any strong lessons, compared with what has going to be Panchai Palang again. We are not going happened since? to see extensive fighting by conventional forces with Colonel Kemp: It is a relatively short time frame, and the risk of heavy casualties to British Forces. They the situation was very different. At that time, the were hoping for a different kind of operation where Americans in, I believe, Operation Enduring Freedom the fighting would be minimal. were quite heavily engaged in pursuing al-Qaeda and That is what the British military would call a shaping Taliban on the border areas, but we were not involved operation. Combined with that was a secret operation in that at all. At that time, there was virtually no involving the use of special forces in particular, to significant Taliban activity throughout most of the identify a target and either kill or capture local Taliban country. It was a very different situation from what it leaders. Something like 27 local Taliban leaders in is now. Nad-e-Ali were killed or captured in the weeks and months leading up to Moshtarak. You essentially Q71 Mr Havard: Professor Farrell, you have done a eviscerate the enemy’s command structure locally and report, which we have seen, on Operation Moshtarak. win over the local population. Then, when you push The Committee was in Helmand in January, just in, you’ve got all the cards stacked in your favour. before it set off, and we had a brief about what was The style of assault was a helicopter assault that was intended to happen and what the outcome was. directly on top of two key Taliban strongholds. I Perhaps you could say something about what your cannot go into detail, but various classified reports report found, what you concluded from it and what its showed that the Taliban defence essentially collapsed. benefits might have been. Then I want to ask you a It was not the case, as some Afghans on the ground question about what conclusions you draw from it thought, that the Taliban made an ordered retreat to about future operations of a similar nature. defend their forces because they were facing Professor Farrell: The report was commissioned by overwhelming opponents. Rather, the defence literally Land Warfare, which asked me to go in and look at the collapsed in the field. That is because the Taliban major British operation in central Helmand, in Nad-e- command was remote at the time and stationed well Ali. The report you saw was the published version, out of the district. They have very poor situation but it is pretty close to the classified version—there is awareness and the command net was quickly very little difference. All I have done is take out a overwhelmed. couple of references that have operational security implications and hidden all the other references that Q72 Mr Havard: Did it collapse or did they just run refer to classified material. away to fight another day somewhere else? As you intimated, I reviewed extensively the plans Professor Farrell: That would be a definition of leading up to Moshtarak. I reviewed the after-action collapse. Then the consequence is what happens next. reports—the post-operational reports and lessons— They were displaced across the Nar-e-Bughra canal that were informing the British approach going into into the desert, which was what we wanted to happen. Moshtarak. I was able to interview troops and units We did not want to corral them and engage in big gun when they came out, and then I went into theatre and fights in a relatively heavily populated area of Nad-e- interviewed 4 Brigade and the units going down into Ali. You want to push them into the desert—that is central Helmand and Nad-e-Ali. exactly what you want. You don’t want a big gun If anyone is going to be critical, it is usually the guys battle. you hand the real estate over to. They can have quite pointed criticisms about what they find, in comparison Q73 Mr Havard: My understanding was that it was with what units sometimes claim they left behind. also part of the broader idea of not just simply going However, broadly speaking, the story was actually a in somewhere and capturing it, but that there was a very good one. I am trying to summarise a very follow-through from that. We saw some of the complex report in a few minutes, as you appreciate. conditioning, shaping and pre-conditioning that you The good news story, I suppose, was the very describe when we were there in January. What do you sophisticated approach that the British had developed think and conclude about the operation that is and were taking to military operations. currently under way around Kandahar, and about The approach combined a number of elements. The similar operations to try and influence other parts of first and most important element that everyone the Southern Province? recognised was what was called influence, Professor Farrell: Okay. There are two parts to that engagement, messaging—essentially, it involves a and, if I may, I will take each part in turn. First, you series of activities. Broadly speaking, on the ground it are talking about the shaping, and then we go into the was units pushing out in contested territory, beginning clear. The clear is the military phrase for when we to engage with local communities and local tribal push the enemy out of the territory. The hold is the elders, and explaining what the operation was about, critical thing. You go in and hold ground local security what was about to occur and what was involved. They forces, and then you start to build. You have explained why it would benefit them for the British development activities happening quickly after you and ANSF partners to push into the territory and push have cleared the Taliban out. Ev 18 Defence Committee: Evidence

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King

At that point, we had been in Nad-e-Ali for almost a Q76 Mr Havard: I want to ask you two questions. year and a half. It was a gradual expansion of local One thing that clearly came from the discussion we government authority across the district, protected by had yesterday with Governor Mangal is that he feels ISAF and ANSF—Afghan Security Forces. that he is trying to be a good part of the process of Moshtarak was a very small area in the Chah-e Anjir governance in Afghanistan, and he would like to triangle, which is in the northern part of Nad-e-Ali. In remove certain people who are in certain key places, a sense, we were building long-term commitment in particularly in the police force, and has not got the Nad-e-Ali and gradual improvement. Crucially capacity to do so. He will get there, doubtless, but important was a very good district governor and a not this week. That is now coupled with what you functioning district community council—the basis of presumably are alluding to, which is ISAF’s local support. assessment and its new OPLAN—is that what we are Post-operation, it all looks good. A very good survey talking about? You seemed to be suggesting at one was done of local opinion by Radio Nad-e-Ali, which level earlier that the Afghan Government were part of showed very high levels of support and the the problem, yet here is a description that the Afghan identification of an improved security situation—the Government have to be put into place. statistics are in my paper. When I visited the situation Professor Farrell: There you go. That is the central on the ground, I was there in October 2009, and it problem. The central problem in this conflict is that was quite unsafe. There was a bit of gunfire in the DC the key is the Afghan Government’s. We are and we had to scuttle back to the FOB. I was there in supporting the Afghan Government and in the new June 2010 and what I found most impressive was plan that is increasingly emphasised. It can’t be any going into the district governor’s compound. other way. At the same time, there are capacity Previously, you would go into what is basically his problems and, as Professor King has pointed out, administrative centre, and you would find a lot of political problems—corruption—that mean only so people hanging around and loitering. This time, you much can be expected of the Afghan Government. went in and you found people actually doing work. That is the essence of the problem.

Q74 Mr Havard: Some of us met Governor Mangal Q77 Mr Havard: Do you think, therefore, that we yesterday and got an assessment from him on some of should be re-framing our approach to all of this, in the effects on the ground in terms of the policing and terms of Afghanistan, and looking at it simply to justice system, and other things to do with security create an expediency—that might have a moral and the economy—the whole nine yards. You make a relativism in it that I find a bit difficult—that would point about the community councils, and he talked stabilise Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan? Is that about that and the reintegration committee and so on, what you are saying—that these operations are so an elaborate structure of governance is now effectively to create a basic stability that has happened developing within that area. That had to come in that particular area, but no more than that? involved with the military force—that, presumably, is Professor Farrell: Just to clarify. The point of the the conclusion that you are drawing, and that has to be the approach elsewhere. Is that right? major operation in Helmand—and appreciate, of Professor Farrell: What you probably appreciate is course, that we also had the Marine push into Marjah that last year Helmand was the main effort for ISAF. and other areas—was to inflict a strategic defeat on Regional Command South was identified as the main the Taliban, and somehow gain momentum back into effort for Helmand. ISAF was concentrating resource the campaign. That was the emphasis in ISAF. I was to achieve a strategic effect in Helmand. out there in January doing some strategic assessment for General McChrystal. That was very clear. By and Q75 Mr Havard: How much of that was the Afghan large, there has been dramatic improvement in plan? How much do you think it was important that Helmand—Professor King can speak more to it. That it was the Afghan plan, and that the Afghans were now is the point in Kandahar—to inflict big defeats implementing something that they felt was theirs? on the Taliban in the South. It goes back to the Professor Farrell: At different levels, there were suggestion that maybe, given the political problems different degrees of Afghan ownership of the plan. that we face at national level, there is only so much There is a new strategic plan, as you probably know, we can achieve and that maybe we should contain our where Kandahar is the main effort for this year. The ambitions in Afghanistan and focus on Pakistan. That strategic plan reality is that, of course, it is very much seems a false choice to me. The strategy in in co-operation with Afghan partners and the Afghan Afghanistan seems quite reasonable. My own view is Government—it has to be—but it has been produced that we have probably about four years during which by ISAF. But if you look at Moshtarak, and way the there will be reasonable resource committed to planning proceeded on that, there is no doubt that Afghanistan, and we are going to try to set the Governor Mangal was very, very involved in the conditions as best as possible over the transition overall plan. Within Nad-e-Ali in particular, District period, so when we eventually transition out, Governor Habibullah was centrally involved in Afghanistan will hopefully survive in some shape that identifying what were the things to focus on in the we can work with. plan. That is also clear in the main battle group that was involved in shaping, leading up to Moshtarak— Q78 Mr Havard: So do you feel that what happened the 1 Grenadier Guards. They are very clear on that there and your report of it has influenced and shaped point. in some way the revision by ISAF of this OPLAN, or Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 19

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King whatever it is, about how to conduct future Professor Farrell: Correct. And, crucially, killing operations? fewer people through the use of air munitions. That is Professor Farrell: No, because my report was to really important. inform what the British were doing in central There is still a problem with regard to what is called Helmand, which is only part of the pie, albeit a very escalation of force, which is at the checkpoint and so important part. forth. Just to give you a taste of the complexity of the issue, how about: if we have Afghan Security Forces Q79 Mrs Moon: Part of the big change in the operating alongside us at checkpoints, does that make McChrystal plan, from my perspective, was to take matters better or worse? Well, it makes it better in military action in a form that recognised the needs and some cases of escalation of force, because they are involvement of the local population. Suddenly, it was better able to read the situation and go, “That is not a about fighting a war in which the local population was threat. Don’t use deadly force.” But it makes the acknowledged as being part of the victims, but also situation worse in other respects, because they have part of the success. Has the situation changed since very poor fire discipline, and they are more inclined, we moved to the McChrystal plan? Has there been when they use weapons, to use lethal force. It’s a any improvement? Has it been a helpful plan? complex picture, but in terms of air munitions, the Professor Farrell: I think you’re absolutely right. I’m number of civilians killed by use of those has, in gross assuming that you’re talking about population-centric terms, gone down. That was a major priority for COIN, as it’s called, and the heavy emphasis in his General McChrystal. plan on the need to protect the population as the main effort. Q82 Mrs Moon: Professor King, do you think that What difference has it made? One of way of looking we’ve made any success in actually securing consent at that is civilian casualties, which is a really and engagement with the local population? Have we important indicator of the extent to which the made a difference? Are they able to live a more population is being protected. The point of the normal life and start building an economy? McChrystal plan, in his strategic assessment, was to Professor King: I think there has been some success. say, “It doesn’t matter who’s killing these folks and Mr Havard, I have inferred a certain line of argument injuring them. It doesn’t matter whether it’s us or the from what you were saying that seemed to accord with Afghan Government forces or the Taliban. They are your own question about McChrystal’s strategy and just being killed and injured. That is what matters for this latest question. We now have probably the largest them.” So, in order to stabilise the country and number of forces that we are going to have. The plan improve security, you must just get a grip on this that is in place, in a military sense, is plausible. It is issue. the optimal plan, given the forces that we have, in There was a major study done for General Petraeus terms of the identification of districts and then the use by a team out of Harvard and US Joint Forces of forces to try and generate force densities. On a Command. It was based on very extensive field work, military level, I think the plan is plausible and, indeed, and what they have concluded is that—the study was Operations Moshtarak 1 and 2, which Mr Havard was reported to the Command about two months ago—if talking about, were perhaps one of the first examples you look back over the last 18 months, the number of of that kind of counter-insurgency approach to try and civilian casualties is in a steady state. It has not generate force densities. declined. However, over the last 18 months, what you Where I might take issue with it, and this is where I find is that operational tempo has greatly increased think I might agree with Mr Havard, is on this. The with the massive surge of American forces into McChrystal plan—the whole US COIN concept— theatre. So when you actually normalise those emerges out of a reinvention and rediscovery of post- numbers for the increase in operational tempo, what war campaigns, Malaya etcetera. It was particularly you get is a net reduction in civilian casualties. used in Iraq, as we all know. What I worried about One of the key areas that General McChrystal was and what, to be honest, I still worry about, is that there particularly focused on in his new— is a bit of confusion of Afghanistan for Iraq. One of the key points here is that what we are using the forces Q80 Mr Brazier: Sorry. Could you just say that last to do is to secure the population; and I think it was sentence again? What is the key factor? implied today that that is what is being undertaken by Professor Farrell: Yes. The number of civilians killed military commanders. This, I think, is a complicated is pretty much steady, but that is against a background issue in Afghanistan. I say it slightly polemically, but where military operations have greatly increased in in a certain sense there is no population in tempo, because of the amount of forces that have Afghanistan, in a general way. The social order is come into theatre—massively increased. What you highly fragmented, partly historically—ethnically and would expect is, obviously, an increase in civilian tribally—but also because of 30 years of war. There’s casualties in that context, so when you normalise the huge social fragmentation right down to the village stability of civilian casualties in the context of the and community levels, where nobody trusts anyone increase in operational tempo, you get a net reduction down the valley in the next village. in civilian casualties. That is to say, civilian casualties, Mrs Moon: Sounds like Wales. in real terms, have gone down. Professor King: What did and does concern me is the concept of securing population and providing benefits. Q81 Mrs Moon: So although we’ve more troops, In a more homogeneous society, the objective would we’re killing fewer people? be that those benefits would flow outwards Ev 20 Defence Committee: Evidence

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King horizontally, but I’m not sure that’s the case in improvement that isn’t going to be very lasting. Is Afghanistan. I think that there’s clear evidence that in that right? many cases the intervention of the international Professor King: Well, no, I think that your point is community has actually generated fighting, because apposite, but there is a clear answer to it. Firstly, let one community is favoured over another, and me clarify that what we are talking about here. It is therefore the other community feels aggrieved and the stabilisation of a regime that must, for certain makes a localised, totally ad hoc alliance with certain reasons of intervention and as a result of the decisions Taliban commanders and fighters to generate a that we have taken, be Karzai-led—whether or not it localised tribal insurgency that has no real strategic is Karzai himself—within the elite power clan that is purposes, but ends up with rather large numbers of now dominating Afghan society. There must be a people, including ISAF troops, being killed. So I have regime built around that on that basis. I agree with a great scepticism about this population-centric COIN you: that certainly means there will be continuing low in Afghanistan. levels of violence in Afghan society. Even in the What’s the other pole of population-centric COIN? It’s period 1920s to 1970s, the level of internecine the belief that what we are creating is a unified, violence between Afghan villages and tribal groups centralised state. This comes back to Dai Havard’s was more than we would tolerate in the United point: what was interesting about Moshtarak was that Kingdom. We are very lucky to have that level of political engagement. We’ve got someone in violence. However, there is a key difference. We are Helmand—Governor Mangal—who seems to be a facing a potential strategic insurgency. We are talking highly competent, able political agent in Afghanistan. in the short term—five years. In the first instance, we Working with him, co-operating with him, using our are talking about creating a regime that is at least own capabilities and capacities to support rather than capable of suppressing the major grievances that give just overwhelm him—that seems to be able to ensure rise to an insurgency that may undermine the whole that certain effects roll down this peculiar and regime. complex political geography, especially in Southern The next point—this relates to a period of very long Afghanistan. term that is well into our old age—is whether we can I suggest, if we look at the Operation—and Mr create a regime down in the South that is capable of Havard mentioned it in terms of Operation Moshtarak generating social stability and economic development 3, which is currently ongoing in the Arghandab Valley of the kind we saw in the 1950s and 1960s, where just outside Kandahar city—the most optimistic inter-communal violence is really quite low. I would process there is Hamkari. Political engagement, hope so. We don’t know, but I would hope so. The identifying appropriate political leaders who are key thing is to focus on the fact that we are creating legitimate in Afghanistan—and not just legitimate, but a plausible regime that is capable in the first instance capable—has been a key enabler for us to then utilise of suppressing a strategic insurgency, not just for the military force in a coherent way in this highly good of Afghanistan but for regional stability right complicated environment. across to India and Iran. Your point is absolutely The answer to your question, on both points, is correct and I agree with you. political engagement; but political engagement in the Professor Farrell: May I just make one observation? right way which shapes and prepares the ground in We should not lose sight of provincial and district which conventional, even COIN, operations must take governance. As much as Professor King is absolutely place. If Moshtarak 1, 2 and 3 don’t work, nothing right that we need to look at the national piece, a lot will, but I think there’s evidence that they may indeed of the effort that goes into ISAF and the work that work, and it’s this political engagement bit that’s the other international community partners are doing is key element of that process. directed towards building provincial and district governance. That is where the sustainability piece Q83 John Glen: It seems to me that there’s a bit of comes in. For instance, if you take a place like aconflict going on here, because you’re trying to say Helmand, you are working with the Provincial at one level that if the nature of the improvements is Governor. We have—the PRT has—an eight-man sophisticated enough in terms of improving the team directly in his office, building the capacity of political culture, and working with the right provincial governance. It is not just Mangal, although individuals, there is a state where less conflict between he has a very impressive office backing him up. Down different communities will ensue, which will be a the districts, you are trying to fill the tashkeels of all positive thing; but what you’re therefore doing, surely, the district governors and make sure there are decent is making the mistake that you have almost suggested district governors. One of the benefits of Moshtarak has been made across the board, of not understanding was that Mangal was able to get rid of a couple of the diversity and the variance in maturity in political lousy district governors—for example, in Musa Qala culture in Afghanistan. That will just be a short-term and Sangin—and replace them with decent people. solution that you might achieve for a while—and you What you want to try to achieve at a district level is seem to say that it’s happening now; but where’s the governance that is able to deliver services for the evidence that that is going to be a sustainable future, people and that enjoys popular legitimacy. That is why if there is, in the near term, wide variance in economic the community councils are so important. Various experience? How are you going to wipe out that programmes, such as the district delivery programme, tendency to have conflict, just because you can are being advanced by agencies like the IDLG—the identify a narrow political window where you’ve got Independent Directorate of Local Governance—in some stability? It seems to be a bit of a fragile Kabul. They are precisely designed to build district Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 21

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King governance capacity and local democracy and support. about it? What needs to change and how can we That’s what is going to be sustainable. counter that? Colonel Kemp: There are two very different targets Q84 Mrs Moon: Colonel Kemp, one of the things for public opinion in the UK and in Afghanistan. To that Governor Mangal talked about yesterday was the give one example of this, I can understand why links between corruption and the police, and President Obama said that he would begin corruption and the Afghan National Army. One of the withdrawing American forces in 2011 and why our questions I asked him was about how much ISAF and Prime Minister said he would expect to get all British the US are funding that corruption, particularly in Forces out within five years. I can fully understand relation to funds for the Taliban through private the reason behind saying that, but I think it sends security firms and the paying of bribes to get the completely the wrong message to the people in convoys through to our Armed Forces and to our Afghanistan. Only if it were accompanied by bases that provide the food and munitions— qualifying statements, such as, “We will start everything that is needed on the bases. Are we making withdrawing in 2011 if we’ve achieved certain it worse and making some of that stability and control objectives” or, “We will have British combat troops almost impossible to achieve? out of Afghanistan in five years, only if we have Colonel Kemp: I can’t speak in detail about what’s achieved certain objectives”, it would get the message happening there in given areas or whatever. But the clear to the people in Afghanistan that we are first thing is that, from my reading of the situation on committed to staying with them, protecting them from the ground in much of Afghanistan, particularly in the the Taliban, and supporting them in the long-term. South, a very large amount of public resentment and That’s more important than the harm that that kind opposition to the Government, ISAF and the Afghan of message does to the Taliban. The Taliban become Forces relates to the attitude of the Afghan police, encouraged by that kind of action, but I think that is particularly in getting people to pay bribes to allow less damaging, because the Taliban are going to fight them to do things. There is a general level of anyway. It is less damaging, I think, than discouraging corruption, which supplements, to an extent, the fact the local people from supporting us is. that in some cases they are not being paid or have Aside from all the other aspects, from a military been paid very little themselves for their own policing perspective the level of co-operation, intelligence and services, which is another issue altogether. That is a information provided by the local people to ISAF and pretty serious problem throughout much of the the Afghan Forces is so critically important. That is country. directly influenced by whether or not they think that Part of the issue is using the Afghan Security Forces in five years’ time we will leave and the Taliban will to support ISAF to get people onside, and to get them be back in with a whip hand. A different message is needed over here in the UK. I would go back to the to provide intelligence and information. There is an point I made earlier; I can understand why people in increasing amount of information coming out of the the UK want to know that this is not an open-ended local community, which is enabling ISAF to carry out commitment in which we are going to be for ever precisely targeted operations against Taliban leaders sending our forces out to Afghanistan, paying a huge and Taliban munitions manufacturers and so on. That cost in blood as well as money, and bringing them desire to get information from the local people, which back in body bags. I think that we need to know that. is fundamental to achieving success with the So many different stories have been told to the British insurgency, is countered not only by killing public about why we are in Afghanistan and those civilians—and we have spoken about that—but by the who follow the situation understand it and don’t need kind of low-level corruption that I have alluded to, to be convinced, because they know. But I don’t think such as stopping making people pay to get through that the majority of people in this country have a clue checkpoints and that kind of thing. I think that is a why we are fighting in Afghanistan, and I think that very serious issue. needs to be addressed more strongly. In terms of security organisations or ISAF paying and I don’t think that most people in this country believe in a way, funding this corrupt system, there’s that opening a school or an irrigation project, which undoubtedly—particularly with the local private can be used for both wheat and poppy, is worth a security firms—a level of pragmatism and expediency British soldier coming back with one limb out of four. in achieving short-term objectives, but in doing that, I don’t think they equate those things. I think that they are fuelling elements of the insurgency as well. I what people can understand is the need to protect this have no doubt that the contribution you have country and the people in the western world from suggested is occurring, from private security Islamist extremism, which would otherwise raise its companies in particular, but it is with the best head again in Afghanistan. I think they can understand intentions and not intended to fuel the insurgency, why you would be prepared to take British casualties even if it is perhaps indirectly doing that. I can’t be for that, but what they don’t understand is why it is more specific or precise but I do believe that to be one way. the case. I like to equate it to a football game. Britain play Germany at football and the Germans score three Q85 Mrs Moon: You talked about the importance of goals. The Britons then go shopping in Hamburg after getting public opinion onside. Do you think the the match and boost the local German economy, but Taliban are winning the information war, both in they don’t mention how many goals we scored, so Afghanistan and in the UK? If so, what can we do they don’t know the true score; they only know that Ev 22 Defence Committee: Evidence

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King we had a lot of goals scored against us. That is what Petraeus has issued commanders with guidance on is happening in Afghanistan. Admittedly, it is slightly contracting, which is available on the ISAF web. They less of a problem now, because the casualty rate seems know that corruption involves what the Afghan to have come down, but the British people are, I think, Government do and what we do. Right now, we can very dispirited by hearing constant stories about chip away at the problem in what we do and we need British casualties and deaths. What they don’t hear is to work with our Afghan partners on the other thing. how many casualties are being inflicted upon the Colonel Kemp is right: part of the problem that we Taliban, what damage is being done to the Taliban, have with the July draw-down of American Forces, and what gains are being made in military terms. the withdrawal of the Dutch, the Canadians and the Moreover, in that same context, you talk about the statements from the Prime Minister is that the picture propaganda or information war being won by the of Afghans is that we’re leaving in a matter of years. Taliban, but we don’t hear enough about the atrocities I totally agree with Colonel Kemp, the real problem that the Taliban are committing. You obviously know is not that that will embolden the Taliban—they don’t a lot about that, but the public don’t hear about the need that to be emboldened—but that it causes local real evils that the Taliban are committing in both Afghans to say, “Well, why should we back our Afghanistan and Pakistan. Government, who rely on ISAF, rather than the Taliban?” Those are Afghans in the South and the Q86 Chair: Colonel Kemp, I am uncomfortable with East. There is no easy solution, but there are efforts your implication that we should say, “Wahey, we have to do something about it. We will see all sorts of killed 400 Afghans,” particularly if they are young statements to mediate on the July draw-down. I don’t people who are not diehards, but who have been know how successful they will be. NATO is due to recruited either for money or because their father was release its new strategic concept at Lisbon in a week a Taliban diehard who was killed. I understand the or so, and at the heart of that will be a new long-term value of saying that we have achieved certain strategic strategic relationship with Afghanistan. That is clearly objectives, but not of saying that our body bag count an attempt to demonstrate—almost like the deal with is bigger than theirs. We produced a report in the past the new member states of eastern and central saying that it would be a bad idea to have lots of body Europe—long-term partnership. bag counts. Are you really going to stick to that? Chair: We may come back to the leaving thing. Colonel Kemp: I am. I wouldn’t want to glory in Personally, I entirely agree with what you’ve both said anybody’s death. I don’t think we should do that, but on that point. we are fighting a war against people who are trying to kill our soldiers. The young people in the Taliban in Q87 Mrs Moon: Could I ask a very quick question? Afghanistan are no less our enemy than the young Is part of the problem that we in this country conflate German soldiers who fought for their own country Afghanistan and Helmand? There are areas where against us were in the Second World War. We weren’t there is huge positive news of success and what can shy about discussing the successes we had against that be achieved that we could be getting out. Instead, the enemy, as well as the successes that they had against public’s impression of the whole of Afghanistan is us. I don’t understand the sensitivity. I don’t believe almost like saying the whole of the UK is Cornwall, that we should be glorying in it, but I do think that and everything that happens in Cornwall is happening we should give the people in this country some elsewhere. Should there be more of a balance, with indication of the success we are having against what news of some of the successes and of stability, is not an army but, for want of a better word, an army security and improvements in other areas of that is fightingusinthefield. Afghanistan? Would that help? Chair: May I just say from my own point of view Professor King: Yes. To pick up the point on strategic that I don’t think it would make the British people communications, I completely agree with Professor feel better about what we are doing. Farrell and Colonel Kemp. We failed completely. It Professor Farrell: May I make three observations? is about precisely what you said, Mrs Moon, about First, on the body count issue, in terms of ISAF, the Helmand. You cannot understand the campaign as a view is unequivocal—do not do body counts. They whole through the prism of Helmand. In the campaign are not helpful to the campaign. One of the primary in the South, it is an important but supporting area reasons why they are not helpful is because they get for Kandahar city. We might brutally say that if the soldiers focusing on the wrong thing. You are not in operations and the political engagement around the field to kill the enemy, but to create security for Kandahar city are successful over the next 18 months, the local population. That is why no one really uses not only would the campaign have been potentially all body counts in the COIN campaign. but won and we would have made a huge step and To pick up two other points, on corruption, which was Helmand would be but a small supporting part. If we correctly raised, and our contracting practice, as you told that story to the British public, I think that they probably know there’s a counter-corruption Task would then understand how the losses we have Force within ISAF that General Petraeus set up. As suffered make sense and fit in, and that, despite the you probably know, it is being led by Brigadier H. R. fact that they are complete tragedies for every family McMaster, who is widely considered one of the most who has lost a soldier, there is a strategic point to brilliant American practitioners of COIN, so it is very them. impressive. That he is the man who is leading the If I may qualify that, I wouldn’t emphasise the effort gives you some indication of how important the counter-terrorism element in any way. It is not a Task Force is. As you probably know, General credible or empirically-based claim about what we’re Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 23

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King doing. There is good evidence that, in fact, our Q90 Chair: And destabilised the local population. presence in Afghanistan radicalises certain young men Professor King: Correct. in this country and elsewhere. I would suggest that the argument is that we are on a stabilisation mission that Q91 Chair: To whom would you attribute the lack of has regional political importance, in support of our analysis, which was your second point? major ally, the US. That seems to me to be something Professor King: That is a nasty question to be asked. that we were doing in the Cold War and, presumably, There was a plan in 2005. There was also a special something that we will do after Afghanistan. I think forces plan in 2005, which seemed to outline the that the British public would understand and value situation in Helmand extremely well. Now, such a mission. For me, counter-narcotics and somewhere in the machinations of the MoD, the counter-terrorism are subordinate and potentially services and PJHQ the at least completely workable— beneficial sub-effects of that stabilisation campaign, of I might say very good, or at least adequate— which Helmand is a small but significant part, which, I understanding of what was going on down there at hope, our Armed Forces will be proud that they have that point somehow got lost in the procedure. One done. factor may have been the very complicated command Chair: Colonel Kemp, it is past 3.34, so past your relations that developed in early 2006. The British witching-hour. Helmand Task Force went in; there was a chain of Colonel Kemp: It’s past my bed time. command going back to PJHQ; there was a Task Force that had a different commander than the brigade Q88 Chair: Thank you very much indeed for coming commander that it was nominally under—that brigade to give evidence. It has been most helpful and very commander was, however, COMBRIT force, so had interesting. some sort of authority over it. We had NATO I want to move on, if I may, Professor Farrell, to Command Structure coming down with a Canadian something that you, Professor King, have written, Brigadier in Kandahar who was seen as weak—I am which is that “the British have consistently dispersed not saying he was weak, but he was seen as weak— their kinetic effects over time and space so that they and therefore could not exert authority and coherence never achieve the lasting dominance over any on what was going on in Helmand, even though there particular area necessary to neutralize Taliban was a very important campaign that was run in August influence there.” You go on to set out how that works. around Kandahar city at that point. Why on earth have we done that? The intelligence was there. It was not a failure of Professor King: It will not surprise you that I am intelligence gathering or understanding—there was an understanding. It was a failure in this complicated going to say that it’s complicated, but let me just put operational architecture to enforce and discipline in one really important qualifying statement. That decisions in relation to that extant intelligence. article takes into account Panchai Palang. However, Professor Farrell: I agree with Professor King. This over the past 18 months to two years—I would say just adds an extra layer of explanation as to what from December 2008—there has been an attempt to happened. As you probably appreciate, everyone concentrate forces in Helmand, and we now have a understood the plan, which was to focus on the key concentration of forces in Helmand. economic area of Gereshk and the key political area of Lashkar Gar. We were going to focus on that area in Q89 Chair: Because of the surge? central Helmand. When the British got into Helmand, Professor King: Yes, a surge and a redistribution of Governor Daoud very quickly requested support from forces with the US Marines coming in. That article British forces deployed northwards, because he felt was intended to analyse the period from 2006 through that the towns of NawZad, Sangin and Musa Qala to December 2008, and possibly through to the end were under threat from the Taliban. So part of the of 2009. problem facing the British commanders on the ground Why did it happen? I would suggest three key factors: was that they had to support Governor Daoud, because a lack of resources, a lack of campaign analysis about he was our governor—we replaced SMA at the how to use and prioritise those resources. Anyone request of the British Government, so we couldn’t familiar with the British military would recognise that leave that guy in the lurch. one of its great qualities is its highly active desire to There was very heavy political pressure on military get things done—an initiative-seizing ethos that I commanders on the ground to support the Afghans, think is one of the most powerful parts of the British and there is nothing new here. That exact problem is Force. But within Helmand and that very complicated being faced, for instance, by the Italians in RC West. political and social environment—and, indeed, Their instruction is to focus on Highway 1 going from potentially highly hostile environment—those north to south near Herat, but the Afghans want them traditional strengths of British commanders and to focus on Highway 2, which goes from west to east. British Forces led us to be over-ambitious. The feeling So you are trying to work and support the local that we could almost do anything encouraged Afghan Government and your Afghan partners, yet commanders to exceed the capacities of their forces they might be running contrary to your superior and to disperse their forces in the hope of achieving orders. good effects, but unfortunately, ultimately, just generating a series of very severe tactical fights, which Q92 Mr Havard: We have asked questions about in many cases did not really add up to much and, in that before, and there has been some descriptive some cases, actually put us behind politically. evidence in the past about some of that probably being Ev 24 Defence Committee: Evidence

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King the case. You both seem to be saying something about things—how they relate to aspects of the PRT and all the Command Structure, though, and you have both the component elements that are not directly under the looked at this. What are your observations, then, about military command, but are under the military what the Command Structure should look like going influence and which influence the military’s behaviour forward and the force mix that goes with it? That force and its capacity to do things. What are you saying mix is very different, now that we have learned some about the Command Structure’s dealing with the of those lessons. We now know the tribes better than complexity of a new mix of forces—forces beyond we did before. When 16 Air Assault Brigade first went those just in uniform? in we stumbled into something that we didn’t Professor King: There are two implied questions understand. We’ve gone through all of that, so what there, and I would like to go back to the previous one. are your observations about what the force Command I think what Professor Farrell said would be my reply Structure should look like if there is to be this NATO at one level. There was an incoherence, a lack of transformation of its plans, and all the rest of it, over power, in the centralised NATO command from 2006 the next couple of weeks? to 2009. The centralisation of power into the regional Professor Farrell: I focused on exactly that at the commands has been extremely important. For a clear operational level in the study that I did two weeks ago example of that, compare Operation Panther’s Claw for General Rodriguez. last summer with Operation Moshtarak. One of the difficulties that came out of the lessons learned was Q93 Mr Havard: Give us a clue. that they just did not have the right resourcing and Professor Farrell: On the effectiveness of the current sequencing, which Moshtarak had. Command Structure. As you know, the campaign is The British Forces in Helmand now are under US run from a three-star headquarters—ISAF Joint Marine command, and you are asking very specific Command—and below that there are six Regional questions—just to confirm—in terms of those Commands: North, South, South-West, East, West and relations. My understanding of the US Marine Corps Centre. When I interviewed the senior staff at each at this point is that they assist and provide additional, regional command, I asked whether they have a sense especially military, resources. Overwhelmingly, the that there is direction at an operation level across the Helmand in this Lashkar Gar area is operating in entirety of Afghanistan. I also asked the people who accordance with the overarching campaign plan that had been there before IJC was stood up whether they really General Carter developed, and predominantly had seen any improvement. There is no question about autonomously. From talking to people in RC South, that: there is no question that they see the proper, the resources that they have at the moment seem directional command that they expect. That comes adequate for what they are doing at this moment, but down into RC South. what they will need in the future is an interesting 1 The point of my paper and of my previous study, question. “Appraising Moshtarak”, was that we tend to lose sight of the fact that we deployed a proper divisional Q95 Chair: Before we get on to that, the Marines headquarters for 6 Division in RC South. RC South don’t traditionally operate with anybody else, do they? was then the centre of the whole campaign, it was the Professor King: No. main effort. We had, for the first time, a proper divisional headquarters running the campaign. There Q96 Chair: And they don’t really like operating with is clear evidence, which Professor King can talk anybody else, do they? about, because he has been embedded in RC South Professor King: Perhaps. for quite a period of time, of command leadership going down into Task Forces. So you invariably had Q97 Chair: How do they get on operating with, for tension between the Marine Task Forces and Task example, Governor Mangal? Force Helmand, the British Task Force, over who Professor King: Theo would know the answer much would do what and who would get which resources. better than I do. For the first time, instead of the Task Force Professor Farrell: The situation has got slightly more commanders sorting that out between them, you complex in RC South-West because a new regional would have General Nick Carter, who was the platform has been stood up—an American senior superior commander, coming down to say, “No, that civilian representative—so he will bring capacity and is what’s going to happen.” You see the exact same funding with him. You now have on the civilian side, thing now. The main effort in RC South is in for instance, three big players. You have the Kandahar, and they don’t have the resources to take stabilisation team within RC South-West, and they care of Maiwand, which is a key district in securing have a very large civil affairs side. The Marines tend Highway 1. Maiwand has been given to RC South- to have very large civil affairs teams; these are West and the Marines aren’t happy, because they don’t military teams. You have the regional platform, who want it, but that’s their order from superior command. is the new SCR, and you have the PRT. So we now have a Command Structure in place that The problem is that the SCR is co-located with the works. headquarters of RC South-West in Leatherneck, which is next to Bastion, whereas the PRT is located down Q94 Mr Havard: Does that reconcile some of the 1 See supplementary written evidence from Professor Anthony other things? I want to get to the point about force King, Ev w23 [Note: references to Ev wXX are references to mix. I want to know the way in which the Marines written evidence published in the volume of additional work, their Command Structure—all sorts of different written evidence published on the Committee’s website] Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 25

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King in Lashkar Gar, co-located with Governor Mangal and you’re saying, the Marines aren’t co-ordinating with the Provincial Government. That distance is a real the civilian governor and they’re not co-ordinating issue; there is no question about that. Compounding with the PRTs. At the beginning, we had a very clear that, of course, is the very close proximity between picture of the priorities that we had and the building the PRT and Task Force Helmand. Task Force up of governance. Is what the Marines are doing not Helmand, for instance, has its planning cell located in counterintuitive? the heart of the PRT—you will know that already. Professor Farrell: Sorry, it’s important that I clarify Look at this from the Marines’ point of view. They this. I am not saying for a second that the Marines see a PRT that is very cosy with Task Force Helmand don’t co-ordinate with the governor—General Mills, and is very cosy with Governor Mangal, and yet the the commander of Regional Command South-West, is Marines are supposed to be running the whole show. frequently down in Lashkar Gah—and I’m not saying As far as the US military are concerned PRTs fall there isn’t good co-ordination by the principals. under military command, because that is what Absolutely not; I want to be clear on this. Also, I happens with American PRTs. As far as the PRT is should point out that the military plan has military concerned, it is the superior actor in the Helmand area tactical priorities and also development and for non-military operations. There is an issue there governance priorities for each of the Regional that, as far as I am aware, has not yet been resolved, Commands to implement. There is the potential for but may be resolved through creative management by unity of effort there; it’s just that there could be better the key players. unity of effort between the military and civilian sides, the American and the British. But that’s to be Q98 Mr Havard: “Creative management by the key expected. players.” That is an interesting phrase. What place is The Americans have ripped 20,000 troops into the PRT in? Helmand, bringing massive resource, and they expect Professor Farrell: The new head of the PRT is an things to happen fast, whereas the British PRT has opportunity for a fresh start, a new regional platform, been operating there for a number of years, and their and of course in due course we are going to have a basic posture is to go more slowly, because they know, new head commander of RC South-West. But the I think correctly, that that’s how you’ll get sustainable current one is very good. These are good guys. growth of governance and development.

Q99 Mr Havard: How do you see that fitting with Q102 Mr Havard: So out of the Strategic Concept, the development of the capacity of the Afghans to or whatever this meeting is with NATO in a week’s deploy and deliver to Governor Mangal, and their time— arrangements? Professor Farrell: The Strategic Concept. Professor Farrell: Everything is in place anyway. The PRT has done sterling work, particularly over the past Mr Havard—and this mysterious OPLAN that year and a half to two years. The Provincial they’re revising in ISAF, how do these things knit Government is very well developed and staffed. It is together? What do you see coming out of that thing a whole different ball game in Kandahar, where they that will change this Command Structure to make all have had real problems trying to fill the Kandahar of that coherent, if it is a support transition plan for Provincial Government, but the Helmand Provincial the future? What does that Command Structure need Government is looking very strong. to look like that it doesn’t do now? Professor Farrell: I don’t think there needs to be any Q100 Chair: What you are describing is a change in the military side of the Command Structure. completely dysfunctional relationship. Effort now needs to be put into coming up with a Professor Farrell: What I am describing—this was functioning civilian Command Structure. This is an one of the points that came out of my report to issue that, for instance, Mark Sedwill was very alive General Rodriguez, but it is not news—is that there is to. It was one of the areas that I think he was going a continual problem with regard to unity of effort on to focus on as NATO SCR. the civilian side. ISAF has yet to figure out how to Professor King: Can I just say one thing about the US resolve it, not least because the UN agencies in theatre Marine Corps? First of all, a number of British are weak for a variety of reasons—we all know of the officers are working in that headquarters. My problems at UNAMA—and there are multiple civilian understanding is that they—as is very frequent with agencies, many of which respond to national British officers selected to work in American Governments. Helmand PRT responds most closely to headquarters—are having huge influence. They are Whitehall, but you have a similar problem with the extremely capable officers. I think that the fears that two German PRTs at RC North: the civilian side does this Committee has—I think that we would need to be not fall under the command of the German careful about the evidence. commander of RC North, which he finds very The other point to make, of course, is that the US irritating as far as I can see. He controls the Marine Corps’ area of operations is Regional battlegroups that guard them, but he does not control Command South-West, and we need to be careful the PRTs. All over Afghanistan there is an issue of about the Helmand myopia issue. The bit of Helmand disunity of effort on the civilian side. that we are in is a very small part of the area out to Farah that they are involved in. As Professor Farrell Q101 Mrs Moon: Is there not also an issue of people says, to make presumptions on the basis of certain fighting their own private wars? By the sound of what little bits of evidence might be premature. Ev 26 Defence Committee: Evidence

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King

Chair: That is fair enough. We have to do an inquiry militias are necessary for self-defence. I suggest that into what British troops are doing. We will change we could well do with using the concept of civilian subjects slightly to civilian casualties. casualty and broadening it to make a more refined assessment of the insurgency. Q103 Penny Mordaunt: We touched on civilian That comes back to Colonel Kemp’s point about these casualties. Professor Farrell talked about the numbers unfortunate terms “kill counts” or “body counts”. It is of civilian casualties and the impact that that might quite disturbing, the number of people we have killed, have on successful operations. If I’ve understood you potentially legitimately under the rules of correctly, the adoption of the McChrystal strategy by engagement, but whom we didn’t need to kill and ISAF Forces had in part the result of reducing the whom we should not have been fighting, and whom, civilian casualties caused by those Forces. I’d like to with better political awareness, we would not have ask Professor King if he agrees with that assessment. needed to fight and kill. I would include all those three What is your assessment of the impact of civilian groups within any systematic analysis of civilian casualties on successful operations? Professor Farrell, casualties in Afghanistan. In so far as we address can you say something about the relationship between those issues in a comprehensive way, we might be in those reductions in casualties caused by ISAF Forces a position to move the campaign forward. and the number of casualties of those Forces? Professor Farrell: There are three points; I’ll address Professor King: First, I broadly agree with Professor them in turn. The first is to come back to the issue of Farrell’s point. Certainly there’s been an emphasis on what we actually know. reducing civilian casualties, which has been broadly From this report that I mentioned, that was previously successful, especially with conventional forces. I think produced, the data being drawn upon was the data that we would want to distinguish between conventional ISAF generates through its civilian casualties forces and special forces; there have been numerous, assessment process. There is probably good reason to quite shaking incidents with special forces involving feel that we don’t entirely know how much confidence civilian casualties. I would say that at conventional we can have in it. First, it is a very complex force level, there have been tragic incidents, but environment and it is very difficult to gather data in there’s an attempt to control them. I think that might volume like that; secondly, there are certain be worth some attention. However, a lot of discussion organisational biases that might lead to under- about civilian casualties stays at that level—the reporting, and the WikiLeaks business has highlighted civilian casualties that our forces perpetrate in that. It is possible that the civilian casualties might be Afghanistan—but there seem to be at least two other higher. In this particular report, the statistical evidence types of civilian casualty that we need to think about was correlated with extensive interviews at all levels very carefully. of command, to gather the overall picture. It is about The first is the civilian casualties caused by the as good as you can get. Taliban, and there are two issues in that. One is, as There is the interesting question of how the Colonel Kemp said earlier, I don’t think that we McChrystal strategy worked. The way the commander clarify the nature of the insurgency that we are does this is to issue tactical guidance to all subordinate confronting there. For instance, a boy of seven was commands, and that gets sent right down to the lowest hanged in Sangin in June this year for supposedly trooper, and it is translated into rules of engagement collaborating with British Forces up there; and there and so forth. The interesting thing is that McChrystal’s are frequent reports of children placing IEDs and tactical guidance was not that much stricter in terms of being killed or severely wounded, or losing an arm, as controlling civilian casualties than that of the previous a result. That raises not only strategic communications commanders, McKiernan and McNeil. The difference issues but whether we are indirectly endangering was the whole philosophy under McChrystal. He populations by not securing them and protecting them brought in a new command philosophy: “Look, this is from Taliban intimidation. I think that that is an the big problem. We’re going to focus on this.” That important point to raise. new command philosophy enthused the entire However, there is a third type of civilian casualty—at command, right down to the COIN units in the field, least, I would call them civilian casualties. There is and produced fewer civilian casualties. Yes, combined a presumption that what we are facing is a unified with certain strictures on the use of ammunitions, that insurgency. There are certainly committed Taliban made a difference. fighters and commanders working in Southern You are quite right that the issue now is force Afghanistan, and intelligence agencies have extremely protection. One of the areas for which McChrystal good intelligence on them. But, overwhelmingly, was criticised by some troops was that with such an manyofthefights that NATO troops get involved in emphasis on civilian casualties, it exposed them to and that the Afghan National Police and Army get more risk. There is no doubt that there was very involved in are against militias. enthusiastic embracement of the McChrystal People who are under the rules of engagement approach, for example by the brigadier of 4 Brigade, because they fire on our troops or on the Afghans are Richard Felton, who felt that civilian casualties were then subject to counter strike by our forces. In many a critical issue in Helmand; I think that he was entirely cases, we kill huge numbers of these people. I suggest right. He instituted very strict rules of engagement, to you that in many cases these people are not which actually made it very difficult for British Forces insurgents; they could be considered civilians in a to engage, unless of course they had to do so in self- normal Afghan way. We know that in Afghan society defence. However, the primary risk to troops comes all men basically carry weapons, and that local from IEDs so that is not really an issue of use of force. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 27

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King

So it’s not an issue in terms of the main threat to therefore that we would have more troops than the our troops. Americans had had previously. ISAF is not taking its foot off the pedal, as it were. It However, what no one anticipated—not only is not the case that it is using less force, due to the ourselves, but the Canadians in Kandahar and our restrictions that were imposed to reduce civilian Danish partners in theatre—was the extent and scale casualties. It is just using force more precisely and of the Taliban resistance that they were able to present more discriminately. What you have seen under ISAF in the field. That could be a product of intelligence is a very extensive increase under General McChrystal failure. I would suggest that probably, on balance, it in the use of special forces, to the extent now that in was, because if we had had better intelligence we the last three months SF in the Afghan-wide theatre would have put more troops in, or we would not have have operated at around four times the tempo that they gone into Helmand in the first place. However, that is were operating at in Lambar and Ramadi in 2004–05. speculation on my part. There has been very extensive and heavy use of SF to As for what the situation is now— carry out precision strikes against targets. Does that raise issues of civilian casualties? It Q105 Chair: Before you get off that subject, do you certainly does and it perhaps comes back to Professor think that if we had had a smaller number of troops King’s point. The hope is obviously that, with a much we would have faced less resistance? more discriminatory operation, in which ideally you Professor Farrell: No. That is really a very good capture rather than kill insurgent leaders, you lower question, actually, because it goes to a major thesis the risk of civilian casualties compared to bigger-unit that, for example, David Kilcullen holds in his widely activity. cited and very good book, “The Accidental Guerrilla”: Chair: Okay. Thank you very much. sometimes we generate insurgencies because we push into areas and then the people in those areas come out Q104 Mr Brazier: Did the UK and ISAF Forces and present an organised resistance. Of course, that have the necessary intelligence when we went into does not only involve foreign fighters and Taliban but, Helmand in 2006 and what do you see as the position as Professor King points out, local people who come now? Actually, I will give you the second half of my out and take pot shots or who are annoyed with you. question too. Colonel Kemp is no longer with us, but It is true that there are parts of Afghanistan that we both of you may have seen that there was a very have not pushed into and right now they are very widely reviewed paper that came out last month from permissive, because we are not there. Ghor is almost General Lamb and Colonel Richard Williams. the size of Helmand in west central Afghanistan and Professor Farrell, you have been saying quite a lot we are not there. The Lithuanians have PRT; there are about special forces. The paper said that the critical no ISAF troops. We haven’t got a clue what is going problem was communications bandwidth and the fact on in Ghor. Right now, it’s pretty permissive. If we that very often we had the right real-time intelligence pushed in in force, would we encounter resistance? coming in, but it was no use to our soldiers because Possibly. The evidence seems to be that the insurgents we did not have the bandwidth to get the intelligence were reforming in the South from 2005 onwards. down to the level that it was needed at quickly Therefore, the alternative to not pushing in in force enough. Do you have any views on that? would have been to give them the south. If we had Shall we start with Professor Farrell, as you were put in a smaller unit, we would have the situation that talking about special forces, and then come to you, we had in Sangin or NawZad, but around Lashkar Professor King, if we may? Gah. It would have been simply untenable. Professor Farrell: Okay. I guess the big caveat is that You were absolutely right on the situation today. It is it is very hard to get any information on anything to about a technical issue that has to do with network do with intelligence. I would not be able to show you capability and the ability to move information around. any information that I had on intelligence, because I There are two problems. One is the actual ability to don’t know whether it is classified or not, or I don’t move information around in a timely fashion. The know if what I would be revealing would be breaching other is the ability to exploit that information. Part of classification. It’s extremely hard to give the answer, the problem is that there is too much information and but I will try my best. we don’t have the human capacity to exploit it. Essentially, did we know enough going into Helmand Basically, the commanders are overwhelmed with in 2006? Almost certainly not. Did we do due information. So, there is that issue, but there is also diligence in sending advance teams to scout the area the issue of whether the guys on the ground can get and develop a reasonable plan with Afghan partners the information fast enough. It is a real problem for on the ground? Yes, I think that we probably did, biometrics. You gather data on an individual. When actually. Did we know that the Taliban would present you stop someone in the street, in Nad-e-Ali for us with organised resistance and therefore that we had instance, you go on the net and ask the question, to go in with a larger force than we originally “What do we have on this person?” It takes longer for expected to use? I think that the answer is yes. them to come back and give you a response. I cannot The American Provincial Reconstruction Team was give you that information because it is classified, but guarded by about 250 troops. The MoD decided that it takes longer than they would want. As you may it had to control the risk of that operation. Therefore know, there is a programme that is urgently seeking it was decided to deploy 3,100 British troops to to address this problem. As I understand it, the new support the deployment. There was an appreciation capability will be rolled out, if not this year, early that there would be a higher-threat environment and next year. Ev 28 Defence Committee: Evidence

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King

Q106 Mr Brazier: Forgive me, Professor King, we be that you can’t have too much ISTAR, and it has to will go into detail, and then we will bring you in. I be said that for the big operations the British have was rather intrigued when the article reviewing this been involved in, such as Moshtarak, because it was particular paper appeared in The Times. At the time, I main effort, they had more ISTAR than you could happened to have in my constituency a firm called practically use—the place was flooded with ISTAR. Amphenol, which makes the low-tech bits of most of The situation isn’t as stark, perhaps, as you present, the high-tech equipment in a whole range of areas. It although there is a general view that, yes, the is the world-leading supplier of the hardened Americans have more. That is the caveat I mentioned. connecters that are used in signalling equipment for Professor King: To go back to your original question, everything from avionics to army wirelesses. The I can’t speak for 2006, but I have been reading the immediate comment I got from Amphenol was, “This intelligence reports whenever I have been in is absolutely right. It was perfectly obvious to us that Kandahar, since last autumn. our signalling equipment didn’t have anything like I would say that the intelligence reports are really enough bandwidth to cope with the information age.” impressive, but—I have no expertise on the You mentioned the example of the biometrics, but the technological side and, perhaps, no particular most vivid example was quoted by the guys in a interest—for me the failures of intelligence are not presentation I heard. They said, “An American soldier primarily to do with technology but to do with is only 40% as likely to become a casualty on patrol as interpretation and analysis. I would say that the a British soldier.” They said one of the most important military are still primarily focused on what they would factors in that—you can’t comment in detail on call a “red focus”, an enemy focus, so they still intelligence—was the real-time information coming analyse in ways that have strong resonances with the in. That goes back to your point about information Cold War. They are understanding the Taliban overload and so on. The ability of the American insurgency in a conventional way, which means that systems to get the information coming in from, say, what is lacking is not intelligence but understanding— UAVs, or a whole range of different sources fusing and locating violent conflict, the insurgency immediately down to the guys on the ground who and its germination and spread within a political need it, is a very long way ahead of us, they say, and framework. not terribly expensively so either. Basically, we are a The key missing part, or potentially missing part, in generation or two behind them. Do you have any ISAF and for the British is not the intelligence at all, views on that? I know that it’s a bit of a techie which is, as of October 2009, extremely impressive I question. think, but it is what Liddell Hart called the “still” and Professor Farrell: I do. The standard military “silent” bit of warfare; the ability to analyse and to response when it comes to a civilian contractor saying situate what we know about the actors in the South that they can deliver a capability faster and cheaper is who are decisive for this campaign in their proper that the operation environment is more demanding and social and political context. The one optimism about will require higher-end capability than they can really that is that the silent and still part is cheap to do and understand. It is possible that’s partly in play here. easy, potentially, if you get the right teams in theatre There is also the cumbersome MoD acquisition even to do it. I hope that Nick Carter thought his Prism Cell under the UORs. Also, at the same time, they are did some of that. I hope that that is accentuated and trying to integrate the Bowman system. Multiple accelerated both for the British Task Force over the factors are in play. coming year and for NATO Forces across On the US versus the UK, the general view, on which Afghanistan. That goes back to my initial point. That you are absolutely right, is that the US has more will get you the political solution that means we get organic ISTAR capability and brings it more into play. out of that theatre with a successful outcome. Units have more ISTAR at Task Force level. We are talking about all these UAVs, full-motion video and Q107 John Glen: Turning to the Elections and the so on. There is an issue about not only gathering full- perception of corruption in Afghanistan, what impact motion video, but pushing that imagery around have the recent Elections had on our operations there? theatre—the operational environment. Against that, I That interaction between the democratic process and offer two caveats. The first caveat is that technology the perception of corruption, how does it effect doesn’t improve your situation awareness but can operations? What comments do you have to make? make it worse. What you are trying to do is get a Professor King: In terms of the recent election, I proper appreciation of what is called the human cannot comment. I haven’t been there since June, so I environment, and that involves talking to people. The just can’t comment—I don’t know if Professor Theo more time you spend in front of a TV console looking Farrell can. I could talk generally but not specifically. at full-motion video, the less time you are spending Professor Farrell: I didn’t go back recently, so I’ve directing your commanders, or yourself, out on the no straight answer. ground having cups of tea. Just to make a serious point, it can sometimes be the Q108 Chair: But you did mention WikiLeaks. What case that senior commanders looking at full-motion effect did the WikiLeaks have on the Afghan video think they know what is going on. They can population, on the UK Armed Forces and on then try and direct, through the long-handled operations in general? screwdriver, a situation on the ground. Professor Farrell: That’s obviously an important set Technology does have consequences, so you have to of questions. Unfortunately, in the last study I was be aware of that. That said, the general view tends to doing, I wasn’t interacting with Afghan stakeholders, Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 29

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King so I don’t know the answer to that. Nor was I in a district which has enjoyed dramatic improvements theatre talking to the British down in Helmand, in security, considerable growth, effective governance, because I was at regional command level. I don’t well, you’re probably a bit more relaxed about this, to know the answer, I’m afraid. be perfectly honest. If you’re in a district that still has to turn that corner and you’re hoping for that corner Q109 Chair: Can we get on to this issue of the end to turn and then you really are deciding, “Do I throw date? You suggest, I think, that the main effect is not my lot in with the Afghan Government and Security on the Taliban but on the local population, who are Forces or do I hold back?” For instance, around still undecided as to which side to support. Is that Gereshk in Nahri Sarraj that is the situation. right? Would you like to expand on that? In terms of the issue of the withdrawal and the Professor King: I’ll go first, although it was a point implications, there are obviously two views. One view that Professor Farrell made. is that by indicating that we’re only going to be here There are a couple of points. If I could just clarify the for so much longer, you’re going to push the Afghan nature of the withdrawal, obviously certain countries, Government to get their house in order, because there including America, have set a date on the is a strong view that they, and ultimately they, must do withdrawal—2015, potentially. But it is quite it and secondly that you will push the Afghan Security important to understand—or at least it’s my Forces to continue to grow and be effective. The interpretation of the campaign—that it is not that the opposite view, obviously, is that you undermine the US is thinking about withdrawing next year, but that Afghan Government, particularly because you they are hoping for is a draw-down of troops by next undermine public confidence. I would suggest that December, assuming the conditions that they think what will really matter is what happens in December they will be able to achieve during the next year are and what happens in July. What’s going to happen in place, and the draw-down they conceive, from my with Obama’s review of the campaign in December, discussions and observations, is a slow one over a and how will that in turn impact on the draw-down? decade. I think we need to be extremely careful about How steep? We know there’s going to be a draw-down this sort of sense that the Americans are in any way in July. The question is how steep will it be? That is thinking of Afghanistan in terms of a quick fix and a going to be the critical thing. Right now we really are cut and run. On the contrary, everything points to a engaging in speculation. If the draw-down is fairly long-term investment, which is materially relevant to shallow then there will be a degree of confidence the question you ask in terms of Afghan perceptions. within Afghanistan. If, however, the draw-down is But it also makes an answer very difficult. I think it much steeper than people hoped or expected, alarm depends on the constituency of Afghans you are bells are going to ring. talking to. If you were talking to the power elite, the power brokers—Karzai and his patrimonial elite—I Q111 Mr Havard: I found very interesting the think they believe that the Americans will sustain their statement by the Foreign Secretary on 27 October in alliance with them over a significant period. As for the House. It is interesting that he talks there about average Afghans living in Kandahar, I haven’t seen the Prime Minister attending the NATO Summit on 19 any evidence of polling about what they think of ISAF November. To quote, he said that “we expect NATO presence or evacuation, so it’s a very difficult question to agree the process of transferring lead responsibility to answer at that popular local level. for security across Afghanistan to the Afghan Security Forces by the end of 2014. It will be a phased Q110 Chair: So your suggestion is that the fact that transition, with the Afghan Security Forces gradually the Americans have announced a start date for the taking the lead—as they have in Kabul—in jointly withdrawal of their troops of July of next year is not selected districts and provinces, as the conditions on something that really is upsetting the Afghan the ground are met. British Forces will be drawn down population, and the fact that the British have from combat operations by 2015.” announced an end date is seen in the context of the There’s a whole packet there. This is combat fact that the Americans will still be there. Is that right? operations that are being talked about, not how you Professor King: I have to be very careful in terms of support transition. There are all sorts of other the Afghan perception of the British. What I would processes. I commend that statement to you, because suggest is that there is no suggestion from the public I think he starts to give a definition of what an statements of the leaders around the Kandahar area acceptable end state in Afghanistan would be in his that they fear US precipitate withdrawal. As for what statement. I don’t have time to quote it all now. local Afghan leaders in the Helmand area precisely As part of that process, there are changes that will think about a 2015 date, I could not comment. have to be sequenced in, not the least of which is Professor Farrell is probably better positioned. that President Karzai will not be President throughout Professor Farrell: I’d agree with Professor King in some of that period, because there will be a transition. one respect: it is very reasonable and important to ask His period will end, and he can’t stand again. Other about Afghan local and national popular perceptions people will be involved. You can see a set of of this issue, but it is notoriously difficult to get manoeuvres already taking place on the ground for accurate data on this. There have been all sorts of that transition to happen, by both individuals and problems with opinion polling in Helmand, for groups. instance. It is very difficult to do. Also it will really I’m interested in your thing about a narrow patronage matter in terms of which Afghans you are talking to. system as opposed to a central state that might accept You can go right down to district level. If you are in the imposition of some sort of amended Jeffersonian Ev 30 Defence Committee: Evidence

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King democracy, which is not going to happen. Can I ask actually be clusters of districts. Will it be areas of you what you see as that process between now and districts? All those are yet to be defined. One can 2014 in that transition? How should we be placing anticipate that the commander of ISAF Forces will ourselves in that process? want to maximise his freedom of manoeuvre with Professor King: The key point is that up to that date, regard to his Afghan partners and Washington as he I think, the military will take a primary role, tries to shape the transition process. necessarily, because the security dimension will be I suggest that the key thing to focus on as we go critical. But in order to get to 2014—it is a very dense forward is how many of the key terrain districts are and useful statement. If we’re still at the level of transitioned. Currently, there are 83, and the new plan intensity we are now—not just the British Task Force increases that number somewhat. They focus on the but NATO itself—ultimately, the campaign has been key population centres, the economic nodes and the lost. What the Americans are planning for—I think transport routes. They are basically central to the their analysis is completely coherent—is that, should whole piece, but they are also where the enemy is they go through the surge, they will then get into a likely to be in greatest force, if it has any force to position where there will be a more benign try to resist what we are trying to achieve. It will be environment. interesting to see the extent to which transitioning That benign environment will allow a couple of focuses on targeting key terrain districts, rather than important things, including the draw-down of combat other districts where we are perhaps less present, but troops, but, crucially, more space for mentoring so are the Taliban. They could be quietly transitioned Afghan Security Forces. I might put as a footnote as well. there that I think we potentially need to think about local militias much more seriously than we have in Q112 Mr Havard: There’s a very interesting report terms of the gap in terms of numbers but also in terms in today’s Financial Times by Ahmed Rashid—I am of revenue. We haven’t got enough revenue to not familiar with him, but you probably are—in which support—Afghanistan does not generate enough he writes about the transition and the reconciliation of revenue to support—the Security Forces that we have Taliban leaders. He mentions NATO providing them said are necessary for its security. It seems that some with—how should I put it—safe passage to Kabul for kind of localised neo-mediaeval militia, mentored and discussions, which the Afghans themselves wish to properly trained, might be a useful way to bridge the promote, and about doing all of that through the High gap. Peace Council and related activities. However, that But then, at that point, we get a diagram where the appears to be something that, although initiated by security bit goes down after 2015, and we get the them, might destabilise the relationship with Pakistan. governance and the economic development coming in. I would like you to talk a little about how that fits into This is a key point. What will that regime look like? the regional context. We have the development on the Karzai will no longer be President, but it will border with Iran, with Chinese bicycles and presumably be an Afghan patron, an aristocrat within motorbikes being sold on one side, but then there is his network, which we well know, around him. the Pakistan business about helping the transition. The Presumably, the most likely person to take charge of Pakistanis feel that they are the brokers when dealing the country is one of that quite small number of with the Taliban, but it appears that Afghanistan is individuals within that ruling aristocratic elite. taking its own independent initiative in approaching What we would look for by 2015 is a stabilised their Taliban. How do you see those political activities patrimonial system in which one of those members is dictating or shaping our contribution in terms of operating, but in a way that is much more inclusive support, training and help? than the contemporary governance system and much Chair: We shall then draw the evidence session to more sustainable in terms of attracting legitimacy and a close. the support of the Afghan people down in the villages Mr Havard: Mine was just a typical question. and communities. By creating that sense of Professor King: I will give a very quick answer. That hierarchical order and providing a space for economic is absolutely correct. Right from the start, it wasn’t development, particularly by moving the South off really an Afghan campaign, but an Afghan and narcotics—it won’t be off narcotics by 2015—some Pakistan stabilisation operation—we perhaps came to areas might begin to move, especially from the West’s that realisation later than might have been ideal— point of view, towards a more sustainable form of because the two were never separate. agricultural production. Mr Havard: Some of us have been saying that for Professor Farrell: You are quite right to say that at a while. the Lisbon Summit there will be an announcement on Professor King: I think that the ability to interact with the framework for the transition process, but there is Pakistan Government and gain their consent and unlikely to be any announcement on the details, the participation in terms of a settlement in Kabul will metrics and so forth. The conditions for a conditions- be critical. For certain regional reasons, especially the based transition still have to be defined. We should Indian-Pakistani relationship, Afghanistan needs to be also anticipate two processes: the “big T” transition, an autonomous regime. It seems to me that it is which goes through NATO’s North Atlantic Council; essential that Pakistan is minimally consensual in the and the “small t” transition process, in which lots of kind of regime that there is in Afghanistan, because if small and quiet de facto transitioning will go on. they are not consensual, as they have shown in their Then there is the question about what will be involvement with various movements since 1979, transitioned. Will it be provinces? It looks like it will particularly the Taliban, they have the ability to Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 31

3 November 2010 Professor Theo Farrell, Colonel (Rtd) Richard Kemp CBE and Professor Anthony King undermine anything that we try to build there. From you. Reconciliation, however, follows a different what your question infers, I think that we are in logic; not a break-off logic, but a bring-over logic. agreement on that. You are trying to bring that side over into the Professor Farrell: I would just point out that constitutional process, or at least to buy them off and reconciliation and reintegration are obviously pretty get them to go and live in the Emirates or somewhere. central to the end game. Again, it is a bit like So it is a different logic. intelligence; it is such a sensitive area of operations The problem with the current reconciliation efforts, as that it is extremely difficult to get reliable information. I understand it, is that they do not engage directly with You correctly point out that the Afghans want Mullah Omar and, therefore, the Quetta Shura, so they ownership of the process—Karzai certainly does. The are not actually following a bring-over logic. We are Pakistanis want to be the marriage makers in that, and not having direct talks with him. We are having talks that is actually not something Kabul wants. The with certain people who may or may not be influential Americans have their own views on that. So it is within the Quetta Shura. Therefore, it currently looks complicated. much like a break-off logic; you are trying to break I would just point out one thing on reconciliation and off a chunk, perhaps of the Quetta Shura. The fact is reintegration. Broadly speaking, some people say that that we do not know a lot for certain. At the very they are the same thing and don’t make a big deal basic level, we don’t even know whether the logic about the differences. However, some say that underpinning the current talks is the correct logic. reconciliation is a strategic piece and that reintegration Chair: I think that brings the evidence session to an is a very tactical thing. They follow different logics. end. Thank you both very much indeed. The Reintegration follows a break-off logic; you break off conclusion I draw is that it is complicated. We are chunks of the enemy’s force structure and bring them most grateful to you for setting out quite how back into society—they are already in society, but you complicated it is. get them to put their guns down and stop shooting at Ev 32 Defence Committee: Evidence

Wednesday 10 November 2010

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Mrs Madeleine Moon Thomas Docherty Penny Mordaunt Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Sandra Osborne John Glen Bob Stewart Mr Mike Hancock Ms Gisela Stuart Mr Dai Havard ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Lindy Cameron OBE, former Head of PRT in Helmand, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Major General David Capewell OBE, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations), Ministry of Defence, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Chief of Joint Operations, Ministry of Defence, Karen Pierce CMG, Director for South Asia and Afghanistan and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Peter Watkins, Director of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence, gave evidence.

Chair: Good afternoon. Many thanks for coming to Karen Pierce: In the latter capacity as Special give evidence to our inquiry into operations in Representative. I was already the Policy Director. Afghanistan. You are most welcome here. I’m afraid Peter Watkins: Peter Watkins, Director of Operational it looks as though there may be interruptions caused Policy, Ministry of Defence, and responsible within by voting in the House of Commons. That’s just part the MoD for policy towards Afghanistan. of our democratic duty. I am sure that we will get Chair: Thank you all very much. through this. We also have, I’m afraid, a huge number of questions Q116 Mr Dai Havard: Are you filling two roles, that we want to ask you, a huge number of people then? asking the questions and a large number of witnesses, Karen Pierce: I’m double-hatted. so we will all require a lot of discipline. It looks as though we’re just about to come up to a vote. If I Q117 Chair: Can we start with a series of questions could ask you please to introduce yourselves smartly. to you, please, Lindy Cameron? From the perspective Some of you have been before us before, some of you of the PRT, how would you say that the security have not. Lindy Cameron, would you like to begin? situation in Helmand is? Would you say that things Lindy Cameron: My name is Lindy Cameron. I was are improving, and if so, would you say that they are until recently the head of the Helmand PRT and the improving quickly enough? NATO Senior Civilian for RC South-West. Lindy Cameron: I’d say that they are significantly improved. The way that Governor Mangal tends to Q113 Chair: You have now come back from the describe this is that when he first arrived in the PRT. You have been replaced. Are you a DFID Province two and a half years ago, it was only employee? possible for him to move in a fairly small area, and Lindy Cameron: No. I’m currently working for the with air support. It is now possible for him and his Foreign Office, so I’m still basically on leave, at the staff to drive to most of the districts of central endofmyForeignOffice posting in that job. Helmand, and I think that’s true for most Government officials. For example, he drives on a fairly regular basis to Nad-e-Ali and has also driven recently to Q114 Chair: And you’ve been replaced by another Marjah. It is certainly true that security is significantly Foreign Office person. better in central Helmand than it was. Lindy Cameron: That’s right. Michael O’Neill. Major General Capewell: Good afternoon. Major Q118 Chair: How would you say that governance, as General David Capewell. I am the Assistant Chief of such, has changed? For the better or for the worse? Defence Staff for Operations. Lindy Cameron: Again, significantly improved for Air Marshal Peach: I am Air Marshal Stuart Peach. the better. When Governor Mangal arrived, there were I am Chief of Joint Operations, holding operational district governors in six of the 14 districts of command for Afghanistan. Helmand. There are now district governors in 12. Chair: Thank you very much. There are four district community councils. If you Karen Pierce: Good afternoon. My name is Karen look at Nad-e-Ali as a case study, participation in Pierce. I’m the Policy Director for South Asia and governance has gone up significantly. People now Afghanistan at the Foreign Office. I’m also the Special engage with the district community council and the Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. district governor in a way that is a significant change even from when I arrived last July for my recce visit. Q115 Chair: You have taken over from Sir Sherard I remember sitting in Nad-e-Ali for a security shura, Cowper-Coles. listening to gunfire on the perimeter that was being Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 33

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins held. I contrast that with walking into the district significant improvement, but you have to recognise governor’s office now, looking at the row of offices that this is in the context of a very conservative and where there are staff from various Government rural society. It was also quite different in different Ministries in a way that AREU described as parts of Helmand. The role that women play in something the like of which it had not seen in any Lashkar Gah, for example, is quite different from the other district in Afghanistan, let alone in Helmand. I public role that women will be able to play in think we’ve really helped Governor Mangal achieve somewhere like Musa Qala, which is a much more the kind of district government and district community conservative and rural district. councils that have shown a significant improvement Chair: You have just come back from running the in governance in the last couple of years. PRT. When the Defence Committee was there in January, General Rodriguez told us that the British Q119 Chair: And the role of women in Helmand? PRT in Helmand was the model for the others, and he What has happened to that? complimented us on its quality. Therefore, it would be Lindy Cameron: I think the key thing for women in right for us to say thank you for the obviously huge Helmand, much like for everyone there, is the role that you played in that. improvement of security. We also have two female MPs, two female provincial councillors and five councillors on the community council in Gereshk. Q122 Sandra Osborne: Also to Lindy Cameron, can Obviously there are still some big challenges, you tell the Committee how effective the working particularly in the justice area. One of the things that relationship between civilians and the military is on we have put a lot of effort into is helping women the ground? access the justice system. My rule of law team did a Lindy Cameron: I have to say that it is extraordinary. lot of work with the Department of Women’s Affairs I have never seen civilian-military co-operation work at provincial level, to help them work out what needed this well. I think that we’ve really got to a place where to be worked on. For example, a small team went up we’ve got the funding, staffing and the personal to Kabul to do a study visit to look at women’s refuges relationships right. I felt very supported by the whole and shelters up there, and understand what best range of Government Departments back here in practice they could bring back. Whitehall in my role inside the PRT, and equally by Bob Stewart: I’m sorry, Chair, but I can’t hear a the military and civilians. We’ve evolved that word. I’ve only got one ear. Either you are speaking relationship, so we have essentially gone from being very fast, Ms Cameron, or I am totally bloody deaf. a PRT that partners only a single British brigade to Could you speak up? I cannot hear a word you’re being a PRT that partners a divisional-level regional saying. command led by General Mills. In a sense, the scale of the challenge has increased, but I think we’ve Q120 Chair: The volume will go up. Do those managed to maintain those excellent relationships. women MPs go both to Kabul and to Helmand? Fundamentally, if you look at how Operation Lindy Cameron: Absolutely, yes. I’ve met Nasima Moshtarak played out, for example, I think that my Niazi in Lashkar Gah on a number of occasions. I military colleagues—I turn to them to comment—felt would say that she is a pretty feisty lady. that they were able to rely on a PRT that was able to both plan and deliver the civilian side of that operation Q121 Mrs Moon: On a scale of one to 10, how much very effectively. do you think the role of women has developed? If one is as it was under the Taliban, and 10 is that they have Q123 Sandra Osborne: What restrictions did the complete freedom of movement and independence, different terms and conditions of service have on your and a right to their own choices, where are we? What ability to deliver the goods? do you mean by, “Things have improved”? How much Lindy Cameron: I would say that I don’t think that have we gone on that scale of one to 10? they did. I have a PRT staffed by international staff Lindy Cameron: It depends a little on what your from the UK, the US, Denmark and Estonia, and by expectations are about Afghanistan broadly. Helmand both military and civilian staff. Effectively, we have a is a rural and quite conservative province in many range of people who are able to do different things. ways, and it is hard to calibrate—say 4 out of 10, For example, the system of military stabilisation perhaps. There has been a significant improvement support teams that the UK uses, which gives us a from Taliban times, in the sense that clearly women military team able to go out on the front line with are participating in government, both as officials and patrols to very dangerous areas, allows me to have the as representatives, in a way that was totally unheard of. They are also able to have a public face. For eyes and ears of the PRT right up in the front line example, I attended a meeting for international backed up by the resource at district level and women’s day last year, where 600 women got together resource at provincial level. That draws on the in the provincial council building. I can’t describe to expertise of a wide range of UK, US, Danish and you what a fantastic event it was. There were brightly Estonian backgrounds. coloured clothes everywhere—and relatively few burqas in sight, I have to say. There was a real sense Q124 Sandra Osborne: I think you said that you had of women being able to gather in a public forum and sufficient funding, is that right? celebrate being women. I think there has been a Lindy Cameron: Yes. Ev 34 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

Q125 Sandra Osborne: If there was one extra with Governor Mangal. And yet the marines are resource or capability that you could have had, what supposed to be running the whole show. As far as the would it have been? US military are concerned, the PRTs fall under Lindy Cameron: To be honest, I got everything that I military command because that’s what happens with asked for in course of the year. Again, to give an American PRTs”—and so on. So he raises a question example of Operation Moshtarak, just before about the continued arrangements and I asked him, Christmas, when it became clear that Helmand would “What price the PRT then”? I would just like to hear be the focus of the main effort for the whole of ISAF your views on whether or not he is right and on what in the early months of 2010, I wrote to Stuart Peach those tensions are, because he ends up using this at PJHQ and to the Stabilisation Unit with a list of phrase: “It will have to be resolved, but maybe additional requirements I thought that we would need resolved through creative management by the key for that operation, which were delivered. When I players”—whatever that means. needed extra resources—funding or staffing—and Lindy Cameron: I think that my view is, as has been extra capabilities, I got them. said, this has evolved significantly in the last year and it will continue to evolve. There is a senior US civilian Q126 Sandra Osborne: So everything in the garden in Helmand now, but in fact the agreement between was rosy. the UK and the US is that the UK head of the PRT is Lindy Cameron: The point is that what you’re also the NATO Senior Civilian for RC South-West, looking for is to ensure that the UK’s funds are used and the US senior representative is his or her deputy in a good value-for-money way in the context of the for that role. operation. We are also very lucky in Helmand in that So we worked through the way that we can use that we have access to a broad range of international funds US civilian surge most effectively, ensure that the US as well; for example, the US provides significant Marine Corps gets the US political advice that it CERP funds and US AID provides significant funds obviously needs for its own purposes and use those too. We’re not short of cash or funds in Helmand at resources effectively in Helmand. this stage. You are right. Obviously, from our experience it is Air Marshal Peach: Just to add the military side to much easier to work in close co-operation with a Lindy’s answer, with which I completely concur. military unit that is co-located. But clearly one of the Since the Committee last visited, 2010 has been particular challenges of the last year in Helmand has marked by a series of changes and evolutions in how been that there are now effectively four other— the military and civilian effort in Helmand has been 2.51 pm integrated, and “integrated” is the key word. The Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. arrival of the US Marine Corps; the integration of 3.2 pm General Mills’s headquarters alongside the UK; the On resuming— civilian effort that the US brought with them; the effort that the US Marine Corps made within its own Q129 Chair: You were in full flood when we broke ranks to understand where it was and help to deliver; off to vote, Ms Cameron. Did you complete your and the practical steps that we have taken to learn general sentiments or would you like to say them from each operation that stabilisation—what we might again? call “hot stabilisation”—straight after a military Lindy Cameron: Perhaps I should summarise them in operation is a crucial part of the outcome; all of those a couple of sentences. The situation in Helmand has lessons were learnt and applied this year, 2010. evolved significantly, as has been described. Therefore, naturally the relationships on the civilian Q127 Chair: Yes, we had some helpful evidence side and the mil side are evolving to reflect that from General Messenger. Was that last week or the change. Basically, we have agreed a situation as I week before? Peter Watkins, did you want to come in? described with the UK and US senior representatives. Peter Watkins: I entirely agree with what has just Of course, naturally it is a challenge working with a been said. headquarters based in Leatherneck rather than in Lashkar Gah but, for General Mills, Governor Mangal Q128 Mr Havard: We took evidence last week, and is as much a partner for him as he is for me, and the Professor Farrell had some interesting things to say key thing is that, for both of us in the military in RC about this area. Everyone recognises the quality and South-West, a region that has only two Provinces, the the effort, and the good work that the PRT has done Helmand Government is in a sense the key and was doing. However, he questions the command, counterpart and therefore quite a lot of— control and governance regimes of the input, in the [Interruption.]—comes forward to Lashkar Gah and sense that he is saying that there is now an American spends time at the PRT. It has set up a dedicated office senior civilian in the area, but the marines have a in the PRT building to make sure that the civilian- different tradition and a different way of looking at military relationship is very much focused on these things. In a sense, throughout his evidence what supporting the Afghan Government. he suggested was that these things are located in different places. Q130 Chair: And that works? I will just quote this to you: “Look at this from the Lindy Cameron: Yes, it does. marines’ point of view. They see a PRT that is very Air Marshal Peach: The word “cosy” was used in cosy with the Task Force element and is very cosy evidence previously. The fact is that, in order to Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 35

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins understand governance in Helmand and the South- Karen Pierce: No, I don’t, Mr. Chairman. I have been West part of Afghanistan, we do need to have that working on Afghanistan for just over a year, but I level of relationship with the Governor, and that is worked on it in 2001 immediately after 9/11. I have a precisely what we have got. I know that General Mills lot of experience of working alongside the military. I is very grateful for all that Lindy has done to enable think of myself as a politico-military expert and, in that depth of relationship. my view, that is not how the British Government, whatever the party of the day is in power, actually Q131 Mr Havard: I am sorry, I missed part of your does its business. There is actually quite a healthy answer, but I will look at it later. As for the point debate in Whitehall to share information and analyse about governance, I spoke to Governor Mangal last it. You will obviously get different points of view, but week myself and your stories match. I checked the I think that the advice that goes to Ministers is pretty consistency. The question of governance in Helmand heavily sifted to ensure that it is the best possible was very interesting. In fact, in fairness to Professor advice and balance of factors. Farrell, he was contrasting the benefits there are in the Government process that is developing in Helmand as Q134 Chair: Air Marshal Peach, we had General opposed to the difficulties there are in developing the Messenger in front of us last week and he said that same set of arrangements in Kandahar and around that until about two years ago the operation in Helmand area of the South-West. had been really under-resourced. We asked whether Lindy Cameron: To be honest, both the Afghan he had told us this at the time, and I think that the Government and also the Coalition partners learnt a implication of his answer was that he didn’t remember lot from Helmand about what to do in Kandahar. having been asked that question at the time. That may Mr Havard: I hope so. well be fair enough. But do you recognise that there Lindy Cameron: Absolutely. The point is that they is a worry about our being given the good news and actively learnt those lessons. For example, Minister not being given the bad news? Popal who runs the independent directorate of local Air Marshal Peach: I recognise the worry, but I don’t governance literally had a sort of top-10 list of things recognise the phrase “consistently deceived”. I think that he thought worked in Helmand, which he wanted we are honest in our advice—certainly from my to apply in Kandahar. For example, the system of headquarters—into the process that Karen has district community councils, which would roll out described. I think we are in tune with events on the under the ASOP programme, and the way that we had ground. We almost accept that there is an evolutionary supported district government by pushing forward the process here of both understanding the environment district delivery programme were both lessons that he in Helmand over the last five years, which has been a took. He also took away the lesson that actually what process of understanding both the tribal dynamic, the you needed in order to get effective government at Taliban itself and its local factors as well as the district level was a strong and capable provincial local Taliban factors more broadly. That evolution is what, I think, Gordon Messenger was trying to describe. I government again. He went away with a number of don’t think there is any sense that I could think of “to-do’s” to push his ministerial colleagues on to get where our advice, as Karen suggested, has been them to support that proposal. anything other than a healthy debate. Of course, the other point to make is very important. Q132 Mr Havard: We wanted to know whether or Throughout the process since 2006, the commander of not all the benefits of doing the PRT in the way that the force has been an American General. We must you were doing it will now be subsumed by a new always put the Helmand operation in that broader dominance of Americans coming into the area, or context of both the region and the whole of the whether there will be the synergies that you suggest. country and there, of course, the debate takes place Lindy Cameron: The US marines have now been in between capitals and between higher headquarters. Helmand for more than a year and have also been at the scale they are at for more than six months now. I Q135 Mr Hancock: You were Director General of am clear that basically for six months we have been Intelligence up to 2006. The Secretary of State at the operating a system which is working well, and which time sat in this room just before our troops were they recognise the strengths of as well. deployed to Helmand telling us that, on the best evidence they had and all the intelligence that they Q133 Chair: Karen Pierce, we are just about to move had got together, this was going to be a pretty low- on to some questions about the consent of the Afghan key, peaceful event. He didn’t really expect many people but, before we do, it would be right to give casualties. He certainly wasn’t expecting to have the you the opportunity to comment on what Sir Sherard problems that pursued. Was he told the truth about Cowper-Coles said yesterday in the Foreign Affairs that situation at the time or was it just lack of Committee. He was reported in the Daily Mail as intelligence that prevailed upon him to give us such a saying that, “Politicians were consistently deceived by misleading statement? the military over how well the campaign in Air Marshal Peach: I can’t comment on the last point. Afghanistan was going”. He said that the top brass I would say that we knew what we knew and we were were “misleadingly optimistic”, and that if any official working very hard to understand what I think the or minister cast doubt on them, they were attacked as Committee would agree is a very complex tribal “defeatist”. Do you have a similar view? dynamic. It’s a very complex part of Afghanistan. It’s Ev 36 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins historically part that we didn’t understand as much as will continue. I think that the NATO Lisbon summit we do now, because we’ve been there for a number will make some of that clear, by looking forward to a of years. longer-term partnership between NATO countries and Afghanistan. Q136 Mr Hancock: But we’d already been there for five years at that time. Q139 Mr Hancock: Who are the Afghans you’re Air Marshal Peach: But we were not in Helmand. talking about who are concerned about us not sticking Mr Hancock: No, but we were in Afghanistan. around? Is it just the Karzai Government and the people who are propping him up, or is it much wider Q137 Mr Brazier: Could I just come in on the edge than that? from that? We had a presentation last night from Sir Karen Pierce: You will hear it among the opinion Graeme Lamb and Colonel Richard Williams, both of formers. It’s a view that they express privately. It’s whom have spent some years not only serving there sometimes a view that appears in the Afghan papers in a military capacity, but have been back many times and it’s sometimes a view that you will hear on the since in a civilian one. One of their central points was seminar circuit, or reflected by other people in the the concern that your organisation at Northwood—it region, such as the Pakistanis. But, as I said, it is is not a personal criticism of you; park completely the gradually coming to be understood that western moral dimension of the quote that we are discussing engagement as a whole will continue in Afghanistan and just think about mechanics—tended to act as a for many years yet, partly because one of the barrier between the people on the ground who often objectives is to get Afghanistan on what I might call needed rapid instructions from politicians as to what a more normal development trajectory, such that the was needed. It is a rather strange system, looked at more normal structures of the international the from outside, in the era of instant communications, community—the UN and so on—can take up a more to have commanders on the ground and politicians regular role. who have to make decisions with the chiefs of staff advising them and then—one doesn’t have to go into Q140 Mr Hancock: Have you done any work in all the stories about the difficulties of getting anyone trying to analyse the counter-view to that from within to answer the phone in the middle of a Twickenham Afghanistan? There are people in Afghanistan who match, and various other things—a group in the would welcome the Coalition Forces leaving ASAP. middle who are acting as the command structure. Why What have you done on that issue? can’t the command be done on the ground and the Karen Pierce: There has been a number of studies, political reference, or reference for policy guidance, some of them funded by DFID, that explore those be directed back to the Ministry of Defence? questions. If you look at the most recent opinion poll Air Marshal Peach: Operational control of the force on the subject, which I think came from the BBC, is delegated forward to Afghanistan, so command in some 70% of Afghans say that they want ISAF to be that sense is exercised in Afghanistan through the in their country. Afghan formal consent has been national contingent. That is held, as I explained to the given for ISAF to be there, and that is noted in the Committee on a visit to PJHQ, by a British three-star Security Council resolutions that endorse the ISAF general forward in Kabul, who is also double-hatted mandate and mission. as the deputy commander of the international force. On whether Afghans want international forces to Operational command sets the conditions and enables leave, I think there is a general view among Afghans command. My headquarters is manned 24/7 and I’m that they do not much like foreigners. Lindy was not here to comment on what others may have said, pointing out earlier that this is a view that you get at which I have not seen. the local level—they don’t much like the people in Chair: I don’t want to spend time on this today, the other district—and it is a view that you get at the because I want to get back to the consent of the provincial and national levels. To that extent it is not Afghan people now. a society that automatically embraces foreigners but, in terms of working alongside ISAF, in practical Q138 Mr Hancock: May I direct some questions to terms, we see rather good co-operation from the you, Karen? Do you believe that the Afghans are Afghans. convinced that we’re going to stay for the long haul or are they convinced that we’re all going to be gone Q141 Mr Hancock: How do you judge people’s by 2015, maybe leaving them in a difficult position? reactions to the widespread corruption of the Afghan Karen Pierce: The Afghans worry that they will be Government? abandoned again by the international community in Karen Pierce: It is something that has been covered general. One thing that they will quote to you is the in the two DFID studies, and it is also an issue that is fact that they see this as the third American covered in regular polling. The Committee may be engagement with Afghanistan and they consider that aware of the Asia Foundation poll that has just been they were withdrawn from, or disengaged from, released—this is a poll that the Asia Foundation does prematurely on earlier occasions. We are starting to annually. In that poll, there are two concerns cited by explain—I think they do understand—that while Afghans as governing their attitudes to the future: one British Forces will be out of combat by 2015, British is security, which Lindy mentioned, and the other is engagement, military training, development and other corruption. We are well aware of the importance of assistance, alongside that of other western nations, corruption not only in terms of helping to develop the Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 37

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

Afghan economy, but also in terms of what you might Q144 Ms Gisela Stuart: So it can be transparent but think of as hearts and minds, and Afghans as a whole still go to groups favouring one side rather than being comfortable with the level of service that they another? get from their Government. Karen Pierce: I don’t know if that was covered by the OECD definition, but certainly the way we run our Q142 Mr Hancock: Do either of you—Ms Cameron funding and the things we look at, and that we want as well as yourself—believe there is a genuine the Afghan institutions to look at, would cover that prospect of seeing the level of corruption reduced in sort of thing. Afghans themselves sometimes have a any foreseeable time scale? That might give people rather different definition of corruption, which can more confidence. mean people doing something inappropriate without Karen Pierce: The two international conferences that necessarily the sense of financial gain. were held this year—the London conference and the Kabul conference—set out mini action plans to help Q145 Mr Havard: I notice in the same poll from the tackle corruption, and some progress has been made. Asia Foundation that you cited an interesting element It being the kind of society it is, where warlords have relating to its concerns about unemployment as well held sway for quite a long time over various districts, as corruption, and I think that there is an interesting it will take a long time for corruption to fall. shift there. I note that Afghan Government structures Transparency International has done some work on have actually stopped 150 aid groups doing their work this, but we are already starting to see some of the because they have not been transparent and put mechanisms that were committed to at the Kabul forward accounts. Is that right? I took that from The conference bear fruit. Times, but I don’t normally believe what I read in it. Lindy Cameron: At a practical level in Helmand, it’s Karen Pierce: I don’t have access to any more precise clearly quite a challenge for the Government, and I information than that which you have just quoted, but think Governor Mangal would certainly say that it is it is the case that various bodies are being stricter something that he feels he needs to take consistent, about how money is spent and accounted for. repeated action on to make sure that people have Lindy Cameron: On the point about corruption, it is increased confidence in the Government. He has been worth saying that in Helmand one of the big extremely tough on corruption, including, on a couple challenges is the funds from opium production. In a of occasions, actually having members of his staff sense, therefore, not only are people focused on the arrested when there were allegations against them. He Government funding, but there is an abuse of power has taken quite tough action at some personal risk. issue that is quite important. One of the key things is That is now playing out in a very positive way, and that Government officials are trusted not to abuse people’s confidence in the Government is beginning power in order to allow access to ways of getting to improve. money from the drugs system, for example. It also helps that people’s confidence in the police force, at very local level, is improving in Helmand. Q146 Mr Hancock: How much of an impediment is You see that partly in people no longer insisting on President Karzai to getting a settlement in Afghanistan generally, and are we putting enough pressure on him having a police force from entirely outside their and his Government to reform and reduce corruption? district or province but actually wanting the kind of He made great play two weeks ago of saying that there local police force which, at times in times gone by, was transparency when he received cash because it has been a generator rather than a preventer of came in bags that allowed people to see the money. corruption. Now they actually have enough confidence He felt that that was a good indication of the in the police force that they are starting to ask for well transparency of the operation. The Americans were trained local police, because they think that they can upset about Iran giving money, but I would like to have confidence in those government systems. know whether the UK has ever paid large sums of cash over in the same way. Q143 Ms Stuart: This question is to both Karen and Karen Pierce: I can assure you on the latter point that Lindy. Could you give me your definition of we don’t pay cash over like that. DFID has very strict corruption? I am slightly puzzled because there is the controls for tracking where its money has gone and non-transparent way in which money goes in but does what it has been spent on. That applies in Pakistan as not come out on the other end, but then there is the well as Afghanistan. With regard to your first question quite transparent way in which money is on the settlement, President Karzai has launched a inappropriately used and given to groups that favour process to aid reconciliation. He has set out three one side rather than another. What is your definition conditions that may be familiar to the Committee: of corruption? renounce al-Qaeda, give up the armed struggle, and Karen Pierce: We would tend to follow OECD work within the Afghan constitutional framework. He standards on that. I can’t cite what the definition has inaugurated the higher peace council, the body would be, but when we help to set up things such as that came out of the May Peace Jirga, which is the Major Crimes Task Force and help with intended to take reconciliation forward. He has set out governance, it is certainly about making sure that the decree so that reintegration can happen. After that, money isn’t diverted and that officials aren’t the next step is for the detailed guidance to be improperly receiving funds that ought to go to elaborated and sent out to the provincial and district legitimate sources. governors so that they can get on with that on the Ev 38 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins ground. President Karzai is making efforts to bring Karen Pierce: There is a long way to go, but the those people in the insurgency who want to reconcile women’s voice, in terms of internal affairs in into the fold. Afghanistan, is getting stronger. Encouragingly, at the I think that there is a second aspect to what is May Peace Jirga, a very high proportion of the sometimes thought of as a political settlement, and delegates who were sent from the Provinces were that is internal political processes within Afghanistan, women. The Provinces that submitted delegation lists of which things such as election reform becomes an that did not look representative were asked to rethink, important part. That is also being taken forward. We which had a salutary effect. When the Peace Jirga have seen already a marked improvement over the started there was some tension, which the Afghans way the parliamentary elections were handled during remarked on themselves, between the women and the the Presidential Elections last year. Those are, of mullahs. But by the second day of the Peace Jirga, course, things that the Afghans are running those tensions were starting to dissipate, and the themselves, so there has been a learning curve. In mullahs were relying on the women to act as terms of the way that parliamentary elections have secretaries and scribes for the committees. Most been handled, they are climbing that learning curve people think that that was a good start. The number reasonably successfully. of women parliamentary candidates has also been going up gradually. Again, that will be a slow process, Q147 Mr Hancock: How do we exercise pressure on but the voice is getting stronger. President Karzai on corruption? What do you Chair: I don’t know that that would be the reaction effectively do on that issue? It is one thing saying that in this country. we don’t want corruption to go on, but what do we actually do? What is the stick that we’ve got to beat him with to get them to do something, or is it simply Q149 Mr Hancock: But are the women who get that we offer bigger and better carrots? elected the sort of women who care enough about Karen Pierce: I would not like to say it’s a choice other women in the villages of Afghanistan who have between carrots and sticks on an issue like corruption. been subjected to generations of abuse and The whole way the international community works mistreatment? Are they the sort of women who will with the Afghans is trying to help them learn how to carry forward a commitment to women generally, or run their country effectively. So, rather than pressure are they just no different from men—they are in the and sticks, it’s more about tutoring, helping, and political game for what they can get out of it? helping to build capacity. Karen Pierce: That is a bit of a caricature, if I may We have three main ways we do that. One is through so. As in any political system, you will find both types planning and establishing commitments from both the of female politicians. Afghans as to what practically they are going to do Chair: I think you are right. on corruption and from the international community as to what assistance it will provide for that. The main Q150 Penny Mordaunt: I would like to ask Karen vehicles for that have been the London and Kabul Pierce and Lindy Cameron what you think the impact conference commitments. On a regular basis, the UN of civilian casualties has been on the success of leads an effort inside Afghanistan to monitor where operations. those commitments have got to, and anti-corruption is Lindy Cameron: I am not sure that is for me to obviously part of that. The British Ambassador has a comment on. I would have thought that that is really programme fund, some of which is devoted to anti- for my military colleagues to comment on. corruption measures. He provides political oversight of that, so that if there is a problem with such-and- such a ministry, for example, the ambassador will go Q151 Penny Mordaunt: I was thinking with to talk that through with the Minister or, as necessary, particular reference to the policy of courageous with President Karzai. Behind that, there stand restraint. Ministers, who take up such issues as and when they Chair: The reason this is coming to you is that we need to with President Karzai and his Ministers. asked General Messenger that question last month, so we feel we have had a military view. That was helpful, Q148 Mr Hancock: We heard from Ms Cameron but we may ask the same question of General earlier about women in the regional and national Capewell and Air Marshal Peach. That is why—you Governments. Would the average Afghan woman be may have been able to see the civilian side. satisfied that we are doing enough to give her greater Lindy Cameron: If I can, perhaps I should reflect stability in her life and greater optimism for a better Governor Mangal’s view, which was that he very future, and to give greater protection to her and her much welcomed General McChrystal’s increased children, particularly girls? focus on preventing civilian casualties. Certainly for Karen Pierce: It is an issue that the Government take him, every time there has been a casualty incident, he very seriously. If it’s helpful, Mr Chairman, I have takes it extremely seriously. He looks to engage with figures relating to Mrs Moon’s earlier question about and understand both what happened and the public’s how life has changed for women since the Taliban. I response to it. He very much welcomed the increased could read them out or write in with them. focus and the transparent relationship between the Chair: Could you write in with them, please, because military and his Government on understanding that would be helpful. incidents as they happened. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 39

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

Q152 Penny Mordaunt: On securing the consent of are aided extremely well by the central ministries in the local population, what would you say the impact Kabul, which really understand the importance of of that has been? developing Afghan Security Forces. That is an Lindy Cameron: Certainly that increased focus has overview. been reflected in helping him have a more effective Chair: May I interpose? Madeleine, do you want to and credible relationship with his population. ask Air Marshal Peach about that? Air Marshal Peach: General Petraeus has continued the policy of General McChrystal. He has simplified Q154 Mrs Moon: You are painting a very positive the language in terms of the guidance given to picture, but we got rid of Abdul Wali Khan, the soldiers. I can say, because I think the figures come warlord-cum-police chief in Musa Qala. The British from the United Nations, that the majority of objected to his presence and his historic allegiance casualties are caused by the Taliban, and the number with the Taliban, and Karzai insisted that he was of casualties caused by the international force has reinstated. When I asked Governor Mangal about the dropped by 30% in the last six months. Every alleged fact that he was still there and still causing problems, incident is taken very seriously, with immediate he said that he recognised that. What can we do when investigation, and there is a tendency for the facts to we remove those in the police whom we see as being not quite bear out the initial report. corrupt, and then they are imposed back on to the Karen Pierce: I used to be in the UK Mission to the community by Karzai? Are we making progress? United Nations, and I can reinforce what Sir Stuart Air Marshal Peach: That is one case, and I am not said about every civilian casualty that is caused by going to comment on a specific case. It is for the ISAF being taken very seriously, because we used to Governor to argue the point up to Kabul. Lindy talk about it in the Security Council. I would make explained earlier that we have the combination of a the point that any casualty caused by ISAF or the district governor, an army commander who ANSF is accidental, and those caused by the understands the local conditions and a district insurgency are a deliberate targeting of civilians. That policeman who is in tune with the local district point isn’t adequately understood in some parts of governor, although he may not be from the same tribe. Afghanistan. When we have those three actors, with international forces very much in support in the background, things Q153 Mr Brazier: May I ask the panel as a whole move quickly on the security line. You are absolutely to briefly assess progress on the Afghan National right that where there are examples of that not Forces—the army and the police? working, the Afghan officials, particularly in Kabul, Air Marshal Peach: The general sense of progress is have to do something about that. very positive in terms of the target numbers being The overall sense in Helmand, in the three key met—over 250,000 between the Afghan army and districts where we are—in the centre—is that that police. More importantly in many ways, it’s positive triumvirate approach is working. Again, I am painting in terms of capability. We are now regularly seeing— not an overly optimistic picture, but a picture of it is happening as we speak—operations being evolution, particularly this year, as we have been able routinely led by the Afghan army at brigade level, to thicken the governance effect at the local level. We brigade level being a sizeable force, and ISAF in a have enabled that through the creation of the Helmand mentoring and supporting role. We are now working Police Training Centre, which has now produced well on the next steps around developing the specialist over 1,000 policemen to do that local policing in areas of the Afghan army, which I am sure your Helmand. advisers can brief you on in terms of logistics, signals Major General Capewell: To go back to training, by and so on. So the Afghan army is succeeding in both any international standard, the training delivery numbers and capability. Obviously, the Afghan police process across Afghanistan has got to be seen as a have been more of a challenge. I think the Committee success. I have been involved in training around the is aware that we helped to create the Helmand police world for the last 30 years and the industrial scale of training centre in Lashkar Gar. It has been very the effort by the NATO training mission is a successful. It has been used as an exemplar of how to substantial success story. It is patchy in areas and change the dynamics for policing locally by the NATO literacy is a problem, but I can read you the figures. training mission in Kabul. We now have 138,000 in the ANA and 120,000 in the We are pushing out a lot of young and not so young ANP. This is industrial. Of course, this is right at the men who have already been policemen in Afghanistan heart of the issue of the transfer of lead security for some time, but who have not received any formal responsibility. We need that quantity and quality of training. When you visit, you don’t just see a stack of people to be able to hand over eventually. new recruits. There is a sort of age mix, so that we are catching up on the training. In addition, and it is Q155 Mr Brazier: May I come back to Sir Stuart for quite an important point, there is a lot of work going a moment? I have pressed him on this issue in the on now, both in Kabul and locally, to train the leaders. private briefings we get regularly from the MoD. The key to success is thickening the ability of the What is the picture on recruiting Pashtuns, in Afghan army—both the senior and non-commissioned particular those from the South, into the army and the officer level—and the ability of their officers to take police? Given that the Taliban are a Southern Pashtun the leadership role from ISAF. We are now trying to organisation, the level of recruitment from that group develop the same thing with the police. I must say we must be crucial to credibility. Ev 40 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

Air Marshal Peach: It is improving. It is near to the Q158 Mr Havard: Some of that echoes the targets that are set centrally. discussion we had with Governor Mangal himself, and Peter Watkins: I can give you the figures either how he can deal with some of the more recalcitrant verbally or in written form. There is a series of targets, district police chiefs that he needs to manage. The and the target for Pashtuns is 44%. The current figure management would partly seem to be reducing its is 43%. I know what you are going to say next—there capacity by ejecting more of those trained policemen are Pashtuns and Pashtuns. The number of Pashtuns into these areas. It is quite clearly one way of helping from the South is considerably lower than we would to achieve that. He did make a plea about the business wish. of the local police. I think that he is right. This is an area that should have been given attention years ago. His plea is that, whilst the training for the national Q156 Chair: What does that mean in terms of army is such that the middle rank officer corps area numbers? needs attention, the same level of attention needs to Peter Watkins: I am afraid I don’t have the figure with be given to police officers. That is my understanding me. One reason for that—it is a vicious circle—is the of it. He doesn’t express it that way. My insecurity that is still in the South. People are worried understanding is that a district governor would be like about serving in the army because they feel that their a police superintendent. It is inspector level. He is families may be targeted. As we improve security in making a plea that we give more resources by putting the South—and we are doing so—we expect the particular emphases—perhaps bringing people here as number of Pashtuns from the South to increase. well to train them. Lindy Cameron: If you look at it from the perspective Air Marshal Peach: We are doing precisely that—not of somebody in a district, clearly, what they will so much the last point, but we are doing exactly that always see is a national army force, which is a right now. We are trying to develop the Helmand balanced composition. What they would like to see Police Training Centre into that level. It won’t be are policemen from their local area. Part of the reason called “inspector”, but it will be that sort of level. We we put so much effort into the Helmand Police are working closely through officials with the Ministry Training Centre is that people are increasingly asking, of Interior because ultimately it is in charge of the as they gain increased confidence in the police force, police in Kabul. That is very positive, and a long way for policemen not just from their province, but from from where we were. their district. They want local boys who recognise Lindy Cameron: The first NCO training course in 30 who the good guys and bad guys are, and who can years was run in Helmand Province this year at the really effectively do local community policing, as well Helmand Police Training Centre. One of the as the more sophisticated end. They want to see a challenges for NCOs and the police force at Helmand police force from their area, which would reflect that is that they have to pass a literacy requirement, which Southern Pashtun composition. is a very challenging issue for many people who want to join. There are some people who are filling Q157 Mr Brazier: You have anticipated my next policemen slots, who need to work on literacy in order to get those NCO slots, which is why part of the question. You do then see a real difference in the training course we run is actually on literacy. behaviour of the police on the ground? Lindy Cameron: Yes, absolutely. To reinforce what Q159 Ms Stuart: I have two things about the training Air Marshal Peach said, we are not going to be over- of police. Visiting it, it also had a European optimistic about this. We are starting from an component. Has not part of Europe gone there as extremely low base. Indeed, when I went to Helmand well? The second thing is that the UK keeps saying a year ago, one of my biggest concerns was actually that there are NATO partners who don’t send any the reputation of the police force at local level in areas troops active on the ground. At least they could help like Marjah where, for example, the historic us more with training. Is that making any progress? corruption of the police force was one of the reasons Peter Watkins: Perhaps I can pick up on the EUPOL why that area turned to the Taliban in the first place. point. EUPOL are active at national level mainly, You are talking about a slow-building confidence, but developing national police capacity particularly in the fact is that people now see a police force that they things like forensic skills. At the local level, we are have confidence in. They have confidence that they providing about twenty Ministry of Defence police to have been drug tested. They can have confidence that assist with the training. they have been trained in how to hold their weapons and in how to man a guard post effectively. There was Q160 Chair: Is it right to say that, until the London a visible difference in the way that police behave. You conference earlier this year, there was an expectation were talking about a police training centre both in that the Germans would do the training of the police Lashkar Gah and the one in Camp Shurabak in a way in the way that the allocation of responsibilities like that is slowly building people’s confidence. The narcotics to the United Kingdom was divided out? reason why I am sure of that is, because when you That has been dropped, hasn’t it? talk to people in Marjah about what they want, they Peter Watkins: Following the Bonn conference in no longer say, “We want anybody but the local police 2001, there was an allocation of responsibilities across force.” They say, “We want you to recruit and train the G8. You are correct, Chairman, that Germany was police from our area who understand us.” allocated police training. Italy was developing the Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 41

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins justice system. We got counter narcotics and the troops deployed; there has been a steady increase in Americans got training the army. Since then, there has the understanding of where we are and what the local been a less rigorous segregation, and we have also conditions are; and there has been a steady increase been active in police training. But we don’t regard in force density to understand what we need in that police training as a major UK line of activity. We counter-insurgency for that part of Afghanistan. That don’t, for example, have a carabinieri-type force, assessment varies by district; it is quite different which is ideal for training police in those across the whole of Afghanistan. circumstances. So we have focused more on niche We can honestly say that we have the force density activities by, for example, supporting the EUPOL for the tasks that we now need, which is linked to the mission in Kabul, and the training that I mentioned previous answers given to Mr Brazier. The task is now we are doing in Helmand. increasingly to bring this partnership—this integration—of not just civil and military effect, but Q161 Mrs Moon: I want to raise some issues in of leadership of the Afghans. That has grown from relation to the Armed Forces, about whether we mentoring at unit level, through support at battalion deployed enough people ourselves in 2006 and level, to support at brigade level in the past year. whether you feel there was an impact on our failure There has been a steady process of evolution since the to deploy sufficient numbers of troops in that year. Afghan Forces started to be developed a few years Peter Watkins: The context here—and perhaps I can ago. I am very confident of that assessment. Of focus on what has happened over the last two years course, situations change, and the situation could as being important—is that we have been seeking to change again in future, and we must be cognisant of rebalance our contribution in Helmand. That has been that. by a combination of a series of force uplifts, which The insurgent has definitely reacted to our progress on the Committee will have been following, from 8,300 the ground. I think that we can be confident that we in early 2008, to 9,500. are now in a position where, in the three key districts Chair: Speak up, please. where British Forces are deployed and in the Helmand Peter Watkins: There has been a series of force Province where the majority of the forces are US uplifts, which the Committee will have been Marine Corps, tactical progress is being made and, following, from 8,300 in early 2008 to 9,500 now. importantly, that progress is being sustained. That There has also been a reduction in our area of sustainment of security is what gives Governor responsibility, so we have transferred a series of areas Mangal the confidence to say what he said when he to the US Marine Corps. was in London last week and the confidence in the civil effect that follows up. Q162 Chair: I am going to stop you, because I think that Madeleine Moon was talking about 2006. Q165 Mrs Moon: It has been suggested that there Peter Watkins: I can’t comment on 2006 beyond are glossy, over-positive descriptions of the success saying what General Messenger said last week about and capabilities of the Afghan National Security the availability of resources influencing the range of Forces and that, in fact, many of the operations in tasks that could be carried out. There were certain which they take the lead are small scale and are tasks that, as he said, could not be carried out because always backed up and that it is only the fact that they there were not the resources. The obvious example is are backed up by British and American Forces that Marjah, which was not addressed before the beginning makes them successful. Is that an accurate of this year. description? Air Marshal Peach: In part. But, of course, for every Q163 Mrs Moon: So did we have enough personnel one of those stories which is a negative, there are to carry out the tasks that we had in 2006? What was many unreported stories which are very positive. the impact of not having enough personnel in that year There have been many positive operations, at the on the tasks that were generated for the forces that we tactical level, undertaken by the Afghan army, where had then? UK, US, Danish or Estonian Forces have been very Air Marshal Peach: Can we return to that in writing, much in the background. I can think of a couple in because without seeing exactly what those tasks were the summer that were not widely reported, but were and exactly what the forces were in 2006, it is hard to extremely successful and virtually led totally by the answer that? Afghans. I think that Lindy would agree that there have been a number of quite serious security Q164 Mrs Moon: Do we have the correct force challenges in the district capital of Lashkar Gah, levels now, and what would you say if we offered which have been entirely handled by the Afghans. I another 5,000 troops? would go as far as saying that when we have contacted Air Marshal Peach: We have the correct force levels them and said, “Do you need that back up? Do you now in terms of what we call force density for the need this or that support?”, they have said, “No. We tasks that we are undertaking in central Helmand in have the situation under control and we are dealing three key districts, where the force level, as Peter has with it.” I do not accept that that is over-positive. That indicated, is around 9,500. Those tasks have evolved is the reporting that we are getting from theatre. since 2006, when it was an initial deployment. As that deployment has developed, so has the geography. Q166 Mrs Moon: What has been the impact on the There has been a steady increase in the number of morale of UK Forces of the withdrawal from Sangin? Ev 42 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

Air Marshal Peach: The withdrawal from Sangin has have said already that this campaign evolved. We to be seen in that process of evolution around the learnt a lot from, as it were, doing it. Our intelligence battle space, as we have concentrated, as required by and our understanding of the area have steadily NATO, on the three key districts in central Helmand. improved, and as our knowledge and experience have One of the obvious ways of achieving that force increased, we have learnt the lessons and applied density was to concentrate, where we have ended up. them. I set out—I am sorry if it irritated the This manoeuvre, this relief in place, is always one Committee—what we did from late 2008 onwards to of the more—as I am sure Committee Members with rebalance our Forces and ensure that there was an military experience and your advisers would agree— equitable division of labour across Helmand, taking complex tasks. It was achieved with great skill by advantage of the large inflow of American Forces. both the UK and American Forces. It was a large- scale logistics effort. Of course, the fight in that area Q169 Chair: Can I put it to you in a different way? continues. We must be sensitive to that, and to our Last week, I read out to General Messenger the American friends and colleagues who are now following quotation: “the British have consistently suffering losses. dispersed their kinetic effects over time and space so I do not think that it is fair to say that it has had any that they never achieve the lasting dominance over effect on the UK Force morale. The soldiers who have any particular area necessary to neutralise Taliban now conducted that relief in place have returned to influence there.” One of the examples of that was the the UK. The new battalion or battle group which platoon houses strategy. I read it to General replaced them has moved to a new area and the Messenger last week and asked him why this had operation, in an integrated fashion, between the UK happened. Are you able to answer that question? and the US continues. What I am trying to say to the Air Marshal Peach: Not this afternoon. I will give Committee is that it isn’t really a story. It is normal, you the answer in writing through the Ministry of routine, military business. Sangin is a difficult place, Defence. I am not prepared to just extemporise over I am not denying that. It remains a difficult place. The four years ago, when I was not in the operational tribute that I freely offer is to the way in which, at a chain of command. tactical level, both UK and US Forces have gone Mr Brazier: I am conscious of the fact that Colonel about their business in making that adjustment. Stewart is a distinguished former regular soldier, but I think the thing that seems so very odd to very large Q167 Bob Stewart: Forgive me for returning to 2006 numbers of people in the retired military community when you do not want to talk about it. You are, was that the strategy we adopted there was completely however, the resident experts. The question we asked out of line with the way in which the British Army was about what went wrong in 2006. I will be specific. has historically operated. The idea that you put little You may not know the tactics in detail, but you will penny packets of people dotted around the countryside have heard and you will have been briefed on the without any support was something that we have strategy and the tactics at the time. Why did we put 3 never done before or since. It suggests to us that there Para in platoon houses—unprotected, unsupported and may well be something wrong with the whole without helicopters? Who was responsible for that? command structure that is applying, which goes Was that a military decision? Or was it a military and beyond the responsibility of individuals. We obviously a political decision? Who gave that order to put our can sit here in safety and comfort in this room, but troops into isolated locations where they were taken every ex-soldier I spoke to about it was just out one at a time and we had to use massive airpower incredulous at what was going on. to save them? Who was responsible for that? Chair: We are not asking these questions because we Chair: Air Marshal Peach? are trying to second-guess the military. I am not a Air Marshal Peach: We were not in our current person of military experience myself, but it would be positions— quite helpful to have an explanation from the military as to what it was that happened and why. But we will Q168 Bob Stewart: Of course you weren’t in your now move on. current positions, but you have been briefed, Air Mr Hancock: I would hope that in doing that, we Marshal, on what happened in 2006, because if you would reflect on what has been given in evidence to haven’t, there is something wrong. What happened in the Committee by people such as Butler and other 2006 that caused us here, back in this country, such generals, who have been there and come here heartache, particularly with 3rd Battalion the subsequently to give evidence about what they were Parachute Regiment? Since then, the tactics have been experiencing at the time. such that we have lost of a heck of a lot of soldiers. You have concentrated our minds back on 2008–09, Q170 Mrs Moon: One of the things that I would like and dodged 2006. The purpose of the question was to put on record is that you, Air Marshal, made a 2006. comment about the withdrawal from Sangin being Chair: You are the military witnesses in front of this understandable to ex-military and to our advisers. It is Committee. We would like to know what it was that important that those of us on this Committee who are caused these concerns to be raised with the British not ex-military understand, because in explaining to public. Those concerns remain. us and making it clear to us who are not ex-military, Peter Watkins: I don’t think we are in a position to hopefully you will also make it clear to our say precisely who took what decision in 2006. We constituents, who are also largely not ex-military. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 43

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

There is a huge problem. There is an expectation that course, dealing with the consequences of the severely the military can explain themselves to the military, wounded, as well as those lost. and it is this Committee that must be the filter that Tour intervals are managed by the single services gets the explanation for our constituents and the through a process of harmony. We can, again, go into British public, who are funding this and who are the statistical detail on that. On the sensitivity—if I have people to whom, ultimately, we are all responsible. I properly used that phrase—of tour intervals, it is very would like to make that clear. much the job of the chiefs of the single services to How do you feel the image of UK Forces, in relation monitor that. Where my headquarters plays a to NATO and the USA, has been affected by our particular supporting role to that process is in ensuring withdrawal from Sangin? that there are no elements in our force structure who Air Marshal Peach: In terms of our relationship with are asked to go more often than others. Those are what the United States Marine Corps? we term “pinch-point trades.”— Mrs Moon: Our relationship and our reputation. Bob Stewart: I accept that that is not your— Air Marshal Peach: Our relationship and our Chair: I want to move on to that issue. John Glen. reputation are undiminished. General Petraeus, General Rodriguez and General Mills are on record Q173 John Glen: Looking at the harmony issue, I paying tribute to the tactical skill of the British Armed understand that there’s been some progress in that Forces and the British Army in the particular case of respect, in terms of not breaching it so significantly. Sangin. In fact, we must remind ourselves that in the Could you give your view on when we get to a case of Sangin it was the Royal Marine Commandos, situation where that breach would not happen at all? 40 Commando to be precise, who conducted the relief Perhaps the Air Marshal and then the General could in place of the US Marine Corps, and all of the comment. commanding generals in NATO have paid tribute to Air Marshal Peach: It would be difficult to say that that. I deduce, therefore, that there has not been any it would never happen because, as I just suggested to effect on our reputation. It is important that we pay Mr Stewart, it depends. There will always be people sufficient regard and tribute to the sacrifice that we who are in high demand and short supply, particularly have made in Sangin. As I have just indicated to the as campaigns evolve; therefore, we have to manage Chair, we will write to the Committee on how we that carefully. The percentages are actually falling at ended up in Sangin in 2006. the moment for all three services, and we can provide the Committee with written detail. Q171 Chair: When we were in Lashkar Gah in January, we heard that the Americans were astonished Q174 Chair: But the percentages of breaches of by what we had managed to achieve with a very small harmony are falling. density of troops. That perhaps describes the other Air Marshal Peach: The breaches of harmony are side of the reputation coin to that presented by the falling. question that has been asked. Let’s now move on. The key point is to understand that with the word of Bob Stewart: I thought that Madeleine and I were evolution comes an evolution within the force— going to talk about sustainment. I am worried by how different skills and different types of unit mixes are we will sustain our operations with such small forces. required. For example, if a unit is deploying as a battle group to undertake partnering and training in support For example, the battalion that I commanded returned of the Afghan Forces, it requires a different mix of last week. It had 12 dead, more than 100 wounded ranks and of skill sets to undertake that role, compared and seven triple amputees, who had two legs between with forces deploying to do ground-holding, as we them. How often are infantry or Royal Marine soldiers may have talked about in 2008 or 2009. As that going back? I know what the answer is for units, but, structure evolves, so the skill set evolves. That is a given the way that the Armed Forces have trickle- complex process and requires a great deal of posted their soldiers, what is the average tour interval interaction within the Army, Royal Navy, Royal between an individual going out to Afghanistan and Marines or Royal Air Force where appropriate. In returning again? other words, the skill set looks different; for example, Chair: Hold on, we are going to move on to tour we’ve been discussing briefly 3 Para, and it would intervals in a moment. We are talking about look very different now on the ground in a unit that’s sustainment at the moment. doing the mentoring and training that we talked about earlier. Q172 Bob Stewart: How do we sustain that sort of Major General Capewell: The figures at the moment thing? No one has ever mentioned battle casualty are that less than 1% of the Royal Navy, 6% of the replacements. If you lose 100 from a 500-strong unit, Army and 5% of the RAF are operating above you are pushed. Do we have effective battle casualty harmony guidelines. I think that it’s important to replacements? Are battle casualty replacements put remark that each service has different harmony into units in the middle of tours? guidelines, and I couldn’t comment on the detail of Air Marshal Peach: Yes we do and yes they are. If the intricacies of that arrangement. My judgment is you wish me to go into detail, I can do that in writing. that this is recognised as a key issue to ensure that the That is a subject that we continually refine through sustainability of the forces is delivered over time—we lessons identified then learned. I, of course, join the all recognise that in terms of the Afghan campaign, tributes paid to your former regiment. We are, of we have to apply this calculus to 2015. Ev 44 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

Q175 John Glen: Just thinking about the situations pretty generous. That’s the feedback we get from the where individuals are deployed multiple times to Forces who are deployed. Afghanistan and Iraq, do you have any data on that? Air Marshal Peach: It is very complex. May we write Q178 Sandra Osborne: So people are not worse off to the Committee on the data? The point that I would now than they were, say, a couple of years ago? make is that people who have deployed multiple times Air Marshal Peach: No, I think they are quite won’t necessarily be doing the same job or be in the considerably better off. same rank. Of course there is recognition and reward here as well; where people have been recognised both Q179 Mr Hancock: May I ask about the suitability for their bravery and for their skill in the field, they of some troops to be redeployed after they’ve been on may well return in a senior NCO rank as opposed to perhaps one or two tours? I don’t want you to answer a junior NCO rank or in a senior officer rank as the question this afternoon, because I think you opposed to a junior officer rank. Those would count probably need to get the information, but I would be as multiple tours, but in different roles. I think that we interested to know, when you reply to us on the all know examples of that. question from John, how many service personnel have We can provide the Committee with more detail, but been deemed fit for service but not for further with so many thousands of people cycling through deployment to a combat area. Afghanistan every year, it is an evolutionary thing and Air Marshal Peach: That is a very interesting and is moving very quickly. In certain skilled areas, there very good question. As you know, the Secretary of will be people who have done multiple tours, for State for Defence has launched a mental health example, pilots—whether Army, Navy or Air Force— initiative. Some very preliminary research is being will often do shorter tours because they have to undertaken. Again, it’s a very rapidly evolving sustain other skills otherwise they will be lost. Other picture. Of course, there’s a physical ability to deploy people do longer tours in staff appointments where it to do jobs, and then there’s the other question you’re is important to have that breadth of understanding asking. All I will say is that I have extremely high from a longer tour; for example, for people supporting confidence—this is a very important point to me Lindy in the PRT. We are sensitive to the fact that personally—in the medical support our Forces receive those fighting need as short a tour as possible. One from the point of being wounded and the other size doesn’t fit all. medical support they receive in Afghanistan all the way through the clinical pathway to this country. I Q176 John Glen: In recognising that diversity of have very high confidence in that. experience and the fact that people go back in Mr Hancock: If you could write to us on that, it different roles, do either of you have a view about would be very helpful. how many multiple tours it’s reasonable to ask Air Marshal Peach: We will. individuals to take, or does your previous answer mitigate against an absolute number? Q180 Mr Hancock: The suitability of people to do Major General Capewell: I think that is an entirely tours and to go back into combat is an issue that the personal question. People very quickly recognise Committee has been conscious of, because of the whether they can put another tour in. I think the letters we’ve received as individual MPs and other general view among my colleagues would be that comments that have been made to us, so that would three six-month tours in five years is about as much be helpful. as you would want to do. May I direct these questions to you, Major General? Chair: Whereas the Chinook pilots in my We’ve gone through years of complaints about constituency do two-month tours, and many more shortages of things that have been requested by than three. commanders in the field, and newspaper stories etc. relating to everything from helicopters and proper Q177 Sandra Osborne: Could I ask about the armoured support vehicles to personal armour and so allowances given for tours? You talked about rewards. on. What’s your assessment now of the situation, and Is it the case that the allowances given for tours have what are the challenges with which you continue to been changed to the detriment of members of the be confronted? Armed Forces and that that is causing a problem Major General Capewell: That is an important with morale? question. Perhaps I can make a general response to it Major General Capewell: Not to my knowledge. I and then dip down into some areas that you may wish think the operational bonus package now is as good to take a little further. I don’t think there’s any as it has ever been. question now but that we see this campaign as set Air Marshal Peach: The operational allowance properly on a campaign footing, where we have package is as good as it has ever been, to my resource streams that are agile, behind a pretty knowledge. We do everything we can—everything we dynamic threat picture. The threat evolves; the Taliban can—to provide as much welfare as we can. It is not techniques evolve, and in many ways we have to a cash constraint; the constraint is literally the anticipate that, pre-empt it, and adjust our resources environment, rather than anything else. We are accordingly. My general remark is that the approach providing as much welfare as we can, and I receive to the campaign in terms of a national effort to sustain very few complaints about that. The operational it and to deliver the technology required to defeat the welfare package has been publicised and is, I think, threat is in reasonable shape. It’s never perfect Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 45

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins because the position in theatre is dynamic. That’s the obvious reasons, but they have found getting through nature of these things. Perhaps as an example, I can the procurement procedures in the MoD to be an dip into the question of the counter-IED fight. absolute nightmare, with delay after delay, even when Chair: I was going to ask Madeleine Moon to ask a those technologies have been tested and approved by question about that. people who are operationally competent. Do you get frustrated at times with the pace that these things Q181 Mrs Moon: The counter-IED fight is the area move at? on which most of our constituents are particularly Major General Capewell: No, because I genuinely focused, because they see the role that those play in a think and have no question in my mind that, while I large number of deaths. Can you give us the latest don’t know what technology you’re talking about, position on that and also, how will the additional there are novel approaches to this problem out there money you were promised in June be used and will it that need to be harnessed. Without going into too actually help tackle the problem? much detail, the fight against Taliban bombs that have Major General Capewell: On the counter-IED fight, a low metal content and so are hard to detect is a it is fair to say that the IED is the weapon of choice very important technological question. In terms of this for terrorists and insurgents globally. I think it is also enemy development, we watch it carefully and do the fair to say that it’s only in the last four or five years best that we can. If you would like to give me more that we have institutionalised an approach to this detail about the firm that you are concerned with, I internationally. I can give you an example; there is a will take it up immediately to see if there is anything counter-IED Task Force in NATO now. Each nation to offer to us. has a counter-IED Task Force. It is institutionalised Chair: It would be helpful if this could be an issue across NATO and, particularly in the US and the UK, that could also be looked at in the reform of we have very regular sharing of expertise and acquisition process review that is currently going on. technological exchange, which deals with this not only in a technological sense, but in an upstream Q183 Mr Donaldson: Just brieflycanIgobackto threat sense—the intelligence required to deliver the issue of sustainment? Are you satisfied that the against this—as well as the defensive techniques current six-month and 24-month length and tour required in theatre. intervals are correct? Can you confirm that 3 The Prime Minister announced £67 million in June for Commando Brigade use this 6:24 ratio for their the counter-IED piece. £40 million of that has gone to deployments in Afghanistan? EOD teams and the Mastiff vehicles. £11 million has Major General Capewell: I cannot speak for 3 gone to remote control vehicles and some of the Commando Brigade, believe it or not, because I don’t residue has gone to military working dogs. look after them. It might sound strange. Bearing in I spend every day thinking about this problem because mind what the Air Marshal has said about the of the obvious force protection requirement. There is individual dynamic, which is right in the middle of no question but that the technological advances to this because it changes on each tour for each person, defeat some of these devices are very advanced now, I am generally satisfied that the tour interval but you cannot just see this fight in terms of the management is within generally agreed management technological approach. You have got to look at norms for these sorts of difficult operations. techniques and practices in theatre. As the Taliban, the Mr Donaldson: Would it be possible to have a written enemy, develop their techniques against us we have confirmation of the position with reference to 3 to respond. We have stratified our effort into both a Commando Brigade? technological approach, which has many upstream Chair: That would be helpful. requirements outside theatre looking at different intelligence streams and also, as a defensive method, Q184 Mr Hancock: I would like to take you back to inside theatre, whether that is improvement in new equipment questions, particularly three or four vehicles, improvement in individual equipment or the individual issues. One is the helicopters. What way we deal with it as a whole force, rather than just restrictions, if any, are still being placed on the day- as individual nations. to-day operations by the current level of helicopter When you look at the institution of the counter-IED availability? Of the 12 helicopters that SDSR fight, while it is not perfect, Fort Halstead, our announced, only three will be in theatre in a research establishment, is full square behind this. This reasonable amount of time. What is your opinion of is a main effort requirement not only because of the the current state? cost to blood and treasure in theatre, but because we Major General Capewell: Eight Chinook Mark 3 are recognise this as a long-term issue that will extend being delivered. Seven of those are being delivered beyond any campaign in Afghanistan—as I said in my for training purposes and the remaining aircraft will opening remarks, they are the weapon of choice for be delivered by the end of this year. That is Chinook. terrorists and insurgents. Q185 Mr Hancock: How many will then be Q182 Mr Donaldson: You have mentioned deployed direct to Afghanistan? technological improvements. I have a firm in my Major General Capewell: Twelve. constituency who recently put forward proposals to the MoD to help bomb disposal operatives in Q186 Mr Hancock: Is that 12 new helicopters for Afghanistan. I won’t go into the detail of it for Afghanistan only? Ev 46 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

Chair: Hold on, are we not mixing up the 12 new Air Marshal Peach: As the type of skill set for the ones and the eight old ones? soldier changes, so the type of vehicle required for Air Marshal Peach: We do not normally go into the different roles and missions, as they evolve, also numbers of individual aircraft because it changes changes. We are doing a lot of work on that. The according to the campaign. But from my perspective bigger vehicles—the Mastiffs and Ridgebacks—are as the operation commander, I need the aeroplanes in performing extremely well. The reconnaissance training here to prepare the crews to give the sort of vehicle—Jackal—is performing extremely well. relief that the Chair was talking about to his Chinook Warthog is deploying as we speak. Other vehicles are pilot constituents, because we have to have sufficient being modified and/or extended for different purposes. pilots and crews to cycle them through. And we need Iamconfident, as the operational commander, that, more aeroplanes in the home base. not only in terms of suffi ciency, but in terms of flexibility to apply different vehicles to different Q187 Mr Hancock: Air Marshal, the question really missions, we are paying great attention to that. is about the number of helicopters available on the The same applies in an answer on helicopters. The ground in Afghanistan to allow proper operations to Chinook is not always the answer to every problem, be carried out and the proper protection of our troops. so, again, there is flexibility in approach there. I would Major General Capewell: If you spoke to any add that, of course, with the US Marine Corps present commander today on the ground they would say the on the ground, we are integrating our aviation with same as I am about to say. There are sufficient theirs, so we get more together from their Ospreys and aviation assets across the whole range of helicopter their Chinooks as well as ours. requirements to deliver the mission in terms of their force density and the campaign progress that the Air Q193 Chair: Can I make a point? Air Marshal, you Marshal has described. are the Chief of Joint Operations, and we also have the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff Operations in Q188 Mr Hancock: And to transport our deployed front of us. You said just now that Mike Hancock’s troops safely around the country rather than have them question was implying some knowledge of when trek across land in vehicles that may be unsuitable? Warthog would deploy. We would rather hope that Major General Capewell: You have to recognise that there would be, among the two of you, some the calculation between whether to go by air or by knowledge on that issue. land is a commander’s decision at the time based on Air Marshal Peach: I don’t have the numbers, Mr a range of issues to do with enemy threat requirement Chairman. Warthog is in theatre. We can get to the and mission demands. numbers very quickly.

Q189 Mr Hancock: When do you expect the Q194 Chair: You may not have the numbers, but it Warthog to be in theatre and properly deployed? would have been helpful if you hadn’t withdrawn the Major General Capewell: We can write to you on the Head of Joint Capability, who could have answered profile of Warthog. these questions, from giving evidence to us. These are Mr Hancock: No. When you expect it be in the field? the issues that we interested in, so if you could give Air Marshal Peach: I think it is very soon. us some answers on it— Mr Hancock: It looks like that decision might have Q190 Mr Hancock: Within six months? been above their pay grade, Chairman, because none Major General Capewell: I think so. of them seem to be aware of why that happened. Air Marshal Peach: I think we will have to reply We’re not absolutely sure, are we? in writing. Peter Watkins: You mean the presence of the Head of Mr Hancock: Would both of you say— Joint Capability? Air Marshal Peach: Warthog is in theatre, and the Chair: It was the Head of Joint Capability, Air numbers will increase over the next six months. Commodore Stuart Atha. Peter Watkins: Yes. I can give you a very precise Q191 Mr Hancock: When is it there as an effective answer on that. We were asked to reduce the size of vehicle that is available to all who need it? That is the the MoD witness panel from four to three, and, I’m question, isn’t it? afraid, he was the one that we pushed off. Air Marshal Peach: Yes, but it is not the only vehicle, Chair: I see. I apologise for attacking you in a totally Mr Hancock. unfair way. Air Marshal Peach: The point that I would make is Q192 Mr Hancock: I understand that, Air Marshal. that, going back to Mr Donaldon’s point about Are you then satisfied, with this responsibility— individual companies being addressed separately, the particularly you, General—that we now have enough protective patrol vehicle mix has evolved very of the right type of vehicles available in Afghanistan? quickly. We have continued to develop those vehicles Major General Capewell: If your question is, “Is the to meet the requirement. We are doing exactly the balance right?” that is entirely contingent upon the same with helicopters. Very few of our helicopters threat at the time. Am I satisfied that we are making now fly, for example, with the same type of rotor all our efforts to ensure that there is a sufficiency? I blade or engine as they did three or four years ago. am satisfied. We have adapted our equipment, whether by need of Mr Hancock: Asufficiency. the responses that David has made clear to the enemy Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 47

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins threat or, indeed, to get more out of them in terms of that gap is to do with the retrofitting of theatre- of performance. entry standard defensive aids suites, which I am not prepared to go into. Some of that gap is simply to do Q195 Mr Hancock: I would like to ask two further with the management of the fleet across the national questions, because we are going to be short of time. requirement, so it is being looked at. One is about Close Air Support. How does it compare now to how it did, say, three years ago? As that really Q198 Mr Hancock: But you have in place only affects fast jets, what use are we making of the contingencies to fill that gap to your satisfaction. Apache helicopters for close support attack? Major General Capewell: Yes, because we have Air Marshal Peach: Close Air Support by aeroplanes recognised—again, I deal with this on a daily basis— and Close Air Support by aviation helicopters are that as you look at this campaign, although the air complementary. The Close Air Support delivered by fleet is fragile it is being managed intimately on a the Apache helicopter in an integrated fashion with daily basis. To date, it has not failed us. The only time the US Marine Corps—with their own helicopter it failed us was when the volcano went off. This is a gunships—is important, as is air. The UK air real question about delivering the mission capability contribution is delivered by the Tornado. The Tornado on time and at the right place. If we don’t do that, we has a range of options of weapons; I won’t go into will not meet the harmony requirements. types and performance of those weapons, but I can Air Marshal Peach: Even when the volcano went off, assure the Committee that the Close Air Support in my 24/7 headquarters we came up with some very delivered by Tornado has been singled out a number imaginative solutions very quickly. We deployed ships of times for its accuracy and discretion. I mean to get the boys back as fast as possible, and very few discretion in the sense of being able to discern what is people were delayed despite the volcano. It is going on on the ground before lethal force is applied. I important that we base the analysis of the airbridge on know both of those statements would be supported by fact, not on rumour. It is important that we recognise NATO commanders. the contribution—with old aeroplanes, freely The way in which air and aviation have been acknowledged—that the crews make, which is integrated in 2010 by the UK Armed Forces, the phenomenal, to keep the old aeroplanes running 24/7 Royal Air Force, the Army Air Corps and the Fleet to keep the airbridge sustained. We have done a lot to Air Arm with the US Marine Corps has been try to understand the complaint side of life, and a lot exemplary. I know that General Mills would is done to try to make the journey to and from theatre absolutely endorse that. So, it is a team effort; it gets as comfortable as possible. better all the time; and it is applied with discernment, Chair: Thank you. Moving on to intelligence and not only in the sense of rules of engagement, but in surveillance issues, Madeleine Moon. the sense of understanding what is going on on the ground before lethal force is applied. In other words, Q199 Mrs Moon: There is a reluctance to deal with there is courageous restraint being applied from the whether you had enough personnel back in 2006. Can air to the ground. I think the UK’s contribution can be I take you to 2006 and intelligence? Intelligence is compared to any in that regard. collected in a variety of ways, both human and ISTAR. In 2006, was our intelligence robust and comprehensive enough before we deployed? If it was Q196 Bob Stewart: Do you accept the supply of not, why not, and are we in a stronger position now? ammunition for attack helicopters in 2007 ran out? Major General Capewell: I really do believe this—I Chair: That is a completely different thing. cannot comment on 2006 because I was not handling intelligence or operations in theatre at that time, but Q197 Mr Hancock: My final question is about the let me attempt to answer what I think you need to sustainability and the robustness of the strategic know. It is fair to say that, until the event, you never airbridge. How will you fill the gap between the know whether you have the right intelligence. It is VC10s and TriStars being taken out of service in 2013 very easy to look at the intelligence business as and the other planes coming into service? There is a monochrome and linear, but it simply is not. It is just gap, isn’t there? How will that be achieved? too chaotic and dynamic ever to predict whether you Major General Capewell: There is a gap. Perhaps I have the right systems in place to answer the right will make a remark first about the effectiveness of the questions at the time. That is my opening remark. airbridge. The joint commander has just conducted a Today, we are making substantial efforts to ensure that major relief in place between two brigades; you will the ISTAR requirement—the intelligence, have seen that. In broad terms, if the judgment of surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance whether this airbridge is successful is the achievement effort—is properly resourced, and my judgment is that of the transfer of military authority at the right time it is improving all the time. If you look at the wider and the right place, that mission was a success. area of intelligence-gathering technological In so far as the downstream replacement of VC10 and equipment, you only have to look at the way that increasingly obsolete Hercules aircraft, there is SDSR drone technology has improved over the past three to work in place now to address the spending round five years. If you look at the stuff in theatre now—I requirements to look at that gap. Some of that gap is do not want to go into too much detail—I think to do with the delivery from commercial contracts of everybody would realise that there has been a new aircraft, which can be solved by spending. Some quantum change in how we look into the battlefield. Ev 48 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

There have also been improvements in the human bandwidth, what are we going to do about ensuring intelligence domain. we have it? Is it an asset that we ought to be pursuing? If we’re not pursuing it, is it because of cost? Who’s Q200 Chair: Before you move to that, the gathering preventing us from doing it? issue is only a small part. Major General Capewell: I think you have to look at Major General Capewell: It is. In the intelligence bandwidth in a systems sense in two ways. First of cycle, there is a collection effort and a fusion effort, all, there is the bandwidth inside the NATO command and then an analysis and distribution effort to ensure structure. That matures all the time as the totality of that people get what they need. Part of that—I think the campaign system to collect intelligence gets better. this might address some of your concerns—is that the From a national perspective, we have a range of networks required to handle the quantum increase in improvements moving into theatre—Projects Kestrel, information and intelligence are also improving. They Falcon and Swift—the details of which I cannot give are not perfect because bandwidth always remains a you. problem. You cannot have everything you want, so But it’s also fair to say that in the way this campaign you have to get the best you can. has evolved, we are now moving towards a single So where does that leave me in my general judgment intelligence network that is getting better as people about the ISTAR and intelligence effort? You have to get more used to sharing information and data across look at how the theatre is put together today. There a large number of nations where hitherto, there have is very clearly now an architecture that is properly been very small communities of intelligence sharers. centralised and controlled by the big American effort So breaking out of that to make sure that it works was that is right at the heart of intelligence collection. That also a challenge in the past. It is not now. is not to belittle other nations’ contributions, but I My final remark on this is that the bandwidth is think it is widely recognised that the US capacity to increasing. You will never have enough bandwidth— collect information—to get it—with all its technology it’s just the nature of this—but it is increasing and is substantially greater than the sum of that of improving. It is not today—certainly to my individual nations. knowledge—a block to mission development and Was that the case in 2006? I suspect not. These things progress in theatre, particularly in the force are dynamic, and technology has come on protection arena. substantially. Can I answer whether we had the right intelligence in 2006? I cannot. Q203 Mrs Moon: Are we over-reliant on the Air Marshal Peach: I was in intelligence in 2006, and Americans for bandwidth, and what if they refuse us we did our best with the knowledge we had. I am not access? allowed at this level of classification to go into the Major General Capewell: I don’t think in a NATO knowledge that we had at the strategic level, but it sense—I’m only talking in terms of the ISAF was fused with what we knew at the tactical level. structures—we are over-reliant on the US. There are national strengths here in terms of imagery Air Marshal Peach: No. It is a NATO campaign, and exploitation and mapping which we used to the NATO does provide a great deal of communications maximum extent possible. I think even those deployed support to the campaign. We are in a partnership with in 2006 would recognise that. the Americans at the tactical level, and we look after Inevitably, though, a fact of life in military campaigns each other. There’s no question of people turning is that you understand the complexity on the ground things on and off, whether it’s helicopter support, when you are there but understanding it from afar is bandwidth, medical support or whatever. very difficult. It’s particularly difficult somewhere like Helmand Province or Afghanistan, where the tribal Q204 Chair: Is our equipment compatible with the dispensation and the arrangements through which Americans’? authority and influence were traditionally brought to Air Marshal Peach: Most of the time, yes. bear had been reduced by narcotics to an extent that we did not then know. I am prepared to say that. Q205 Mr Brazier: I appreciate we don’t have your Details beyond that on the intelligence picture in 2006 capabilities, colleague—that’s our fault and not would have to be undertaken, Chair, in a classified yours—but I am, frankly, a little astonished at what session. I’ve just heard. To give two completely opposite ends Chair: Have you finished your questions? I’m not of the spectrum, the American company Amphenol, sure you have. in my constituency, is the world’s top manufacturer of the connectors for a whole range of military avionic Q201 Mrs Moon: Where was the lack of signalling systems. Staff there told me they were intelligence coming from? Should there have been astounded by how undemanding our bandwidth further intelligence provided to us before we went in requirements were for the various systems that went in 2006, perhaps from the Americans? through them. Chair: We have done this issue. At the other end of the scale, I’ve heard from a very decorated and gallant officer who was in uniform until Q202 Mrs Moon: Okay. Then I want to go back to very recently—in the last 24 hours—the constant bandwidth, because that’s the other area where we problems of having to borrow American bandwidth. have a considerable amount of concern. Do we have All the great systems we’ve been hearing about—we enough bandwidth? If we haven’t got enough don’t have the means to get the information to the Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 49

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins people who need it without borrowing bandwidth Air Marshal Peach mentioned earlier that there are from the Americans all the time. Although the some areas of Afghan National Army capability that Americans certainly are excellent allies and do try to we think need to be strengthened, now that we have help, they’ve got their own priorities, and they can’t the basic numbers much higher than was the case. always pick the pieces up for us. Are we moving into That is one option. But we can’t, at this stage, until the information age or not? we’ve done the detailed analysis, say precisely where Air Marshal Peach: The systems that David has or in what number that reinvestment will take place. outlined do give us a quantum increase in bandwidth. Do our bandwidth requirements, historically, compare Q209 Sandra Osborne: So it’s a tight time scale. If to the United States’? I think that that was one of your you’ve a date of 2015, that’s very tight. comments. While the requirement probably does, the Peter Watkins: I don’t think it is such a tight time means of getting there probably didn’t, but is scale. The Afghan Government have set a target of the improving rapidly. Therefore, there have been end of 2014 to achieve a situation where the Afghan occasions where we’ve cobbled things together, as I National Security Forces have the security lead across would put it, but they’ve been cobbled together for the Afghanistan. That’s another four years, so I don’t right reasons and have achieved the right outcomes. think we think it’s too tight. Chair: I suspect this is an issue that we will be returning to. Q210 Sandra Osborne: Can I ask, Karen, what plans do the UK Government have, over and above the Q206 Sandra Osborne: Your memo states that the military effort, for transition? transition will be conditions-based. Can you outline Karen Pierce: Specifically related to transition, the what these conditions are? main conditions for transition are security based, Peter Watkins: Broadly, the work on conditions is rather than governance or development, although under way at the moment. It’s being undertaken those are factors. We would interpret that, for between NATO and the Afghans. The precise example, as follows. If you want the Afghan army to conditions will vary from province to province and be consistently capable in a particular province, then district to district. But in broad terms the conditions you would need a certain level of governance to that we are looking at are as follows: the Afghan ensure that operations carried out by the army were National Security Forces should be capable of not then allowed to dissipate. So we and DFID do shouldering additional security tasks as ISAF reduces; some work to support that, but primarily it’s a security security should be at a level that the population can go about their normal lives; local governance should issue and the detailed work on transition at that level be sufficiently strong that it underpins security, as will be done by NATO and the Afghans together, ISAF begins to draw down; and ISAF itself should be there’s a joint framework—a joint board—in Kabul properly postured so that—to use General Petraeus’s that will look at this province by province. NATO and phrase—it can “thin out” and provide a different sort ISAF have a consultation mechanism whereby they of support to the Afghans as they become more can consult member states and the UN, and other capable. Those are the broad conditions, but, as I said, people who are relevant to the development of that how they will look in each province and district will particular province. The Foreign Office would be vary, because each one is different. involved in that, but it would be something started on in theatre. Q207 Sandra Osborne: This question is for Air Where we have a major role is in the political Marshal Stuart Peach. When will the PJHQ review of process—if you like—beyond that. What does it mean the transition arrangements be complete? to bring forward certain Afghan governance Air Marshal Peach: We’re working closely with our capabilities? The main vehicle for that is the Kabul friends and colleagues in the Ministry of Defence on process that I referred to earlier—commitments that. Obviously, we have to wait for the Lisbon coming out of the Kabul conference monitored by the summit and then we’ll be looking at what that means UN, that is, both monitoring how the Afghans on the ground. We’re doing some work for the approach that and how the international community National Security Council on that, so when would it approaches it, and trying to identify gaps. be complete? Probably by the end of the year, to look In terms of even longer-term political processes, forward to 2011 and beyond. obviously reconciliation and the political settlement is coming to be high on the agenda. We have supported Q208 Sandra Osborne: Your memo also talks about President Karzai in his conditions for reconciliation reinvesting troops as required. What does this mean and we have given practical assistance to the Peace for troop levels and capabilities? Jirga and now to the High Peace Council, which will Peter Watkins: Again, this is part of the detailed work go into more detail about how to take forward that Air Marshal Peach referred to. Basically, in reconciliation. We would be involved in institution conjunction with his headquarters, we are trying to building and capacity building to try to make internal work out what this transition will look like on the governance in Afghanistan more effective. We take ground, in terms of what does it mean for the balance part in those various levels. of roles and capabilities that we have. But in terms of reinvestment, obviously one of the options that is Q211 Thomas Docherty: Can I ask Karen and the available to us is to put additional effort into training. Major General first, how confident are you that UK Ev 50 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins and Coalition Forces can withdraw successfully at the Q214 Mr Brazier: Forgive me, Air Marshal Peach, transition period? but surely our withdrawal from Iraq is not seen as a Karen Pierce: I was going to say that we expect successful role model, given the end state there. transition to start in early 2011 and finish in 2014. As Air Marshal Peach: If I may say so, Mr Brazier, the explained earlier, that is the target date that Karzai question was how to withdraw, and that was what I has— was referring to. I wasn’t referring to the whole campaign. The question was about how we tidy up, Q212 Thomas Docherty: For the UK or the UK and how we sort things out and, as Karen suggested, how Coalition Forces? we change from role to role, and so on. We do that Karen Pierce: Transition will be nationwide in through normal military planning. I was not making Afghanistan. It will be about handing all the provinces an observation on the wider aspects of the campaign. and districts eventually over to Afghan lead control on security. Whether that enables such and such a Q215 Thomas Docherty: Iwanttofollowuponthe country to reinvest its forces, put them into training in planning element. I guess this question is largely for a particular area at a particular time, is one thing that the gentlemen, but obviously it may involve others as we have to work out. The NATO-Afghan board will well. What do you see as the dangers in the look at which provinces and districts are ready and in Government announcing their intention to withdraw what order. Should there be pilot projects? What as you try to do the planning? might be needed to get them ready? Beyond that, it is Peter Watkins: There are both benefits and risks in not possible to give you greater clarity. If you’re doing that. One of the benefits has been that it has saying, can we successfully withdraw by 2015, as the been quite widely welcomed by the Afghans Prime Minister said, we are obviously putting all our themselves. They want to take over the lead role for energies into ensuring a robust and effective Afghan security in their own country and have reacted quite security capability so that we can successfully positively to the 2015 date. As I said, that is simply withdraw by 2015. the year after the end of 2014, which is the date that Peter Watkins: The 2015 date is a logical they themselves were intimately involved in agreeing. consequence of the target set by the Afghan That’s the benefit, and I think we’re seeing that Government, with the full support of the international benefit already. community, that states that the Afghans should be able The risk is, of course, that that date might be to take the lead by the end of 2014. We think that that misinterpreted by the Taliban and they might imagine is a reasonable and respectable aim, based upon our that it means that the international community will growing knowledge and experience. leave, but of course that is not the case. As the Prime Minister, President Obama and the Secretary-General of NATO have said, we are not just going to leave. Q213 Thomas Docherty: I was going to come on to ISAF will retain—the countries of the Coalition will the rights and wrongs of the date, but specifically on retain—Forces and other capabilities in Afghanistan whether you can successfully withdraw— to support the Afghans. Peter Watkins: The precursor to that is, will there be Major General Capewell: I think it’s widely an Afghan National Security Force at the end of 2014 recognised that the next four years are about many that can take the lead for security across Afghanistan? things, but one of them is that none of us wants to go Based upon the evidence that we have, we think that back, so whatever we do, this has to be seen as there can be. irreversible in many ways. I don’t think there’s any Karen Pierce: This is about withdrawing from question that there’ll be a very low level of violence, combat; there would still be military assistance there as is normal in that part of the world. The trick is to and possibly some support functions, not necessarily make sure that the Afghan Security Forces can deal delivered by the UK, but by the Americans and others. with that. That is the beauty of the transition plan: It isn’t as if the whole ISAF Force would completely it gradually delivers to the Afghan Security Forces come out of Afghanistan by 2015. There will be increasing responsibility for the management of that training, assistance and support missions. How exactly violence. It will take fine judgment and some patience, we phase and elaborate them will be the subject of but that’s what we all want to happen. detailed work, probably starting next year. Major General Capewell: My view of all this is that Q216 Thomas Docherty: My concern is this, and underneath all that policy, which is absolutely right in correct me if I’m wrong. The United States has said terms of setting the conditions, there is a sequence of that its ambition is to withdraw at the end of 2014, sound military planning in the MoD and particularly but it is not set in stone in the way that ours is. The in PJHQ to deliver that. The real question on all this French have said they intend to withdraw, but in effect is synchronisation across the whole country, which is have said it will be after their allies—after the United an ISAF responsibility. Kingdom. The Germans have said—correct me if I’m Air Marshal Peach: In terms of detailed planning, wrong, Chairman—that they will do it as conditions that is what we do. If you wish, you can look back are met. So I’m slightly puzzled as to how you can in history at an exemplar: we planned and executed say we have synchronisation of ISAF Forces when we withdrawal from Iraq in 2009, and I know that that have four other major players that are each setting has been through the Committee and the NAO, so we different time scales and goals for their withdrawal know how to do this; we have a plan. from one another. We also have this question: what if Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 51

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins

President Karzai turns round at some point between summit, I hope the quality of the narrative is improved now and the end of 2014 and says, “We are making in order to improve their understanding of it. tremendous progress, but we aren’t going to be there Karen Pierce: May I respond to that? There should at the end of 2014”? The United Kingdom has given be a declaration issued by NATO specifically on an explicit guarantee that combat troops will be out, Afghanistan, which hopefully will help with that. whereas the Americans have given themselves more wiggle room. Q221 Mr Havard: Yes, but plain English means— Peter Watkins: I think it’s an international goal. As I what you’ve just said could have a very variable said, the objective of the end of 2014 was agreed—I geometry. It could be districts within a province that think it’s been agreed twice by the international are transitioned, and then it looks very different in community—at the London and Kabul conferences. another province. It could be a whole province gone This is a shared goal. In terms of the steps by which over. There’s a whole variable geometry that you and we get there, that will be conditions-based. I set out I understand, because there’s a level of assumed the process earlier. The entire alliance is quite clear knowledge here that the public do not have. All I’m that the process by which we get from here to there is saying to you is that it can be explained much more a conditions-based process. simply and better than it’s been up until now.

Q217 Thomas Docherty: My feeling is that come Q222 Chair: Karen Pierce, can I clarify in my own what may, in 2014, UK combat troops are out of mind what it is you have just said? Because of the Afghanistan. Is that correct? Prime Minister’s statement, we will leave, come hell Peter Watkins: The Government have said that British or high water, in our combat role by 2015, and if there troops will not be in combat roles beyond 2015. is still a need for combat troops to be there, we will essentially leave it to the rest of ISAF, which, as we Q218 Thomas Docherty: So when you say it is know, means the Americans. Is that the position if conditions-based, it is until the end of 2014, and then there is still a need for combat troops to be in it is an absolute date? Helmand? Karen Pierce: It’s the date that the Prime Minister has Karen Pierce: No, Mr Chairman. I was speaking in a set for Britain. ISAF as a whole has not set a date. It hypothetical way. is conceivable that we would not be in combat but that another ally would be. It’s possible. That’s not anyone’s intention. The intention, as Peter explained, Q223 Chair: So was I. is to back this commitment of Karzai’s, which the Karen Pierce: I think the way you’ve put it is rather international community’s now endorsed and the more concrete. It would be for Ministers, not for me, NATO summit in Lisbon will further endorse, to have to answer what might happen in the event of a created a successful transition to Afghan Forces by situation being X or Y in 2015. What I was trying to the end of 2014. So in that sense, the question whether do—I apologise if I’ve been misleading—is simply anyone will be in combat from the international say that it is conceivable that there is one scenario in community after 2014 becomes a moot point. But at which a part of Afghanistan still requires ISAF the moment, we’re all focused on standing up the combat assistance, and that that assistance would be conditions to meet that 2014 date. provided. It does not automatically mean it has to be provided by Britain, but this is really a question that Q219 Thomas Docherty: In your best assessment, Ministers could only properly consider at the point at are we on target to hit, by the end of 2014, all the which it was a live question. I don’t want to give the conditions necessary so that ISAF Forces will be able impression that we would withdraw and leave our to hand over control? allies in the lurch. That’s not what I’m trying to do. Karen Pierce: I would say that we are on target. Peter Watkins: May I go back to what Karen said? It There’s a lot of work that needs to be done, and we is conceivable, but it is unlikely, because we’ve all now must factor into that the detailed planning on recognised that our Forces are in one of the most transition, so that district by district and province by difficult parts of Afghanistan. As the Defence province can be handed over to the Afghans. It won’t Secretary has said, Helmand will be one of the last be a big bang; it will be a gradual process of handing provinces to transition. some provinces and districts over. Peter Watkins: As Karen has said, one of the key Q224 Thomas Docherty: To clarify, have you just criteria—the leading criterion—is security. From that told us that you aren’t actually planning, in case you perspective, it is the growth in the numbers and get to 2014 and discover you’re not ready, that there capability of the Afghan National Security Forces that is a problem? I think what you’ve just told us is that is crucial, and that certainly appears to be on track. yes, it’s conceivable, but it’s politicians’ responsibility to deal with that issue, and that you’re not planning Q220 Mr Havard: You have a particular for the horrible eventuality, which no one in this understanding, and—it’s like a lot of things—I have Committee would want, that there is a need for an understanding as well, because I have a degree of combat troops in parts of Afghanistan. experience and knowledge in it. I think it is one of Karen Pierce: No, I’m not saying that. We undertake these things where Josephine and Joseph Public don’t a range of contingency planning on a range of understand it in quite the same way. After the Lisbon different scenarios, and in that respect, Afghanistan is Ev 52 Defence Committee: Evidence

10 November 2010 Lindy Cameron OBE, Major General David Capewell OBE, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Karen Pierce CMG and Peter Watkins no different from any other place where we have without us in 2015. That’s a reasonable conclusion Armed Forces serving or have had them serving. from what he said and what you’ve said. Peter Watkins: I would say that that would be a Q225 John Glen: My understanding is that the Prime logical deduction that is extremely unlikely, for the Minister hasn’t said that the pull-out of combat troops reasons that I’ve said. There are four years in which by 2015 is contingent on any analysis of what’s to develop the capability of the Afghan Forces, and actually happening in various provinces on the that work, as I said, is on track. ground. He said that that is absolutely going to happen Karen Pierce: As the Foreign Secretary explained on at the end of 2014. the Floor of the House, all our energy is going into Chair: The words used were “make no mistake creating the conditions so that that 2014 transition is about it”. met. John Glen: So if there were circumstances where at the end of 2014 there was a need for combat troops Q227 John Glen: I understand that. That’s absolutely in Afghanistan, and given the absolute commitment clear; nobody disputes that. What we’re talking about made by the Prime Minister, then we would be in the is the very real possibility that there will be no circumstances that the Chairman described. There flexibility from a British point of view as we would be a need for those combat troops to be understand it from the Prime Minister’s decision. provided by other allies on the ground. Surely that’s Karen Pierce: We would say it isn’t a very real unavoidable, given the nature of the Prime Minister’s possibility.1 That, I think, is the difference between statement. It wasn’t ambiguous; it wasn’t contingent us. on any planning activity; it was an absolute hard stop. Chair: I think we’re reasonably clear on this, and I Peter Watkins: As I said earlier, we are talking about think it’s time to draw this session to an end. Thank a situation that’s four years away. The priority for our you very much indeed to the witnesses. I’m afraid it’s planning is, obviously, to ensure that the Afghans are been a slightly scratchy session in some respects, and in the situation that they want to be in. to the extent to which that is our fault, I apologise. No doubt to the extent to which that is yours, you do Q226 John Glen: Sure. I’m not disputing that. But too. Thank you for your evidence, which has been the Chairman put the point that if, in those most helpful in our inquiry. Quite what our report will circumstances, there were a need for combat troops in say, I’m not sure yet, but time will tell. 2015, given the statement of our Prime Minister, we wouldn’t be in a position to provide them. Therefore, 1 Note by witness: This refers to the issue of combat troops it follows that our allies would have to carry on still being needed after transition. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 53

Wednesday 17 November 2010

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Sandra Osborne Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Bob Stewart John Glen Ms Gisela Stuart Mr Dai Havard ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Brigadier Simon Levey, Director Royal Armoured Corps and formerly part of the NATO training mission in Afghanistan and General Sir Nick Parker, Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, and former ISAF Deputy Commander, Ministry of Defence, gave evidence.

Q228 Chair: Let us begin. We are a minute early, behave more in an Afghan way and to understand the but that is a good thing. May I welcome you to the culture that we were operating in. Committee’s inquiry into operations in Afghanistan? On the system, he introduced the NATO Training When the Committee of the last Parliament was in Mission in Afghanistan, the joint detention operation Afghanistan in January we met both of you there, and 435 and, importantly, the ISAF Joint Command. He we are most grateful to you both for the help you gave broke the theatre-strategic and operational levels apart us. In spite of having met you before, it would be to give greater clarity to the command and control that helpful if you would kindly introduce yourselves, and was necessary. That was manifested in a much more tell us what you now do and what you were doing directive command. He told people what to do and then. where they were to do it. He elected to undermine the General Sir Nick Parker: I am Nick Parker. I was the insurgency in the South. His predecessors had only Deputy Commander of ISAF based in Kabul, and I ever been able to co-ordinate and ask. That was also had the role of the National Contingent absolutely nailed by the introduction of additional Commander. I am now the Commander-in-Chief, forces—the 30,000 that President Obama announced Land Forces in Andover. on 1 December last year and the additional NATO Brigadier Levey: I was the Combined Training troops. If you add the 20,000 American Forces who Advisory Group Commander, dealing with army had previously been allocated to Afghanistan, that training in Afghanistan under the NATO training gave General McChrystal the opportunity and the mission there. I am now the Director of the Royal ability to operate in a more aggressive and forceful Armoured Corps. way in those areas where he wished to do so. That was when he started to undermine the insurgency in the South. Q229 Chair: What would you say have been the key issues in Afghanistan over the last couple of years? Q230 Chair: Brigadier Levey—from your point of General Sir Nick Parker: My experience of view? Afghanistan directly started about late October last Brigadier Levey: By definition, my prism is far year, so my sense probably covers the two years that narrower than the General’s. I can only cover the you are talking about. The McChrystal review brought Afghan National Army training piece. The bit that I three fundamental changes: first, to the resourcing of personally saw was the significant uplift in resource, the operation, which I will come back to; secondly, to of both men and money, to enable the growth of the the culture of the operation; and thirdly, to the Afghan National Army at pace. That was the biggest structure—the way the operation was conducted. significant change from when I started in December Those were the three principal military strategic ’09, when it really picked up, until I left changes that the McChrystal injection made. I am not Afghanistan—the biggest single change. criticising those who went before him; I am saying that this was a process of evolution that suffered a bit Q231 Chair: The issue that came up when we were of a revolution when he came in and conducted a watching the training of troops in Kabul was that more formal process of analysis. money and time spent on training in Kabul would pay On the culture, having population-centric operations dividends once they got to Helmand. Was that was essentially changing the emphasis. We were resolved by the British sending more people to do conducting counter-insurgency before then, but training? McChrystal focused people on the people that we Brigadier Levey: In fact, all the other NATO countries were there to protect, emphasising the fact that if you sent a lot more people to do training. I had roughly poison them, you are never going to be able to win 340 people when I started, and there are now some the security fight. He injected emphasis into that 1,400 trainers. The numbers increased exponentially, through the tactical directive that he issued in about not only from NATO countries, but across the board. August last year, and also through the process of That made a significant difference to the quality of partnering, which is a very big change. He realised what we were able to do. That enabled us to put in that we had to partner ourselves with Afghans both to place quantifiable, measurable tests to see that the Ev 54 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker quality of the training was improving. We knew that the wider public message that we sent raised we were increasing the quantity significantly. The expectations of progress above what was achievable. Afghan National Army has grown by 58% this year Today, we have demonstrated in some really difficult from November to November. That is a big growth, parts of the South, both in Helmand and Kandahar, but it is the quality that has really improved with the that we can deliver consistent security and that we can advent of the NATO Training Mission, where the do it with our Afghan partners. That is beginning to emphasis changed from just quantity to improving the send a powerful message to the insurgents, who are quality. Those trainers and the money that went with beginning to make a balance of judgment that says it allowed us to improve the quality. I can give you we—ISAF and the Afghans—are going to be around lots of stats, if you want them, on how it improved. for a credible length of time, and their allegiance should start to change to us. Q232 Sandra Osborne: With regard to the situation in Helmand, what are the particular challenges that Q234 Sandra Osborne: You have laid great store by the Coalition faces there? the need to bring the Afghan people on board. Do the General Sir Nick Parker: That is probably one for people in Helmand trust the Coalition Forces? me, isn’t it? I speak very deliberately from the theatre- General Sir Nick Parker: I think it has been and will strategic perspective. It is terribly important for us to always be qualified. They trust us by our actions, but understand that Helmand is a part of a greater they would wish to have their own armed forces operation and that we risk, if we only look at what is providing security for them, like any country. happening in Helmand, possibly misrepresenting Ultimately, they see us as a bridging force that should where the military security pressures are across the be able to transfer to their own people. But I don’t whole of the campaign. I absolutely understand that think they mistrust our motives. for UK Forces, the risks and the threats in Helmand are of prime importance. Our job was to look at this Q235 Sandra Osborne: How much has governance across the whole theatre. As an aside, just because we improved in Helmand Provinces? can win a battle in Helmand, it does not mean that General Sir Nick Parker: It has been slower than we ISAF success is guaranteed. We must ensure that we would have wished. I am not sure whether Governor guarantee ISAF success from a security perspective. Mangal has spoken to you in any other forum. He has There are three big challenges in Helmand that I significantly increased the levels of governance inside recognised when I arrived. First, we needed to make Helmand over the last four to five months—12 sure that the density of force was appropriate, to the governors out of 14 districts. Those sorts of statistics people that we were trying to secure. There was need are bandied about. If you dive down into the detail, the district governors in Nad-e-Ali and Sangin are to continue the process of increasing force density. both building confidence, but it is a work in progress. The second thing is that, as part of the McChrystal Stepping back to what I said before, it is the plan to get people to partner effectively with the governance of Kabul and governance at the provincial Afghans, we began, before it was being talked about, level and the district level that need to continue to the process of transition, because ultimately it is an develop. All three levels are challenging. My work Afghan solution. We had to start getting our Forces was mostly in Kabul, working with President Karzai’s closely alongside the Afghans, building confidence immediate advisers. and using them effectively. Thirdly, we had to connect people to give them better situational awareness. That Q236 John Glen: We have a memorandum from the is a rather military term, but we have to understand MoD that sets out the 47 countries represented in the the environment that we are operating in, and Coalition—from the three personnel from Austria to Afghanistan is a very difficult country to operate in as 78,000 from the US. I would imagine there are a Westerner. We needed to continue to improve that considerable strains in trying to run a coalition. Could so that our military judgments were based, as far as you tell us about how that works and what the issues possible, on accurate assessments of what was going are in making that coalition work when you have such on around us. a large number of participants from different countries? Q233 Sandra Osborne: Has the security situation General Sir Nick Parker: It is important to recognise improved since the increase in troop numbers? that in military terms the US is effectively the lead General Sir Nick Parker: Yes, it has, but we want to nation. Therefore, automatically, there is a deferral to be really careful about the messages that we send. I them, because they bring the greatest amount to the consider myself as having been guilty of being over- operation. Having said that, because the military confident, or appearing to be over-confident, in culture is pretty consistent across all those nations, February last year. Before Operation Moshtarak people fit into that well. Provided they believe that started, I deliberately said that it was going to go well. they are reasonably represented, there is no great I was using the language of 60, 90 and 120 days for challenge in the military sense in managing the bringing in things such as governance in a box. With Coalition. However, it is something that one has to the benefit of hindsight, that raised expectations to an work on all the time. unreasonable level. I rationalised that by saying that I Working on behalf of both General McChrystal and was doing it because our men and women were about General Petraeus, I have found that getting nations to to go into a very dangerous operation and we needed reflect their grand strategic policy inside the theatre- to be confident in their ability to do that. I think that strategic decision-making process was quite difficult. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 55

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker

I would hold fortnightly meetings—I chose to—with not yet been fully answered. How much difference the senior national representative of the eight principal do you think the McChrystal approach of courageous nations, and it was sometimes difficult to get a restraint has made? The impression obviously is that dialogue going with them over things where we it has been very positive. Do you feel that it has made needed to understand what their capitals were thinking a real difference? in order to be able to shape the military theatre General Sir Nick Parker: Yes, I think it has. decision making. It works much better than it might Courageous restraint is a difficult label; we want to be appear, because there is a lead nation. There are eight very cautious of it. I think we went through a bit of a principal nations that we need to corral, but that is wave. We over-corrected in order to bring people back hard work and we need to do it better. I do not want from what was on occasion a very aggressive this to sound at all derogatory, but they tend to come approach, where the risk balance between protection along because they respect the way the thing is and offensive action was a little out of kilter. organised. McChrystal recognised that, and brought it back into line. Q237 Mr Brazier: Let us move on from the change We then experienced subordinates who were over- that the McChrystal strategy has made. Brigadier correcting, and who were losing their initiative in Levey, do you feel that the fall in the level of civilian order to protect the population. There was a very clear casualties is helping recruiting for the Afghan sense, which I am sure you will have seen over the National Security Forces? summer, when General Petraeus took over, that the Brigadier Levey: Are you asking for a personal American trooper needed to have more freedom to act opinion? so that he was not as vulnerable as I think it was felt in Mr Brazier: Yes. the American chain of command that he had become. Brigadier Levey: To be honest, I don’t know, but I General Petraeus reissued the tactical directive with do know that recruiting has remained pretty constant exactly the same basic principles, but with greater throughout. Ever since I was there and they ramped emphasis that the chain of command was not to add up the recruiting numbers, we have essentially been to the conditions, and that we were not to be able to feed the training machine sufficiently to concerned to take action if the lives of our troops were exceed the targets of the number of soldiers we at risk. The principle was right. It took us a bit too far needed to train. By October we had to be at 134 and and was over-corrected, but it is now operating in I think we were at 138, so we are ahead of schedule. exactly the right way. The recruiting has been consistently sufficient to meet Chair: I’m glad you answered that, because that is the requirement—in fact, above. not a narrative that we have heard before in so helpful a way. I am grateful to you. Q238 Mr Brazier: That is obviously welcome news. Do you think that we will be able to make more Q240 Ms Stuart: I have come to Defence new. All progress with getting Pashtuns from the South into the my previous visits to Afghanistan have been with the army and police? Foreign Affairs Committee. Last week, this Brigadier Levey: I know that there is a big push to Committee went to Permanent Joint Headquarters. I get more Pashtuns from the South into the army. am trying to understand how the chain of command Pashtuns are in the army in roughly the right sort of works. It seemed to me that there was a duplication numbers, but not from the South, as you know. Post- in it, but it may just be me coming to this new. I Eid, which has just happened around now, there is a wonder what your perception is. big drive going on right now to do more recruiting in General Sir Nick Parker: I think— the South. I think—this is a personal opinion based Chair: Brigadier Levey is very much enjoying the on professional knowledge—that with what has been fact that you have to answer this. going on in the South, where the secure zones have General Sir Nick Parker: Can I defer to you, increased, it is likely to be more successful than it has Brigadier Levey? Two contextual aspects before I been in the past. answer the question. First, Coalition Operations are General Sir Nick Parker: Ihavetwofinal remarks. extremely complicated. There are 47 different nations, First, it will be incredibly important to the credibility and in this case, a NATO chain of command, and of the ANSF in the South to get more recruits from therefore each one is different. Secondly, I think our the South. They realise that, and this additional effort approach is developing all the time. So every will help. There is an initiative called the Afghan operation is different, and it morphs as it goes along, Local Police Initiative, which we must be very careful so there is a lot of change. about not over-emphasising, but it essentially creates My professional opinion is that we do not yet a much better-disciplined locally recruited security understand the theatre-strategic level clearly enough force. It is working reasonably well, and I know that in the British Armed Forces. There needs to be a General Petraeus believes that it should be spread greater understanding of the importance of the further. That would offer us an opportunity to get decision making that takes place, in this case in Kabul. people out of the community into a bridging role—it The linkages between Kabul and the grand strategic shouldn’t be permanent—to provide security inside or military strategic decision making in London need communities. to be clearer and better understood. I believe that that was a reflection of why I was sent out as the National Q239 Mr Brazier: That is an interesting point. The Contingent Commander, although I don’t believe I Chair said that he feels that one of the questions has was given sufficient resource to do the job as actively Ev 56 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker as I needed to. There is a need for greater Convention, the rules of engagement and the ways of understanding of the critical nature of pulling levers doing, as well. in Kabul because you can pull as many levers as you Brigadier Levey: On the training side, the Afghans like in Helmand, but it won’t make any difference to certainly have already incorporated into their training the way that the campaign is being run by the big all of that element that you have just referred to. They command level. That is very important. have a thing called RCA—Religious and Cultural But I was not in a position to deploy, sustain and Affairs—which is a sort of combination, in our terms, recover a very complicated British Force. There is no of a padre and welfare officer and a few other bits and way that that could have been done effectively in pieces put together. That branch school is already up Kabul. In my current job, where I am generating the and running in Kabul and training the people who then land element of this force, I need to feed it through go out to the battalions and live with them. That is an organisation that can consolidate it, can ensure that part of it. what is being done is correct, and then deploy it and At the same time, all those soldiers going through sustain it effectively. I firmly believe that there is a their basic training and who come back for their role for the Permanent Joint Headquarters to deploy, courses with their officers, NCOs or not, get all the sustain and recover, and it needs to understand what’s other bits that make up the moral components. They going on, but I think we should look carefully at its get taught the laws of armed conflict. They get taught true pure command relationship because it cannot in basic training about looking after civilians. All that influence decisions that are made inside the Coalition element is covered in various parts of their training, in Kabul. just as we do in our army. So, it is covered.

Q241 Bob Stewart: General, hello. Did you have Q244 Mr Havard: We hear reports about difficulty in establishing yourself as the National absenteeism rates, the fact that people cannot work Contingent Commander? And when you used the unsupervised and the low numbers, so the quality word “London,” did you actually mean PJHQ? question comes in. But this is meant to be a people’s General Sir Nick Parker: No. I had the normal army, looking after the people as opposed to challenge that you would have whenever you something else; that is why we are asking the introduce a new element into any chain of command. question. What is happening with that? We seem also So I had to educate myself, and those around me and to be training a lot of people who are then up the chain of command where I felt that I could add disappearing, and you are on a treadmill. Is that what real value. I had to demonstrate a bit of success in is happening? order to build confidence, and I quite understand that. Brigadier Levey: I can talk to you about the absentee By “London,” I meant the Ministry of Defence. rates. The absenteeism is caused by a number of Bob Stewart: Not PJHQ? different factors, as in any army. One of the particular General Sir Nick Parker: No. problems in the training base is that the soldiers have such a compressed time scale—going from basic Q242 Mr Havard: You talked about the training. training, through their specific branch training and Our experience and understanding of it is that, as far through their collective training—and they do not get as the training of the ANA is concerned—the army any leave during that. Therefore, if they want to get component—you are teaching them the physical and their pay home, sometimes they take themselves off, conceptual components of military activity, but how pay and come back. So we know that we get soldiers do you train soldiers in the ground? One of the coming back eventually who have not really deserted; questions we want to ask you is about the moral they have just been absent to go and pay their component of an army and what the aspects of trying families. to deal with that in training the Afghan Army have That side of life is being looked at to try to improve been and how you are dealing with that. the way in which the soldiers are paid, but that is only General Sir Nick Parker: Can I start at the top level one element of it. There certainly was an element of and then get Simon to answer the question properly? soldiers going absent if they were sent down south— Mr Havard: Sure. that was definitely the case. There was a higher General Sir Nick Parker: The general loyalty of the proportion of soldiers going absent from those Afghan National Security Forces is something that we battalions who were going to be sent down south. That need to help. We need to nurture it. The relationships particular issue was resolved by making sure that we that the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the topped up the battalions before they went. Interior have with President Karzai and with that In the army as a whole, they are seeing how they can close-in group of people, the Cabinet, are something improve retention by having what you have probably that we must not undermine. In my job, I was very heard referred to as the red-amber-green cycle—where conscious that one needed to sustain the confidence of they do a bit of training, have a bit of leave, and do a the President and the Cabinet in his armed forces so bit of operations—so that they do not all get that they felt that they were doing what was right for consumed in the fight all the time. That has the country. We need to continue to do more to that improved retention. so that the Security Forces have the confidence of the General Sir Nick Parker: I agree with everything that higher level of Government. Simon has said. The high-level point is that we have grown—we have done “growth”; what we have not Q243 Mr Havard: That presumably includes the done is “capacity”. Are we doing sufficient to build issues about the laws of armed conflict, the Geneva capacity inside that growth? Yes, we are starting to, Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 57

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker but we are doing it in phases. We have a lot of what continue to press on, to try to mitigate the risk of they call attrition. Now we are starting to build better a maverick. offices, better schools, and better cycles, so that But we must not forget the benefit, which is huge. It people come off the front line. All those things are is about operating alongside people—even if they’re being built and they will take time. You can build the Tajiks and they come from the North—who number to 137,000 in the year, but have you got the understand the place so much better than we do and capabilities? No, that is thin and we need to continue who have very good low-level tactical fighting skills. to build that. When you partner our people alongside them, you get real synergies with our technical capability, our Q245 Mr Havard: We have asked this question weapons systems and our training with good, natural about ethnic mix, distribution and so on. In the end, soldiers who understand the environment they’re the best of Kunduz is full and the best of Helmand is operating in. not so full—we have seen all that. That is why we are The benefits that we’ve seen from this embedded asking whether it is going to be a national army that partnering are huge. So I have to say that the risk still is deployable across the whole of the nation of exists, but we should not just accept it; we should Afghanistan, or whether it is a large number of people, continue to try to mitigate it. What we shouldn’t do is but not a sustainable quality group of people who stop and lose sight of the benefits, which from a stick. military perspective are very significant. General Sir Nick Parker: It can be done, but it Chair: It was interesting that when we were in requires time. You can grow quickly, but the Afghanistan in January, the British soldiers there told capability takes longer. us that their greatest protection was the Afghan Brigadier Levey: The year ending in October this year soldiers they were working alongside. was all about building the infantry. That was the deliberate plan. October to October next year is all Q247 Mr Havard: You’ve dealt with some of the about the enablers—the logistics element and all the stuff about partnering. Can I ask you a specific other bits and pieces that make an army complete. question about where women sit in relation to the That is why the literacy programme has been Afghan National Army and about the women within expanded so dramatically, because there were not it? How is that training done and how is that process enough literate soldiers. developing? All those things are contributing to building the other Brigadier Levey: In my time there, we had the first element, and even when that is done, you will not be ever female officers’ course. It was not my idea; it there fully, because you will still need to keep the came from General Ameenullah Karim, who is the institutional training base supported to ensure that Afghan National Army Training Commander. He got future generations are brought alongside. the idea from his wife, who said to him, “This is a Mr Havard: You have been reading some of my really good idea.” He then proposed it and drove it questions; you have been looking over my shoulder. through. There was considerable opposition among other Afghan army personnel. Q246 Mr Donaldson: Gentlemen, you will correct The key thing about this particular idea is to recognise me if I am wrong, but I understand that our Forces that we are talking about Afghanistan, not Europe, and who are training the Afghan National Army are it has to be done at their pace. If we had tried to billeted side by side with them, whereas the impose that on them, it would never have happened. Americans create some kind of a barrier between the The fact that the General was personally so keen and two—they sleep in different quarters, and so on. I may drove the idea is what made it succeed. They now be wrong about that. We had the recent incident when have their first 29 female officers in the Afghan the three soldiers were killed by a member of the National Army, and another course is about to run. It Afghan National Army, including Lieutenant Neal is a small step, but it needs to be in keeping with their Turkington. I wonder about the wisdom in all culture to make it succeed. circumstances of our soldiers being billeted alongside those of the Afghan National Army. Q248 Mr Havard: Yousaiditisatofficer level? General Sir Nick Parker: The circumstances that you Brigadier Levey: These are officers. are talking about are not in training; these are people who are conducting operations together. This is the Q249 Mr Havard: What sort of level is that? concept of embedded partnering and at Patrol Base 3, Brigadier Levey: Well, it means they can come in as where that incident took place, they slept in separate second lieutenants and lieutenants. They will not be tents in similar parts—they were actually in slightly used in a combat role; they will be used in different compounds, but on the same FOB, defended administrative roles. by the same security force. The issue is: is the risk worth the benefit? The risk is Q250 Mr Havard: You were talking about logistical that in a large armed force you are almost certain to support and other things beyond basic manoeuvre have a few mavericks. If we are fighting an insurgency warfare and teaching them about other components where we are battling for people’s minds and wills, that make up a whole military. You say it has only you will inevitably get some infiltration. Is our vetting just started, but how is that progressing? Is there a sufficiently good? Are our biometrics sufficiently role and a function for women more in that area of good? Those are the sorts of things that we have to activity as opposed to perhaps the infantry, as it were? Ev 58 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker

Brigadier Levey: Female numbers are very small at been trained, so not only were they recruiting and the moment. The numbers going through could not training new ones, they were also training those who keep up with the vast numbers we are putting through were in the police already. A huge amount of effort the logistics schools and all the other schools that are went into that and I know that the Brits, down in starting up. Those are the ones that have got to make Helmand, have had their own involvement in that, the effort this year—the military police, the logistics, doing a really good job training up the police forces. the engineers and all those bits and pieces. They are It has not been a good news story throughout, but growing exponentially just as the infantry did the huge strides have been made. As I was looking over year before. the fence at the police, I was quite surprised at how That is why all those schools were put in place: to well they had caught up, considering that they were allow this growth to happen for this year. In addition, starting at a much, much lower base than the army. of course, they are establishing logistics bases around They were starting at a really low level. They are not the country. They have established four in the last there yet, but they have done a good catch-up job. year. So the whole thing is happening in parallel. The The Afghan National Civil Order Police, which is one real mark of success will be at the end of October next particular part of the police, was very high-end and year, when we’ll see if the growth has happened, as it they put a lot of effort into improving their retention. did this year, with all those schools filling all those The commandos is the other sort of model. The places. Based on what has happened currently, I see commandos had a 98% retention rate—really good. no reason why they should not succeed. They did the cycle of red-amber-green, so they went on leave-training-operations. No matter what was Q251 Ms Stuart: Can we turn to the Afghan going on in Afghanistan, they did that. They started National Police? Could you, Brigadier, just give us a bringing that in for the ANCOP, which then improved quick rundown on retention rates, literacy rates and retention and you get this virtuous circle happening, problems on retention in relation to drug so the good lessons from the army have been taken dependency—those kinds of figures? In your opening across to the police. That is, I am afraid, all I can give remarks, you said it was not just the quantity but the you, but it is really only a broad-brush perspective. quality that was improving. Can you just give us a quick rundown of where we are? Q253 Ms Stuart: Earlier, you mentioned the Brigadier Levey: On the police force? methods of payment of the Afghan National Army. Ms Stuart: Yes. The police occasionally did not get paid at all, never Brigadier Levey: I can only give you a very mind being paid and then having to take it back to superficial view because my job was with the Afghan their families. Can you say something on that? Also, National Army, not the police. do you know about the weapons going amiss after General Sir Nick Parker: You’ve got to be careful, they had been issued? Simon. If you want real fact— General Sir Nick Parker: The key area for development has to be the police force, and it is the Q252 Ms Stuart: I was very conscious of the fact most challenging one. It is going to take time. Even that the Afghans call their soldiers “warriors” and in an Afghan sense, a more sophisticated security their police “soldiers.” When we talk about the organisation that is community-based is going to take Afghan National Police Force, our nice distinction is us four or five years. that these aren’t community support officers. Which A lot of the early steps with the police have been quite one of you can give us an answer? frustrating. There have been difficulties; two steps General Sir Nick Parker: We can both give you a forward, one step back has been the feeling. The general answer, but I think we should offer you some Petraeus Afghan Local Police Initiative is designed to real, clear statistics in writing, if we may. produce a community-based security organisation that Chair: Real, clear statistics in writing would be will bridge between now and the time when the ANP helpful, but do please answer to the extent that you will become better trained and better led. Leadership feel able to. was one of the key things that we were trying to build Brigadier Levey: The Afghan National Police Force up, so that local leadership would be better. certainly had a problem with—I am talking about In any organisation that is not terribly well led and is from the time I started until the time I left—retention, being formed, you get—if I call it leakage that may drugs and corruption—and recruitment, for that appear to belittle the loss of ammunition and the loss matter. All those things were acknowledged. The of weapons—those sorts of things happening, and we police force, not the army, became the main effort in were having to tighten up on that. We are having to my time there. tighten up on the discipline of the organisation, but it All the key effort in terms of intellectual and physical is an area that we watched very closely, because it is resource started to be diverted into the police and it the area where improvement will have a very had an impact, without a shadow of a doubt. Drug significant impact. The Afghan Local Police Initiative testing across the board for everybody. They did was designed to try and catch up on some of the areas biometrics of all the police. That meant that they where we were losing. could then get rid of those who said they were Brigadier Levey: On the specific issue of pay, the working and weren’t, because they knew who, army and the police are paid in the same sort of way. physically, was at work. They are paid the same sort of wages. What the army Huge strides were made in the training of the police. does is get paid by phone. You have probably heard Of course, a large proportion of the police had never of that system where mobile phones are one of the Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 59

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker ways to get paid. It should be improving, particularly different. It is not run by the NDS, but by the prison with what they did with the biometrics and the service, and it has greater capacity, but needs some registering of every single policemen, physically, to serious development. That was being introduced. make sure that they were all there. Lindy Cameron and those sorts of people will be able On the weapons side, the army does not have the same to talk about that. On the statistics for the Pul-e- problems. They all have NATO weapons. Therefore, Charkhi prison for the new facility that the Americans we know how many weapons there were in the first are working at, we would give you those things in place, because we issued them and they are all detail. checked very regularly. On the police side, it is a bit more difficult. There are Q256 Bob Stewart: I want to look at what happened so many AK47s around, we don’t know how many in 2006. We have heard from General Messenger, who there are, so it is a bit of a trickier problem. With the said he didn’t have enough personnel to carry out the army, I knew in my time that we lost one pistol and tasks in Helmand in 2006. Would you like to comment one rifle. The rifle was recovered and the pistol took on the lack of personnel for the tasks allocated to us a little longer. We know exactly how many NATO in 2006? ones there are; it is the other ones that are trickier. General Sir Nick Parker: I hope you won’t think I’m The police are now bringing in systems to do what being rather wet. the army does. The problem is that there is such a Bob Stewart: I know what you are about to say, proliferation of that particular type of weapon that it actually. is harder to control. General Sir Nick Parker: Because, in this and my General Sir Nick Parker: Our hope was that the previous position, I had no direct military Afghan local police would bring their own weapons, responsibility for what was going on in 2006. I start so you would start to regularise or legitimise the AK from a real understanding of what was occurring in that was under the bed. 2009. All I can say is that my experience has been of a very dynamic insurgency and, as I said earlier, an Q254 Ms Stuart: The Afghan National Army insurgency where our understanding of the recruits across Afghanistan and tries to create a environment was extremely challenging. national force. The Afghan National Police attempts that, too, but it’s less successful, isn’t it? Q257 Bob Stewart: I will let you off, because I think Brigadier Levey: No. that you had to say that. What about the number of Ms Stuart: I thought that the aim was that we move troops that we have now? Do we have it about right? to a national police force— General Sir Nick Parker: Yes. From an ISAF Brigadier Levey: In different sorts of police forces, perspective, the South has just about got it right, but you have one sort that is recruited locally— we mustn’t be complacent. The effective growth of Ms Stuart: Is that what the Americans are funding? I the ANSF is critical to start to complement what we am trying to understand. have. As far as the British are concerned, exactly the Brigadier Levey: I am not sure about the funding same philosophy applies: we must continue to grow aspect. One sort is recruited locally and works locally. an effective ANSF. I could not commend highly Another sort is recruited nationally, so it depends enough the Afghan National Police training which police force it is and what role it is going to organisation in Helmand. These are really important play. So there are different types of police forces that to continue to put as much high-quality Afghans do different things. Some are local and some, which I among our people as we can. refer to as being like the commandos, go in to do a I feel very strongly about the need to apply normal particular job. military judgments to the tactical operation. We must General Sir Nick Parker: We can send you the allow our commanders, at the appropriate level, to be details. There are five pillars of the police force. The able to use reserves in an effective and dynamic way. criminal investigation—what I suppose we would call We must have sufficient force and capability to be the specialists—are nationally recruited. The proactive and to stay in front of the insurgent. At the uniformed police are recruited by provinces, so they moment, we have, but it is a dynamic insurgency, and are locally recruited. The ANCOP that Simon was we must stay on the balls of our feet. talking about are recruited nationally, too. Q258 Bob Stewart: Withdrawing from Sangin, was Q255 Ms Stuart: I have one final question on prisons there an impact on morale in any way? What about and on building a criminal justice system and law our relationships with the US Forces? Did our enforcement. When Governor Mangal came to a reputation suffer a loss? briefing, he gave us a good view as to where we are General Sir Nick Parker: I consider the withdrawal going to be, but I didn’t really get a sense of what we from Musa Qala, Kajaki and Sangin as absolutely have at the moment. Could you update us on how essential ISAF military moves in order to concentrate many secure places we have? forces properly in the population centres of central General Sir Nick Parker: I can’t give you the exact Helmand where they were needed. Again, you are details. I would commend Task Force 435 to you. It going to think that I am being rather naive, but the is the detention’s taskforce and is run by an American transfer in Sangin was no more than the Royal Welsh three-star. From a Helmand perspective, the NDS in handing over to the Royal Irish. This was a Lashkar Gah has a facility with, I think, about 100 straightforward RIP where a UK Force was being beds. There is also a prison in Lashkar Gah, which is relieved by a US Force, because they had the resource Ev 60 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker to do it, and we put 3 Para into central Helmand, General Sir Nick Parker: My professional which was where it was necessary to be. It was a very observation is that we misunderstand the importance straightforward military move. of hierarchy. I am concerned that we may have allowed brigadiers to make decisions that are beyond Q259 Bob Stewart: I understand that, but I was their capacity or capability. I feel very strongly that, really quite concerned that it was perceived, in some when we operate in a coalition environment, we must quarters, that we were actually cutting and running a still make sure that there is a hierarchy of wisdom little bit. I would like to hear your counter to that within the UK commitment that ensures that the right comment. decisions are made. We did not have such clarity at General Sir Nick Parker: It could be seen like that if the two-star level in the chain of command during our you view it from a very particular perspective. It was early days in Afghanistan. That would make me quite absolutely the right military thing to do. If you talk to nervous today. I think that it is very important that we somebody from 40 Commando, they don’t feel that support the perspective that allows us to make really they were being abandoned. The US Marines were in difficult military judgments about capability and tasks. there for six weeks before the RIP took place. It was a really carefully conducted handover. Q262 Mr Havard: That is interesting. Could I put a Where I think we have a potentially subjective issue proposition to you that has been put to me? is that the lives that were lost were British lives, and Essentially, all we managed to do between 2006 and the people who are there now are American, but, from 2009 was maintain the situation. We’ve learned my perspective, we’re all ISAF. This is a very lessons since then. In the South—I take the point that challenging area, and both the British and the it’s an ISAF operation with the involvement of lots of American commitment to that particular part of the countries, and that it is the whole country, not just country have been extraordinary. You will have seen Helmand—it is essentially no longer a NATO mission, the statistics of the battalion that took over from us, it is a coalition of the willing dominated by the United and it is a very challenging area. Now, 3 Para will be States of America, although there are thousands of having a very challenging time in Nahri Sarraj. So it Danes, and so on. There is nothing necessarily wrong is the label of Sangin, if you view it from a very with that, but there is a set of policy questions that particular perspective, which, I have to say, us military come from that, particularly for NATO, in terms of men must not do. how we form the various components. The Brits put their hand up and said, “We’ll go,” but perhaps there’s Q260 Bob Stewart: I’ll keep going, because I will a better way of doing such things. be corrected very quickly by the Chairman. The reality of the situation is that it’s only America’s Intelligence in Helmand was nowhere near good volume and capacity that can do it. As far as NATO enough in 2006. You probably won’t be able to answer is concerned, the proposition that has been put to me the question as to why, but is it that much better now is that, in situations such as this, there are limits to in 2010? NATO, as has been demonstrated by this activity, and General Sir Nick Parker: It is hugely challenging. I it’s important that defence policy makers in the UK think this is very close to the critical capability that are aware of that. The egalitarian multinationalism of we need to continue to develop. Our situational the NATO axis attempted in the South doesn’t work awareness and our understanding in a very strange with such risky military aspects of the overall cultural environment with a very dynamic insurgency command. What lessons are there about who decides have got to be absolutely cutting edge. I think we’re to deploy what and where have we learned from that learning all the time. I think we’re a heck of a sight process? better than we were when I got there—not me—but General Sir Nick Parker: The lesson is properly to the process is constantly evolving, and it must empower the ISAF chain of command, and in this continue to do so. case it is, as I said right at the beginning, effectively Bob Stewart: I am not going to ask the last question. American led, because they are the people who have the major physical stake in it. I think that our Q261 Mr Havard: There is a question about lessons interpretation of coalition, NATO, or whatever type of learned here, and there are questions about 2006 and operation it is, has to take account of those who so on. We withdrew from Basra. We ended up putting provide the largest amount of resource. more of a component into Afghanistan. We are just wondering whether, having taken troops out of Iraq Q263 Mr Havard: We are going into a risky area, earlier, perhaps, in order to train them up, that caused and when you go into a risky bit, it’s really a coalition us some risks in one theatre in order to invest in of the willing with the Americans, because it’s not another. Whether we invested enough because we really the rest of NATO. didn’t know enough and didn’t have enough to send General Sir Nick Parker: Well, yes— is a question I think we are struggling with. It is not Mr Havard: The other bits are fine, because there’s a case of blaming an individual; it is about learning less of a risk up there, and there’s less fighting. from that process. Is that a fair assessment of the General Sir Nick Parker: They may not be. Georgia, general situation that we saw ourselves in from 2006 Denmark, Estonia, Canada— up to 2009? Mr Havard: There are some others with us, yes. General Sir Nick Parker: I can’t—I’m pathetic. General Sir Nick Parker: And the Dutch. There are Mr Havard: You can say no. significant numbers. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 61

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker

Q264 Mr Havard: We don’t want to diminish their been extraordinary and considerable but we must not contributions by any stretch of the imagination. kid ourselves: what we call the counter-IED fight is General Sir Nick Parker: But they are relatively not against the IED, it is against the system that it is small stakeholders, and therefore one has to rely on operating in. If you can defeat the insurgency, if you those ISAF mechanisms, which are designed to take can eject the insurgent from the community, the IED account of those national interests, and the German goes away with no technical assistance at all. So we Chief of Staff and I are involved with that. That comes need to continue to improve our situational awareness; back to my point about the importance of investing in improve our intelligence; improve our tactics; make decision making at the theatre strategic level. That is sure that our soldiers remain really brave and are the interface between the national interests and prepared to do offensive operations and don’t become military decision making, which is where we must defensive; keep the proactive edge; and we need our apply our influence. technicians to keep watching developments because as sure as night follows day, once we get on top of Q265 Mr Havard: Those decisions in 2006 weren’t one capability, it will morph into something else. British decisions in isolation. General Sir Nick Parker: I can’t answer that. Q269 John Glen: Is your assessment that we are on top of it at the moment? You have spoken in general Q266 Mr Havard: Well, they weren’t. They were terms about the moving nature of the target and being NATO’s. appraised of the need to have more resources pumped General Sir Nick Parker: I can’t answer that. in. I am really keen to get the explicit view from you Chair: You were in Northern Ireland at the time. We now about how well that is going and whether there don’t think you’re pathetic. are sufficient resources to deal with the nature of the Bob Stewart: From the answers we’ve heard, not threat at the moment. from you, but from others, we might imply that the General Sir Nick Parker: I’m going to give you an chain of command wasn’t right in 2006. answer which I worry about because I think it will Chair: I think we can now move on. give you the wrong impression. The statistics show that we are on top of it and that it is getting better. I Q267 John Glen: Over the past four years, concern think that when you get into that position you start has been expressed at various times and in various to become complacent and you start to think you are degrees about the shortages facing UK Forces in terms winning. So this conversation worries me, partly of the lack of helicopters, Close-Air Support and because it is an open session and partly because I counter-IED capability. How do you see the Armed think there are positives and there is a danger that they Forces now in terms of having sufficient quantities of could be misinterpreted. But if you look at the what they need? Are there any gaps remaining? statistics and you look at the trends, you’re going to General Sir Nick Parker: It is a balance between see something positive, but for God’s sake don’t let capability, tactics and the plan. Those three interrelate. that make us complacent. If your tactics go wobbly you’ll start to lose the initiative; if you either don’t have sufficient capability Q270 John Glen: Last week we took some evidence or employ it incorrectly you’ll start to lose the about bandwidth and communications infrastructure. initiative; and clearly, if the plan is wrong you’ll start There seemed to be some different views about what to lose the initiative. My judgment when I left, the UK Armed Forces had compared with the speaking as the British National Contingent Americans. Do you think that the UK Armed Forces Commander, was that we had those things broadly in have access to enough bandwidth to use their balance. You have to keep watching them all the time and there are two very important things that I think communications systems in the best possible way? we should recognise. First, we need to ensure that we What is your view on that at the moment? generate continuity so you don’t have six-month General Sir Nick Parker: There have been some chunks of ideas. You must allow those ideas to flow remarkable advances. In 2009, when I came in, it was so that you can react to things in a considered way. poor. I think we have shown a capacity to increase Secondly, we have to accept that the insurgent is very our bandwidth, thank goodness, which allows us to dynamic and therefore what looks great today will operate in a much more effective way. Fusing have to be adjusted when he changes his tactic. As a information in order to stay on top of it is critical. I military man, I think we have force densities that believe that the culture of communication in my part allow us real flexibility now. When you have of the Armed Forces is wrong. We have to take a very insufficient force density and your capability is different approach to communication—the flat stretched, your flexibility is reduced. We are not in information environment—and it is in that culture and that position at the moment. that attitude, the willingness to use the sorts of technology that are available to allow us to Q268 John Glen: To give us some detail, could you communicate today, that we have to change the way comment on how well ISAF and UK Forces are we do our business. dealing with the IED threat at the moment? General Sir Nick Parker: Yes. The IED has clearly Q271 John Glen: It is much improved, but there is a gained considerable interest because of the numbers long way to go. of casualties that have been caused by it. The effort General Sir Nick Parker: A long way to go, and that has been put into it across all ISAF nations has culture, not necessarily stuff, is critical. Ev 62 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 Brigadier Simon Levey and General Sir Nick Parker

Q272 Sandra Osborne: You have referred to the loss Afghans and making sure that they are content with of British lives, and that of course is one of the major what we are doing is another serious area that we need concerns of all our constituents. Many of them wonder to consider. what the purpose is and what is actually being achieved. The Prime Minister has said that we will Q274 Sandra Osborne: When will ISAF be able to withdraw by 2015, “make no mistake about it.” How withdraw? confident are you that that can be successfully done? General Sir Nick Parker: That I can’t answer. I am General Sir Nick Parker: I think that is an entirely saying as a military man that it is entirely reasonable reasonable order to give to the military. The resources to be told to plan to get out of combat operations by and the plan are there. We will have to manage a 2014 or 2015. That is an entirely reasonable ask, and whole series of risks, and we should be planning to if we cannot do so we should pull our finger out. The do so, but we should stay on the balls of our feet to situation is very dynamic, however, and we need to deal with the unexpected. stay prepared to react. We need to continue to plan for contingencies that are unforeseen now. Q273 Sandra Osborne: But given everything that you have said today about the difficulties of training Q275 Sandra Osborne: But you have talked a great the army, particularly in relation to the police and the deal about the need to keep the Afghan people on whole scenario of the culture of the area, none of these board, and you have also said that things might look things are new. They have been going on since we good today but situations can change. How do you first went into Afghanistan. The culture is well known, convince the Afghan people that we are not just going for a start. How can you be so sure that this will work? to cut and run in 2015, no matter what the General Sir Nick Parker: Because I feel that with circumstances? the plan that McChrystal brought in, that catalyst for General Sir Nick Parker: At our level, by honest progress injected something into this campaign that is relationships, by trust and by showing them the blood starting to develop momentum and cautious optimism. that we are spilling on their behalf. I work with all the It is entirely reasonable for our political masters to principal advisers and the Ministers in the turn round to the Coalition and say, “Do it by 2015.” Government. They understand the degree of I think that time frame is entirely reasonable, even commitment at our level. I am not in a position to with those challenges that you talk about. I am talking answer the question of how much political about out-of-combat operations, because that is what commitment there is from the Coalition nations. I read in the instruction. Chair: General Parker and Brigadier Levey, thank There is still a debate to be had about how much we you both very much indeed. That was really will need to be helping in the institutional capacity of worthwhile evidence, and we are most grateful. We the Armed Forces to sustain this. Dealing with the will now take evidence from General Lamb, but not at the same time as you.

Examination of Witness

Witness: General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO, gave evidence.

Q276 Chair: Welcome to the Committee. You come we are now.” It has been a long, bloody and difficult here on a regular basis, and we are most grateful to campaign and it was always going to be that. you for coming in again so soon. Because you have However, one has to see the wave pattern of the initial been here so recently, I don’t think it’s necessary for removal of the Taliban, most of whom just went to us to ask you to introduce yourself. As you have ground and/or disappeared, because the Afghan recently returned from helping the Americans in people had dismissed them and they had lost their Afghanistan, do you mind telling us what you think authority. They recognised retribution as, sort of, the key issues have been in Afghanistan as a whole “That’s entirely understandable,” on the basis of what and in Helmand over the past two years? had happened in the United States. There was that General Sir Graeme Lamb: The reality is that I came period when our eye was taken off the ball and we out at the beginning of July, so I’m already four somehow thought it would be an easy ride. months out of date and in a collapsing circuit, one might say, by way of an informed position. At the time I was in Afghanistan I was principally driving Q277 Chair: Our eye was taken off the ball by Iraq? towards the reintegration programme in support of General Sir Graeme Lamb: I think Iraq, obviously, General McChrystal’s adjustments in the campaign, was a large factor, but it was also, in many ways, a but I was obviously privy to a host of conversations sense that these things somehow have a beginning, and had access to how they were developing their middle and end. It’s a never-ending story. Savage wars thinking and approach. of peace continue well beyond—well, I’ll be long I think it’s quite important not to see Afghanistan as dead by the time Afghanistan plays out and through. we tend to, which is to clump it into an act that started We are still engaged with Kenya. We don’t have any in 2001—and I recall that only too well—with the combat troops there, and we left it a long time ago, removal of the Taliban and how it is now, saying, but the truth is that there is a continuation of policies, “Well, it’s been a long campaign and look at where diplomacy, force and use of military force, training, Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 63

17 November 2010 General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO training individuals, good governance, building think that that is wrong, in view of what you have capacity and so on. That has gone through. said? The interesting thing with Afghanistan, in particular, General Sir Graeme Lamb: Yes, I would. I am a was this cold realisation, which came about in the straight-talking individual. period towards the end of 2008 and in early 2009, that the situation was really very serious, to borrow a line Q279 Chair: Ah, it’s wonderful when you have from General McChrystal’s assessment. A lot of the retired. expectation—you know, hope is not a plan—was that General Sir Graeme Lamb: I was pretty straight- it was going in the right way, but in this case, there talking when I was serving, actually. Everyone in was a realisation that it was not, and that it was going uniform would sit there listening, waiting for the in the wrong way. comment. When I turned up in Kabul in 2009, I You have heard me before, referring to what I saw looked at an organisation—a structure—and a when I turned up in 2009, which was a sense of relationship with the embassy and with the Afghans, perceived and real intimidation that had taken a grip as well as the civ-mil connection, which was not fit across the country. It was very persuasive and for purpose. You can dress it any way you want and intrusive across areas where we had no people, or in put lipstick on it, but it was not fit for purpose. In that areas where we did have people but were not actually short space of time, General McChrystal turned all connected to them—that sense was there. Therefore, that. He restructured, reconnected and re-engaged. He the campaign, in many ways, took a clear and new drew the pieces together and changed the overall direction with the assessment that General McChrystal culture. wrote. It took him three months to write it, and it took four months of contested consideration in Washington Q280 Mr Havard: You say that there was the before the force or the resource that was needed to counter-terrorism operation, Operation Enduring execute it was agreed—the President made his Freedom, the ISAF thing and all that stuff going on, decision, as I recall, in the early part of December— but this is a much more joined-up operation. You have because it was such a change. counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism in a unified In many ways, what we are seeing is a change in package, with support and so on. It is not just a simple direction, and we should not view the campaign today change, saying, “Let’s end the separate mission that as being from 2001. We should see it from 23 August the US were conducting and integrate it with the rest 2009, as we understand how that began to change. I of the ISAF mission.” Or was it? You seem to be think I have put on record that in the first meeting that saying that this is something conceptually different to General McChrystal had with President Karzai, he that and much greater than that. As I understand it, arrived in his dress greens. That was not to impress there is four times more SF activity going on than the President with how many medals he had or who there was during Operation Enduring Freedom, but he was, or because he was a very swish dresser. It was that does not matter, because it is part of a more not the case; it was to show due respect to the unified process. Is that right? sovereign President. I sensed that President Karzai General Sir Graeme Lamb: Correct, sir. The term had not enjoyed that level of respect, and that level of “unified” is exactly the right one. There is a way to understanding that here was a sovereign nation, over go yet, so the idea that the civ-mil peace is tidy would the previous years. There was a sense of him being misrepresent the reality. It is a lot better. The given responsibility. relationship between ISAF and the United States— A number of campaigns were running concurrently, between the different approaches—has been brought which were independent of the sovereignty of the together. Chains of command have been improved, nation. Sovereignty is important to the Afghan. and they needed to be, because they were pretty General Mattis and General Petraeus created the ineffective. They were operating in single lines of counter-insurgency doctrine, which I call an operation. I sense that time will draw out the legacy extraordinarily good piece of work. They changed the of the McChrystal year, in terms of the change of direction, and brought in, in many ways, the culture and the change of force command control, as embracing of what we had seen from Afghanistan, well as the sense, whether it was in Europe, understanding, living with and going in and among Washington, or even Westminster, that this was do- the people; that was being drawn through. I recall— able from a military point of view. The campaign in fact, I think that it is recorded in a Bob Woodward began to conform and respond to that. That was a book—General McChrystal saying that it was not new draw. either counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency. It is America would not have sacked Dave McKiernan— both, in the sense that both have to be brought to bear, he is a fine officer whom I worked with in 2003, when which is important. The campaign that we are seeing we went into Iraq, and has a good track record—if he is one that has been drawn from that period of 2009, had been able to embrace the change that was seen to when the change in direction was set by General be necessary and that was then brought about by McChrystal in that first year, and it is now being General McChrystal. At that time, there was a range delivered by General Petraeus. of relationships between NATO, ISAF, America and Karzai, who was going through the difficult period of Q278 Chair: Yet we were told earlier today by an election. All that occurred at the same time that he General Parker, and last week by others and General was building relationships that, in many ways, Messenger, that the McChrystal doctrine was not a General Petraeus is now able to fuel off so as to new thing. It was a development of a process. Do you proceed on a course that was set in that earlier period Ev 64 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO of change. The movement in that period was a Are we doing that? People will say that we have Herculean effort by all those involved. At that time, modern communications, but I say that they are it was driven and the course was set in a quiet and sometimes just an excuse. unassuming way, but with his inevitable delivery, by The question is how is the campaign being directed, McChrystal. That included both counter-terrorism and both from an overall grand strategic point of view, or counter-insurgency, and it brought those together, whatever the right level would be—I defer to Hew because they had been parallel activities or divergent Strachan on this one—and from a theatre perspective. activities, and they had not been inclusive of the It is about the delivery of the campaign as a single population per se. action, not a series of individual national activities, Chair: I regret saying that it is wonderful when you which is where the campaign has gone to. We have retire, because I remember from what you told us in Germans training the police, or not, as the case may Iraq that you did not seem to mind speaking most be, and us responsible for drugs, or not, and not doing controversially, even when you were not retired. as well as we could have done. I don’t apportion blame very glibly; I just see it as it is. At the same Q281 Mr Brazier: General Lamb, would you like to time, we have the Americans with the high-value share with us your views on the effectiveness of the targets, the counter-terrorist approach, the drones, and PJHQ, which figures heavily in the pamphlet that you what I call the specific targeting programme. All of recently co-authored, and particularly on its general that is running. effectiveness and on the specific issue of overlap with There is an importance in drawing all those together, the Operations Directorate in the MoD? because it is the sum of the parts that makes the General Sir Graeme Lamb: My views on the PJHQ Force—the Coalition—so superior to the individual are partly expressed in the paper that we pushed out asymmetric attacks or approaches that the opposition for the Policy Exchange. I had the good fortune to sit has taken. It learns and morphs very quickly, as Nick at the back and listen to General Parker—I have a quite rightly pointed out, but the truth of the matter is huge amount of respect for him—and his observations that we need to bring not only the whole of were right on the money. He talked about the need for Government, but the whole of the campaign, to bear. such an organisation, when you are dealing with a If you look at the movement of troops, as Nick quite complex, multi-service commitment, to be able to rightly pointed out, it was an absolute no-brainer to prepare, deploy, sustain and recover. The term that is me and Nick Parker sitting in theatre. It was felt, for in question is the issue of command. a vast number of legitimate reasons, back here that we I read a recent article by the Professor of the History will be seen to have failed in that, but that is just a of War at Oxford, Hew Strachan, who nicely captures battle of the narrative, and that is the narrative back the dilemma of theatre and the rear, in a way that is here that needs to be run out. The right decision was hugely insightful. He is a master of the pen; I could about where we need to apportion our Forces in order probably kill somebody with one, but I certainly to deliver the best effect in a campaign sense. cannot write with the damn thing. He puts it nicely when he talks about this operational and strategic Q282 John Glen: Can we turn back to the attitudes divide. That was an area of some confusion. of the Afghan people to the Coalition? What is your I remember having a conversation with the American assessment of how they see things evolving by 2015 ambassador responsible for counter-terrorism, whose and beyond? Do they believe that the Coalition will name escapes me. At the end of the discussion, he just evaporate, or won’t have such a long-term came out and said, “Graeme, I see all the intelligence commitment? that you have, and you are getting great access”— General Sir Graeme Lamb: We are light years on because of the position that I was in—“and I see some from where we were, in a dislocated relationship with other stuff above that, which you do not see, but the the population. We are now very much more joined truth is that I just don’t see it in the same way as you up in that sense. A sense of how this plays out to have just explained.” I said, “That will be because you where we will no longer be delivering combat force are 4,500 miles away.” It is that simple. is not unimportant to the Afghans. They see that as a There is a real danger that you end up with very sound natural transition to a problem that they themselves and good reasons, from good people working would realise exists, if you rubbed them hard enough, extraordinarily hard, back here. They are trying to and that is about the level of intimidation. They did understand something, but they are already behind a not enjoy their time under the Taliban—I am not massive time lag in following the nuances of change, talking about everyone, because they weren’t all over and they are not living and breathing it. So, the theatre the place, but the majority of them—and the Hazaras level of command is very important. The concern had a bloody time. I remember going to Bamiyan in remains, whether about Sangin, Helmand or Basra, 2001, and there were grim reflections of people’s time over this continual perspective from little Britain, under the Taliban. It wasn’t just the Buddhas being which is where our people are. But they actually sit knocked down, but real people being knocked down. within a broader campaign, and it is the success of That was their greater concern. that campaign, not of Helmand or of Basra, that will We see this in stark terms, which is right. While we deliver the out-turn. Our forefathers had the ability to are here now, we are gone in 2015. As Nick quite understand. Churchill and his chiefs crossed the rightly pointed out, the direction that has been given Atlantic two or three times to sit down and discuss is that we will cease combat operations in 2015. What the campaign against Germany and Japan over a we continue to do in the way of training is for 2015, number of days, and to set the broad course of action. and for the government of the day to decide—how Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 65

17 November 2010 General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO they want to play it out, the authority that is given and General Sir Graeme Lamb: You have the campaign how the Afghans want the relationship. That is the for the rule of law, and people are actively engaging next phase. Reducing some of the campaign’s forces, with FBI investigations. Some will hit the walls and as set out in the near term, is, in my view, again be adjusted. Others will begin to chip away. The idea entirely sensible because the Afghans begin to take of delegating some authority is back out, because we the responsibility. The Afghans taking ownership of were the ones who, in many ways, constructed the their army and police and, in a sense, their national Bonn Agreement and how Afghanistan should be responsibility, is an absolutely essential part of the governed. We centralised the power. That was quite transition. counter-culture. It made eminent sense to Westminster or Washington, but I don’t think that it made too much Q283 John Glen: Do they see themselves as having sense if you were living out in the shires in Farah. sufficient support beyond 2015? Is that distinction in the nature of the evolving role of the Coalition? Q287 Mr Havard: Yes, some form of Jeffersonian General Sir Graeme Lamb: I cannot speak for the democracy might work somewhere, but not Afghans, but my sense is that they are entirely necessarily in Afghanistan. As for President Karzai comfortable with the idea of us beginning to being in transition, he is in his last term as President. relinquish the position that we hold in the coming We are talking about a continuum that takes us beyond years, in a way that puts them back into that sense 2014, when the next President will be in place. of sovereignty, which is very Afghan. You often hear Presumably there will be another presidential election people saying, “Well, there is no nation of the in America during that period. There are lots of Afghans”, but I would contest that in every way. questions about how the transition will work. How do you see the changes made by the Afghans and others Q284 John Glen: Moving into the area of a political to that constitutional structure affecting the ability to settlement, there is a lot of debate over the degree of do the things that we have declared we want to do? corruption and the role of President Karzai. How do General Sir Graeme Lamb: If you take a run across you see him, in terms of being an impediment to a to Iraq and look at Prime Minister Maliki, that political settlement? Are we stressing enough the continues to be a transition—a political change in problems of corruption and trying to sort it out? progress. Exactly the same will occur in Afghanistan. General Sir Graeme Lamb: Corruption is pretty An enormous amount of work is being done. omnipresent anywhere in the world. Everyone recognised back in 2002–03, just as we did in Iran, that we need good governance. You then put Q285 John Glen: What I’m trying to get to is the lots of people in. There is lots of talk, papers are issue of how it impedes a reasonable political written and money is spent, and you turn around and settlement. say, “What is the output measurement of individuals General Sir Graeme Lamb: Others will disagree, but who are now back in government, who have been my view is that an election took place, and there were trained in finance, or in the Provinces’?” A lot of that inaccuracies during that, but the outcome was that is going on, and it will increase because the President Karzai was affirmed as President. That is a importance has been recognised. I sense that it has democratic process. It may look a little ugly, and it been a little late coming, and that is the whole may be slightly tarnished and rough, but that is the Government approach. The situation is often is put hand you’ve got. I have heard said in a number of down as security stopping us being able to something, other countries, “Oh, he is not the man we want. He’s in which case nothing was done. Kipling wasn’t not going to do what we want to do,” and you think, wrong when he talked about “doers”. My view is that “Well, that’s pretty bloody undemocratic.” He is the it will move forward. bloke we’ve got, and therefore one has to try to help Chair: We now have a vote. I guess that there will be him help us help him, and so on. The transition is only one vote, so I propose suspending the Committee quite important. for 15 minutes. Will you please come back at 4.15 Quite often, we will look back and say, “President pm? I am sorry to give you a break for 15 minutes Karzai is this” or “President Karzai is that.” What I while we do our democratic duty. found fascinating is that when Stan McChrystal took Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. President Karzai out to the shires—I am sure that On resuming— exactly the same is occurring with General Petraeus— people were weeping because their President had Q288 Sandra Osborne: I wanted to ask about come to see them. Their President, not ours. We General McChrystal’s strategy, but I think you have somehow missed the importance of the sense of made it perfectly clear that you see that as a positive nationhood, nationality, and sovereignty, as it runs strategy and one that has already reaped rewards. across for the Afghan. What impact have civilian casualties had in terms of the counter-insurgency strategy, and has the policy of Q286 John Glen: But the amount of corruption and courageous restraint made a difference in relation to the need to continue reform within the Afghan securing the consent of the local population? Government still remain. What you are attesting to is General Sir Graeme Lamb: On the position that the democratic legitimacy, fundamentally, of Karzai. General McChrystal took, to change a culture, quite Is enough being done to address the corruption that is often you push the boundary and then settle back into still embedded within the Afghans? a position, which is where I think the campaign and Ev 66 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO

General Petraeus are taking it to. General Parker television. We are here to try to make his life better. explained that rather eloquently. The beltway is your drama.” And he said, “Fair call.” The importance of casualties to the Afghans had been Our sense is that we tend to keep looking backwards a long-running sore. The assumption would be, “We to the broadsheets, what’s driving neo-politics, and are seeking the bad guys and if the two of them are popularity—to today’s headlines—rather than among a group of whatever they may be and they are recognising that that is important. At the end of the killed in the process, then by association they day, Clausewitz wasn’t wrong with his holy trinity of shouldn’t have been there, or that’s just how it is, public, politicians and armed forces. Equally, we must because the bad guys are pretty evil individuals.” But recognise that there are some very important I think that some of that, year on year over the years, audiences regionally. That is why, in Iraq, we put a was a sore that grew that the insurgency then bled off. lot of effort into not manipulating or manoeuvring, but They were able to see that this was an attack against being able to express our case to al-Jazeera, because them and against tribes, individual clans, families, it was well listened to. villages and communities. They operate in the In ’82, we all remember that rather dull Jock— communication space incredibly better than we do. It McDonald, I think he was—who went on, night after is the area in which we are horribly deficient. It was night, on the BBC. Eventually we thought, “He’s the important, therefore, to change that dynamic through guy telling the truth”, so that mattered. The range of the way people drove—so it was how we were the audiences we are looking for—whether it is the perceived by the population—and how we tried to Sons of Malik, through twittering—are widespread. reduce the casualties in the use of force and other Often we think that we have a really great message ways. here, but it’s retired General Lamb. I get up and I’m Hobbes’s world is a grim old place. Both sides are a white guy, a Brit, so there’s no way I can carry getting broken up, killed and damaged in the process the message. of this, and people try to apply a Surrey map to it, So, they are very good at understanding who the which just doesn’t work. Trying to reduce those messengers are in this world. They have taken a great casualties is recognised by the people. There was an deal of time building up and setting the conditions in incident in the North, in Kunduz or wherever it was, the madrassahs in Pakistan or the like, so you have when a tanker was blown up and a number of locals people who are absolutely inclined to a view that says who had been told by the Taliban to get the fuel were that the twin towers was a CIA plot—a ridiculous killed. McChrystal went straight there, and a lot of view, but it is believed because they are able, in effect, people said, “What are you doing? We haven’t had the to bring that to bear. We are badly responsive and, inquiry yet and Germany are upset about this.” The actually, rather ignorant in the way that we think that bush net of Afghanistan is every bit as good as the a message that makes eminent sense back here is bush nets you will find in other parts of the third and absolutely or entirely appropriate. That should be second world. It is often far better than where we have understood by those forward. We just don’t do cross- a clever communication space. It went around the culture nowadays—we don’t have Wilfrid Thesiger, country that here was someone who was genuinely who spoke six or seven local dialects and lived with trying to reduce civilian casualties, and the vast the tribes, so that he understood them and they majority of Afghans got that. So McChrystal was seen trusted him. as somebody who was in charge of ISAF and the Coalition Forces who was genuinely aware of Q290 Mr Havard: Yes, we have had a lot of—well, Afghans. That is not how they had perceived it before. some—evidence on that. I spoke to Governor Mangal That doesn’t mean that the previous Generals were not last week or the week before. We have the “radio in a conscious of that responsibility, but it was not seen box” and all that sort of stuff, so there are clearly that way by the Afghans. That change in culture was attempts. very important, and him taking Karzai down on visits Like you, I met the Afghan farmer in 2003 who had and standing shoulder to shoulder was very important a bicycle and a donkey. I said, “What do you want?” for perceptions and, therefore, visualisation. and he said, “A mobile phone.” Well, he’s had one for The adjustment in doing everything we could to a long time now—all of that stuff. I think you are reduce casualties—from those injured in road right about that. accidents to those killed under a collateral damage The question I wanted to ask was this. While you have profile in the rules of engagement—was an important all that happening in the population, out of that cultural change for ISAF and the Force, and that has population has got to come the country’s own security borne fruit. services. Can you give us your view of how you think that process is developing—that is, the development Q289 Chair: Why do they operate in a of the Afghan Security Forces, mindful of the fact that communication space incredibly better than we do? there are various components within that, such as the General Sir Graeme Lamb: It is long-standing. I army, the police and so on? What is your general, travelled by train from Scotland today and read Paul overall assessment of how that process is now Wolfowitz referring to a piece in one of the letters. I working? remember him coming out to Iraq and saying, General Sir Graeme Lamb: Again, we had the “Graeme, we’ve got to get this message into the bringing in of General Caldwell, with the energy he beltway.” I said, “Hey, that’s your job, with due put forward, the money that went in behind him and respect. My job is to get the message out to the old the emphasis on training—NATO’s response had been shepherd over the hill who doesn’t have a radio or a tad lacklustre. The investment in literacy before Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 67

17 November 2010 General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO

2009 was zero, but now 27,000 individuals are we will be in a position where I sense that it will not literate. That is not unimportant. be an issue of numbers. Whether it is in that period or The army and police sat almost static at about 60,000 the near period of 2012, I think we will be considering or 70,000, as I recall, from about 2002–03 right whether we can reduce some of our force levels. The through to 2005–06. And don’t forget that the police overall capacity and effect that the ANSF and the weren’t being trained—they were being given a Coalition bring to bear will be significantly different. uniform and told to go out there and be policemen. For all this period, you had this. Look at the increase Q292 Chair: Would you agree that the force levels over the near period, and not only in the infantry— we had before 2009 and the general build-up to the the foot soldiers, whether police or army. There is now American surge were inadequate to do what we were real investment in signallers. There were no schools asking them to do? for logistics, but there are now four, from my General Sir Graeme Lamb: I would put it that the recollection of when I left. numbers were inadequate, and that was realised. All these changes are really important, because what President Obama should be given credit for increasing they do is build up Q2—quantity and quality. We had the numbers twice—the initial force was 21,000 and almost no investment in quantity or quality for four or then in effect 30,000 when NATO asked for the five years, year after year. Suddenly we began to put additional 10,000, and rightly so in that period. The some investment into quantity, and only recently have mere fact that you have a new campaign go in this we really increased that and ramped it up direction probably will increase the force levels from exponentially, exactly as we did in Iraq, and at the where we were. Before, we were in a campaign that same time we have absolutely paid. Petraeus is driving was just bumping along. that really hard now. Stan set the correction, but Petraeus really understands the idea of quality. Q293 Chair: How did that come about? So, we have the investment in the quality base. I think General Sir Graeme Lamb: That came about because the number of training seats went from 1,900 to about of a realisation that the campaign of intimidation was 9,300, almost doubling up in areas, and doubling in beginning to increase—the levels of violence, the the police from about seven to about 14. All that has levels of control across the country. Hence the reason increased exponentially in the near term, with a view that you had the Chairman, Admiral Mullan, go out to improving the leadership and quality of the force. and have that discussion with General McKiernan, If you then put that in place alongside the partnership, who had already asked for more forces, but was in the partnership is a two-way street; you have the many ways not embracing the idea of a fulsome and Afghan police or army beginning to realise what is fuller campaign to be able to address the underlying right and what is wrong, because when that person is problems that needed to be addressed. That’s what operating, somebody says, “You don’t do that, son.” Petraeus did. His assessment set the tone—“This is But we have the individual on the other side—the very serious”—and it was a report to be read in a cold British or American soldier—being told some of the shower. His requests for forces, if you recall, were cultural nuances, which, no matter what little training 10,000, 40,000 and 85,000. There is a harsh—what I we can put in during the time we have available, has call appetite. You could change to the new campaign, an effect. If you put that together, my view is that we but it would require at least a 40,000 figure to do that. are on a significantly better trajectory than we were. There was no trajectory for 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, in the form of the police. We have been Q294 Chair: But somehow, we had got into the able to improve a little, but we have been on a position where we were heavily deployed in Helmand significantly better trajectory since 2009. As George in those terms, yet it was far too lightly to achieve Harrison said, “Give peace a chance.” I sense that what we wanted to do there. there are absolutely Herculean efforts going on out General Sir Graeme Lamb: Again, if one reads the there to improve the quantity and the quality of the Petraeus-Mattis doctrine of counter-insurgency—what Forces, and they will make a significant difference. I call the correlation of forces, the numbers game, and all the rest—that is self-evident. Q291 Chair: What about the quantity of ISAF Forces? Have we got enough troops there now? Q295 Chair: But how did we get into that position? General Sir Graeme Lamb: I can’t remember the General Sir Graeme Lamb: Because, before that exact figures. Not every Provinces is a drama and not time, we were asking, “Where is the enemy?” My first every district is a security crisis. I would not want to point to General Stan in the briefing that I gave was speak for General David or Nick’s replacement. It is that our strategic communications suck—this was in for them to lay out whether they think they have late August 2009. I had done my assessment and set sufficient forces. There is a danger sometimes of the conditions in the context as I saw it. thinking we need to throw in more forces. I am quite My second point was that we had, for seven or eight clear that as you increase and ramp up the ANSF in years, asked the question, “Where is the enemy?” The both the police and army, as you begin to build in question that we should have asked was, “Where genuine governance and have PRTs operating and should we be?” ranging widely, because one has managed to get over some of the ridiculous security constraints of being Q296 Chair: Why have we not asked that question? unable to leave the barracks or go outside the wire, General Sir Graeme Lamb: I suppose you will have but soldiers can. My view is that as we go into 2011 to ask others. Ev 68 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO

Q297 Chair: You were, at the time, in Iraq. Did you In this case, it is absolutely axiomatic that for the feel that you were having your forces whittled out problem that occurs in Basra, at the end of the day, from underneath you in order to fulfil this new priority you have to bring forces in from outside, because of in Afghanistan? the nature of the problem, in order to help. It is interesting to see what they brought down; a lot of it, Q298 Mr Havard: In addressing that, I think that actually, technology—ISR, some helicopters, you were here earlier, and you heard the question that biometrics, bandwidth. It wasn’t just foot soldiers. Oh, I similarly asked about our drawing down to train and and then Iraqis who were not from Basra, who we to divert power, so perhaps you could incorporate a should have embedded with. So, all of that—the idea comment about that. that your higher authority, your higher headquarters General Sir Graeme Lamb: Don’t forget, I was in helps you—that is why Hew Strachan’s work is so Iraq in 2006–07, for the summer period. very correct in the way he identifies it. Because in Afghanistan, in looking at where our force levels were Q299 Chair: You could see all the focus moving and our density, our ability to bring about—Sangin and Helmand are a hard nut, in many ways the hardest from Iraq to Afghanistan, could you? nut that sits within Afghanistan. The idea that now General Sir Graeme Lamb: No. Often it is about this is “our” space. You say, “No, this is the campaign things such as the enablers—the number of special space.” Success or failure there is quite important, but forces, the number of Predators, the systems, the it’s the overall campaign that matters. As we saw, they bandwidth, the biometrics, which is just hardware push pressures up on to Kunduz and around on to stuff. There are also some electrons that go with that areas to the North in order to try and draw forces and then there are some people, because the dwell away from that which was a correlation which was a time was a continuous question, not only for us—our superior level of force against the forces that were harmony guidelines—but also for America. Dwell arrayed against us down in Helmand Provinces. time was a big deal because they had gone through a period where they had increased the pressure on their Q301 Chair: Do you think we suffered reputationally own forces. They were going out for a year, which by the withdrawal from Basra? was extended to 14 months and in certain cases 18 General Sir Graeme Lamb: Yes. Was it some sort of months—and a year turnaround. In these campaigns, catastrophic moment, some end-of-Empire, end of the if you are operating in Baghdad or Mosul, or where British? Not at all. the Americans were—the Marines in particular, who Chair: That wouldn’t have been the question I would were out in Anbar—it is absolutely hard pounding. have asked. We were in Iraq at that point on a campaign that was General Sir Graeme Lamb: But is it a sore? It is no the transition to handover—picking—they were the different from that naval debacle in the NAG. Most terms that I recall were around at the time. What is Americans say, “I can’t believe you didn’t fire back.” interesting is that at the time that America—that So these things have a compilation. America, though, General Jack Keane realised that the transition was and people such as General Petraeus, General not going to succeed, that the situation was very ugly, McChrystal, actually all the people I deal with—and and they changed their campaign focus, we were I can only speak of those—and all the Senators and ahead, because Basra was what it was. We always the individuals who I have gone across and seen, are knew that it required the Government of Iraq to take only too conscious of the incredible contribution in ownership of that, both with their own forces and with blood and treasure that the United Kingdom has made their political forces. to this campaign, and the importance of that in the The question that the Committee should ask—I am overall condition setting for the opportunity of not the one to answer it—is, “As that campaign success. change occurred, what was the discussion amongst the Coalition? What was the discussion between America Q302 Mr Havard: By design, default, mistake or and us, and America and the remnants who were still whatever, it consolidated the Baswarian nationalism there, on that change in direction?” I sense that we and the Iraqi nationalism—their aspirations to have carried on in Basra with the campaign that we were their own country, do their own thing and get their running with, and America had changed to a different own security. direction, and the two diverged at that point. The General Sir Graeme Lamb: Correct, but it wasn’t consequences then ran out as we went through in and until they came down and did that. That was the time. over time. Actually, it all worked out fine in the end— That is why there is some similarity in Afghanistan— or where we are now, which is— the importance of getting President Karzai to begin to accept and own, as the sovereign leader, those issues Q300 Chair: Well, it worked out fine after the around Kandahar and the like, and how that goes Charge of the Knights, in a sense, because the Charge forward. That is the route, which is a difficult one, of the Knights succeeded in Basra. because you have got constant conflicts of General Sir Graeme Lamb: It is no different to perceptions. President Karzai has a raft of audiences when—I could be corrected on this—the Ardennes that General Petraeus does not. He has a different set Offensive went through in ’44. Montgomery had to of audiences. Both are looking for almost opposite shift north very rapidly to help the Americans, statements, as is the United Nations. So, de Mistura’s because otherwise Antwerp was under threat. So position is very important. Mark Sedwill’s ability to within a coalition, the answer is that is what you do. be able to interface some of that. All of that is this Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 69

17 November 2010 General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO complex mixture of communication that needs to take it put billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money into the place. Some of what is said, you think is really requirements that we needed. unhelpful and is counter to what we want to do, but Did we as an organisation take the equipment actually it is necessary in order to contain what I call programme and shake it, break it, turn it around and the large majority of individuals who are looking for deliver to a campaign that everybody thought would some sort of route and progress. be over by Christmas? No, we did not. My father fought in a war that in four years went from Fairey Q303 Chair: Have we, the British, learnt lessons Swordfish biplanes sinking the Bismarck, to us flying from Iraq and Basra, that we are transporting into jet fighters. Even now we have I don’t know how Afghanistan? many Reapers and Predators, but my view would be General Sir Graeme Lamb: If you look at the new that we are well short of. Chief of the Defence Staff in the form of David Richards and if you look at Nick Parker sitting here Q305 John Glen: Notwithstanding the changing today, here are people who have had intimate nature of the need, and the fact that there was a knowledge, in every sense, of the Afghan campaign. deployment of resources from the Treasury in a timely They are hugely conscious of how this thing has way, what could have been done differently in the unfolded over time. They have personal experiences provisioning? Are there any lessons learnt from that from Iraq as to how that should be read across. The overall experience, or is it really quite typical of what question you might have to ask is not whether the you would expect, given the changing nature of the generals have learned those lessons, but has the need in the theatre? comprehensive approach, have the other component General Sir Graeme Lamb: Who would have said parts of the force, all drawn from that? Are we feeling, that Bosnia would last as long as it did? President in effect, that those lessons are now learnt? The most Clinton absolutely got his time scale on that one misused term I come across in modern days is wrong by some margin. The idea that one can be very “lessons learned,” because they seldom are. clever and say, “It will last this long, and it will be over and we’ll be back by Christmas,” is misleading. Q304 John Glen: I refer back to the question that I We then have the big programmes that run all the way think you probably heard General Parker address, through these, whether it is aircraft, tanks or grey which concerns the deficiencies—or not—in the hulls. They are running on to the institutions of the supply of the UK Armed Forces with counter-IED three services and how they operate. One has no idea capabilities such as protective vehicles and how short or long these campaigns last. helicopters. There has been a lot of commentary about Chair: But we do. We know. those gaps in provision over the various different General Sir Graeme Lamb: Well, we do know, and stages. I wonder what your perspective is on that, and history helps us. At the same time, there is the what the situation is now in terms of whether the question whether this is a change in the nature or the Armed Forces are getting what they need. character of warfare. My view is that we are now General Sir Graeme Lamb: Again, I’m a retired old seeing changes in this century. Again, when talking bloke, at the end of the day. about the Policy Exchange work, where industrial It is in the nature of a fellow or girl in uniform not violence can be brought about by just a few blindly to say, “We will overcome,” but to work with individuals, which was the act of only a state before, the hand you are given, because that is the practical, that changes the ground rules fundamentally and for pragmatic reality of what you have got. ever. Consequently, understanding that is no mean In 2001—I can speak about this from a personal point feat. There are some who understood it, there are of view—when we went into Afghanistan, I remember some who sort of got it, but were stuck with what we having conversations and saying, “Somebody needs to were getting, and there are some good, honest people, get me some serious ISR capability.” The Predator, who fight well, who just won’t get it as far as—to which was the original one, was up and running and I borrow a line from Parker—night follows day. said that whatever it took and whatever it cost, I needed to have them. Each one of those takes a belt- Q306 Sandra Osborne: So what’s your view on the load of people to operate it. You look at the Predator chances of a successful withdrawal by 2014–15? and think that it is unmanned, but it takes about 150 General Sir Graeme Lamb: Again, I would agree people to operate the damn thing, from the entirely with General Parker’s view. I think it is a meteorological, to the commanding, to the fliers, to respectable time scale given the way that the the maintenance, to the sustainability and all those campaign has shifted—the commitment to that aspects that come into play; my figures may be wrong, campaign in numbers and resources. Are we seeing but it is a belt-load of people. My view was to say, the same level of political diplomatic engagement in “Whatever it takes, just get me an awful lot of these the region—China’s place, position and interests, both pieces of equipment, as we need.” from a resource, but also, in fact, a stability point of My sense over the years was that we tended to run view? There is Russia, Iran—all these individual the two campaigns off supplementals. So the Treasury, players—and Turkey, which is a significant player in which we can often find fault with and throw a dart this game. Are we addressing that with the same at, actually did rather well on Urgent Operational energy that the young men and women in Helmand Requirements—UORs—which are one-time-use and those who are committed in Afghanistan are? My equipments. It is a story that is not well understood. view is that the jury’s still probably out on that, and We tend to blame the Treasury for not doing this, but that the Foreign Secretary could do better yet. Ev 70 Defence Committee: Evidence

17 November 2010 General (Rtd) Sir Graeme Lamb, KBE CMG DSO

What I saw in 2009 was a campaign that I have need for a population that is growing at the rate it is referred to as people marching along looking very and has to create 24 million jobs every year. So there smart and being overtaken by lemmings. The route is the demand from just those two before you then was one that, in effect, would be really unsatisfactory look at Turkey and all the rest. in every sense. That has changed. Listening to the I therefore think the opportunity of a successful campaign that General McChrystal put together and outcome in Afghanistan is something that we have the direction he gave it, and the way that General been slow to identify and slow to engage in. It is not Petraeus—I know him well—is able to take that and necessarily about having the really huge push it forward, my view is that, as we were in Iraq, multinationals come in, because what they will do is and as I look toward a whole range of little things hedge their futures off in a reserve, which is Helmand, beginning to occur, we should be cautiously optimistic Afghanistan. We don’t want that. We want some small right now. Watch as we go through, because I sense companies to go in that have to meet an in-year or that that position will improve. So when you look as very near to in-year or three-year target return of a far as 2014–15, with a new set of directions and all profit on actually extracting. The Chinese embassy the work that is going on, my instinct tells me that buying the mine outside Kabul, one of a series of very this absolutely has a shot at the title. large, very rich copper deposits, was jolly good. That was $3 billion. That’s not the half of it. The important Q307 Mr Havard: On the current campaign, one of part is what that brings in over 30 years in the way of my questions was going to be about whether we are revenue to the country. sufficiently joined-up across the UK Government to But the most important part is what does that bring in be supporting the current campaign. You made a few the way of jobs for Afghan people, whether it is comments earlier on about that, and perhaps that has railroads or an infrastructure that comes in and all the improved dramatically. Whether it is sufficient or not, support for that? It’s about getting small starter I would like you to say something about that, and companies up, which we were not so good at doing in also about whether that is true across the international Iraq and we don’t seem to be doing so well in Coalition, because there are slight differences there. Afghanistan. We should be looking to get in those Perhaps in doing that, you could contextualise some who are looking for a near-term profit, whether it is of the things you were just saying about how that in gold, oil, gas or some of the exotics like lithium. develops Afghanistan’s economic situation, its That is what we should be pushing hard to bring position with its neighbours, and its general context. about: getting that investment in—it’s all about the At the end of the day, we have discussed this before— money. the regional dimension to this question is just as important as the domestic question in Britain or in Q308 Mr Havard: Do you have you any confidence Afghanistan itself. that our approach to helping them to develop their Chair: This, you will be relieved to hear, is the last processes to do that—our cross-Government approach question. and the international community’s approach to General Sir Graeme Lamb: The well-known fact that developing Afghanistan along an Afghanistan plan, as there is $1 trillion—and rising—worth of resources opposed to some other beautiful plan—is what is sitting in Afghanistan was neither understood nor really happening here? recognised by me in 2001. I’m not sure that it was General Sir Graeme Lamb: No. But I think your recognised by David Richards when he was there in comment is absolutely right. What is the Afghan plan? 2006. We had inclinations—we knew that the How do we help the Afghans secure what they see Russians had oil and gas—but we had no idea of the as being important rather than what we see as being volume or potential wealth that sits in there. important? I heard comments when I was in I sense that you have two common interests for the Afghanistan saying, “Right. We need to concentrate region, and those involve Turkey, Russia, Iran, on marbles and gems.” My experience of gemstones Pakistan, India from a little distance, and China from in Africa is not a particularly attractive one. So the a little more distance. The first is the real need for truth is say, “No, to hell with that.” It is about the regional stability and Afghanistan is an unknown practical part. We should turn around and listen to player in that. We have some great diplomats. The what they want and let’s help them make sure that idea of engaging in that and helping where common they safeguard it, otherwise the resource will be raped. interests meet in bringing about that stability is very Safeguard that resource and at the same time give important. them the ability to see how they can make both near The second is, in fact, straightforward and selfish self- money and then mid-term money in order to be able interest needs. If you are India and you have no to fund a nation state. copper—it is a developing nation and it is absolutely Chair: On that very important point, I think we on a big development spree—at the end of the day should finish. Thank you very much indeed for you need copper. If you are China, the answer is you coming to help us. It was, as always with you, could probably take every single resource that exists extremely interesting and, as usual, pretty in Afghanistan and you’ll still be short of what you controversial. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 71

Wednesday 15 December 2010

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Mrs Madeleine Moon Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Penny Mordaunt John Glen Sandra Osborne Mr Mike Hancock Bob Stewart Mr Dai Havard Ms Gisela Stuart ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE, Chief of Joint Operations PJHQ (UK), and Peter Watkins, Director, Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence, gave evidence.

Q309 Chair: Secretary of State, welcome to this Q310 Chair: Do you think governance has improved, evidence session on Afghanistan. At some stage, but or has it always been at what we would regard as a not today, we will have questions to ask you on the relatively low level? Strategic Defence and Security Review. Today’s Dr Fox: I would say that governance has improved at session, as you know, is devoted to Afghanistan. Sir the local level. In Helmand, for example, we have Stuart and Mr Watkins, welcome back to this inquiry. seen quite a lot of progress. The number of district As you have all appeared before us in recent weeks, governors has risen from only five in 2008 to 12 there is no need for me to ask you to introduce today. We are also aware of that improvement yourselves. Secretary of State, could you begin by because, as a specific target, the insurgents have telling us what you think the key challenges are at the continued trying to attack and undermine that governance, although it is fair to say that disruption moment in Afghanistan? of the shadow governors—the Taliban shadow Dr Fox: I would rate them as three. The first is governors—has been a priority for us. I think it is security, and I ask the Committee to remember that important that we point out to the public our success we are facing a persistent and ruthless enemy that has in disrupting that, otherwise we have a scorecard with shown the capacity both to regenerate and to adapt. only the away team showing on the scoreboard. That is why it’s so important to break the link between the insurgency and the population from which it Q311 Mrs Moon: Could you clarify where you see recruits. An Afghan face is vital for security governance as being? With a score of one meaning operations—vital for building support. With our total anarchy and a score of 10 meaning that Afghan partners we’re putting the insurgency under governance is clearly in position with the enormous pressure at the tactical level, but the levels establishment of central control, regional control and of violence show that we still have a long way to go. local control, where would you put it on that scale The second challenge is Afghan capacity. Successful between one and 10? Where are we today? training of the Afghan National Army has led to Dr Fox: It depends on a number of things. First, it Afghan soldiers playing an increasing role in the depends on whether we are purely looking at planning and conduct of operations, and a renewed Helmand, where we have our main effort, or at commitment from the Afghan Government on the Afghanistan as a whole. training of the Afghan National Police is a cause for optimism. Developing committed, competent and Q312 Mrs Moon: Could we do both? capable Afghan Forces is essential for long-term Dr Fox: It is useful to remember that Helmand is only security and stability. 3.5% of the population of Afghanistan, and those The third of the challenges is governance. One of our living in areas under the control of UK Armed Forces biggest challenges is a shortage of educated, capable make up only 1% of the population. We have a Afghans willing to take on a role within the Afghan tendency to see Afghanistan through the prism of that Government. Progress in building up Afghan 1% which can be quite distorting. That is probably the governance at both the national and sub-national most difficult part of the country, and I would rate that levels is much slower than that of building up the on the lower part of the scale. I won’t arbitrarily pick Security Forces. That is unsurprising. The Afghans a number. In other parts of the country, it is possibly have an unequalled tradition of fighting spirit, as in the middle of the scale. In Kabul, it is probably just Britain has discovered during its long historical above the middle of the scale, but still with a long waytogo. engagement there, but a very limited history of competent and honest government. That is where we continue to place a great deal of effort, and it is an Q313 Mrs Moon: So five or six in Kabul and area in which we will have to continue putting a lot elsewhere, and two or three— of effort for some time. Dr Fox: I think, Chairman, that is what they call leading the witness. Ev 72 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins

Q314 Mrs Moon: No, it’s called trying to get an Q315 Chair: How much is a judge paid in answer. Afghanistan? Dr Fox: It is very difficult to put an absolute number Peter Watkins: I’m afraid I don’t know that. on it. I would by instinct want to put it on the lower part to give it room for improvement rather than be Q316 Chair: Am I right in thinking that it is, or at over-optimistic. I also think we have tended to be least was a year ago, half the amount that is paid to a over-optimistic and have over-assessed, for the best of private soldier? motives, how we see things. We need to stand back Peter Watkins: The Committee has asked this before and have a look at this whole question of governance. and we have been trying to find out the answer. There The way I would put it is like this: if you’re trying to does not seem to be an available figure. It seems to construct some kind of democratic model from vary considerably, depending on the rank of the judge, scratch—and we in this country, and in the west in obviously, and the location. general, would do well to stand back and take a look at our own history. There was 150 years between Q317 Mr Hancock: Has the increase in the number Adam Smith and universal suffrage in the United of law officials available led to an increase in the Kingdom. We abolished slavery 100 years before we number of citizens who would use that method rather gave women the vote. Maybe now and again taking than going through the traditional method, or have the a deep breath and looking at our own history might figures roughly stayed the same? I ask that, because be instructive. you can have people in the right place, but the There are probably three things that you have to have convincing needs to be done with the people on the to provide the supportive pillars for a democratic ground, so that they want to take their disputes to model. One is a working judiciary and a concept of law officials. the law that applies equally to the governing and the Peter Watkins: We don’t have scientific figures, governed. I might ask Peter to say a word about how because we have only started to track this relatively the judiciary is doing. Secondly, you need to have the recently, but we know that there were some areas in concept of the ability to exercise your economic Helmand that had no formal judicial figures at all just liberty inside a free market, which, if you go to the a couple of years ago. So, almost by definition, people bazaars of Nad-e-Ali you will see quite clearly alive are beginning to take disputes through the official and well. Thirdly, you need a concept of rights. The process, because they now have the ability to do so. whole concept of rights is one that is difficult to Dr Fox: The importance of that process lies in develop in some places. I intend to pay a visit to denying the social space, if we might call it that, to Afghanistan in the relatively near future with the the Taliban, because many people, especially in the Attorney- General to have a look at some of these South, were turning to the Taliban for simple dispute concepts and see how we think they are working on resolution and it was that role that was giving the ground. In terms of that judicial element, which is legitimacy to the Taliban. The 2010 Asia Foundation key in my view to governance and the development survey showed that 42% of people were now turning of a stable state, I might ask Peter to say a quick work to the shura for resolution and 31% were taking about what is happening more generally on judicial disputes to local government institutions, such as the development and Stuart to say a word about what is district authorities, which was certainly a change, happening in terms of the judiciary in Helmand. That because we know that those institutions were not there might give the Committee a flavour of that element. before. We were still seeing some 27% of people Peter Watkins: It might be helpful if I cover both. In going to senior tribal figures. So there is definitely a looking at the national level, the development of the shift going on. judiciary and the rule of law is an increasing focus of However, I think that the important point is that there ISAF. There are two aspects to this. One is building are alternatives to dispute resolution through the up the formal sector, judges, prosecutors and so on. Taliban. That is the key and I am not sure that it really There were 1,500 judges a couple of years ago. That matters which of these methods has a relative position number has increased, although I don’t have the in the league, if you like. However, the fact is that we precise figure for 2010. The second is building up the are squeezing the Taliban out and denying them the informal sector. If you look at surveys, such as the legitimacy and the space in which to operate. recent Asia Foundation survey, the majority of Chair: There is an interesting passage in The Kite Afghans—40%—when they have a dispute or Runner about Afghans not believing in the rule of law whatever, take it to a local shura; they don’t take it but instead believing in the rule of tradition. through the formal process. So we are trying to strengthen both of them. To give an example of how Q318 Ms Stuart: Moving on from dispute resolution we are doing that locally, in Helmand on the formal to the application of criminal law, can you update me side we’ve now got eight judges in Lashkar Gah and on how many prison places we have in the areas that about 20 prosecutors. Outside Lashkar Gah, over the are actually safe to hold convicted prisoners? last eight months alone we’ve gone from having just Chair: If you would like to write to us with the two justice officials to 16, but at the same time we are answers to some of these questions, I think that that not just relying on the formal sector. The informal would be helpful. sector is very important as well and arguably more important and so the Provincial Reconstruction Team Q319 Mrs Moon: Quickly, in relation to the legal is helping to develop community councils and four system I noticed that the Afghan Ministry of Women’s community councils have now been set up. Affairs, in its recent report, as well as the United Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 73

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan say in all the violence in Afghanistan is in just nine of the relation to violence against women that there is a need country’s 401 districts, four of which are in Helmand for education and training, not only of the judges and and four of which are in Kandahar. That gives us an the shuras but of mullahs, in relation to the law, idea of the dynamic within which we are operating. violence against women and Sharia, which is also Security remains a major challenge, and the tempo of opposed to violence against women. However, even operations is significantly higher in Helmand than in in traditional law, there is a lack of understanding of other parts of the country. I believe, however, that our the law that they need to practise. presence there is creating the space for progress in Dr Fox: I think that’s true. There is also quite a other areas, such as in development and governance difference in how the law is perceived by women. For and in the local economy, as I have just mentioned. example, in Kabul, that perception is likely to be It’s very important for us to recognise that once an different from the perception in the rural areas in area has been cleared of insurgents, it’s vital that outlying Helmand, because there is a different sufficient forces—both Afghan and international—and tradition and different experience. I think that it is also sufficient resources are placed on the ground to hold. about willingness to access law, as well as the That has been one of the great lessons in recent years, provision of the law itself, because even if the and we recognise that importance. provision is there, if there is not the cultural We keep the precise tasks of our forces under review; willingness to take it up, that leaves women at a from time to time it might be necessary to be involved disadvantage. That is something that we need to look outside our own immediately described area, but that at that through our development programmes. will be looked at on a case-by-case basis. I intend to inform the House about such a task by way of a Q320 Chair: We will return to that issue shortly, I written ministerial statement tomorrow. I hope that the think. I want to ask you one final question about the Committee will understand that that should probably BBC/ABC/ARD poll. Last year, the poll showed a done to the whole House, rather than done in advance remarkable increase in the number of people thinking to the Committee today, much as I would like to that Afghanistan is going in the right direction. This inform the Committee of its contents. year, the poll showed that that figure had dropped again. Why do you think that is and is it a picture that Q322 Mr Donaldson: One of the factors in the you recognise? ceasefire in Northern Ireland was war weariness, if I Dr Fox: I share the scepticism of probably many in may use the term “war” loosely, on the part of those your Committee, Chairman, about polling, even when involved on the terrorist side. Is there evidence among it is conducted within the conditions set out in the the Taliban of that kind of weariness? Are we finding UK. I am not sure what the methodology is for polling that at leadership level people are drifting away, or are in parts of rural Afghanistan. Admittedly, I am falling they remaining intact? into my own trap of looking at things through the Dr Fox: It’s only realistic to say that the Taliban have prism of Helmand, which I pointed out in the shown themselves to be very resilient and adaptable. beginning. However, having spent time in different Against that, there has been substantial disruption in parts of Helmand in recent months, I notice quite a terms of the command structure of the Taliban, and difference in both security and attitude from previous that has obviously produced a degradation in some of visits, particularly in Lashkar Gah and surrounding their capabilities. Ultimately, to go back to the districts. As I think I might have indicated when I last example in Northern Ireland, the economic spoke to the Committee, if we mentioned Afghanistan development and improvement in Northern Ireland then, the fact that in Lashkar Gah the civilian airport made people more aware of the fact that they were is open and there are three business flights a day to stakeholders in the broader security picture. That is Kabul; the fact that the ice factory is open and where the whole concept of development is important. delivering ice to the bazaars, enabling people to go People who have nothing to lose, if you like, are likely about normal economic activity; and the fact that that to gamble with it, whereas people who have economic activity has increased is testament in something to lose are likely to be more circumspect. themselves to improving stability. The fact that a As we move into greater security and greater number of the elements on the poll itself were very development, where people will feel that they have optimistic gives us grounds overall for cautious more of a stake in their wellbeing, that is how we optimism, but we would be fooling ourselves if we deny some of the space for the Taliban to operate believed that we had entirely won the battle for hearts where hitherto they were more free politically, and minds. I think that is a long time into the future. socially and militarily to do so. Chair: We will come on to that shortly. Jeffrey Donaldson. Q323 Mr Donaldson: In denying that space, are you finding that the people of Helmand are trusting the Q321 Mr Donaldson: We have been provided with a coalition forces more? Is there an improvement at list of achievements in Helmand Province, and many that level? of them are commendable. How would you describe Dr Fox: If, for example, you look—and Stuart might the situation there at the moment, and how quickly do want to talk about this—at information that we get you think things are improving? Is it moving at a fast on the placement of IEDs, the population seem more enough pace? willing, when they feel secure, to provide us with that Dr Fox: It remains the most difficult part of the information. That is potentially the beginning of a country. It’s worth pointing out that just over 50% of virtuous circle, where greater stability provides us Ev 74 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins with greater intelligence, which in turn provides us the summer of 2011. It seems to me that that will with greater security, stability and intelligence, and so be a time when we would want to be pushing our it goes. It is about getting to that point of confidence, psychological advantage and be pushing concepts of where the public believe we are genuinely committed reconciliation, in that period. We need to be aware, I and that we are going to be there and see it through—I think, of when we potentially have the upper hand in go back to the concept of not just clearing, but holding this conflict psychologically, and then be willing to territory and providing security—and that is move into the political space that is offered. absolutely essential. Air Marshal Peach: The key change is that the Q325 Mrs Moon: In relation to 2015, we have talked Afghan Security Forces are conducting a lot of the about our troops coming out by then. Are we hold operations. They, with us increasingly in the considering that, in terms of the NATO Training background, are taking that sort of level of trust up Mission Afghanistan, our involvement will be another level, with the army playing a traditional army ongoing from 2015? Is that something that the people role, and the Afghan police increasingly being those of Afghanistan recognise, or do they want to see all trusted people. Exactly as the Secretary of State says, foreigners out after 2015? there are these green shoots—and not just green Dr Fox: The Government of Afghanistan have made shoots—in several of the key districts, where both the this very clear. Time after time, President Karzai has UK Forces and US Forces are in Helmand. There is said that they want to take on security themselves and now this tendency of the people that, once that take responsibility for it from the end of 2014. I met economic development has taken hold—in the bazaar, President Karzai during the NATO summit and the typically—they will then push out the Taliban and/or impression I have from him and from any meetings I tell the Afghan Security Forces where the Taliban may have had in Afghanistan is that people understand that be going. There is that sense of things linking the numbers of the Afghan Forces are up and that the together. As the Secretary of State made clear earlier, capabilities are improving, but it is very likely that if you can then link that, as phenomena which we’ve there will be a continued need for assistance when enabled, to developing governance and developing we have finished our combat role. That was certainly local conditions for governance through meetings and reflected at the NATO summit. Other countries so on, you actually get quite a rapid change. Many recognise that getting the capabilities of the Afghan of the visitors to Afghanistan have noticed that rapid Forces up has to become a top priority for us now. I change over months. think there is awareness in Afghanistan that they will Dr Fox: If I may add to that, this whole concept of require that help. securing and holding has been helped by the fact that I don’t think it’s a bad thing that they should want to the Afghan Forces themselves have been able to do take more control for themselves earlier on. We very much more. 215 Corps in Helmand, for example, shouldn’t see that as a negative element in the process, has conducted a series of independent brigade level but as something that we would want to encourage. It operations, some with only very limited mentoring may well be that the ambitions of the Afghan support from UK Forces. That improvement in Government are moving faster than their capabilities, capability is also something that is adding a positive but it is up to us and the international community to element to the mix. ensure that those capabilities are improving more quickly. Q324 Mrs Moon: We are talking about trust, Secretary of State. Do the people of Afghanistan trust Q326 Mrs Moon: May I take you back to your areas that we are going to stay for the long haul, or do they of challenge? Never mind the National Security Force fear that, in fact, we will cut and run in 2015, no competence—you talked about governance. How matter what the circumstances are? much is the perceived corruption of the Afghan Dr Fox: It is more accurate to say that they will be Government—we are working alongside them—an wondering whether the message that the Taliban gives impediment to trust in the ISAF Forces? is correct; namely, that the US and its allies will be Dr Fox: In the meeting with President Karzai at leaving in the summer of 2011. It is, therefore, of huge NATO to which I referred, he raised the issue of how importance that we take advantage of the period much corruption was and was seen to be a problem. immediately after the summer next year to make it The fact that the Afghan Government recognise that very clear that we are not going home and that the it is a problem is good, because it means that we might Taliban were not telling the truth. I think that they will get action on it. I think we have to be quite careful find it very difficult to continue that line of about what we are talking about when we talk about propaganda when people see that the Coalition Forces corruption. The traditions in some parts of the world are still going to be there, particularly in the areas are not the same as those we would accept in a where the insurgency is strong. I think that when we modern, progressive, liberal democracy. Having said get to that point—next summer is a very crucial point that, we have a duty to deal with it not only for the in that regard—a number of things will coincide. We people of Afghanistan, but because the people of our will have had the Afghan elections—not great, but not own country who pay the taxes that pay for our too bad. We will have had an increased concept of involvement in Afghanistan would expect that we can sovereignty, and the willingness to exercise that move as close as possible, given the cultural sovereignty from the Government at the centre, and circumstances, to the sort of ethos of government in there will be a continued presence of the international our own country. It is reasonable that we should coalition in the country in very large numbers after continue to do that and press the Afghan Government Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 75

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins at all times. One of the key elements is that we get to key districts, is also testament to that change and that the position that we discussed a little while ago in dynamic which is definitely at play. which the rule of law applies equally to the governing Finally, we are of course assisting the Afghans, as and the governed and a growingly independent Peter suggests, with taskforces and other support that judiciary is willing to tackle corruption at whatever we can offer, with information and help to develop level it happens. practices for the future. Chair: We will come back to the issue of police Q327 Mrs Moon: If it starts at the top, how much is shortly. President Karzai an impediment to that peace, and Dr Fox: Could I just add to that? I think there are how much is he seen as part of the problem in terms two general areas and two specificareaswhereweare of corruption? Are we pressing President Karzai and assisting on anti-corruption, the specific being support his Government far enough to tackle corruption? for the Major Crimes Task Force and the support for Dr Fox: I will ask Peter and Stuart to say something the Supreme Court to establish an anti-corruption about this, but I think that we are pressing President tribunal. But on the more general, the UK is working Karzai very hard. I have never been at a meeting with to strengthen Afghanistan’s public financial the President in which the subject has not been raised management, in partnership with the World Bank and by us and pressed very strongly. I have been at the IMF, to reduce the opportunities for corruption. meetings in which the Prime Minister has pressed it Of course, building up civil society that will hold the very strongly indeed with the President. Some positive Government to account is also a powerful anti- steps are being taken by the Government, but I think corruption tool. So we have the specific tools that we it will be an ongoing problem. The idea that we are can use, but we also have the political development, going to find a silver bullet to deal with this in the which in itself will on the one hand diminish the short term is massively over-optimistic, but that opportunities for corruption and on the other hold doesn’t mean that we should diminish the effort in those who might be involved in corrupt activity to any way. account. Peter Watkins: In addition to raising the issue of corruption per se, it is also important that we create Q329 Mrs Moon: The United Nations Assistance the basis for a system that doesn’t rely on it. One Mission in Afghanistan says, “Harmful traditional aspect of that is building up the judiciary, which we practices that violate the human rights of women and have mentioned, and the other is building up the girls are pervasive in Afghanistan, occurring in institutions, particularly a civil service as we would varying degrees in all communities throughout the understand it. Again, that is an area in which we have country”. When I met with the Minister for Women been making considerable investment recently. for Afghanistan, she was concerned that only 16% of Just to give you an example, we have helped the people at the High Peace Council were women. Are we doing enough to promote the needs of women and Afghans set up a Civil Service Institute that is now children in Afghanistan? Has their position changed running programmes to train civil servants in resource at all? Now, I appreciate there is a wealth of difference management, accounting and all those things at 29 in relation to the North and the South. Perhaps you provincial centres across Afghanistan. In the past year, could comment on both. more than 11,000 civil servants have completed that Dr Fox: Yes, indeed. I had anticipated that Mrs Moon training. The idea is to build up a cadre of people might ask this question. I discussed it with my who can run the institutions and therefore embed, over colleagues at DFID this morning. We are working time, the sorts of processes and practices that we closely with the Afghan Government to ensure that would like to see. gender equality is integrated into policies for the long term, in sustainable improvements. We provided an Q328 Chair: Sir Stuart, would you like to add adviser to the Afghan Government to ensure the anything? Afghan National Development Strategy to integrate Air Marshal Peach: Of course, the Afghan police cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality, into have come a long way too. It is important to recognise sector plans. We are, of course, working through the that under the leadership of General Bismillah Khan, NGOs to ensure that we can put a lot more money the Minister of the Interior, there have been a number and effort into some of the programmes that are of cases recently where he has intervened, almost right actually very women-specific. DFID is also providing down to district level, to make sure that examples of support to WOMANKIND, which is providing corruption that were brought to his attention were £237,000 across Afghanistan and several other dealt with and—which I think is the important point— countries, the International Planned Parenthood were seen to be dealt with. I am not suggesting that Federation, War Child and a number of programmes the police have turned overnight into paragons of to try to ensure that, on a whole range of issues that virtue across the whole country, but—going back to will affect women, we are giving greater importance the earlier discussion—generating that trust between to that in our general approach. the people and the police is a vital element of establishing not just the rule of law, but the wider Q330 Mr Hancock: I’m interested in this concept of sense of governance. So the fact that the police are how you get the wider population to understand that cracking down on corrupt individuals is very there are now laws in place, which ought to safeguard important. The fact that it is happening all over them from corruption, when, from what you read, the Afghanistan, and that we are seeing that in our three majority of the Afghan population believe that Ev 76 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins corruption is still there at the very top. I am interested Q332 Mr Brazier: I shall ask two questions together, to know how you are going to persuade the because they are effectively similar questions. overwhelming majority of Afghans that corruption is How has the situation changed in Afghanistan being tackled, and that part of the condition for us following the adoption of the McChrystal counter- being there is that it is being dealt with, when there insurgency strategy? In particular, has the policy of are still widespread allegations against people who are courageous restraint made a difference in securing the very close to the President and people in senior consent of the local population? positions within the country. Dr Fox: I will answer that in general, and then I’ll Dr Fox: First, we would encourage the Government, ask the CJO to comment. at all times, to investigate that, however senior I think that General McChrystal was successful in anybody may be. That is a constant message. As I changing the way that we thought about what we were have mentioned, we have our support for the Supreme doing in Afghanistan, so that the emphasis moved Court and our support for the Task Force. Ultimately, from killing terrorists to protecting the population. As for people on the ground, they will believe that I said in an earlier answer, the real value of protecting corruption is being tackled when they see it for the population comes in the virtuous circle of security themselves, when we are achieving an improved level and intelligence that we can get from that. of governance, when they see that the law applies at What was successful? There was the doctrine itself, all levels of the country, when they believe that they counter-insurgency, the fact that the surge came and have access to law and when they believe that there brought greater numbers in terms of manpower and equipment and brought a thickening across the is impartiality of the judicial system. All those things country, and, again as I said in an earlier answer, the are necessary. concept of “clear and hold,” which means not only Some of that will come about as we, over time, clearing territory of insurgents, but holding it to improve the educational status of people, as they protect the population. That was key. understand how the country is being run and how it’s Courageous restraint perhaps over-corrected for a meant to be run, and as we improve the ability of time, in that extra risks were being taken. Perhaps in ordinary people to hold the Government, at all levels, the way that it was being interpreted, right down to to account. It’s going to be a slow process, and I don’t the lowest level, it was putting our forces at greater think that we, in any way, can believe that it is going risk in order to give even greater protection to the to be rapid. public. Perhaps under General Petraeus the pendulum swung back a little bit towards the middle, or perhaps Q331 Mr Hancock: I understand that it’s going to be that is just experience. I think it has been important, a slow process, but in many countries in former however, and it has been important in giving Eastern Europe, for example, the perception is that if confidence to the public that they could give us you’re in trouble, you can buy your way out of it at information, and that they could help us improve their whatever level. I am interested to get a view of how security and our security, without the Taliban coming you believe that the average Afghan will not believe back at night and paying them a visit. That holding that there is no way that they can buy themselves out element and that element of protecting the public have of a problem, and that they will have to go through been absolutely key. Certainly, I have visited a number the normal processes. There is corruption right at the of places myself where that has been quite evident on top and right down at the lowest level. There is always the ground—not everywhere, and there still remain far a price that you can pay to avoid the repercussions of too many hotspots and areas of violence, but where it your actions. When there is no excuse for that is what has been put successfully into place General makes the fabric of a society, isn’t it? McChrystal’s strategy has certainly been vindicated. Dr Fox: Mr Hancock’s question began with “in Air Marshal Peach: Of course General Petraeus, as Eastern Europe, people believe that you can do that”, the Secretary of State indicated, has developed that which shows that corruption is not exactly limited to and has tuned the strategy to suit the emerging what is happening in Afghanistan. situation as our own operations and those of the Mr Hancock: Absolutely. I agree entirely. Afghan Forces have changed the situation. As indicated, the pendulum has now gone back and Dr Fox: I think it emphasises that there is quite a General Petraeus has issued a number of directives to cultural gap to fill. As I said, I think that if we are the NATO Forces to make it clear that we continue able to make the right steps at the top, which we are, the strategy, which is starting to reverse the with the Task Force, with the Supreme Court and with momentum and starting to work. our constant pressure on politicians at the top to The other key change that General McChrystal regard the issue as important, which they now do introduced, which has now taken hold across seem to recognise, if we are able to minimise the Afghanistan—it looks different across Afghanistan for chances of corruption taking place and if we are all sorts of reasons—is the concept of partnering, maximising the chances of holding people to account, where the ISAF Security Forces partner with the all those steps will gradually, I think, have an effect Afghan Security Forces. That looks different for all on the problem and thereby, because seeing is better sorts of reasons, as much to do with the geography than hearing about it, the public will ultimately come and the layout and whether it’s urban or rural, as to to realise that the problem is being tackled. do with particular styles of European armies in the Chair: Moving on now to operational issues, Julian way they do this. None the less, the concept of Brazier. partnering becoming part of the strategy, as that Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 77

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins strategy has moved forward, under now very firm the Ministry of Defence by Afghan civilians. We have leadership from General Petraeus, is definitely an area claims officer located in Lashkar Gah, and achieving the effects set out by General McChrystal. claims officers travel throughout Helmand, and make We remain very positive about that outcome. visits even further afield, to ensure that all claims We also remain very positive, if we turn back to the receive attention and so that people feel that they are Afghan Security Forces, that we are now seeing what able to bring claims forward. I would describe as a shift in the Afghan Security Air Marshal Peach: There is that sense of local feel. Forces from us all focusing on inputs—recruiting, This is very detailed work and it would almost be training and deploying—to outputs. We are now different within a village, depending on the talking about, as the Secretary of State indicated, circumstances and whether the particular farmer has a brigade level operations with us training, assisting, particular need and so on. That’s why we have the mentoring, supporting and enabling—all those words. local area claims officer. Increasingly, the Afghan Security Force is taking the lead within the concept of the McChrystal, now Q335 John Glen: What about the difference between Petraeus, strategy. the US and the UK? Your assessment is that there is no significant difference in the speed with which Q333 Mr Brazier: Thank you. Could I drill down a they operate. little on that? Moving from the overall picture Air Marshal Peach: Absolutely, because we both specifically to focusing on the British element of it, follow the ISAF procedure, and increasingly over the picture very often painted of the Brits by off-the- time, and certainly now, such things are held and dealt record American service personnel, and often reflected with at the local level. That might mean that, across in their media, is characterised by our forces being Afghanistan, stories appear different, because they’re unwilling to fire because of their, as they see it, applying a local context, which is very different extremely— depending on the nature of the economic activity. Chair: We are coming on to that later on, I think. I would rather leave that until later on. Q336 Chair: Is this is an issue that arises out of Dr Fox: There was one other element that General claims having to be made, as opposed to ISAF Forces McChrystal was able to bring, which was greater making an offer if they know that civilians have been clarity to command and control. Unlike his killed? The latter doesn’t happen; it happens instead predecessors, he was able to tell people what to do by way of claims made. Is that right? and where they were to do it, whereas his predecessors Air Marshal Peach: Yes, but that is an interactive before then had only been able to co-ordinate and ask. process. It would be right to say that the Afghans That improvement, which I know that both sides of understand this and are quite agile at understanding the House of Commons for a very long time were the local circumstances. complaining about, was the clarity of command and Peter Watkins: Perhaps I can add to that. We have a control. General McChrystal definitely brought an process by which, in the interests of speed, we can improvement to that. make ex gratia payments quickly, before the claim has Chair: If when we come to it, Julian, we find that actually been proved, as it were. I think the Americans your point has not been covered, can you come in have a similar approach. after Penny Mordaunt please? John Glen. Q337 Chair: Is that often used? Q334 John Glen: I would like now to turn the Peter Watkins: It is often used, yes. Secretary of State to the issue of compensation for Air Marshal Peach: It’s highly effective. civilian casualties caused by UK Armed Forces. It would be helpful if you could set out what the UK Q338 Mrs Moon: To clarify, if there is an incident policy is. Secondly, there has been some concern somewhere and as part of that incident there is about the differences between the UK and the US damage—to a building, perhaps, when a vehicle policies, perhaps with regard to the level but also the reverses and knocks down a wall, or a cow is knocked speed with which that compensation has been paid. If over, or whatever—does there have to be a claim; or you could address that, I’d be grateful. is there the potential to make an immediate payment Dr Fox: First, on the latter point, I’m not aware of there and then, on the spot, before moving on, so that difficulties caused by any difference in approach by you don’t end up with a build-up of resentment? the UK and the US. I have heard that mentioned in Dr Fox: That is exactly what the ex gratia payments public, and if any member of the Committee has any are for. They are used and range from $100 upwards. evidence on that, we’re very keen to hear about it. If They are to do exactly that—to make sure there is there are examples of where difficulties may have swift reimbursement for any damage or loss accrued. been caused, that is something we would like to look We also make sure that the Afghan locals know that at as a matter of policy. As of the moment, however, the claim scheme is available by announcements on although the question has been raised in the past, we the radio and leaflets distributed by the military are unable to find areas where it has made a practical stabilisation support teams. They collate details of difference. claims for those who can’t reach the claims officer. When we’re made aware of an alleged incident that We go out of our way to offer swift possibilities for may have been caused by UK Forces, the UK follows people to be reimbursed for loss and to ensure that the ISAF process to investigate. A system is in place people are aware of the scheme more widely than just for handling claims for compensation brought against the big population centres. Ev 78 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins

Q339 Sandra Osborne: You referred to the support Q344 Sandra Osborne: So there’s not going to be in Helmand Province by DFID. We have quite a long any big major withdrawal of aid to Afghanistan after list of support that has been given, including the troops come home—that stabilisation effort is information about improvements in the health service going to continue? and education. Do you think that enough resources Dr Fox: I think the international community fully are being put into the civilian side of the stabilisation understands that if your measurement of value for operation to sustain it following 2015 when the troops money is greater stability and therefore security in the come out? region, which is our primary purpose there, that has Dr Fox: Certainly we in the UK are the second largest to continue for some time. This is a very poor country contributor to the multi-donor Afghanistan and often I think that people here don’t necessarily Reconstruction Trust Fund. Since 2005, we have understand what we’re talking about. Eritrea is channelled £200 million through this to help, for wealthier than Afghanistan. This is a country with a example, to support the salaries of civil servants. That life expectancy of 43 or 44, where over 60% live in now includes 168,000 teachers, 29% of whom are rural areas, and where the literacy rate is probably women. So we are doing a great deal. 20% or so. This is a very poor country, and some of There are two things that I will say. First, we need to the developments that have happened in recent years recognise that there is a limit as to how much can be have been quite spectacular. absorbed in terms of the pace at which development can take place. In addition, we should also be a bit Q345 Sandra Osborne: You mentioned the support more vocal, perhaps, about the extent to which we that goes to women. What proportion of that goes have already made quite big improvements. In 2002, through NGOs and what proportion through the 9% of the population of Afghanistan were covered by Afghan Government? Are you secure in your own basic health care; at the end of last year, that had risen mind that that money is being spent well by the to 85%, which is an astonishing improvement in the Afghan Government? world’s second poorest country. Also, 5.3 million Dr Fox: I couldn’t give a specific answer—I’m not children are now in school, compared with 1 million sure if Peter can do that in terms of the absolute in 2001—and, of course, in 2001, very few were proportions—but the majority of DFID’s money goes female. That has dramatically increased. through the Afghan Government, on the basis that we want people to see that their Government can deliver Q340 Chair: Last year, wasn’t it 6 million? the services and to be able to have faith in their central Dr Fox: The estimates were between 5.3 million and Government for the very reasons that we mentioned of 6 million, and we’re heading towards 8 million by the concepts of governance and confidence in governance. end of next year, we hope. However, we also have a large number of NGOs that the British public will be contributing to, which will Q341 Chair: But, we don’t know what the carry on their own work, especially in specific areas. population is, do we? Peter Watkins: I would have to check the statistics, Dr Fox: It’s an estimated figure, Chairman. but I think about 75% to 80% of DFID’s money goes Peter Watkins: It is true that there hasn’t been a through the Afghan Government. census for many years, so all of these figures are estimates and they are compiled on different bases, Q346 Mr Hancock: On that point about the aid, if it which is why you sometimes get these differences goes centrally, how do we monitor the way it is then between figures. filtered down locally? It is one thing to say that we give the money centrally, but we really need to know Q342 Sandra Osborne: Do you think we’re getting for sure that the aid and the money are going in the good value for money from the development aid being predicted direction. What are the checks and balances spent in Afghanistan? that you see on the ground? Dr Fox: It depends, of course, on how you measure Peter Watkins: My DFID colleagues could give you value for money, but I am sure that the Afghans who more detail, but my understanding is that they have a are getting their children immunised and getting them system agreed with the Afghan Government under to school and who are seeing the improvements in which the money is accounted for and the purposes health care would think that they are getting value on which that money should be spent are indicated to for our money. I doubt if there has ever been an aid them. It is not just given to the Afghan Government programme that couldn’t be more efficient, but I defer as a block and then forgotten about. to my DFID colleagues in terms of how they are able Dr Fox: The money largely goes through the to measure those elements. They do not fall within my Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which is expertise, although either of my colleagues are very specifically there to provide certain things in terms of welcome to add something if they wish. services and livelihood. That can be identified and is, I understand, closely monitored by DFID. Q343 Chair: You look keen to do that, Mr Watkins. Air Marshal Peach: Some of the money is spent in Peter Watkins: As you know, we also have a Conflict the Afghan Government sense, at district level though Pool, where money is administered on behalf of all things such as the PRT in Helmand and elsewhere, three Departments for various forms of assistance in where it is monitored very closely. The projects Afghanistan. So we do, as MoD officials, have an themselves are very local, but of course, as the opportunity to see how the money is spent, and my Secretary of State has indicated they go a long way in sense is that we do get value for money. such a poor country. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 79

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins

Q347 Chair: Those are generic answers, rather than measurements until now were about inputs, such as answers on the issue of aid for women, are they not? the numbers we were getting in, and now, subtly Dr Fox: They are generic. perhaps, it is beginning to move to outputs. What are the capabilities? What proportion can operate Q348 Mrs Moon: I want to pick up on how much is unsupervised? How much further training do they actually going through. Could you write to us on how require? What are they capable of doing on their own? much is going through the Ministry of Women’s There has been substantial progress. Numerically, they Affairs? are several months ahead of the targets that were set Chair: I think it would be useful to have an account. for them. In terms of capability, that is where we need Although I have been impressed by the depth of the to be focusing. At the bilateral meetings we attended detail that you have given us, could you answer that at the Lisbon summit, a lot of the focus on question in writing? Afghanistan was on the training mission. Who was to Dr Fox: That is a question on which I imagine DFID contribute to the training mission and how was it to would be able to give us better figures, and we will be sustained? What would happen after 2015? It certainly ask them. seems that almost imperceptibly the argument has moved from, “Do we have the numbers?” to “Do we Q349 Ms Stuart: Before I move on to the Afghan have the quality and the capabilities?” That is a very national security forces, I want to quickly follow up good place for the argument to be. something Peter Watkins said. He mentioned the I am encouraged that countries such as Canada have Conflict Pool. Does DFID contribute money to that decided to make a major contribution to the training conflict Pool? mission as it moves out of a combat role. I hope that Peter Watkins: It’s slightly more complicated than is something that other countries will follow, because that. It is a pool of money that is held centrally but is that is essential to the long-term maintenance and administered by a board upon which sit DFID, the coherence of the alliance in Afghanistan. As General MoD and the Foreign Office. Between the three Petraeus and others say, “In together, out together.” Departments it is, if you like, a manifestation of the We will need to focus on the capabilities of the Forces comprehensive approach. We work out the priorities now. There would be no point leaving behind a and spend the money accordingly. numerically large force, if it didn’t have the ability to carry through the security tasks that we are currently Q350 Ms Stuart: I am asking because DFID is undertaking but gradually transferring on to them. bound by a statutory definition of what it can spend its money on. I am trying to establish whether that Q352 Ms Stuart: What about Pashtun recruitment? statutory definition causes you any difficulties in Air Marshal Peach: Pashtun recruitment is still an pooling money. issue, but not a dominant one. We’ll have to get back Peter Watkins: I think you mean the so-called ODA to you on the latest figures, but the sense is that more eligibility. No it doesn’t, but it does mean that we have Pashtuns are being recruited. There is also a sense that to be able to identify which money is ODA-compliant the army is a trusted institution across Afghanistan. and which isn’t. So, even if the local mix of the army units is not Pashtun, we get no sense that that makes them any Q351 Ms Stuart: I want to move on to the Afghan less trusted. We are encouraged by what NTM-A— National Security Forces. A US report in June 2010 the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan—is telling stated that 23% of Afghan soldiers and 12% of the us. As the Secretary of State indicates, this is an army police can work unsupervised, which are very small that is changing its whole ethos, from building itself numbers. Some 12% of the army and 17% of the up through numbers into basic light-scale, light- police were absent without leave. That is combined equipped units. Now we are at that point of with the continuing lack of recruitment of Pashtun transitioning to brigade-level operations and so on, soldiers. Could the Secretary of State answer two there is a definite focus on administration. That is questions? First, could we have a brief update on the most welcome because that is exactly, Ms Stuart, what progress of the Afghan National Security Forces? will switch those absentee rates, sort out the pay, sort Secondly, what progress has been made to ensure that out the leave plot—it is all important administrative by 2015 those forces could secure the safety of our detail that will help reduce absentee rates. The next soldiers who are there not in a combat capacity, but switch we are likely to see and we are working in a training capacity? together with them on, is a move towards logistic Dr Fox: There has been a big improvement in total support, developing Afghan specialist capabilities— numbers recruited and operating. The problems that signals, police and so on. We are at that important Stuart mentioned are correct. Obviously there are moment when we are shifting gear from light-scale going to be problems with those who are absent equipped forces that have been trained quite quickly, without leave and those who require supervision, but to developing that training-and-assist function to do the fact that a quarter of the army can operate more specialist tasks around the country. unsupervised is probably not a bad figure. The fact that they are able to carry out brigade-level activity Q353 Ms Stuart: Does the same apply to the police? with minimal mentoring is a substantial improvement Is there the same kind of progress, or is it just the from where we were before. army? I think there is a change in how the international Dr Fox: If I can add on the army before I answer that community views the ANSF, in that all our question, of the 140 ANA kandaks since May 2010— Ev 80 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins

Q354 Chair: And an ANA kandak is what exactly? the intention to commit zina, which is sexual Air Marshal Peach: A battalion. intercourse outside marriage. In the training that we Dr Fox: I am sorry, Chairman, that is twice I have provide, are we including experience and fallen foul. There is probably some donation to charity understanding of Afghan law that actually protects I have to make. women? Peter Watkins: Yes. The training that we provide Q355 Chair: Twice in six months is not too bad. includes training in the principles of the rule of law, Dr Fox: If I told you about the number of offences principles of human rights, including women’s rights, inside the main building. and all those things. That is part of our training. As Since May, of 140 battalion levels, those judged by the Secretary of State has said, we started from a ISAF to be broadly effective or better, has increased lower base with the police, so it’s taking time for this from 51 to 74. That is quite a big increase in that time. to, if you like, suffuse through. Talking to commanders on the ground, many have been surprised at how quickly the Afghan National Q357 Mr Hancock: It is not very often that senior Army has been able to improve and take on military commanders disagree with each other when responsibilities for itself. I imagine some did not they are both still in the service—if Britain is anything believe it could do that in the time scale. to go by, they normally wait until they retire to In terms of the police, the police have always lagged criticise each other. However, we now have the behind the army. That is something we have discussed situation where, in answer to Gisela’s question about in the House of Commons on a number of occasions. the quality of the service, General Caldwell has said When shadow Defence Secretary, I was particularly one thing only to be contradicted by General critical—some of us do remember a time before Rodriguez. Who, in your opinion, is right? Rodriguez Government. said that the reports about the lack of substance to the Ms Stuart: I didn’t want to mention it. Afghan Forces were correct and Caldwell, who was Dr Fox: That criticism was fair. There have been two responsible for training them, denied it. So, one of major changes that have put the police training on to them has to be wrong. a different path. The first was to give equivalence in Chair: These are US generals. pay with the ANA; the second was compulsory Mr Hancock: Yes, I might add that. literacy training. In a country with very low literacy Air Marshal Peach: I know both generals. levels and very low income levels, suddenly being I do not know the specifics, but I think that we are able to get a better income and suddenly being able to painting deliberately an improving picture. General be taught to read and write would improve the social Caldwell has the detailed knowledge of the output of standing of anyone. That is why I think there has been both the army training and the police training, and such a big increase in the number of people coming General Rodriguez, of course, will be observing more forward for police training. from a visits perspective. Rather than comment on Anecdotally—I accept that that is never a good basis individual reports, I don’t think that that sounds like for anything—when we were last in Lashkar Gah, I a tremendous dispute in the sense of progress this was told that locals had been complaining that police year— had been brought from another part of the country to carry out policing in their district, until it was pointed Q358 Mr Hancock: They are diametrically opposing to them that they actually were locally trained. They each other. One was saying that 17% of the police had problems believing that this quality of police were absent and only 12% can work unsupervised, training could come from their own area. It was a very and so on. The same statistics that Gisela mentioned nice bit of local colour, and it indicated first, that the were coming out and General Rodriguez made it quite training was occurring and secondly, that people were clear that he supported that view and said that the recognising the improvements. Training of the army report is correct. He is the one who has to use these alone will not be sufficient; we must have police soldiers in conjunction with his own, whereas training at several levels. The different types of police Caldwell is only responsible for training them. training also bear scrutiny, and the UK contribution in Chair: I think we are going to have to call the Helmand has been quite remarkable. I visited the Americans up. training centre that we run there and I was very impressed, not least by the English skills that the Q359 Mr Hancock: Okay, but I just wondered from students were exhibiting after a relatively short time. our perspective whether we agreed with Rodriguez or Caldwell. Q356 Mrs Moon: Can I ask you about the training Dr Fox: Well, I think we should look at the evidence of the police force in connection with the aspects of about the capability of the Afghan National Army, and Afghan law that relate to violence against women? what they are actually able to do. They have already The UN report says that Afghan law enforcement opened branch schools in intelligence, engineering, authorities are unaware of the violence against women legal, military police, logistics, religious and cultural laws, many authorities are unwilling and unable to affairs, and finance, in order to develop those apply the law, and police often fail to enforce the law. capabilities. So, whether you want to take an It also says that, in fact, a large number of women optimistic or a pessimistic view of exactly where they detained in Afghanistan are detained for moral crimes, are at any one time, on top of the figures that I gave and the police will arrest, jail and prosecute girls who earlier that 74 out of 140 were regarded by ISAF as are running away from violence; the charge is usually being particularly effective, and when you take on top Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 81

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins of that these branch schools that are opening to give partners are ready and want that to happen. We’ve particularly improved capabilities in specific areas or made it quite clear that it is our intention not to be understanding specific areas, you see an improved there except in a training role. Does that put us in picture. Certainly if you compare what we are looking difficulty with our NATO partners? at the end of 2010 with what we would have been Dr Fox: No, we have made it very clear on transition looking at the beginning of 2006, there is huge gulf that the criteria for geographical transitioning will be between the two. agreed by the Afghan Government and NATO, so we will set them between us. There was a great deal of Q360 Mr Hancock: How confident are you now that discussion about this at Lisbon, as one might expect. the aspirations of the Prime Minister and others that There has to be a balance struck. Above all else any the coalition can leave at the end of 2014 can be transitioning needs to be regarded as irreversible. The achieved? worst thing that could happen would be to transition Dr Fox: That’s the military coalition? any areas, only to see it roll backwards. We need to Mr Hancock: Yes. think about the number of areas that we will transition Dr Fox: We think that this mission is doable and the and this is something where work is being done. Were improvements that we have made are sustainable. I we to transition only a very small number of the very believe that the capability of both the Afghan National safest areas, it would provide a very key target for the Army and, to a lesser but improving degree, the Taliban. So we will need to think about exactly how police, will enable the Afghan Government to achieve many areas are transitioned and in what time scale. I their own goal of being a sovereign Government, know that there is a lot of military thinking going on looking after their own internal and external security about that at the moment. CJO might want to by the end of 2014. So we are confident. comment specifically on that.

Q361 Mr Hancock: What do you consider are the Q363 Mr Hancock: The last time you were at the dangers of announcing the intention to withdraw by Committee you talked about the issue of sub- 2015? What happens if Helmand in particular, and provincial transition, but there were some difficulties. possibly Kandahar, is not ready for the transition? Have the issues relating to that now been resolved? Dr Fox: I don’t do the “what ifs” on that because I Dr Fox: Yes, I remember saying that I was very think it is very important that we give a very strong concerned that we would stick to the provincial level signal of confidence. It is very important for the only, and that that would provide us with a number of Afghans themselves to believe that it is going to difficulties in choosing which Provinces and in happen. It encourages them to move forward potentially not being able to show momentum in how positively. To say that we don’t think that we quickly progress was being made. That has been ourselves will necessarily complete what we want resolved, and we will now do it at a sub-provincial does nothing for the morale of our own forces but level. That has been a major step forward. does a great deal to improve the morale of the Taliban. So I think we move forward with the belief that we Q364 Mr Hancock: Can I ask a question about UK can achieve it. There is always an upside and a troops after the withdrawal, and the ones that will be downside to this, if we are being very frank. The there for training purposes and so on? It might be upside to setting a time scale is that we deal with the difficult to answer this question now, but has any issue that the Taliban never have to deal with, which thought been given to the numbers that you would is that we require consent and support in democratic expect to be fulfilling that role and for what period societies for what we are asking our armed forces to of time? do. Dr Fox: Obviously, that will be dependent on the An entirely open-ended commitment, especially at conditions in 2015. It will also be dependent on the times of high casualty rates, is very likely to size of the NATO mission and the contributions from undermine our ability to have the sort of resolve that the rest of our NATO allies. It is very key, not only we need to see the mission through. There is always from the perspective of UK domestic opinion but from the possibility of sending signals that we are not there an alliance and NATO cohesion perspective, to ensure “for the long term”, but as I have made repeatedly that that mission is spread as widely among the clear today, we intend to be there in sufficient numbers coalition members as possible. Very clearly, as a and in a sufficient force to ensure that the quality and matter of arithmetic, the more our allies are capabilities of the Afghan National Forces will contributing to training, the less we are likely to have themselves be able to take on that security role by the to do given any particular size of the mission. end of 2014. To start to talk about plan B or “what ifs” runs a great risk of making us look as though we Q365 Mr Hancock: My final question really relates do not have the resolve required to be successful in to resilience of the Afghan Forces post-2015. When the objectives we have set ourselves. we first went there, the Taliban didn’t effectively have an army of the size that the Afghan Forces will have Q362 Mr Hancock: By 2015 it will have been 13 post-2015 when they could have as many as 200,000 years and by any shadow of the imagination that is a fully trained soldiers, as our colonel said earlier, twice very long haul, during which time an awful lot of lives the size of the UK Forces. Are we sure that a re- have been transformed one way or another and, emergence of the Taliban wouldn’t effectively give tragically, many have been lost. NATO has stated that them the whip hand so that they would not only have it will not go into a transition unless its Afghan control of the country, but the resilience of the army Ev 82 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins would simply collapse and they would become the Q370 Chair: No, we haven’t yet had that. We have fighting force of the Taliban? had a letter from the Ministry of Defence apologising Dr Fox: Well, of course the primary aim is not to for not having had that yet. We would quite like it. allow the re-emergence of the Taliban, by denying Dr Fox: I’ve seen it today, in fact. I think it goes into them both the military space and the political space in quite a lot of operational detail that the Committee which to operate. That is dependent on the things would find very interesting in terms of what happened we’ve already discussed: the quality of governance in 2006–09, but I am not sure that I would be entirely and the level to which the Afghan Government and comfortable sharing some of that detail publicly. its constitution is accepted by the population, and the Chair: Are you done on this point? ability of the Afghan Security Forces themselves to Penny Mordaunt: Yes. secure the space. The political space is secured by Chair: That leaves Julian Brazier’s question from governance and the military space is secured by the earlier, and then I want to come on to Bob Stewart. ANSF. These are the key discussions for us in the years ahead. Q371 Mr Brazier: The frequent criticism from Americans prior to the McChrystal strategy in both Q366 Chair: Presumably, after 2015 there will be a Iraq and Afghanistan—and I have heard it by word of need for a helicopter force in Afghanistan, and mouth; it is not just WikiLeaks stuff—is that they feel possibly even a fixed-wing force. Would we take part their British counterparts are so hampered by the rules in that? of engagement they operate under and the wider legal Dr Fox: In terms of support I think we would be framework that they are unwilling to open fire. To unlikely to see fixed wing, but no decisions have been expand on that point a little, we also have the sort taken. Those will be looked at over the years ahead in of—for want of a better word—coroner’s environment terms of the conditions on the ground. every time we lose one of our own soldiers. As Richard Holmes points out, it is unlikely we would Q367 Chair: That includes the helicopter force? have won either of the World Wars if we’d had the Dr Fox: We may again want to give support in terms coroners checking on every casualty. Do you actually of what we have in the helicopter force. It would be think that the legal framework, both in terms of the difficult to envisage the Afghans being able to do risk to civilian casualties under the rules of engagement and the duty of care for the individual everything for themselves, but of course the United soldiers, is fair on young commanders? Very often, States has a substantial presence. The balance between the safest thing for everybody is for them to make a the allies in terms of the support we gave to the decision quickly. Afghans would be dependent on what they needed and Dr Fox: I think the rules of engagement, and related what we had available at the time. subjects, are for CJO. Air Marshal Peach: We have robust rules of Q368 Chair: Combat helicopters? engagement. I have not picked up, in almost two years Dr Fox: That is a level of detail that we haven’t yet as Chief of Joint Operations, precisely that sort of considered, but it is something that we will have to concern that the rules of engagement are insufficient look at. to allow the freedom of action to open fire when the Chair: It’s a tricky one, isn’t it? circumstances permit. So I think that our rules of Dr Fox: That’s why you asked it, Chairman. engagement are robust. The process is flexible in that commanders on the ground are allowed to request Q369 Penny Mordaunt: Former commanders, changes to the rules of engagement, and in appropriate including General Messenger, have said that we didn’t circumstances that is done very urgently. I would have enough UK Forces personnel to carry out the apply that statement to aeroplanes and helicopters tasks asked of them in Helmand in 2006, and where appropriate. Whether that looks back, returning independent commentators have agreed with that to the previous discussion, I don’t know, but I do not view. In your opinion, what was the impact of the think that applies now to our rules of engagement. failure to deploy sufficient troops, and do you think They, of course, are consistent with the overall that now the armed forces have the correct force framework inside the NATO strategy, which goes back density level? to the Chairman’s questions on courageous restraint. Dr Fox: Yes, I do believe we have the correct force In terms of the overall framework, that is more of a density levels. I was very concerned for a long time policy question. Of course, there will be individual that the ratio of our force strength to the size of the cases that we are not here to consider. But again, we population we were looking after was incorrect. I are alive to changes in policy and, where appropriate, think that has been remedied. I think that was helped the operational chain of command will ask the by the movement of British forces in Afghanistan into Ministry of Defence for clarification on any legal the area that they are now responsible for, as well issues or any rulings. We will always try and interpret as simultaneously seeing the American surge, which those to ensure our operational freedom of action. improved not only the level of troops available, but Peter Watkins: I was just going to add to that. We also the amount of equipment, frankly, that was obviously do try to ensure that our soldiers operate available. within a clear policy and legal framework. For In terms of the 2,000, I am not yet aware whether the example, that is why the Government decided to Committee has had the classified memorandum giving appeal against the ruling in the Smith case last year in details on decisions made in 2006. order to precisely get a clear ruling from the Supreme Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 83

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins

Court on what the duties of officers were to their along with it. I find the whole concept of WikiLeaks soldiers. and its activities completely loathsome.

Q372 Mr Brazier: But clearly you can’t predict the Q375 Bob Stewart: I accept that totally. That’s good. outcome of that particular case. It is one of a number Going back to 2006, Secretary of State, what do you of cases that have left commanders, one hears think is the key lesson that we learned from what anecdotally, increasingly concerned about that happened in Helmand? particular area. It has led to an ever-increasing training Dr Fox: The key lesson is that if you are going to chain of people going off to Afghanistan. One really undertake any military activity, you should have a has to ask oneself whether, in the long run, it will clear plan and it should be properly resourced. save lives to have an ever-increasing feeling that there could be something like a corporate manslaughter Q376 Bob Stewart: What about our deployment? charge out there. At a presentation I attended in the Maybe we shouldn’t touch on it. past fortnight, there was a strong hint that even that Dr Fox: Well, as I say, a lot of operational was lurking in the background. Is it really fair to have information is being made available to the Committee. British troops on operations under this kind of threat, I could only give a necessarily partial opinion on that, when the Americans and Canadians—who both have a in that I regularly said in those years that I believed very similar legal structure—are not under this threat, that our mission was being under-resourced. despite the fact that America is statistically the most litigious country in the world? Q377 Bob Stewart: Since the surge in 2008, what Dr Fox: One of the key ways in which you might have we done differently? What have we done judge that is to actually ask our commanders whether operationally that is different from what we did before they feel that there is an appropriate balance and the surge, apart from the fact that we have more whether the rules of engagement are set in a way that troops around? makes it easy for them to operate. When I became Dr Fox: First, the whole counter-insurgency Secretary of State, one of the things that I did was to approach, as we discussed earlier, changed how we ask whether there were elements there that needed to saw the conflict. Secondly, we were able to adapt our be redressed. There was the specific example, which force densities, and, in Helmand, if you look at the we mentioned, of courageous restraint. I met some population density map rather than the geographical young soldiers who told me that the rules were being map, you will see that we now are roughly a third, a applied too tightly. In fact, the rules themselves third, a third between the Americans north and south weren’t wrong, but the interpretation as it came down of us and our Forces in the middle. Previously, we the chain was, in effect, making them feel that they were hugely stretched in terms of the proportion of had to err too much on one side. Mr Brazier mentions the population we were being asked to cover with a that what we did in that case was simply to give much smaller total force in Helmand. That has been clarification to them. the biggest change. Not only did the Americans bring numbers in terms of manpower, but they brought large Q373 Chair: You have, in the past, raised the issue amounts of equipment. That is one of the basic rules of lawfare, as opposed to warfare. I do not know of warfare—a sufficient size of force is required for whether it is right to announce it now, but it is likely the job in hand. I don’t know whether— that we may well do some inquiry in the next year into Bob Stewart: Get there firstest with the mostest. the concerns that Julian Brazier is raising. It strikes us Air Marshal Peach: Understand what the key terrain that they are very important. is, which as you understand very well, is dependent Dr Fox: That would be as interesting for us as it on being there to understand it. Once we’d got to that would be for you, because it is a very important and point, we were able to focus on that key terrain, as the contentious political area, where there are no clear Secretary of State said. The second area is to party political lines. It would be useful for us to understand that having an integrated approach is consider. essential, not simply nice-to-have. In other words, Chair: That is true of most of these defence issues. when you have cleared the village where the Taliban may have been present, the stabilisation effort has to Q374 Bob Stewart: WikiLeaks has exposed some be very close behind the troops to set the right criticism of our operations, specifically from the conditions for the whole. Afghanistan Government and even the United States. Are they being unfair? Are these criticisms wrong? Q378 Bob Stewart: And stay there. Dr Fox: I have studiously avoided questions on Air Marshal Peach: And stay there, and deliver that WikiLeaks disclosures. First, they are fragments and which is sufficient locally to give the people incompletely disclosed. They are designed to damage confidence that you will stay there and follow up. the United States in the eyes of the outside world, and Those would be our key lessons, and, of course, that drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. masks quite a lot of integrated planning action We should have no part in playing the WikiLeaks between the Task Force and the PRT, which General game. It is trying to set a particular agenda and put Petraeus has often remarked is a model. All of that particular ideas into the public mind and the wider flows up the echelons. The final point I offer is the public discourse. I think that it is extremely regrettable understand function, which is an amalgam of being that some organs of the British media have played there to understand the tribal dynamics and Ev 84 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins developing intelligence structures and fusion, so we it did, it does, and it probably will present one of the can understand the context of where we are. biggest challenges that we face anywhere in Afghanistan. I would like to put on record how well Q379 Bob Stewart: So going back to the Secretary British Forces did and the progress that they achieved. of State’s key lesson, the key is that we have to have It was very hard won and the sacrifices were very enough to do it. high, but they transformed the district’s centre. One Dr Fox: And also to understand the importance of example of that being the more than 850 shops trading clear and hold. I think that has been one of the key in Sangin’s bazaar, which is more than twice as many things that we have learnt—clearing territory is not as this time last year. enough; you have to hold it, or a counter-insurgency Chair: I want to pick up speed dramatically, because strategy certainly becomes nigh on impossible. I understand that there might be a vote at about 12 Bob Stewart: I think Caesar understood that too. minutes past 4. I think that we might be able to get When he visited us in 55BC, he realised he didn’t through the rest of our questions if everybody is tight have enough and got out. and fast. Dr Fox: Are you looking at me, Chairman? Q380 Penny Mordaunt: Just a couple additional Chair: I am looking at us all, including myself. questions on the theme of lessons learnt. Are there things that our troops were doing well, and the Q382 Penny Mordaunt: Just one final question on Americans have taken over and maybe have not the withdrawal from Sangin. What was the learned from our good practice? To give an example: withdrawal’s impact on the morale of our troops? our understanding is that our troops had developed a Dr Fox: Our casualty rate clearly fell as a model of working that created a number of small consequence of that, but to say that that necessarily bases and zones, which enabled them to patrol and to meant an improvement in morale would be reduce the risk to themselves and the risk of misleading, because it might imply that morale was casualties. The Americans are now covering that area, low in our forces in Sangin. In fact, they understood and they have reverted to the too large base strategy that they had a difficult task to do and were applying and, as a consequence, casualty rates have increased. themselves with huge professionalism. When I Dr Fox: This relates to Sangin. previously visited Sangin I didn’t detect a low morale. Air Marshal Peach: I don’t wish, Mr Chairman, to go into comparing and contrasting the US and UK Q383 Ms Stuart: If I put the four components of my ways in war. Those differences, as reported, are questions together and you answer all four, rather than largely media reports. In fact, as I think I made clear forgetting about the one you may not like, it may help last time, when we handed over in Sangin, there was us get through in the time that the Chairman wishes. a relief in place between the Royal Marine Commandos—it happened to be them—and the US One is on the shortcomings of equipment, which we Marine Corps, and there were reconnaissance visits by all know about, and the current financial constraints. the Americans to the British Forces. It was a very I would like to know precisely whether the current harmonious process. In fact, many of the Royal Treasury opposition will affect UORs and, in Marine Commandos—40 Commando, to be precise— particular, affect the introduction of new technologies. stayed on for a few weeks as the Americans arrived. The second question is: could you tell us a little more Of course, certain forces have a different way of about the new funding stream known as Urgent developing their tactics, but it is true that Sangin was Defence Requirement? The third element again goes adifficult place for us and it remains a difficult place back to the Treasury’s asking the MoD to pay back for the United States. That is the truth of it, and how the cost of UORs for Afghanistan. Is that going to they apply their tactics actually on the ground is very happen for this year and in the future? Finally, what similar to the way that we did. impact do you think the withdrawal of UOR funding will have on the efforts in Afghanistan overall? Q381 Chair: I want to pick up on one remark there. Dr Fox: The future UORs are not affected by the Those reports are largely media reports—pretty well current settlement, because the MoD and Treasury informed media reports, aren’t they? The media are reached an agreement that whatever was required for there to report things and they are facilitated by us Afghanistan in terms of UORs would be met from the and the American Forces, and they do a valuable job Treasury reserve, notwithstanding the financial in Afghanistan. difficulties inherited by the Government. Air Marshal Peach: I hope I didn’t imply that they were not doing a valuable job, but they will not have Q384 Ms Stuart: So there is no payback? had the insights that the tactical commanders have Dr Fox: There is no payback, because the MoD has generated over many weeks or, in some cases, months not exceeded the expected level for UOR spending of understanding the local terrain. This is what we did, that was previously arranged with the Treasury. In this is what worked, and this is how we may choose terms of the other financial flow— to do it, and so on. So it’s a very tactical activity that can be observed from different perspectives. Q385 Ms Stuart: Before we move on to that, how Dr Fox: It is also fair to say that Sangin presented will it affect new technologies that might have been particular difficulties, not only because there was a covered by UORs? very high level of insurgent activity, but because of Dr Fox: We have an agreement that we will still be its centrality to the drug problem in Afghanistan. So able to procure what we require in terms of new Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 85

15 December 2010 Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP, Air Marshal Sir Stuart Peach KCB CBE and Peter Watkins technologies, if they are required for the conflict in Dr Fox: It is a developing debate, because, as we Afghanistan. move closer to a point at which we will no longer Peter Watkins: On your question about Urgent have combat forces there, it becomes harder to justify Defence Requirements, basically £150 million has in terms of pure UORs. Clearly we are going to been allocated to that. That sum will be paid back into transition into different funding mechanisms as we go the reserve from the defence budget in 2012–13. The through that. Where we specifically require something point to note about UDRs is that they are not the same for the conflict in Afghanistan that we would not as UORs. These are projects for which we believe otherwise have, that falls under the UORs. That we have a continuing requirement, beyond the current system continues, because that is something that the operations. In effect, therefore, the Treasury is Treasury and the MoD had a very clear agreement advancing the resource to us so that we may procure about. them in a timely way so that they can be available for Afghanistan, but then continue in use thereafter. Q388 Mr Havard: Is that the Snatch replacement? Peter Watkins: That is a UOR, rather than a UDR. Q386 Ms Stuart: Is there a limit on that stream? Peter Watkins: £150 million. Q389 Chair: I was almost tempted to fall into the Dr Fox: These are things that would have to have trap of disobeying my own injunction about not been bought anyway, but are of more use to us if we getting into the SDSR. That is an issue to which we bring them forward. So it is effectively, if the Treasury will return in our next inquiry, which will be on the would forgive me for saying it, a kind of interest-free SDSR. From what you have said, it sounds as if loan from the Treasury for the sort of thing that planning round 12 will be even more ghastly than doesn’t happen very often. planning round 11. Dr Fox: If such a thing is conceivable. Q387 Mr Havard: I was just wondering whether Chair: Thank you very much indeed. That was you’re, therefore, re-badging UORs as UDRs. That’s profoundly informative. We got through a lot of not what you’re saying, but, presumably, some will material, and you gave us a lot of detail. We are be, because some of the new armoured vehicles will most grateful. be exactly what you described, won’t they? But you applied for them with UORs. Ev 86 Defence Committee: Evidence

Tuesday 8 February 2011

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Sandra Osborne Jeffrey M. Donaldson Bob Stewart John Glen Ms Gisela Stuart Mrs Madeleine Moon ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid gave evidence.

Q390 Chair: You are both very welcome in front of George, chaired both the Strategic Defence Review the Select Committee on Defence. As I understand and the Efficiency Drive. it—let us know if you disagree—the agreement is that a transcript will be taken of this meeting. After the Q395 Chair: Until when were you Minister for the meeting, which will be held in private, you will each Armed Forces? be given an opportunity to go through anything that Lord Reid: I went in at the Election in ’97. As soon you would like not to appear. There will be as we finished the SDR, about 15 or 16 months later— negotiation between yourselves and the Committee after the SDR—I was moved across to Transport to staff if there should be any disagreement. Nothing address several problems there. should be published without your agreement unless General Fry: In the role of DCDS (Commitments), as there is—I think the best of dealing with this is to say it was then, I can’t remember whether it was May or that if there was a problem, you could come back and June of 2003, but it was one of those dates, until explain to us why there was a problem. But my January 2006. Before that, I was the Deputy Chief of expectation is that, as has always been the case with Joint Operations at the PJHQ from about June of the Ministry of Defence, agreement will be reached 2002. Before that, I was the Maritime Component about what can and cannot be published, for decent Commander in the Gulf, and I went there in March reasons. Does that sound sensible? 2002. So I guess, in various guises, I had an adjacency General Fry: That is my understanding, yes. to Afghanistan from March 2002 until January 2006. Lord Reid: Yes. Q396 Chair: After January 2006, what did you do? Q391 Chair: Okay, and you are happy to speak with General Fry: I became the Deputy Coalition each other, as opposed to this meeting being done one Commander in Iraq. after the other? You’re happy to discuss this with each other? Q397 Chair: We are particularly interested in the Lord Reid: Yes. issue of going into Helmand in 2006. Could you both General Fry: Yes. set out for us the background to the deployment in Southern Afghanistan in 2006 and who authorised it, Q392 Chair: For your information, the Ministry of please? Defence said it would like to be present for this General Fry: Perhaps I’ll start, because I think that I meeting, to which I said no—I didn’t think that was probably predated Lord Reid in the general debates. appropriate—but it may show an interest in what you On the precise chronology, I cannot give you exact say. May I ask both of you to tell us the dates for dates, but to the best of my memory, we first started which you held your relevant responsibilities? thinking about a reinvestment in Afghanistan probably Lord Reid: That’s a very good question. It was 2005 in early 2004. At that stage, it was very clear that a to 2006. I left, I think, on 5 or 6 May ’06 and I joined number of things were happening in Afghanistan or, approximately one year before that, in ’05, so I was more pointedly, not happening. The NATO campaign there from May ’05 through to May ’06. looked completely moribund at that stage. It was obvious that Stage 2, which was the movement into Q393 Chair: From the General Election ’05 to May the North and the West, was taking place, but there ’06? was no appetite that it was possible to discern Lord Reid: That’s right. Prior to that, I was anywhere in NATO for taking the campaign into the somewhere else—Health. I went to Defence and then South, Stage 3, which was then to be followed by was moved on about 6 or 7 May. I remember that Stage 4, which was the east of the country, so in effect because—I’ll come back to this later—we had a it was an anticlockwise progression. Chiefs of Staff meeting on 3 May, which was my last That was worrying, for several different reasons. The meeting, to discuss developments in Helmand. first reason why it was worrying was the fact that we had embarked on a campaign in Afghanistan in the Q394 Chair: And you had been the Minister for the first instance to deny ungoverned space for malevolent Armed Forces before. purposes. It seemed to us that if NATO was only Lord Reid: In ’97–98, I was Minister for the Armed successful in pursuing its writ through half of the Forces under George Robertson and, on behalf of country, and that part of the country was almost Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 87

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid completely coincidental with the Northern Alliance, completely different force profile than would attend a in effect, there was the possibility of creating a semi- counter-insurgency or nation-building operation. autonomous Pashtunistan, which would be adjacent to Therefore, there was the masquerade of governance in Baluchistan and Waziristan and create a Pashtun belt the South of Afghanistan. In actual fact, it remained that not only would be ungoverned, but in many ways the purview of whoever the local warlord was. would be more autonomous than it had ever been Chair: General Brazier—I mean Julian Brazier. previously. Therefore, not to do this would, for the alliance and for us in purely national terms, be a Q401 Mr Brazier: TA captain of 25 years ago. complete failure of strategic intent. Of course, they were two completely different There was also the fact that if NATO ran out of fuel campaigns, as you were right to remind us, but while after half a mission, and the easiest, most benign half agreeing with all your underlying points, I am not sure of a mission, question marks would be placed against I share your conclusion. A friend of mine with a its efficacy and its future role. special forces background tells me that the Americans had Green Berets deployed in Helmand very Q398 Chair: By “fuel” you mean political will? successfully before we moved in, who sat in little General Fry: Indeed. The third and fourth points, I camps in the hills, had a lot of money with them and think, were that we were very conscious that there did a mixture of things: they called the occasional air were two campaigns being conducted in Afghanistan strike when things were going badly wrong but in the at that stage. One we will loosely call nation building, mean time did very well dealing with the locals, because it had not yet got into counter-insurgency. It shelling out significant sums of money when things was about extending the writ of governance from were going right. His perspective was that, while of Kabul, which was relatively easy in the Northern part course it was a completely different operation there of the country. The other one (Operation Enduring and we weren’t putting in place robust rather good job Freedom) was a very determined and quite relentlessly of keeping the lid on Helmand. prosecuted counter-terrorist campaign, which the General Fry: That’s absolutely true, but in a Americans were running primarily in the south of profoundly live-and-let-live way. There was no the country. attempt whatsoever to extend the writ of central Those two things were profoundly inimical to each governance. This was all about simply having a token other, and in fact to conduct a counter-terrorist presence in the area. I think that we made the mistake campaign in that way was almost mutually exclusive of being lulled into thinking that was actually the way to a peace support operation, because if you happen that it was going to be. If I look back on it now I can to be dropping bombs on people and killing them in see that what the American Forces were doing was significant numbers, they are unlikely to be simply almost attaching themselves to the local susceptible to the blandishments of political culture and making very few attempts to in any way accommodation. get into it in a way that would intimidate or alienate If you put all those things together, it seemed to a either the local population or the Taliban or, indeed, body of Whitehall opinion that there was a clear and any other form of parallel governance that existed in pressing need to revivify the NATO campaign in Helmand at the time. Afghanistan and to try and draw American eyes back Chair: Would you like to answer the question? to Afghanistan, which had been fundamentally Lord Reid: Yes, to go back to your original question, distracted by events in Iraq. it might be helpful if we had a timeline, objectives So that is the general background, and from that point and sub-objectives. Then we can go into motives and we then went on to try and create the internal the local particularities. As it happened, I had cause mechanisms, which would allow us to lead in concert to go over the timeline, not at the time, but before the with some other allies whom we went on to recruit to Chilcot inquiry, which touched upon Afghanistan and the whole purpose. If I hold it there, you might have Iraq. It might be useful to go through what I dug out some questions on that framework. from then. In 2004, the ISAF mission Stages 1 and 2, in the Q399 Chair: The implication of what you have just North and in the west, had been completed. The ISAF said about drawing the attention of the Americans aim was always to go round the clock, anticlockwise. back from Iraq to Afghanistan is that it was the British You started in the North; you went to the West; then wish to take Afghanistan—the Southern part of it was envisaged that you would go to the South, and Afghanistan—into governed space. then you would go the East. Perhaps at that stage, the General Fry: Absolutely. two missions—the counter-terrorism mission of the Americans and the peacekeeping and reconstruction Q400 Chair: As opposed to coalition or American; mission of ISAF, which I continually distinguished is that right? between in public and in private—could have become General Fry: Yes, but the Americans were making no a single mission. But, by 2004, the North had been real attempt to bring it into governed space. They done; the west had been done; and there was the were conducting a counter-terrorist campaign in beginning of thinking, as General Fry said, about the Southern Afghanistan at the time. South. Lord Reid: Operation Enduring Freedom. Let’s remind ourselves where the UK Forces were in General Fry: That was all about very limited mid-2004. They were split between the Kabul Patrol exposure of troops on the ground, and an awful lot of Company in Kabul and half a battalion in Mazar-e- indirect delivery of munitions, so there was a Sharif. They were dispersed in those areas. On 29 Ev 88 Defence Committee: Evidence

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid

June 2004, at Istanbul, the Prime Minister announced timeline when I was Secretary of State, but having that we would take the leadership of the ARRC gone through the papers, that is it. In terms of deployment—the headquarters—to Kabul. That is not objectives— the Helmand mission. At Istanbul, we said that we would move in, subsequently with General Richards, Q405 Chair: Before you go on to that, did you agree who is now Chief of the Defence Staff, as the HQ in to go the South? Kabul. That was the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Lord Reid: No. We agreed to go to Helmand. (ARRC). In the first half of 2004, as General Fry said, NATO started discussing a move south. In January 2004—I Q406 Chair: That’s relevant, isn’t it? There is a am doing this on the basis of the papers that I have difference. read—the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Secretary of Lord Reid: By April, we had decided we would lead State should signal willingness for the UK to refocus in Helmand, but we had not decided on the options from north to south. On 10 February, at the NATO for going into Helmand. ministerial meeting in Nice, the then Secretary of State, Geoff Hoon, announced the UK’s intention to Q407 Chair: So when had the decision to go to move Forces from north to south. In April, the month Helmand been made? before I became the Secretary of State, the Chiefs of Lord Reid: By April 2005. Staff agreed to preliminary operations from that September, six months hence. Q408 Chair: In other words, before you became Secretary of State. Q402 Chair: When you are saying from north to Lord Reid: Yes. It had been mooted to go south, with south, you are not taking account of the ARRC, which the idea of Helmand as one of the options, from was deployed in Kabul. around mid-2004. It had been agreed by the end of Lord Reid: No. This is the Helmand operation origins. 2004 that it would be ourselves, the Netherlands and Canada. It had been decided by April that we would Q403 Chair: So what were the non-ARRC British be Helmand, the Canadians would be Kandahar and Forces doing in the North? the Dutch would go to Uruzgan, though they delayed Lord Reid: At that stage, the non-ARRC British in that decision. That is why I later delayed for four Forces were the Kabul Patrol Company in Kabul and months our deployment, because I was not willing to half a battalion in Mazar-e-Sharif. deploy without three conditions: first, the Treasury fully funding our configuration that the Chiefs thought Q404 Chair: Okay. So, the Mazar-e-Sharif battalion was necessary for the option we chose; secondly, was going to move to the South. adequate money for, what you would call, alternative Lord Reid: Yes. Those were the ones that were going incomes—economic building—and thirdly, that we to move—not the ARRC deployment. On 10 had the NATO configuration around us that NATO had February, as I said, Geoff announced at the NATO said was necessary, including guarding our northern ministerial in Nice that we would move our Forces flank by the Dutch going to Uruzgan Province. from the North to the South. In April 2005, the month Basically, when I came in, I reiterated that before I became the Secretary of State, the Chiefs of commitment. The options then were placed before us Staff agreed to preliminary operations from that about whether we went in with one of three options— September, a handover in the North and a move to well, there were four; one was to do nothing, which Helmand, but they said that further work was required had been mainly discarded. I can go through the on the appropriate options. three options. When I arrived, my first briefing basically asked me In terms of the objectives that were outlined, the to reiterate publicly in the next month, in June, what strategic objective was exactly as Rob said. You’ll Geoff had said already—that we would go into the remember that we went in after 9/11, and the strategic South—and it was envisaged that three countries would lead in the South: the Canadians, the Dutch and objective always stayed the same. It was to have a the British, with the British taking Helmand, the sustainable, stable Afghan Government, which was Dutch taking Uruzgan to the North and the Canadians separated from and opposed to the use of Afghanistan in Kandahar to the East of us. as a host to or sponsor of terrorism, through the In fact, for the record, I will tell you what I was vehicle of al-Qaeda in particular, but also more briefed when I arrived, that there was widespread generally. That was the strategic objective, and the expectation within NATO, based on the previous objectives to achieve that were the development of Defence Secretary’s commitment at the February 2005 good governance from the centre, which was the point NATO ministerial to move south and that the UK will Rob made; the development of institutional robustness (with Canada and the Netherlands) be one of the three at a local and national level; economic development nations leading in the Stage 3 area. That basically was of a self-sustaining nature; social development to the position when I came in, arriving out of the improve the lives of people there; and, finally, the considerations that General Fry has outlined. At the development of the capacity of the Afghan state to NATO ministerial on 9 and 10 June, a month after I defend itself internally and externally, through the came in, I reiterated the commitment that Geoff had development of its forces and police force. That was made at Nice. That is the timeline as best as I can the strategic objective, the underlying objectives and make out. I am not saying that I knew that exact the timeline. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 89

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid

Q409 Chair: One final question from me before I ask accord with the rest of the British foreign policy, Gisela Stuart to carry on: by the time you became including where we were putting our military Secretary of State, did you think that the issue of emphasis. whether the British went to Helmand or to Kandahar General Fry: Can I give a bit of background to some was still available to you? If you had thought, “I want of the things that happened within the chronology that to go to Kandahar, not Helmand,” would you then Lord Reid has just gone through? There was a have thought, “No, that decision has already been sequence of command appointments in the NATO made,” or would you have thought, “Well, that’s still Reaction Force, which we were implicated in. If we open to me.”? were to get the ARRC out of that and into Afghanistan Lord Reid: My memory of this is that the decision then we had to tear the entire arrangement up and had been made and it was that it was going to elbow a few others aside to create the conditions Helmand, subject to two things. First, what were we where we could do that. In 2004, there was an awful putting into Helmand? I had three options placed in lot of external negotiation, first with the NATO front of me, which had been developed by June/July. military staffs, which ended up with an agreement that Secondly, I’m afraid that I imposed three conditions we and the Italians would do what we described at the almost unilaterally. I am not saying that they wouldn’t time as a double-header spell in command of ISAF. have been conditions that the Chiefs would have Both headquarters would do nine months, so that we wanted, but it was to the surprise of some people at knew we would have guaranteed continuity of my first meeting. As you know, the ops meeting with command. We went in May 2006, and the Italians the Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff also includes preceded us for the nine months before that. We also people from the Foreign Office, DFID and the had to actively recruit allies who wanted to get intelligence services. I made it absolutely plain that involved with this. That was no easy task for all sorts there had to be three conditions satisfying this of reasons. Secretary of State before we went in, and that was the At the time, the Canadian military was in search of first meeting. redemption, having had a fairly long period of First, any troop configuration that the Chiefs decided undistinguished activity. It was seen by them as a was necessary for the mission had to be met and military entity, but also by the Canadian Government, financed in full by the Treasury. Secondly, the external as something appropriate that they would like to do, troop configuration that NATO said was necessary for but it came with a price. Their price was leadership in us, including Canadians to the east and the Dutch to Kandahar. So the reason we went for Helmand was the North in Uruzgan, was met. That wasn’t the case several fold. One was that the Canadians laid down a by the time of our proposed entry, by the way, in marker against Kandahar for their own domestic September. That is why I delayed through September, reasons. There were other reasons for going into October, November and December, until the Dutch Helmand. Helmand was, and has continued to be, finally agreed that they would go into Uruzgan, before synonymous with the production of heroin. We were we deployed. During that period, I was under the lead for the counter-narcotics mission, so there immense pressure—sometimes indirectly—from some people in the military, who seem to have been critical was some sense in that. now that we went in the way we did, but at the time, Neither of the Provinces that one went into—as the the whole thrust of what they were saying, through leaders of this process, we would have to have taken intermediaries, was that I was holding up the Helmand or Kandahar—was going to be easy. preparations and asking why wasn’t I going in. Kandahar was the spiritual home of the Taliban. It is Indeed, the Opposition spokesman, now Lord the scene of the battle of Maiwand and has all sorts Ancram, was asking me in the House what was of cultural resonances that have far more importance delaying things. The second thing therefore was that in Afghanistan than here. To be honest at the time, we had a configuration from NATO around our own given the intelligence we had, it was a toss-up troops. between the two. To some extent it was to The third thing was that we had sufficient resources accommodate the requirement of allies that we went from DFID so that we did not have a situation that into Helmand, but the impression I need to give is had developed sometimes in Iraq where we did not that we have had a chronology laid out here. That have the capacity and resources for what Rob has chronology was only made possible by quite a lot of called nation-building, by getting DFID to redeploy activity going on in the background all the time. its money towards our strategic objectives. Also the By the time we get to the spring of 2005, we’ve got a Americans left roughly $100 million that they had series of headquarters committed to the task. We’ve been deploying in the area, as Mr Brazier said, and got an Allied force that is capable of coming in with although they could move, I didn’t want their money us, and we impose two conditions on the Americans to move with them. for taking this thing on: one was unity of command So those three conditions were laid down at my first between the nation-building and the counter-terrorist meeting, and we did not go in until they were met. operations, and the second was that they would take On the third one, we had a long series of meetings in over Stage 4. By taking on Stage 3, we knew the Cabinet Office under an Afghanistan group to try automatically that we were going to complete the to focus the DFID effort, because I am afraid my view NATO plan. That is a fair jump from being marooned of DFID throughout that period was that it was in the North to the certain knowledge of the execution sometimes pursuing objectives which, however of the mission, and that was about five months after worthy they were in themselves, did not always we entered Helmand. Ev 90 Defence Committee: Evidence

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid

Lord Reid: General Fry made a distinction. Our Nice. So theoretically it would have been possible to mission was not a counter-terrorist mission. It was change anything, but that was the position when we based on the concept of operations of “Ink Spots”— went in. I laid out three conditions. You are asking of a small number of concentrated forces, which could me, from memory, when we met them. better liaise with the local community, better protect their own Forces and so on, and you will no doubt Q412 Ms Stuart: I am asking whether, by the time want to come on to when that changed. It changed we actually did move, you were satisfied that we had significantly, quite quickly. There was a real met them. distinction between that and the counter-terrorist Lord Reid: By the time that we moved in? Operation Enduring Freedom at the time that we were Ms Stuart: Yes. planning this and going in there. Lord Reid: Yes, because there were three. One of I have one final comment that is worth making. I am them was that the Treasury financed in full— aware that, while everyone accepts the political Ms Stuart: That’s fine. I just wanted you to— reasons for going in, understands them and the idea Lord Reid: I’m giving you the time-lines. That was of NATO good governance, some people have felt that met quite quickly. The second was that DFID there were some tactical self-interested considerations concentrate the resources necessary. That took months from the British Armed Forces’ point of view. I am and, extraordinarily, because of my view that this was not saying they have said that these were so important, the ministerial meeting, including the dishonourable, but there is an imputation. There is Foreign Secretary, was nevertheless put under my another way of looking at this. On top of all the things chairmanship by the Prime Minister, so that we could we’ve given, there is an honourable view of this drive both the Foreign Office and DFID towards attitude towards the British going south. I think it was meeting that. The one that held us up was the Dutch laid out by General Walker when he spoke to the deployment to Uruzgan as part of what NATO said Chilcot committee. was necessary for the deployment to the South and Basically, he said that we had a battle group that was the safety of our Forces. The Dutch would not commit split between Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif up in the to that in the September, the October, the November North. Mazar-e-Sharif was benign to the extent that or the December, and there was therefore a huge the soldiers up there were not producing for NATO amount of politics and diplomatic work going on. I the capability that was possible out of British troops. am grateful to all our allies who worked with us on I think that that was a feeling among the Chiefs about that. My memory is that it was not until the third week a major ally of the United States and a Member of the in January 2006 that the Dutch finally committed to United Nations Security Council. Remember, this was going to Uruzgan Province, and it was only at the end not Iraq; this was a United Nations venture into of that week—26 January—that I announced that we Afghanistan, which was supported throughout the would deploy. United Nations. They had seconded it in a sense to In fact, I can give the Clerks the questions to me in NATO, and there was a feeling that British troops—I the House on why I was delaying, and I made it think among the military—were not doing the task absolutely plain that I was delaying—despite the fact that was up to the level that British troops were that I was being pressed in some quarters by those capable of doing. That certainly is what General who were ready to deploy, because they felt that they Walker said. There is an honourable interpretation of had reached, if you like, the appropriate level of what some people have perceived as perhaps being a preparedness to go, which includes the psychological self-interested interpretation. preparedness of the troops. There was a downside to my delaying, but I delayed because I did not want a Q410 Ms Stuart: You have answered many of the northern flank that was exposed. So the three questions that we wanted to pursue in a way. Can I conditions were not finally met until January 2006. just be absolutely clear that what you are saying is that by the time we deployed, your conditions for Q413 Ms Stuart: In terms of what we wanted to deployment had been met? achieve once we deployed, there was no difference Lord Reid: Yes, that is a matter of fact in all practical between the military and the politicians as to what senses. Basically, I think I recounted to you the first they wanted. briefing that I got. General Fry: None whatsoever. Lord Reid: None whatsoever. It was the right Q411 Ms Stuart: That was your briefing. What was decision. the timeline for the conditions that you felt were General Fry: We will come to describe exactly what necessary to be met, and therefore you were satisfied the original mission was, and I don’t know whether to deploy? the Committee has a clear idea of what that was. But Lord Reid: On the first question of what was the we do need to describe that in some detail, because it position in reality when I came in, I have already said very quickly became something completely different. there was a widespread expectation within NATO, based on the previous Defence Secretary’s Q414 Ms Stuart: That is what I want to pin you commitment at the February 2005 NATO ministerial down on, because Lord Reid mentioned that the to move south, that the UK would (with Canada and mission became something different. the Netherlands) be one of the three nations leading I am still confused. There is a general decision to go in the Stage 3 area. That was the briefing that we got, south, there are three conditions that the Secretary of and I was asked to reiterate our commitment made in State clearly laid down that he wishes to be met, and Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 91

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid we don’t move south until those three conditions are a series of Alamos in the North of the Province. We met. We then move to a period where it seems that, were completely dislocated geographically from unless I’m very much mistaken, things happened on where we went in, thereby placing a hugely greater the ground that went quite beyond the original mission emphasis not only on the fighting power of the troops and what the Secretary of State intended to happen. but on the requirements for things such as protective Lord Reid: Yes. The three conditions were related to mobility, autonomous logistics and aviation. You can the concept of operations, the configuration of the only fight in as many places as you have the ability to Forces going in, and the mission. I have been much extract your casualties from. maligned for a misrepresentation of something that I Lord Reid: That is a question that lots of us have said, but I distinguished completely between our asked. Just prior to me leaving the MoD, I recall being mission and the counter-terrorist mission, Operation briefed that, while Permanent Joint Headquarters Enduring Freedom, whose job was to chase, kill, regarded Governor Daoud, the Governor of Helmand imprison, expel and get rid of the terrorists. If they Province, as an honest man, he needed to be strongly had come back after a year of Operation Enduring discouraged from making gestures—for example, the Freedom, with that purpose, and hadn’t fired a shot, I idea of a forward operating base at Sangin—that were said that they would be damned unhappy. unsustainable. Not long after this, I left the MoD for Our mission was entirely different. It was one that was theHomeOffice. You can imagine that when, five dangerous—I constantly spoke of the danger, and I weeks later, sitting in the Home Office, I heard that can give you chapter and verse on that—but we were fighting for our lives in Sangin, I could not nevertheless, I said that we did not go with aggressive entirely understand it. intent; we went to protect the building-up of the social I understand from inquiries that I made then and and economic infrastructure. That was to be done in a subsequently that the matter was not referred to the particular way that was conventional for the British Secretary of State for Defence who succeeded me. It Armed Forces in terms of counter-insurgency— was never brought to his attention, except in Anthony King, in his piece that you have no doubt retrospect. Undoubtedly, in my view, it was an read, has laid this out—which was an ink-spot operational decision which may or may not have been strategy, taking an area and concentrating your forces right. Let us assume that the commanders on the spot in it. That is what we went in to do, in my got it right; but it was an operational decision that understanding, and when I was there, that was what changed the strategic nature of the mission, and when happened. you change the nature of a mission, there is an obligation to change all sorts of things such as the Q415 Ms Stuart: You used the term “aggressive force configuration, the resources and so on. It seems intent”. That changed the mission. When does to me that how that came about is a question that has aggressive intent occur? to be answered, General Fry. General Fry: Let us try and put a bit of geographic specificity around where we were going and what we Q416 Chair: May I just draw to your attention the were trying to do. The whole of the plan was fact that your giving us this evidence today means that predicated against going to a small area around this question, which you have been asking in private, Lashkar Gah, which was the provincial capital—and will now, unless this evidence session is to be pretty where, incidentally, the Americans had been for the pointless, become a question that you are asking in preceding period. The whole intention there was to public? take every agency available to the British Government Lord Reid: I think I referred to it as a question that in order to try and create the comprehensive effect the Committee needs to be asking. about which you would have heard an awful lot. I actually re-read the CDS Directive and the JC Q417 Chair: It is a question which arises out of what Directive before coming here today. It is remarkable you are telling us. how little Military Force appears in the intent that runs General Fry: Yes, it does. Forgive me for the through the instructions. It is all about localised effect, accusation, but you would be being disingenuous if from which we would gain an intelligence and cultural that were not in your mind already. understanding of the general environment, and where we would have the ability, by imposing a local Q418 Chair: Indeed so. envelope of security, to create governance, build General Fry: It seems to me that any independent Afghan capacity and create also a capacity for observer of this whole process would want to economic growth. understand precisely how that complete change in After that, we would build out from what is classically gear took place, what the rationale behind it was and regarded as an ink-spot idea. The whole of the Force what the decision processes were that attended it. that was sent to Afghanistan was predicated against that mission. The whole of the supporting Q419 Chair: Indeed so. I am just drawing your infrastructure, in terms of aviation and everything attention to the lack of privacy that this is going to else, was predicated against that mission. involve. The key question that you are interested in—I think Lord Reid: Anthony King has already raised the the key question that the public record needs to get to matter at some length in his paper, which has been in the bottom of—is how did we get from that, which the public domain for some time. was an absolutely clearly understood intention, to General Fry: Mr Chairman, if your question is fighting for our lives no less than two months later in whether I am personally content that the conclusion Ev 92 Defence Committee: Evidence

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid you have just drawn is the result of this meeting, yes, tenure, so that we can understand where that gap I am. I think that it is something that the public record came from. needs properly to understand. Lord Reid: I don’t in any way say that you should not try to understand; I am saying that I cannot explain it Q420 John Glen: Just to assist my understanding, it to you. seems that you are saying, Lord Reid, that in that final briefing with PJHQ, the clear implication was that a Q424 John Glen: Can you tell us about the military move to Sangin was not the right thing to do. advice? Who was it from? Lord Reid: The clear implication was that demands Lord Reid: Yes. Basically it is very simple: to put it would be placed on us by people such as Engineer crudely, to use words from a relatively recent book, Daoud, an honest Governor, that ought to be resisted, military power and the use of force has no purpose. because they were requiring us to do things that were There is no utility, other than a political— unsustainable. That view was completely in accord with what I understood to be the concept of Q425 Mr Brazier: What has no use? operations, the mission purpose and the configuration Lord Reid: In “The Utility of Force”, Rupert Smith that we had sent into Helmand. I took responsibility said that military force has no utility other than the for sending that in on the basis of the mission, the pursuit of political objectives. Therefore, at the objectives, the configuration, the finance and so on. political objectives level, the politicians decide such Therefore, we should understand why, later, that things—the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State, mission—to me and others—palpably changed. andsoon. In terms of the military strategy, although the Q421 John Glen: In your mind, can you account for politician has to agree the strategy, or not, he does so how the military advice at your disposal led your in close liaison with the chief advisers—the Chief of successor to a different conclusion in such a short the Defence Staff, the Chief of the General Staff, the length of time—three weeks? deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (operations), the Lord Reid: I think it was about five weeks. But no, I deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (commitments) and cannot. But then I don’t have access to what was so on. The operational implementation of that plan is decided on the ground, or to what were the methods mainly a matter for the Chiefs of Staff through of communication. One’s instincts on these occasions are always to rely on general strategic and operational Permanent Joint Headquarters and the commanders on plans—on the Chiefs of Staff. It is not the job of the the spot. They have to make life and death decisions, Secretary of State to start deciding military operations. sometimes 10 times a day, and it is not right for politicians to interfere with them. Q422 Chair: Particularly if it is not referred to him. On some occasions, as it appears on this occasion, a decision is taken at that level that affects strategy. Lord Reid: Absolutely. On the other hand, it obviously raises issues in my mind when we agree According to what we have read—I don’t know, but to a certain disposition of resources, and a specific according to Anthony King—the decision was taken configuration for deployment with a specific mission, in a fairly short period of time to meet an emergency and that mission appears to change. As I understand situation. Although it appeared to be a tactical and it, the matter was not referred to the Secretary of State operational decision, in my view, and, I think, in the who succeeded me—it was not put to him. It appears view of General Fry, it had strategic consequences, that there was an operational decision—and I do not because it changed the nature of the mission. question whether it was right or wrong—that changed Does that help you? I am not sure I can go any further, the strategic purpose of the mission. It developed, as because I wasn’t part of the discussion. Anthony King says, into forward dispersals, into forward operating bases, into small units, who are less Q426 John Glen: What I hear you saying is that, in self-sustaining. Such units might be in more danger, essence, it seems that the operational decisions that because they might not get as much intelligence and were legitimately transferred to the theatre created a they are certainly not part of the traditional counter- strategic shift by stealth. insurgency concentration of forces that General Fry General Fry: No, that is not entirely true. I will tell has laid out. you two things: one is a military technicality, which I think is important to understand; and the second is an Q423 John Glen: In the final 12 weeks of your observation and impression. position as Secretary of State, you would have There is an awful lot of popular literature that tries to received certain inputs from military advisers. Will capture the period. So an awful lot is available you say who they were? It is difficult to get over the discussing how it happened. The only person who can fact that you would have had routine, regular, in-depth change a mission within the conventional military briefings on military progress all the way through the structure is the man who is given operational early part of 2006, yet there was a clear shift five command of the deployed forces. weeks afterwards. There are cascading levels of command: full You cannot account for that decision—and nor should command, operational command, operational control, you—because you were not Secretary of State. tactical control and so on. The man who had the Nevertheless, surely it is realistic for us to draw operational command of forces in Afghanistan was the something from all that routine advice you were Chief of Joint Operations. If there was a change of getting in those months right up to the end of your mission, he had to agree to it. It is not possible, by Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 93

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid protocol or by practice, for it to be brought about by changes at the tactic level. Where was the oversight the deployed commander on the ground. coming from? Who was pulling all that together? So, in technical terms, the only place the decision General Fry: I can answer your question formally, but could have been made is in Northwood. I find it it is more difficult to answer it in terms of what incredible that the decision would have been taken in actually happened. As for a formal chain of command, isolation, because it would have had implications not you know that as well as I do. There are Ministers. only for Military Forces, but for all the other arms of There is then a Chief of the Defence Staff; there is a Government that were involved in the deployment at Chief of Joint Operations with operational command the same time. So it had to have been briefed in of the operation and then there tends to be in-Theatre Whitehall, either to the Chiefs of Staff Committee in commanders. Sometimes, the in-Theatre commander isolation or more broadly. I have no idea how it can be COMBRITFOR, but the tactical commander worked on the day, but there are constraints on the can be the man who runs the Brigade. That is freedom of operation that are defined by military absolutely understood within national doctrine. definitions of command and mean that that decision Everybody knows how that cascade works. What that was unavailable to the Theatre commander. does not account for, however, is the colloquial usage That is the military technicality. My one other of command. What becomes common practice does observation is that, as a nation, we have tended to not necessarily observe the cascade that I have just command at the one-star level in recent times; the outlined. You have made the observation—others Americans tend to command at four-star level. By that have as well—that for quite a long period in Helmand, I mean that, habitually, we command brigades. every six months we had a new solution. Compare Because of our military capacity, that is where we are. that with the observation I made a moment ago about The Americans tend to command theatres. In the unbroken narrative within an American command. American-commanded operations, therefore, you tend That is because there is unity from the four-star level. to have an absolutely clear narrative inside a If you actually pitch your level of military ambition at the one-star level and invest trust and faith in that, campaign from the top to the bottom, because they it is likely to bounce around a bit—and that is pitch their level at four-star command. That is an precisely what happened. appropriate reflection of their sense of national destiny at the present time. Q429 Bob Stewart: Does not the mission in British We are less ambitious, and we tend to command at understanding, although we have the mission that the one-star level. We occasionally command at two comes all the way down, change as we go down and star, but at three star and above we are only ever we get confused with tasks as well that make it deputy commanders. We never actually exercise change? That means that a Brigade at one-star level operational command. That has sometimes led—this actually has a mission and separate battalion process is over now—to a process that can best be commanders have a mission and tasks, and this is described as inverse deference: the man on the ground where the confusion starts. Is that the difference knows what is right. between us and the United States that you are referring to? Q427 Mr Brazier: Among Brits, you mean? General Fry: The Americans have a much more General Fry: Yes, as opposed to Americans. In many mechanistic approach to campaign execution. In some ways, that is absolutely commendable, but you have ways, I find that a bit sort of dreary and mechanical, to be sure that you wrap around that a certain amount but in other ways, I thoroughly admire the efficiency of check and balance to make sure that you do not with which it is done. You know all this. We tend to make really bad decisions. have a rather more cavalier approach.

Q428 Mr Brazier: The question on the rubric is did Q430 Bob Stewart: Mission command and the Armed Forces know why they were in Helmand, flexibility. but that is too generic. We have had three quick General Fry: Mission command, but not as Moltke observations in front of us in the past few weeks, the intended it. first of which was Colonel Richard Williams’s comment about the loss of confidence in senior Q431 Bob Stewart: Yes, not as Moltke intended but, commanders at the middle ranks. The second was actually, we rather took pride in the flexibility. Nick Parker’s point made either in front of us or on a General Fry: Indeed. public occasion that we had lost sight of the wisdom of the Major-Generals, and—exactly your point— Q432 John Glen: I am still a little confused. I take there was too much deference towards the Brigadier on board the difference between the ways in running on the spot. Thirdly, there were the widely reported military in the US and the UK, but Lord Reid, as American remarks that the Brit system of changing Secretary of State, had received a series of advice that not only the Brigadier but the whole brigade led him to hold one position yet, five weeks later, headquarters every six months was bound to fail. there was a significant change. What were the drivers Putting those three things together, my question is of that change? Both of you can substantiate the point where was the oversight coming from? There appears we were at when Lord Reid left office, but there is a to have been a change of tactics every six months. We complete void thereafter. There is not really any are discussing the most drastic one. It was actually a serious speculation of what would have led to that change at the operational level, but there were also change, which, given that you were both key players Ev 94 Defence Committee: Evidence

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid up to the point when Lord Reid went to the Home the move to Sangin was wrong or right; I have said Office, is quite difficult to understand. I thought we that it seems to me outwith the operations envisaged were making some progress in recognising the gap with the mission we sent in. between operational and strategic. Governor Daoud was an honest Governor, and he was Chair: In a sense, we are asking this of the wrong a huge asset to the British Forces there, and to Karzai. witnesses. He took the view that you had to be a strong man, who John Glen: To some extent we are, but the advice up was perceived to be strong in every area of Helmand to that point would suggest a certain narrative Province. At one stage, he had wanted to do that by thereafter. the development of his own security force, and we Lord Reid: We can and will—and I think we have had great debates about whether that could—or been quite straightforward, I hope you agree—give should—be done and whether it should be financed, our views on everything of which we have knowledge. and so on. It would have supplemented his personal The point after that, we don’t have knowledge. You protection and that of his people. So, in every possible could refer to Anthony King, whose article you have way, we were wanting to support Governor Daoud— no doubt read at some length and re-read. He covers he was known as Engineer Daoud. We wanted to a lot of these issues and has his own views, including support him in every way. There were some ways, about the incident we are mentioning. All we can however, in which it was obvious and we thought, at really tell you is, what was the strategic part of this, least up until the stage where I left, that some things what were the objectives, what was the mission, how that he would have liked us to do were unsustainable. did it differ from Operation Enduring Freedom, why For some reason, that presumably changed. I can did we go in there up to the point at which we were imagine that the commander on the spot would have no longer privy to the decisions? been under enormous pressure to do a lot of things in I only volunteered one thing, which was my order to support Daoud. It may well be that President understanding that the Secretary of State who Karzai was deployed to lobby for support for him as followed me did not have this matter referred to him. well. So, if you are looking at the continuity of views of the Secretary of State, there isn’t the disjuncture that Q435 Chair: The reason I said that it would be you made out, because as the Chairman said, it wasn’t helpful for us to have further information is that it is put to him. possible that somewhere, within the British Government, there was support for Governor Daoud’s Q433 Chair: May I ask you where you received proposal that he should be strong in every part of these briefings saying that we must strongly Helmand. discourage Governor Daoud, etc? Lord Reid: *** Lord Reid: The meeting that the Secretary of State had every week with the Chief of Defence Staff and Q436 Chair: *** the other representatives of the Foreign Office, DFID, Lord Reid: *** the intelligence services and so on. There were two General Fry: It doesn’t need an awful lot of forensic meetings on a Wednesday. The first one was with the power to join up some of the dots here. Governor Chiefs themselves, which would have been people Daoud succeeded Governor Akhundzada, who was like Rob Fry, the Chief of General Staff, the Chief part of a well-known family in Helmand. It is widely of Defence Staff, the Chief of Naval Staff. That was understood that that was as a result of the intervention followed by a briefing for the Secretary of State for of the Foreign Office. There are popular accounts of Defence with all of those and with my Ministers. this that go into immense detail, such as the rather luridly titled “A Million Bullets”, which is actually a Q434 Chair: So this would be at the second of those rather reflectively written book. If you want to pick Wednesday meetings. Is that right? your way through that, there is one chapter that covers Lord Reid: Yes. My memory was based basically on this entire thing. I find it extraordinary that you can’t the explanations given and my understanding of the just ask for the Chief’s minutes of all the meetings mission—the fact that it was concentrated, the idea of that surround this. the inkspots, the consolidation with force in a limited number of areas, and moving out. And therefore my Q437 Mr Brazier: Normally, after a change of surprise afterwards, when I saw that we were moving Government documents are closed, aren’t they? to Sangin, was based on that. It wasn’t based on a Lord Reid: I don’t know. specific recollection. It was only recently when I re- Mr Brazier: That’s the problem; they’re closed. read my papers that a specific recollection was recorded. Q438 Mrs Moon: Lord Reid, when you had this Chair:. *** briefing or this advice—saying that Governor Daoud Lord Reid: *** wanted to extend the mission, and it was decided that, Chair:. What you have said clearly implies that “No, we should stay with the original plan.” Were Governor Daoud had in his mind the thought that there those who were pressurising you at that time to British troops should deploy outside Lashkar Gah. reconsider your decision? Were voices saying, “Yes, Lord Reid: Not only that. Let me say this—and I say we should do that. We should move into Sangin?” this because, quite frankly, I think we have to Lord Reid: Can I put this in context, because I’m not understand the position that commanders on the spot trying to avoid your question? I have no recollection may have been in. I have not said at any stage that of such voices, but I would not want to suggest that Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 95

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid this was the only request from Governor Daoud that with that, and what steps were taken to make sure that was being discussed. Requests were being discussed we had sufficient intelligence? What more could we all the time. For instance, the Afghan group, to which have done? I referred, met regularly to discuss how we might General Fry: I think it is a fair observation. develop social and economic and security issues. I Sometimes you go into campaigns and you don’t have have already mentioned that at one stage, Governor a complete picture. Did we go into Sierra Leone or Daoud was very keen on having his own security Kosovo with a complete understanding? Absolutely force. There were great discussions about whether we not, but there were operational imperatives that said could do that with any proprietary. We looked at that we had to do those things, so we made judgments whether we could bring 200 members of the Afghan about risk and we went ahead and did it. As I said in Security Forces from the North, from Kabul, down to an earlier part of the testimony, we intended to go to his place. How long would that take? If it was three a small, geographically defined area from which we months, could we finance his security force or would would grow out. One of the reasons that we did that that be wrong? It was decided that it would be wrong. was not just limitations on military capability, but the Could the Americans put something in? There would knowledge that we did not have an appropriate be all sorts of demands that I would see. God knows, amount of intelligence. You start small and you get an they must have been only the tip of the iceberg of understanding of the areas that you can govern and the demands that the commanders on the spot were control and, over time, you expand beyond that encountering on daily contact. lodgement into a wider area, taking with you the If it is the case—and I am speculating here—that the understanding that you gained from the operating commanders on the spot thought that one of their key environment from the start. The danger comes when strategic objectives was to keep Governor Daoud, who you leap out of that mission and go into something was an honest Governor and was seen as—to use a that is quite different, because then you are taking a phrase that has been put to me since—the “centre of much greater risk in the absence of proper gravity” of our political efforts in the area and a sine intelligence. qua non for success, then that could have been the context in which such a request was seen on the Q440 Mrs Moon: But there are opportunities that we ground, however it was seen elsewhere. It is possible have now to gather intelligence that perhaps in that over a period of a month or two that such a previous campaigns were not available. There are situation had changed so dramatically that someone opportunities for planes to fly over, for drones to fly thought, “Yes, it is worth it on this occasion. We didn’t over and, indeed, as we have heard, we had Americans want to do this, but it is necessary to do it.” That is already on the ground operating in a counter- why I have never at any stage said that it was a wrong insurgency way. Were there efforts to ask the decision. I am just saying that I don’t understand what Americans to gather additional intelligence before we the circumstances were that caused that decision to be went in? Did we seek to maximise the intelligence made. I only knew that the decision to go there was that was available to us before we went in? out of step with everything that I thought was the General Fry: Yes. The American footprint was very nature of the mission. Re-reading my papers small, and we’ve already talked about that. That was confirmed to me that it had been an ongoing request, the footprint on the ground, and what a footprint on but it was not one that would be isolated; there would the ground will give you is human intelligence, which be any number of requests, many of which we would is the ability to talk to people and understand what presumably turn down. their concerns are. There are all sorts of other sources General Fry: I think that that is accurate. I recognise, of intelligence—call it objective intelligence— I think, exactly what Lord Reid has just said. Let us including imagery, movements and listening, and we put ourselves in the position of the commander of the explored those exhaustively, even to the extent of time. If the core effect you are trying to achieve is the developing a technique that we have borrowed from extension and the consolidation of central the Americans, called MASINT, which looks at Government, which is exercised at a local level human movement. You can, for example, see foot through Daoud, then it might be an absolutely infiltration routes by using that sort of thing. We took compelling story that you want to go and do these every advantage of the relationship that we have with things. I do not think that we understand the the Americans to get that sort of indirect intelligence, mechanics, but I can understand the thought process but I cannot claim that we had a real sense of the that people would have been exercised with at the texture of what it was like on the ground dealing with time. the people, and that can come only from interfacing Chair: You have mentioned the issue of intelligence. with the people. I want to get back to intelligence now. Lord Reid: Intelligence is always fragmentary and always less than comprehensive. It is a matter of Q439 Mrs Moon: A number of commentators and degree. In this case it would have been the same and, observers have suggested that there was a distinct lack in addition, we had virtually nobody on the ground. of overall intelligence of what was happening on the The Americans had very small numbers. I read ground, that there had not been American fly-over recently that in 2003, not long before we went in, the missions, and that there was not enough drone- Americans estimated the Taliban, in terms of their collected intelligence or even operations-on-the active fighters, at 4,000. By 2009, they were ground intelligence in place before we were able estimating them at 29,000. They might have grown, successfully to deploy into Helmand. Do you agree but that suggests that even the Americans, with all Ev 96 Defence Committee: Evidence

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid their intelligence and, as we have seen from other dislocates the analysis that had been done about force recent conflicts, that of all the intelligence agencies in levels, intelligence and so on. the world, can get things wrong. So, I think that the answer to your question is, yes, enormous efforts were Q444 Mrs Moon: Can I just be clear? What you’re made to get intelligence there but it was, as ever, saying is that the decision to go into Sangin changed fragmentary and, probably because of so few people the balance? on ground, it would have been commensurately less General Fry: Yes, exactly. However, to answer your than we had in other areas. question in a more direct sense, human intelligence is There is another thing, which is that intelligence can what we lacked and that is always going to be the tell you what the position is at the moment, but it is a most telling insight that you can ever get in an matter of judgment how that will be affected by your operation like a counter-insurgency operation, which very presence on the spot. In other words, you might is based in the minds of the people. have very few people on the spot, but if you go in that may have a galvanising effect on your opposition. If Q445 Chair: Was the decision to go into Helmand you go in in one particular fashion and on one one that was compatible with continuing to be in Iraq? particular mission, that may have less of an effect in Lord Reid: Well, I asked. Obviously that is a question acting as a magnet for opposition forces than if you that any Secretary of State would ask. Indeed, they went in in another way. would ask it in more specific terms. “Is the decision The final thing is that the opposition is not staying to go into Helmand in this mission, with this Force, static; the enemy is constantly changing in order to dependent upon us drawing out of Iraq?” That is a outwit you. So, in a conventional war, if you go in question that I actually asked the Chief of the Defence and assume conventional fighting and the intelligence Staff, who told me, “No, it wasn’t dependent on that”. is based on that, but you then find that they are I then asked a second time orally and the third time I increasingly using suicide bombers or IEDs, then the asked for the answer in writing, precisely because it whole position can change. I suppose that if you was an important question. Basically, what I was change your own mission in practice—your told—the short answer—was, “No, it is not dispositions and forces and so on—your original dependent. We can go in. There will be pinch points”. intelligence doesn’t really help in the new situation. I think that one of those pinch points would have been General Fry: One footnote is to remember also that engineering and logistics, and another would have from early 2005 right the way up until the been helicopters. So, this is not something that is done deployment, successive reconnaissances were being without pain, but it is something that can definitely be done by the planning staff at the permanent joint done. I think that I gave this in evidence to Chilcot. headquarters, so it wasn’t as if we were entirely The reason that I asked for the answer in writing was disassociated from what was going on there. precisely because of the importance of the question.

Q441 Chair: Can you remember who the Chief of Q446 Chair: It could be done in a sustainable Defence Intelligence at the time was? fashion, for three years or whatever—five years? General Fry: Andrew Ridgway, I think. Lord Reid: The question was premised on our entry Lord Reid: Yes, it was. for three years. That was well known. That was accepted. That was what the original mission was Q442 Chair: Where was Stuart Peach? for—three years. There were three options to go in, General Fry: I think he was somewhere in the bowels just for the record, Mr Arbuthnot. The first one that of the defence intelligence set-up. was put to me—well, they were all put to me at the Lord Reid: That meeting that I mentioned, that same time—was a Provincial Reconstruction Team, happened every week and sometimes more than once which I was told would have minimal local effect in a week, with the Chiefs of Staff and others—the Ops a challenging operational environment. The second COS-Ministerial meeting—would have a very large was a PRT plus a battle group, which would have section, normally at the beginning, on intelligence. It some effect in the area local to the PRT, but it would would be the latest estimate, on which Ministers have only limited access to the bulk of the Province, would be briefed. unless other nations offered helicopters. The third one, which was the obvious preference, was a PRT plus Q443 Mrs Moon: Can I ask you what the impact was battle group in support and attack helicopters—what of the missing intelligence, how it demonstrated itself was called a Task Force, which I was briefed would and what it would have been useful to have had? What have positive impact over the whole Province, support would have made the difference if you had had it HQ ARRC and with allies create impact comparable before you went in? to the coalition forces being replaced. General Fry: I’m terribly sorry to paraphrase Mr So those were the three options and there was an Rumsfeld, but I don’t know what I don’t know. I have obvious preference for the third option. On the back got to come back to this idea that we went there with of that, I asked the Chief of the Defence Staff to give one mission, one idea, one force structure, which was me an assurance that this option would not be all about going smaller and getting larger. I think that dependent upon a draw-down on Iraq. I was given that that force structure and that level of intelligence that assurance and I can supply that to you, if you want. we had was appropriate for what our level of ambition The other question that then arose was the question of was at the time. We then take a complete jump out of helicopters, which you may want to come back to. that and take on something else, and that completely Chair: We will come on to that in just a moment. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 97

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid

General Fry: From the very inception of the idea, Lord Reid: It might be helpful if I am explicit on there was a constant dialogue about whether this was this point, precisely for the reason that any responsible possible or not. As the force-generating headquarters, Secretary of State or politician would want, without Headquarters Land, which was responsible for the interfering in operational deployment measures, to Army, was constantly consulted about the ability to assure himself that this could be done. The note, dated generate a sustainable force to go to Afghanistan. 12 September, says, “Secretary of State asked whether Two things probably changed which created far in the event of a slower than expected draw-down of greater friction when it actually happened than in the our Forces in Iraq, our planning assumptions for planning process. One is that Iraq deteriorated sharply deployment in Afghanistan would be achievable”, with the Shi’a insurgency in the South, which which is the question you asked. happened to coincide with our area. Secondly, we Paragraph 2 says, “The short answer is yes, but to made the tactical shift from the middle to the North provide further reassurance for Secretary of State, we of Helmand, which then led to an in-Theatre have taken advice from Chief of Joint Operations. He reinforcement of close on 2,000 troops during the is clear that our plans for Afghanistan are deliverable course of 2006. So you can see these things became even if events slow down our Iraq disengagement.” It rapidly much more complicated as they progressed. goes on to say, furthermore, that they had factored the But I think, in some senses, you need to look at this possibility of such a slippage into the MoD’s strategic almost in a historical sense. These are the sorts of planning, and to be equally fair, it said that it was of debates that took place in 1915, with easterners and course the case that such a situation would lead to westerners. In 1942 and 1943 it was the far east or some pain and grief, in particular the hope for North Africa, Greece or Normandy. These are the easement of pressure on our current pinch points, sorts of decisions that you have to make when you are which are especially helicopter support, specialist intelligence gathering and set logistic functions. concurrently involved in displaced campaigns. Notably, medical and some combat service support trades would be delayed. Q447 Ms Stuart: Can I just follow that up? You’re But it says finally, “Our ability to fulfil our plan in saying that we moved from the South to the North, Afghanistan is not predicated on withdrawal from with an extra 2,000. In an earlier part of the evidence such capabilities from Iraq, and notwithstanding these session, you were actually saying the intention was to qualifications, in the event that our conditions-based go in small and then get larger. plan for progressive disengagement from Southern General Fry: Yes. Iraq is delayed, we will still be able to deliver our DOP-A”—that is the Committee; Defence and Q448 Ms Stuart: What were the planning Overseas Policy—“mandated force levels in assumptions for getting larger and for extending Afghanistan.” That was the position in September, operations there? Was that in line with what when I asked the specific question in writing in happened? What were you planning for? anticipation that this question would be raised with General Fry: What we were planning for was the me at some stage. objective most limited in space and ambition, which is called the Lashkar Gah lozenge around the state Q451 Chair: By that stage, we had already been capital: reinforce the seat of governance. That is the operating above the defence planning assumptions on core assumption that we constituted the force for and a continuous basis for about four or five years, had designed our intelligence plan around, and every other we not? dimension of the plan was predicated upon it. Lord Reid: This is September ’05—before we go into You then have a dislocation caused by the movement Afghanistan—so we’re not operating above the from Lashkar Gah to the series of platoon houses in planning assumptions. the North, which then completely changed all those fundamental equations. You immediately require Q452 Chair: Well, the Ministry of Defence Report much more logistics support, because you are and Accounts for most of those years accepts the point supplying four, five or maybe half a dozen different that the defence planning assumptions have been bases. You immediately require more aviation, you exceeded for, about two years ago, six out of the past completely transform the intelligence requirement and seven years. you are actually fighting a live enemy rather than Lord Reid: There are two different things here. First, simply trying to create a sustainable piece of civil the defence planning assumptions as incorporated in governance around the provincial capital. the Strategic Defence Review, which, as I said at the beginning, I had a little to do with, are that you can Q449 Ms Stuart: I am trying to pin you down on run two medium-sized operations, but you can’t run what the planning assumptions were about what you two medium-sized operations for a longer term. They needed once this event happened. We were still in are not sustainable in the longer term but you can do Iraq, we were doing this, the North emerged. What them if they’re short—if one of them is short— were your planning assumptions for what you needed for those new circumstances? Q453 Bob Stewart: In the shorter term? Lord Reid: If one of them is short, yes, you can do it. Q450 Chair: But your point is that you didn’t intend In this case, the note in September was in anticipation that to happen in the first place. That was after of us going in, just to assure us that we could do it, General Fry— even if we did not withdraw from Iraq—that was not Ev 98 Defence Committee: Evidence

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid essential in our planning assumptions. In terms of the occasions. That is why one of the last things that I subsequent breaching of planning assumptions, Mr intervened in in Parliament was to try to reverse the Chairman, you are right: it was outwith the planning decision to reduce the training money for the assumptions, as I think I, but certainly Mike Walker, Territorial Army, at a time when we had soldiers said to Chilcot. In terms of the implications of those fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan. planning assumptions, what you’re really talking Chair: A quick question, because you mentioned about is stretch on the Military and the Army helicopters. John Glen. themselves. If you look at the breach of harmony guidelines for Q456 John Glen: May I ask about your assessment the Army, in particular, which I did—this may be of whether you had the right availability of helicopters slightly dated now—pre-Afghanistan, the percentage for that early stage of the mission? Obviously, a lot of total personnel who had breached individual has been written about this, but what was your view? harmony, which is the guidelines for tours and so on, Lord Reid: Fortunately for posterity, it is also a in ‘04-‘05 quarter one was 17%, and by ‘06-‘07 question I asked at the time. *** There is an allegation quarter four was down to 10.3%. This came as a in one book that an interlocutor raised the question surprise to me, I have to say, but according to the with me and I did nothing—nothing happened. That figures that I have, the individual stretch on individual is untrue. soldiers in the Army had actually decreased as a It is true that an interlocutor did phone me, as he did percentage between ‘04-‘05 quarter one and quarter on a number of occasions about these matters, but it four when we were in Afghanistan. is also true that, on the back of that intervention, I asked for a personal assurance from the commanders Q454 Chair: That is a surprise. on the spot that the helicopter hours for the mission Lord Reid: Well, it’s surprising to me, I have to be were adequate. On 13 March 2006, just before we honest. I brought this prior to Chilcot for more went in in the April, a letter went to the interlocutor information. I will supply it to you. It may have been saying when we had spoken on the telephone the other updated, it may be factually incorrect and it may have day about the forthcoming deployment to been revised, but those are the figures, and I’m willing Afghanistan, I undertook to get back to you in respect to give them to you. of the three points that you raised. The first one was Apparently, in 2005, the harmony individual breaches helicopters and I was able to say that “On the matter were running at 21.4%—before we went in. I would of helicopter availability, I am reliably informed that say, however, that there may be an explanation for the the commanding officer of the helicopter force is decrease, which may be the run-down of our Forces content with the number of flying hours available to in Northern Ireland, because this was precisely the him for the prosecution of the mission. Of course, in period during which we were withdrawing troops common with existing practices in Iraq, there will be from Northern Ireland, which, as you know, were at regular force-level reviews of the Forces in one stage 29,000 in number, and were reduced to Afghanistan, and this may lead to adjustments to the 5,000 or 6,000. While we were going in on two size and nature of the forces deployed.” On the operations, it may be that the coincidence of the question of helicopters, in the preparation, apart from drawdown of troops in Northern Ireland helped to the assurances that I was getting from people I trusted, ease the individual pressure, despite the fact that we such as General Fry, I actually went to the length of were running two operations, which, as you say, once asking for a specific assurance from commanders on they were fully engaged and prolonged, were outside the spot that the helicopter hours and provision were the planning assumptions. adequate. I was given that, Mr Glen. That is not to say that, if you change the mission, the Q455 Mr Brazier: A very quick observation. I’m resources stay sufficient. It is patently obvious that if going to break my purdah on all matters Reservist— you change the mission so that your logistic chain the subject of a commission that I am sitting on— is greater, the distance travelled is greater, it is more because we are in a private session. Of course, when dangerous to travel and so on, you could have a we went outside the DPAs when we were trying to requirement for more resources in the first place. run both at once, what in fact happened was that you That’s one of several lessons I would take from this: called up very large numbers of Reservists, not only if you change the mission, you have got to change from the TA, but also, crucially, the RNR Air Branch the resources. came back and for three or four months ran the Navy’s *** helicopter training pipeline virtually on its own—all facts that have been excised out of the MoD’s Q457 Bob Stewart: I think the point is that we can’t memory. ask about platoon houses, because the answer is that Chair: But this is all after Lord Reid— you were not involved in the decision making on Mr Brazier: Yes, immediately after the period that platoon houses and their deployment—it was after we are talking about. your time. Lord Reid: I do agree that the role that the Reservists General Fry: What would the question be if you played in Afghanistan was a formidable one. Mr asked it? Brazier knows that I have always believed that there Bob Stewart: The question would be, particularly has been an inadvertent tendency within the Regular who made the decision on platoon houses and did the Army to undervalue the Territorial Army’s role, and Governor or Karzai have any influence—did he push yet we have been so dependent on it on so many Butler into the deployment into platoon houses? Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 99

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid

General Fry: The genuine answer is that I am an combined joint statement of requirements was not unreliable witness and I don’t know. My being fulfilled by other NATO countries stumping up understanding, colloquially and second hand, is that the troops that they were intended to stump up, there was pressure put on him, and very considerable obviously he couldn’t have that. pressure—but I don’t know. Lord Reid: No, he couldn’t. We were already going Bob Stewart: It is unfair to put that on the record in with the ARRC and we were already going into anyway. Helmand. I have the greatest respect for Sir David Richards. Actually, I was supposed to visit him—I Q458 Sandra Osborne: May I ask you about the think he was at Fallingbostel or somewhere in command and control arrangements of the Germany, en route to Berlin and couldn’t do it, so he international coalition? Were they satisfactory? Were went to the extraordinary lengths of travelling to have there any problems? Did it make it difficult to have breakfast with me in Berlin to make this very point, an oversight of the whole mission in any way? for which I am very grateful. It seemed to me, General Fry: No, I don’t think so, but remember that however, and to the Chiefs of the British Armed there were two, or maybe even three, things colliding Forces, that we were already committing a lot of here. You have an American structure that was people in there, and others have to make their responsible for ISAF, which was the NATO Force, but contribution as well. There was a sense that, far from also for its own national operation. Initially, our being in any way sort of gung-ho going in there, we Forces came under the command of that organisation, were setting conditions on the entry—we were not but then our own commander, General Richards, who prepared to go until the Dutch went and all that; we was commanding the ARRC at the time, took over were not prepared to supply another Theatre Reserve from that organisation. He took over from that, I think, Battalion. We were trying to be as cautious and as two months after our Forces deployed on the ground. sensible as we could on a mission that we regarded as What he immediately did was collapse all of the of key strategic importance for the reasons in the very existing structures into one unbroken chain. Once that first comments that General Fry made. had happened, it was all pretty clear, but there was an awful lot of friction, an awful lot of moving parts, in Q461 Sandra Osborne: What is your take on the the two months when he was taking over command, contribution of the international partners? the Americans were winding down the national Lord Reid: Some of them in the South have been command structures that they had for Operation marvellous allies, I think. The Canadians, the Enduring Freedom and at the same time, we were Netherlands and others have suffered casualties. busy deploying a force. It had a COMBRITFOR—the General Fry: You should never forget that the commander of British Forces—sitting in Kabul. We had a deputy to the Canadian commander of the Canadians have taken far greater casualties Forces in the South, and he was sitting in Kandahar, proportionally than ever we have. The Estonians and so there were a few things shifting around. I think that Danes have been extraordinarily effective in the little in the early part of the deployment, it’s possible that things that they have done. The Danes certainly have caused confusion, but once it had settled down, it taken a lot of casualties. entirely conformed to conventional models for this Lord Reid: The French have had special forces in sort of thing, and I think we entirely understood it. Operation Enduring Freedom, but the North is a more Lord Reid: One thing for the record, during this benign territory, so some of our allies perhaps don’t period, it was not really regarding Helmand, and have a tradition of fighting the way that the British although it was General Richards, he was not really a do, and sometimes you would like them to contribute British General at the time, but a NATO General. But a bit more in that direction. It’s not just people on the it is true that he would have liked to have seen another ground, it’s what people do. Since this is the first time Theatre Reserve for Afghanistan as a whole for that I’ve discussed Afghanistan, I think, in the 10 manoeuvring purposes. It doesn’t really concern the years that we’ve been in there, I want to place on Helmand side, but that’s what he wanted, but we record my respect and admiration for the courage and didn’t have troops available— bravery, the fortitude and endurance of the young men and women in the British Armed Forces, and my deep, Q459 Mr Brazier: General Richards wanted it? deep sadness that, once again, so many of them have Lord Reid: Yes. General Richards was coming in as had to give their lives in order to protect this country. the Head of the ARRC in Kabul. He discussed this I think that ought to be placed on the record at some with me. He would have liked another battalion under stage during this hearing. his command, not in Helmand, but for manoeuvring. General Fry: Which would have had no ground- Q462 Chair: I think you both gave evidence to a holding responsibilities. This was purely to deploy, joint meeting of the Defence Committee and the and any commander would want that. Foreign Affairs Committee with Margaret Beckett when she was Foreign Secretary and I am pretty sure Q460 Chair: I remember that he told the Defence that you said the same thing then, but we are grateful Committee, when we went to Kabul at the time, that to for saying it now. if we could give him anything he wanted, the one I have been keeping an eye on the annunciator for the thing that he would want was a Theatre Reserve. He division bell in the Lords, and you haven’t missed a would have quite liked it to have been a British vote, but I wonder if—as we close this meeting— Theatre Reserve, I remember, but because the whether there is anything you feel that either of you Ev 100 Defence Committee: Evidence

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid would like to say that we haven’t already covered in at odds with what we were doing, you have a duty to evidence today? try to elicit their point of view on this, because we ask General Fry: I have two points. It’s very interesting people to risk their lives and to make decisions of the way that public perception of these campaigns has immense magnitude, sometimes in hugely short gone. I think that both the public perception at large periods, under pressures that few of us can imagine, and the emphasis that you have on an awful lot of the other than those of us who have served in such critical commentary that goes on have concentrated circumstances, such as Bob Stewart and others. So upon episodes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Were we anything I say is caveated with the fact that it has to kicked out of Basra? Did we do the right thing in be tentative, with not having been there and so on, but Helmand? At no stage—and I don’t detect this in there are a number of lessons I would take from the either journalism, official circles or academia—do I discussions we have had today and what I have read. get any sense of anybody writing the audit of war The first is, stick as long as possible to the original from 2001 to 2010. Maybe it can’t be written until operational plan or mission. I accept fully that no plan 2015, when we finally have out. survives first contact with the enemy, but so far as is In one sense there is no shared strategic provenance possible, we ought to stay with the strategic dimension between Iraq and Afghanistan. We went to war in the of a mission, the operational overplan as long as two places for different reasons. The dossier might possible. If we can’t—this is the main point—if the have tried to establish to some commonality, but it plan or the mission changes or expands, so must the failed to do so. But you only ever have one order resources and the commitment behind it. There is of battle to discharge these responsibilities, and if it’s nothing wrong with changing a mission, nothing possible to take a wider view of what British arms wrong with changing your plan or your tactics have achieved in central and western Asia over the providing you’ve got the resources to back that up; last decade, I think that would be a substantially that is one thing you should bear in mind. different view than ones that simply concentrate upon Secondly, and we haven’t dwelled on this at all today, sets of tactical engagements. if you are gonna have a military surge, you have to I would make a big claim for the move to the South. have a political surge as well. You are there in military Had this not happened, there is a chance that NATO force to pursue a series of political objectives and I would never have gone into the South of Afghanistan, have sometimes asked over the past few years, though with untold consequences for the alliance. We would I am not in a position to know, if we have been doing also have created, de facto, the very ungoverned space enough to identify those elements of the Taliban who that we went there in the first instance to deny. What aren’t pro al-Qaeda, those elements of the Pashtuns we as a nation achieved during that period was a very who might be incorporated in a government. It may large, bold and imaginative stroke, which has been be that I am just not aware that the international lost because of subsequent events. community has been doing that, but it seems to me I would even make one greater claim. I think that we that, if you are asking people to risk their lives, you probably made the Americans think more about have to pursue the political objectives as vigorously as counter-insurgency than counter-terrorism. If you you are asking them to pursue the military objectives. recall, in 2004 and 2005, they were just beginning to Thirdly, it is a very personal view, but I think you make the intellectual leap from counter-terrorism into should always have a timeline in your head, but you counter-insurgency, which later bore fruit in Iraq. I shouldn’t necessarily have it in the newspapers, the think that our insistence on approaching Afghanistan press and the media. I understand why it is sometimes as a counter-insurgency operation played a role in the necessary, especially when we have been there for general intellectual mindset of America, with years, to announce that we’re gonna do certain things consequential results in Iraq and the possibility of on certain occasions, but you have to weigh in the consequential results in Afghanistan as well. If I sum balance the advantage you gain by that against the this up, I thought it was the right thing then, and I advantages your enemy gains. Again, it is a point we think it was the right thing now, and I make no haven’t covered, but it is worth bearing in mind. apology for having been involved in it. Thank you for your courtesy today and I hope what Chair: I would agree with that. we have had to say has been helpful to you in your Lord Reid: Just to repeat something that I said on the deliberations. 27 March 2006 in the House of Commons. I said then, Chair: It has. It has left us, rather worryingly, with a “I fully accept that it is more dangerous in the South major vacuum as to what happened when you both than anywhere else where we have been present left and we will have to decide what to do about that, hitherto, but whatever the dangers, they are less than but it has been very helpful to have your experience the danger of the Taliban and the terrorists taking over while you were there and we are most grateful. Afghanistan again, which would be a danger to not only our forces but the people of that country.” I think Q463 Mrs Moon: Sorry, I have a final question. You that that, in a sense, is what General Fry said. talked about the vacuum, and James has identified that You are fulfilling a hugely important task here, if I vacuum, about where the plan changed and where the may say so, Mr Arbuthnot. I have not been close to decision to change the plan came from, and that is this for the last few years and, therefore, anything I where we’ve got to go next, but one thing that is say has to be tentative. When we ask people to make growing for me is the fact that we are there as part of judgments on the spot, we ought to give them the an ISAF force. Have we also been guilty of allowing benefit of the doubt. That is why, when I was saying other nations to sit back and not step up to their over things I did not understand or things that appear responsibilities through our own fighting spirit, as you Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 101

8 February 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE and Lord Reid described it? Have we in a sense been culpable of occasions when you should say, “No, this is a bridge taking on more because others have felt that by too far unless you are prepared to step up to the plate.” allowing us to do that, they could sit back and do That was exactly the position we had in September less? Should we have been more proactive in forcing 2005 when we delayed our intervention into Helmand others forward? because we wanted cover in the North. That was fair. Lord Reid: I’ll have the first word because in some We were taking on a difficult enough task without ways that is a political question and then Rob can fill some of our allies saying, “Well, we’ve decided we’re in. First, and this is a minor correction, when you said not coming in with you.” So there are occasions when “Have we also been guilty”, on the back of referring you’ve got to do that. But on the general relationship to the plan of the mission, I have not said anybody between allies and fighting forces, General Fry will was guilty. answer. General Fry: The answer to your question may be yes Q464 Mrs Moon: I was not suggesting that at all. but the fact is that if we hadn’t done it, it might not Lord Reid: I keep saying that. I want to understand it, have happened. If it had not happened, there would as you do, and I remark, as you do, that there was a have been all the conditional outcomes that I have change. That may have happened accidentally. It may already talked about. But you actually make military have happened under pressure of events. It may have commitments fundamentally to gain political been a right decision at the time; I do not lay blame outcomes. Lord Reid made that point earlier on. We or guilt. I just think it is important for us to understand wanted to display a degree of leadership in this whole why it happened. thing, which was consistent with traditions that we On the political thing, I think that some of our allies would historically observe and wish to continue. have been immensely brave and active in this area. There may be something in what you say. But if we Some of them have been. Is it the case that those of hadn’t done it, it wouldn’t have happened, and if it us, in terms of great nations, who step forward, allow hadn’t happened we would have been in a worse others to continually stand at the back? Possibly, and position. There is also one corrective that needs to be possibly it was ever thus. If at the end of the day you made. The British nation tends to see Afghanistan are faced with a threat to the west and to the United purely as Helmand. There are an awful lot of people Kingdom of the sort that we saw in the origins of this doing an awful lot of good things elsewhere in intervention in Afghanistan—the loss of thousands of Afghanistan. For a nation that should have a sense of United States lives but, more than that, the loss of historical purview, we are being remarkably narrow more British lives in that terrorist attack on the twin minded in the way that we look at this. towers than has ever occurred in any other terrorist attack, including 7/7—you have an obligation to your Q465 Mrs Moon: Largely through our press, though. own people and your own country to take that hard General Fry: But that does orchestrate the popular decision. mood. I certainly think you should not draw back from Chair: Gentlemen, thank you very much indeed. telling others that they ought to go in and there are Ev 102 Defence Committee: Evidence

Tuesday 15 March 2011

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Penny Mordaunt John Glen Bob Stewart Mr Dai Havard Ms Gisela Stuart Mrs Madeleine Moon ______

Examination of Witness

Witness: Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler gave evidence.

Q466 Chair: We are sorry to have kept you waiting. about force size, and whether it would be 16 Air As you know, we are trying to get to the bottom of Assault Brigade or 3 Commando Brigade. The the reasons why we were in Helmand, and precisely decision was taken in mid or late summer 2006 that it how we got to where we are now. The key time—a would be 16 Air Assault Brigade that would provide difficult time—seems to have been 2006. We are most the force elements. How many, what type and what grateful to you for coming to give evidence in private. constitution of command and control, and everything The way it worked with Rob Fry and John Reid was else, was still to be agreed. that they answered questions and a transcript was made. Agreement was then reached between them and Q470 Chair: What did you think was the mission of us as to what, if anything, should be cut out and not the UK’s deployment to the Southern part of for public consumption. Is that okay by you? Afghanistan, as opposed to discussions of a Theatre Brigadier Butler: Karen explained that to me. Reserve? Brigadier Butler: We can park the Theatre Reserve, Q467 Chair: I will kick off. What was your because that evaporated, not that General Richard understanding of the background to the deployment of lacked the requirement for it. We were engaged UK Forces to Southern Afghanistan in 2006? What intellectually in this as a headquarters. I had most was the designated UK mission? experience at a senior level in the Army, having been Brigadier Butler: I think everyone was aware that I there in 2001 and 2002. I had a reasonable was involved right from the early stages in 2004, understanding of the Afghan environment and the when I took over command of 16 Air Assault Brigade. sorts of things we could and could not do there. I, in I first got into discussion in early 2005, when it looked my discussions with various people and my likely that we were going to deploy a force to headquarters, could see a number of grand, strategic Southern Afghanistan. The debate in early 2005 was reasons why we should be there, out of which we really centred around the size of the Force and could see a mission starting to emerge. whether it would be a PRT—a Provincial As for clarity of mission, that did not come until much Reconstruction Team—a PRT plus, or a battle group later. That was centred on the reconstruction of what plus plus. Those sorts of debates were going on, in had been referred to as a failed state. We could see terms of force levels. that the future of NATO was going to be paramount here, and we could see that there was going to be a Q468 Chair: You say you first got into discussion— role on the counter-narcotic side, because we [the UK] discussion with whom? were the G8 lead nation. There was already a heavy Brigadier Butler: The very first discussions I had emphasis on the UK’s comprehensive approach. That were with General Richards, who was commanding had to succeed as a concept, after its not-perfect roll- the ARRC at that time. He and I discussed the concept out in Iraq. Lessons had been identified, however, and of a Theatre Reserve, and 16 Air Assault Brigade, we knew that we should do something joined-up. We being a highly mobile, aviation-led brigade, would knew that NATO was going to expand its mission to have fitted that requirement very neatly. As you know, Stage 3 and 4. We knew that preventing al-Qaeda re- that was one of his enduring requirements as establishing itself in Afghanistan was critical. In the commander of the ARRC, and then commander of bigger picture, we saw that the whole mission was set ISAF. in the context of the first offensive deployment of the war on terror. We made those deductions on where we Q469 Chair: He wanted a British Theatre Reserve, sat as a force. didn’t he? It was early 2006 when we were getting that clarity Brigadier Butler: He didn’t specify that as such, but that we were going to be deploying on a I think his preference would have been for a British reconstruction basis. I scribbled some notes in my Theatre Reserve. That made absolute sense; it is notebook: “We were going to undertake security and something that wasn’t committed, and as a brigade we stabilisation operations, within Helmand”—we can could have fitted that requirement. That was the come back to why it was only Helmand—“and the genesis of my actual engagement as a brigade wider regional command sites, jointly with our commander of my headquarters. The discussion took Afghan partners and other Government Departments place over the late spring and the summer—discussion in order to support Afghan governance and Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 103

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler development objectives.” That was reasonably clear level, for example, the mobilisation for Reserves and to understand, but a whole lot of sub-issues fell out the authorisation for urgent equipment requirements of that, such as whether we had done the investment ***. It also impacted on when we wanted to do our appraisal on the resources needed to meet all those pre-deployment training. It was already going to be requirements. We were set a mission. It was a question very tight to get it in by an April time line, and it of the achievability of those objectives with the would be even tighter by a January start date. resources we had, the time to prepare and the time scales to deliver success. Q473 Chair: Would it be fair to say that it was not the clearest of missions that you found yourself being Q471 Chair: When you say that things fell out of deployed to put into effect? that, can you translate that? Is it that they didn’t Brigadier Butler: No—and I can try and give you the happen, or that they arose from that? real nuts and bolts of this. On top of these competing Brigadier Butler: In terms of those challenges—these missions, and all the consequences and consequent were recurring themes in late 2005 and early 2006 management that we have to put into effect from the before we deployed, and throughout our tenure in purely military side, there was a split planning effort those first six months—we talked a lot about the as well: the American OEF counter-terrorist mission, “duality of mission”. and the international community’s mission of reconstruction and development. Q472 Chair: It sounds more like plurality of mission. We had the American plan. They were still Brigadier Butler: We can get on to plurality, but commanding ISAF and had a plan of what their “duality of mission” was the term that we used on engagement was going to be in ISAF, 2009–10. We whether we were going to engage only in Helmand, had the ARRC conducting pretty well independent or in Kandahar as well. The important thing was that planning—we didn’t have any liaison with it, and we determined that we could only do Helmand; we General Richards was focused on making sure that couldn’t do the second, wider mission of Kandahar NATO’s first out-of-area operation was going to be a and Regional Command South operations. You are success. It was clearly a British lead with a British- right; that duality of mission perhaps because one of majority headquarters. It had to plan for the transition plurality. from Stage 2 to 3, and beyond to Stage 4. There were competing missions, as we saw them, We also had CENTCOM doing its planning. We had within the theatre. We had—this was important from the Canadian Headquarters, which was relatively a conceptual approach, and from a British brand immature as a military organisation. It was going to perspective—Operation Enduring Freedom, which be the first combat operation they had re-engaged in was very much counter-terrorism, whereas our since their experiences in the Balkans. We had the stability, security and support of reconstruction and MoD, the other Government Departments, and then development in Afghan governance was on the other we had PJHQ and 16 Air Assault Brigade. My end of the war fighting spectrum; those were two Headquarters came together after a relatively short diametrically opposed missions. That was, again, a period with PJHQ, in relative harmony about what we significant conflict of interest that we were were trying to do. You can see that five or six plans recognising and determining in 2005. were being written and developed in relative isolation; We then had the counter-narcotics issue. As I have that, again, added to what you might be getting at, in said, the UK was the lead G8 Nation—we recognised terms of confusion, or confusing indicators. that. We sought, throughout the deployment, clarity on our approach, our rules of engagement and the legal Another important point, if I may, is. What I call the position of our engagement on counter-narcotics synchronisation of the various political, military and operations. We took a tactical view that we wouldn’t economic levers which were out of kilter. If we park get involved in those, because we could see that that those independent planning operations, we had, within was the quickest way of upsetting the ordinary Afghan UK plc, the SIS with one set of plans, objectives and farmer—the man we wanted to protect. We didn’t end-states, the Foreign Office, DFID and ourselves— want to turn the farmer into an insurgent; we wanted the military—at a tactical and a political, MoD level. to turn the insurgents back into farmers, so counter- The removal of the old Governor and his replacement narcotics was another contradictory objective. with Governor Daoud took place at about Christmas It is also important to note that, as we were trying to time, which was the original deployment date for the piece together what we were going to do and when operation, before it was delayed by Secretary of State we were going to do it, we had the issue of the impact Reid’s decision to wait until the Dutch came on board. of the “operational pause”, or “political pause”, The Foreign Office had a different set of time lines, induced by the then Secretary of State, John Reid, for and so did DFID. The changeover from Sher all the right reasons from his perspective, but that Muhammad Akhunzada, who wasn’t the straightest made it very difficult to plan against. There was the Governor, to a very honest governor, took place three Dutch political prevarication and the issue of whether months prematurely. The lack of co-ordination at the or not they would commit forces to Uruzgan. political level again led to a very disjointed planning Militarily, he was absolutely right that we needed to process. That’s all the planning side. I can talk a little protect our northern flank, and he also saw politically more about other issues, which are all important, in that we could pick up the resource bill from within terms of context. coalition resources, to plug the Uruzgan gap. That had Chair: You have answered a lot of the questions that a knock-on effect on our planning at a very tactical we were going to come to. Ev 104 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler

Brigadier Butler: Well, if you’ve followed that, I’m a short-term look at the problem to come up with a very encouraged. comprehensive plan. It reported in December 2005 and highlighted a lot of the issues which then became Q474 John Glen: As the Chairman says, you have very apparent. That Headquarters then continued with looked at some of this, but can you just be a bit more its role and deployed to Helmand through January, specific on the timings? Once the decision had been February and March. made and you were given your command, what time I stated at the time that, in my experience, this did period did you have to plan the deployment? You have not make military sense, because my headquarters was discussed the existence of a number of bodies you doing the planning to engage in all lines of activity in needed to consult in planning that, but were the FCO Helmand Province in early 2006. By that stage, it was and DFID specifically involved in that planning going to be not before April, but another headquarters process? was already there doing all the shaping, influencing Brigadier Butler: If I look at it purely from 16 Air and limited intelligence gathering. Again, 16 Brigade Assault Brigade’s perspective, in terms of getting all did not have sufficient representation within the the pre-deployment training done for the soldiers, the Preliminary Operations HQ. My argument was that Marines, the air force elements and the helicopter either we start the preliminary operations in January pilots, and in terms of doing all the regulatory training to understand the environment, the people, the requirements, from individual courses to medical and relationships and the trust with all the stakeholders, or so on, we started the process in September 2005. Our you give it to what was in fact part of the Joint Force original Interim Operational Capability—(this is an Headquarters and it runs with the initial deployment important issue, when you get on to how we got into for the first six months; with the Force Elements from the plan suddenly not surviving contact)—was going 16 Air Assault Brigade. The decision was taken, “no, to be April 2006. they can do the first three months, then hand over to Mr Brazier: Sorry, your regional— you”. So we came relatively cold into what was, at Brigadier Butler: Interim Operational Capability— best, already very much a semi-permissive it’s a military term. You set out in a plan when your environment. force is going to be Fully Operational Capable—FOC. This was important in the height of the summer. There Q476 Mr Havard: When was that? was some wariness back in London that we had Brigadier Butler: We started deploying the first engaged in operations before we were meant to. I have elements of 16 Air Assault Brigade in April 2006. got ahead a little bit, but that was before FOC, which was meant to be June 2006, if I am not mistaken, with Q477 Mr Havard: I am trying to remember back to an interim capability two months before that, at the then. I came to see you in, I believe, February. I end of April or the beginning of May. Actually, I think remember it was pretty damned cold in Wattisham, it was May. So we are talking about May IOC and anyway. There was a wind blowing up my shirt from July FOC, although I wouldn’t like to be held to somewhere or other. You were having discussions at those dates. that point about what you knew about the place. The original dates were three months earlier. We were My questions will be about intelligence. The general training and preparing for a three-month earlier start question is whether we had the necessary intelligence date, and that would have been very difficult—almost to deploy successfully. I remember discussions with impossible—to have the force fully trained up to the you and then visiting you pretty soon after you were required standards, with all the equipment and all the out there and seeing a very different analysis of what urgent operation requirements. I can list what we were you discovered once you actually got there. What was already saying in the late part of 2005 that we were your take on whether you had the intelligence to short of. So in some ways, it benefited us to be deploy successfully? delayed. Brigadier Butler: Importantly, one of the PCRU In September, we were given the authority to liaise reports stated at the time—sorry, I think it was part of with other headquarters—again, that is a formal a preliminary operations report, the main report—that military process—whether it was PJHQ, London, the we simply did not know enough before we went in to Canadians or NATO. Actually, the only ones we had come up with a coherent, long-term campaign plan for a dialogue with were PJHQ and the Canadians, and Afghanistan. A very short-term view was taken by we sent a very small team over to see them in late some Government Departments that this was a three- 2005. year commitment funded at £808 million-odd, to be capped at 3,150 troops. We said, “You cannot come Q475 Mr Havard: When did you actually go out? up with that sort of figure and timeline.” I wrote one Brigadier Butler: In terms of the disjointed approach, of my directives to my headquarters and said that we to what was going to be a major campaign, there was would be engaging in a very complex insurgency. We a capability called Preliminary Operations. It was recognised in 2005 that we were getting into an formed in late 2005 and involved DFID, the Post- insurgency. Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), a representative We didn’t have enough of the “picture” to start from the FCO and a very small force from the making the sort of judgments that we were making. military, who pulled together the Joint UK Campaign When I say “we”, I mean UK plc collectively. I knew for Helmand. That preliminary operations the challenges of the terrain, and as repeated in many headquarters then had another role which went on briefs that we did beforehand we were severely beyond December—initially it was only going to be underestimating the terrain, and the effects of heat and Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 105

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler altitude on men, machines and equipment—the Brigadier Butler: The mission was to conduct the resources needed to do that. I knew from personal security and stabilisation operations within Helmand experience, but also from history, that the Afghan, and the wider Regional Command South, jointly with whichever hat he is wearing, fights extremely hard. our Afghan partners, other Government Departments We also recognised that there would most likely be a and multinational partners, in order to support the transfer of technology, tactics and techniques from Government of Afghanistan and the development Iraq to Afghanistan through foreign fighters. objective. What I would call a more tactical mission We were making a lot of assumptions, some based on was that we were going to deploy the force and experience, some on history, but we recognised, as the establish our footprint. operators, that this was going to be a very different Remember, Camp Bastion had just a fence around it environment we were getting into. Actually, the and we were living in tents. You guys have been there, intelligence that was coming back from the prelim ops probably more recently than me. It was totally headquarters in January, February and March, and different then. Gereshk was a very small Forward from the American accounts and from Operation Operating Base, and Lashkar Gah had been just a Malaya, (TA/SAS), was that before April 2006, small Provincial Reconstruction Team with very Helmand Province was already in some form of crisis. limited force protection. If we could achieve getting We had compulsory eradication of the poppy crop, the force in, build up the bases, establish a “central which we knew intuitively was not the right approach lozenge”—the Triangle was between Lashkar Gah, if you were trying to get on with a reconstruction and Gereshk and Camp Bastion—stabilise it and then stabilisation mission. progressively expand our capability out and build up We knew the Taliban, over the four years post-2002, some form of intelligence picture for 3 Commando were re-arming and re-equipping. We were hearing, Brigade, that would have been success. open source, from their information campaign, which was extremely effective, that they were going to throw Q480 Bob Stewart: So your first mission was to us out, as they had done on the three previous deploy the Force—to get in, deploy and establish. occasions. I remember one account said, “Our fathers What was the mission after that, once you were in and forefathers are scratching at the lids of their theatre and established? Was there a single mission coffins to come out and throw out the infidels”. They then, or did you go back to the original? were already challenging Daoud’s authority. This was Brigadier Butler: No. That overarching mission, in a very complex tapestry with Sher Mohammed and terms of the principles of supporting governance and his previous regime and all the links he had into the going in—we did a lot of this Estimate within 16 narcotics trade, warlord-ism and the Taliban. He was Brigade in 2005; we’d talked about it. We’d been already mischief-making at best; at least, we would asked in. We were in support of the Afghan call it that. Government, and we were going in to help the Afghan people. We were recognising from the liaison we had with the Americans that their approach, through operations such as Operation Mountain Thrust, were very kinetic. Q481 Bob Stewart: Those became the key tasks We could see that Helmand, at best, was in some form below the mission? of turmoil and changing already. We were going to Brigadier Butler: They were, but I’m trying to keep arrive at the beginning of April, in what I sometimes it in non-military-speak, in simple language which is referred to as “half-time in the war-fighting season”. much easier for people to understand. What happened was that there was an assumption—I had a difficulty That is exactly what happened, but your point—I’ve with this, and this is, again, part of a split planning come a long way round it—is that we did not know approach—that we were just going to deploy the enough about the very complex tapestry, the tribal Force into a permissive environment and when we had relationships, the “narco” mafia, the patron-client reached full operation capability in July 2006 then we relationships and all that. would go out and start engaging with the people. Well, funny old thing— Q478 Chair: To carry out the mission? Bob Stewart: Once you went out, they started Brigadier Butler: Actually, to carry out a detailed engaging you. assessment—what I’d call an investment appraisal— Brigadier Butler: As soon as we arrived in those of how long, how much it was going to take in terms conditions—and as I have said the Province was of people and how much it was going to cost from a already in some form of crisis; they were certainly development and reconstruction perspective to ready and waiting—of course they wanted to engage achieve these aspirations. I think there was some us. We used to say that there would be a reaction to wishful thinking by some Government Departments our size 12 Boots going into Helmand Province, that we were going to be welcomed with open arms, whether from the Taliban, from the opiate dealers or because we were coming in on a reconstruction and from the warlords, because we were threatening their development operation. very existence. We were trying to turn a failed state into a steady and successful one, which was contrary Q479 Bob Stewart: Brigadier, you outlined a whole to all their aims and objectives. We knew full well, series of tasks but not a mission, I think. Did someone as reasonably experienced military men, that we were give you a mission at all before you deployed, or did going to have a reaction. What happened—this was you deploy with a whole series of tasks but not an again the tension, and it impacted on resources and actual mission, in the simple sense, to do something? the in-load of people—was that we were trying both Ev 106 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler to deploy the force and to employ it at the same time. things clear. The size and structure of the Task Force Doctrinally, you don’t do that. has been guided by a careful assessment of the likely tasks and threats that it will face. What matters is that Q482 Bob Stewart: I understand that. Did you give we put the right forces in to do the job and to do it tactical missions to the battle groups or the battalions, safely and well, and I make no apology if that requires as such? Were they different? more soldiers than some people initially envisaged.” Brigadier Butler: No, the overarching ones for the What you seem to be saying to us is that a careful Brigade were the same for the Battle Groups. Clearly, assessment was made, but there was more than one 3 Para battle group, which was a large battle group, assessment made, and in a sense, the assessment was slightly different from the Joint Helicopter Force. which was made was done so by the group that you Most of the focus was very much on getting the force said were deployed to do it—rather than you making in. When the enemy had a vote, the situation changed the assessment. The Quetta Shura made an assessment very quickly and we then got into a radical change of all right and they’d been planning for you to arrive the situation. for some time. They saw this as a political advantage. There had been a small number of Americans and Q483 Ms Stuart: Earlier you mentioned the things special forces roaming around. We didn’t really have that we didn’t know, such as the heat and the altitude. a lot of intelligence, did we? So, how did you mitigate With the benefit of hindsight, which of those things this when you got there? How much impact did that could we have known and should we have known, and really have? which are just simply things you find out once you Brigadier Butler: The numbers? go there? Mr Havard: The limited intelligence. Brigadier Butler: I knew it; I’d been there. We’d Brigadier Butler: If I go back to your claim and already had forces there. The Americans had been where the figures came from, a reconnaissance was there, up in the North, and they had been in some done in early 2005 by a planning team out of PJHQ. parts of Eastern Afghanistan as well. At the end of They went in and looked at troop numbers for every presentation I gave at 16 Brigade in Colchester, Helmand Province only. They judged that then, and I in 2005, I used to list a whole series of things, one of suspect, like all things, that they would have liked which was that we were underestimating the longer to do it. environment—the time and distance, and the impact that was going to have on helicopter hours and just Q485 Mr Havard: This was all about putting the getting people from A to B to C. We were also in turbines into the Kajaki dam, was it? danger of underestimating what the reaction of the Brigadier Butler: I don’t think they were looking at Taliban was going to be. Kajaki at that stage. What I would liked to have done—it would have been Mr Havard: This is PJHQ. slightly more conventional, and I tried to state this Brigadier Butler: This is staff officers—I suspect they case—was to deploy the force into Kandahar and saw Helmand as relatively permissive, because the build it up so that we had bundles of capability that American special forces, which were 100-strong, could look after themselves in terms of finding things, weren’t challenging any of the opposition groups, or defending themselves, reacting to things and all those other opposing groups I talked about earlier. recovering themselves, as well as providing the They were probably exchanging bags of gold to keep conditions of security that we were there to do. We the peace. When people went there, they thought that could have achieved that. We could have done that it wasn’t too bad—“This is the total number of people from the safety of Kandahar airfield but, again, with you need, and this is the total number of helicopter the split planning effort, that was not deemed to be hours you need, just to do Helmand.” Going back to the way others wanted to do it. my point about the duality of mission, people hadn’t Would it have mitigated the heat? We had taken steps started saying such things as, “You’ve got to support to address that. We did our pre-deployment exercise operations in RC South, and you have to provide a in Oman, so we were in the heat and the soldiers got Reserve to them. You may have to provide a Reserve used to it. Water was the critical requirement, and to General Richards. You’re going to have to support these guys were drinking a couple of gallons a day to US-led operations such as Operation Mountain start with. That was the intensity of carrying 70 Thrust.” We said, “3,150”—as it was then—“is just pounds of equipment and fighting 20 hours a day, about sufficient to meet Helmand-only tasks.” We had water intake was almost more important than very detailed figures then, if we were standing still. ammunition. The trouble, again, with the imposed We could do one deliberate operation a month—we [Dutch Government] delay, was that we had people in planned for that—and three or four reactionary Oman who were acclimatised, but we brought them operations. Clearly, when we got there, the situation back and some of them didn’t go into Afghanistan had changed. It had gone from permissive to semi- until May or June, so they were sitting back home re- permissive, at best, and we were engaged in a acclimatising to English weather. ferocious engagement with the enemy, almost from the start. We identified the numbers right from the Q484 Mr Havard: Part of the question that I was planning stage. If you split the planning team from going to ask about the impact of limited intelligence those who have to deliver it— has come out. For the record, I have got in front of me John Reid’s statement to the House when you Q486 Mr Havard: So that intelligence was done, if deployed, in which he said, “I want to make a few you like, on a solid-state environment, which they Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 107

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler thought that they were going to enter. This was perspective, as he is a very skilful man in his something that would be over and done in three years, understanding of the media. Funnily enough, they which would cost £800 million. The timing was quite didn’t say what he’d said before or after that, but it clear, and a limited process had been planned for. set the conditions. Brigadier Butler: And this was all documented in the There was the backdrop of all of that, plus what I UK Joint Campaign Plan for Helmand by the prelim described as wariness within London—and I use that ops team, which had cross-Government broadly—that we shouldn’t be operating before full representation. It was said that the assumptions that operational capability came in July. So we said that had been made were not deliverable, and they weren’t we needed more people as we were getting engaged affordable. We needed more intelligence to take a in multiple things—this is before the platoon houses, proper view, and it was going to take far longer than just at the operational level. We had already flagged three years. We knew that. up that we knew we would always have shortfall in troop numbers of about 12%—this is an important Q487 Mr Havard: A cross-Government assessment? point from generation of force numbers—because Brigadier Butler: Cross-Government, which was the that’s how many people would go out on the R and R prelim ops team. That was the PCRU—Post-Conflict flights. That happened within a month of any six- Reconstruction Unit—DFID, the FCO and military. month tour. That was well-documented. Chair: Getting back to the issue of troop numbers— I had discussions with PJHQ and said, “Look, 3,150 Penny Mordaunt. is the cap, we understand that, but is that 3,150 in theatre? Because you’re actually going to have 320 Q488 Penny Mordaunt: Following on from that, people out of theatre at any one time before you have you spoke about the planning team being separate any attrition, illness or anything else. Why don’t we from the delivery team, in terms of bottom-line troop go for an additional 300 but never have any more in numbers. Could you say a little more about the theatre if that’s what politicians or the Treasury are process after that had been realised by the delivery concerned about?” We were already coming down to team? How were you able to feed that back? Could under 3,000 to try to carry out this very complex you describe that, because we are interested in what operation. We staffed this on a very regular basis, trust actually happened on the ground? me. It was a weekly issue on reports back to PJHQ, Brigadier Butler: Is this before or after we deployed? which is where we reported to from theatre. Penny Mordaunt: Both, actually. Brigadier Butler: We contested very heavily the Q491 Penny Mordaunt: What would you say was number of 3,150. Every time that we recognised there the impact of the failure to deploy the right number was a new threat or a new requirement, we did another of troops? assessment of the time and distance to fly a helicopter Brigadier Butler: The impact is that we have now got from Kandahar to Bastion, to Gereshk, to Lashkar it right and have 30,000 troops in Helmand Province Gah and whether it was just a routine post, getting alone. We understand the environment, and we can people out on R and R. We went into detail. Every cover and maintain the ground that we are trying to time we wanted to bring in a new capability, we were occupy and everything else. It has taken us six years told, “No, it has to fit within the cap of 3,150.” to get there. Q489 Chair: When you say, “We contested”, who is “we”? Q492 Chair: That won’t do. Brigadier Butler: The Brigade Headquarters. The Brigadier Butler: That won’t do? people who were going to deliver it. Chair: No, and “Now we’ve got it right” is not an answer. Q490 Chair: You contested it with whom? Brigadier Butler: I actually said to the Chief of the Brigadier Butler: We staffed the case very strongly to Defence Staff at the time—in about May—when he PJHQ. Where and what happened to it, we don’t asked whether another battalion would make a know, but the message was always the same: “It is difference, I said rather quickly, “No you’ll need a 3,150, which is what the Treasury is going to fund Division here,” and I remember saying, “but even you at. You can have any composition you want with a Division we’re not going to conquer the underneath that, but 3,150 is the limit.” We then went Afghans by strength alone.” He then said, “You’re not to 3,350, because someone had forgotten to count in getting a division, Ed, what about another battalion?” the number of C-130 support crew. That was an I said “It’s not 600 more people we need,” which is exception, but that went to Chiefs’ level to get that about the size of a battalion, “we need all of the cap raised to 3,350. enablers. We need the helicopter hours.” In terms of After we deployed, it was probably May when reality the shortfalls of equipment it was helicopters; was starting to be recognised back here in London. helicopter hours; force protection—ballistic matting Remember that this was a theatre that people didn’t was a particular issue for vehicles; electronic understand, and we had gone in in the context that it countermeasures; interpreters; ISTAR; anything that was going to be reconstruction and stabilisation. There flew in the air in terms of giving us that SigInt—signal was the unfortunate soundbite from John Reid that we intelligence; over head surveillance (UAVs) in terms were going to go in and not fire a shot in anger, and of predators. I said, “It’s the enablers. We can get come home having made it a better place. He was more out of the blokes if we have more enablers, more caught out, which was surprising from my medical supplies, and all of those issues. I’d love to Ev 108 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler have another 600, but you’ve got to give a troops is closer to a medium scale technically than a commensurate amount of enablers.” small scale. We had two medium scales that we simply could not resource in terms of the urgent Q493 Mrs Moon: So did you have enough enablers equipments I have listed. for those 3,150 when you first went in? Did you have enough helicopters, for example? Q494 Mr Havard: The reassessment you are talking Brigadier Butler: No, we didn’t. We did some very about was before you did the platoon house thing? detailed planning, and I was fortunate in having a very Brigadier Butler: Yes, May. This is about the first competent and large headquarters from the RAF and Force Review we had. the Army, and people who understood Air-Land operations—getting in and out of helicopters or C- Q495 Mr Havard: So that did not include an idea 130s was the Air Assault Brigade’s role. We were the that you would need more support for that approach proponents of this. Going back to my earlier point: that you were about to develop? steady state, one deliberate operation a month and Brigadier Butler: No. three or four reactive operations—we could do that within Helmand itself. Everything else you asked us Q496 Mr Havard: So how did the reassessment all to do above it, or if the enemy had a vote, which we take place? As the thing developed, various knew they would, we were going to be very short. We reassessments must have been done, and you must knew that we were going to short: by May we could have made calls for both troops and resources. How actually say it for sure, but we were saying it in 2005. did that process run throughout? We were some 20% over our hours for support Brigadier Butler: May was when there was the first helicopter—Chinooks—we had six of them. We were Force-Level Review (FLR). FLRs are a routine already 11% over on our attack helicopter hours. The approach in any campaign with PJHQ and the MoD. C-130s were operating at 92% of their maximum We were able to formalise the figures and numbers of output, so there was the resultant impact on spare troops in this Review as now had accurate data for it. parts, crew fatigue and everything else. We staffed That Force-Level Review was almost a constant back in May a requirement for a 30% uplift on all air process. We were able to start getting in platoons’ and aviation capability. We had the hard facts by that worth of people from the Royal Irish—we got another stage; but we knew them already from our estimate platoon plus out of Cyprus. That was all as a process beforehand. consequence of the Force-Level Review. We also knew before we deployed that we had I think with your question now comes on to why did something in the order of a 45% on average shortfall we move north. of vehicles. We had already identified that Snatch was Mr Havard: Partly. not an appropriate vehicle for the desert. We wanted Brigadier Butler: But you may have some others. WMIKs and Pinzgauers, logistical vehicles, DROPS, container vehicles, equipment support vehicles, the Q497 Mrs Moon: I am interested by the politics on small Scimitar CVRTs. It was on average a 45% the ground, and the role that Governor Daoud and shortfall across the fleet. That was compounding the President Karzai were playing in changing the manoeuvre problem that we had. All those things were deployment plans. Did they have an influence in the identified and staffed into PJHQ. development of the platoon house strategy? What role Go back to the political and strategic context: we were were they playing in terms of deciding what the still in Iraq. The assumption was that the drawdown priorities were? of Iraq would have happened by 2005. This goes back Brigadier Butler: That is the nub of what a lot of to 2004, when the commitment was, yes, we will put people are interested in. There are a number of a force in. The assumption was that we were going to variations of the account of how we got into this. be drawing down out of Iraq, so these big strategic If we step back from it, why did we go into enablers and some of the operational ones would start Afghanistan? It was at the behest of President Karzai. to come across into Afghanistan. Iraq remained the We had a UN mandate to go in. We were there to Main Effort, both politically for a lot of reasons that support the Rule of Law, prevent human rights abuses, you will be much more aware of, but also establish effective governance and build up the operationally. capacity of the Afghans; we went in at their request We were also competing with the Iraq theatre— with all the mandates behind us. We were there to importantly, intellectually. The thinking was all about support them. We were in a “supporting role” to the how do we mitigate what is going on in Basra and Afghans. We said then that this must be an Afghan Iraq in 2005 and 2006. In terms of Urgent Operational plan, an Afghan solution—you will have heard the Requirements, whether it was through electronic expressions. Actually, there was an Afghan National counter-measures, force protection for soldiers or Development Strategy, which was very fledgling, but vehicles, roughly two thirds would go to Iraq and one the trouble was that it didn’t have the capacity, third would come to us. That was a difficult position capability or competences to support and deliver it. to be in for everyone, because we simply did not have There was a complete dearth of Afghan human enough, due to the long-term degradation—if that is capacity as well as Afghan infrastructure. the right term—of our Equipment Programme. We If you set that as the context, did Governor Daoud were suddenly having to accelerate the UOR process say, “Right, I’m rewriting the campaign”? We knew to meet two very high-demand Medium-Scale he didn’t have the authority, but when the man you’re operations. One was ongoing in Iraq—and 3,000 trying to support and protect and help to establish Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 109

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler some pretty basic form of governance, stability and Musa Qala. Whether they killed or injured anyone, we security for which he could start to bring in some form never had specific intelligence, but that is our of Afghan democratic process and he is supported by assumption. We dispatched a force with a pathfinder the President of the country: and your own Prime platoon and a lot of Afghan policemen—tribal Minister has said that we will do everything we can militia—who chased them all north. We thought that to help you. If they start to say to you “We need you we had achieved something and they had gone away. to support governance. We need you to protect us. You The people were very grateful and said, “Thank you”. need to give us the freedom of movement. You must Of course, very quickly we said, “But we’re not going support me to be allowed to go round my own to stay there”. Very soon, the Taliban came back and constituency. If I can’t do that, why are you here?” started to threaten Musa Qala again. They made it very clear, in very simple terms. This is At the same time, we had a pretty horrific incident in the iconic nature and importance of the Afghan flag, Sangin. This was probably as much about all the other and we see it in Libya now. It’s quite interesting that dynamics of tribalism, power politics and counter- whoever’s flag flies over a position of governance, narcotics. I cannot remember his name—forgive me— whether it’s at a district level or at a capital level, is but one of the Afghan politicians was threatened and paramount. The Afghans, from Karzai—(I had so were some of his family. They killed about 20 or 30 discussions with him, because I was privileged to go people in Sangin. Now, it could have been retribution. with all the visitors who used to go there)—right Again, Governor Daoud said, “What are you going to down to Daoud, were clearly saying, “If the black flag do about this? You’re not protecting my people. of Mullah Omar flies over any of the district centres, We’ve got a major, on-going human rights issue.” He you may as well go home because we’ll have lost our was a very clever man. He was a development man authority to govern in Helmand, and if we lose our not a warrior but he was honest and I think that he was authority to govern and our ability to govern, then that a real asset. So there he was, outlining all these issues. will threaten the South. Kandahar will be next. We’ll Against that backdrop, we said, “Look, we can’t do it. lose the South before you’ve even started. What are We haven’t got the force levels.” So we had this stand- you going to do about it?” off. Importantly, this decision was not taken in We argued very strongly about all the tactical issues, isolation. Some people think that it was a stand-alone and why we couldn’t do it—we didn’t have enough decision taken by the commander of British Forces, force levels in place. He [Daoud] was frustrated. Brigadier Butler. Not a bit of it, because in terms of When he was elected or put in position, going back to the command and control arrangements in theatre we the mis-alignment of levers (principally by the had the Helmand Executive Group and the Provincial Foreign Office in December), he was under the Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gah. They were impression that we were going to turn up with 3,000 privy to all these discussions. They were represented soldiers—fighters—instead of 600 paratroopers, with at the same meeting with myself, Colonel Knaggs, all the support elements. He thought he was going to Tom Tugendhat, who was Governor Daoud’s adviser, have 3,000 warriors to help him establish new Department for International Development governance, so he was pretty frustrated that, by May, representatives and Foreign Office representatives. We we still weren’t able to do so because we’d delayed had the same representation at Kandahar, but the our deployment. He was not able to get out into his Southern Afghanistan Group was not really constituency safely and securely, and make sure that established at that stage. It spent more of its time in effective governance, rule of law and so on was Helmand. We had the Kabul Steering Group, chaired brought in. But again they said, “If the black flag flies, by the Ambassador, with cross-Government you may as well all go home.” representation. We then had the Afghan Steering We talked in rather doctrinal terms about trading space Group in London. And we had weekly tele- for time—“Let us get in, we’re going to establish our conferences with London. force”—and we talked long and hard about the So everyone was aware of the situation that we were lozenge building up the capability, concentrating on in, what the drivers were and the pressures that were centres of mass and population. They wouldn’t have there. Of course, everyone had a slightly different it. They wouldn’t have it at Helmand level, and Karzai interpretation of what should be done, but the decision again made it very clear; he was threatening, and said, was not taken in isolation. So, when we made the “Well, I’m going to talk to your Prime Minister. I’m decision, from a military perspective, to preserve the going to talk to NATO Command. I’m going to talk capability of Governor Daoud to govern and not allow to the Americans top commanders.” They are very the Taliban flag to fly, that was an all-informed clever, the Afghans, saying, “I’m going to talk to all decision. Not everyone may have agreed with it, but these other people and say, ‘You’re not doing what it was not taken in isolation by the military alone and I’m asking you to do, and I asked you to come in it was certainly agreed at the tactical level in here.’” Helmand, and it was supported by the Ambassador, We had many a discussion, very late at night, because Stephen Evans. I had a close relationship with him, that is the Afghan way of doing business, well into because I spent two days of my week in Kabul, with the small hours. General Wall was present at one of some days spent in Kandahar and some in Lashkar these meetings. What we had seen in the run-up to Gah. this ‘unplanned deployment’ was a whole gang—they were probably supported by Sher Muhammad Q498 Mr Brazier: Brigadier, you are painting a Akhunzada, which came into Musa Qala and start to picture of an extraordinarily difficult situation, with a kick out all the locals and start to threaten people in tremendous overstretch. One can understand the Ev 110 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler pressure that you were under. We heard the other side Lorimer [Commander 12 Mech Brigade] asking for of it from John Reid, because right up to the point tanks and so and so asking for something else.” He where he left he was saying categorically, “No”. You said that he was only taking the best military advice. made this decision, and you have set out the reasons My judgement is that in some parts of the military, for it very clearly and lucidly. Can we just pursue it a we had, taken to the extreme, this “politically aware, little bit up the specifically military chain of military advice” approach rather than having someone command? You mentioned that Peter Wall was there say, “This is the military reason why we need this at one of the key meetings. He was there, was he not, capability.” That was confusing sometimes to our as a deputy director of PJ— political masters. Brigadier Butler: Deputy Chief Joint Operations, Bob Stewart: So, the mission was the same but the Permanent Joint Headquarters, or PJHQ. application of that mission changed from Brigadier to Brigadier. Q499 Mr Brazier: So your immediate chain of Chair: I want to draw this to a close with Dai asking command had completely signed up to and was part the last questions. of this decision, then? Brigadier Butler: Yes, absolutely. I did not have the Q502 Mr Havard: On the Daoud thing and who we authority to make it in isolation. We had weekly were supporting, we have had people say to us that it conference calls—video teleconferences, or VTCs— was felt by the Afghans—the very people we were with PJHQ. We would discuss, write daily reports, trying to win over—that we were supporting the write our weekly assessment and we would sit down Taliban. In other words, they were saying that you on the VTC every week to discuss the issues. supported the wrong bandits as far as they were concerned, and so you actually turned people away. Q500 Mr Brazier: And your immediate point of Did you have any sense of that as a consequence of contact there would have been Peter Wall? what we were doing—that we made a problem for Brigadier Butler: Peter Wall and the Chief of Joint ourselves by the Afghans initially perceiving what we Operations, General Houghton. were doing as being counter to their interests, and us supporting various interests within Afghanistan rather Q501 Bob Stewart: Can I ask if different Brigadiers than supporting them? had different missions, or did they change their Brigadier Butler: That is the first time I have heard mission as they went through, Brigadier? I know that that. The wider piece was that there was huge it is a bit unfair to ask you, because you are just one. expectation by the Afghans in 2002 and 2004. That But take your successor, for example: did he get the started to fade because things were not happening. In same sort of deal as you got, which is a pretty rough 2006, I thought that at best we might have the hand, frankly? tolerance of the Afghan but certainly not his consent. Brigadier Butler: I think that the military should stick We found that as we came in—we arrived years late its hand up on this occasion. The mission was the on what they were expecting—we were not delivering same. How they saw it being delivered was interpreted the economic benefits that we had promised. They differently by the subsequent Brigade Commanders. were at best tolerant and on the fence— There were a number of reasons for that. We were an air assault brigade. Having seen what happened in Q503 Mr Havard: It was to do with that rather than Northern Ireland and then what happened in Iraq in us supporting the wrong people by mistake? terms of the IED threat, we knew that we would be Chair: We have had this stuff about us supporting the heavily reliant on helicopters. We pushed very hard Taliban and we did not understand it either. for a helicopter solution, which was maintained. The Brigadier Butler: No. It was probably too Marines wanted to do it slightly differently. progressive. What we achieved—and it was an *** unintended consequence of going into the platoon The next Brigade Commander, who came from a houses—was that we kept “the lozenge” relatively mechanised background, said, “Ah, what we need free of violence. We did not have any of the violence here is tanks and APCs.” I made this point during and that we had seen in the last two years in Lashkar Gah after because I went to the PJHQ to command the and Kandahar, and the very reason was that they Joint Force Headquarters,—was that part of this could focused round the northern platoon houses. But the be resolved by having an operational headquarters unintended consequence, when both sides were close deployed from the PJHQ into theatre. That would to exhaustion—this was late August and early make sure that there was campaign continuity, which September—was that they [the Taliban] blinked first. we have now. So, you would be told as Brigade HQ; Governor Daoud and I sat down with tribal elders in you take responsibility for the tactical operation at a the last week of August and the first 10 days of particular time and place, and you join the process September to negotiate a conditional ceasefire—there here and you get off here and these are the parameters were 14 parts to that—and that tribal elders’ solution of what needs to be achieved. I think—having was start of fledgling Afghan self-autonomy. retired—that we gave people too much latitude in Governor Daoud and I used to talk long and hard interpreting the ways of doing it. I remember Des about this, and we recognised that the solution was a Browne turning to me, about two years after, and tribal solution. But at that stage, we weren’t backing saying, “Ed, I tried to give you all the support I the tribes, because we had been fighting local Afghan could.” He said, “I supported you when you wanted hired guns as well as hard core Taliban fighters, and more helicopters, but then I had Brigadier John we’d got into this very destructive attritional battle Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 111

15 March 2011 Brigadier (Rtd) Ed Butler with them. But the Musa Qala solution, which lasted Mr Havard: And now we’ve gone back to it. for 150-odd days before the Taliban saw that it was Chair: I’m afraid we’re going to have to move on starting to encroach on their freedoms and power, was now. Thanks very much indeed for helping us out with part of a tribal solution and Afghan self-autonomy, this. We’re most grateful. which people now recognise.

Examination of Witness

Witness: General (Rtd) Sir Mike Jackson gave evidence.

Q504 Chair: Welcome to the Committee. The way either Helmand or Kandahar Provinces. I don’t think we are doing these particular sessions is that we’re I can usefully add any more. What emerged was a asking you to give evidence in private. A note will be NATO plan; a counter-clockwise move with this or taken of all you say. That will be given to you, and that Province being allocated to this or that country or you will then negotiate with Karen as to anything you countries. In some cases more than one country was want cut out. It may be that there is nothing you involved in a single province. particularly want cut out, but that negotiation comes That is how it came about. Planning for that continued up and if there is a disagreement it can come back to in 2005. I can’t quite remember what the proper title the Committee. Is that okay? for it was—it was the preliminary ops group, or General Sir Mike Jackson: Understood. something of that nature, and that started to set up in Helmand. Does that answer your question Q505 Chair: May I begin by asking about the sufficiently well? background to the deployment of UK Forces into Southern Afghanistan in 2006? What do you think Q507 Chair: Well, that helps. Do you remember was the intent of that deployment, and what was the what the designated UK mission was? desired or expected end state? General Sir Mike Jackson: We began with a concept. General Sir Mike Jackson: The context of that Perhaps I should say something about force levels as deployment was, of course, not a unilateral national a preface. There was an assumption in 2004–05 that decision. It was Britain taking its part in the by the time the expansion of the NATO effort in determination by NATO to take on a presence Afghanistan began in earnest, we would have drawn throughout the country of Afghanistan. If you recall, down in Iraq, perhaps completely or very it all began with a small force in and around Kabul, substantially. As we know, that time line did not work and a number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams— out so neatly. The initial deployment, which PRTs—in certain places such as Mazar-e-Sharif, for concerned me because of its size, was basically a example. My memory is getting a bit murky now, but single battle group. It had a lot of additions, but it the NATO move, I think, began sometime in 2004. was, at the end of the day, in its manoeuvre capability, The intent, I recall, was for it to be done in a counter- a single battle group. That being so—quite sensibly, it clockwise manner—I am sure you have heard seemed to me—the plan devised was to start in and evidence about that. Various nations were allocated around Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital. The so- this or that Province. I tried to think before coming, called “ink spot theory” was brought into play, with but I cannot for the life of me remember how it was references to Templer and Malaya, and that seemed to that the United Kingdom finished up with Helmand. I me to be a sensible balance between the force honestly can’t remember what went on, and I don’t think that was an MoD decision anyway. available and the task. You will no doubt have heard Ed Butler’s narrative of what then happened to change that strategic concept. Q506 Chair: Would you have been involved in it? General Sir Mike Jackson: No, not in the sense of, Chair: We will come to that. “These are the options—which one?” My memory General Sir Mike Jackson: The original plan was to says that it was more a fait accompli when it came to start in Lashkar Gah and bring a security envelope the Chiefs. I suspect it was partly—there must be a into a relatively small area within which other connection, how strong it is I don’t know, but there agencies could then start to improve the lives of the must be a connection with the then Prime Minister’s Afghans living within that security envelope, and then enthusiasm to take on counter-narcotics. If you recall, look to expansion. contributing nations were given a primary responsibility for this or that function. Q508 Chair: So the original mission was to bring in Chair: Indeed. that security envelope and then perhaps to consider General Sir Mike Jackson: I think the Italians got establishing a different mission once that security had law and order, for example, or justice, and I make no been established? comment there. The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, General Sir Mike Jackson: I don’t recall it in that took up the gauntlet on counter-narcotics and, of sense. I don’t recall that. It was to start in Lashkar course, Helmand is the focus for that particular Gah and, hopefully, as conditions improved and a function geographically. It came about in a way that I greater force level became available with Iraq coming do not fully understand. None the less, I have a vague down, to expand that concept beyond the starting notion that Kandahar was a possible option—it was point of Lashkar Gah. Ev 112 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 March 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Mike Jackson

Q509 John Glen: To some extent, General, you have it happened. I have just a recollection of talking and explained that you have limited recollection of the asking whether we could do more, and being told, decision-making process to deploy. Could you “Yes, but it would be pretty painful and we are not describe your specific role at the time in that, and also confident that we could sustain it until Iraq comes indicate the interaction that you can recall with the down.” Of course, the detailed planning is done at FCO and DFID? Also, in order to take all the PJHQ with the commitment staff—or, as I think they questions together, could you discuss the MoD’s are now called, the operational staff, which makes a responsibility, and how long it had to make decisions bit more sense—in the MoD. Reconnaissances were in the run-up to deployment in 2006? carried out and the preliminary operations team was General Sir Mike Jackson: Perhaps I could give a put in, and so on. Had we stayed with the original little homily on the decision-making structure and concept, in my judgment, we would not have had the constitutional position. very rough fighting that went on in the summer of Chair: That would be helpful. 2006—and indeed afterwards, but particularly that John Glen: That would be excellent, thank you. first summer. We did not stick with the original General Sir Mike Jackson: That will, I hope, go at concept, as I know, ladies and gentlemen, you will be least some way to answering your first point. I have only too well aware. described the structure of the Ministry of Defence as byzantine and I will stick with that adjective, but Q513 Chair: What lessons would you learn from when forces are committed to operations, the chain of that? Would you abolish PJHQ? Would you send the command is pretty clear. Obviously, it starts with the chiefs of staff to PJHQ to do their jobs? What would Prime Minister—aided and abetted by whatever you do? Cabinet arrangements, either permanent or ad hoc, are General Sir Mike Jackson: That is a very good put together for this or that operation—and then goes question. We have a number of layers of command, to the Defence Secretary, to the Chief of the Defence which may be excessive for the amount of force we Staff, to Permanent Joint Headquarters and down to actually deploy. That said, prior to the establishment the theatre commander. That is the operational chain of PJHQ one of the front-line commands would be of command. I don’t know how best to describe the designated on an “as and when” basis. For example, position of the single service chiefs. It’s an awkward Bosnia was delegated to Land Command to be the one, because you play your part with the other single service chiefs in the Chiefs of Staff Committee under operational headquarters, and additional personnel the CDS’s chairmanship, but it is the CDS who were posted in order to give that operational staff. It renders the military advice and the others do not go was an ad-hoc system, and if you go back to the with him. Certainly, in my experience they never Falklands, inevitably, of course, it was fleet went. headquarters that were given operational command for I say it’s awkward because you are of course chewing perfectly sound reasons. I think that as the operational over the problem, but you don’t have the Executive tempo after the end of the Cold War ratcheted up, responsibility. You have an assumed accountability; people were looking to see whether this was the most people say, “Well, the Chief of the General Staff is sensible way of establishing the operational level of the head of the Army, so what happens in the Army is command. We know what the outcome was: it was his affair.” Would that it were quite so simple, because decided to establish on a permanent basis a joint regarding many of the Executive functions—for headquarters. example, pay and conditions, the quality and condition The strategic and operational space is not as well of the estate or who buys which kit—you are in a delineated, in my view, as perhaps it should be. The position at best of influence, not of authority. Ministry of Defence is institutionally incapable of not using, as the phrase has it, the 6,000-mile screwdriver. Q510 John Glen: But with respect to this particular It is institutionally incapable of standing back and decision, did you as the CGS hold a view different letting those whose job it is turn the screw with a from that taken by the CDS in these discussions? rather shorter screwdriver. Equally, PJHQ inevitably General Sir Mike Jackson: To some extent. gets drawn in to the political-military interface, because of the nature of current operations, which are Q511 John Glen: Do you account for the difference almost by definition of great political interest, shall by the different perspective you had in terms of wider we say? So, there is a blurring. I would need to think responsibility; or do you conflict given what you long and hard before I gave you a judgment that PJHQ know he knew about other things, too? should be abolished, however, because that would General Sir Mike Jackson: Just as an aside, the only inevitably result in the Ministry of Defence being relationship between any of the single service chiefs yet more absorbed in tactical detail, which is not its and the CDS is slightly different when you are of the place. same colour. Perhaps a purist would say it shouldn’t be, but reality is reality. I niggled away at the amount Q514 Mr Havard: I want to ask you about of combat power we were putting in at the beginning. intelligence and whether we had sufficient intelligence about what we were doing. It is interesting that you Q512 John Glen: It was insufficient? mentioned the preliminary ops group and so on, and General Sir Mike Jackson: The force generators— Ed mentioned them as well. such as Land Command in this case—were, as I recall, General Sir Mike Jackson: I remember visiting them able to generate certainly the force we put in, because very clearly before. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 113

15 March 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Mike Jackson

Q515 Mr Havard: But there did seem to be more Q518 Mr Havard: We had intelligence from the than one of them, in the sense that you had an SAS and others that Quetta Shura was very active and assessment being undertaken on a cross-governmental these were the areas where surely the insurgents were basis, and you also had a military assessment. What making their base, on the basis that NATO was intelligence did we have? We seem to have had some coming with the anti-clockwise revolution of the plan. SAS; Americans wandering about—only 100 of them. Chair: Do you remember that we had that Can you speak to whether we had the right intelligence? intelligence and what that meant? General Sir Mike Jackson: I cannot be specificon General Sir Mike Jackson: That’s a very good that. My sense is that no intelligence was put in front question, Mr Havard. My recollection of the of the Ministry of Defence which said, “What you’re preliminary operations and the run-up to that about to do will result in mayhem.” Had that been deployment tells me with hindsight—and I would so, I think there would have then been a very serious stress that—that there was an assumption too discussion as to whether that plan was viable or not. favourable to a benign environment. Why was that? First, as you just mentioned, the United States had a Q519 Mr Havard: Right. So the mission was set on special forces contingent in and around Lashkar Gah the basis of this three-year thing going into an and had been there for some time, perhaps all the time environment that was relatively benign. We would be since the fall of the Taliban—I can’t remember. It there, and things would inevitably move on. appeared to be quite benign. I have only a sketchy General Sir Mike Jackson: John Reid’s famous, or knowledge of what they were actually doing. What infamous, remark—I think it is misquoted—in a way they were not doing, it seems to me, was taking al- summarises or focuses on how the thinking was that Qaeda on in battle, because that would have had the this was a nation-building exercise to remove the same effect as the stick in the ant hill, when the ants ungoverned space which Helmand and Kandahar start running around. I remember visiting the Provinces certainly represented, and we know what preliminary ops team, who were pretty bullish about happened with that ungoverned space before. That the thought of the British deployment to Helmand. was the conceptual thinking behind it all. We will never know, because it didn’t happen, how it would Q516 Mr Havard: Was that the cross-governmental have panned out had we stuck to the original concept. We very rapidly did something quite different. team? General Sir Mike Jackson: May I come on to that? On the intelligence side, certainly, I have no Q520 Penny Mordaunt: On troop numbers, when recollection of dire warnings that if you do this, you General Messenger gave evidence to us last year, he told us that we didn’t have enough UK Forces are going to get a violent reaction from al-Qaeda/ personnel to do all the tasks that were being asked of Taliban. I say, with hindsight, perhaps there was a them in Helmand from 2006. degree of optimism that underpinned the planning and General Sir Mike Jackson: May I ask whether he was thinking. As for the inter-departmental piece, I am a referring to the concept, or to what happened? bit of cracked long-playing record on that, I’m afraid. In my experience—that goes back to Bosnia, Kosovo Q521 Penny Mordaunt: He was referring to what and our other interventions in Sierra Leone and the happened. So my question is, do you agree? We are two big ones of Iraq and Afghanistan—the cross- also particularly interested in how the decisions were governmental piece is not very well engineered made about troop numbers both before and after machinery. The cogwheels don’t mesh that well. deployment. Obviously, a particular concern, because it has the General Sir Mike Jackson: I think I’ve taken you money, is DFID. I don’t think it’s any secret that I through the decision making over the initial size of have had my differences with the way DFID thinks the contingent, predicated upon the original concept about operations that the British Government have of commencing in Lashkar Gah and then taking it invested huge political capital in. It sometimes seems from there, but I can’t answer your question now to take a rather autonomous view of its role, in a way without going into the complete change of concept. that I would certainly wish otherwise. Chair: We’ll come on to the complete change of concept. Q517 Mr Havard: John Reid said to Parliament General Sir Mike Jackson: It is quite difficult to when the deployment was made that it was all done answer that question on the basis of a careful assessment of tasks, needs Chair: Okay, go ahead on the complete change of and so on, and everything was structured on the basis concept. of this information that had come from the various General Sir Mike Jackson: It is my understanding bodies and was decided through these various that you have heard from a far better witness than processes. In some senses, you seem to be saying that myself this afternoon. It is also my understanding that, some people perhaps saw what they wanted to see, or almost immediately, internal Afghan political perhaps there wasn’t a deeper assessment— pressure—both from Kabul and from the provincial General Sir Mike Jackson: That may be a harsh Governor—resulted in a dispersal of the small force. judgment. Therefore it was not concentrated in Lashkar Gah but Mr Havard: Okay. penny-packeted into the so-called platoon houses. General Sir Mike Jackson: I’m not saying that it’s That really was a very big stick to put into the Taliban outwith the range of possibilities. anthill, and the ants did run around. If you were going Ev 114 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 March 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Mike Jackson to do that, that initial force level was not enough. We Q524 Chair: Can you remember thinking at that got away with it, not least through the fighting quality stage, when things were clearly changing, “This is of the soldiers involved, but there were some close- madness”? run occasions, and I dare say that you have heard General Sir Mike Jackson: You are putting words evidence to that effect. I am content to say that the into my mouth, Chairman. original plan and original force level were just about Chair: You can always answer no. in balance. I would have wanted more myself, but General Sir Mike Jackson: No, I didn’t think it was when the plan changed in the way that it did, it was madness. It was worrying. asking an awful lot of four rifle companies. Mr Havard: It wasn’t correctly resourced. General Sir Mike Jackson: No. I hope that I have Q522 Mr Brazier: General, can I ask about the made the point that— Whitehall oversight? As you pointed out, you had influence but you were not directly part of it. We heard Q525 Mr Havard: I think what Julian is after is this: very clear testimony last month from John Reid that who was advising on what you would need in terms his view, right up to the moment that he went, was of resources if you were going to make the change? “No, no, no” to a change of plan. Suddenly, five weeks Did PJHQ agree that it had the right resources on the later, the plan changes. We have just heard from ground, or was this just the boys on the ground saying, Brigadier Butler that PJHQ was intimately involved “We will make do. It’s a crap decision, but we’ll just in that plan. Indeed, he had the Deputy Chief Joint get on with it”? Operations of PJHQ there with him when the change General Sir Mike Jackson: I wish I could do better of plan took place. We have the outgoing Secretary of for you. I just do not now fully understand—perhaps State saying no, and PJHQ saying yes. Where did the I never did at the time—what had gone on to go from MoD come into that? Clearly, the new Secretary of Lashkar Gah to penny-packeting. You must have State must have signed it off, but as a brand new man heard better evidence than I can give you on this. in the job, he must have been getting advice from various sources, and not only from PJHQ. What is Q526 Mr Brazier: The difficulty is who we ask next. your reading of what actually happened? We have established the train as far up as PJHQ. General Sir Mike Jackson: I wish I could give you a Clearly, we must talk to the people who were in clear and concise narrative of that time. Again, PJHQ then. anticipating this question, I have tried to give this General Sir Mike Jackson: Have you had CJO in? some thought. I can only almost repeat what I have Chair: No. Not yet. just said: almost immediately, this internal Afghan General Sir Mike Jackson: Or indeed the CDS. There political pressure was brought to bear to show that is your chain of command. Kabul’s writ ran in a wider part of Helmand than just Lashkar Gah. I suppose the question is: why did we Q527 Ms Stuart: First, we are trying to establish go along with that? when the change happened. We have got as far as we Mr Brazier: Yes, that is the question. can on how it came about, but then there must be a General Sir Mike Jackson: And I’m not sure that I form of process whereby once you have the change, can give you a clear answer. you assess the means to support it. Where ideally should that have taken place? General Sir Mike Jackson: There is no template Q523 Mr Brazier: May I just narrow the question there, I think. I will reiterate my point, because it is down slightly? We have established that the important: it is a great tradition of the British Army commander on the ground, with all these pressures on that the commander in the field is best placed to make him, did not make the decision alone. Clearly, he had decisions about his own dispositions, and that the it cleared through PJHQ. My question is really about 6,000-mile screwdriver should not be used to second- a quite narrow point. Presumably, PJHQ must have guess. You may be feeling, ladies and gentlemen, that come back to the MoD. Who discussed it there, and that tradition was not helpful on this occasion; I what was the process? don’t know. General Sir Mike Jackson: Do you have access to the Chiefs of Staff’s minutes? Q528 Ms Stuart: I’m trying to get to the bottom of Chair: No. whether they should have gone back to PJHQ to General Sir Mike Jackson: Well, that seems to me to check, or whether there was a level of assumption on be a lacuna. I am sorry; I am not trying to slope the ground that “This is the new mission; we’ve just shoulders on this, but I cannot remember whether that got to get on with it; this is as good as it’s going to fundamental change was brought formally to the get, so let’s try.” Chiefs of Staff or not. All I know is that it appeared General Sir Mike Jackson: Without a doubt it was to have the imprimatur certainly of PJHQ and, I open to the British Government to say to President suspect, of the Foreign Office. I think that I am right Karzai and Governor Daoud, “We hear your requests. to say that, although that ought to be checked as well. We understand them, but we are not willing to comply Again, it is without doubt a proud tradition of the with them.” That was an option. British Army—one which perhaps may have gone too far this time—that you take a very deep breath before Q529 Chair: John Reid did that. you start disagreeing with the commander on the General Sir Mike Jackson: Well, quite shortly ground. afterwards, we complied with their requests. It is this Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 115

15 March 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Mike Jackson political-military interface; you are absolutely on it another battalion, or whatever it might have been. I here. I cannot dissect that one for you, I am afraid. don’t recall that. I had a sense at the time that there was nervousness because the Iraq commitment was Q530 Ms Stuart: Madeleine and I were whispering considerably higher at this time—the summer of to each other, “Would Des Browne have known?” 2006—than had been planned for. There was real Mrs Moon: Would this decision have gone up to Des concern that we would get right out of kilter. I don’t Browne to be signed off? think I can do any better for you than that, sorry. General Sir Mike Jackson: I’m absolutely certain of Chair: Okay. I am going to invite people to catch my it. eye if there are further questions that they would like to ask. I think we have pretty much abandoned the Q531 Mrs Moon: John Reid was saying, “No, no, structure that was set out. no.” Then suddenly, we had a change. General Sir Mike Jackson: I cannot imagine that a Q536 Mrs Moon: I would like to ask about the level decision that had such great political overtones, of support that was provided. We have got the domestically in this country and in our relationship impression that almost as command changed, so the with the Karzai Government, did not go to ministerial matériel needed to pursue their direction also changed. level. I don’t know that, but I cannot believe that it At one point it was helicopters that were short; wasn’t so. another time, we needed tanks. It is almost as though everybody had a different shopping list. Is that your Q532 Chair: But it would have gone on the basis of perception? military advice, wouldn’t it? General Sir Mike Jackson: That is interesting. There General Sir Mike Jackson: Yes, without a doubt. is no doubt that from the summer of 2003 the campaign developed. If you recall, in the first two Q533 Mr Havard: So some of the military advice summers the Taliban took us on, basically using fire could have been, “Well, okay. We can maybe do a bit and manoeuvre—small arms, basically—and each and of it. Maybe we can do it, but at a different pace to every time, they were defeated tactically. We can what President Karzai wanted”? discuss whether any operational-level progress had General Sir Mike Jackson: The request was very been made, but they were defeated tactically. It took specific, in terms of this and that location. Again, it them rather longer, looking back, than one might have was open for us to have said, “None at all,” or “We expected, but they obviously thought very hard, will do Sangin” or whatever, or “We will do particularly after the second summer, 2007, and said, everything that you ask us to do.” We seem to have “We’re not going to get anywhere taking on the gone towards the latter. I understand the politics British soldiers at what they do best; ergo we will find behind that; we were there—and are there—among another way.” That brings us to the IED. That changes other things, to get better governance in Afghanistan. priorities on our side. Armoured vehicles suddenly go To some extent that implies being co-operative with right up in terms of priority, because that is the way the Afghan Government. you protect the force. As I’ve already touched on, the dispersion put a greater premium on helicopters. Q534 Chair: Were you aware at the time, getting Tactics and equipment will vary according to the back to Penny’s question about troop numbers, that on operational circumstances. One has to respond. a regular basis Ed Butler had been staffing requests Ideally, you need to be one foot ahead, but that’s not for more resources to PJHQ? Was that something that always possible. Does that help? had come past the chiefs? General Sir Mike Jackson: I have that sense that Q537 Mrs Moon: One of the things that have been there was a request for more. The difficulty is that the suggested to me is that there was also an element of original concept was matched reasonably well to the the Armed Forces using Afghanistan as a reason to force available. With the dispersion to quite a number modernise and equip—that there was an element of of small bases, your logistic problem increases using the operational requirement to restock and get exponentially, because you have to deliver matériel the latest level of equipment. How much of that is over distance. You have to do that either on the ground natural? or in the air, which gets us into the helicopter problem General Sir Mike Jackson: Mrs Moon, I think I and all of that. Not only was it tactically very different detect two strands. You can tell me I’m wrong when from the original concept, but it brought with it—I am I’ve answered. *** Let’s not forget, I haven’t used the looking at Tim Cross, a logistician of some renown— two words “Northern Ireland” in all this either. Part huge logistic complications. of the time scale of this is, of course, the British Armed Forces going non-operational in Northern Q535 Chair: The reason I asked the question is that Ireland on, I think, 31 July 2007. That had another if Ed Butler was saying that even before the change bearing on 2006. We still had a commitment in of tactics—the change in what was happening on the Northern Ireland. It was predicated—indeed, the ground—we didn’t have enough people here, where reduction in the size of the Army that took place over does this great tradition in the British Army of 2005–06 was predicated—on that run-down in supporting the commander on the ground come in? Northern Ireland. General Sir Mike Jackson: Indeed. I am trying to The first strand, which is reflected in some of the remember whether there was any occasion on which evidence I’ve read, is that somehow the British Army PJHQ came up with a clear, distinct proposal for was looking for a new operation. Northern Ireland was Ev 116 Defence Committee: Evidence

15 March 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Mike Jackson

finished, and in Iraq one could see the horizon, so we is substance in the criticism. Again, it goes back to wanted to go and do something else. I don’t see that part of our doctrine, in that it is for the commander myself. That is not to say that you don’t have an Army on the ground to handle his force. Of course, he that is operationally hungry, because that’s what it is. doesn’t have complete freedom, and nor should he. You will have detected that, I suspect, on visits for I think your question goes to a much deeper point. yourselves; I hope you have. That’s a far cry from Clausewitz said that the use of force is politics by actually pushing to go and up the ante. That is a strand another means—ergo, what is the political end which that I can’t see, myself. is sought? That has not always been clear, although Ministers and Cabinet of whichever Government may Q538 Mrs Moon: I wasn’t suggesting that. be of the view that it is perfectly clear. To be fair, it General Sir Mike Jackson: I beg your pardon. But is a criticism I get from the lay public as well, who it’s probably just as well I’ve said what I’ve said, don’t quite understand what we’re trying to do in because I’ve seen reflections to the contrary. Afghanistan. What is the political objective required? That takes you down a way of thinking that ought to Q539 Mr Havard: So would you say that when each be common. commander goes out there—depending on whether In Afghanistan, perhaps it was not clear, with they’re Marines or whatever—the mission’s clear? Enduring Freedom running. Is the political objective Their intent on how they prosecute might be slightly to remove al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters from different. Some will say, “I’m going to take the fight the ungoverned space of Southern Iraq—and that is to them”; others will say, “I’ll do things this way and it? Or, is it broader: to help Afghanistan out of its emphasise it differently”, and so on. That’s just the miserable past into a more stable future, where way the thing works. Do you think, however, there governance, rule of law—if I can say “rule of law” was a lack of clarity and understanding? At the time and “Afghanistan” in the same sentence? It seems to when all this was happening, you then had an overlay me, however, that it is all part of that. There is the of political decisions to say, effectively, “No, no. You balance that the commander must strike between, will go and do it this way. The mission has changed. obviously, protecting his own force—but that may not You will go and take the fight to them, but at the be enough in terms of the opponents—but doing that locations that we are choosing for you, rather than you in a manner that does not result in the civil population, choosing as a commander to do it the way you want not the Taliban, becoming more sympathetic or indeed to do it.” So no matter how much discretion there was turning to the Taliban. This can be a fine line— for individuals, that was the big change. At that time, the Americans were still on Operation Enduring Q541 Mr Havard: So, it is not a case of not giving Freedom, so there were two very conflicting processes the commander sufficient support to make the tactical running at the same time. Was that more important difference that he wants to on the ground. It is a case than tactical nuance or changes of individual of not having supported properly the political intent commanders, and what support they would need to do those things differently, as well as the political that you are expecting the commander to carry out. If imperative that then meant they couldn’t do it because Ed Butler is on the ground saying, “I need more they didn’t have the support? Which is it? What is resources, on a weekly basis. If you now want me to the mixture? move and do a different thing in a different way, I General Sir Mike Jackson: May I deal with the chain need extra resources to do this work”, and they’re not of command issue first? There is no doubt that the arriving, it’s because additional support is not being Coalition and NATO chains of command—because given to the political intent change, which was to there were two, in 2005–06, and you would not have agree with Daoud and Karzai to do it differently. got many marks at the staff college for coming up Whether or not the commander is acting differently with that as a solution to your command and control. on the ground is not the issue, is that what you are The counter-terrorist operation—Operation Enduring saying? Freedom, I think—was clearly under American General Sir Mike Jackson: Although commanders guidance, direction and command, and then there was are of course individuals and will bring their own the NATO operation, which was more about nation characters, beside anything else and despite all of the building, if I can use that shorthand. There were training, it seems to me that the crucial point here is blurred lines. It got better because, at least in theory, that—sorry, I’m going to repeat myself—we will the two chains of command merged, I think, in late never know whether the original concept was sound 2006. David Richards had to push that one very hard. because it didn’t happen. I judged that it was just So, that was not ideal. about okay in terms of task and force levels. However, Am I right that the first part of your question was when the dispersal happened, and it happened very about the degree to which British commanders in the quickly, it was almost self-evident that you were field take individual and somewhat different views on asking too much of four rifle companies and the the task in front of them? limited logistics. My logistician has— Chair: He’s gone. Q540 Mr Havard: And you said, “Trust the General Sir Mike Jackson: He got rather bored with commander.” When they are making different listening to Jackson banging on. Anyway, that is why decisions, that might have different implications. you get the mismatch between those new tasks and General Sir Mike Jackson: That criticism has also doing it from the same force level for a rather been levelled at command in Southern Iraq, and there different task. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 117

15 March 2011 General (Rtd) Sir Mike Jackson

Q542 Ms Stuart: This is another attempt to get the General Sir Mike Jackson: Again, I have to put it in picture, because I have been checking a few date lines the greater context of the overall NATO operation. We as to where we were. You’re sitting out in Afghanistan weren’t doing this as a single nation doing its own and looking at a British Government where the Prime thing. Minister has not yet said he is going, but everybody knows he will soon. He has a Chancellor of the Q544 Bob Stewart: But you would have visited him Exchequer champing at his heels who is known to and asked him about his mission. dislike military intervention, so the military doesn’t General Sir Mike Jackson: Would I have visited have much confidence in him, either. There was yet whom? another Secretary of State for Defence, and a Foreign Bob Stewart: Butler. Secretary who, when told she was going to be Foreign General Sir Mike Jackson: Yes. I visited him a lot. Secretary, came out with an “expletive deleted”. Iraq The overall NATO mission, as it spread out, was to wasn’t working out the way we thought, so the put a Coalition/NATO presence throughout the departing Prime Minister’s political legacy was country and to assist the recovery of Afghanistan getting pretty shaky. You guys were still out there in towards stability. Those are my words, but that was Afghanistan and being asked to do yet another thing. roughly what it was about, and Britain was to play its Would the troops on the ground have said, “These part doing that in Helmand. It was therefore a guys don’t know what they’re really up to and won’t mixture—I have already of covered that point—and be around for much longer, so we might as well just that balance between improving governance, make the best of a bad job”? Is that theoretically an improving the economy and so on, and providing a interpretation of what may have gone through some secure environment within which that could happen. minds? It is that balance. So far as I am concerned, that is General Sir Mike Jackson: Ms Stuart, you are putting what we set out to do in Helmand. It turned out it in quite partisan terms. As a recently retired Crown differently, for reasons that we have now— servant, I don’t want to get into partisanship—unlike Chair: Discussed. one or two others, I might say. I will answer the General Sir Mike Jackson: Well, I have exhausted question in this way. Soldiers in the British Army my knowledge of it. It is not so very satisfactory. understand perfectly well that they are all volunteers, and the vast majority—not necessarily every man Q545 Chair: Thank you very much indeed. It has jack, but the vast majority—are operationally hungry, been extremely helpful, and we are most grateful to to use that phrase again. Throughout British military you. I am sorry that because of my own inefficiency history the soldier has cursed the politicians who sent we had to change your time, as well as keeping you him there, but that does not mean to say that they do here late. not understand perfectly well that in a mature General Sir Mike Jackson: No problem. If I can help, democracy such as ours it is the bounden duty of that’s all I ask. I would just say that it seems to me— soldiers to follow the direction of the elected no doubt the MoD will have its own reasons—that the Government of the day. They do it with more Committee would be much better informed if you had cheerfulness than is perhaps sometimes warranted, but better access to contemporary documentation. they do it pretty cheerfully. I don’t know if that helps at all, but I do not want to go down your partisan lane, Q546 Bob Stewart: To the chiefs of staff document? if you don’t mind. General Sir Mike Jackson: Among others.

Q543 Bob Stewart: General, I totally understand the Q547 Chair: We have not asked for those minutes, short chain of command: theatre to PJHQ to CDS, and it would be quite interesting to see what would Chiefs of Staff Committee— happen if we did. Chair: The Chiefs of Staff Committee is not involved General Sir Mike Jackson: Yes, it would be quite as such, is it? interesting. I would be intrigued to see the outcome General Sir Mike Jackson: Well, it is involved, in of such a request. that the CDS will chew things over, but then he trots Chair: We shall need to consider that. Thank you. off. General Sir Mike Jackson: Not at all. My pleasure. Bob Stewart: So the Chiefs of Staff Committee sits, Mr Havard: We’ll tell them it was your idea. Chairman, and CDS actually answers for it. My General Sir Mike Jackson: That means you won’t get question to General Sir Mike is: what, in your view, them at all. I am not the favourite retired general up is the mission of the brigade on the ground as the in that place, but there we are. operational Head of the Army? What did you think Butler was supposed to be doing, as a member of the chiefs of staff committee? Ev 118 Defence Committee: Evidence

Tuesday 29 March 2011

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Mrs Madeleine Moon Thomas Docherty Penny Mordaunt Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Sandra Osborne John Glen Bob Stewart ______

Examination of Witness

Witness: Lord Browne of Ladyton.

Q548 Chair: Welcome back to the Defence Lord Browne: First, without going into the detail of Committee. As you know, this is an evidence session this, because I have not researched the detail of this that is being held in private. The process that we particular part of my ministerial career—that is, the followed in previous such evidence sessions on what time I was in the Treasury. I was a member of a happened in Helmand and in the United Kingdom’s Committee of Ministers and others, called the Reid deployment in 2006 was to have a transcript taken, group, chaired by John Reid, which continued. It was and to ask the witnesses whether there was anything involved in the planning and anticipation of the they wished to have redacted from that transcript. If delivery of our commitment to expand into Helmand. there is, a process of negotiation goes on between Other countries had accepted the responsibility to go yourself and the Committee Clerks. I would not have to other parts of Afghanistan. So I did not exactly thought it would be exceedingly difficult, and it has come to the Ministry of Defence with no knowledge not proved to be difficult in the past. Eventually, the about our deployment into Helmand Province. I knew transcript will be published as part of the evidence in what the purpose of the deployment was. our inquiry into Afghanistan. Does that sound reasonable? Q553 Chair: Sorry, if you knew what it was, what Lord Browne: I am perfectly happy with that, did you think? Chairman. Thank you very much. I welcome the Lord Browne: I will come to that in a moment. You opportunity to consider the draft at some stage in the will remember that in about April, John Reid was future, but I do not think there will be any difficulty. interviewed—he has subsequently been consistently I am not anticipating any. misrepresented about that interview—from Helmand Province, which he visited on 23 or 24 April. He tried Q549 Chair: I expect this sitting to take roughly an to explain to a sceptical media—they may say now hour. The questions are about something that that they were right to be sceptical—that what we happened five years ago, so we recognise that your were endeavouring to do was to help the memory may not be completely perfect on the issue, reconstruction of Afghanistan and that, to facilitate any more than ours will be. I will begin the questions. that reconstruction, we had deployed forces designed When you first arrived in the MoD, it was May 2006, to create a lozenge of security. The plan, as I I think. understood it then, was, I suppose, an ink spot Lord Browne: Friday 5 May. process—that reference was constantly used—or the Chair: Friday 5 May. expansion of a lozenge of security to develop, from Lord Browne: At about 3 pm. the centre of Helmand, governance and economic development off the back of improved security. So it Q550 Chair: And it was that weekend that the was quite clear. I remember that he tried to explain helicopter came down in Basra, was it not? that, because there was some suggestion that the Lord Browne: It was, I think, about midday our time configuration of the force, particularly the deployment on the Saturday. I remember watching the drama of of attack helicopters and artillery, suggested otherwise the aftermath of the helicopter—it was shot down, but and that we were there to war fight. He was trying to we did not know that at the time—unfolding on my explain in his interview, I think, that, from his point domestic television screen in Edinburgh. I of view, he would be content if we did no war fighting immediately packed my bag to return to London. and that it was reconstruction-focused. But that phrase that he used about never firing a shot has been Q551 Chair: I remember thinking and, in fact, constantly misrepresented ever since. commenting to my wife that you dealt with that So I had a very clear understanding as a Treasury incredibly difficult matter, immediately on getting into Minister of what the purpose of the deployment was the Ministry of Defence, outstandingly well. and what the plan was. That was why the force was Lord Browne: Thank you very much. shaped as it was and why this was a tripartite operation with DFID, FCO and the Helmand Task Q552 Chair: You also had to deal with the mission Force, which was, essentially, 16th Air Assault in Helmand. What was it that you were told about Brigade, augmented by some other forces, deployed the mission in Helmand? What did you think that the to provide the security for, essentially, Lashkar Gah mission was designed to achieve? and Gereshk and the area around there. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 119

29 March 2011 Lord Browne of Ladyton

Q554 Chair: You refer to the expansion of Lord Browne: I don’t think so. To be honest, I am not development and talk about the ink spots and the clear about that. The chain of command was complex lozenge. Did you regard it as a potentially expanding because we were in a transition stage. The deployment deployment, or did you think that the troops who were to Helmand Province reached initial operational already deployed were going to produce that capability in, I think, about the beginning of June, and expanding development? full operational capability in about the beginning of Lord Browne: The plan, as I understood it then—I July of that year. The command was then chopped haven’t researched all of this stuff, and I got access to to—that was the phrase used—ISAF properly some my papers from the MoD, but didn’t ask because I time in July. There was the further complication, of didn’t anticipate this line of questioning—was that the course, that there was an American command in the force was configured to hold that area. As I South, which operated in both the South and the East understood it, it was designed to hold that area, and under what was known as the OEF—Operation the plan may originally have been on advice that that Enduring Freedom. I do not recollect ever being would take about three years to establish, because I briefed about a chain of command in which I or any think the original budget, as I recollect it as a Treasury other politician was part. Minister, was for three years. It has turned out to be significantly greater than that original budget, and Q559 Sandra Osborne: What was your view about many other aspects have expanded significantly, but being in Helmand while the situation in Iraq was still that was the clear plan. I don’t think there was any so uncertain? Were key members of the MoD more doubt about that. focused on Iraq than on Afghanistan? There was a very complicated command and control Lord Browne: Clearly from my evidence to you thus structure associated with that because of the tripartite far in this session, I was totally focused on Iraq in the relationship. The PRT was at the heart of the initial days, so from my point of view, having forces command and control which, if I remember correctly, deployed in two environments, and conducting two was commanded by a man called Maggs. wars was challenging. When events determined that you had to focus on a particular area, you had to focus Q555 Chair: What was the chain of command? fully on that area. Lord Browne: The chain of command was quite As I have said already, at ministerial level I was part complicated. I must admit that when I came into the of a team. In particular, the Minister for the Armed Department on 5 May, and particularly on 6 May, my Forces, Adam Ingram, was an experienced man. He went on to be, I think, the longest-serving Minister for attention was diverted to Iraq, and you will recollect the Armed Forces in the post-war history of this that I made a statement on the Monday. country, and he will probably hold that record for Understandably from my point of view and of our some time. I relied on other members of the people in Iraq, because of the nature of the ministerial team. On the procurement side I had Paul helicopter’s loss, I went to Basra. That occupied about Drayson, whom I considered, and still consider, to be the first fortnight of my time there. I did not a very successful Minister. He was on top of things. personally engage significantly with Afghanistan, but That was the case at the political level. I had no sense other Ministers, the Chief of the Defence Staff, and that the focus of headquarters, as it were, in the MoD, other people were associated with that. in either the military or the civilian sense, was being As I recollect, the Commander was the ISAF distracted from doing one job rather than another. Commander, a man called Fraser, a one star based Clearly, it became necessary, and it became necessary in Kandahar. very early, to look at whether we had sufficient forces in Afghanistan. I have addressed that issue time and Q556 Chair: He was a Canadian general. again before this Committee and in the House. The Lord Browne: He was a Canadian general, and I think fact that we only have one Army, and we only have he subsequently handed over to a one-star general one set of forces, became an issue. from the Netherlands—I don’t remember his name— When I became Secretary of State for Defence, we but he was the commander of the forces in Helmand were already running down in Iraq. The line of Province from what became known as Regional reduction was not sustained, and it flattened out for a Command South. There was another name for it at period of time during my time in office because of one stage, but it became known as RC(S). I think the circumstances in the south-east, but we were running chain of command went from him to Colonel Knaggs. down and reducing our numbers in Iraq. I think we had already started to reduce our numbers in Iraq, and Q557 Chair: Were you part of the chain of we continued to reduce them over time until command? eventually we left. Lord Browne: I was never briefed that I was part of the chain of command, and I never considered myself Q560 Sandra Osborne: The Armed Forces were to be part of the chain of command, but of course as breaking the defence planning assumptions at that Secretary of State for Defence, I realised what my time. What impact did that have on the MoD budget? responsibilities were, and we will no doubt come to Lord Browne: Operations are paid for out of the that at some stage. reserve. So if we required additional resources, and we did, because the cost of the Afghan deployment Q558 Chair: Was the Prime Minister part of the rose exponentially over a comparatively short period chain of command? of time and has been sustained at that much higher Ev 120 Defence Committee: Evidence

29 March 2011 Lord Browne of Ladyton level, we sought those resources either from Urgent in command in military terms as an operational Operational Requirements or from longer-term decision and that is how I perceived it. The first point commitments from the reserve. I have no recollection I want to make, because I think it is important to the of our being refused. The cost of operations in context and should be understood, is that discussions Afghanistan and Iraq had no direct impact on our throughout the preparation for deployment into operational budget as a Department that I am privy to Helmand, but particularly in the latter stages in April, or that I can recollect. were peppered with references to the importance of The issue of planning assumptions had quite a the Governor of Helmand Province, a man called significant effect on our people. We had certain Mohammed Daoud—Engineer Mohammed Daoud, I assumptions that people would be deployed, if they think, was his full title. He was perceived to be, and needed to be, to the operational environment for a proved to be, an honest, incorruptible individual. The period of time and that they would then rest and same could not be said about all the people who have retrain. One of the steepest learning curves I had as a enjoyed the post of governor in provinces in Minister was getting to grips with that whole concept. Afghanistan. That is understandable given the history I remember it dawning on me very early on that from of the country. But he was believed to be—I think, a civilian perspective—if you have no military rightly believed to be, because I met the man on a training—your belief would be that if you’re doing couple of occasions and was impressed by him—key the job, you’re getting better at it. But, actually, if to our objective to build good governance, which was you deploy people and they live in the operational very important for the future of Helmand Province, to environment, particularly those sorts of operational build reconstruction efforts and to build, basically, environment, you are degrading your capacity to do faith in government. the job, because you build that capacity in training. However, Daoud was considered by everybody—the You need time for people to rest, to recuperate and Americans who were there before us in Helmand and to train. others—to be at risk. Two reasons were given for this. We were asking people, against the planning One was that he did not have the reach into all the assumptions that we had, to deploy with a regularity communities of Helmand Province that others had. that we had not planned or expected. There was a Others were warlords and did have that reach—one period when every time I appeared before this family in particular. Secondly, he did not have at his Committee I was asked the same questions. People disposal the ability to project power beyond Lashkar used all sorts of phraseology to describe it, but I Gah. It was considered by all the experts suppose that when General Dannatt was CGS his internationally and all those who advised me to be a phrase about “running hot” was the best of them all. weakness on his part that the Taliban could challenge We did run the engine very hot for a long period of his authority in the further reaches of the province and time, but as it turned out, because of the reduction in he would not be able to respond. There was a lot of Iraq, we were able to sustain ourselves through that talk about training and developing and offering him a challenging period and get to where we are now, QRF—a Quick Reaction Force—of police officers. It which is much closer to the defence planning was discussed at some length, well into May or June. assumptions. I haven’t followed the whole trail and I can’t I don’t remember a financial issue at any stage, with remember the detail of it, but I don’t think it was ever the Treasury or any other part of Government, about stood up. the cost of deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan. Clearly, My understanding was that as we were deploying into they had planned financially for a certain level of Afghanistan, into Helmand, the Taliban took the commitment that proved to be a significant opportunity to challenge Daoud’s authority in the underestimate. But that was a central Government northern villages of Nawzad, Musa Qala, Sangin and responsibility; it didn’t impact on our defence budget. Kajaki; although I’m not so sure in relation to Kajaki whether they had any significant presence there or Q561 Bob Stewart: In July 2006, you told whether that was perceived to be screening protection Parliament that there was a need to strengthen the of the other villages. The Governor, understandably, force structure. You said “commanders on the ground” asked—you have to be reminded that this is all had “grasped an early opportunity.” What was that hearsay as far as I’m concerned; I’m not privy to any opportunity? of these conversations—the commander of the British Lord Browne: A tactical decision was made—I’ve Forces, Brigadier Ed Butler, to respond to that and gone back and checked these dates—over a period in over the month of May, in series to those villages, May, substantially from about 20 to 25 May. I have he did respond. He responded with forces from the some dates and I’ll give them to you, either in Helmand Task Force; I think on one occasion some evidence or otherwise. A tactical decision was made reconnaissance troops were sent. I am not entirely sure to deploy forces beyond the lozenge. I don’t know to where they were sent but I have a note here which I what extent you want me to go into the detail of that, could use. I might get the number wrong— but I’m happy to explain my understanding of it.

Q562 Bob Stewart: Yes, it would be nice to know. Q563 Bob Stewart: So the grasping of the Can you remember why— opportunity was that the Governor— Lord Browne: I can recall it now as it was briefed to Lord Browne: Let me explain. I think that it is me, but it was all briefed to me retrospectively and it important that you understand this. I have no has been subsequently described by those who were recollection of being briefed on this series of events Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 121

29 March 2011 Lord Browne of Ladyton as they happened, which is why I considered them and which we had planned for, but having secured our still consider them to be operational decisions made presence in central Helmand Province better than we by a commander on the ground. Subsequently I met could have done if we had just stayed inside our own Brigadier Butler and told him that I respected the bubble, or lozenge or ink spot. It was described to me decisions that he made and would support them on the as a window of opportunity. explanation that had been given to me, and I continue The opportunity cost was that the troops we had fixed to do that. He was faced with a position where the in these environments had lost us manoeuvre Governor—I am also told that President Karzai had a capability. The CinC Land had been out immediately role to play in this, but I have no knowledge of what before me, had had the same presentation and had that was. I doubt very much personally that President come back with the same message; he asked for Karzai was encouraging anybody to protect that additional troops and more helicopter support to make Governor, because I don’t think that he supported the up for that lost manoeuvre capability, which came governor very well. He responded to these requests from fixing troops in the northern villages. I came for support, in my view, in a way a QRF would have back and tasked the Department to find those done had Daoud had one at his command. additional troops. In July, I announced 900 more The decision was then made, and my understanding is troops and other support. I used the phraseology—“a that this has its history— window of opportunity”—I had been given, which is still preserved in the presentation.

Q564 Chair: Just for the record, please would you Q565 Bob Stewart: So the window of opportunity translate “QRF”? was the fact that we could extend the lozenge into an Lord Browne: Quick reaction force. I think I area and possibly control it with the Governor? translated it earlier. Lord Browne: Yes. If he had had at his disposal police officers or Afghan National Army troops that he could have sent quickly Q566 Bob Stewart: And the change, as you said, to respond to developing issues, that is what he would was 900 more troops—another battalion group? have done. I believe that Ed Butler did that in Lord Browne: Of course, I had no knowledge base on response to that request, or decided to do so in an which to assess how many it would be, but I came operational sense. They then developed into platoon back and tasked the Department to review the houses. I am told—you may know the answer to this situation and to identify what additional resources better than I do—that the idea of platoon houses has would be required and whether they could be raised its roots in the Balkans. I am not sure; somebody effectively, given the circumstances that Mrs Osborne suggested Bosnia to me, but I have no knowledge of has identified—that we were also still in Iraq at the that. In any event, these platoon houses became a time. We did, of course, have a reserve, which was focus for conflict between the Taliban and our troops. based in Cyprus and which it was open to us to One or two of them were situated in places where deploy. they were doing damage to communities, because they were in the centre of the villages. Over time this Q567 Bob Stewart: Did discussions with the Chief became a problem. of the Defence Staff committee take place on the If we go back to May, this is what happened. I have change in the tactical picture—moving outside the gone back and looked at all the papers that crossed lozenge—or strengthening the force by 900? Can my desk over the month of May, and there is no direct you remember? reference to this development. However, in the middle Lord Browne: I had no discussions with the Chief of of June I went to Afghanistan. I went in June because the Defence Staff committee, but we had what was at the request of the deploying troops on the ground called an Op Min—operations and Ministers; we had of the Helmand Task Force we delayed the new a Tuesday briefing. I was travelling quite a lot at the Secretary of State’s visit, as it was a pressure on our outset, so I wasn’t able to attend those meetings as troops on the ground to support and protect a VIP. In regularly as I did subsequently. What I haven’t told any event, John Reid had gone on 23 April. They were you is that there were European Union ministerial not at full operational capability; they were in the meetings and NATO ministerial meetings in the diary process of deploying. We agreed to go later rather than before I became the Secretary of State for Defence in earlier in my term, but as it turned out Iraq occupied May, and I had to attend them as well. I was out of a lot of my attention in the month of May and it would the office, between Iraq, NATO ministerial meetings have been impossible for me to go any earlier. and Afghanistan, on days when these Op Mins took When I went to Afghanistan I was given a slide place. presentation by Ed Butler, in which he described the process as a window of opportunity. He said that they Q568 Bob Stewart: If you were away, did the had achieved a dual effect. One effect was that there Minister for the Armed Forces chair the Chief of the was a sustained presence of the Governor in the Defence Staff meetings? villages of the North, which was good, but he had also Lord Browne: If he was in the country and able to do protected the development zone from the attacks that it. There was a briefing on Afghanistan early in my would inevitably have come if the Taliban had been time, on 11 May. I haven’t been able to find the note able to occupy the villages to the North and operate of that meeting in the enormous amount of paperwork with impunity in that area. So there was the dual that was presented to me, so I can’t say with any benefit of having an extended presence beyond that certainty what I was told at that meeting. There was a Ev 122 Defence Committee: Evidence

29 March 2011 Lord Browne of Ladyton subsequent Op Min, which I attended before I went the case because there was an intensity of discussion to Afghanistan. among the military that Ministers did not need to be The other thing you will have noted is that there was privy to and then Ministers would be briefed about quite a significant change in the personnel and the what had been discussed, so it was a proper use of Chiefs about the same time. The Chief of the Defence people’s time. PJHQ would be brought in to that either Staff who served contemporaneously with me had by video link or they may have had someone present been in post for only about two or three days before I at the table. PJHQ sat slightly to this side of the chain became the Secretary of State for Defence, and he of command in any event because of the nature of the wasn’t the only change. The CinC Land became the transition that was taking place. CGS. The VCDS changed as well at the same time, and he had particular responsibility for commitments, Q573 Mr Brazier: Forgive me, but when you say so there was quite a lot of briefing of people going on. that they sat to the side of this chain of command, they were the chain of command. Brigadier Butler Q569 Chair: That wholesale change right at the top reported to PJHQ at that time. We did not have the of Ministry of Defence, just as we had deployed to a two star orders in place; it was a different place like Helmand must have rung alarm bells, arrangement. As far as one can see in the rather murky mustn’t it? circumstances of command in Afghanistan at the time, Lord Browne: Yes. There were lots of things ringing they were, in UK terms anyway, his chain of alarm bells in my early days as Secretary of State for command. Is that not right? Defence. Mostly, the bells were ringing in the Lord Browne: Of course he reported back to them, operational environment and I was trying to respond but the chain of command on the ground in to them. You will remember of course that the change Afghanistan— at the ministerial level was forced by circumstances, but the changes in the Chiefs of Defence Staff would Q574 Mr Brazier: Forgive a cynical observation, but have been planned; they do not happen overnight. on the basis that success has 1,000 fathers and failure is an orphan, it does seem that, as this clearly did go Q570 Chair: Was that when the Chief of Joint wrong, everyone is blaming the one star on the ground Operations changed at the same time? when the people further up, below you but Lord Browne: I am not sure. I don’t remember a immediately above him, appear to have been very change. There may have been a change before I came much part of the decision. in, but I am not sure. Lord Browne: One of the disadvantages of coming Chair: I think it was shortly before you came in. late is that you didn’t hear what I said earlier. I made Lord Browne: I am not in a position to contradict you it clear, and I have said this directly to Brigadier if that is your recollection. Equally, being five years Butler, that, in political terms and in terms of my removed, I am not in a position to remember. That is responsibility, I will always support what he did. I am how it ought to be. not seeking to distance myself. Mr Brazier: I did not suggest that you did. Q571 Chair: Did General Fry stop and Air Marshall Lord Browne: I take the responsibility. You will Torpy take over? forgive me for resisting the temptation to quote or to Lord Browne: That is possible. To be honest, I don’t respond to your characterisation of the relationships remember and I didn’t check it. I honestly don’t between him and other senior military officers. I am remember, but at least it is checkable. trying to restrict my evidence here to what I can clearly remember or what is supported by Q572 Mr Brazier: I am sorry I was a little late but I documentation that I have read and researched over really was detained. Let me follow on from the the past couple of days in anticipation of giving questions that we have just had. At the very top, we evidence. I am privy to a lot of hearsay, and I have had huge changeovers: you came into office and there read other accounts of conversations between people were changes in the Chiefs of Staff. The one thing that relate to these decisions—a whole lot of things— that emerges from this is that there has been a lot of but I have no personal knowledge of them. emphasis in earlier testimony, public testimony and in My position was that I came into this job and this man what I have heard from you, about backing the was in a very diffi cult environment that became even position and the recommendations of the commander more difficult. He wasn’t looking for sympathy, but I on the ground. When we interviewed the commander have an enormous understanding of the difficulty he on the ground, Brigadier Butler made the point that was faced with. There clearly was an overwhelming PJHQ was very much up to speed all the way through view that Engineer Mohammed Daoud’s survival as and that one of its deputy heads, General Peter Wall, governor was key to the strategic success of what we was actually physically with him in the briefing when were trying to do, and it appears that, whether by luck the final decision was endorsed. Presumably, PJHQ or good judgment, the Taliban attacked that very must have been an important source of advice on this. vulnerability at the point at which he was partly Lord Browne: Yes, of course they were. They related deployed into the environment and made a decision, to me indirectly through the Chiefs with whom I which I think was a perfectly understandable and engaged. They made a contribution to the weekly responsible one to make at the time, that has had Ministerial briefing. The practice I inherited was that significant strategic consequences. I don’t seek to a briefing took place among the military first and then avoid my share of the responsibility for that the Ministers joined in. I can understand why that was environment at all, but I can’t comment, I’m afraid, Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 123

29 March 2011 Lord Browne of Ladyton on what may have happened in meetings or briefings coincidental that I happened to be out of the country that I wasn’t at. But I tell you this: if Ed Butler told on the day of the week in which the Op Min took me that that’s what happened, I would believe him. place. I do not have the diary of the Minister for the Armed Forces. He may well have been in the country Q575 Chair: This is a wholly understandable and on every one of those Tuesdays when I was not wholly commendable attitude. You said at the time present, I have no idea. Just a careful qualification: that you would back the decision, and you have done you asked me whether he chaired them, and yes he ever since and are doing so now. But I think that what did if he was in the country. That is all I am saying. we’re trying to get at is whether it is likely that the decision would have been taken not simply by Q577 Bob Stewart: Because the decision to deploy Brigadier Butler, but by people higher up in the 900 more troops would not have been made by the military chain of command as well. Brigadier. It would have been made higher up the Lord Browne: I have heard very senior officers chain of command and I am sure it would have describe this decision as being an operational decision required ministerial approval. properly in the province of the commander on the Lord Browne: The decision to deploy 900 additional ground. That is not a direct quote, but words of that troops was made by the Government at the highest nature have been used. possible level. With respect, I think that between the two of you I’m being asked two questions. The Ed Butler I know, Q578 Chair: So, the Prime Minister would have worked with and enormously respect strikes me as a been involved. man who would make sure that his senior officers Lord Browne: The Prime Minister was involved. knew what he was doing. Who he actually had Everybody was involved who had responsibility for communication with, I’m not sure, but if he said, this. The decision was formally notified to the Cabinet “This briefing took place in which I made the decision and reported to Parliament at the beginning of July. and other people were present,” I would believe him. That is why you are in a position to quote the I would have no reason not to believe him. reference to a window of opportunity, which has its But that wasn’t my job, and if I had started to interfere roots in the briefing I got in Afghanistan. That is how in that, with the level of knowledge I had of the detail it was described to me and I accepted that at the time. of how the military worked then—I know a lot more Of course in time we discovered that the platoon now—it would have been entirely inappropriate. I had houses, and more importantly the fixing of the landing responsibilities and I was determined to live up to strips that were used to service those platoon houses, them to the best of my ability, and it is up to people created a long-term vulnerability. *** Later in the year to judge whether that was good enough. It certainly in October the Governor, whose reach had extended, wasn’t to try to interfere with the chain of command got into discussions with tribal chiefs and all sorts of or with military decisions but, once I had said that I other things happened. would be Secretary of State for Defence, it was quite clearly to take responsibility at political and other Q579 Chair: *** levels for the decisions that these people made. We Lord Browne: *** were putting them into an environment of dilemma, and this is the clearest dilemma. Q580 Mrs Moon: Lord Browne, you described how I have since met 100 people who are very critical Engineer Daoud was seen to be, and the knowledgeable and who with 20:20 vision are telling problems that he faced. You said he had asked Ed me how this could have been done differently, but Butler to respond to those problems and that there was they were neither Ed Butler nor me in that also an input from President Karzai. Was any concern environment, and I know what was going on. expressed at the time, and in retrospect do you feel that perhaps UK Forces were being pulled in two Q576 Thomas Docherty: A quick point. You directions by ISAF and the Afghan authorities? Was mentioned before that understandably you were out of there a lack of clarity about who should be setting the country doing important tasks, and that the the agenda? Minister of State for the Armed Forces wasn’t always Lord Browne: When you are an international force in able to chair ministerial meetings. Was it a very a sovereign country’s environment, decisions of that frequent occurrence that neither of you was in the nature are always to a degree a negotiation. I am sure room? even today that President Karzai is making demands Lord Browne: No. I don’t want to give you that on those who command the troops in his country to impression. I didn’t intend to give that impression. use them in a particular way. Whether they respond to What I’m trying to have you understand from this that or not is a judgment to be made against the evidence is that a particular set of circumstances arose overall strategic priorities, the nature of the resources in May. I inherited a diary in which there were available and where they see the demands sit in the international ministerial meetings and, of course, we overall strategic priorities. That became apparent to had to go to them—that was just part of the job. They me in the latter stages of our time in Iraq. You are don’t happen very often, but they just happened to be restricted in what you can do in another country’s there at that time. As they unfolded, in my view the sovereign environment by the permission of the events in Iraq required the attention of the Secretary elected Government. You have to accept that and it of State both in the UK and in Iraq. That had to be can restrict you in doing significant things. It stopped added to it. Checking my diary, it is entirely us doing lots of things in south-east Iraq, which we Ev 124 Defence Committee: Evidence

29 March 2011 Lord Browne of Ladyton would have done had we been totally in control— Q582 John Glen: Lord Browne, in July 2006 you but we weren’t. This was a country with an elected increased the numbers of troops on the ground in Government and they had a view. And President Helmand. Could you describe the advice that you Karzai was a properly elected President and he had received, tell us from whom you received it, and a view. explain why you decided, given that advice, to The answer to your question is that of course there is, increase those numbers of troops on the ground in in that environment, the competition, but you can’t do Helmand? anything about it. You have to live with it all the time Lord Browne: I have already explained from my point and constantly negotiate in that environment. That is of view what the genesis of the initiative to review exactly what I would expect of our commanders on our force levels was. I believed that I was responding the ground, and of ISAF commanders. I hope they are directly to a briefing that I accepted on or about 15 or still doing that. I hope General Petraeus is still 16 June from Brigadier Ed Butler, the commander of the British Forces there. He needed a degree of engaging in discussions with the properly elected manoeuvrability that he did not have because he had Government and considering their priorities. Because, fixed forces, necessarily, in these villages in the North. after all, that is what we are trying to do: we are trying I came back and tasked that review and an assessment to build a government that can govern and make such as to whether or not we could provide additional decisions. That is part of the challenge you face, but force. In due course—within a matter of a fortnight it is very difficult to explain to those who like to see or thereabouts—substantially, I suspect, through work tram lines, to see things neat and tidy, when they are done at PJHQ, but also through commitments and not. other people in the MoD, advice came to me in written form that we could deploy 900 more troops with other Q581 Mrs Moon: But did it result in our troops support, that that would serve the provision of the being spread too thin? manoeuvre capability that the commander on the Lord Browne: This is the issue of retrospectivity. Of ground needed, and that it would be able to be course, this proved not to be the sustainable lay-down provided from the resources that we had. of our troops. There is no question about that. If it had been sustainable then it would have moved in a Q583 John Glen: So, to be clear, the dynamic was smooth line beyond that to some sustained progress, your conversation with Ed Butler, you then asking but it didn’t. But it is not just a function of that initial your officials to develop plans to respond to his decision, it is a function of lots of other things, general needs, and then you making the decision to including a significant change of tactics by the enemy, deploy the troops on the basis of that advice? with the engagement of resources beyond the country, Lord Browne: As I have made clear, I was not the such as significant numbers of foreign fighters coming only senior visitor who had been given the impression into the environment and equipment—including that we were at a disadvantage because we had fixed arms—coming in from outside, to improve the these troops in the North. General Dannatt, who was capability of the enemy. then Commander-in-Chief, Land, had been out about Retrospectively, it is very easy to say that this tactical 10 days before, and he came back with a very similar decision, if that is what it was, changed the strategy report. He wouldn’t use the same wording as I would, and is therefore why we are where we are today, but but he came back with an almost identical report on that is not the truth. The truth is that this is a much the issue. more complex environment. Things that happened in I suspect, actually, that by the time I came back from Pakistan were as significant as—to some degree, my trip, there was already something going on inside much more significant than—what happened in the command, and the Army in particular, as to Helmand. Or the price of heroin, and the use of it in whether or not they could raise additional forces to our cities—there is a whole complex of associated deploy to Afghanistan. I’m not taking credit for having started this process. I suspect that others had, issues here. I do not envy you your job of trying to and I imagine that I wasn’t the first person Ed Butler understand these things, but I caution you against told. So this process was going on, but I specifically trying to come to conclusions about things in 2011 said when I came back that I wanted that review to be from decisions that commanders on the ground made concluded or I wanted the forces to be reviewed. They in 2006, because it is not as simple as that. were reviewed by the chain of command, by PJHQ It was a very significant decision and, no doubt, it has and by others. Exactly who did it I’m not sure, but contributed to where we are today. But, even from you can find out. now, looking at it, I think it was a very difficult The process is that they then report back to me in a decision to make, and I still support the commander submission to the Minister, and then I in government for having made it. He created an environment in seek support from my ministerial colleagues and the which we got our forces deployed, with a degree of Prime Minister to deploy these additional forces. I security that we would not have had, and he sustained agree that we will do it and then announce it to and held the governor whom we wanted in position Parliament, having got the approval of the Cabinet for for a significantly longer period than he would have these additional forces. done. The Governor was moved, but it was the President who moved him, later on. I didn’t agree with Q584 Chair: Can I put a question to you on this? I that, but that was another force I didn’t have control think it is fair, but you will tell me if it isn’t. It sounds over. as though the decision to reduce the mobility in the Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 125

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North of Helmand Province had already been taken We always knew that the Taliban would respond to by the time that the request was put in for the extra the deployment of our troops into Helmand Province. troops and the support that would be needed to supply Exactly how they would respond was not predictable, that reduced mobility. Is that fair? What would have because there had only ever been a very small number happened if you’d said no? of American troops in Helmand Province, and they Lord Browne: The commander would then have had were held in a fort in the centre. There was a degree to live with reduced mobility. “Manoeuvre capability” of intelligence and knowledge of the area, but it was was the phrase used. It was a case of saying, “My not as extensive as we would have wished. We were manoeuvre capability has been restricted by the fact putting a man, as a commander, into an environment that I have troops”—they presumably would have in which he was learning, and in which people were provided that; the totality of the troops allowed that changing the environment round about him. There provision—“fixed in other environments. I need that were all sorts of other dynamics going on in the manoeuvre capability. That was part of the original internal and tribal politics of the area. He did not have force lay-down, and I will need additional troops to to worry about only the Taliban; he had to worry about provide it.” other people who were carrying out illegal activities Your question is perfectly fair, but my sense from with impunity in Helmand Province, which we were here, and from having re-read a lot of the paperwork disturbing. I did not hear his evidence, but he was at the time, is that because we had not yet reached full exactly right if he said that it was a changing operational capability, he did not have all his forces. environment and he was having to respond to those He was anticipating a position that would be effective changes—of course he was. We changed the by the beginning of July, but by the beginning of July environment significantly by putting in 3,100 troops, we had decided to give him additional troops. Apache attack helicopters, artillery and other Whether there was actually a lack of manoeuvre accoutrements of military force. capability in relation to the plan for the deployment as it was laid down—whether that had materialised or Q587 Thomas Docherty: Briefly on the air side, not—it would have materialised. The answer to your during the course of 2006, Lord Reid—rather than question is that in the fullness of time, if I was being you, I think—decided to deploy eight Apache, four properly briefed, of course there would have been Lynx, and six Chinook helicopters. There has been a restriction in our manoeuvrability inside the area that long debate about helicopter hours and types of we deployed to protect and create. helicopters. When you became Defence Secretary, how often did you assess whether there was sufficient Q585 Chair: That restriction on the manoeuvre helicopter support for the operations? capability was an irreversible decision was it not, until Lord Browne: Constantly. It is often forgotten that one withdrew from Musa Qala or Sangin? the Americans had a substantial helicopter force in Lord Browne: I can only assume that. I am not being Kandahar—a significant number. A lot of my time in obtuse in my responses, but I am operating on the the early months of my term as Secretary of State for basis of what I was told. I was told that a consequence Defence was spent trying to persuade the Americans of this decision was that we would have a restriction to keep those helicopters in RC South, and they on our manoeuvre capability. If we did not get agreed to do so. We were part of an international additional resources, we would not be as force. The Americans had a very significant helicopter manoeuvrable as we expected to be, so the answer to force there and they had other fixed-wing aircraft, so your question is yes. If you reverse the process and we were not dependent only on using our own bring people back from their fixed environments, of resources, but I devoted a lot of my time, as did my course, you have the manoeuvre capability, because Ministers, to finding ways and resources to increase you have the troops you originally intended to deploy. helicopter hours and helicopters. We bought Merlin helicopters. The Danes agreed to sell us Merlin Q586 John Glen: When we saw Ed Butler, he was helicopters, which we re-bladed so that they could fly quite clear that there was a lot of movement on events in this environment. With the helicopters that had on the ground during those few months. Can you never flown, which is a procurement story that goes describe the size and shape of the force required? back many years, I made the decision to strip out all What was happening over those two months from their sophistication and basically turn them into flying when you came in on 5 May, in terms of the evolution buses to get them deployable. of the plan? It seemed that it was a process that As I often explain to people, you cannot just turn up needed to change considerably during those weeks up and buy helicopters that you can deploy in until the decision in July. Afghanistan. It took years. It was 2010 before the Lord Browne: There is a phrase that military people eight Chinook helicopters that were reconfigured for use about plans not surviving first contact with the flying there were able to fly. That decision was made enemy, which is perhaps a truism. There is a phrase in 2006. They became longer-term decisions than I that Ed Butler prefers, too: “The enemy gets a vote.” would have wanted, but these are very sophisticated He used that phrase on a couple of occasions when he pieces of equipment. Not only do you have to source was briefing me. He would say, “This is what we them, but you then have to armour and blade them so intend to do, but the enemy gets a vote.” That is a that they can fly in these conditions. There wasn’t a very instructive and descriptive term. week that went by in my term as Secretary of State We were dealing in a dynamic environment with for Defence when I didn’t have a meeting, briefing or people who were responding to what we were doing. conversation with Ministers, senior officials or senior Ev 126 Defence Committee: Evidence

29 March 2011 Lord Browne of Ladyton members of the armed forces about either helicopters lack of will on the part of Ministers but a challenge or protected vehicles. in terms of procuring either parts or aircraft. Do you think that that caused significant problems for the Q588 Thomas Docherty: On fixed-wing aircraft, my operations on the ground—that perception of a lag understanding is that, when the decision was taken to between a desire for a piece of equipment and actually put the GR7 into operational support, it was chosen getting it to theatre? because the Harrier was the only one of the two strike Lord Browne: Every bone in my body gives me the aircraft that, at the time, had sufficient defensive sense that I would like to help you here, but I honestly capabilities. Did you regularly review the decision, do not know the answer to that very complicated during your period as Secretary of State, about Harrier question. It may be the answer. We concentrate all of versus Tornado? our interest, questioning and force on the sharp end of Lord Browne: Forgive me. I haven’t researched this this process, but there is a very long tail, going right in detail, and this depends on recollection. I will back into the defence industrial environment, that describe it generally to you, and you can ask the supports those who work at the real sharp end. Department to give you chapter and verse on it, and I Of course things happen that have consequences. For am happy that they give that to you. As I recollect, example, we deployed Apache helicopters in a fashion the way in which this was done was that we would that made a significant contribution to the operational make decisions for a period of time. So we would environment, but because we flew them a lot we deploy these resources, particularly aircraft such as created a demand for spare parts that, originally, there Harriers, for a period of time—I cannot remember wasn’t an industrial base set up to support. So we had what that was—and we would then review it, because to help and encourage the creation of that in order to we would have to plan beyond that period. So, maintain our helicopters at the front line. I could see because we were doing it in that way, yes, of course, that happening with Tornados, but I’ve no idea it was constantly being reviewed, and we were trying whether it did. If it does happen and you find yourself to find the best resources that we could to support not with insufficient spare parts to maintain very complex only our troops, but other troops, too, because these pieces of machinery in the front line—in the worst Harriers flew not only in Helmand or in Kandahar, but possible environment imaginable for operating in all parts of Afghanistan. They were in great them—then it will have a detrimental affect on your demand, because our pilots were extremely skilled operational capability. That is why, of course, having and the aircraft were very well equipped for that a defence industrial strategy that sustains what people environment. I would constantly get stories from my do on the front line is extremely important, but it’s international colleagues of how their troops felt not cheap. supported by our Harrier force and of how good they actually were. I don’t know whether this was true, but Q591 Mrs Moon: We started off with an attempt to other Defence Ministers would say, “When our people look at the chain of command, and you talked about call up close air support, they ask the controller to ask operational responsibility. Could you help us to for the Harriers and not anybody else.” understand oversight of the mission, and how that was achieved by the armed forces, the MoD, PJHQ, and Q589 Thomas Docherty: Were you therefore others in Whitehall? What was the process for surprised at the decision to replace the Harrier with oversight, and who was responsible? the Tornado in, I think, 2009? Lord Browne: This was an operation in which we Lord Browne: No, because I wasn’t privy to the were not the only Department involved. The circumstances of the decision. When I was Secretary Department for International Development and the of State, I had enough people second-guessing my Foreign and Commonwealth Office had people decisions to know not to go about second-guessing deployed in the environment and significant people on decisions that they make with information responsibilities. Of course, the Cabinet Office and the that I don’t have. Nothing surprises me. It wasn’t Prime Minister had an oversight of this. We had a consistent with the decisions that I was being briefed structure in Government that stretched from the to make, but we were a year on from when I was Cabinet through Cabinet Sub-Committees, and Secretary of State for Defence. Lots of things could through which a constant oversight of these issues have changed. The Harriers were a year older. I don’t was kept. know why they took that decision—it may have been To be honest, at this remove I cannot remember the as simple as wanting to give the people who flew the names of all of the committees and the structure of it, Harriers a rest. I’m sorry, but you are asking me to do but they are well recorded and you can find them. something that I don’t have the knowledge base to From the Prime Minister down, senior members of comment on. the Cabinet were constantly involved in meetings and briefings in relation to this, with chiefs and operational Q590 Thomas Docherty: An observation has been commanders, who regularly briefed senior that one of the reasons why the Tornado wasn’t Ministers—including the Prime Minister—when they available to us in 2009 was the issue of procuring were in the country. For example, David Petraeus was the specialist parts to equip it for strike operations in a regular visitor to London, briefing the Prime Afghanistan. Coupled with your earlier point about Minister. There was a very complex and constant the understandable lag between going into the chain of oversight involving Ministers, and there were province and the extra Chinooks being available, you regular reports to the Cabinet by Ministers could make the observation that this wasn’t about a individually and collectively. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 127

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Q592 Mrs Moon: Did anyone in Kabul or in PJHQ Q594 Mrs Moon: There are also always lessons to spot the problems that were beginning to develop and be learnt. Part of the responsibility of going back and if not, why not? re-examining is to see whether there are lessons we Lord Browne: Of course people spotted the problems should learn. Are there things about our characteristics that were beginning to develop in this environment, that we need to learn? One thing that I would have which, as I have already explained, was very complex, thought that it is essential to look at here is whether and there was constant review. Ministers still say— we were over-ambitious in what we set out to do. With and I hear them saying it—that we keep our force the benefit of hindsight and the benefit of your levels under review. You feel when you are saying experience in that office, would you say that perhaps that that people think you are avoiding the question, we were over-ambitious? Were we trying to do too but that’s actually what’s happening; people much, too soon, with too few on the ground? constantly keep those issues under review. You don’t Lord Browne: This may be unfashionable to say, but control the whole environment, which is the point. I think we did the right thing. The whole world was Other people interfere in that environment for good represented in this endeavour. This was being done purposes and bad. We were part of an International under a United Nations Security Council Resolution. Security Assistance Force, and there were 40-plus I remind you, because we’re embarking on another countries involved in that, every one of whose Prime adventure at the moment under a similar United Ministers, Ministers of Defence, Ministers of Foreign Nations Security Council Resolution, that the whole Affairs, Ministers of Development and the equivalent of the world who had resource to be able to do it of Cabinet Office Ministers had a view about how that should be done. There was also the ISAF structure was engaged in this environment. There was a plan to and the NATO structure. extend the reach of the Afghan Government beyond I encourage you to read the book “Obama’s Wars”. It Kabul and a few provinces in the North into the rest is a fairly accurate, if larger-scale, version of what of the country, to reconstruct and build the country. It actually goes on in government in those environments, required us to do it. when people are considering how you sustain your We planned for a long period of time, against the very troops and your troop presence, as well as your best advice that could be got at the time, this presence in terms of reconstruction. deployment into central Helmand, which was the most difficult Province, with the possible exception of Q593 Mrs Moon: But I am talking specifically about Kandahar, where the Canadians were. We set out to the problems that UK Forces were experiencing, as do a very particular thing. The circumstances that we well as how we carried out that oversight, how we helped create by doing that, and other people’s spotted the problems that were developing, how activities, caused our commander—in whatever quickly we were able to respond, and whether we circumstances those were; that’s what I thought I was could have responded quicker. I am specifically coming to talk about—to make certain decisions addressing the situation in relation to UK troops in which have had an effect on our strategic approach. Helmand. Did we spot the problems developing and The rest, of course, you know about, as it’s developed. were we responding quickly enough to the situation I’ve listened now—I have to say, with some interest— that was growing? to a series of people reviewing our engagement in Lord Browne: Those are qualitative, rather than Afghanistan and making announcements that we now quantitative questions. There will be 100 different have the right strategy. I hear them all say exactly answers on whether people think we did or didn’t. All what I was saying, but with a slightly different I can say is that we were on top of this issue on a emphasis or maybe slightly different vocabulary. daily basis. As the situation developed, we sought to They’re saying exactly the same as we’ve all been respond to it. If you look at the degree to which we saying all along the line. The questions we should be increased our troop presence over a very short period asking ourselves, if this is what you’re asking me, is of time in Helmand Province, and how we responded not whether we have the strategy right, because we and encouraged other countries to respond to a have the strategy right, but whether we can actually developing situation, I would say that we responded deliver the strategy at all, whether it’s possible to do as well as anybody could. However, everybody now it at all, in an environment such as Afghanistan. It is has the benefit, of course, of looking back and saying, testing our ability, with the best possible resources we “Why did you not appreciate that that was going to have,todothat. lead to that?” I don’t think that is an honest way of looking at it, but I can’t stop people from doing it. My answer to you is that the human beings who were Q595 Chair: So that’s your question. What’s your committed to this were honest, hard-working, very answer? skilled people. They worked as hard as they could Lord Browne: My answer is that Afghanistan and my to respond to this, against a perfectly legitimate and experience in Iraq suggest to me that we can do part appropriate objective, which was founded in securing of the job, but we don’t yet have the capability to do our interests in that part of the world for our security the other part of the job. We don’t have the resources and protection—and that’s what they are continuing or the ability to build a settled, governed community to do. People worked as hard as they could within the in an environment to which we are culturally not constraints of the number of troops and the resources sensitive, and where the people of that country have that we have, the size of our country and the degree of not known governance for 40 years or more and have political and public support for what it is we’re doing. a life expectancy of about 46. Ev 128 Defence Committee: Evidence

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Q596 Penny Mordaunt: Still looking at the international partners to contribute more. But I was oversight of the UK mission in Helmand, was working very conscious, I have to say—I repeat this now, and in an international coalition particularly difficult for I said it at the time—that there were a limited number providing that oversight? I am thinking in particular of countries who had deployable capability that was about command and control arrangements and our capable of making a positive contribution in this partners delivering on their commitments. Is there environment. We were sometimes asking countries— anything you want to tell us about that? I have heard Presidents do this, in series—to do things Lord Browne: Working in an international that they were not capable of doing. environment has significant challenges; there is no I may as well finish this, because I started it earlier: question about that. So does working out command we then switched to saying to countries, “Well, we and control in an international environment, because understand that you can’t give us military capability, countries have a view, in relation to their contribution but you can give us the other. You can give us the or their status in the world, of where they think they complementary side of it. Give us more money. Give should be in this command and control. These were us people we can deploy for justice or governance,” challenging. Thankfully, I didn’t have to deal with or whatever. They don’t have them either. I remember them. The military negotiated and sorted these things cautioning some of our more active colleagues not to out among themselves. I’m not saying it was easier ask for things that they couldn’t get and, when they for them to do it because they were the military, but switched into the complementary side of it, to be they do speak their own language and understand it, careful there too, because they were asking people for and they work these things out. resources they didn’t have. I am sure we probably continue to do this, but we Chair: Thank you very much indeed. That’s it; most spent a lot of time encouraging some of our allies and helpful, and we are very grateful to you. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 129

Wednesday 4 May 2011

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Bob Stewart John Glen Ms Gisela Stuart Penny Mordaunt ______

Examination of Witness

Witness: Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC, former Chief of the Defence Staff, gave evidence.

Q597 Chair: Good afternoon, and thank you very The concern was that development in Afghanistan— much for coming. We are thin on the ground, partly by development, I don’t just mean reconstruction, because some of us didn’t get to bed until 5 o’clock because I am talking in particular about the in the morning, and partly because some of us are development of governance—was occurring in Kabul traipsing around constituencies doing local election and around Mazar-e-Sharif, where the UK was stuff, but as we have already agreed among ourselves, deployed at the time, but not in many other places. you have the quality here. Governance was seen then, as it is today, to be the Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: What a shame you key to long-term success in Helmand. The question can’t say the same about my side of the table. was how to spread governance to other parts of the country. Q598 Chair: The deal is this, and I hope it has been In late 2001 or early 2002—thinking back to my time put to you in roughly these terms: we’re asking you at CENTCOM after 9/11—the concern had been how to give evidence in private, but we expect to publish to manage the various warlords who were scattered what we all say, subject to the Committee staff and around the country, and how to ensure that you going through what you say for any redactions Afghanistan did not degenerate into a series of that are thought necessary. After the negotiation on feuding warlord-led states. It was much more about that, our military advisers will consider whether Ismail Khan, Fahim Khan and Dostum. The anything needs to be cut out in the national interest, assumption was made that Karzai, being a Southern in terms of confidentiality or restricted material, but I Pashtun, could pretty much be relied on to deliver that hope you will consider that as well in the redaction constituency. That, as it turned out, was an inaccurate process. It will then be published as part of our report. judgment. Concern was growing throughout 2004 and What we’re trying to get to is this: the story seems to 2005, as I recollect. be emerging that in 2006, the Armed Forces went to There was also the problem of a split mission, which Helmand with a certain configuration and with a went right back to the earliest days. I recollect from certain resource level that was geared to cope with a my time in CENTCOM at the end of 2001 that the relatively low-key, low-profile operation in Helmand. UK in particular, along with others, was pushing for At some stage during the early summer of 2006, the an international stabilisation and assistance force to operation changed, and perhaps the strategy changed, help get Afghanistan on its feet, but there was no real and our Armed Forces found themselves in places interest in that at all at CENTCOM or, as far as I such as Musa Qala and Sangin, having previously could determine, from up the chain of command in been limited to places such as Lashkar Gah. The Washington. From my perspective, the final question we want to get to, and it will take us a bit of arrangement was, “Well, if you want to do that, fine. time during the next hour or so—I don’t think it Just don’t get in our way of chasing al-Qaeda.” I think should take longer than that—is: what consideration you can see the aftermath of that in 2004 and 2005, was given to that change, and was any consideration where you have Operation Enduring Freedom, which given to whether the resources and the configuration is still very much an anti-terrorist operation, and you of our armed forces in Helmand were appropriate for have a small NATO-led international stabilisation and the new mission? You had just recently come into assistance force, essentially around Kabul and Mazar- position as CDS, I think. Do you remember when that e-Sharif. The other issue was how to fuse those two was exactly? missions as much as was possible, and have unified Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: It was 28 April, I command and control throughout Afghanistan—one think. The last Friday was the day that I actually team and one mission. walked into the office, so essentially it was from the A decision was taken, and I’m afraid I don’t have the beginning of May. details of all the debates that went on within NATO on how it reached the decision. However, the decision Q599 Chair: Can you tell us what you remember of was made in principle that NATO would expand its the background to the deployment of UK Forces into mission from Kabul and the North to encompass the Southern Afghanistan in 2006? Before that, you were whole of Afghanistan. Then, of course, a process Chief of the Air Staff, weren’t you? followed of looking for NATO contributors to take up Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: I was. Clearly, we various roles within that expanded mission. The UK debated those issues in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was asked to take up a mission in the South. It wasn’t although I was not directly involved in the planning. the first time that the notion of the UK going to the Ev 130 Defence Committee: Evidence

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South had been raised; I can recollect that some within Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The Dutch had been our Foreign Office would have preferred us to go to holding things up, but they resolved their issues and the South in the first place, rather than Mazar-e-Sharif, decided what they were going to deploy. At that stage, which is where our PRT ended up after 2001. Again, because we had stopped our planning, we were seen I am afraid that I was not party to the conversations as holding back the process, so we restarted our and dynamics that led to the decision that it should be planning. I give that as an example of the caution that Helmand for the UK. I recollect that there was some was felt by a number of people, certainly around the debate about Helmand and Kandahar. Chiefs of Staff Committee table, about the operation. Around 2005, when the thinking was crystallising in that regard, the UK was focusing on Helmand as its Q602 Chair: What was the mission? contribution to the overall NATO expansion, plus the Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The mission was intention had emerged, at that stage, that the pretty much the same as it is now, frankly. I haven’t headquarters of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps would got the piece of paper with me, so I cannot quote from form the first deployed headquarters for the expanded it, but if you look at the draft mission statement—the ISAF mission. that would be another key UK objective in the draft OPLAN—that NATO drew up contribution at that stage. in 2005, it looks remarkably similar to what we are There have been a number of propositions put forward doing today. Essentially, it is about helping the saying that we didn’t really know what we were Afghan Government spread governance to the parts of getting into—that we thought that we were going for the country that have been without it for far too long, a peacekeeping operation and it didn’t turn out like in order to militate against the spread of terrorism. that. I can say quite categorically that that is From the start, it was essentially all about governance. absolutely not the case. I can recollect a number of discussions around the Chiefs of Staff Committee Q603 Chair: What you just said implies that once we table that essentially were along these lines—I have got there and saw what things looked like on the used these very words myself, so I can recollect them ground, the mission would develop in a way that was well—“We don’t know much about the South, but not entirely possible to predict. what we do know is that it’s not the North. It’s real bandit country.” We had a number of intelligence Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Well, of course the briefings, of course, from the Chief of Defence objective of the mission was to help the Afghans to Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Staff, but spread governance, but how you achieve that is a very one must remember that the international presence in complex question and depends very much on the the South, particularly in Helmand, had been very thin circumstances that you encounter. There has been a on the ground right up until the deployment of British lot of talk over the years about changing strategies in troops. There were something like 100 members of Afghanistan. My own view is that the strategy, in the the US special forces, for example. way that we define it, in Afghanistan has not really The development of a suitable intelligence base in changed very much, but the operationalisation of that Helmand was not very far advanced, so we recognised strategy—the ways and means that you employ to that, in essence, we would need to have something of achieve the objectives—has changed quite a break-in battle with Helmand, develop the significantly. intelligence base and then see where the mission went from that particular point. Q604 Chair: Ijustwanttoconfirm one thing. You That is my recollection of the debates that led up to said that the Americans’ attitude really was: “Well, if the deployment. As I say, there were two issues in you want to do that, fine. Just don’t get in the way of particular. The first was that a number of us were very our chasing al-Qaeda.” cautious indeed about this deployment because of the Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: That was at the end lack of knowledge and the uncertainty. I also recollect of 2001 and the beginning of 2002. By the time we that at one stage the Dutch went a bit wobbly on their get to 2006, you’re in a situation where the Americans deployment in Oruzgan and I personally said, “We are heavily engaged in Iraq, and Iraq is not looking need to call a halt to our planning. We cannot possibly too good. As far as I could see, what the Americans deploy UK Forces when we don’t know what the really wanted at that stage was for somebody to hold environment is going to be like and we don’t know the ring in Afghanistan so that they could focus on who will be in the adjoining provinces, so we don’t Iraq. Indeed, my own experience was that it was know what the total picture will look like.” We did almost impossible to have a sensible conversation halt for a time, but then concern grew within NATO, with anyone in Washington about Afghanistan until the Dutch resolved their difficulties and then at that the beginning of 2008. stage we were seen by NATO as holding up the whole process. We were asked to step forward again, which Q605 Chair: 2008? we consequently did. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: 2008. If you think back, 2007 was the year of the surge in Iraq. Iraq was Q600 Chair: Sorry, you said “we consequently did”? burning all the political oxygen. By the beginning of Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: We resumed our 2008, the Bush Administration were beginning to turn planning for a UK deployment to Helmand. their attention to transition. At that stage, Iraq looked like it was on a much more promising vector, but the Q601 Chair: And that was because NATO regarded Bush Administration became aware that that was us as holding up the whole process? certainly not the case in Afghanistan. Washington Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 131

4 May 2011 Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC started to become politically concerned about the response to your opponents’ intention to bleed you handling of the mission in Afghanistan. dry, because you get out as quickly as you can. “As I recollect that at the beginning of 2008—January or quickly as you can” may not be for quite a long time, February, I cannot remember the exact date—Hillary but nevertheless you are always focused on that. You Clinton came to London to pick up David Miliband, always know that you have limited time. Time is who was Foreign Secretary at the time, for a joint visit limited because of the tolerance of the people in the to Afghanistan to assess the situation. We had about country, but that applies equally to the other side’s two hours over lunch in Lancaster House to discuss strategy of trying to bleed you dry. those particular issues. That was my first serious engagement on Afghanistan with members of the Q609 Bob Stewart: Hello, Lord Stirrup. It is nice to Administration in Washington. see you again. You have already talked about the decision-making Q606 Chair: This is my last question in this little lot. process on going into Helmand, but would you kindly There was a realisation in Iraq that nation-building is outline what you saw as your role as Chief of the Air a valuable thing to do in a country that you’ve gone Staff in the decision-making process within the Chiefs into. Was there any sense that that realisation of Staff Committee? translated to Afghanistan? Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: First, to bring any Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: In what time scale? specialist expertise that I might have because of my Chair: That realisation arrived just before the surge background. That certainly applied. The command in 2007, so maybe in 2006. Was there a sense in 2006 and control arrangements for air operations that I saw that nation-building could be useful in Afghanistan, as at the end of 2005 and in early 2006 were pretty poor. well as in Iraq? I went along and made representations to the then Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: From my CDS about that, and there were therefore a number perspective, in that time scale, people in Washington of discussions on that point. Secondly, as part of the weren’t really thinking about Afghanistan; they were collective wisdom, such as it is, of the Chiefs of Staff, so focused on Iraq. to contribute to discussions about specific issues that were presented within the Chiefs of Staff Q607 Ms Stuart: I just want to confirm our Committee—not to participate in the planning and not ambitions. The mission of al-Qaeda was, in four to make the decisions about operational points and all words, to bleed them dry. The Americans had their the rest of it, but to give views and to contribute to response, and our response was to focus on the debate, which is what I and my colleagues did. governance. Was there a meeting of the various mission statements? Did we respond to al-Qaeda’s Q610 Bob Stewart: I might be pre-empting, but the mission—“to bleed them dry”? That seems to be Chairman will stop me. Does that include discussion much more forceful than what we were trying to do. on mission? Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: First of all, from the Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: It certainly includes outset, certainly in my engagement with the discussion on the strategic objective. I use those discussions on Afghanistan—the same is true of different words because you will recognise very Iraq—we recognised that we couldn’t solve the clearly that people are talking about missions problems ourselves. Only the indigenous people could sometimes to mean very different things at different solve their own problems. What we had to do, levels. Certainly, in terms of the strategic objective, essentially, was get them to the starting line in decent yes. condition. We couldn’t run the race for them. Bob Stewart: Sure. I’ll shut up, sir. Secondly, we recognised that when you are in somebody else’s country, you are going to be seen by Q611 Ms Stuart: On military intelligence, whoever some people—a smaller or greater number depending we talk to, the common response seems to be, “We on the circumstances—as something of an occupying didn’t quite realise just how difficult the terrain would force. Even those who welcome you do so reluctantly. be and just how the tribal structures were.” What is They would rather you didn’t have to be there. The your assessment as to whether the intelligence tolerance for your presence and the tolerance for your available to the military was limited? Was it limited activity declines over time, so it’s always a race and, if so, to what extent did it impact on our against time. Can you get the indigenous people, operations? particularly their security forces, to a suitable level Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: First, it is not true before the tolerance of your presence there and your to say that we didn’t realise it was going to be contribution gets too low to be sustained? difficult. As I tried to indicate earlier, we knew that the South was, in my terms, bandit country and that Q608 Ms Stuart: The thing I’m trying to get at is this was going to be a tough mission. But clearly, we that if al-Qaeda says, “We want to bleed them dry,” were pretty hazy about the extent and nature of the the Americans say, “We only want to deal with bin challenge. Laden and the al-Qaeda threat,” and we come in We knew that Afghanistan was a very tribal society, wanting to deal with governance, was there any and that there were a lot of tribes in Helmand, but we convergence? didn’t understand the dynamics. That is one of the Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes. Helping to problems: in such a situation, the only way you can build governance and getting the Afghans to do it develop usable intelligence is to be there on the themselves as quickly as possible is clearly a rational ground—to talk to people, to see how they interact Ev 132 Defence Committee: Evidence

4 May 2011 Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC and to get a sense of the tribal dynamics of who does Q616 Ms Stuart: But nobody would have thought in what to whom and who has power in the various 2001 that we would be in and out within 18 months. villages and districts. You don’t get that from satellites Given the length, would you not say that it might have or from other sensors; you get it only by being there. been prudent to assume that this was a place you There were very few people on the ground from the would be for more than 18 months and therefore you international community and those who were, could have done some work on the languages? particularly the Americans, were focused on chasing Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Clearly, with terrorists. There had been people from international hindsight, that would have been prudent. In late 2001 aid agencies in Helmand at various times, but, first, and into 2002, the Government and those who were they are not terribly keen on having protracted involved had much more of a Bosnia model in mind conversations with the military for understandable than what turned out to be Afghanistan. reasons—they like to be at arm’s length from the military—and, secondly, they weren’t necessarily Q617 John Glen: Can I just take you back? I am looking at the same issues that we were concerned quite intrigued by what you said about engagement about. with the Americans. You referred to a meeting with There was, of course, a governance structure in Hillary Clinton. When did you say that was? Helmand before we went in, and you could ask, “Why Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: That was at the couldn’t we tap into that?” But one has to remember beginning of 2008. It was in January or February, but that the governance structure was under Governor I cannot remember the precise date. Sher Mohammed Akhundzada. People did ask him questions, but his answers were all about protecting Q618 John Glen: Hillary Clinton was an aspiring his own base and his own particular sources of presidential candidate then. She was not Secretary of income. Even when we went in there in 2006 and State, was she? started to get people on the ground, we didn’t Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Sorry, you’re quite immediately get a clear picture. It took us a very long right. I misspoke. Condoleezza Rice is what I meant time, a lot of hard work and a lot of painstaking effort to say. to build it up. John Glen: Fine, I just needed to be clear. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Hillary Clinton has Q612 Ms Stuart: Given that it takes about 18 months been Secretary of State for so long, I tend to think that to do the language training, for example, and that we she has always been there. Thank you for correcting realised that we did not have enough people with the me. It was indeed Condoleezza Rice. language skills when we went in, in 2005 and 2006 we still had not caught up with that, had we? Q619 Penny Mordaunt: Were relevant lessons from Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: No. Unfortunately, Iraq considered when going into Helmand in 2006? languages are one of our vulnerable areas, not Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: In the sense that because— there are certain principles that apply to any such operation. I have mentioned one of them—the level of tolerance of the local population for what they see Q613 Ms Stuart: And a key component of as an occupying force and how that declines over intelligence, I would have thought. time—and there is the fact that you are trying to build Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Absolutely. But not up indigenous security forces so that they can take on because we don’t think that they’re important and not the role. There were very many similarities in because we don’t train people, but because, exactly as principle, but the way that it was to be done was very you have said, it takes a very long time to make different in the two countries, because the two someone competent in a language. I can pretty much countries are very different. In Iraq, there was a long guarantee that by the time we have everyone fluent in history of a structured military force. That was not the Dari and other dialects, we will be somewhere else case in Afghanistan. It had not had a structured entirely. That’s the problem—you don’t know which military force for some considerable time. The languages you are going to need in the future. We challenges are very different, even though the ends weren’t able to tell that we were going to need those that you seek to reach are the same. particular languages, so we didn’t have a structure and I come back to this central point: it may seem to be a process set up for generating those kinds of people. splitting hairs, but the issue in Afghanistan, frankly, We switched as soon as we realised, but it takes years has always been how to give effect to your strategic of lead time to build up that core of expertise, so it’s intent, how to operationalise the strategy and how to a real challenge for the military. develop the specific ways and means to reach the end you’re aiming for, rather than the end itself. Q614 Ms Stuart: Forgive me, but just remind me— whendidwegoin? Q620 Penny Mordaunt: During the planning Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: We went in in 2006. process, was there anything formal that you can recall that was looking at drawing comparisons with Iraq? Q615 Ms Stuart: No, when did we first go into Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: There is an ongoing Afghanistan? lessons-learned process in the Ministry of Defence, Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: We first went into in PJHQ and down through the command chain that, Afghanistan at the end of 2001, but that was a very particularly on a long campaign, on a rolling basis limited mission. updates the lessons that have been learned from the Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 133

4 May 2011 Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC campaign and looks at how those apply across the of command. I know that there had been some board. That would include, of course, Afghanistan. concern because the Canadian was a one-star and Ed Butler was a one-star, so you’d have a one-star on a Q621 Chair: You have said that you were not one-star, but that’s entirely workable, so we put Ed involved in the planning process for going into Butler into the chain of command. Helmand because you were Chief of the Air Staff. The second thing that concerned me was that the You have also said that your role as Chief of the Air command in the South under Brigadier-General Fraser Staff was to bring your expertise to bear in the Chiefs was wholly under-gunned. This is a very complex of Staff Committee. Do you think there is a problem mission. Although the force levels were not that high with Chiefs of Staff not being directly involved in the at that stage, it was a very complex mission, and that chain of command? one-star headquarters was wholly incapable of Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Not if you ensure running such a complex mission effectively. One of that they are involved in the consideration at the the first things I did when I came back was to go strategic level. It is hard to see how you can have all round to our partners in what became RC South and the Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command. For a try to persuade them that we had to get a serious two- start, when one talks about the chain of command of star headquarters with a two-star commander in there, an operation, one has to be careful to define what one which we subsequently did a bit further down the line. is talking about. There remains a great deal of confusion in many Q623 Chair: When did you make that assessment? people’s minds about Afghanistan. The chain of Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: On my first visit. command for the mission in Afghanistan did not and does not come to London. The chain of command in Q624 Chair: Which was when? Afghanistan, when we went into Helmand in the first Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: In May 2006. The place, was Central Command to General Karl formal connection was through Ed Butler, the national Eikenberry, who was commanding Operation contingent commander at that particular time, but of Enduring Freedom in Kabul, down to a one-star course I talked to my American opposite number. Canadian called Fraser in Kandahar, down to a PJHQ and the operations director in the MoD talked Colonel Knaggs, who was running the PRT in to their American opposite numbers while the Lashkar Gah. operation was under Operation Enduring Freedom, Once the transition had taken place to ISAF, which, and of course talked to NATO opposite numbers once as I recollect, was around July 2006, it went SACEUR it transferred to ISAF command. So there is a lot of to COMISAF, General Richards in Kabul, then down interaction, but it is not formal chain of command to Fraser again in Kandahar and down this time to stuff. It’s about making sure that everyone stays on Ed Butler in Helmand. So, as far as the UK chain of the same page. The formal chain of command goes command is concerned, it is there to take care of the through the national contingent commander in theatre. strategic issues, make sure that there is consonance between the Government’s strategic intent and what’s actually happening in theatre, make sure that the Q625 Mr Brazier: Before coming out with my own resources and tasks are balanced as well as they can question—forgive me; this is an obscure point that be on the national side, and, of course, to deploy the I’ve raised several times, and I still can’t fully get my national red card if that ever becomes necessary. The head round it—looking at the UK parallel chain of UK chain of command, if you like, is rather different command as opposed to the definitive one, I’m still a from the chain of command that is actually conducting little confused by the fact that there seem to be two the operation. separate strands to it. On one hand, there’s the chain that goes through PJHQ; on the other, there’s the chain Q622 Chair: But what is the link, then, between the that goes through the commitment staff in the MoD. UK chain of command and the chain of command that Which one is, so to speak, the UK owner of, in this comes through ISAF? case, Ed Butler and his headquarters? Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The link is Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The chain of essentially through the national representative in command goes from the operations staff in MoD theatre, the national contingent commander. When I through PJHQ to the national contingent commander. took over as CDS, just about the first thing I did was That is the UK chain. Do people relay every message to go out to Iraq and Afghanistan to see the situation through every link in that chain? No, of course not. on the ground for myself in both theatres. What I When I was CDS, I would quite often speak to the found in Afghanistan in terms of command and brigade commander in Helmand, but not to issue control was a little disturbing. There were two real formal orders. That was, in terms of the national problems. The first was that Brigadier Butler, who was chain, done through PJHQ in the normal way. But out there as the UK front man, if you like—the man you’d talk to people up and down the chain of who would wield the red card—was not actually in command, rather than having everything move up the mission chain of command. As I said, the chain of through every link in it. Otherwise, the process command went from Colonel Knaggs in Lashkar Gah becomes too slow and sclerotic. But the formal chain to Brigadier-General Fraser in Kandahar. This seemed of command is the operations director in the MoD— to me odd. which is, after all, the staff supporting the Chief of the One of the first things I did when I came back was to Defence Staff—through the Permanent Joint make sure that Brigadier Butler was put into the chain Headquarters to the man in theatre. Ev 134 Defence Committee: Evidence

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Q626 Mr Brazier: From an outsider’s angle, it does aspiration, in terms of the allocation of resources and look terribly complicated. I understand why you need the end goal we were aiming for—had become a logistic focus in PJHQ, but it does look terribly disconnected with the reality of the operational cumbersome, and there have been some quite public experience. Obviously, the feedback mechanism criticisms that you have effectively got a one-on-one between the theatre and the strategic decision makers arrangement there before you get down to the is going to influence the direction of that strategy. The individual operations. strategy cannot be taken in isolation. I suppose my Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: That isn’t the case. question is, do you feel that it was becoming a bit There is, inevitably, a degree of overlap, as there is in isolated from the reality on the ground, and therefore any organisational boundary. You can never have an the strategic direction was needing to be tweaked and absolutely neat division. But, for example, PJHQ is changed in consideration of that reality? the organisation that will carry out the periodic force Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: I don’t think it was level review. Every six months, it would have teams becoming disconnected, but what quickly became of its people—its experts—go out to theatre, talk to apparent was that it was going to take a long time and the commanders on the ground, look at the missions a lot more effort than we were putting in at the they were having to conduct, assess what was with beginning to get close to that strategic objective. It’s them and what sort of forces would be required over a question of pace and scale. [Interruption.] the coming six months. It would then put together that Chair: We were just about to get on to the meat of it force level review and send it up to London. and I am afraid that we now have to go away and London did not repeat all that work. London, of vote. I am sorry about that. Talk quietly among course, looked at the resource and political yourselves. We will be back as quickly as possible. implications of all this—how it was to be done and Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. how the forces were to be generated and so on—but On resuming— they were absolutely distinct tasks. But of course, in any organisation, at the boundary there is a grey area, Q629 Mr Brazier: Lord Stirrup, General Messenger and you can never get away from that. So the answer told us that we did not have enough UK Forces is not to say, “Let’s delineate that boundary more personnel to carry out the tasks asked of them in clearly,” or, “Let’s do away with this level.” The Helmand from 2006. It was pretty clear from the tenor answer is to make sure that people are working of Brigadier Butler’s evidence how overstretched we effectively across that boundary. In that particular were. Were you involved in the decisions about the sense, it is crucial that the director of operations, the shape and size of the force required in 2006? DCDS(Ops), the MoD and the chief of joint Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: I was not involved operations in PJHQ are joined at the hip. in the planning to put the force together. Clearly, the Chiefs were briefed that this was the force level. One Q627 John Glen: I would like to focus on what has to understand from the outset that we were, and appears to me to be a disconnect between the continued to be for a long time, heavily engaged in operational perceptions of Brigadier Butler and the Iraq. In the early stages of 2006, we sent what we strategic view higher up, and your experience in could manage. Throughout our engagement in recognising that Brigadier Butler was somehow Afghanistan, until we got to our current forces of somewhat disconnected from that chain of command. 10,500, we sent as many people as we could to the Do you think there was a difference between the mission as quickly as we could generate them, as Iraq perception that you had talking to Brigadier Butler ran down. and the general view that was held by the strategic I recollect, when I was CAS, a discussion of chiefs players in the other conversations that you were about that and how we could manage two campaigns. having at a higher level, detached from operations? The proposition that was put to us was, as we ramped That is the key issue here—whether there was an down in Iraq, we would be ramping up in emerging discrepancy between that strategic Afghanistan. I and a number of my colleagues said, perception and what you were hearing in your “Let’s remember that nothing ever works out bilateral conversations with Brigadier Butler in according to plan. We have ideas about the rate at operations. which we might be able to draw down our forces in Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: There was never a Iraq, but all our experience tells us that they will not discrepancy up and down the chain about the strategic come true and that things will be delayed. How will objective, but—I come back to my central point—how we cope?” We were reassured that we could cope if is that objective to be achieved? How, in detail, do there was delay in running down in Iraq. Of course, you do it on the ground? That has to be the challenge we did run down more slowly in Iraq, we did cope, for the person on the ground. You can’t do that from but it was at the cost of some significant stretch. London. The person on the ground sees difficulties before people back in London see them, and quite Q630 Bob Stewart: Did that mean that the Chiefs of often will say, “Well, you may think that’s a wonderful Staff felt that the troop levels were over-faced by the idea, but let me tell you, it isn’t going to work task that they had when they arrived in Helmand? because”. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: When they arrived in Helmand, nobody had a really clear idea of the Q628 John Glen: Forgive me, Lord Stirrup, but what troops to tasks equation, because the tasks were so I am driving at is that at this point it seems that that unclear. The environment, the challenges and the strategic objective and that conversation—that levels of violence were unclear. It is important to Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 135

4 May 2011 Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC remember that throughout 2006, we were in the early undermine him in the eyes of the President at the stages, if you like, of a resurgent Taliban. So, in 2005 same time. and the beginning of 2006, when this plan was going The decision was taken to deploy troops to try and on, there were relatively low levels of violence, but stabilise the situation in the outlying areas, which they continued to climb through 2006. That was in were not originally envisaged as being part of the part because of our presence, but also in part because tasks. So the tasks grew, for very understandable the resurgence was taking place at that time. reasons, connected to the strategy and the object of the mission. But now, suddenly, there weren’t enough Q631 Bob Stewart: So the initial planning on force troops to cover all the bases. levels was for a lesser threat than, obviously, we found. Q634 Chair: You said that the decision to deploy Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: For a lesser threat, what troops there were available, essentially, was done but also to establish a presence and a secure area at the cost of some considerable stretch. around the capital of Lashkar Gah. What might then Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: No. The force be required subsequently in other parts of Helmand deployed initially was judged adequate to establish a was far from clear. Certainly, nobody was in any secure area around Lashkar Gah to begin the position to do a troops to task analysis of that. development of governance, and was judged to be manageable within the overall forces available, given Q632 Mr Brazier: Before we move on to some of the commitment in Iraq. The increase that was my colleagues’ questions about the change in the required in troops in Afghanistan, allied to a slower nation, Brigadier Butler told us that the situation in draw-down of troops in Iraq, was what then Helmand had changed, by the time they arrived, from contributed to the stretch. a permissive situation to, at best, a semi-permissive Chair: I see. one. Is that a situation that you recognise? Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes. There were a Q635 Ms Stuart: So now we don’t have sufficient number of factors. First, I referred to the resurgence troops as we expand from just securing the area of the Taliban. Secondly, the Governor had been around Lashkar Gah. Can we look at whether we had replaced—forgive me, I cannot remember the exact enough support? In particular, could you say a bit date. Sher Muhammad Akhunzada was replaced, very about whether we had sufficient helicopters? Pre- much at the behest of the UK, by Engineer Daoud. empting your answer and assuming that the support Sher Muhammad Akhunzada did not take kindly to wasn’t sufficient, to what extent did it prevent you that. I do not have any specific evidence to put before from doing all the things that you thought you needed you to show that, because of that situation, levels of to do? violence increased, but I think that one can draw not Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Clearly, if you unreasonable conclusions from what has gone on deploy to more dispersed locations, your logistic subsequently. So there was considerable unrest, which challenge becomes greater. Helicopters are an was growing throughout 2006. Undoubtedly, in May important part of the logistic line of communication 2006, the situation was different from that in January within theatre. Automatically, by adopting that posture, you are going to put more strain on your 2006, and it was different again by the end of that logistic support, including your support helicopters, year. than you originally envisaged. That’s the first point. Secondly, it’s very hard for any commander ever to Q633 Mr Brazier: You have explained the reason for admit that he has enough helicopters—actually, it’s the shortage of troops to cope with the rapidly hard to admit that he has enough of anything— changing situation, but that must have been a factor because we can always do more with more. In a sense, in the mission getting off to a poor start. support helicopters and other specialist assets are an Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The shortage of unbounded demand, and they are nearly always troops arose from a number of factors. In considering bounded by supply. The issue is to make sure that you numbers of troops, you must look at the tasks that you don’t have so many tasks over such an area that you are asking them to carry out. If you have fewer troops, just cannot sustain them with the force that you you could still have an adequate number, but you currently have. would have to reduce the tasks. The initial plan was Throughout the first three years of our engagement in to establish a secure area around Lashkar Gah. As Helmand, it was a constant struggle, not just because everyone knows, those tasks quickly expanded to of support helicopters, but because of Apache encompass platoon houses in the mid to Northern part availability. Afghanistan was really the first of Helmand, which was never originally envisaged. operational deployment of Apache. It was the first I know that you have questioned witnesses on the time that people had used it, and they developed rationale for that, and they will have said to you what concepts for its use as they went along, as you would was explained to me when I went out there for the expect. It quite quickly became a “Don’t leave home first time. I was told that the Governor was on the without it” asset, because it was so valuable. But of verge of implosion, that the whole mission was about course, the Apache force was still forming in the UK governance and that we had to do something to when we deployed it. So the resource base, the logistic stabilise the Governor’s position, bearing in mind that base, and the base of pilots to fly them and engineers not only did he face challenges in various towns and to maintain them, were strictly limited. So the villages, but his political rival/rivals were working to Apaches themselves became a limiting factor. All the Ev 136 Defence Committee: Evidence

4 May 2011 Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC way through the next three years, we were constantly would have to be put into more outlying locations to trying to increase the supply of these critical sustain the governor, because without the governor resources, and those in theatre were trying to juggle there would not be governance. The means of them to cover the task as best they could. delivering security and the areas in which that delivery was to take place changed, but the rationale Q636 Ms Stuart: May I press you just a little bit for the delivery of that security did not change. When more? The Russian experience was that they needed did it change? It changed about the back end of April, helicopters, and they had realised that helicopters, at when it was clear that Governor Daoud was on the high altitude, with high heat and a lot of sand, were verge of implosion. When I went out at the beginning quite demanding, so we shouldn’t have been of May to Afghanistan, we were already in the process surprised. What in particular did you find you weren’t of doing that and there had already been some able to do, but which you thought you ought to have discussions between theatre and London about it. done within the wider strategic framework, because of the limitations on equipment? Q639 Chair: Do you know what the process of that Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: On the Russian decision to change was? Was it an increasingly experience, my own view, and that of a number of concerned set of communications from Governor other commentators, is that the Russians over-relied Daoud? on helicopters. In this kind of mission, what you need Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: That was before I are people on the ground, not in helicopters or in took over, so I am giving hearsay rather than direct vehicles, but in their boots. People talk about boots on evidence from my personal knowledge. It was the ground, and they are critical in this kind of human Governor Daoud, our PRT in Lashkar Gah, which was terrain in which we are seeking to operate. working with him, and it was also to a degree from Nevertheless, they have to be moved from place to President Karzai in Kabul. Of course, the difficulty place as safely as possible, and that requires a mixture with communications from Kabul was that President of protected mobility and helicopters. The less Karzai was still talking, as he did for a long time, protected mobility and the fewer helicopters you have, to the previous governor and, of course, the previous the less you are able to manoeuvre, so the less governor would naturally have a stake in talking up flexibility a commander has. In a sense, in the middle the degree of instability occurring under his successor. of 2006, it was not as big an issue as it became subsequently because the mere fact of deploying to Q640 Chair: So there is no question of it being a places like Musa Qala meant that the majority of the decision by Brigadier Butler to expand his role; it was force became fixed so the issue was resupplying it a decision of the overall coalition deciding to rather than manoeuvring it. When more forces were reinforce Governor Daoud. Is that right? deployed, more were available for manoeuvre, but Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: There is certainly limitations with support helicopters will always no question of Ed Butler just doing this off his own restrict you in that manoeuvre. It will slow down the bat as a piece of private enterprise. There was a chain pace at which the commander on the ground can of command in theatre to which our forces were create movement towards the strategic objective. It reporting. At that stage, it was Operation Enduring will limit his options on the ground. Freedom and, of course, any such significant shift in tactic would, as is always the case, be reported to Q637 Chair: Is there a sense that you can do things London, not—I must add—so that London can control and you can do things with overwhelming force, but the tactics in theatre, which would be entirely wrong; unless you do things with overwhelming force, you no matter what goes on in theatre and no matter what are likely to suffer more casualties? criticisms people might have of it, I can pretty much Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes. guarantee that London would always do it worse. Naturally, however, the Government need to know Q638 Chair: You have said that the process in how their forces are being used and what risks are Helmand was to secure the area around Lashkar Gah. being run with them, and they need to have the It then changed. To what did it change, and when did opportunity not to amend the tactics but, if they feel it change? that nationally that is not where they want to go, to Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The military hold up a red card and say, “No, we are not up for mission throughout was two-fold. It was first to train that.” the Afghan Security Forces so that they could provide their own security and then to help hold the security Q641 Chair: Was this a decision that was made by ring until they were ready to take over in order to Ministers or, if not, at what level was it made? allow governance to spread. That was very important. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: I was not there It was not about just providing security. There are when the decisions were made, but certainly it would areas in Helmand for which we still do not provide have been briefed to Chiefs of Staff and to Ministers. security because they are not critical in spreading governance. It is all about allowing governance to Q642 Chair: When did you become CDS? spread. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: AsIsay,thelast The initial concept was very understandably and Friday in April. I went out to theatre right away at the rightly focused on the capital, Lashkar Gah—get beginning of the following week. When I was in governance established there and spread it outwards. theatre, I was briefed by Ed Butler on this whole As I explained, the decision was taken that troops process. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 137

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Q643 Chair: Who was your first Secretary of State? Q648 Bob Stewart: So silence means tacit approval. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The first Secretary Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes. of State was John Reid. When I came back from theatre, I found I had a new one. Q649 Chair: Okay, so the way of achieving the mission has changed. You’ve agreed that, in order to Q644 Chair: This is interesting, because John Reid reduce casualties, the concept of overwhelming force has expressed considerable surprise at discovering requires you to have more troops—possibly more than that, after he left the Secretaryship of State for you can ever afford to have. Nevertheless, you need a Defence, the mission had suddenly changed. Do you high degree of force level to bring in the concept of think that his recollection is wrong? overwhelming force, which implies that there needed Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: First, we may be to be an immediate reassessment of the resources using the term differently. The mission had not devoted to this operation. Do you agree? changed; the tactics had certainly changed. The Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes, but can I just tactical deployment had changed for the reasons that enter a couple of provisos? Overwhelming force does I have just described, but it was still to execute the not mean you have wall-to-wall soldiers—soldiers same mission. everywhere. Chair: Of course not. Q645 Chair: It was to do so in places like platoon Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: There are some houses. places where tactically it’s much better to have no visibility whatever. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Itwastodosoin Chair: Yes. order to bolster confidence in and to ensure the Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The second point is survival of the governor, so that governance could that it must be force levels pertaining to the tasks that continue. As it happened, the downstream you are undertaking. consequence of that decision was that we ended up Chair: Agreed. maldeployed, but that was inevitable if you were Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: You can, of course, going to save the governor. Sometimes these things have higher force densities by reducing the tasks that happen. You have to take tactical action on the ground you undertake. But certainly in the June-July 2006 to make sure that you retain the ability to achieve the time frame, when we had found our forces deployed mission in the long run but, having done that, you to places we had not originally expected them to be have to recover to a more balanced and different going and, as I say, it was therefore becoming too posture, which is essentially where we wound up in fixed, clearly something had to be done. One option the second half of 2006. On the nub of your question, was for us to pull out of those places, which would I am afraid that I had John Reid for literally a few have been very difficult, as the deployment had been hours, so I can’t comment on any of the discussions successful in bolstering the confidence of the governor he had. and helping him to survive that particular crisis. To pull out immediately would have had the reverse Q646 Chair: What I am trying to get to the bottom effect. That was going to be very difficult. The only of is how you understand John Reid’s astonishment other option, of course, was to increase the number of that our troops ended up in Sangin and Musa Qala. forces we had deployed. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: As far as I am aware—again, this is only hearsay, because I was not Q650 Chair: What happened? there—these issues were briefed at the operational Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: The decision was Ministers meeting that is held weekly in the Ministry taken that we would seek an increase in the force of Defence. levels as quickly as we could generate it.

Q647 Bob Stewart: Lord Stirrup, the move to Q651 Chair: From what to what? platoon houses was pretty crucial, and you mentioned Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: I think it was an earlier that Ed Butler would not have made that additional 900, but I’m thinking off the top of my decision alone. How far up the chain of command do head now, Chairman. The numbers will be in the you think such a decision might have been made? You records in the Ministry of Defence. may have to speculate; if you don’t want to, I would understand. Q652 Chair: But given the size of the change in the Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Well, Ed Butler tactics employed, a mere extra 900—it was at about would have made the proposal or would have said, as the 3,000 level at that stage, wasn’t it? you will recognise, “This is what I am intending to Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes, 3,200 or do.” But he would not have said, “I want your thereabouts. decision on this, London” or “PJHQ.” He would have said, “This is what I intend to do.” PJHQ or London Q653 Chair: Yes. Surely a mere extra 900 would be then had the chance to say, “Hang on. That doesn’t a drop in the ocean compared with the hornets’ nest— accord with what we understand you are out there to if you’ll forgive the mixed metaphor—that we were do.” The decision would have been a decision for stirring up. operational commanders in theatre but, as I say, they Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Well, three points. would not have done it as a piece of private enterprise, First, that’s actually quite a big percentage increase if as you well recognise. you think about it. The second point is that these Ev 138 Defence Committee: Evidence

4 May 2011 Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC numbers, as you will understand, are not plucked out Q656 Chair: Would you accept, though, that what of the air. As I mentioned in reply to an earlier we did in moving to the platoon house strategy question, the PJHQ, along with commanders on the changed the environment from semi-permissive to ground, would carry out a force level requirement non-permissive? study, doing a troops to tasks exercise to see exactly Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Well, we went into what numbers were required, what sorts of formation, much less permissive areas of Helmand, if I can put what sorts of expertise and all the rest of it. it that way. I don’t think that Musa Qala or Sangin The third point is that at that stage we were seeking were ever permissive environments. When you went to balance resources across two theatres, and of course into them, they were always going to be non- one of the key tasks at the strategic level is to do permissive. We went into them earlier than we had precisely that. It’s not to run detailed campaigns in envisaged. I can recollect that in earlier discussions, theatre, but it is to try to balance ways, means and no one was really clear in the initial planning stages resources, although in our particular case across two about how we would get into places such as Sangin, theatres, not across one. The demands in Iraq were in part because we had not developed the intelligence growing at that stage, and it became clear to me very base, but it was always recognised that it was going soon after I took over that there was no way that we to be incredibly difficult. would be able to draw down our force levels in Iraq at the pace that had been previously assumed. That Q657 Chair: There were problems that began to was one of my earliest pieces of advice to the develop from this, weren’t there? Do you think that it Secretary of State—that we would not be able to do is fair to say that Ministers were kept involved with that. The UK was limited in terms of what it could and aware of those problems, or would you say that force-generate, so the issue for us was to make sure they would inevitably accept the military advice that that what we could generate was adequate for the new they were given? tasks that were being undertaken on the ground. Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: They usually wound up accepting the military advice that they were given. Q654 Chair: Did you think it was? They rarely failed to question it, and rightly so. Every week we would have a Chiefs of Staff operational Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes, but if you look committee meeting, in which we would bring at the end state of where we are in Helmand, which is everyone up to date on the latest situation and the that there are 20,000 to 30,000 troops there, you can plans for operations around the world, but particularly clearly see that from where we started to the end state focusing at that stage on Iraq and Afghanistan. Then, in Helmand, there’s a very long journey. Although we immediately after that, we would have an operational could fill some of that requirement, there’s no way the ministerial meeting, where they would receive exactly UK could ever fill all of that requirement. This was a the same briefing and the advice that had been put NATO mission. Although we had responsibility for together in the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Helmand at that stage, the overall mission was a NATO mission by July and therefore it was incumbent Q658 Chair: If you could have had more than 900 on the alliance to provide the appropriate force levels extra troops, would you have done? to conduct the mission properly and safely. It does not Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: I can recollect follow that just because it was Helmand, the UK saying at a very early stage of this operation that if I should automatically have to increase its force levels, had my druthers, personally I would send two but what does follow is that as you have some success divisions into Helmand, so yes. Of course, we didn’t and create opportunities—as well as stirring up, as have two divisions; nor did we have the equipment you say, some of the hornets and having to react to for them. But had we had more, I would absolutely that—the overall requirement for the mission will have sent more, or at least I would have recommended grow over time. that we send more.

Q655 Chair: The impression being created is that Q659 Chair: Was there any element at this stage of Ministers are being advised, “Yes, you can go into some of the decisions being affected by the fairly large Helmand; it’s a pretty permissive environment”, and changes in personnel that there were at the top of both suddenly we discover it’s a semi-permissive the Ministry of Defence and the political level of the environment, and then we, through our tactical Ministry of Defence? We had a change of Secretary decisions, turn it into a non-permissive environment. of State, a change of CDS and a change of CJO. Is that fair? Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes, although the Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Well, first of all, CJO, General Houghton, had by that stage been in his Chair, I am not aware of anyone—maybe they did, job for a couple of months, and of course he had just but I am not aware of anyone—at any stage ever come back from an operational deployment in Iraq. saying that Helmand was a permissive environment. I Before that, he had been Assistant Chief of the come back to the evidence I gave earlier; I used these Defence Staff, Operations, in the Ministry of Defence, very words in the Chiefs of Staff Committee: “What so he was extremely current on Iraq. He had been we do know about the South is that it is not the North; involved in the early stages of Afghan planning. He it is real bandit country. It is going to be really was not as current when he took up his post, but he difficult.” I certainly never viewed Helmand as a had been there for several weeks when I took over. permissive environment, and nobody in the The director of operations—the Deputy Chief of discussions that I attended voiced that view. Defence Staff, Commitments, as he then was—was Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 139

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Vice-Admiral Style, who had been in post since the Committee that during the week in which you January 2006, and the Vice-Chief had been in post for were out there—this transitional week while he was a year or more, so there was some continuity, but what in the process of moving—we had already started to I certainly did not expect was to lose my Secretary of move troops into the North of Helmand? State within days of taking over. Given that John Reid Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: I can’t recall the was immersed in this, and, as far as I could see, had exact details of where the troops were on the ground exerted considerable leadership within the Cabinet on at that stage, but Ed Butler briefed me on the platoon Afghanistan, there is no doubt that that was a house concept and the rationale for it. I am pretty clear significant transition to make at that particular stage, in my recollection that he had had discussions with but I think that it was the nature and pace of events PJHQ in London at that stage. Now, what involvement on the ground in Helmand that dictated what John Reid had in that, I am afraid I cannot answer. happened, rather than events back in London. Q663 Mr Brazier: Understood. You are not certain Q660 Chair: Since we did not have the extra two whether people had actually moved, but certainly divisions that you would have liked, do you think we moves were in hand; they were discussed. Why is it had too few troops there to carry out the tasks that we that each successive brigadier out there seems to have were giving them to do? been allowed to adopt a different intent and concept Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: No. We worked of operations? The Americans are rather dismissive of very hard always to try to ensure that the balance the fact that we replace our brigade every six months. between the troops and the tasks that they were They not only seem to do longer stints, but seem to undertaking was appropriate, but of course in every have more continuity, in terms of their approach to the brigade deployment, they would open up new casual reader of the press. That seems to be the opportunities that they would seek to exploit, so the American view. Can you comment? requirement was always growing. We faced a Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Well, I agree with continual challenge in keeping that growth in everything you say up to the last bit. I have seen requirement down to the same pace at which we could significant differences in approach from different generate additional forces as they became available American commanders in the same region. from Iraq as we drew down there. There was always a tension. We could always have used more troops Q664 Mr Brazier: At brigade level? faster, but the issue, of course, was to make sure that Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes. We have a in theatre, we didn’t overreach ourselves on the tasks concept, as you know, called mission command. You that we were undertaking before the resources became don’t tell commanders how to execute their mission, available for them. It is always a very difficult but you tell them what your intent is and what you balancing act, but every six months, PJHQ would go want them to achieve. As they are the ones on the out with its experts on the ground, talk to ground who see the circumstances, they have to judge commanders, carry out a formal force level review, for themselves how it is to be done. Of course, they come back and report on what was going to be report back to you on how they are going to do it and required in the next deployment. what their plans are, but you have to leave it to them. As I said earlier, people always make mistakes, but Q661 Chair: When they talked to commanders on no matter what mistakes a commander on the ground the ground, they were always told, weren’t they, “We makes, I can pretty much guarantee you that higher need more troops”? headquarters, especially London, will make far more, Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Of course, but as I because they don’t know the situation. said before, no commander ever has enough. As we It was my experience—I think I am right in saying can see today, there were more tasks in Helmand in that I had nine brigade commanders in my time as total than any force that we could ever have generated CDS—that everyone discovered counter-insurgency from within the UK could deal with. It was crucial afresh all by himself, or at least that is the impression that, from a UK perspective, we made sure that the one got, going up there. It became a bit frustrating. tasks given to and undertaken by those troops were The intent of the mission remained exactly the same, constrained by the resources that were available to but the way they executed the mission varied from meet them. commander to commander, for a number of reasons; first, because the circumstances changed. As we have Q662 Mr Brazier: This has been absolutely riveting. just discussed, 2006 was a dynamic year, as were 2007 Forgive me, but I must go back to an earlier question and 2008. Each commander was faced with a from the Chair, because I just didn’t understand the somewhat different situation. His predecessor would answer. You have been immensely frank with us, and have created opportunities which he could go on to have given us very detailed answers. The week that exploit. He would also want to create his own you were first in Afghanistan—your first week as opportunities, but the enemy always has a vote in CDS—was the week when John Reid was replaced as these things, and they were doing things to which the Secretary of State; that was a crucial transition. The commander had to react. All the commanders were minute that he wrote to us, as the Chair just said, we absolutely clear that they were focused on counter- were crystal clear on his absolute opposition to insurgency. moving into the dodgier parts of the Northern part of As I have said, I always saw them before they went the Province—never mind tactics. It could not have out, and I also went to see them in post, fairly soon been clearer; it was in black and white. Are you telling after they arrived in theatre, and they would brief me. Ev 140 Defence Committee: Evidence

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They were always clear that it was about counter- clearly the situation on the ground is developing much insurgency, but they always tended to give the more quickly. I find myself sitting here doing a impression that they had discovered that for terribly circular argument: I am on the ground, doing themselves for the first time. Of course, it was not what I need to do, depending on the tasks and what I true, because every one of them was focused on the have. But who decides what particular tasks I pursue same outcome. They just approached it in different at this moment, given that there are more than I could ways. Did that lead to a lack of continuity? pursue and that I never have enough means to do all Absolutely. I very much wanted to extend the tour of the things that I want? Where does all this meet? Who duty of brigade commanders in Helmand for that very makes the decision about tasks and what is needed? reason. The clear advice from my Army advisers was Who will, at some point, say, “Folks, we do not have that we could not do that, because the brigades were enough people for the tasks that we must carry out in units that lived together, trained together, fought order to survive, so you need to change tack”? Take together and recovered together. That cohesion, me through the platoon houses. I do not understand particularly in the context of difficult combat where it meets. operations with significant losses, was overridingly Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: First of all, I am important. I accepted that advice and I accepted that sorry to have confused the issue by talking about we would have to deal with the consequences of counter-insurgency. I must come back to the point that shorter tours. this is not a military mission in Afghanistan; it is One way of overcoming that would have been to about a political resolution, which is governance, but deploy the entire brigade, not just the headquarters the military does not do governance. I said, from my and commander, but that would have meant first day as CDS and all the way through my tenure: operational tours for troops on the ground of nine to the military cannot deliver strategic success in 12 months, which was felt to be unsustainable given Afghanistan. It cannot be delivered without them, but the pace of operations. The Americans, I know, take they cannot deliver it; it has to be a political solution. a different view, but people will then point to suicide The military, as I tried to explain earlier, had two main rates and divorce rates among American military. tasks. The first was to train the Afghan Security This is still a live debate, but it was discussed at length Forces so that they could deliver security. The second when I was CDS, with all the Chiefs of Staff together. was in conjunction with the Afghan Security Forces We would sit in my office and drag this one out and that exist to hold the security ring until the Afghans discuss it. The decision was that we would stick to can take it over. Without a sufficient degree of security six-month tours for all the reasons that have been in the right places, that governance cannot flourish. advanced, and that we would therefore try to Without it, you cannot get politicians and civilians ameliorate the difficulties through other means. We doing the things that they need to establish that had posts within the brigade headquarters— governance, which is a sort of unwritten contract with particularly the J2 posts and other important the people. So the military is about counter- continuity posts—which stayed for nine to 12 months. insurgency, because it is an insurgency that is creating the insecurity, but the mission is about governance. Q665 Chair: Sorry, you had better translate “J2”. Everything must be directed to that political end state, Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Sorry. J2 is so I am sorry if I confused you. intelligence. Over time, we had posts that ran between There is a simple answer to your question about who brigade deployments to provide that additional degree decides which tasks can be taken on and which of continuity. We, of course, also had very detailed cannot—the commander on the ground. He is the only handover processes. Staff from the incoming brigade person who can do that. If he believes a task is coming would go out very early to make sure that they picked up for which he does not have adequate resources, he up as much knowledge and situational awareness as says, “Either I have more resources, or I can’t do this they could before they had to be up and running. All task.” You talked about the six-month cycle. It would those were less than perfect, but there was no perfect be nice to think that we could constantly change the answer. force levels out there to reflect the weekly or monthly situation, but the fact is that people have to be trained Q666 Ms Stuart: Forgive me if some of this sounds for Afghanistan. There has to be force generated. stupid, but I am one of the junior members of this People go out not as individuals, particularly on the Committee, so I may not be as familiar with some of ground, but in formed units—as companies, as the military decision-making processes. I am battalions, as brigades—and although there can be beginning to struggle. The brigadiers go in and think individual reinforcements or battle casualty it is about counter-insurgency, but we started off this replacements, all those people have to be trained and debate talking about governance. There we are out in go through the appropriate cycle. We have to think a Helmand and the mission changes. What I am trying bit in advance about force generation. Okay, that to get to the bottom of is that the mission changes makes you slightly less flexible, but your flexibility because we intend to save Governor Daoud, so am I overall is improved because you have better trained right in thinking that we are suddenly going into areas and organised people. we had not originally intended to go into? As a At the end of the day, the decision to take on the consequence of that, platoon houses emerge. We find platoon houses did not put us in a situation where we ourselves with platoon houses, but not enough troops could not protect Lashkar Gah and protect the platoon and probably not enough support. As you say, PJHQ houses. It put us in a situation where, as we would goes out once every six months and looks at this, but say in military terms, we had culminated. There was Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 141

4 May 2011 Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Lord Stirrup GCB AFC nothing more we could do; we were stuck. We were Clausewitzian. That is why we have the civilian-run fixed, and we could only move forward on the mission civil-military mission in Helmand. It does not give by putting in additional forces. orders to the military command.

Q667 John Glen: I welcome the clarity on the Q668 John Glen: But it would influence the military and the governance—the understanding that governance. those two work together, and that one cannot be Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: But the military achieved without the other. On the argument that task commander must be conducting military operations to prioritisation decisions reside at brigadier-level on the support the political outcomes; otherwise, there is no ground, if the political governance challenges at some strategic point to what they are doing. You are point, from a strategic perspective, overwhelm and absolutely right, but we have to remember that, in take precedence over the operational decisions of the 2006, we did not have the civil-military mission. We brigadier on the ground, clearly there is room for him did not have the Helmand road map and then the to be influenced, when it comes to the allocation of Helmand plan. All those things were still in early resources, priorities and tactical decisions, by the stages of development. Have I made that clear? governance issue, which you have said works John Glen: I think that it is my ignorance. alongside the military. In those circumstances, if it Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: IfImaysayso, were decided that it was necessary politically, from a you’ve absolutely got it. You are trying to deliver a governance perspective, and from the perspective of political outcome to get strategic success. The military the whole credibility of the political aspect of the mission is about helping to deliver that strategic operation, to change the configuration of resources, success. It must support the policy of the political line. while the overall mission is to win the war—a great Chair: I think that we have detained you long enough. thing to hide behind—in reality, it is beyond that. I have to say that this went on far longer than I had There must have been some influence over those expected it to, partly because you have been frank and tactical decisions. If there were a governance change extremely helpful to us. One thing that we shall not of priority, that could change the bearing. suggest in the Report that eventually comes out is that Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Yes, of course. any of the decisions were simple or were taken Everything you say is absolutely right, except I do without thought. We are very grateful indeed to you not think that I said governance works alongside the for your time in front of us this afternoon. military. It works above it. It is all about delivering a Air Chief Marshal Lord Stirrup: Thank you very political outcome. Most military operations are about much indeed. delivering a political outcome. Sorry, I am a bit of a Ev 142 Defence Committee: Evidence

Wednesday 11 May 2011

Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair)

Mr Julian Brazier Mr Dai Havard Thomas Docherty Mrs Madeleine Moon Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Penny Mordaunt John Glen Bob Stewart Mr Mike Hancock Ms Gisela Stuart ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen, Chief of the General Staff, and General Sir Nicholas Houghton KCB CBE ADC Gen, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, gave evidence.

Q669 Chair: Gentlemen, good morning. Thank you 2006, I was in Iraq. I came back from that in mid- very much indeed for coming to give evidence in this March 2006, spun round, and by the end of March— session on Afghanistan. There are two purposes to this literally the last couple of days—I assumed the evidence session: first, to look at what happened in appointment of Chief of Joint Operations at 2006, at the way in which and structure with which Northwood. I was Chief of Joint Operations for the we went into Helmand, and at what happened subsequent three years—from 2006 to 2009—prior to subsequently; and, secondly, to look at the current taking on my current appointment. At that time, situation in Afghanistan. I should like to get on to the therefore, I was very closely involved with the early current situation in Afghanistan at 11.20 am in order days of the deployment in Helmand. to finish the sitting by noon, if that is acceptable to General Sir Peter Wall: In February 2005, when I had the Committee and our witnesses. That will explain the rank of Major-General, I assumed the job in the why I might try to rush things through, in a sense, to Permanent Joint Headquarters of Deputy Chief of get to those timings. Joint Operations. I was responsible for the day-to-day CDS, would you be kind enough to introduce your running of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and team? At some stage, we will also need you all to go anywhere else we had to go. I did that job for almost through the positions you occupied in 2006? exactly two years, until February 2007. In the context General Sir David Richards: Thank you very much. of the questions I think you are going to ask us today, It is a pleasure to be here doing our constitutional that means that I was directly involved in all the duty. We are grateful for the Committee’s work on planning for the deployment to Afghanistan after the behalf of defence generally, so it is genuinely good to key strategic decisions has been taken. I was also be here. We have agreed that all we are going to do responsible for the oversight from the Northwood end today is to make sure that we tell you the truth so that of operations in Helmand through 2006. you can do your work properly. For the record, my team is General Sir Nick Houghton, who is Vice Chief Q670 Chair: Thank you. I think you may all have of the Defence Staff, and General Sir Peter Wall, who had an opportunity to see on the Committee’s website is the Chief of the General Staff. Would it help if we the evidence given by previous witnesses, including said now what we did in 2006? Lord Reid and General Fry. If, from your perspective, Chair: I think it would. there is anything in that evidence that you wish to General Sir David Richards: IwasaNATOofficer correct, please take the opportunity this morning to in that period. Just to remind you, I was commander do so. of the ARRC. In November 2004, the then Prime The first question is this: do you think it was wise to Minister, Tony Blair, said that HQ ARRC would take push for the deployment to Helmand in 2006? What responsibility for exercising command and control was your own role in that deployment and the decision over NATO’s agreed expansion into the South and to go into Helmand? East. I went to COMARRC in January 2005, and I General Sir David Richards: Remembering that by was in that capacity throughout the 2006–07 period then I was in my NATO role—General Houghton and that you are looking at. General Wall probably have more explicit knowledge General Sir Nicholas Houghton: At the beginning of what happened in this country—the decision to go of 2006, I was in Iraq as the Senior British Military into Helmand was on the back of a much bigger and Representative. I did that job from early October 2005 more important decision for NATO to go into the to late March 2006. It is probably pertinent that prior South and East. Britain had been absolutely to that I was the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff supportive of that decision in principle, which, for (Operations) in the Ministry of Defence. I was, what it’s worth, I thought at the time was right, therefore, the two-star deputy of General Sir Rob Fry, because the campaign needed gingering up. who has given evidence to the Committee. I was Someone had to decide which province would be therefore aware of some of the material related to the taken by each of the four lead nations in the decision genesis of the commitment in 2006, but for the last to go into the South—the Canadians, the British, the three months of 2005 and the first three months of Dutch and, to a degree, the Romanians, with Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 143

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American support. That process led to the UK going the South and the East to NATO command. That level into Helmand. Someone had to do Helmand, and we of competence was in demand, which of course were the most capable of the four nations. I personally implied a national commitment. Down at the regional thought that there was a stronger case for going into level, where there was a pretty light presence prior to Kandahar, but we ended up in Helmand for reasons our planning for this, the onus was put on us to try to that I suspect Nick and Peter know more about than work with the other nations that were going to be part I do. of this quadrilateral combo down south to start putting General Sir Nicholas Houghton: In a certain respect, together the concept of operations, and a lot of that the question has three parts: was it right to go; was it was done in PJHQ. right to go to Helmand; and was it right to go then? As for why Helmand, the Canadians were very clear On the question of whether it was right to go to that their ambition was to play a dominant role in this, Southern Afghanistan at all, that was, in many and it would not be putting words in their mouth to respects, a strategic and political level decision, the say that they pitched their ambition to be a key player genesis of which was within the UNSCR and a in Kandahar, because of its locus vis-à-vis Kabul, and discussion at the political level in NATO to galvanise because of its importance in the region. Helmand was the nature of both the international community and the next place that you looked at in this mosaic, and NATO, on the international community’s behalf, to it was of course consistent with the fact that the UK, bring about strategic change within Afghanistan—in through the Foreign Office at the time, had the G8 terms of it being an unsafe place that was host to lead for counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, and international terrorism and for which the delivery of Helmand was a significant element of that issue. A good government and governance was essential. In number of factors led to Helmand being the place terms of going, the genesis of that, from an where we ended up planning on going. international political level, was right. On Helmand—Peter will have some views about this Q671 Mr Hancock: When these decisions were as well—it was inevitable that the United Kingdom, being made about going into Helmand, what was the as a leading player within NATO, had to play a perception of what you expected to find when you got leading part in what was assessed to be, as it were, there, and who was giving you that view? the most challenging part of the country. Therefore, it General Sir Peter Wall: We put in an awful lot of needed to be somewhere in the South. Within the effort through the middle of 2005 to try to understand context of the various decision making during 2005, what was going on there in light of the existing it was quite clear that the Canadians were very keen Operation Enduring Freedom presence. In the case of to take on Kandahar. Helmand was the next most Helmand, that was a Provincial Reconstruction Team appropriate place to go. Helmand, by dint of the with a small protection force that was very much political deal that attended who did what in the South, involved in dispensing reasonably large sums of as it were, was the right place. money to a relatively quiescent population. It came Was it the right time? That is the only thing over on the back of the previous US AID and American which I might hesitate because, in terms of strategic enthusiasm that had led to the development of decision making relating to committing at that time, Helmand in the 1950s as an agricultural area with the some of it—certainly from my knowledge in 2005— Kajaki dam, the Helmand river valley and so on—it was based on a realistic but subsequently optimistic was all a sort of extrapolation of that. As well as that, view of what our level of commitment in Iraq would they had done some military operations. They had a be by then. In actual fact, the level of reduction in couple of battle groups in the South, a couple of Task commitment to Iraq that had been forecast and hoped Forces and quite a lot of helicopters that used to make for in 2005 had not actually materialised in early occasional forays into parts of Helmand and 2006, but I sense that there was an irreversibility, Kandahar. We spent a lot of our time trying to given the political and international level of the anticipate what sort of force we would need to decision, and it was at no detriment to the selection propagate governance from the centre of Helmand and of the most robust force package. the most populated areas, eventually with a view to General Sir Peter Wall: Going to the business of “was delivering wider security. That was the key question it right”, I am not sure that we are best placed to judge in our minds through 2005. here. Certainly from where I sat, what I detected from February 2005—at which point the UK presence in Q672 Mr Havard: I wanted to ask about the whole Afghanistan was in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, pretty business of intelligence. In large parts—in the benign environments—was a very strong sense of a Helmand part of the south—the Americans had about burgeoning prospect of insecurity in the South that 100 people wandering around that huge geographical needed to be nipped in the bud. All I detected in PJHQ area. As you say, the assessment seemed to be that it was very strong momentum coming out of London for was a fairly benign area. I remember visiting 16 Air us to get engaged in this in a very constructive way. Assault Brigade before it deployed, and discussing There was no sense of any tentative commitment here. with those people what they thought they were about After all, the ARRC headquarters under David had to encounter. A couple of weeks later I discussed with been identified as the sort of level of commitment that them in theatre what they had actually experienced, was going to be needed to galvanise a result within and quite clearly, their intelligence had exponentially the tolerances of the Americans, who were going to increased because they had come up against tribes and cede their Operation Enduring Freedom presence in so on. We did not seem to have any graded Ev 144 Defence Committee: Evidence

11 May 2011 General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen and General Sir Nicholas Houghton KCB CBE ADC Gen intelligence of any quality about what that brigade Lashkar Gah area that there was a good picture was about to encounter. Was there a failure in terms building up, which was pretty positive and benign. of the intelligence? The crux of the problem was when we went into the General Sir Peter Wall: I absolutely accept that what North and arguably turned up a hornets’ nest, but no we found when we had forces on the ground was one could know that until they did it. Although there starkly different from what we had anticipated and will always be lapses in intelligence—it’s a nirvana to hoped for. To be fair, we had discussed with Ed Butler, think that you’re going to know everything that you who was initially going to mount his force out of would wish to know about your enemy—the processes Kandahar, that there might be situations in which the were in place to deliver the best we could. troops would have to fight their way, certainly down As is historically the case, it is not until you get on Highway 1 to Lashkar Gah. The idea that they would the ground and start braving out, and really get to saunter into Lashkar Gah, set up camp and get on with know what is what, that your intelligence picture will good deeds was not what we anticipated. We were start to develop much more rapidly. That is ready for an adverse reaction, but to be fair we did historically the case in every conflict, and I have to not expect it to be as vehement as it turned out to be. say that, despite all of our high-techery, it will We did a number of things over the preceding six continue to be so. months to try and anticipate the intelligence situation. General Sir Peter Wall: If I might add, in my list of We set up a preliminary operations team under the things that we did I was not, in any way, trying to then Colonel Messenger, which was a cross- pretend that this wasn’t a failure of intelligence. It governmental team to make a plan called the Helmand clearly was. Reinforcing CDS’s point, we had always Road Map—we did not at the time plan to build many anticipated Taliban potential intent; what we probably roads, but we’re getting on with that now. It was underestimated was their capacity. euphemistically a plan to meld the security operation with all the development activity, building on the Q673 Mr Havard: I would like to hear what General experiences of the cross-Government effort in Iraq Houghton has to say. You occupied a particular which—it is no secret—was not that finely tuned. It position at this time, and perhaps you could address was an opportunity to take the lessons of Iraq and get the question of whether or not there was the things right in cross-governmental terms. possibility of delay as a consequence of knowledge? One of the other things that had not gone terribly well General Sir Nicholas Houghton: I wouldn’t have in Iraq if we are honest, was our understanding of the said it was delay because of knowledge. My point on situation and our ability to garner the fullest that was whether or not, if you’d been able to wind intelligence picture down to tribal level. That was back the strategic clock on decision making, there absolutely on the tip of our tongues throughout the would have been an ability to de-conflict more the whole period. We were not about to emulate the resource demands of two separate operations. inadequacies of our Iraq efforts, and as far as we were concerned we were stretching every sinew to get the Q674 Mr Havard: I’m sorry; de-conflict two picture as clear as possible. We were understudying different operations? our US predecessors, and UK intelligence agencies General Sir Nicholas Houghton: Our commitment to were actively engaged, including with their American Iraq stayed at a higher level for longer than was counterparts. There was wide consultation with anticipated in the original genesis of the planning. academics. We even had an ex-mujaheddin guy on our Chair: We will come on to that later. staff in PJHQ; he had fought there in his university General Sir Nicholas Houghton: Iwantedtoadda gap years. We had a red team in our intelligence cell, couple of things to the business of whether this was a under Brigadier Newton—now General Newton— failure of intelligence. To an extent, as Peter and CDS who has a bit of history of shedding light on what say, it is. Intelligence is not a perfect science. Some might happen in these situations. I cannot complain people think that if you apply your intelligence to the about the quality of people that we had working for intelligence then the future can be defined with us at PJHQ. We were working really hard, with 16th certainty; that is not at all the case. Reflecting on it, Brigade and everybody else, to try to get the best however, I think that there were a number of incipient assessment of what might meet us when we hit the factors that emerged in those early months that better ground. explain why the hornets’ nest was as it was. General Sir David Richards: If I may just add, I was The first, I would say, is the attendant factor of poppy doing parallel work in the ARRC, and I remember a eradication at the time of deployment. There was, number of meetings with Lord Reid. It is not my job therefore, in the minds of some local Helmandis and to defend politicians and their statements, but because within the narrative of the Taliban, the idea that these we were not certain—and there was, in some respects, arriving forces are coming here to eradicate their a failure of intelligence, despite the efforts to get it poppy and take their living away. That worked against right—he gave the taskforce Apache helicopters, us, in terms of strategic narrative. It was agonised over artillery, and all of that sort of thing, because we had the summer, and in subsequent poppy eradication to be prepared for the unexpected. I think that the nub campaigns. Linked to that, as we’ve found in of the problem is that we could not know enough retrospect, is that this is the natural start of the fighting about the northern parts of Helmand until we got season, if a fight is to be had. Something like 200,000 there. There was just no way one could do it because casual labourers migrate north from Pakistan to it was basically enemy territory. It was only in the conduct the poppy harvest in Helmand alone. They Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 145

11 May 2011 General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen and General Sir Nicholas Houghton KCB CBE ADC Gen are very happy to stay on as guns for hire if there is a it is on public record in a number of books on the local tribal fight in which they can earn some money. subject, I personally was opposed to what became We only need 2% or 3% to stay on and we have 4,000 known as the platoon house concept. I was very fighters fighting a cause. In many ways, the poppy forgiving of Brigadier Butler’s need to respond to eradication gave them a cause. some very strong political pressure, largely from The third thing is that as part of the preparation for our Governor Daoud. However, it was to a degree arrival, the Americans in CJTF 76 were conducting a instigated—this is all quite natural, by the way—by series of kinetic operations that culminated in President Karzai, who felt that at the very moment Operation Mountain Thrust, which in many ways was that NATO was on the brink of taking over part of their desire to create an easy entry for us. responsibility that things were beginning to slip away Because it was a particularly kinetic operation and from him on the back of a resurgent Taliban in a there was much to-ing and fro-ing about the degree to number of places that included Northern Helmand. which we could moderate this on a nation-to-nation The British—who, from my perspective, were just basis, it is possible that it also acted to whip up the another nation that had responsibility or were going environment. to have responsibility—came under a lot of pressure The fourth and last point is that—for reasons not to to respond to the essentially political requirement of do with the Ministry of Defence; I think it was FCO- President Karzai’s to be seen to be doing more about led or whatever—decisions were made about what the what was happening north of Helmand. However, it nature of the governance and in particular the absolutely ties in with General Houghton’s point that, governor in Helmand should be. A character that will on the back of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada’s be known to many of you—SMA or Sher Mohammed replacement by Daoud, there were a lot of internal Akhundzada—was removed as Governor and a new political pressures in Kabul, stirred up to a degree by Governor called Daoud was put in. The net effect of SMA, who was saying, “I was running a very good this—I think it was not thought through, but I am not show.” Daoud, his replacement—by the way, to a an expert on this—was completely to destabilise the tribal balance and the balance of power within degree that was a British-inspired move, as Nick Northern Helmand. said—had to show progress. So Brigadier Butler was I am just making the point that, yes, lots of the put in a very difficult position. It was not the tactical rigorous intelligence that Peter describes was carried plan that we had agreed, but it was the eventual aim. out. That led to a fairly robust force package that was They had to bring it forward. As you all know, the able to deal with the hostile environment. If you put troop ratios to implement that were not in place and together the narcotics, the Taliban narrative, the it became a pretty fraught year. fighting season, the American kinetic operations that General Sir Peter Wall: Perhaps I will pick up the were a prelude and accompaniment to our deployment story. This was not a decision that was made by and then this upsetting of the tribal balance, you have Brigadier Butler—the tactical commander—alone. He a more comprehensive explanation of why the did it in consultation with PJHQ, anticipating that this situation on the ground was not that which would be the case. We had articulated, as I think Lord intelligence had forecast. Reid has said to you, that this would be tactically Chair: That was a fascinating answer: although long, undesirable, but it was the sort of thing for which it was not one that I have heard before. I am grateful political pressure was starting to build. It was to you for that. We have to move on quite rapidly. something that those on the UK side in other Departments who had worked very hard to put in Q675 Ms Stuart: Did the appointment of Hugh Daoud in place of Akhundzada had equities in. Powell at that time into Helmand affect things as It so happened that I was on a programmed visit to well? Lashkar Gah at the point when this crisis started to General Sir Nicholas Houghton: No, Hugh wasn’t unfold. The timing of it was driven because the there at that time. Hugh was part of a change in C2 Taliban had the district centres in Northern Helmand 12 months later. under pressure. On Governor Daoud’s perception, particularly bearing in mind his lack of tribal Q676 Mrs Moon: I’d like to talk about mission influence, for the reasons that Nick has talked about, change. You have seen the evidence that we received he was not able to pull this off with behind-the-scenes from Brigadier Butler, in which he says that he didn’t politicking. There was, undoubtedly, pressure coming take the decision alone. Will you explain how the from the Akhundzada axis. If the Government flag had decision was made, who was involved and why the fallen in any of these district centres and the Taliban decision was made then? Why at that point? flag had replaced it—it was totemic stuff like that; it General Sir David Richards: I can start. I was not was the battle of the flagpoles in some ways—the UK responsible at the time for the South; I took over on effort, in terms of its recognition of Afghan political 31 July, but I was monitoring what was happening, motivation from the district level through the and discussed it with General Eikenberry, who in provincial level and all the way up to the national theory had responsibility for what was happening at level, as David has suggested, would have been in that time within Helmand, Kandahar and the rest of political jeopardy. Its credibility would have been in the South. I took over from him at the end of July. question at the time when a UK-led headquarters was I don’t think it is fair to describe it as a change of starting to take ownership of the operation in the mission. It was a change of tactics. Although I know round. Ev 146 Defence Committee: Evidence

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Any suggestion that this was a whim by Brigadier Q677 Chair: What date was that? Butler on the day is a falsehood. Everybody else, as General Sir Nicholas Houghton: It was 24 May. far as I know, was aware of this—they were closely At the following meeting, on 31 May, I was able to involved. The military tactical risks were considered. report that the platoon house concept was bedding It was accepted that this could be done at measured down well. There had been a good local reaction to it. risk for a limited time frame, and that we would start I think at that time I raised the first concern. The to have real logistic stresses if it then got extended Chiefs had previously persuaded themselves that this beyond a short-term period to shore up the security would probably be resource-neutral. I said, “No, if this of these district centres, essentially to keep Governor is to be sustained over time, it will put additional Daoud in power. pressure on our logistics and sustainability in There is a wider question that we ought to throw into manpower terms.” That was reinforced a week later— the mix. Most of the questioning that I have had on on 7 June—when I said, “Yes, and there’s a helicopter this—the BBC is making a documentary about it at dimension to this.” At that stage, it was proposed to the moment, and there are various books on it—does do it for only one month, due to the initial political not come at it from the position of what would have concern that Engineer Daoud’s governorship would be happened had we just stuck to plan A and taken no undermined in what Peter graphically referred to as account of a changing situation, which is not normally the battle of the flagpoles. The black flag of Mullah a recognised military approach. I believe that we Omar flying over a number of district centres would would have had a political failure. We would have had probably have been end of mission for Daoud, as it a significant credibility problem in terms of the UK were. As the minutes record, there was a sensible initiative in the South and in the wider integration of conversation that the nature of the platoon house the two missions. And we would still have had a hell concept would be resource-intensive. To the tactical of a fight with the Taliban; it’s just that it probably commander and to me—and I think to David, with would have happened much closer to Gereshk and whom we were having conversations off—the bigger Lashkar Gah—in the centres of population rather in concern was that it would come to a situation where the more remote districts. So it would actually have too great a percentage of the force was fixed in place, had a much bigger resonance had we not done this, rather than being able to manoeuvre. The narrative even though the outcome was very unattractive. and dialogue of whether we were over-fixed and General Sir Nicholas Houghton: I agree with all that needed to manoeuvre more played out during the summer and informed various troop uplifts. To go has gone before. This was not a change of mission, back even earlier, on 3 May, the Chiefs of Staff but it was a change of tactical lay-down to deliver on committee noted the fact that there would be a that mission. Peter has talked about the non- requirement for an earlier and more significant discretionary nature in support of that mission of deployment to the north of Helmand to support the having to support the local government and governance of Daoud. governance of Afghanistan, particularly Governor I say all this to dismiss any idea that this was Daoud. You cannot prove a negative, but I also take happening in a black box of military decision making Peter’s view that to have done otherwise could have that was not completely open to both the Chiefs of undermined the operation from the outset. Staff and Ministers at the time. It is quite right that The bit where I can perhaps add more value is the Lord Reid had no part of it; he had gone by then. I business regarding the degree of visibility of all this haven’t seen his transcript, but my memories of Lord and the decision making back in town. As Chief of Browne are that he was understanding and wholly Joint Operations, with the team, one of my supportive about the judgments of the tactical fundamental responsibilities was to give the best commander on the ground, and who could see through possible understanding to decision makers back in the optics of political necessity the need to do this. London of what was happening in theatre so that we The realities of the resource intensity quickly became did not go on some strategic divergence without the known as May turned into June, in a context of political authority to do that. everybody understanding what was going on. It was I won’t bore you endlessly, but I dug out the best not some compartmentalised military adventurism. record of all this, which is probably the Chiefs of Staff minutes of May and early June. I think it is clear from Q678 Chair: I have not quite understood what Brigadier Ed Butler’s record of the Chiefs of Staff, transferred this from being a one-month process to and borne out by the minutes of 24 May, that Ed something more. Butler briefed the Chiefs about the proposed platoon General Sir Nicholas Houghton: At the outset, it was house concept. The actual investments were 26th and said, “Just for one month,” to see whether this new 27th to Sangin, and 28th to Musa Qala and Now Zad, disposition would work. It was almost a trial from even though there had been presences there in the which we could draw back if necessary. There was a build-up period. In the battle procedure—if I can call running dialogue as to whether staying in NawZad it that—of the Ministry of Defence, a chiefs of staff made sense. You need to have been in the guts of the committee meeting is immediately followed by a thing at the time. Tactically, it was precarious; ministerial briefing. Ed Butler stayed on for that strategically, it was not vital. Musa Qala was different. ministerial briefing and briefed on the proposed You will remember that as the year went on, it was concept. I won’t be exhaustive, but over the next two decided, at the time that 16 Brigade were leaving and meetings— 3 Commando Brigade arrived, that it was important to Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 147

11 May 2011 General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen and General Sir Nicholas Houghton KCB CBE ADC Gen create the circumstances under which we could get State had not been around, the next senior Minister out of Musa Qala. It was too dangerous to hold and it would have been. was not of strategic benefit to us. A deal was arranged, Chair: Thank you, CGS. politically led by Engineer Daoud. From memory, it was a 14-point plan for the raising of local police, Q680 John Glen: May I turn to the assessment of under which ISAF came out. There were local police troop levels around this time: what assessment was there and ANP there, and a deal was done on made by the MoD of troop levels and whether there governance. was sufficient investment of new resources as required After that initial month, there was a constant in May, June, July? We have had evidence before that discussion about where we should come out of and there are significant strains leading up to this point where did we need to stay. It was determined there anyway about the sufficiency of resources to deal with was a need to stay in Sangin for the longer period; the tasks in Helmand. Perhaps you could clarify what Now Zad not so; and to come out of Musa Qala. There was probably never a specific date when the overall changed at this point and whether it was sufficient to decision to adopt a lay-down was made, but you deal with what was required. incrementally moved to a lay-down that better General Sir Nicholas Houghton: When Lord Stirrup balanced available resources, static security and the became CDS, he was clear that if there is a ability to manoeuvre. If I am honest—Peter might requirement for the theatre and the commanders can have his own view on this—we collectively breathed refine it and justify it, he will do his best to deliver on a sigh of PJHQ relief when 3 Commando Brigade it. One of the early ones was a requirement for more were in and settled. They brought additional helicopter lift. That was translated not into more equipment and additional manoeuvre capability, and it helicopters out there, but into an uplift in the ration was a far more balanced lay-down, but we had of helicopter hours. That was by flying them harder, successfully got through that initial deployment sending out more spares and all that. That was without it undermining the local governorship of relatively early on, by the end of June. Afghanistan. There are three other big things that I recall. Many of General Sir Peter Wall: I absolutely support them may surprise you. One is that the most important everything that Nick has said. The simple answer was resource concern at the time, having re-read the that the problem for Daoud did not go away. He had minutes, was the force protection of Kandahar air field not managed in the time that was bought in the early and the concern over the loss of a strategic AT aircraft. weeks to secure his political influence over the That led to the deployment of a force protection governance of those districts. Others were actively squadron of the Royal Air Force that summer. There orchestrating against him. That was why it carried on. was this thought that it could strategically unhinge this Chair: We have got to move on if we are going to campaign, if one of the strategic AT was shot down. get on to the current operations. The second is the realisation that the R and R plot meant that 15% of the force came out six weeks in. Q679 Mrs Moon: Can I clarify whether the There was the backfilling of the R and R plot, ministerial briefing was of Lord Browne? Which primarily by the Royal Irish, and then there was an Ministers were present? Lord Browne in his engineer surge to increase the pace of the build of presentation to us said that it was briefed to him, but Bastion. It was not a matter of needing 10 more for the retrospectively. platoon; they were higher level concerns about what Chair: Is that right? resource was needed. Throughout the last five years, General Sir Nicholas Houghton: To be honest, there there has been a constant debate, which matches the are no minutes or record that I can interrogate to try dynamics of the theatre and the demands of the to assemble the detail of this—or that I have had time resources. Those were the early ones as I recall. to. Ed Butler briefed on 24 May. Lord Browne was at the ministerial briefing that followed. At that time, Q681 Mr Havard: But the shape of the deployment there had already been some investment—that’s a at that time, to take General David’s point, was about military phrase—of military presence in many of manoeuvre capability and support. The initial those, but it might have been only temporary for a particular operation and then come out again. The optimistic assessment by John Reid, when the whole formal adoption of the platoon house concept was thing was meant to go about, was that the US would consequent on that briefing. That was not a decision come in with all sorts of helicopter support and there brief, per se, but 26th and 27th formally invested into were all sorts of promises of additional resources from Sangin, and I am pretty certain that Musa Qala and elsewhere to carry out the deployment. Its shape NawZad was the 28th. But that is not to say that there changes and the needs change dramatically. Where had not been running battles with people going in and was the ability to meet those needs to give you that coming out prior to that time. Therefore the supply and manoeuvre capability? emergence of the idea of the platoon house concept, General Sir Nicholas Houghton: You are quite right. and some people in these places, pre-dated that We went in with certain bridging agreements with the briefing. Americans for the supply of certain things, to get us General Sir Peter Wall: I think I would add that those established. One thing you have to remember is that briefings were not the only ways in which we the full operating capability of the deploying taskforce conveyed information to Ministers. If the Secretary of was not due until 1 July. Ev 148 Defence Committee: Evidence

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Q682 Mr Havard: But the enemy had made that General Sir David Richards: Looking at it from a different. distance, as I did in Kabul, it was very clear that the General Sir Nicholas Houghton: There was still only British were going to get into, and were getting into, a pace at which you can get out. There is a thing adifficult situation. Having been involved at the time called the DOAS, which is the desired order of with both Nick and Peter in trying to generate a good arrival—Tim will know the acronym. We changed it plan, it is that very understanding that led to the around, to get more bayonets out there more quickly, original very cautious plan, which was that we go into because we were employing as we were deploying the Lashkar Gah and consolidate there and only force. The idea was that those bridging things from cautiously over time start to push out. the Americans would run out at the point of full War, and you all understand this, is a bummer. Politics operational capability, when all our helicopters and and the enemy have a vote. I am afraid that we, the people had deployed. That was the end of the bridging military, had to respond to the reality of the aspect. We did incremental uplifts, such as helicopter developing situation on the ground. I was slightly hours, force protection and all those sorts of things. critical at the time, as everyone knows, but I was full The next major change was the change out of 16 of admiration, as a NATO commander, for both our Brigade and 3 Brigade. They came with a larger force, political masters, who, as Nick said, were very with a greater amount of protected mobile equipment, supportive. Des Browne could not have been more primarily their Viking vehicle. supportive, and he knew the problems. The military, particularly 3 Para, had one battle group effective. Q683 Chair: CGS, is there anything you want to add That is all that 16 Brigade really consisted of. They to what the VCDS has said? behaved magnificently to respond to changing tactical General Sir Peter Wall: No, Chair. I will just endorse and political situations. We were inevitably going to that it was not easy for us to find a net theatre-ready take time to recover. If you look at it over not six uplift instantaneously. I cannot remember the airlift months, but two years or five years, things are much situation, but it probably would not have been easy to better. But that is the way that wars tend to develop. get it there either, in an acclimatised and suitably We were no better than our predecessors. trained way. Therefore, we were able to put people General Sir Peter Wall: In preparing for this, I read on the ground. On enablers, however, which were the the article by Anthony King that has been referred to critical drivers here—as Ed Butler has told you—this in previous evidence. I think some of his analysis is was going to be incremental. Not quite a game of quite compelling. His concentration versus dispersion inches, but incremental. It was not about more thing is probably oversimplified, because it is about airframes; it was about more hours. It was about more tactics, rather than politics. We could be having an spares, more fluid ammunition supply, and logistics even more difficult conversation about this had our and that sort of stuff. soldiers not stepped up to the plate and delivered in a situation that turned out to be very different from the Q684 John Glen: What do you think the implications one that was anticipated. were of that constraint? Last week, Lord Stirrup told us that the Apache force was still forming when it was Q685 Chair: You have made a very valuable point. deployed. What is your assessment of the implications We have not yet analysed what would have happened of these very restricted means at a time of increased if we had acted differently. need? We take the general point about there being General Sir Peter Wall: Brigadier Butler, with our infinite demands from the theatre and limited means, complete support, adapted his tactical plan, but the but we are trying to get to an assessment. At that point soldiery stepped up to the plate and delivered against in time, what impact did the constraint have on the it in some very tough circumstances, which we need theatre? to record. General Sir Peter Wall: We need to go back to the General Sir Nicholas Houghton: Within the strategic constraint we were put under in terms of the original priorities of both the theatre and the nation, as I have force size. It was only ever going to be what we call explained, Helmand was coping quite well. We tend a small-scale deployment with a theatre platform, to focus on it being a drama and that it was all about bearing in mind that it was a new venue, if you like. to fall, but the report of July said that nothing that is We tailored a force within a level of 3,150. You have happening on a military basis is at all a strategic threat heard about the costing regime and all of that sort of to the mission. David can speak at length about that. stuff, which was for the first three years. For our part His concern, as came out the time, was more about we were planning for longer than that, but that was what was going on in Kandahar and in the Canadian the endorsed assurance. So we did not have more stuff area. That could have strategically unhinged the standing by, whether it was enabling activity or whole campaign. combat units. The psyche was very much to live Going back to the minutes, which I have fallen in love within that volume. with over the past 48 hours, it is amazing to recognise Your wider point is pertinent to the discussion we how much Afghanistan was the second fiddle to what might have this afternoon. We are tending to design was going on in Iraq. In Iraq there had been a year of our aspirations for the future in fairly tight, minimalist the Samarra mosque—the golden mosque—bombing. bundles that don’t lend themselves to being resilient A Government hadn’t been seated. Where a civil war against changing events and situations that in some might go was on everybody’s lips. There was the cases are unavoidable. preparedness for an operation called Salamanca, and Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 149

11 May 2011 General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen and General Sir Nicholas Houghton KCB CBE ADC Gen then Sinbad. That is what drips from the minutes of possible, but they were all on the job. I could not the time, not actually a deployment that was coping have had a more receptive audience and as soon as the and getting through. That is without suddenly British could get more, in the shape of 3 Commando departing off to Lebanon; I had forgotten the fact that Brigade, we got them in. in the middle of all this for a month in summer we I would have thought that every nation had been conducted an evacuation operation in Lebanon. The caught by surprise by the developing events of 2006. idea that there was this intensity of concern—it I have often pondered whether those people who took probably did not feel like that in the context of the the decision to deploy NATO into the South and East time. in late 2004 would have done so if they knew what they were confronting in 2006. I cannot tell you the Q686 Mr Hancock: I only wish we had had the same answer, and I suspect that they would have had to, but opportunity as you, General, of seeing the minutes nevertheless everyone was suffering in the same way. that you refer to, which you have become so This takes time to generate. The legal and media affectionately attached to. We have been denied that scrutiny—as you know very well—and, rightly, your opportunity, and it would have been nice for us to scrutiny to make sure that we put troops properly have had the same thing. I also think it is strange that prepared, trained and equipped into theatre today in searching for his evidence, Des Browne could find means that it is just impossible to chuck troops in a little or no record of many of the things that were hurry at a problem, because we have a duty of great referred to in conversations of which there appear to care to them to make sure it is done as well as it be no minutes. possibly can be. I hope this has placed it in context; May I ask you about the situation? You realised very it wasn’t for want of pestering people. quickly that things needed to be changed: within a matter of days, in fact, if you look at that time frame. Q691 Chair: I am afraid that we have already way General Sir Peter Wall: Yes. overrun on the 2006 aspect of what happened. I am grateful to all three of you for this, and indeed to Q687 Mr Hancock: Then you have the increased everybody who has taken part in this inquiry into the deployment in July. Was it enough, General? You 2006 aspect, because we are not trying to say, “It was were there; you were knowledgeable about the your fault,” or, “It was your fault.” What we are trying deterioration in the situation, and the realisation that to do is to work out how we as a nation can try to it was far worse and it was going to be a long job improve on the way we do things. Is there anything rather than a short job. Was that deployment in 2006 on the 2006 aspect of moving into Helmand and enough, and did it happen quickly enough? Could you moving into the platoon houses that any of you have got troops there sooner? feels—I think this is particularly addressed to you, General Sir Peter Wall: To be honest, I can’t recall CGS—there is a key point you would like to add, how we were thinking about this at the time. I suspect which we have not yet covered? Or should we move there were practical limits to the rate at which we on to current operations? could build up the force. The fact that we carried on General Sir Peter Wall: No, I think I am content that building it over the winter and in the following year, everything that is important has been exposed both and because of this business of being fixedinset today and in the evidence that I have kept track of locations we contributed from the UK an air assault from previous witnesses. air mobile reserve battle group for the wider RC South use, suggests to me that we probably were not bold Q692 Chair: CDS? enough from the get-go. I cannot remember the General Sir David Richards: No, I am happy, Chair. precise details. Thank you.

Q688 Mr Hancock: What part did you three have in Q693 Chair: VCDS? setting the numbers that were going to be deployed General Sir Nicholas Houghton: Happy. in July? Chair: Moving on to current operations in General Sir Peter Wall: We would have put forward Afghanistan, Julian Brazier. propositions that the folks in the Ministry of Defence at the time would have taken a view on. Q694 Mr Brazier: CDS, I am going to give you three questions on current operations together, Q689 Mr Hancock: Did you ask for more than was because as the Chair mentioned we are running out of delivered? time. In general terms, what is your feel about them? General Sir Peter Wall: I don’t recall. More specifically, can you also say something about the relationship between UK and US forces, and Q690 Mr Hancock: You don’t recall? specifically about progress in training the Afghan General Sir David Richards: I was the NATO army and police force? Perhaps they are easier to deal commander, and I can tell you that I was asking every with as a body, rather than individually. nation for more, well before 31 July. I remember General Sir David Richards: Thank you. First of all, having very constructive conversations particularly just to remind you, a new strategy was agreed at with General Houghton and with Air Chief Marshal Lisbon in November, and that is what we are now Stirrup, in which it was very patiently explained to me getting on and implementing. It was on the back of that because of the demands of Iraq it was not the US surge, to which we contributed a little bit, a Ev 150 Defence Committee: Evidence

11 May 2011 General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen and General Sir Nicholas Houghton KCB CBE ADC Gen year earlier. That strategy is to intensify military of the Americans, which is worth reminding ourselves pressure through the surge on the Taliban; to of as they increasingly have a very difficult challenge aggressively grow the Afghan National Security in the east of the country. I have no complaints about Forces, including the new Afghan local police; to helicopters at the moment. We cannot get a complaint develop local as well as central Government capacity, out of our soldiers about kit. When I see what they with a real focus on local governance; and have, I am almost embarrassed that they have too concurrently to work what are known as reconciliation much good kit. and reintegration strands of operation—reconciliation Non-military activity? At the time we were at first is the higher-level stuff, and reintegration is more perhaps overly critical of our non-military local—with the aim of bringing people who are tired counterparts, saying that things did not start quickly of the fighting or disillusioned back into the fold. enough in Helmand. I have to say that today, it is Specifically on your three questions, the military is excellent. DFID is doing an outstanding job. The setting the conditions for success in some of those FCO—I was attending a conference yesterday, and we other areas—i.e. military and tactical operations. We are very close. The SIS and the GCHQ could not be are ensuring that the ANSF grows in the very closer. I think we are learning the lessons, and we now aggressive time frame that an outstanding American have three or four years to deliver. General, Bill Caldwell, is leading on. To give you a Finally, command and control was weak in 2006; I feel for it, because I was very usefully tipped off that have been very critical of it. Today, we have a national you would ask this question, Bill has told me that the contingent commander who is charged with making 31 March target for the ANA was a total of 155,000. sure that this “six month-itis”, that you have rightly On 31 March, the total was standing at 159,000, so it picked up on, is no longer possible. We are much is ahead of its numbers—I will return to quality in a more fully integrated into the NATO operation, which moment. The police target was 122,000, and the total is run, as we all know, by the outstanding military stood at 125,000 at the end of March. The targets for commander of our age, David Petraeus. I do not want 31 October are 171,600 and 134,000 respectively, and to paint too rosy a picture—there will be lots of when I spoke to him two days ago in preparation for challenges in the next three years—but we have this session, he told me that they are ahead of them. learned our lessons, and we are determined to If the core of our strategy is transition in all its aspects succeed. from, in our case in particular, NATO-ISAF operations to ANSF-run operations, that seems to be on track. I Q695 Mr Brazier: One quick supplementary on that, would not say that it is without drama and pitfalls if I may. I was impressed with both of the units doing ahead. You can grow numbers, but can you police mentoring that I visited over there, in Helmand institutionalise the necessary qualities to sustain it the Argylls from my own constituency, and in Kabul beyond 2014? The jury is out on that. It will be a the National Guard cavalry unit. The question that has difficult thing to be certain of until about the end of next year, but—my goodness me—General Caldwell, to be put, however, is: how are we doing on recruiting and a lot of British officers by the way, could not be Southern Pashtuns, who are just over half the more aggressively pursuing that necessary population? There seems to be quite a serious issue requirement, as well as pure numbers. there for both the army and the police. US relations are excellent. You have three officers General Sir David Richards: It is a problem, and I here among many in the British Armed Forces who cannot disguise it from you. All that I can tell you is have been engaged in sustained military operations for that the proportions are rising. This is absolutely part 10 years. I know Dave Petraeus, Bill Caldwell and of the wider strategy. They will not join—this is Jim Mattis. They are all friends of ours, so, at the very common sense, I suppose—until they have a sense highest level, relations could not be closer. I and CGS that we are going to succeed and the Taliban are not had General Mattis in our offices yesterday, and going to go back into their village in 2014–15. I General Rodriguez, who is the IJC Commander, is a wouldn’t, you wouldn’t. The fact that it is now very good friend of ours, too. standing at about 5–8%—it changes, but is on an At the lower, tactical level, the US Marines have been upward path—is a good sign in itself. outstanding in the way that they, first of all, went into When I was there not long before you—and we went Helmand alongside us, and now are running that into this in some detail—I was taken into the ANP regional command. The relationship between our training area that the Argylls were leading on. I was forces and theirs, which we were a bit worried about introduced to a number of Southern Pashtuns, who I at one stage, because we were not certain about it, is do not think were stooges. They emphasised that their also outstanding, so I have absolutely no worries sense was that more and more were going to join. We about our relationship. Indeed, it is very important to are on the case and we know the importance of it. I us to preserve that relationship as a strategic think that, like a lot of other things to do with our requirement, because its strength is central to our strategy in Afghanistan, it is just too early to tell how ongoing success. On ANSF I think I’ve answered. successful we are going to be. I think if you were to Have we learned the lessons of 2006? Force ratios? invite us back in the autumn, that would be a very We had 3,000-odd in 2006, today it is just under good time to review it, and we could tell you whether 11,000, as the Secretary of State for Defence recently or not this year, first real year in which the surge and said in Parliament. Britain has the best force ratios in all of this extra effort starts to pay off, is indeed Afghanistan at the moment—indeed, we are the envy doing so. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 151

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Q696 Mr Hancock: May I ask whether those are the useless and incapable? They have never had such a figures for people who have gone through a training thing happen before. I would like to think, from the programme, or people who have gone through a reassurance that we have had, that they are content training programme and actually been retained? What they have learned the lessons and they will never let is the current strength of fully trained soldiers, as it happen again, but we have got to remember that the opposed to those who might have been trained but enemy is thinking and has a vote in these things. It have then been disaffected in some way? was a very audacious and, on the day, a very General Sir David Richards: The current paper successful break-out. strength is what I have told you: 159,000 on 31 I do not think that we should think that every prisoner March, 125,000 ANP. On any given day, it will be is about to escape from the number of secure locations less than that, but it is on an upward trajectory, as I in Afghanistan. As I said, it has not happened before. emphasised. I remember, when I was COMISAF, that I am clear that a lot of soul-searching went on and lots there were times we could not believe that such of people were sacked. If you go to Pul-e-Charkhi, as stupidities would happen—they were not being paid I have done on two occasions, the way they run their properly, and when they were paid they were paid in prison is a bit different from the way we run ours—it cash and robbed on the way home. These are very is a bit more chummy—but no one has ever broken basic things, but vital to the maintenance of morale. out of Pul-e-Charkhi before on that sort of scale. But All of those things have been sorted out: they are paid people do break out of our prisons occasionally—very through banks, believe it or not, and have all sorts of rarely, though. things that you might not associate with Afghanistan. General Sir Nicholas Houghton: HMP Maze. They are properly fed and housed, and their medical General Sir David Richards: When that happened in treatment is much better. The levels of absence and Northern Ireland, did you all write off the British desertion, which were standing at about 20% at one Armed Forces and the then Northern Ireland police? stage, are now much lower. [Interruption.] I am sure you didn’t. Did you? I am just saying that I do not think that we want to Q697 Mr Hancock: What would you estimate that is view it as a disaster. Actually, they have already taken now? What is the attrition factor now? back quite a lot. That is the context in which I would General Sir David Richards: Iwouldhavetocome set it. It was definitely a setback and it should not back to you with the accurate figure, but the sort of have happened, but as in all things, I ask: have they figure that I associate with it in my mind is around learned their lessons and could it happen again? I 5%. In terms of combat capability—those who are think it unlikely. available to fight on any given day—the figures stack up well against our own Armed Forces, for example. Q699 Mrs Moon: You made an analogy with the great escape. I would say that there was not, a short Q698 Ms Stuart: Of course they are paid through while after the great escape, a major assault and a Kabul banks. Let us hope that that does not go wrong. number of deaths in Berlin, for example, but that has I want to talk to you about what was not a break-out happened in Kandahar. Do you feel that the recent but a break-in to the prison in Lashkar Gah— violent and very successful attack on Kandahar would Chair: Kandahar. have taken place if this break-in/break-out had not Ms Stuart: Kandahar, sorry—and the fact that we happened? now have 450-odd people out there who, at one stage, General Sir David Richards: Again, that is a very we would rather have had inside some confined place. good question. I think it would have done. Our What does it tell us about the Afghan Government’s intelligence suggests there was planning for such. You ability to have secure prison places and the know that on 1 May, the great Taliban spring offensive implications of that? When the Foreign Secretary gave was supposed to have happened, and that was part of a statement in the House of Commons on that, I asked it. I think there is no doubt that some of those escapees him for a current assessment of how many secure who were capable fighters joined in that attack, and places there are. The written answer that I got back probably made it more difficult for us and the ANSF was an estimate of some 10,000 prison places. to respond, but I do not think the escape actually led Although there may be many places, what is your to it. I do not know whether you read the spring assessment of the Afghan Government’s ability to directive—it was on the internet. It was part of a detain people? number of things to persuade the international General Sir David Richards: It is a very interesting community and ISAF that they were on the front foot. question. We have gone into it in some detail, All that we know, from our own examination and obviously, because it is a natural concern for us if all reports from the American commanders on the our hard work ends up in a lot of people whom we ground, was that the response to that was remarkably would like to stay locked up escaping. good and has given people confidence that the ANSF A few things. First of all, when the great escape took is growing in capability in the way that we need to place in Germany in the second world war, did that ensure that we transition by the end of 2014. mean that we all thought the German Armed Forces The enemy—the Taliban—will continue to attack. The were completely incompetent? No, it did not. What I question is how we respond to it and increasingly can am really trying to say in a coded way is: should we the ANSF shoulder the burden? So far, things are extrapolate from a hugely audacious break-in and looking good, although I am sure there will be break-out that the whole Afghan Government is setbacks during the year. Ev 152 Defence Committee: Evidence

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General Sir Nicholas Houghton: Within the sure that as we transition out of the combat role, a dynamics of the campaign over time, quite often the percentage is put in the first instance in the training tactics of your enemy are indicative of their relative role. That is absolutely Government policy, and we strengths. From an early period in 2006–07, when the now have to make sure that we can deliver on that Taliban were effectively taking us on in conventional policy in our developing strategy. war, that migrated to the tactics of the IED. It could be this year—I do not want to pre-guess it—but if Q702 Mr Havard: Obviously the death of Osama now the tactics transform to selective and high-profile bin Laden has raised a series of questions, particularly hits against political targets, it is indicative that in the about US strategy in relation to Afghanistan. The dynamics of the enemy, their force ratio and what they question is whether they would now look for a more are capable of doing, that could be interpreted as a rapid withdrawal as a consequence with their attention reduction in their overall capability, because they are turned elsewhere. I am not asking you to gaze into having to resort to specific, targeted attacks against a crystal ball, but we have the presidential elections, political figures. There is more interest, but it is too potentially, in Afghanistan in 2014—the time we have early to judge. discussed in terms of our potential withdrawal—and General Sir David Richards: I know we are often then there is the sustainability of the Afghan state so charged with being overoptimistic. What we have that it becomes self-reliant. Currently the projections always said is that if you resource the operation are that it could be 2023 or 2025 before they are able properly, then you have a chance of succeeding. We to have the money to sustain the structures that we can only set the conditions for other actors, but have helped them build. What is your assessment? particularly in the political sphere, and I personally Have you got any plans? What is the effect of all have been banging on about the need for strong the potential speeding up of the process of American political engagement for years—we have all known withdrawal? What are your plans in relation to that? this. But it will not be until September, October, General Sir David Richards: It is a hypothesis. I have November, after this full year of the surge on the back also picked up on the speculation about it. The of a pretty active winter campaign, that we will really Secretary of State for Defence and I were in be able to see whether it is beginning to come good. Washington 10 days ago, and it was clear that no All the indicators as we sit here seem to be positive , decision has yet been made. There is a lot of but we are the first to be cautious and not to want to speculation. At my level, we are clear that the strategy fall in the trap of over-optimism. is sound, and we must give it proper opportunity to come to fruition—hence my emphasis that no one can Q700 Bob Stewart: CDS, you have already kind of really draw proper deductions until probably the early answered my question, so I will be very quick. I autumn of this year, by when we will have seen it all assume from what you have said already that you see coming through the system for well over a year. us as being on course to bring out our regular combat Secretary Gates said the other day that it is too early forces by the end of 2014. Do you have any further to tell the effect of OBL’s death. He talked about comment on that? around six months—that is our consensus. There are General Sir David Richards: I think we are on indications that he did have a psychological effect on course, but we will continue to need to veer and haul some of them, and that they are a bit worried. Their as, undoubtedly, we are challenged. Our biggest ability to raise money may be affected; that is hugely problem, or rather NATO’s biggest problem—it is important to them. It is a net positive, as I said much bigger than us; we are playing a part in it—as recently in an interview, but we don’t yet know how we transition, is to put sufficient extra capacity into it will come through. Again, the autumn might be a the training of the ANSF, particularly the institutional good time to come back and tell you how it is going. training. I think you will all be aware—we took it as On the draw-down, both NATO and the US have an a great tick in a box for Britain—that President Karzai enduring partnership, or intend to have one, with has specifically asked, for example, that we develop Afghanistan. We in Britain who are fully committed for them a Sandhurst. We would love to do that for in this war must always remember that the Americans all sorts of good, enduring, pol-mil reasons, because have committed huge amounts of treasure and blood that means that their future military, and inevitably to it. They have committed to making sure that this other leaders, will be trained in the British tradition. strategy—which, from the end of 2014, will We need to find the wherewithal to do that properly progressively become based, in our case, on in the time frame we are talking about. So that is our training—will be funded. I think it is a huge biggest concern at the moment; it is not really the commitment on their part. We are hugely grateful that tactical conduct of operations— they have made this commitment. That is the plan on which we are currently taking forward our own plans. Q701 Bob Stewart: So is it all about training? It will be affordable because the Americans will General Sir David Richards: It is the generously continue to sustain their effort. institutionalisation of the army. As you know very well, you can have any number of foot soldiers. An Q703 Mr Havard: While you see, as I do, that the army that is worth its name has its logistics right, its death of Osama bin Laden perhaps prompts a administration right, its long-term training right and reassessment—political and otherwise in the US and its ethos right. Those are the things that we now elsewhere—military and strategically to Afghanistan, increasingly must concentrate on. We need to make is the al-Qaeda organisation of military significance, Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 153

11 May 2011 General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen and General Sir Nicholas Houghton KCB CBE ADC Gen or is this about transferring activity from Afghanistan the way in which 90% of the casualties inflicted by to Pakistan? the Taliban—it is still the case, although it is a lower General Sir David Richards: In the case of the percentage now—were innocent civilians. Could we military significance of al-Qaeda, your view and get that into the psyche of the people we were trying understanding, to be frank, is probably as good as to protect? Not very readily. mine. It is an idea that has clearly travelled well I think we are much better, but I have the particular beyond Osama bin Laden and where we now know aim in my time as CDS of developing our ability to he was in Pakistan. Yemen, Somalia and other places conduct perfectly legitimate information and influence in the Middle East are today more important in a operations much more efficiently. I would say—Nick counter-terror context than what was going on— is very much involved in this with me—that we have which appears to be a bit more than we might have not yet organised to deliver it. It is not understood to thought—in Osama’s compound. Where will it lead in be a vital part of warfare—as it always was, but it is terms of focus on Pakistan, as opposed to much more complex now in this media-heavy era—as Afghanistan? All those things are going through the much as fighting in a kinetic sense. We have some mill at the moment. We are all clear that Pakistan is a way to go, but keep pressing us on it, because your vital ally in the “war on terror”—I do not necessarily interest in it is a big help to me to resource it properly. share that term, as you don’t, but it is a catch-all. We Chair: We certainly shall, and that will form a fairly must remain close to Pakistan while ensuring that it large part of our report eventually. learns whatever lessons it undoubtedly will. General Sir Peter Wall: I absolutely endorse the Chair: There are two final questions. macro point about strategic communications and information operations. We are finding it quite Q704 Mrs Moon: I wonder about the manner and the difficult to forge a definitive improvement on that. We place of bin Laden’s death, and its impact in the need to recognise that in a democracy it is quite Pashtun heartlands where our troops are based. Are difficult to balance what we can say and what we have you seeing any impact, either due to the manner of to say. death, or the fact that he was killed in Pakistan? Is On the specific Helmand situation, I am always struck that impacting on the ground as to how our mission is when I go there by how much time Governor Mangal seen and how a potential outcome would be seen? spends watching the telly. A lot of it is local telly with General Sir David Richards: The picture continues to him on it. We really need to get their view of this, but be built up, but there is no evidence today. Don’t of course the messaging on security in Helmand and forget that the Pashtun do not want the Taliban back. its relation to governance—I pick Helmand because It is sometimes seen as a Pashtun freedom fight, but that is our experience, but I am sure it goes wider the latest polling continues to suggest that the vast across the South and beyond—is an Afghan lead now, majority of Pashtuns do not want to be ruled by the which is commensurate with their lead on governance Taliban. With AQ, we do not want to think that Osama and all the things we have been trying to instigate. in particular was some popular, mythical figure among Their military and police are very often at the the vast majority of Pashtuns. forefront of that, because quite a lot of the operations Whether it had an effect on the Taliban is a different that are going on today are Afghan-planned and issue. As I said a minute ago, we do not really know. Afghan-led, notwithstanding they are in a context that It would appear that most Pashtuns in the South are we are enabling. rather pleased, because they do not want the Taliban The ability for our soldiers to engage with Afghans back. If it breaks the linkages between AQ and the has increased exponentially as we have acquired the Taliban—we know now, interestingly, that they were initiative, which is born as much as anything else of greater than we thought—that will be a net positive. having the right force ratios by dint of the very We have not seen evidence to support that concern, significant American reinforcement by the US although we are monitoring it, because obviously it is Marines into the same area that we are in. That is a a possibility. positive trend, and if you were to go and ask people down on the street in Helmand, and to look at the Q705 Thomas Docherty: Going back to the much Helmandi media—which is quite sophisticated, earlier point about propaganda and 2006, we have also actually—I think it would be quite reassuring. heard some evidence about the battle for hearts and General Sir David Richards: My excellent MA has minds, and the battle for communicating our mission. just handed me the statistics on ANA attrition, Mr Are you confident that you now have sufficient Hancock. In March it was 2% and in April it was resources to communicate the purpose and the tactics 1.85%, and the target is 1.4%. The figures for those to the local populations? two months are pretty good, actually. They are much General Sir David Richards: I would say one of the better, as you know from your interest in the subject. many lessons that we haven’t yet fully incorporated Chair: Gentlemen, thank you very much indeed. I in our psyche, training and resourcing is what we have been studying these things for a number of years might call information operations. I think it is now now, yet I learned a great deal during the course of much, much better. I remember as COMISAF railing this morning. We are all grateful to you for an against our inability to turn something that should excellent evidence session. I am sorry it had to be so have been a great propaganda coup, and particularly rushed, but that is the way of life. Ev 154 Defence Committee: Evidence

Written evidence

Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence This memorandum provides evidence on the many aspects of Operations in Afghanistan requested by the House of Commons Defence Committee. Due to the sensitive nature of information relating to operations, elements of the memorandum are provided in strict confidence within a classified annex and should not be disclosed outside of the Committee. The information provided in the text is principally drawn from HM Government sources. Acknowledgment is made as appropriate for sections which draw significantly from ISAF or other sources.

1. General Background 1.1 Population Afghanistan’s population of approximately 28 million is made up of numerous ethnic groups. The largest are the Pashtuns (40%), predominantly found in the South, and the Tajiks (35%) predominantly in the North. Hazaras, Uzbeks, Chahar Aimaks and Turkmen make up the other significant ethnic groups. Islam is the predominant religion of Afghanistan, practiced by approximately 99% of the population, 80% of whom are Sunni. The major languages are Dari and Pashto. Afghanistan ranks second to last on the UN’s Human Development Index, with over a third of its people living in poverty. Thirty years of conflict have undermined the Afghan state, society and economy. However, despite ongoing conflict and security challenges, progress is being made. There is no doubt that the situation in Afghanistan is challenging: — over a third of Afghanistan’s people live in poverty: 36% of people live under the official poverty line of under US $0.90 per day (May 2010). In the South-West region (which includes Helmand and Kandahar), the figure is less than one quarter (22%); — 1 in 6 children die before the age of five; and — all Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are off track and the Afghan Government has agreed an extension until 2020 to meet them. Despite the challenges, we are starting to see real improvements in the lives of the Afghan people: — The International Monetary Fund (IMF) confirmed 2009–10 tax revenue at around US$1.26 billion—exceeding the IMF target of around $1.1 billion, for this period. — 5.2 million children attended school in 2008–09. This is an increase of 800,000 from 2007–08 and a five-fold increase since the fall of the Taleban. — 85% of Afghans now have access to basic health care, compared to only 9% in 2002.

1.2 History At the crossroads of central Asia, lying on the historic Silk Road, Afghanistan has long been of importance in regional and international politics. The roots of Afghanistan’s most recent period of instability stem from the 1970s, when Prime Minister Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah (1973) and was subsequently overthrown himself by the socialist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (1978). This led to armed resistance by conservative Islamic elements and the 1979 invasion by the Soviet Union. Soviet intervention lasted 10 years and sparked a bitter civil war with anti-Soviet Mujahideen forces. The departure of Soviet troops in 1989 did not bring an end to the conflict, as Mujahideen groups began to compete among themselves. By 1994, the Pashtun Taleban began to emerge as the dominant power in Afghanistan, taking Kabul in October 1996 and controlling most of the country by 1998. After 11 September 2001, the international community called upon the Taleban to cease providing shelter to al-Qaeda. When they refused, the US and UK acted under Article V of the UN charter to prevent and deter further attacks that might originate from Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taleban government, in November 2001, the United Nations brought together leaders of Afghan ethnic groups in Germany. The Bonn Agreement, signed on 5 December 2001, set out a road map for the restoration of representative government in Afghanistan. In June 2002, an Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) established a Transitional Administration to govern until elections could be held. The Loya Jirga marked the first opportunity for decades for the people of Afghanistan to play a decisive role in their future. It concluded with the election of Hamid Karzai as President of the Transitional State of Afghanistan. The Transitional Administration came to an end with the Presidential election of October 2004. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 155

1.3 Political System Afghanistan has a presidential system of governance. The Executive branch of government is made up of a Cabinet appointed by the President, subject to Parliamentary approval. The Legislature is made up of a bicameral parliament called the Afghan National Assembly. The Wolesi Jirga (lower house), is directly elected. It has 259 members, with 64 of these places reserved for women. The Meshrano Jirga (upper house) is made up of 102 members, two-thirds of whom are elected by district councils, and one-third of whom are appointed by the President. Under the Constitution, the President is obliged when making nominations to ensure that minorities such as the disabled and the nomad Kuchi are represented, and 50% of his nominations must be women. The Afghan political neighbourhood does not have Western-style opposition groups or issue-based political parties. Most Members of Parliament stand as independents, though many are loosely affiliated to one (often ethnic-based) political grouping or another. These political parties field or endorse candidates, but often do not have clear policy-based platforms or national manifestos, and may not supply financial or campaigning support.

1.4 Presidential Elections On 9 October 2004, Afghanistan held its first Presidential elections, which were won by Hamid Karzai with 55.4% of the vote on a 70% turnout. On 20 August 2009 the second set of Presidential elections since the fall of the Taleban were held. They were the first elections to be Afghan-run in over 30 years. As no Presidential candidate polled more than 50%, a second round run-off was scheduled, for 7 November 2009, between the two leading candidates: Hamid Karzai (49.7%) and Dr Abdullah Abdullah (30.6%). However, Dr Abdullah withdrew before the second round was held. The Afghan Independent Election Commission therefore announced that President Karzai was re- elected on 2 November 2009.

1.5 Parliamentary and Provincial Elections

Elections to the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) were held on 18 September 2005. They were the first such elections in 36 years. Candidates stood in their own right as individuals, with no parties officially recognised in the elections. Turnout was 51.5%, 41% of whom were women. The elections and appointments to the Meshrano Jirga (upper house) election were completed on 10 December 2005.

Parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2010 were postponed by the Afghan Independent Election Commission, in accordance with the Afghan Constitution. They took place on 18 September 2010.

1.6 Sub-national governance

A Province is the local administrative unit of Afghanistan. Provincial Councils are directly elected bodies that advise the Provincial Governor. They are elected every four years, most recently alongside the Presidential elections in 2009.

In March 2010 the Afghan Government approved a new Sub-National Governance Policy. The new policy defines the responsibilities and authority of local administrations, strengthens local governance structures and will improve the delivery of services locally. This was a key outcome of the London Conference on Afghanistan, and demonstrates the commitment of the Afghan Government to delivering services for the Afghan people at the local level.

2. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign Narrative 2.1 The ISAF Mission ISAF, in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and acting under UN Security Council Resolution 1890, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency; support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable by the population.

2.2 Security

In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan Government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the ANSF and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) through mentoring, training and equipping. Ev 156 Defence Committee: Evidence

2.3 Reconstruction and Development Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), ISAF is supporting reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors. Where appropriate, and in close cooperation and coordination with GIRoA and UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) representatives on the ground, ISAF is also providing practical support for reconstruction and development efforts, as well as support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organisations, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

2.4 Governance ISAF, through its PRTs is helping the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. The principle mission of the PRTs in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve.

2.5 History and expansion of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan Afghan opposition leaders attending the Bonn Conference in December 2001 began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority. The concept of a UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was also launched at the Conference to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. ISAF was duly established through UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001. These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, UNAMA and ISAF. On 11 August 2003 NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, turning the six-month national rotations to an end. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan. ISAF’s mandate was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country. ISAF’s UN mandate has been extended on a rolling basis, the most recent extension, UN Security Council Resolution 1890, being adopted unanimously on 13 October 2009 and extending the mandate for a further 12 months.

2.6 Stage 1: Expansion to the North In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorised the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, to initiate the expansion of ISAF by taking over command of the German-led PRT in Kunduz. The other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan in 2003 remained under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom, the continuing US-led military operation in Afghanistan. On 31 December 2003, the military component of the Kunduz PRT was placed under ISAF command as a pilot project and first step in the expansion of the mission. Six months later, on 28 June 2004, at the Summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would establish four other PRTs in the North: in Mazar-e-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan. This process was completed on 1 October 2004, marking the completion of the first phase of ISAF’s expansion. ISAF’s area of operations then covered some 3,600 square kilometres in the North and the mission was able to influence security in nine Northern provinces of the country.

2.7 Stage 2: Expansion to the West On 10 February 2005, NATO announced that ISAF would be further expanded, into western Afghanistan. This process began on 31 May 2006, when ISAF took on command of two additional PRTs, in the provinces of Herat and Farah and of a Forward Support Base (a logistic base) in Herat. At the beginning of September 2006, two further ISAF-led PRTs in the West became operational, one in Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor province, and one in Qala-e-Naw, capital of Baghdis province, completing ISAF’s expansion into the West. The extended ISAF mission led a total of nine PRTs, in the North and the West, providing security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan’s territory. The Alliance continued to make preparations to further expand ISAF, to the South. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 157

Over the period of the 18 September 2005 provincial and parliamentary elections the Alliance also temporarily deployed 2,000 additional troops to Afghanistan.

2.8 Stage 3: Expansion to the South

On 8 December 2005, meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the Allied Foreign Ministers endorsed a plan that paved the way for an expanded ISAF role and presence in Afghanistan.

The first element of this plan was the expansion of ISAF to the South in 2006, also known as Stage 3.

This was implemented on 31 July 2006, when ISAF assumed command of the Southern region of Afghanistan from US-led Coalition forces, expanding its area of operations to cover an additional six provinces—Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul—and taking on command of four additional PRTs.

The expanded ISAF led a total of 13 PRTs in the North, West and South, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan’s territory. The number of ISAF forces in the country also increased significantly, from about 10,000 prior to the expansion to about 20,000 after.

2.9 Stage 4: ISAF expands to the East, Taking Responsibility for the Entire Country

On 5 October 2006, ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion, by taking on command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led Coalition.

In addition to expanding the Alliance’s area of operations, the revised operational plan also paved the way for a greater ISAF role in the country. This includes the deployment of ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to ANA units at various levels of command.

See also Annex A Current ISAF Force Laydown (Security classified, not publicly available to Committee Members at Defence Committee Office).

3. Current ISAF Force Laydown

3.1 ISAF Force Structure

The following table gives an overview of the ISAF Force Structure setting out the lead nations, troop strength and PRTs for each of the six regional commands in Afghanistan: Ev 158 Defence Committee: Evidence

Commander: General David H. Petraeus (USA) Senior Civilian Representative: Ambassador Mark Sedwill (GBR)

47 Troop Contributing Nations ISAF Total Strength: approx 119, 819 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ISAF Commands in Kabul (strength 3,500) Regional Command West: (strength 6,000) •HQ ISAF •HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA) Commander: G David H. Petraeus (USA) Commander: BG Claudio BERTO (ITA) •ISAF JOINT COMMAND (IJC) Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP) Commander LG David M. RODRIGUEZ (USA) PRT in RC(W): •NATO TrainingMission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) •HERAT (ITA), FARAH (USA) Commander: KG William B. CALDWELL •QALA-E-NOW (ESP), CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command Capital (strength 5,00) Regional Command North: (strength 11,000) •HQ RC(C) KABUL (TUR) •HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU) Commander: BG Levent COLAK (TUR) Commander: MG Hans-Werner Fritz (DEU) •Kabul International Airport Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU) PRT IN RC (N): Regional Command South (strength 35,000) •MAZAR-E_SHARIF (SWE),FEYZABAD (DEU) •HQRC(S) in KANDAHAR (GBR) •KUNDUZ (DEU), POL-E-KHOMRI (HUN) Commander: MG Nick Philip CARTER (GBR) •MEYMANEH (NOR), JOWZJAN (TUR) Forward Support Base KANDAHAR PRT in RC(S): Regional Command East: (strength 32,000) •KANDAHAR (CAN) •HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM •TARIN KOWT (US/AUS) Commander: MG John CAMPBELL (USA) •QALAT (USA) Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA) PRT IN RC(E): Regional Command South West: (strength •LOGAR (CZE), SHARANA (USA) 27,000) •KHOSt (USA), METHER LAM (USA) •HQ RC(SW) in CAMP LEATHERNECK (USA) •IAMYAN (NZL), PANJSHIR (USA) Commander: MG Richard MILLS (USA) •JALALABAD (USA), GHAZNI (USA) Forward Support Base CAMP LEATHERNEXK (USA) •ASADABAD (USA), BAGRAM (USA) PRT in RC(SW): •NURISTAN (USA), WARDAK (TUR) •LASKAR GAH (GBR •GARDEZ (USA) •PARWAN (KOR)

Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 159

3.2 ISAF Force Laydown The following map gives an overview of the major troop contributing nations in each regional command along with the lead nation for each PRT: Ev 160 Defence Committee: Evidence

4. International Contribution to ISAF 4.1 Troop Contributing Nations The following table gives the approximate troop contribution for each of the 47 troop contributing nations as of 6 August 2010. These figures are indicative and actual numbers will fluctuate on a day by day basis due to visits, Rest & Recuperation (R&R) and for operational reasons.

Albania 295 Germany 4590 Norway 500

Armenia 40 Greece 75 Poland 2630

Australia 1455 Hungary 360 Portugal 250

Austria 3 Iceland 5 Romania 1750

Azerbaijan 90 Ireland 6 Singapore 30

Belgium 575 Italy 3400 Slovakia 300 Bosnia & 10 6 Slovenia 70 Herzegovina Jordan Bulgaria 540 Republic of Korea 270 Spain 1555

Canada 2830 Latvia 170 Sweden 530 The Former Yugoslav Croatia 295 Lithuania 245 Republic of 240 Macedonia Czech Republic 500 Luxembourg 9 Turkey 1740

Denmark 730 Malaysia 40 Ukraine 15

Estonia 160 Mongolia 195 United Arab Emirates 15

Finland 80 Montenegro 30 United Kingdom 9500

France 3750 Netherlands 380 United States 78430

Georgia 925 New Zealand 205 Total 119,819

4.2. Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) Contributing Nations OMLTs provide training and mentoring to the ANA. They also serve as a liaison capability between ANA and ISAF forces, co-ordinating the planning of operations and ensuring that ANA units receive necessary enabling support (including close air support, casualty and medical evacuation). Under the OMLT concept developed by ISAF, each team deploys for a minimum of six months and consists of 11–28 personnel, depending on the type and function of the ANA unit with which it trains, and can consist of personnel from several ISAF nations. In line with the recommendations of General McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment in 2009, UK forces in Helmand moved from the small OMLT concept to the Embedded Partnering of UK units with Afghan counterparts, usually using the UK “company” and Afghan “tolay”, each of around 120 men, as the basic building block. While the UK retains liaison teams attached to ANA units in Helmand, partnered UK-Afghan “Combined Forces” have been the UK’s principal means of training and mentoring newly raised ANA forces over the course of 2010. These Combined Forces are the UK’s contribution to ISAF’s OMLT statistics which sets out the number of deployed OMLTS provided by ISAF nations as of 3 September 2010. The next NATO Force Generation Conference on 22 September is expected to result in some increases in the level of contributions. In addition to the OMLTs listed, the US contributes 76 Embedded Training Teams. These units can deploy to partner the ANA across Afghanistan on training requirements, insurgent activity and ISAF campaign direction. Contributing Nation Number of OMLTs Additional OMLTs offered to Deploy Albania 1 Australia 5 2 Belgium 1 Bulgaria 1 3 Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 161

Contributing Nation Number of OMLTs Additional OMLTs offered to Deploy Canada 6 Croatia 3 Czech Republic 1 Denmark 1 Germany 6 3 France 6 1 Greece 1 Hungary 1 Italy 7 1 Latvia 1 Norway 1 Poland 4 Portugal 2 Romania 3 1 Slovenia 1 Spain 3 2 Turkey 5 UK 7 Sweden 1 Multinational 5 2 Total 70 OMLTs 18 Additional Offered

4.3 Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT) Contributing Nations

The POMLT programme is an important part of NATO-ISAF’s contribution towards the development of the ANP. POMLTs are composed of 15–20 personnel from one or several countries. Each POMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum period of six months.

As is the case with OMLTs, the US provides the bulk of the ISAF POMLT contribution with a pool of 279 teams providing POMLTs on a flexible basis, as required.

The table below sets out the number of deployed POMLTS provided by other ISAF nations as of 3 September 2010, on 22 September a NATO Force Generation Conference is likely to result in significant increases in the level of contributions. Regional Numbers of Command/ Contributing Number of Districts Additional POMLTs Organisation Nation POMLTs Regional Provincial Mentored Committed to Deploy Afghan National Poland 1 Civil Order Police Centre Turkey 1 Croatia 1 East Poland 10 4 France 5 1 4 South Canada 4 4 2 South West UK 6 3 3 Denmark 1 1 North Germany 11 11 Norway 1 1 Croatia 2 West Italy 2 1 1 2 1 Spain 1 1 1 1 Lithuania 1 Total 41 POMLTs 13 Additional Committed

5. Current State of the Insurgency

See Annex B (Security classified, not publicly available—available to Committee Members at Defence Committee Office). Ev 162 Defence Committee: Evidence

6. Future of the ISAF Campaign 6.1 Transition The International Community and the Afghan Government have agreed that the ANSF will have responsibility for security across the country by 2015. In line with this the Prime Minister has stated his intent that there will not be British troops in a combat role or in significant numbers in Afghanistan in 2015. Transition is the process by which the ANSF will take responsibility for security operations across Afghanistan. It is important to note that Transition is a process not an event. It involves ISAF and the international community progressively shifting responsibilities to Afghan forces and institutions as we move increasingly to a supportive role. Once Transition has been initiated, the Afghan Government, in collaboration with NATO, ISAF, PRT lead nations and international community stakeholders, will incrementally Transition responsibilities for districts and provinces to the Afghan Government, based on conditions on the ground. The criteria for Transition reflect the three main pillars of the Afghan National Development Strategy: security; governance; and development. At the Kabul Conference on 20 July 2015 the International Community agreed to support the Transition process, endorsing the joint Afghan Government and NATO plan for phased transition to full Afghan responsibility for security laid out in the “Inteqal” (Transition) paper. A Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) has been established, co-chaired by the Afghan Office of the National Security Council and NATO/ ISAF and attended by key stakeholders from the Afghan Government and the UN. The JANIB will assess conditions on the ground against security, governance and development criteria to establish which province/s fulfil the conditions to begin Transition. Recommendations will be jointly approved by the Afghan Government and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). See also ANNEX C (Security classified, not publicly available—available to Committee Members at Defence Committee Office).

7. Development in Afghanistan The UK’s programme for development across Afghanistan is led by the Department for International Development (DFID)—it would not make sense to develop Helmand alone while the rest of the country faces major challenges. DFID’s bilateral programme, alongside the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and MoD, forms a comprehensive effort to help strengthen key government institutions, counter the threat of violent extremism and pursue sustainable economic growth across the country.

7.1 Impact of DFID’s programmes to date Education 5.2 million children attended school in 2008–09. This is an increase of 800,000 from 2007–08 and represents a five-fold increase since the fall of the Taleban. Girls were banned from attending school under the Taleban; now one third of children who attend school in Afghanistan are girls. DFID Contribution: DFID’s Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) allocation to education supports the equivalent of 31,000 teachers (almost 1 in 5).

Health 85% of the population now has access to basic healthcare, compared to 9% in 2002. Five out of every six children are reaching their fifth birthday. 24% of births are now supervised by skilled birth attendants—an increase from 13% in 2005. DFID Contribution: DFID’s ARTF allocation to health is approx £18 million since 2002, helping to build Government capability to deliver health to its people.

7.2 Growth and livelihoods DFID has contributed to national rural development programmes to help elect almost 22,000 Community Development Councils and initiate almost 50,000 locally-generated projects in agriculture, education, health, irrigation, power, public buildings, transport and water supply. Over $500 million worth of micro-credit and savings facilities have been extended to over 440,000 farmer families and small enterprises and over 9,790 km of rural roads have been built or repaired.

7.3 Anti-Corruption Efforts All DFID funding to Afghanistan is subject to high standards of financial management and scrutiny to minimise the risk of misuse. Our support to the Afghan Government is channelled primarily via the multi- donor ARTF which is managed and monitored by the World Bank. Aid given through the ARTF is provided on a reimbursement basis and must conform to strict eligibility criteria. This means money is only given when Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 163

the government has proved that actual expenditure has already been paid. The fund is also monitored by international auditors as a further safety check. In addition, the UK with other donors is working with the Afghan Government to strengthen accountability, encourage financial management reforms in the public sector and build institutions with the ability to tackle corruption over the longer term.

8. Afghan National Security Forces 8.1 UK Responsibilities for Training the ANA The UK provides support to the training and development of the ANA in three main ways, through embedding staff officers in NATO Training Mission—fghanistan (NTM-A) Headquarters, by providing trainers to the NTM-A training institutions and through the embedded partnering of deployed ANSF in Helmand Province. Almost half of the UK’s deployed forces—ome 4,500 troops—re available to support ANSF training in one of these forms. All UK ground-holding troops are available to support ANA development through partnering. UK and ANA ground-holding troops are permanently living and operating together throughout the UK areas of operation. Alongside partnering there are small teams (OMLTs) which provide coherence to partnering by offering liaison, advice and continuity of relationships with ANA units. These teams attach themselves to specific ANA units and stay with them as they move around different ground-holding areas within the UK area of operations and can be partnered by different ISAF units. The UK’s role in NTM-A training institutions includes leading the Combat Arms Directorate; being the principal supplying nation to the Infantry Branch School; and providing personnel to the Afghan Defence University, the Officer Cadet School, the Counter Insurgency Training Centre, and the Non-Commissioned Officer Training School.

8.2 UK Responsibilities for Training the ANP The UK provides training and development in specialist police skills (including civilian policing, investigative skills and tackling corruption) and leadership skills. Mentoring is provided for senior officers and Ministers at district, provincial and national level. We support reform of the Ministry of Interior and institutional development on both a strategic and operational level. Training is reinforced through partnering and mentoring on the ground. The UK is a major contributor to the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). We also second three senior police advisors to the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A) and have contributed to the costs of police salaries. We have a substantial bilateral effort in Helmand, training and mentoring the ANP. Through our engagement in NTM-A and EUPOL we support the Ministry of Interior to strengthen leadership capability, police accountability and develop training strategies and policy to ensure the role and development of the ANP is appropriately tailored as the security situation improves. As part of our bilateral effort in Helmand, the UK continues to deliver training to officers and patrolmen, and to provide embedded partnering and on the ground mentoring to the police at all levels.

8.3 Numbers and Sources of Trainers The UK currently provides, or is in the process of force generating, around 160 military personnel to NTM- A HQ and institutions, which support both ANA and ANP training. This includes 77 personnel for the Helmand Police Training Centre. All UK ground-holding troops are partnering ANA and ANP on the ground in Helmand. Supporting partnering are small advisory teams made up of 206 personnel for the ANA and 75 personnel for the ANP. Further military uplifts to the Helmand Police Training Centre and to police mentoring may result a review currently being undertaken as a result of our changing force laydown in Helmand. Civilian personnel are also provided by the UK to support police training. This includes: — 10 UK secondees to EUPOL (both serving and retired police officers). — 3 UK secondees to NTM-A (both serving and retired). — 19 Ministry of Defence Police.

8.4 Number of ANP Trained and Ethnicity As at 31 August 2010, the current strength of the ANP is around 115,500 policemen. Of those, around 18,150 are officers, 38,000 are NCO’s and 59,300 are patrolmen. The ethnic makeup of the total force is 43% Pashtun, 42% Tajik, 5% Hazara, 5% Usbek, and 5% other. The ‘other’ category includes: Turkman, Balooch, Nooristani, Bayat, Sadat, Pashayee, Arab, and Alevi. Because of attrition, and ongoing training, the percentage of ANP that have undertaken training is difficult to put an exact percentage on. However, 90,350 policemen were trained between 2003 and 2009. In 2010, 22,182 policemen have been trained to date. Ev 164 Defence Committee: Evidence

8.5 Number of ANA Trained and Ethnicity As at 31 August 2010, the ANA stands at around 136,000 personnel, already ahead of its 2010 growth objective of 134,000 and on-track to achieve the 2011 goal of 171,600. Development of the ANSF is ISAF’s strategic priority. While the size of the infantry-centric force is growing strongly and exceeds established goals, ISAF is working to improve institutional capability. Approximately one third of Coalition troop offers are identified to support ANSF training and mentoring. The Afghan Ministry of Defence and ANA are addressing continuing concerns about the lack of southern Pashtun soldiers with several recruiting initiatives. The ANA Recruiting Command sent four delegations on a recruiting fact finding mission to examine possible ways to increase recruiting for future Pashtun soldiers. The Defence Minister also committed to employing southern Pashtun officers as “hometown recruiters”. Other recruiting initiatives conducted include billboards and media (radio and TV spots). The success of these methods will only become apparent over time; an improvement in security in the South is assessed to have the greatest impact on increasing recruitment. The lack of southern Pashtun soldiers is partly due to the fact that many Pashtun areas are heavily dominated by the insurgency; either Pashtuns do not want to join the ANA because they lean towards the Taleban or they are unable to do so because of pressure and intimidation.

8.6 Number of ISAF Personnel Involved in Training The training capability required by the NTM-A is listed in the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR). Troop contributing nations pledge personnel to deliver specific capabilities identified by the CJSOR, as opposed to simply filling designated posts. There are currently around 600 ISAF personnel providing training through NTM-A and the associated US Combined Security Transition Command— Afghanistan (CSTC-A). This number is expected to increase as a result of the NATO Force Generation Conference on 22 September 2010 and is scheduled to rise to 2,796 trainers by March 2012. ISAF nations also provide civilian personnel to training efforts, and military personnel are involved in on the ground mentoring and partnering that is not captured on the CJSOR. See also Annex D (Security classified, not publicly available—available to Committee Members at Defence Committee Office).

9. Negotiations with Insurgents Afghanistan’s enduring stability requires an Afghan-led political process of reintegration and reconciliation that takes account of the concerns of disaffected Afghans. Reintegration is focused at the low and mid levels of the insurgency—fighters and their immediate commanders—with the aim of reintegrating them back into mainstream communities. Reconciliation refers to negotiations with the insurgent senior leadership. The UK supports the Afghan Government's conditions for this process that, in order to participate, insurgents should: cut ties with Al-Qaeda; end violence; and live within the Afghan Constitutional framework. President Karzai set out his commitment to this approach during his inaugural address in 2009. This was then followed up at the London Conference in January 2010 when the Afghan Government pledged to create a sustainable reintegration programme, supported by an international Peace and Reintegration Fund. President Karzai convened a Peace Jirga (a consultative meeting with a large cross-section of Afghans) on 2–4 June to secure wider Afghan support for his reintegration and reconciliation proposals. The Kabul Conference in July then secured clear commitments from the Afghan Government on the next steps for reintegration and reconciliation, and to advance a political settlement. The international community endorsed this approach. One of the key outcomes of the conference was the recommendation for the establishment of a High Level Peace Council to take forward reintegration and reconciliation. The Council was formally announced on 4 September. We are now looking forward to President Karzai's appointment of the Council's chairman and membership so that this process can get going, in particular the rollout of the reintegration programme in key provinces.

10. UK in Afghanistan The UK contributes 9,500 troops to ISAF. Of these around 7,700 are assigned to Helmand Province, 1,300 to Kandahar Air Field and around 500 troops and staff officers are assigned to Kabul in support of ISAF Headquarters, ISAF Joint Command and the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan. Of the 9,500 UK troops, nearly half are involved in mentoring, training and partnering the ANSF. In order to assist ISAF in delivering the improvements in security, the ANSF, governance and socio-economic development, the UK civilian and military personnel work closely with a number of international partners and organisation including: — United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA): a political mission established at the request of the Afghan Government to assist it and the people of Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development; — International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—led by NATO since 2003; Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 165

— the World Bank; — the Afghan Government — additional donor nations; and, — International NGOs. Ev 166 Defence Committee: Evidence Lashkar Gah Location Camp Bastion Lashkar Gah Camp Bastion Kabul Kabul Kabul fi eld is hander Kandahar Air fi ve. Deputy Commander ISAF, is also Commander of When command of Regional Command (South) Kandahar Air When command of Kandahar Air Lt Gen Sir Nick Parker, in addition to his role asof Kabul Notes the National Contingent for which he has a staff over to the UScontribution in will November reduce 2010, to the 10. UK Field rotates to the UScontribution in will November reduce 2010, to the 5. UK Field fi cers placed within the major ISAF command structures as well as senior posts held by UK military personnel: 2x1* posts [Commander (3*)] 2x1* posts Coalition Training Advisory Group—Army 5 Director Reintegration (2*) 20 30 Commander (1*) 10 30 Deputy Commander (3*) 30 Chief of Staff (2*) 220 Commander (2*) 230 Commander (1*) No. UK held senior posts 11. UK Contribution Overview The table below gives an indication of the number of UK Staff of HQ Regional Command (South- West) 100 Deputy Commander (1*) Task Force Helmand HQ Joint Force SupportProvincial Afghanistan Reconstruction Team 110 Commander (1*) HQ ISAF National Contingent Commander HQ ISAF Joint Command NATO Training Mission—AfghanistanBritish Embassy Kabul 30 Commander (1*) of HQ Regional Command (South) Kandahar Air Field Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 167

12. History of UK Force Levels The table below sets out the approximate UK conventional force level in Afghanistan at certain dates since 2001. These dates reflect either a point when public announcement of a change in force level was made or when a sequence of rebalancing and adjustments cumulatively resulted in a significant change in UK force levels. The precise number of UK military personnel deployed at any one time varies due to several reasons including periods of overlap during the roulement of units and individuals into and out of theatre, rest and recuperation and casualties. Approximate Force Date Level Notes on UK Forces 2001 4,300 Relates to Op VERITAS and therefore predominately comprises forces (Royal Navy (RN)) and RAF) that were not in Afghanistan but were supporting coalition operations in the country. Jan 2002 2,100 Relates to Op FINGAL and refers to the first ISAF deployment (Jan- Jun 2002) involving 1800 UK personnel on security operations and a temporary commitment of 300 UK military engineers to repair Kabul airport. Mar 2002 3,500 Includes the UK’s 1800 ISAF deployment and the 1700 UK personnel in Task Force JACANA (Mar-Jul 2002) based in Bagram and operating in eastern Afghanistan. Jul 2002 300 Comprises the residual UK ISAF commitment following the transfer of command to Turkey. Does not include the c.4000 embarked RN personnel supporting coalition operations. 2004 900 Relates to the beginning of Op HERRICK and includes the 230-man HARRIER GR7 deployment to Kandahar which, at that time, was part of Op ENDURING FREEDOM although able to support ISAF as required. Mid 2006 4,900 Comprises Task Force Helmand (TFH, then 3150 personnel deploying with 16 Air Assault Brigade and associated units), the HARRIER GR7 deployment and the UK personnel assigned to HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)—HQ ISAF—in Kabul (May 2006—Feb 2007). Autumn 2006 6,200 Addition of c.130 RAF Regiment personnel in Kandahar, increase of c.770 Royal Engineers and infantry over the summer to reinforce TFH and the inclusion (absent from the early 2006 figure) of c.400 personnel in enabling forces providing support to TFH. Late 2006 6,300 Reflects the replacement of 16 Air Assault Brigade and associated units by the c.100-man larger 3 Commando Brigade and associated units. The level of 6300 UK personnel was maintained following the withdrawal of HQ ARRC in Feb 2007 because Ministers approved an initial package of force uplifts on 14 Dec 2006 plus contributions to HQ ISAF and the retention of some ARRC capabilities. Jul 2007 7,800 Reflects the deployment, in Feb 2007, of an enhanced Regional Battle Group (South) comprising c.1370 UK personnel and subsequent, less significant, increases in UK personnel associated with training. May 2008 8,030 Reflects the findings of the UK Force Level Review which recommended personnel increases in several areas including infantry, combat engineers, military training and stabilisation personnel, Protected Mobility (PM), helicopter crews, and ISTAR personnel. Mar 2009 8,300 Reflects the findings of the Jan 2009 Theatre Capability Review which recommended the deployment of additional personnel include a 219- strong Counter-IED task force. Jun 2009 9,000 Reflects the deployment of a UK Election Surge Force of 700 personnel in response to a request from NATO to ISAF members. Initially a temporary increase in UK force levels, the then Prime Minister agreed, based on military advice, to make the increase enduring beyond the end of the election and the withdrawal of the surge force. The increase in personnel provided additional capabilities including C-IED, helicopter crews and ISTAR personnel. Late 2009 9,500 Announced by the then Prime Minister on 14 Oct 2009, the increase to an established and enduring UK force level of 9500 reflected the findings of the then COM ISAF’s Strategic Assessment and associated studies which recommended the deployment of more ISAF forces to increase the capacity to train and partner with the ANSF. Ev 168 Defence Committee: Evidence

13. UK in Helmand 13.1 Introduction UK troops first deployed in significant numbers to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan in April 2006, with the establishment of Task Force Helmand consisting of 3,150 personnel, the majority of whom were drawn from 16 Air Assault Brigade. The decision to deploy UK forces to Helmand followed careful analysis and comprehensive discussion within the MoD and across other government departments. This decision helped the UK to implement a NATO decision to extend its presence to the South in response to a growing threat of a resurgent insurgency. The decision to deploy UK forces to Helmand was based on the importance of the mission to UK national interests and the UK’s leading role in NATO. In common with many of our international partners in Afghanistan, we have had to adapt our approach and force levels to reflect developments on the ground. During the first six months of the UK deployment to Helmand, we increased our force levels to around 6,000 personnel, in response to the situation there. The UK currently contributes 9,500 troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to Afghanistan on an enduring basis, although actual numbers on the ground fluctuate daily. We have around 7,700 troops assigned to Helmand, most—but not all—in central Helmand where we are responsible with the ANSF for providing security for around 32% of the Helmand population. Camp Bastion, located to the north-west of the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, is our main logistics hub for the province; the main point of entry and departure by aircraft for UK troops; as well as the base for elements of the UK’s helicopter fleet. It is also the location of our main in-country medical facility. The UK also has forces assigned to Kandahar Air Field (approximately 1300) and to headquarters in Kabul (approximately 500), and holds several key command positions, including Deputy Commander ISAF (on a permanent basis) and Commander Regional Command (South) (RC(S)) (until November 2010). The UK has operated within the endorsed force levels of 9,500 troops deployed on operations in Afghanistan since December 2009. This figure excludes "surge" deployments, such as the annual deployment of engineers to repair wear-and-tear of Forward Operating Bases, or deployment of the Theatre Reserve Battalion (TRB), which is based in Cyprus and can be deployed rapidly and on the authority of the Chief of Joint Operations when a temporary need for additional troops is identified. The TRB was deployed to central Helmand in July 2010 for a three-month period to further progress and consolidate gains in central Helmand following recent operations in the area.

13.2 Task Force Helmand International forces deployed to Helmand province operate within Regional Command South West (RC(SW)), currently commanded by the US Marine Corps’ (USMC) under Major General Richard Mills. The majority of UK personnel operate under the command of the UK-led Task Force Helmand (TFH), which also contains significant Danish and Estonian contingents, which has responsibility for providing security in the centre of the province alongside the ANSF. UK command of TFH is refreshed on a six-monthly basis. It is currently under the command of Brigadier Richard Felton, Commander of 4 Mechanized Brigade (4 Mech Bde), who will be replaced by Brigadier James Chiswell and 16 Air Assault Brigade in October 2010. UK forces are focused in the central part of the province, operating in the population centres of Nad-e Ali North and South, Nahr-e Saraj North and South and Lashkar Gah. Task Force Helmand Headquarters is located in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, alongside the PRT, which is headed up by a UK civil servant, Ms Lindy Cameron (to be replaced by Michael O’Neill from the FCO in October). The co-location of the Task Force with the PRT and the Provincial Governor is key to coordinating the military effort with the international civilian effort and that of the provincial government.

13.3 Strategy The UK’s focus in Helmand, in line with ISAF’s priorities, remains protecting the Afghan people, increasing Afghan governance at provincial and district level and building the capacity of the ANSF. The UK has adopted a strategy of being physically located in close proximity to the protected community, operating out of bases located in and around the key population centres. In line with ISAF intent, we are conducting a counter- insurgency operation, a vital element of which is for troops to interact with the local population and many key activities, including patrolling in population centres and holding meetings with local community leaders, can only be conducted on the ground. Partnering with the ANSF is key to our strategy, as the quickest and most effective way of bringing them up to the level where they can increasingly take over security responsibility from international forces. On the ground, working closely with the ANSF helps our troops to engage more effectively with the local population; gathering valuable intelligence on suspected insurgents and potential threats. Operations, such as the recent Operation MOSHTARAK, follow the Shape, Clear, Hold, Build phased approach to counter-insurgency operations: — Shape opinion before an operation to maximize popular support by engaging the local population and disrupting the insurgency in the area; Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 169

— Clear an area of insurgents through operations designed to undermine them and protect the population; — Hold the area by rapidly introducing effective Afghan governance and beginning immediate, quick-win ‘hot stabilisation’ activities; and, — Build sustainable Afghan Government-led progress across the area through stabilisation and development. Counter-insurgency is patient, methodical work. It takes time to convince people that they should back the Afghan Government over the insurgents. This is reflected in progress on the ground. Nad-e Ali district, where ISAF and ANSF have had a presence for around 18 months, is further advanced than Marjah, where ISAF troops have only been for around six months. In Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, where we have had a long term presence, there is even greater progress with the Afghans increasingly dealing with the majority of security threats themselves. It is only through helping to implement sustainable and accountable governance, that ISAF will successfully separate the population from the insurgency.

13.4 Achievements UK personnel, operating as part of ISAF, have made tangible improvements across their area of operations in Helmand province since first deploying there in significant numbers in 2006. Successes include: — in 2008, of the 14 districts in Helmand, government authority, represented by a district governor, extended to only five. In 2010 there are now governors in 11 of Helmand’s districts; — the Helmand Police Training Centre (HPTC) delivers training to 150 new recruits every four weeks. The HPTC is staffed by a mixture of UK Ministry of Defence Police (MDP), British Army, other ISAF and Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) instructors; — Governor Mangal’s Counter Narcotics strategy has reduced poppy cultivation in Helmand by 33% over the past year. Since 2008, 3,200 tonnes of wheat seed has been distributed annually to approximately 30,000 local farmers; — in 2006 there was one district hospital and nine comprehensive and 20 basic health clinics. In 2009, that had grown to one provincial hospital, two district hospitals, and 54 health clinics; and — since the end of 2008, 40 schools have re-opened across Helmand. There are now 103 schools open in the province.

13.5 Looking Forward COMISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) have provided direction on transition implementation, outlining a number of key principles: — that Transition will be conditions based; — recommendations will be bottom up, not top-down, being informed by local assessments; — transition will involve thinning out of ISAF forces rather than handing off; — it will require retaining headquarters elements even as units thin out; — it will start at the district level and progress to the provincial level; — it will involve “reinvesting” some of the Transition dividend in terms of ISAF resources; and — it will involve transitioning institutions and functions as well as geographic areas. Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Northwood are currently undertaking a review into the military options for security transition and transfer in Helmand. It will look at Transition in the context of a complete withdrawal of UK combat troops by the end of 2014. We expect that our force profile will evolve as the Afghan's take on more responsibility in our Area of Operations, and that we will reinvest troops as required, for example to deepen the hold in central Helmand and invest in police training, to increase prospects of success. Any plan for changing force posture through Transition will need to be developed over time and, dependent on ISAF Transition planning, wider governance and development work, will need to take into account the position on the ground and the Taleban approach as we go through Transition. The plan will be in line with and based on ISAF’s conditions based plan for Transition.

14. Development in Helmand 14.1 Overview of the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team The Helmand PRT is a UK-led, multinational team helping the Afghan Government deliver effective government and security across Helmand Province. It has 260 staff, approximately half of whom are civilian and half military, provided by the UK, US, Danish and Estonian governments. The PRT includes some 21 civilian police staff and 30 Afghan staff. The UK staff are drawn from DFID, FCO, MoD and a database of consultants who can deploy at short notice. DFID staff, who manage the UK’s bilateral, long-term development programme in Helmand, are co-located with the PRT in Lashkar Gah. It is led by the Head of Mission, Lindy Cameron, who has previously headed the DFID offices in Baghdad and Kabul. Ev 170 Defence Committee: Evidence

The PRT works to a single Helmand Plan that has been agreed with the Government of Afghanistan and international partners. The plan is structured around seven themes: Politics and Reconciliation; Governance; Rule of Law (Justice, Police and Prisons); Security; Economic and Social Development; Counter Narcotics; and Strategic Communications. The PRT is headquartered in Lashkar Gah and has UK, US and Danish District Stabilisation Teams in 10 of Helmand’s 14 Districts. A Stabilisation Team typically consists of civilian stabilisation advisers (STABADs), civilian specialists (e.g. in agriculture), a political adviser and either a UK Military Stabilisation Support Team (MSST), a US Civil Affairs Team, or a Danish CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) Support Team. The teams bring together people with a range of backgrounds including development, politics, engineering and project management. The Stabilisation Teams work hand in hand with the District Regimental, Battle Group or Battalion HQs to co-ordinate civil and military activity.

14.2 Progress in Helmand The role of the PRT is to help the Afghan Government improve the governance, services and security it provides in Helmand. Since the PRT was established, in September 2004, there has been progress across all themes of the Helmand Plan. DFID’s programme in Helmand focuses on four key areas of work which set the conditions for medium term progress, and complement the stabilisation activities of the PRT and other donors. — Supporting sustainable economic growth through the Helmand Growth Programme. — Delivering infrastructure and capacity building support at Bost Airfield and Agricultural Centre. — Constructing the road between Lashkar Gah and Gereshk and starting the refurbishment of the Gereshk hydro-power plant. — Supporting the Afghan Government to improve its ability to deliver for its own people through the DFID/PRT state-building programme in Helmand and the District Delivery Programme. DFID’s support in Helmand has contributed to: — 1,600 wells benefiting 250,000 people; — 59 km of road repaired, with a further 21km underway; — 87 irrigation projects benefiting 350,000 people; — 2,500 small loans to farmers and small businesses; — 20,000 people in Lashkar Gah have access to safe drinking water and 65% of the city is now being cleaned by the municipality; and — construction of essential infrastructure at the Bost Airfield and Agriculture Centre;

14.3 Governance There are now district governors installed in 11 of Helmand’s 14 districts (Nawa, Nad-e Ali, Gereshk, Sangin, Musa Qaleh, Garmsir, Naw Zad, Khaneshin, Marjeh, Dishu, and Kajaki with a mayor in place in Lashkar Gah). A temporary 14th District has recently been established under direction from President Karzai with an acting District Governor in place. At the end of 2008 there were only five District Governors in place. With PRT support, four Community Councils have been established in Helmand to empower local representatives to determine the direction of development and security in their district. 5 members of the Gereshk Community Council are female. Through the District Delivery Programme (DDP) process the PRT has pioneered on-budget support to the provincial administration, directorates and district administrations. The first District Delivery Programme in Afghanistan has already been approved for Nad-e Ali which will provide the district government with $1.5m to provide services according to the priorities of the communities, and work is now underway to roll DDP out in Gereshk and Marjeh. 26 Afghan line ministries are now represented in Lashkar Gar, including the Ministries for Rural Reconstruction and Development; Education; Public Health; Finance; Energy and Water (including the Helmand Arghandab Valley Authority); Public Works; Transport; Information; Media & Culture and Counter- Narcotics.

14.4 Education There are now 103 schools open in Helmand, up from 47 in December 2007. Forty schools have re-opened across Helmand since December 2008, four of them built by the PRT and TFH. Pupil enrolment is rising in Helmand. The latest, January 2010, figures, show total enrolment of 83,995 pupils: 64,846 male and 19,149 female. This represents an increase of 63% since December 2007. Female enrolment is estimated to have increased by 34% during this period. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 171

Alongside school construction and refurbishment, the PRT is funding school supplies; Ministry of Education (MoE) led teacher training and helping the Department of Education build its managerial capacity and district outreach capacity.

14.5 Economic Development The PRT is helping improve farmers’ access to markets through the provision of roads and regional transport links; delivering more affordable electricity; improving access to finance; providing vocational training; and increasing support for small businesses. This will deliver more sustainable jobs and have a key impact on medium and long term stability in Helmand. The joint USAID/DFID-funded Lashkar Gah airport opened in June 2009, allowing over 40 commercial flights a week to land in Helmand. DFID is financing the further development of the Agricultural Business Park adjacent to the airport, building on initial work started with USAID financing. Once complete, the park will provide small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with a secure location and services on which to base their businesses. Over 3,000 loans, totalling over $2m have been dispersed to small businesses across central Helmand, using DFID funding. The first national retail bank branch opened in Lashkar Gah in 2007. Two more have opened offices in the province since then. Mercy Corps, a Helmand based NGO supported by DFID, has built a new agriculture high school, providing vocational training for 270 students aged 16–18 each year. Mercy Corps has also trained over 4,500 farmers, supporting improvements in farming techniques for almost 50,000 people. Over the next three years, the DFID-funded £28 million Helmand Growth Programme will help to remove barriers to economic growth by improving roads and market access, improving electricity supplies, improving access to credit and providing vocational training and business support to local farmers and small businesses.

14.6 Infrastructure Roads: Working with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, a large number of road construction projects are ongoing. Up to 2010, over 90km of roads have been resurfaced, mainly in the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah but also 10km of roads in district towns such as Garmsir, Nad-e Ali, Sangin, Musa Qaleh and Gereshk. Power: USAID have financed refurbishment of the second turbine at Kajaki Dam, resulting in an increase in power supply for Lashkar Gah residents from four hours a day to anywhere between 12 and 24 hours a day, depending on location. Planning for the refurbishment of the Gereshk Hydro-electric plant is underway, which will improve electricity for 50,000 people. The work itself will be completed by 2013. This project, costing $60 million, is funded by DFID (over £15 million), the Asian Development Bank and Denmark. Water and Irrigation: $1.3 million of improvements to Shamalan Canal has improved irrigation for 10,000 farmers. A major Helmand River Basin Study and Master Plan is being started to re-build the capacity of the Helmand Arghandab Valley Authority by restoring river and canal gauging stations, re-creating data records, enabling river and canal modelling, establishing an asset register and maintenance system. A DFID-funded UN Habitat programme is providing access to safe drinking water for some 35,000 people in Lashkar Gah by installing hand pumps and building new water towers, as well as improving water, sanitation and roads for local communities through smaller projects, which have so far benefited 90,000 people. District Stabilisation: In the past two years, improvements have been made to roads and drainage in the District Centres of Sangin, Garmsir, Nad-e Ali, Musa Qaleh, Gereshk, as well as refurbishment of bazaars in Sangin, Nad-e Ali and Garmsir.

14.7 Strategic Communications There are currently five local radio stations in Helmand, up from one in 2001. The PRT has funded 18 months of training for Helmandi journalists and provided the Journalist’s Union with a building and an IT/internet facility to help them conduct research and file stories. The PRT has equipped the Governor’s Media Centre—the only Afghan Government press conference facility outside Kabul. PRT funding has been allocated to provide Communications Advisers to District Governors in six key districts. The PRT is working with the Government Media Centre to develop a campaign approach to government communications. Ev 172 Defence Committee: Evidence

14.8 Justice In 2008, the PRT supported the establishment of civil justice institutions, including the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Provincial Office and the Land and Tribal Dispute Commission. A Women and Childrens’ Justice Group Independent Commission for Women and Children’s Rights have now been set up, and equipped, assisted by the PRT, to support local communities and justice institutions. The PRT has supported the provision of a legal defence capacity in Helmand since 2008. The PRT worked with the Chief Provincial prosecutor to place prosecutors in Gereshk, Garmsir, Sangin, Nad-e Ali, Marjeh and Nawa. In October 2009 Helmand’s run down prison was replaced with the first wing of a new, purpose-built facility. It houses up to 450 prisoners in an environment that is more secure and meets Afghan and international standards.

14.9 Policing The HPTC delivers basic patrolmen training to up to 150 new ANP recruits every four weeks on eight week training courses. In May 2010 approval was granted by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) to run specialist leadership training for Police Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs). The training for both basic patrolmen and NCOs is delivered by a combination of UK Ministry of Defence Police, UK, ISAF and MOI Instructors. The Provincial Police HQ opened in January 2009. The PRT provided the office equipment and IT to make the building operational along with an education and training facility. A cadre of women police officers completed police training at both Police HQ and Kabul at the end of 2009 with another cadre of women currently receiving training on a course that started in May 2010. The Ministry of Defence Police are deployed in a number of districts and provide mentorship and training to the District Chiefs of Police and their police officers on the ground. The detailed design work for the permanent Helmand Police Training Academy has been completed and the first phase is funded by the PRT. This will be a purpose built training facility that will allow for training of ANP specialist courses, recruit training and a separate facility for women officers. The PRT has funded a number of ANP checkpoints, patrol bases and police HQs in the districts to enable the ANP to operate as a professional force and continues to project manage a number of ANP infrastructure projects throughout Helmand.

14.10 Counter Narcotics Governor Mangal’s Counter Narcotics Strategy (also known as the Food Zone Programme) has contributed to a 33% reduction in poppy cultivation in Helmand over the past year, (UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Opium Survey 2009). Cultivation levels are expected to remain stable in 2010. This strategy, launched in 2008, was the first provincial counter-narcotics strategy. In 2008, as part of this strategy, 3,200 tonnes of wheat seed was distributed to 32,000 farmers across Helmand, supporting a transition to legal livelihoods. In 2009, 37,500 farmers across Helmand received wheat seed and fertiliser. This was followed up in February 2010 with the distribution of fruit saplings (apricots, plums and pomegranates) and vines to nearly 1,200 farmers alongside agricultural advice. By the end of May 2010, approximately 27,000 farmers had received subsidised agricultural inputs, giving them the chance to boost their agri-business and household income and reducing farmers’ dependency on poppy cultivation. Governor Led Eradication was conducted in areas where security conditions allowed and where access to alternative livelihoods was provided previously. This acts as a means of injecting credible risk into farmers’ future planting decisions. The PRT is also supporting and mentoring the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), to assist them with the interdiction of those involved in the narcotics trade. The numbers of people from Helmand being convicted of narcotics offences as a result of CNPA investigations is continually increasing, reflecting the robust approach to gathering intelligence and evidence.

14.11 Health The government-contracted health supplier is now able to operate clinics in all priority district centres. In 2006, there was one district hospital, nine Comprehensive Health Clinics and 20 Basic Health Clinics in Helmand. In 2009, this has increased to one provincial hospital, two district hospitals, 15 Comprehensive Health Clinics, 30 Basic Health Clinics and nine Sub Centres. Over 400 Health Posts operate across the Province providing basic health care at a local level. The total number of Health Care Workers in Helmand is now 1047. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 173

The PRT, through UK and Estonian funding, has improved facilities at Bost Hospital in Lashkar Gah— meaning it now meets the standards set by the Ministry of Public Health. Medecins Sans Frontieres took over the management of Bost Hospital in Oct 2009.

14.12 Non-Governmental Organisation DFID maintains a regular dialogue with NGOs, both in the UK and in Afghanistan. Over 50% of DFID aid in Afghanistan is channelled through Government systems. The Government of Afghanistan and donor partners reached agreement at the London and Kabul Conferences to increase assistance through the central government budget to 50% over the next two years. DFID has already achieved this target but its ability to provide funding, off budget, for civil society is limited. However, DFID does provide direct and indirect support for NGOs in: agriculture and rural development, de-mining, business and private sector development. The Government of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Programme works with NGOs as Facilitating Partners which deliver essential services and support community development throughout the country. DFID supports the National Solidarity Programme through contributions to the multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. DFID is developing a new civil society programme called “Tawanmandi”—which means “strengthening” in Dari. The programme will be co-funded with Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. In the UK, DFID works with the British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG), an umbrella organisation for UK-based NGOs with an interest in Afghanistan. We participate in bi-monthly NGO contact group meetings hosted by the FCO. In addition, DFID holds regular meetings and consultations to discuss issues of mutual concern, including civil-military cooperation. DFID supported NGO and civil society participation in the London and Kabul Conferences of January and July 2010. DFID also supported BAAG and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the NGO umbrella organisation in Afghanistan, in organising a civil society conference on 26 January and ensured that civil society was represented at the main London Conference on 28 January.

15. List of Operations Operation Mar Karadad was launched in December 2007 with the aim of driving insurgents from Musa Qaleh district centre and establishing a permanent ANSF/ISAF presence in the area. Operation Asada Wosa was conducted between April and May 2008 with the aim of extending the influence of ANSF/ISAF forces and the Afghan authorities in Garmsir. Operation Oqab Tsuka took place between 22 August and 8 September 2008 to move a second turbine from Kandahar to the hydro-electric dam in Kajaki. Extensive support was provided by UK and ISAF assets including close logistics support and air assets. Operation Sond Chara took place in December 2008 to allow further strengthening of the ISAF position in central Helmand through reinforcement and consolidation of the security of Lashkar Gah and Nad-e Ali, allowing the provincial government to expand and deepen their influence. Operation Panchai Palang took place between June and July 2009 to set the security conditions for successful presidential elections in Helmand and to support an inflow of US troops. Security for the election period was achieved by disrupting insurgents in the greater Lashkar Gah area and through continuing to clear Nad-e Ali district to extend the Afghan Government’s influence in the Afghan Development Zone. Operation Moshtarak is the 3-phase regional operation, commanded and controlled by Commander RC(S), to provide security in central Helmand and Kandahar and to enable freedom of movement on main routes. Operation Moshtarak Phase 2, planned and conducted by the ANSF in partnership with ISAF, began in February 2010 to provide security in central Helmand. Operation Omid Do was launched on 11 July 2010 to reinstate government authority and bring security to the area of Yakchal, south-east of Gereshk. As one of the first major operations entirely planned and executed under ANA command, mentored by UK forces, it is a significant milestone in the development of the ANSF. Operation Tor Shezada was launched on 30 July 2010 by British troops partnered with ANSF to continue the momentum generated by Operation Moshtarak and further squeeze insurgents in central Helmand. It aimed to clear insurgents from Sayedabad, to the south of Nad-e Ali, and prevent them from being able to use the area as a base from which to launch attacks. Hamkari is the Afghan government’s ongoing initiative in Kandahar to strengthen institutions of sub-national governance and reduce negative influences. Hamkari objectives are jointly civil and military and the Afghan- led political surge is being enabled by better security conditions, delivered by ANSF and ISAF (mainly US). This military activity takes forward the third phase of Operation Moshtarak. The UK is contributing some specialised elements of support but Hamkari does not involve significant numbers of UK personnel. Ev 174 Defence Committee: Evidence

16. UK Force Laydown and Responsibilities in Helmand

16.1 Regional Command (South-West)

Following General McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment in September 2009 and the subsequent uplift in ISAF troop levels, there are now more international forces in Afghanistan than ever. The deployment of additional international troops to southern Afghanistan in early 2010 created a large force in the South and prompted a review of how troops are managed in the region. Command of a force this size is beyond the capabilities of a single regional command headquarters and therefore, in order to provide the most suitable command and control relationship and to enable the right level of command focus, the command structure in the South was divided into two commands: RC(SW), headquartered in Helmand and consisting of Helmand and Nimruz provinces, and RC(S), headquartered in Kandahar and consisting of Kandahar, Dai Kundi, Uruzgan and Zabol provinces. The separation of regional commands along provincial boundaries also aligned the ISAF military structure in the South with the structure of the ANA, enabling a greater partnering capacity between ISAF and ANSF. Since June 2010, UK forces in TFH have come under the command of RC(SW), commanded by the USMC’s Major General Richard Mills. RC(S) continues under the command of UK Major General Nick Carter until November 2010, when rotational command will transfer to the US.

The previous government agreed in principle that the UK should seek to share command of RC(SW) with the US on a rotational basis, following the previous command arrangements in RC(S) where command was shared between the UK, Canada and the Netherlands on the basis of annual rotation. Once the associated resource implications of this are fully understood, a final decision will be sought from the National Security Council.

16.2 Task Force Helmand

There has been further reorganisation of UK and US forces in Afghanistan below regional command level. TFH have consolidated their presence in central Helmand by withdrawing from bases in the north of the province at Musa Qaleh, Kajaki and Sangin. Responsibility for these areas was transferred to US forces in March, June and September 2010 respectively. Withdrawal from northern Helmand has enabled UK troops to further concentrate, and consolidate gains, in the population centres of central Helmand. As part of the UK’s commitment to this area, the Chief of Joint Operations, Air Marshal Stuart Peach, accepted an ISAF request for a temporary deployment of approximately 300 troops from the UK’s Theatre Reserve Battalion, to give commanders additional flexibility to reinforce progress in central Helmand in Summer 2010.

16.3 Kandahar

In addition to the logistics hub at Camp Bastion, the UK has logistics and combat support troops at Kandahar Airfield. Pending the completion of a new runway and infrastructure at Camp Bastion, due to achieve Initial Operation Capability in early 2011, Kandahar Airfield is the only military airfield in southern Afghanistan able to accommodate the largest transport aircraft. The Headquarters of RC(S) is also based at Kandahar Airfield and as well as being responsible for overseeing all operational activity in RC(S), Major General Nick Carter also coordinates strategic assets for the region. For example, the command is responsible for managing intelligence and surveillance assets and close air support (fast jets), both located at Kandahar airfield. These assets can be deployed across a large geographical area and are managed centrally, in order to get the most effect out of them.

16.4 ISAF Responsibilities

In September 2009, General McChrystal, outlined direction for the campaign in Afghanistan, centred around a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy and based on the four pillars of Embedded Partnering, Governance, Operations and Geographic Priorities. The current commander of ISAF, General Petraeus, has confirmed his commitment to this approach, with regular reviews of progress. — Embedded Partnering. Developing the capability of the ANSF by pairing up Afghan and International Security Assistance Force units at all levels so that they are collocated, plan and conduct missions side-by-side; — Governance. Prioritising responsible and accountable governance at both the national and local levels through both formal and traditional mechanisms; — Operations. Gaining the initiative and reversing the insurgency’s momentum through a staged approach which incrementally increases the size, capability and operational responsibility of the ANSF; and — Geographic Priorities. Prioritising Afghan and ISAF resources to those critical areas where the population is most threatened, with an initial focus of main effort on Helmand and Kandahar provinces in southern Afghanistan. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 175

16.5 Afghan Elections 2010 Afghan Parliamentary elections took place on the 18 September 2010. Security for the elections was the responsibility of the MOI, with the ANSF in the lead. The IJC provided support to their Afghan partners and the Independent Electoral Commission, which was consistent with the overall ISAF approach. IJC also provided support to the Electoral Complaints Commission, the United Nations Development Programme and international observers upon request.

17. UK Casualty Figures As of 20 September 2010, 337 UK service personnel have been killed in Afghanistan since 2001, with 92 fatalities occurring in 2010. The most recent, detailed casualty and fatality figures, which cover the period up to 31 August 2010, are provided below.

17.1 UK Afghan Casualty Figures by Year Seriously Injured Very Seriously Injured Year or Wounded or Wounded Total 2001 0 0 0 2002 0 1 1 2003 1 0 1 2004 3 3 6 2005 0 2 2 2006 13 18 31 2007 40 23 63 2008 38 27 65 2009 75 82 157 2010 (to 31 Aug) 51 66 117 Total 221 222 443

17.2 UK Afghan Fatality Figures by Year Year Killed in Action Died of Wounds Other Total 2001 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 3 3 2003 0 0 0 0 2004 1 0 0 1 2005 1 0 0 1 2006 20 1 5 26 2007 36 1 5 42 2008 47 3 1 51 2009 91 16 1 108 2010 (to 31 Aug) 67 13 7 87

Total 263 34 35 332

17.3 UK Casualties and Fatalities by Month since August 2009 Seriously Very Seriously Injured Injured Killed in Died of Month or Wounded or Wounded Action Wounds Aug 09 10 10 15 4 Sep 09 8 6 7 1 Oct 09 7 13 5 1 Nov 09 9 13 11 1 Dec 09 3 2 5 4 Jan 10 3 9 5 1 Feb 10 4 7 15 0 Mar 10 3 5 9 3 Apr 10 4 5 2 1 May 10 10 12 6 1 Jun 10 4 10 12 4 Jul 10 15 14 14 1 Aug 10 8 4 4 2 Ev 176 Defence Committee: Evidence

18. Friendly Fire Incidents and Inquiry Process 18.1 UK Service Personnel deaths due to friendly fire, 7 October 2001 to 6 September 2010 Year Confirmed1 20012 0 2002 0 2003 0 2004 0 2005 0 2006 2 2007 3 2008 0 2009 1 20103 0 Total 6

1. Those where the cause has been confirmed at a coroner’s inquest 2. Data starts 7 October 2001, inclusive 3. Data ends 6 September 2010, inclusive.

18.2 UK Service Personnel casualties resulting from Friendly Action/Fire as reported on the initial NOTICAS (Notification of Casualty), 7 October 2001 to 15 August 2010 Year Reported 20011 0 2002 0 2003 0 2004 0 2005 0 2006 2 2007 2 20082 16 2009 4 20103 3 Total 27

1. Data starts 7 October 2001, inclusive 2. There were four incidents where more than one person was injured. 3. Data up to 15 August 2010.

In the above table, casualty data has been sourced from the initial Notification of Casualty (NOTICAS) using the Cause Category Friendly Action/Fire. This a field populated by medical authorities with the information that is available to them at the time of an incident. It is not a definitive classification of the event. Not all casualties will have a NOTICAS raised (those less severe casualties that do not require hospitalisation), so the numbers presented here should be treated as the minimum.

18.3 Process for Investigating Alleged Friendly Fire Incidents

Where it is immediately apparent or suspected that there has been a breach of law or Rules of Engagement, or death, or injury to friendly forces on operations which involves a shooting incident, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) policy is that a Serious Incident Report (SINCREP) is made at the earliest opportunity and they are passed immediately to the in-Theatre Formation HQ Legal and Service Police staffs to conduct investigations that will determine whether and by whom any criminal or Service discipline offence has been committed and provide information to the coronial system, as appropriate.

In addition to triggering the Joint Casualty and Compassionate process to enable the notification of the emergency contact and next of kin (NOK) the SINCREP also notifies the Army Incident and Notification Cell (AINC) and Chief Environment and Safety Officer Army in order that they can initiate incident mapping and, where necessary, deployment of the Land Accident Investigation Team. Within 48 hours, AINC and the Chain of Command are required to initiate a Learning Account (LA), which is staffed during operations as a priority, and submitted to the unit’s Formation HQ where any immediate lessons are identified and passed to other units for their action. At this point it will also be decided whether the incident merits an After Action Review (AAR).. A friendly fire incident will also be reported to the Service police to decide whether or not to initiate a criminal investigation. If there is no AAR, the lessons from the LA may be considered in the Counter Threat Working Group. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 177

The final level of investigation is the completion of a Service Inquiry which is used to examine the circumstances surrounding an incident, to determine the facts and to make recommendations to reduce the possibility of a similar incident happening again without attributing blame.

19. Civilian Casualties and Fatalities and Inquiry Outcomes 19.1 Overarching Policy The protection of the Afghan civilian population is at the core of the international military strategy and the importance of this was recognised by the international community in the Communiqué which was released at the Kabul Conference on 20 July, which states that: “Participants recognized that civilian casualties and protection of civilians are of great concern and noted that most civilian casualties are caused by insurgent attacks. Participants regretted the death of every Afghan and international civilian, and Afghan and international military forces remain committed to the objective of a steady reduction in the rate of civilian casualties.” ISAF has worked extremely hard to reduce the levels of civilian casualties and has introduced new rules to govern the use of force which are laid out in ISAF Directives. As Commander ISAF, General Petraeus has committed to building on the efforts of his predecessor, General McChrystal, in this area. UK forces in Afghanistan also make every effort to avoid civilian casualties in line with the ISAF direction outlined in the Commander ISAF Tactical Directive Revision 1, dated 1 August 2010. This is currently classified as Secret but an unclassified version of the previous COMISAF Directive dated 6 July 2009 is available.

19.2 Investigation Procedures There are strict procedures, frequently updated in light of experience, intended both to minimise the risk of casualties occurring and to investigate any incidents that do happen. The procedures followed after a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incident by both the UK and ISAF chain of command are set out below. The two processes run in parallel but are independent and the reports cross from one chain of command to another. This is to ensure that the neutrality of the processes is maintained. The Afghan operational theatre is a non-international armed conflict with an insurgent enemy. This provides adifficult and complex environment in which to identify enemy forces (EF) and the role which other individuals who may or may not be civilians are playing in the hostilities. The result of this is that careful judgement has to be exercised before engaging to ensure that those being engaged are legitimate targets.

19.3 UK Shooting Incident Review (SIR) Policy The most recent issue of the UK SIR policy was on 4 January 2010 and it is regularly reviewed. The first report of all shooting incidents is the Serious Incident Report (SINCREP). This report is sent by the military unit involved to their unit operations room in the first instance. It will then be forwarded as appropriate up the Chain of Command. From the SINCREP, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Battlegroup must make one of three decisions: — If only positively identified enemy forces have been killed or injured and there is no suggestion of any breach of the Laws of International Armed Conflict (LOAC) or Rules of Engagement (ROE) then no further action will be necessary. — If civilians may have been killed or injured although there is no indication that LOAC/ROE have been breached an SIR should be initiated. — If it appears there may have been a breach of the ROE or LOAC or a friendly fire incident or any other circumstances deemed appropriate then the incident is reported to the Service police. If a SIR is required then it should be completed within 48 hours and should set out the detailed facts to enable the CO to conclude if any further action is required. The review is to be conducted by an officer of at least the rank of Captain, who was not involved in the incident. The review will involve the collation of all documents, ledgers and logs that deal with the incident, as well as reports from those present. At the conclusion of the SIR the CO will have three options, depending on its outcome: inform the Service police; recommend an investigation from within unit resources; or take no further action. If a service police investigation or unit investigation is commenced this may or may not lead to disciplinary proceedings. Any investigation will clearly produce documentation and a report.

19.4 Investigations A Service Police investigation will be conducted in the usual manner in accordance with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), including the taking of statements and, in most cases, the interviewing of suspects after caution. This will produce a report which will be sent to the relevant authority. A unit investigation will be less formal than a Service Police one and will not be conducted in accordance with PACE. A unit investigation will report to the CO who will then decide if disciplinary action is appropriate. Ev 178 Defence Committee: Evidence

19.5 ISAF CIVCAS Procedures The primary difference between national investigations and ISAF ones is the purpose of them. While a national investigation is to establish what happened with a view to taking action for any potential offences and to examine Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), the ISAF process is aimed at establishing what happened, to examine TTPs and assist in providing an explanation to local nationals and GIRoA. ISAF has no disciplinary powers over troops which are deployed under national service laws. The essence of the ISAF investigations is to record CIVCAS allegations and learn the lessons to improve TTPs in the future. A procedure for Initial Assessment Teams (IAT) to be deployed from ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in the immediate aftermath of a CIVCAS incident to report on it has also recently been established. The source of the ISAF CIVCAS investigation procedures is the Escalation of Force (EoF) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The first indication of a CIVCAS incident will again be a SINCREP. The first appearance of this in an ISAF system will be as an entry in Joint Operations Centre Watch (JOCWATCH). This is a real time computer version of an Operations Log on to which all incidents are reported. If CIVCAS appears to be a possibility then this will be reported on the JOCWATCH entry. If there is a CIVCAS possibility the unit concerned will be required to provide a First Impressions Report (FIR) within 24 hours and a Second Impressions Report (2IR) within 48 hours. The first report is the bare details of what happened while the second is to give a full explanation along with any appropriate documentation. As a result of the reports, alterations to TTPs may be recommended or direction may be given on alterations to ROE etc. The reports are archived by the HQ ISAF CIVCAS Cell. If there is a large scale CIVCAS incident, COMISAF may direct a large scale investigation. Depending on the nature of the incident the IJC may decide to deploy an IAT to conduct a short on the spot assessment. This team typically consists of three people including a lawyer who will conduct fact finding with the unit and, where possible, at the location of the incident. The purpose of the IAT is to conduct a more thorough investigation than the FIR/2IR process. On occasions the IAT will also have Afghan members. As well as taking accounts from troops involved it will liaise with the local authorities to provide an initial explanation of the incident. The IAT will produce a report which will be shared with the unit and its Chain of Command and may make recommendations as to changes in procedures. It may also conclude that in fact the CIVCAS was as a result of an engagement that was lawful and within the ROE and no blame could be attached to ISAF forces. IAT reports will be archived with the CIVCAS Cell at HQ ISAF.

19.6 Civilian Casualty Numbers The UK does not collate, publish or hold figures of civilian casualties in Afghanistan because of the immense difficulty and risks of collecting robust data. The operational environment in Afghanistan makes it difficult to monitor the overall number of civilian casualties. Among the complicating factors is the removal in some cases of the dead and/or injured by local nationals before investigations could feasibly take place (Islam directs that bodies must be buried within 24 hours). UK forces may also need to vacate an area before an accurate assessment of the numbers of fatalities and casualties could be made and it is not feasible to have personnel on the ground at the site of each attack to ascertain the numbers of those killed or injured, particularly if the attack is airborne. It is therefore impossible to estimate with any confidence the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan that have been caused by the current conflict. However, where we are aware that a civilian casualty has occurred, a full investigation, as outlined above, is undertaken. It should be noted that insurgents routinely make false and exaggerated claims about civilian casualties caused by ISAF and Afghan forces; care must be taken not to accept their accounts at face value.

20. Cost of Operations The Defence Budget is not used to fund the additional costs of current operations—they are met from the Treasury Reserve. HMT funds the net additional costs MoD has incurred, but not the costs that the Department would have incurred regardless of the operation taking place (eg salaries). Any savings on activities that have not occurred because of the operation (eg training exercises) are also taken into account in arriving at the net figures. Defence Resources can provide the actual net operating and capital costs of operations in Afghanistan funded by the Treasury, which to March 2010 totalled c£9.5 billion. However, given the Department’s purpose and how it is funded, it is not possible to identify which elements of the core Defence budget are being spent in Afghanistan. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 179

THE ANNUAL AUDITED FIGURES FOR THE COSTS OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2001–02 (£M) 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 Total Resource 187 236 36 58 148 560 1,071 1,655 2,330 6,281 Capital 34 75 10 9 51 178 433 968 1,491 3,249 Costs FY Total 221 311 46 67 199 738 1,504 2,623 3,821 9,530

THE ESTIMATED COST OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AT MAIN ESTIMATE FOR FY 2010–11 (£M) 2010–11 Forecast Total Resource DEL £2,940M Total Capital DEL £1,496M Total Estimated Costs £4,436M

These figures conform to HM Government’s Clear Line of Sight (CLoS), or Alignment, project and do not account for Cost of Capital, nor do they include the cost of provisions. In addition, the MoD contributes (along with the FCO and DFID) to the tri-departmental Conflict Pool (formerly Global Conflict Prevention Pool—GCPP) for which the allocation and spend for Afghanistan 2002- present is given below. (£M) 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 Total Allocation − 18.00 13.73 15.35 10.00 13.38 18.20 53.69 67.00 209.34 Spend − 11.04 12.83 15.72 9.36 9.17 18.87 52.50 62.75 192.24 Allocation −−10.08 11.47 10.00 10.00 10.00 −−51.54 (CN) Spend (CN) −−8.10 9.91 10.15 9.67 9.85 −−47.68 GCPP allocated no funding to Afghan in FY01/02, and between FY 02/03 and FY07/08 funding for Counter Narcotics work is treated separately.

21. Logistics Supply 21.1 Airbridge Passenger Airbridge: The primary passenger air bridge, or Air Line Of Communication (ALOC), runs five TriStar C2 / KC1 aircraft per week on the route Brize Norton—Akrotiri—Kandahar and back. The C2 variant is the passenger carrying variant and can carry 190 passengers and baggage to Afghanistan; the KC1 variant is a tanker/freight/passenger combination aircraft which can carry 115 passengers. The Second Air Line Of Communication (2ALOC) uses a twice weekly civilian charter flight into Minhad, and then a C17 to move directly into Bastion. This route is surged by up to five flights per week during the Relief in Place (RiP). Freight Airbridge: The regular strategic freight airbridge is provided by six C17 flights per week and six charter aircraft (DC8s & A300s) per week. These are often augmented by outsize lift Antonov and Ilyushin aircraft for the movement of outsize loads to theatre. The charter/military freight split is 57% / 43% (January–June 2010) moving approximately 150 tonnes per week on military aircraft and 200 tonnes per week on charter aircraft. Whilst operating under considerable pressure, the airbridge is providing a robust service to theatre and the recent statistics for August 2010 show that 73% of passengers flying from UK to Afghanistan arrived on time with 89% arriving within three hours of the planned arrival time. Over the past 12 months, 55,421 passengers have been flown to Afghanistan with the RAF TriStars flying 33,565, 2ALOC charter / RAF C17 17,982 and 3,874 on RAF C17 direct to and from the UK. The complexity of interacting factors including diplomatic clearances, access to slot times in Afghanistan, requirement for defensive aids for the aircraft, passenger aircraft being restricted to take off and landing in the dark and last minute changes to accommodate high priority aero medical evacuation tasks all contribute to the challenge of operating the airbridge. Currently, the most significant issue is one of aircraft availability. All UK aircraft carrying passengers into theatre are required to have Theatre Entry Standard (TES) protection systems and the fitting of these state-of- the-art systems has proven to be a complex and lengthy process, taking aircraft out of the transport fleet for the duration of the modification work. The availability of TriStars, particularly the C2 variant is also significantly impacted by maintenance and modification programmes to address obsolescence issues and ageing Ev 180 Defence Committee: Evidence

aircraft problems. The introduction of the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft, scheduled to replace TriStar in mid- 2013 will resolve these problems. Charter aircraft used by MoD to carry freight into Afghanistan have to be compliant with Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) regulations. The CAA recently withdrew the UK licence for two of the three companies which operate DC 8 aircraft on safety grounds. This has had a significant impact as the DC 8 aircraft can operate directly into Camp Bastion (BSN) whilst the Airbus A300 aircraft can only operate into Kandahar resulting in an increased burden on the Tactical Air Transport fleet. The opening of the new runway in BSN in 2011 will help resolve this issue. In addition to the airbridge, an option known as Op SUNDERLAND is also used. This involves transporting equipment, including UOR vehicles which cannot transit through Pakistan because of security considerations, to Cyprus or the UAE where they are then transferred to charter or C17 aircraft. This method reduces the reliance on the SLOC through Pakistan and allows the reverse leg to be used to remove obsolescent and damaged equipment from theatre.

OP HERRICK—LINES OF COMMUNICATION

21.2 Pakistan Surface Line of Communication The Pakistan Surface Line of Communication (SLOC), which enables deliveries into Afghanistan by road, runs between Karachi Port and the two primary border crossing points (BXP) into Afghanistan; Chamen BXP (north of Quetta) and Torkham BXP (in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass. While the Pakistan floods have not disrupted the SLOC, customs processes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan can be slow, bureaucratic and result in delays to the delivery of routine freight. Continual in-Theatre engagement is required to obtain Afghan Tax Exemption certificates and Pakistan customs clearances. At SHAPE’s request, and on behalf of ISAF, the British High Commission Islamabad with support from PJHQ is seeking to assist the Pakistani authorities in resolving the issues on their side of the border. In Afghanistan, ISAF has the lead on ensuring a solution can be found within the bounds of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA). The UK will continue to concentrate on promoting improvements in the ISAF process and working with the British Embassy Kabul and Afghan Government Ministries to clear UK consignments. The recently established In-Theatre MTA Joint Coordination Board will assist in resolving friction points and the establishment of a Customs Coordination Cell with UK representation will help to further improve understanding and relationships.

21.3 Northern Distribution Network (NDN) NATO has provided a significant logistic benefit by enabling a network of routes to Afghanistan through Northern Europe, Russia and the Central Asian States to complement the Pakistan SLOC through a series of Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 181

NATO Transit Agreements (NATO TA) open to all NATO and non-NATO ISAF members. The UK has led the NDN trials on behalf of NATO. As the largest anticipated user of the NDN (after the US) it is anticipated that some of the other ISAF contributing nations will follow the UK lead. Consignments are restricted to non- warlike goods. In order to continue the development of the NDN, further work is being undertaken to reduce Diplomatic Clearance timelines and to negotiate expanding the types of commodities carried to include warlike stores and to expand upon the NATO TAs to enable a two way flow of freight.

21.4 HERRICK Campaign Support Plan (HCSP) The HCSP is an operational level plan owned by the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). It represents a change in HERRICK campaign support, drawing on strategic direction from the MoD whilst bringing together a range of inputs from the wider support community. It promotes both continuity and stability for the support elements of the campaign in Afghanistan, allowing CJO to guide the logistic effort more effectively. It is framed around Decisive Conditions (DCs) (those things which need to be achieved/occur) set against a specific timeline (currently ending 2015) to meet the Mission. Progress is in line with expectations albeit that some DCs have moved to reflect more realistic and mature timelines. Current headline issues are: — Maintaining sufficient relevant material in theatre. — Effective Information Systems to enable a well managed joint inventory. — Achieve a robust supply governance regime. — Maximise all lines of communication in and out of theatre. — Contribute to stabilisation. — Prepare for effective Transition.

21.5 Contractor Support to Operations (CSO)—Op HERRICK The UK military is increasingly making use of CSO in Afghanistan, as reflected in the growth in the number of contractors in-theatre and the increasing range of capabilities that they provide. From July 2008 to July 2010 the number of companies supporting the UK in theatre increased from 22 to 67 and the number of contractor personnel deployed in theatre from 2,030 to 4,867. The latter number is considered to be conservative, with a further estimated 500–1,000 contractors (mainly Afghans) working on in-theatre contracts. The UK also utilises a number of NATO contracts for support, such as for fuel and for rotary wing freight movement. The range of support provided through CSO is indicated below. This list is not exhaustive: Theatre Support Contracts External Support Contract System Support Contracts Supply of construction resources Operation & Maintenance of UK Contractor Logistic Support for Rotary Wing Freight infrastructure equipment systems Road Freight Real Life Support (eg catering, Communication System support Construction of infrastructure laundry) to UK personnel SATCOM system support Provision of low value goods Food and Water supply Operation and Maintenance of Fuel Supply some UOR systems Medical and welfare support Road Freight Repatriation services

The MoD and contractors are currently implementing the findings of a joint MoD-Industry 2009 study which provided a number of recommendations to reduce MoD’s cumulative risk, increase MoD’s assurance to contractors and better integrate the military and contractors into a “Total Support Force” which will best utilise the strengths of each.

21.6 Afghan First Policy (A1P) While the UK military makes use, where essential, of UK and third country contractors, an Afghan First Policy is practised; seeking where possible to use Afghan contractors based in the country. This is seen as a key element in achieving stabilisation and stimulating and developing the Afghan economy. By spending money in Afghanistan rather than on Afghanistan the UK can not only contribute to economic rejuvenation by maximising local procurement and encouraging legitimate business growth, but also realise benefits of winning influence amongst the local community. In addition, local purchase also reduces the amount of materiel sent from the UK and means MoD can source goods at a lower price. Operating alongside the US (which also has an A1P) and the NGO Peace Dividend Trust, a series of Afghan Business Conferences have been held to make local contractors aware of our requirements and let contracts for a variety of goods. In addition, by encouraging competition and widening the contractor base for the supply of aggregates, theatre have achieved significant cost reductions. Ev 182 Defence Committee: Evidence

A1P also addresses the training of local personnel where appropriate and the screening of contractors to ensure that funds are not channelled to malign actors, towards the insurgents or those involved in corruption.

21.7 Equipment Sustainability System (ESS) In order to provide the best possible equipment availability to the Operational Commander, the ESS Programme is designed to undertake deep repair and maintenance (regeneration) in theatre. By carrying out repair and maintenance in Camp Bastion, this programme negates the requirement for each vehicle to be returned to the UK for maintenance. In addition to improving availability of vehicles and other equipment in Afghanistan, it will save over £50 million per year in equipment rotation costs and reduce the demands on the airbridge. As well as maintenance, ESS will deliver a Heavy Repair Facility, significantly increasing the capacity to repair damaged vehicles on site. Full Regeneration Capability of ESS will commence from 1 October 2010 and grow in capacity over the first 18 months of the three year contract gradually regenerating more of the HERRICK operational fleet. By mid 2011 numerous platforms will be undergoing regeneration including SUPPORT VECHILE, HEAVY EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTER, MASTIFF, RIDGBACK, WHEELED TANKER, JACKAL 2, COYOTE and ROUGH TERRAIN CONTAINER HANDLER. It is intended that as much forward repair and regeneration as possible will take place as ESS matures including Explosive Ordnance Device and Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) equipment.

21.8 Multinational Support Solutions In order to reduce costs, improve interoperability and share responsibility, MoD has engaged in multinational support solutions. Examples of these are: — Contracted Rotary Wing—ISAF nations work together to fund (through NATO) and utilise contracted helicopters to provide cargo lift for the sustainment of ISAF throughout theatre. This allows military support helicopters to focus on operations in direct support of ISAF/ANSF. — Protected Mobility Support—The UK has committed to a NATO initiative to scope multinational logistics support for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles (MASTIFF, RIDGBACK, etc). — Combat Logistics Patrols—UK & US Logistic units combine requirements and resources to deliver sustainment stocks to Forward Operating Bases within the RC(SW), thus optimising the logistics footprint and reducing the unnecessary exposure of personnel to insurgent activity. — Real Life Support (RLS)/Theatre Air Port of Delivery (APOD) Facilities—Through NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) (as the lead organisation) nations work together to fund and operate RLS/APOD facilities that enable Kandahar Air Field (KAF) as the theatre APOD and Dispersed Operating Base. The same construct has been applied to the military estate at Kabul International Airport. — Intra Theatre Airlift Support (ITAS)—Nations work together to pool Tactical Air Transport assets and offer spare capacity to each other, thus optimising the Tactical Air Transport and logistics footprint.

21.9 Logistics Information Systems (Log IS) Due to the inherent end-to end nature of the military logistics process, the logistics IS requirement in Theatre is complex—trying to deliver logistics support over poor infrastructure to moving locations where demand surges in an often unpredictable fashion and in a changing tactical situation influenced by the enemy. The Log IS deployed to Theatre are mostly ageing legacy applications and they need to be renewed in order to be effective and robust. Progress has been made but until all the new systems are fielded, Log IS will remain a principal area of risk. The primary logistics applications cover the following areas: — Equipment Support including Engineering and Asset Management for land equipment and Air/ helicopter assets. This is essential to maximise availability of assets, exploit the savings associated with Whole Fleet Management, and ensure the crucial safety-relevant aspects of asset management are recognised. — Supply Chain Management including Deployed Inventory Management, In Transit Visibility and Air Movement processes. — Logistics Decision Support including a variety of tools which supports the logistic commander ability to conduct support and planning.

22. Current Equipment 22.1 Key Issues Afghanistan is a demanding operational environment, in terms of its physical characteristics, the threats to our forces—articularly the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat—and a persistent, determined and Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 183

adaptive enemy. We must recognise that most equipment has to be a compromise with inevitable trade-offs to produce the best overall solution (eg between levels of vehicle protection and the need for mobility). Nevertheless, our equipment is widely recognised as being better than ever before. We are procuring increasingly bespoke and sophisticated equipment for Afghanistan—for example, some of our cutting edge protected mobility vehicles. But more complex equipment is often accompanied by long lead- times for its delivery and fielding; there are usually no simple, rapid solutions—although done urgently, it necessarily takes time. This applies equally to the increased training requirement and it is vital that we have sufficient numbers to provide for pre-deployment training in a representative environment, and for attrition reserve purposes. In a constantly evolving operational situation, notably the need to counter new enemy tactics, roles change and develop, and equipment requirements must reflect these changes. This may impose constraints on operational freedom which will be mitigated by progressive improvements to capability over time and sensible planning by operational commanders (eg restrictions on the use of SNATCH Land Rover off-base).

22.2 Helicopters We have consistently improved helicopter capability. The baseline for this has been November 2006, since when we have doubled the number of battlefield helicopters and have seen flying hours increase by 140%. [Note: Only the percentage increases in helicopters and flying hours are made public, for operational security reasons.] We have achieved this through a combination of increasing the number of aircraft and maximising delivery of capability through efficient logistic support. There are a number of different helicopters from all the Services deployed in Afghanistan, performing a variety of roles. Chinook, Merlin and Sea King Mk4 helicopters enable the essential movement of men and materiel around the battle space, whilst Lynx helicopters provide the light utility support. The Apache helicopter delivers an attack/armed capability, whilst the Sea King Mk7 contributes to the Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) task. An additional eight helicopters will be delivered to the Chinook Force from the Mk 3 Reversion Programme by December 2010—the first three of these aircraft have already been delivered for training purposes, and the remaining five will be delivered by the end of 2010. These aircraft will provide resilience within the Chinook Force, enabling the deployment of additional capability to theatre and allowing a greater contribution to vital pre-deployment operational training. In addition, a programme is in place to provide the whole fleet with more powerful T55–714 engines, increasing their ability to operate “hot and high” and improving flight safety. The installation of up-rated engines to the entire Lynx Mk 9 fleet has allowed these helicopters to operate in Afghanistan during the summer months, providing for the first time a Light Helicopter capability on a year round operational basis. Whilst we will always be able to use more helicopters, there is a requirement to balance the number of deployed aircraft with the need to sustain their use with the number of aircraft and crews deployed. Our ability to generate sufficient numbers of operationally capable crews and engineers is fundamental to the sustainment of our battlefield helicopter capability and therefore our operations.

22.3 Protected Mobility (PM) In total, over £1.8 billion has been approved for over 1,800 new Protected Mobility Vehicles for operations since 2006, including MASTIFF, RIDGBACK, JACKAL, and Tactical Support Vehicles. MoD has bought WARTHOG vehicles to replace the VIKING on operations in Afghanistan, providing improved protection to troops; the first vehicles deploying from this September for operational use in Afghanistan. Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs), funded by the Treasury, are providing the in-theatre requirement, the requirement for pre-deployment collective and individual training, and an “attrition reserve” to off-set operational losses, and the situation is improving month-on-month with regard to the delivery of vehicles. Most recently, the inflow of significant numbers of alternative platforms—SNATCH VIXEN PLUS and HUSKY—has been sufficient for the use of all SNATCH 2A Land Rover and VECTOR vehicles “outside the wire” to cease before the end of April 2010. We are also urgently progressing with delivery of the next generation of Light Protected Patrol Vehicles (LPPV) which will, in due course, succeed SNATCH VIXEN PLUS. Responses to the Invitation to Tender were received from two contenders and Force Protection Europe has been selected as the preferred bidder. The chosen LPPV will represent leading edge technology, providing the best currently available balance between protection, weight and agility; LPPV has been specifically designed to meet our requirements and will provide unprecedented levels of blast protection for vehicles of this size and weight. Notwithstanding the progress that has been and continues to be made, no vehicle—not even MASTIFF—is completely invulnerable. All armour can, at some point, be overmatched. We will continue to suffer casualties as a consequence of the ever-evolving threat and the operational demands, not because of shortcomings in Ev 184 Defence Committee: Evidence

protected vehicles. Physical protection necessarily forms only one layer of protection—tactics, techniques and procedures, such alternative route planning, are also critically important.

22.4 Dismounted Close Combat (DCC) Equipment Enhanced Combat Body Armour is still used in transit and on larger, less threatened bases, but everybody in Afghanistan who needs it has a variant of OSPREY body armour. All front-line troops are issued with OSPREY body armour, and Mk 6A helmets. OSPREY ASSAULT and Mark 7 helmets are being issued, and offer advantages in terms of comfort and freedom of movement. But the current OSPREY body armour and Mk 6A helmets provide exactly the same outstanding ballistic protection and is available now—and will continue to be available—to everybody who needs it.

22.5 Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) 2009 saw a step change in the threat posed by IEDs in Afghanistan, with an unprecedented increase in their number. In response, the MoD has invested significant resource and effort into countering IEDs. A C-IED Task Force has been established, manned by a niche of highly motivated and trained personnel, which plays a significant part in developing C-IED capability, including PM vehicles and specialist equipment. Among the non-specialist equipment now being fielded are Hand Held Metal Detectors (HHMDs) known as VALLON, which are provided to all UK foot patrols in Afghanistan. UORs have been approved for more HHMDs, in addition to new robots and remote control vehicles, and MoD is also investing in new C-IED facilities for training and intelligence. The Prime Minister announced on 10 June 2010 that up to a further £67 million is to be allocated to the C- IED campaign. This includes over £40 million for more protected vehicles for use by our C-IED teams in Afghanistan. Funding will also be available—more than £11 million—for more Remote Control Vehicles. The remaining funds will be used to enhance other critical capabilities, including enhancements to our military working dog capability.

22.6 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) ISTAR includes air and land capabilities, ranging from manned aircraft and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), for example REAPER and HERMES 450, to base protection (eg cameras). We have successfully deployed the RN’s Sea King Airborne Surveillance and Control helicopters and the joint Army/RAF ASTOR system as complementary capabilities to improve ISTAR in theatre. Our UAS capability is improving and a new UAS—WATCHKEEPER—will be introduced later this year to replace HERMES 450. Steady improvements to our ISTAR capability incrementally increase our situational awareness through the collection and dissemination of ISTAR data, a vital element in mitigating the operational threat. We continue to work with our Allies—principally the US—to ensure that we can share secure information in a timely manner.

22.7 Fast Air Close Air Support (CAS) Since July 2009 the Fast Air CAS capability has been provided by TORNADO GR4 aircraft based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) as part of an international pool of aircraft. Eight TORNADO GR4s are based at KAF on a permanent basis with an additional two deployed temporarily until 31 October 2010, in response to a request from Commander ISAF for additional CAS support around the Afghan Parliamentary Elections on 18 September. CAS aircraft deliver a range of non-kinetic and precise, scalable kinetic effects as well as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in direct support to ISAF Forces. The crews are well versed in the rules of engagement and the need to minimise civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure and only operate under control of a qualified Forward Air Controller (FAC) who is normally on the ground embedded with friendly forces. In many cases a “Show of Presence” or “Show of Force”, where the aircraft is flown in an increasingly aggressive manner, is sufficient to disperse insurgents, enabling friendly forces to break contact and reposition. On occasion however, when insurgents can not be dissuaded by non-kinetic means, the aircraft’s own 30mm cannon, BRIMSTONE missiles and/or PAVEWAY Mk IV precision guided bombs can be brought to bear to provide decisive effect. In the ISR role the Raptor pod is carried and provides high quality imagery rapidly to ground forces; this can be supplemented by imagery from the laser targeting pod that can be linked directly to the FAC and the troops on the ground. UK aircraft can be tasked with providing support to ISAF troops across Afghanistan, however, their tasks are mainly conducted in the South and South-West where UK forces are based. The provision of precise, timely air-delivered effect is often decisive in assisting friendly forces in contact with the insurgents whilst the provision of accurate and relevant ISR product often helps them avoid trouble in the first place. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 185

See also Annex E (Security classified, not publicly available—available to Committee Members at Defence Committee Office)

23. Personnel Harmony 23.1 Harmony Guidelines and Pinch Points Harmony is a measure of the number of nights individuals spend away from home (separated service) over a given period. Harmony guidelines differ between the three services and are given as a ratio of days separated service within a period of so many years. For the RN the ratio is 660 days in a three year period (or 61% of the time), for the RAF 280:2 (39%) and the Army 415:2.5 (46%). On occasion, these guidelines are breached.

23.2 Royal Navy Harmony As RN harmony guidelines permit greater tempo than Army and RAF counterparts, it is less likely that Royal Marine (RM) units or individuals have breached or will breach harmony guidelines. However, the tempo of activity for RM units has been higher than Army units currently rotating through HERRICK cycles due to regular amphibious deployments in between HERRICK tours. In general, over the period of operations in Afghanistan, individuals in breach of the harmony guidelines have been very limited and often as a consequence of HERRICK deployments combined with time at sea. In the RN, the following trades have been identified as “pinch points” which have been subject to a degree of disruption to Harmony. — Armoured Support Squadron—particularly over the periods HERRICK 5 to HERRICK 9. The pressure has now reduced due to Army ranks taking on the Armoured Support role in theatre. — Assault Engineers—Directorate of Naval Personnel (DNPERS) have increased the trained strength to cope with increased demand. — Heavy Weapons—DNPERS have increased the trained strength to cope with increased demand. — Mountain Leaders—lengthy courses (command and specialist) add to the operational separated service bill that has to be carefully managed by DNPERS. The Directorate of Naval Personnel is confident these groups have been managed sufficiently. The RN has not breached its harmony guidelines in any great number over the past three years and does not expect to do so over the forthcoming three years as a consequence of HERRICK deployments.

23.3 Army Harmony In the Army, in addition to individual harmony guidelines, the impact of extended operational commitments on the Army’s people is also measured through unit harmony, the target for which is an interval between operational tours of no less than 24 months. Due to the way in which the different corps deploy their personnel on operations, unit tour interval statistics are maintained only for the Infantry, Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) and Royal Artillery (RA). Given that this is a measure of unit activity, they are not maintained for pinch point trades. A tour interval can be established for the vast majority of units, aside from six of the 14 units in the RA, who deploy at sub-unit strength as part of larger formations rather than at unit strength. Taken across these three Corps, the current average of the most recent tour intervals for individual units is 22 months. This is broken down by Corps, as follows: — Infantry—The average tour interval is 26 months, with 15 of the 36 Infantry battalions breaching the 24 month guideline. — RAC—The average tour interval is 21 months, with five of the 10 units breaching the 24 month guideline. — RA—For those units where a tour interval can be established, the average is 21 months. Of the 14 units in total (which includes those units for which a tour interval cannot be established); six are breaching the 24 month guideline. The unit tour interval is in effect only an approximate guide to the impact of the current operational tempo on individuals. The natural flow of personnel through the Army (through recruitment activity, discharges and transfers between units) means that not all those who deploy with a particular unit will deploy again on the next occasion. Moreover, many individuals, even within the Infantry, RAC and RA deploy either as individual augmentees or within sub-units. Such deployments are not, of course, captured by the unit tour interval measure. In addition, not all personnel with a particular unit will deploy on every occasion—at any one time and for a number of reasons a proportion of a unit’s personnel is always listed as “unable to deploy”. Separated service statistics for the Army are collected from a combination of data on the Joint Personnel Administration and Unicom systems. The most recent statistics, as at 1 July 2010, show that 6% of current Trained Strength and 5% of Gurkhas are exceeding the guideline of 415 days in 30 months. Ev 186 Defence Committee: Evidence

23.4 RAF Harmony For the RAF, as at 1 July 2010, 97% of personnel had met individual harmony guidelines. In addition, the RAF applies a filter to Individual harmony guideline figures, to include only nights away due to operations or operational training both in the UK and abroad to give an operational harmony guideline of no more than 125 nights away from home in a rolling 20-month period. 88% of personnel met this guideline. Within the RAF the following trades have been identified as operational ‘pinch points’ which have been subject to a degree of disruption to Harmony: — Officers—Pilot, Air Traffic Control, Intelligence, RAF Regiment, Medical, Medical Nursing. — Non-Commissioned Aircrew—Weapons Systems Operator. — Ground Trades—General Technician (Mechanical), RAF Regiment Gunner, Intelligence Analyst, Intelligence Analyst (Voice), Logisitics (Movements). Eleven out of the twelve trades / branches have shown improvement in meeting the guidelines. While detailed analysis would be necessary to provide comprehensive reasons for these improvements, it can be suggested that the cessation of Operation TELIC in Iraq has reduced the deployment commitments of the RAF within the two-year rolling period. The largest breaches are in RAF Regiment and Intelligence trades/branches. Most deployments for RAF Regiment or Intelligence roles are 180 days (six months) long and require extensive pre-deployment training. Therefore they are more likely to breach harmony guidelines on one deployment, in comparison to other trades/branches whose commitments are usually 120 days (four months) and require less pre-deployment training.

24. Pre Deployment Training (PDT) 24.1 Overview The overall policy for pre-deployment training is defined and prioritised by the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) Joint Commanders’ Operational Training Requirement (JCOTR). The broad process for RN (including Royal Marines(RM)) and RAF personnel is set out below. Personnel from both services also receive, as appropriate, the more specialist Afghan-specific training provided to Army personnel and set out at 24.2 and 24.3.

24.2 RN (RM) PDT Royal Marine units are force generated in the same manner as their Army counterparts. Royal Marine units are initially trained under the RN’s Littoral Manoeuvre training programme before being delivered to Collective Training Level 4 (CT4) at the start of HERRICK PDT (six months out). The only difference to the above is for Individual Augmentation training for RM and RN ranks. This is conducted by the RN Mobilisation and Mounting Centre (RNMMC). Courses are delivered in accordance with PJHQ Individual PDT Policy and liaison across the RNMMC and Land Forces Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG) is very effective.

24.3 RAF PDT RAF personnel must maintain currency with their Common Core Skills training, which is conducted at their local Force Protection (RAF Regiment) Training Flight. This involves weapon training, handling and shooting practice; combat first aid; and revision and practice of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN). The RAF has two types of pre-deployment training, as stipulated by PJHQ: Individual and Formed Unit PDT. Individual PDT differs depending on whether personnel may be required to deploy within or outside the confines of a defensive location, the former a five-day package and the latter a 10-day package to cover more extensive deployment skills. Some personnel may also undertake specific individual pre deployment training for their specialised role. For those deploying as Formed Units (currently only RAF Force Protection Wings and supporting personnel), personnel will complete six month mission specific training delivered at the RAF Force Protection Centre by the Operational Training Advisory and Standardisation Squadron.

24.4 Army PDT Land Forces troops preparing for operations in Afghanistan begin their formal training 24 months before deployment. The revised training cycle, known as the Campaign Formation Operational Readiness Mechanism (C-FORM) has recently been introduced. This consists principally of two sequential elements: — Hybrid Foundation Training (HFT)—HFT trains individuals, units and formations (force elements) for Hybrid conflict.1 For realism and relevance, the training environment is matched as closely as possible to the contemporary operating environment. Force elements use both core equipment and, if available and applicable for a named operation, equipment used currently on operations. 1 that which is characterised by adversaries (conventional, irregular and terrorist) who employ a blend of traditional and irregular tactics using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways, decentralised planning and execution conducted amongst and about the people. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 187

— Mission Specific Training (MST)—MST encompasses both individual and collective training and delivers force elements that are able to operate on a defined operation with defined capabilities. It is conducted predominately using equipment used currently on operations. On completion of MST, force elements are able to operate in a complex, Joint, multi-national and inter-agency environment.

24.5 Counter IED Training Pre-deployment training includes general education on different types of IEDs, enemy tactics and what signs soldiers should look out for. Soldiers will also cover in depth the drills used in Afghanistan to ensure that the force is as well protected as possible against the IED threat. Headquarters staff are trained on IED scenarios to ensure that they can provide the most appropriate response available. The level and detail of training provided is dependent on the role of the individual. Every soldier deploying on the ground has an awareness of the threat and can operate a Hand Held Metal Detector. Drills are continued in theatre to ensure that the very latest data and situational awareness is passed on.

24.6 Cultural Awareness Training All soldiers receive briefings on the culture and people of Afghanistan in order to place military operations in the context of the people the mission is seeking to support. All personnel also receive an introduction to local languages, including the use of basic words and phrases, which are issued on a language card. Commanders receive additional information on relevant aspects of local culture and the effective use of interpreters. Cultural Specialists receive extensive additional training appropriate to their role.

24.7 Development of training to adapt to changing environments All service personnel deploying to Afghanistan receive theatre-specific training to ensure that they have the skills to carry out their specific role, while maintaining their own safety and contributing to the protection of those around them. Recent work by Land Forces in support of the Permanent Joint Headquarters has seen the development of revised Joint Training Requirements (JTRs) which capture the relevant individual skills. The JTRs are derived from an analysis of which tactical tasks are required in the demanding operating conditions in theatre. They also incorporate best practice identified by training specialists in theatre and an extensive study of the lessons drawn from post-operational reports. The training continues to evolve, driven by the rapidly changing requirements of operations against a determined enemy. The significant increase in C-IED training in direct response to changing insurgent tactics in theatre is a particularly good example of this.

24.8 Partnering/Training with other nations A notable aspect of MST is the participation of foreign forces. This is particularly helpful in replicating the particular dynamics of partnering with the ANSF. In September 2008, an Indian Army company was attached to the Land Warfare Centre Battle Group for a month. The attachment was not only highly successful from a training point of view, but it also generated significant defence diplomacy benefits. Since then foreign forces have been used routinely to replicate our Afghan partnered forces during MST Field Training Exercises (FTXs); as indeed have UK based Afghans and member of the ANSF from theatre. So far we have had a Polish company taking part in MST FTXs in January 2010 and July 2010. In the future we will have Jordanian and Latvian companies for January 2011, Omani, Jordanian and Indian companies for July 2011 and Lithuanian and Jordanian companies for January 2012.

24.9 Equipment availability for training For the safe and effective operation of new equipment in theatre, personnel need to be trained on it prior to deployment. The availability of equipment for training is therefore given a high priority. Training on or with operational equipment currently begins about 12 months before deployment, with a full training equipment pack being available to troops six months from deployment. Work is ongoing within Land Forces to make more operational equipment available even earlier in the process to increase the amount of time available for soldiers to train on the equipment that they will go on to use on operations. As new equipment programmes deliver, there is an understandable imperative to provide operational units with the new capability. A balance therefore needs to be struck between the quantities available to the front line and the quantities available to units in training. This balance is kept under constant review and is managed and prioritised by Land Forces Equipment Directorate and the Land Training Fleet.

24.10 Integration into US Marine Corps 2* Headquarters RC(SW) is currently being commanded by a US 2 star headquarters and elements of pre-deployment training are therefore being coordinated with US Forces, specifically for the 1* HQ Task Force Helmand. This requirement is being met by a small number of experienced British military personnel travelling to the US in order to support the training of US formations, advise our US allies about British tactics and procedures and Ev 188 Defence Committee: Evidence

develop command relationships. Similarly, the US Army and US Marine Corps have agreed that reciprocal support to British pre-deployment training will be provided, with the costs borne by both nations as appropriate. The types of training that will be supported by British forces are as follows: — Planning conferences. — Seminars. — Formation Training Exercises. — Command Post Exercises.

25. Language Training The following figures update previous evidence to the Committee on military language training for Op HERRICK. Pashto is predominant in Helmand province, whilst Dari is the official language of the Afghanistan National Army and of governance. Higher level training has increased in response to operational demand. Lower level training has also increased to improve direct communication with both Afghan security forces and the local population, and also to enable the training of approximately 1,200 (11.4%) of the deploying force in basic language skills (a one week course). Military language training continues to generate an appropriate volume and balance of capability in theatre from military, contract and Locally Employed Civilian linguists. PASHTO Professional Training Level Survival Functional and Expert Total &Time 10–12 wks 9 months 15–18 months Training Year TY 05–06 0 16 18 34 TY 06–07 108 8 30 146 TY 07–08 124 0 81 205 TY 08–09 116 0 59 175 TY 09–10 128 2 66 194 TY 10–11 123 17 108 248 TY 11–12 180 5 119 304 TY 12–13 183 5 117 305

DARI/FARSI Professional Training Year Survival Functional and Expert Total TY 05–06 0 16 23 39 TY 06–07 8 17 35 60 TY 07–08 3 0 27 30 TY 08–09 1 0 37 38 TY 09–10 5 0 28 33 TY 10–11 98 2 33 133 TY 11–12 98 4 30 132 TY 12–13 98 3 32 133

26. Personnel Welfare 26.1 Operational Welfare, Rest & Recuperation Deployed Welfare Package—The Deployed Welfare Package (Overseas) continues to improve, with considerable focus on communications from the operational Theatre to home. Wi-Fi has been provided into the eight Forward Operating Bases and will be rolled out to other forward areas where possible. The ratio of personnel to satellite handsets has improved from 1:30 to 1:15 and 12 more e-bluey (electronic letter system) machines have been provided to Theatre. In addition, work is in hand to reduce the cost of private telephone minutes (those bought in addition to the allocation) to cost price; this will happen by the end of this year. The SSAFA Operational Welfare Fund has been established to enable Service personnel to request specific desirable items (above and beyond those provided under the Deployed Welfare Package) to be provided Theatre. The fund has received tremendous public support with a total of just under £39,000 being donated to date. Around £31,000 of it has spent on items such as additional Wii handsets, solar powered lanterns and table tennis tables. Rest and Recuperation—As announced in July, all Service men and women serving tours in Afghanistan (and on other qualifying deployed operations) for six months or longer will receive two weeks Rest and Recuperation. Where circumstances dictate they cannot take all that Rest and Recuperation during their tour, as occurred, for instance when flights were suspended because of the volcanic ash cloud, personnel will receive additional Post Operational Leave in compensation. We will also increase the resilience of the airbridge and Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 189

prioritise the needs of those who serve longest—six months or more—in Afghanistan. The best way to achieve this improved resilience is to deploy those posted for short tours for less than four months so that they will no longer receive a week’s Rest and Recuperation in the middle of their tour. This will affect a minority of the force, primarily from the RAF, but improved airbridge resilience will significantly benefit the eighty-five percent of the force who are serving on longer tours. Together, these two measures will strengthen our operational effectiveness in Afghanistan and ensure those serving the longest tours receive the Rest and Recuperation they so richly deserve.

Decompression—All personnel who are part of a formed unit normally undertake a period of decompression in Cyprus as they return from operations. Whilst there is no medical evidence to confirm the efficacy of decompression, military judgement is that it is of benefit. As a consequence a trial has been conducted to assess the value and viability of extending decompression to include individual augmentees who do not deploy as part of a formed unit. The findings of the study are currently under review; a decision of any extension will be made later this year.

26.2 Care Planning

Transition Care Planning Protocol—A Transition Care Planning Protocol has been developed between the MoD and the Department of Health, and the appropriate Departments within the each of the Devolved Administrations, to ensure that personnel leaving the Services on medical grounds are provided with continuity of care. The aim is that through early engagement between the MoD and local service providers, the appropriate service providers will have a comprehensive support package in place at the location where the Service person intends to settle. The Protocol is currently being piloted (to end-2010). Once the pilot has been completed and evaluated, the lessons identified will be used to adjust the Protocol as required.

26.3 Post Operational Support / Research Developments

Post-operational support—Post-operational support comprises Decompression in Cyprus, a period of Normalisation in the UK, followed by In-Service support for those that require it. Aftercare arrangements are made for personnel leaving the Armed Forces with known mental health difficulties. The Defence Medical Services have a comprehensive, occupationally focussed community mental health service, supported by contracts with NHS Trusts to provide inpatient care.

Research programme—A vigorous program of research has been undertaken over the last 15 years, spearheaded by the Kings Centre of Military Health Research, which contains the Academic Centre for Defence Mental Health. Much good quality data on mental health issues has arisen out of various large cohort studies, as well as two studies undertaken in operational theatres (Iraq in 2009 and Afghanistan in 2010).

27. Operational Support (Health)

27.1 Overview

Defence Medical Services is responsible for delivering and sustaining a deployed medical system, within an ISAF framework, configured to provide optimal consultant delivered care to UK Forces, other ISAF troops in the UK Area of Responsibility, and consultant delivered emergency care to ANSF and Local Civilians, in accordance with ISAF medical eligibility criteria, and in support of the UK’s strategic end state of a stable and secure Afghanistan.

The medical mission is co-ordinated by a medical cell within the UK Joint Force Support HQ in Bastion delegating healthcare provision to specific units. The HQ of the Field Hospital in Bastion provides governance oversight and material support to the UK Medical Emergency Response Teams (MERT) and the hospital, whilst the Medical Regiment provides the primary health care, pre-hospital emergency care and force protection advice to the deployed force. The rotary wing aero-medical provision operates across southern Afghanistan (with US counterparts) and final tasking authority is through ISAF HQ.

The entire medical group has continued to evolve to reflect the changes in the operating environment. Due to the increasingly advanced trauma care it can provide, the hospital now has a dedicated Commanding Officer (CO). Close Support has increased to meet the growing demand for forward based medical personnel embedded on patrols, the requirement for additional environmental health teams to reinforce health protection in patrol bases and Medical Officers in support to UK detention facilities. In recognition of this increased role, the Close Support medical capability now has its own co-ordinating CO.

Capacity at the Field Hospital in Bastion has been increased to meet the needs of the deployed UK force with the increase in numbers of ISAF and ANSF forces having surged into Helmand during 2009–10 and the commensurate rise in operational tempo. The operational medical framework is continually monitored to ensure that sufficient capability / capacity is maintained, specifically reflecting both changes in casualty numbers and wounding patterns. Ev 190 Defence Committee: Evidence

27.2 Aeromedical Evacuation The RAF Medical Services are tasked to provide the timely and rapid evacuation of patients from point of wounding to appropriate care in the UK. This is achieved whilst maintaining the highest standards of intensive care, clinical care and ongoing treatment whilst in transit. Aeromedical evacuation is a priority activity that places significant demands on the RAF’s air transport fleet. Routine flights are used whenever possible and if the clinical condition of the patient allows, specialist flights are provided if required.

27.3 Disease and Non-Battle Injuries (DNBI) While disease and non-battle injuries rates in Afghanistan have fluctuated in recent years, the levels continue to fall within the norm for operations and peacetime duties. (2009 NAO Report Illness and Injury on Operations). We continue to work to refine our understanding of the underlying causes and to drive rates further downwards. The 2010 second Force Protection audit report is due in October 2010. An interim action matrix has been produced to enable immediate action to be taken with regard to issues identified earlier.

27.4 Manning and International Aspects The current operational tempo continues to challenge manning with delivery of capability sustained by contributions from regular forces, Volunteer Reserves, and use of NHS Support to Operations and contractors. The use of NHS personnel has proven to be a useful addition providing small numbers of niche specialities flexibly that either do not exist within the military (paediatric nursing) or are in short supply (Intensive Care Nurses). The UK will continue to lead the Role 3 Medical Treatment Facility at Camp Bastion setting the standards of care and governance practices within the hospital on behalf of ISAF. Following the successful deployment of a Danish Field Hospital in 2009; coalition support has been sustained. The US continues its commitment currently providing 55 personnel, a significant component of the hospital. During 2011–12 on two separate tours the Role 3 will also be augmented by an Estonian Surgical Team demonstrating the UK’s commitment to Coalition and wider NATO medical development and integration.

27.5 In-Theatre Capability Enhancements There are ongoing developments in the level of care on operations, contributing to increased survival and improved long-term morbidity rates. The following are exemplars of enhancement: — The introduction of novel haemostatic (bleeding control) techniques to the front line is saving lives in the critical first few minutes, with regular updates of equipment as it evolves; — The UK MERT, continues to deliver critical consultant led emergency care to the front line; — Advances in resuscitation and blood transfusion, consequent upon Defence research; — Allows maintenance of critical life support in readiness for surgery—ongoing research effort continues to refine these capabilities; — Integration of Consultant led Emergency Medicine, Anaesthetic and Surgical teams on arrival at the Role 3; — The deployment of advanced diagnostic capabilities, to a level never before deployed brings emergency care ever closer to that available in a major trauma centre; and — Two additional new CT scanners.

27.6 Royal Centre for Defence Medicine / Queen Elizabeth Hospital The new Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB) opened its doors on 16 June 2010. The transfer of services is staged over six phases; the military ward capability transferred as part of Phase 1 and is fully operational. The military ward provides care for Service personnel in single or four bedded rooms further instilling the military ethos within the establishment. The QEHB has the UK’s largest single floor critical care unit consisting of 100 beds. As part of the switchover the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (RCDM) Clinical Unit HQ will transfer to the new hospital in October 2010. Leading edge care for the most complex and challenging polytrauma has been an enduring feature of the current campaign with a requirement for proven capacity to respond to an increase in casualty numbers. The treatment of these highly complex cases has afforded QEBH a level of experience and expertise that is unique in the UK. Much of this is due to changes in medical doctrine, informed by academic work at RCDM.

27.7 Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre, Headley Court The numbers and complexity of trauma survivors with amputations continues to rise. This has resulted in a requirement to increase staff numbers overall at DMRC including within the DMRC prosthetics department, and in the physical space required to support the prosthetics unit; this has required urgent estate works. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 191

Over the last six months there has been an organisational change in the way specialist teams are configured to deliver care, with the patient going to a single therapy area to receive care from their assigned multidisciplinary team. At the end of August 10, a new ward was handed over accompanied by a new dining facility for the trauma cohort. The in patient bed capacity at DMRC will now have 96 established beds with access to 15 step-down beds within Wood House. Modelling is currently being undertaken at DMRC and the Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA) to predict future bed capacity for trauma rehabilitation. The DMRC gait and physiological research facility continues to develop with the Clinical Area Development (CAD) the next highest priority. This project is being planned and is intended to include a purpose built accommodation block for delivery of ward based care to current standards of health, safety and infection control.

27.8 Mental Health Support All deployed personnel undergo pre-operational stress briefing. In theatre psychological-education is delivered on arrival and throughout deployment the TRiM system2 provides individuals with early support following traumatic events. A Force Mental Health Team consisting of three mental health nurses provides in- theatre mental health assessments and mental health liaison in forward areas. A Consultant Psychiatrist visits every three months, providing oversight and support.

28. Communications Strategy 28.1 Cross-Government Approach The UK’s current Afghanistan Communications Strategy, approved by the previous government in October 2009 and now in the process of being revised, sets four communications objectives to: — increase UK public support for the mission in Afghanistan; — improve the capacity of the Afghan government and media to communicate with the Afghan public, and vice versa; — maintain and demonstrate the unity of the international coalition; and to — increase understanding of the links between the Afghanistan mission and counter terrorism in Pakistan as part of a regional strategy. HM Government aims to achieve this through a cross-governmental approach which co-ordinates Departmental effort and ensures all activities are consistent with the overall strategic narrative. The PUS of Government Communications chairs a weekly meeting of Communication Directors and officials from key departments. Day to day co-ordination at working level is led by the Cross-Government Afghan Communications Team (ACT), based in the FCO and reporting to Number Ten. A weekly meeting of the Afghan Information Strategy Group brings together officials from the ACT, FCO, MoD, DfID, Stabilisation Unit, British Embassy Kabul, Provincial Reconstruction Team Lashkar Gah and the UK Delegation to NATO to discuss current issues. Communication activities include regular media briefings by Ministers, a programme of Cross-Government briefings, a media embed programme to Helmand, quarterly meetings with key interest groups including NGOs and Parliament and the Afghan diaspora, digital diplomacy (websites, Twitter Q&A), outreach events, seminars, debates and visits. Specific activities are also carried out around significant events, such as the London Conference and Kabul Conference in January and July 2010 respectively, significant military operations, and Afghan Presidential and Parliamentary elections. The UK public remains supportive of UK Forces involvement in Afghanistan (source: MoD polling), but less supportive of overall UK involvement (source: various polling). Opposition has grown over recent years at the same time as a reduced perception of progress. Media focus on the security challenge and continuing British casualties in the fight against the insurgency continues to impact upon public opinion on the international campaign.

28.2 MoD Communications Strategy The MoD has a detailed Communications Strategy. This strategy is an integral part of the UK cross- Government approach to communicating on Afghanistan planning led by ACT and complimentary to and co- ordinated with NATO and ISAF communication plans Detailed subordinate communication delivery plans for specific topics direct and co-ordinate all communications activity across Defence. Within this delivery framework, the MoD stresses the importance of: — coherence and consistency of all MoD communications; — the need for integration with all elements of the campaign; especially making communications an integral part of operational planning; and 2 TRiM = Trauma Risk Management, a peer delivered risk assessment at 3 and 28 days following traumatic events, aiming to detect problems early, signpost personnel at risk to medical services and address stigma. Ev 192 Defence Committee: Evidence

— the importance of proactive planning and delivery of communications effects across the full spectrum of media and communications channels; including the exploitation of new and social media; — wider media and communications focus; includes growing emphasis on ensuring that messaging resonates with Afghan audiences and that our media and communications activity is not focused exclusively on UK domestic audiences.

The Directorate of Media and Communications (DMC) leads the management and co-ordination of MoD’s departmental communications on Afghanistan through a network of military and civilian Press Officers in London, PJHQ and on the ground in Afghanistan. DMC are also the Department’s lead on cross-Government engagement on communications issues.

29. Lessons Learned

29.1 Overview

Every six months, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff proposes to Chiefs of Staff potential subjects for Audit, producing an endorsed Defence Operations Centre (DOC) programme of work; this can be adjusted if higher priorities emerge. DOC must also maintain an awareness of emerging topics to allow a dynamic response to “targets of opportunity”. The output of this process falls into one of three main categories: — The Operational Audit Report—An independent assessment of capability produced in consultation with the associated Chain of Command and key Force Elements. It is not a consensus report. Examples of recent Operational Audits include: “CIMIC”; “Air-Land Integration”; “ISTAR”; “UK Operations Command and Control”; “Carrier Strike”; “United Kingdom Special Forces”. — The Operational Lessons Report—When a joint operation is mounted, Vice Chief Defence Staff (VCDS), Deputy Chief Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS(Ops)) and Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) determine if a DOC Lessons Report is required to encapsulate the strategic lessons identified from various areas of the operation. Examples of recent Operational Lessons Reports include: “Operation HIGHBROW”; “Operation MONOGRAM”; “Operation HERRICK Volume 2”. — Other work—DOC will produce individual briefs on particular topics for the Defence Secretary, Minister for the Armed Forces and the Defence Board on demand and may also be called on to answer Parliamentary Questions.

29.2 The DOC Audit and Lessons Report—Process Outline

The DOC Audit and Lesson Report process has five distinct phases: Preparation; Initial Data Gathering; Interviews and Evidence Gathering; Report Writing and Staffing; Implementation, Monitoring and Reporting: — Preparation: The lead DOC Staff Officer scopes the subject to assess the main areas for the report by analysis of current policy papers, doctrine and previous reports if available; appropriate desk- level liaison throughout Defence is also undertaken. DOC may also canvass opinion from key 1*/ 2* stakeholders for their assessment of areas that may warrant investigation. The output will be a set of VCDS endorsed Terms of Reference. — Initial Data Gathering: DOC will ask key stakeholders for their written assessment of the “Top five” issues affecting their organisation for the capability under audit. This should include an assessment of any areas of risk and its impact, as well as detailing any action plans already in place, or problems that are preventing resolution. This “Top five” will form the basis of the DOC interviews. — DOC Interviews: The DOC interview consists of an informal interview with the Principal to explore the issues highlighted in the “Top five”, as well as seeking opinions on areas that may have been raised by other returns or previous interviews. Whilst DOC must be able to justify any observations or findings, interviewees are assured confidentiality to ensure as frank and open a discussion as possible. — Report Writing and Staffing: Once the main interviews are complete, the Report is drafted and issued for comment to the Chain of Command and a 1* Reference Group (1*RG) is convened. Each member of the 1*RG is responsible for drawing together comments from their sphere of responsibility, including from their Chain of Command. Factual inaccuracies will be corrected, but DOC reserves the right to decide on the inclusion of any matters of opinion or judgement. The final report is forwarded to VCDS two weeks prior to the report being circulated to the Chiefs of Staff (COS). COS receive their copy two weeks prior to the committee meeting, circulated by COS Secretariat (COSSEC), providing an opportunity for the single Service Chiefs to be made aware of the key issues. The recommendations and lessons from the report are refined if necessary, and once amendments made, COSSEC will distribute the report and DOC passes it to the Joint Lessons Cell for inclusion in DLIMS. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 193

— Implementation, Monitoring and Reporting: COS-endorsed Recommendations and Lessons are implemented, monitored and reported within Defence by means of a “follow-up” process which is common to both Audit and Operational Lessons Reports. The first stage of this process occurs at the 1*RG (described above) where appropriate personnel are nominated to staff and implement each Recommendation or Lesson. DOC Audit and Lesson Reports

DOC led 1* Reference Group allocate Gatekeeper/SPA/SAM

COS Endorsement

Ministerial Oversight (if appropriate)

Report COS progress ‘Gatekeepers’ (via JCG) ACDS ACDS to JCG (S&P) every 6 (Ops) months

Joint Lessons Cell

Relevant Studies and Audits Operational lessons studies have been conducted into the following operations in Afghanistan: — Op VERITAS—UK contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom—2001–04. — Op ORACLE—Maritime & Air Interdiction 2001. — Op FINGAL—UK contribution to ISAF—2002. — Op JACANA—45 Commando Battle-group deployment—2002. — Op TARROCK—UK Mil contribution to PRT 2003–04. — Op HERRICK Vol 1 (Prelim Ops, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) deployment to HQ ISAF & initial deployment to Helmand—2005–06). — Op HERRICK Vol 2 (Op HERRICKS 4 and 5—2006–07). The following Operational Audits (amongst others) have reference to operations in Afghanistan: — 02/03 Air Transport. — 04/01 Defence Language Capability. — 04/02 Mounting of Operations. — 05/05 Information Operations. — 05/06 Counter Terrorism. — 05/07 Logistics Command and Control. — 06/04 Civil Military Co-operation. — 07/01 Protection of the Deployed Force. — 07/04 Prisoner Detention and Tactical Questioning. — 07/05 Air Land Integration. — 09/01 UK Special Forces. After conducting work in other areas for over a three year period, DOC is currently working on an Operation HERRICK Volume 3 Lessons Study (April 2007–October 2009). This work has aimed at the strategic level and attempts to include all the relevant reviews and studies that have resulted in changes during the period. See also Annex F (Security classified, not publicly available—available to Committee Members at Defence Committee Office) 30 September 2010 Ev 194 Defence Committee: Evidence

Acronyms 1* RG 1 Star Review Group 2ALOC Second Air Line of Communication 2IR Second Impressions Report A1P Afghan First Policy AAR After Action review ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief ACT Afghanistan Communications Team AFG Afghanistan AINC Army Incident and Notification Cell ALOC Air Line of Communication ANA ANA ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces AOR Area of Responsibility APOD Airport of Delivery ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps ARTF Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund AT Air Trooping ATO Ammunition Technical Officer AUP Afghan Uniformed Police BAAG British Agencies Afghanistan Group BEK British Embassy Kabul BSN Camp Bastion BXP Border Crossing Point CAA Civil Aviation Authority CAD Combat Arms Directorate CAOC Coalition Air Operations Centre CAS Close Air Support CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear CCS Common Core Skills CESO (A) Chief Environment and Safety Officer (Army) CFORM Campaign Formation Operational Readiness Mechanism C-IED Counter IED CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation CIWG Capability Integration Working Group CIVCAS Civilian Casualty CJO Chief of Joint Operations CJSOR Combined Joint Statement of Requirement CMD Conventional Munitions Disposal CN Counter Narcotics CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan CO Commanding Officer COIN Counter-Insurgency COM Commander COS Chief of Staff CPP Conflict Prevention Pool CSO Contractor Support to Operations CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan CTC4 Collective Training Competence Level 4 CTWG Counter Threat Working Group DASA Defence Analytical Services Agency DC District Centre DCC Dismounted Close Combat DCOM Deputy Commander DDP District Development Programme DFID Department for International Development (UK) DMC Directorate Media and Communications DMRC Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre DMS Defence Medical Services DNBI Debilitating Non-Battle Injury DNPERS Directorate of Naval Personnel DOC Defence Operations Centre EF Enemy Forces EOD Explosive Ordnance Device EOF Escalation of Force Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 195

ESS Equipment Service Support EUPOL European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan FAC Forward Air Controller FFIR Friendly Force Information Requirement FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FTX Final Training Exercise FY Financial Year GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GCPP Global Conflict Prevention Pool HMG Her Majesty’s Government HPTC Helmand Police Training Centre HRT High Readiness Team IAT Initial Assessment Teams IED Improvised Explosive Device IJC ISAF Joint Command IMF International Monetary Fund ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance ITAS Inter Theatre Airlift Support JANIB Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board JCOTR Joint Commanders Operational Training Requirement JFSp(A) Joint Force Support (Afghanistan) JOC Joint Operations Centre JTAP Joint Tactical Air Picture JTR Joint Training Requirements KAF Kandahar Air Field LA Learning Account LAIT Land Accident Investigation Team LOAC Law of Armed Conflict LogT-S Logistics Tracking System LPPV Light Protected Patrol Vehicle MDG Millennium Development Goals MDP Ministry of Defence Police MERT Medical Emergency Response Team MoD Ministry of Defence MOI Ministry of Interior (Afghanistan) MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected MSST Military Stabilisation Support Team MST Military Stabilisation Team MTA Military Technical Agreement NAMSA NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCC National Contingent Commander NCO Non Commissioned Officer NDN Northern Distribution Network NGO Non Governmental Organisation NOTICAS Notification of Casualty NSA National Security Advisor NSC National Security Council NTM-A NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM OMLT Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team OPTAG Operational Training Advisory Group PACE Police and Criminal Evidence Act PAK Pakistan PDT Pre-Deployment Training OPHQ Operational Headquarters PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters PM Protected Mobility POMLT Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team QEHB Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham RA Royal Artillery RAC Royal Armoured Corps RAF Royal Air Force RC Regional Command Ev 196 Defence Committee: Evidence

RCDM Royal College of Defence Medicine RCV Remote Controlled Vehicle RiP Relief in Place RLS Real Life Support ROE Rules of Engagement RM Royal Marines RN Royal Navy RNMMC Royal Navy Mobilisation and Mounting Centre SCR (UN) Security Council Resolution SCR (NATO) Senior Civilian Representative SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SINCREP Serious Incident Report SIR Shooting Incident Report (acronym can be conflated with SINCREP) SLOC Sea Line of Communication SOP Standard Operating Procedure SSAFA Soldiers, Sailors, Air Force Association STABAD Stabilisation Advisor TES Theatre Entry Standard TFH Task Force Helmand TiC Troops in Contact TRB Theatre Reserve Battalion TSV Tactical Support Vehicle TTP Tactics, Training and Procedures UAS Unmanned Aerial Surveillance UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime UNSCR United Nations Senior Civilian Representative UOR Urgent Operational Requirement USAID United States Agency for International Development USMC United States Marine Corps VCDS Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

Supplementary written evidence from the Ministry of Defence MoD response to follow up questions from the House of Commons Defence Committee 10 November evidence session:

Q.141—The Committee requested sight of the studies, referred to by witnesses, covering the reaction of the Afghan people to corruption in Afghanistan The poll referred to was the Asia Foundation Survey, a copy of which can be found on the internet at the address below: http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2010-poll.php The study referred to was an independent study on “Testing the Hypothesis of Radicalisation in Afghanistan”, conducted by the NGO Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU). A copy of the study report is available on request from CPAU (who own the copyright) via their website listed below, the Committee should note that this is a sensitive report. www.cpau.org.af

Q.143—The witnesses informed the Committee that the UK tends to follow OECD standards on corruption. Further information on this is given below: When interacting with other States, the UK is bound by the definitions, standards and obligations set out in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The most recent reports on progress on implementation can be found at the following website: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html The UK is also a member of the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption and has ratified the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The latest progress report can be found at the following website: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/3.%20What%20is%20GRECO_en.asp Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 197

In addition, under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the UK is committed to take effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connection with international business transactions. Further information can be found at the following website: http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_34859_44583772_1_1_1_1,00.html

Q.147—Following a series of questions on corruption in Afghanistan, the Committee requested the budget and expenditure of programme funding for 09/10 and 10/11 with anti-corruption expenditure separately identified The total amount of programme funding for Afghanistan available for financial years 2009–10 and 2010–11 is: 2009–10 Conflict Pool £68 million Strategic Programme Fund £20.4 million Other (Counter Terrorism / Migration / Bilateral Programme £4.8 million Budget) 2010–11 Conflict Pool (of which £10 million is an uplift for DFID for £78.5 million infrastructure) Strategic Programme Fund £19 million Other (Counter Terrorism / Migration / Bilateral Programme Budget) £7.7 million There are a number of projects focused on “anti-corruption” and expenditure in FY 2009–10 was £1,190,700 and in 2010–11 £2,908,000.

Q.148—The witnesses offered to write to the Committee with figures on how life has changed for women in Afghanistan. This information is given below: The number of children attending school regularly increased by 400,000 from 2009–10 to 2010–11. In 2010–11 5.7 million children were attending school regularly and 2.1 million of them were girls. The latest figures show 42% of primary school age girls are enrolled in school,3 but this is still far behind the 83% in South Asia.4 A remarkable surge in literacy is seen for younger age groups (those educated since the fall of the Taliban): more than one in three girls aged 12–16 are able to read and write (37% ) compared to just one in ten women in their mid 20s (10%). The youth (aged 15–24) literacy gender gap is gradually closing as the ratio of literate women to men is increasing; latest figures (2007–08) show the ratio to be almost 1:2 females to males (45%) compared to just over 1:3 (37%) in 2005 (37%).5 For children around the age of 12, progress is even more evident: the ratio of literate girls to boys in the 12–14 age group is 63%, reflecting the increase in girls being schooled in recent years.6 A quarter of seats (26%) in the national assembly are held by women—better than India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 68 out of 249 seats are reserved for women in the Lower House and 23 out of 102 seats in the Upper House.7 In the 2010 Parliamentary elections, for the first time, a female candidate won an unreserved seat outright in Nimruz province taking the total number of female MPs in the lower house to 69. A quarter of births in Afghanistan (24%) are now supervised by skilled birth attendants—an increase on the 2005 figure of less than one in six (13%).8 Today there are more than four times as many trained midwives as in 2002 (467 in 2002 rising to 2,200 in 2009).9 The latest figures show that today more than one in three pregnant women (37%) receive antenatal care in Afghanistan10 compared to only 16% in 2003.11 Despite this, Afghanistan’s maternal mortality rate- at 1,400 per 100,000 live births—remains the highest in the world.12 3 NRVA 2007/08, P. 69. Central Statistics Organisation, Afghanistan. http://nrva.cso.gov.af/ The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) is the only nationwide socio-economic household survey in Afghanistan, and provides the best available demographic and household characteristics data available in the country. The results published in Oct 2009 were collected over a year from August 2007, and involve 20,000 respondents. The survey has been completed three times since 2003, but this year’s showed significant improvement in methodology and robustness—next due to be published end 2010. 4 Global Monitoring report on MDG Progress, 2008, World Bank 5 NRVA 2007/8 P. 106 6 NRVA 2007/8 P. 106 7 Women and Men in Afghanistan: Baseline Statistics on Gender, 2008, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, GIRoA 8 NRVA 2007/8 P. 84 (Overall proportion of births attended by skilled birth attendants is 24% up from 15.%) 9 Afghan Midwifery Association Report 2009 10 NRVA 2007/8 P. 84 11 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003, Central Statistics Office, UNICEF 12 WHO, Trends in Mortality, 1990 to 2008 Ev 198 Defence Committee: Evidence

Q.153—The Committee has requested further information on the Helmand Police Training Centre and related statistics The Helmand Police Training Centre (HPTC) was established in December 2009 and is located in Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand Province. It is capable of turning out 150 qualified policemen every four weeks, following an intensive eight week course. The training centre currently trains Patrolmen and NCOs. In addition, it recently completed its first pilot training course for Officers. The training staff are currently drawn from the Royal Gurkha Rifles, supported by members of the UK Ministry of Defence Police, ISAF and Ministry of Interior trainers. The syllabus, approved by the Afghan Ministry of Interior covers law, arrest and restraint, search and evidence gathering, patrolling skills, IED awareness, drill and skill at arms and literacy training. Over 3000 personnel have graduated in the 16 months that the Centre has been running. The HPTC transferred to NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) command on 01 March 2011. The UK will continue to lead the training effort at the Regional Training Centre South West (RTC-SW), as the HPTC is now called.

Q.155–156—The Committee has requested further information on targets and achievements for recruitment of Pashtuns to the Afghan National Army, including for southern Pashtuns. [Also in response to Q.233 from 17 November session] Challenges exist in balancing the ethnic make up of the Afghan National Army (ANA); currently southern Pashtuns are under-represented and there is a disproportionately high number of Tajiks. Increasing recruitment figures in the south is a major focus for NTM-A , which, amongst other efforts, has launched recruitment campaigns to appeal to Pashtuns in the south. The latest figures [May 11] on ethnic composition for the ANA are: ANA ANA Population ACTUAL % TARGET % ACTUAL^ % Pashtun 44* 44 42 Tajik 32 25 27 Hazara 11 10 9 Uzbek 7 8 9 Other 6 13 13

Population data is based on the 1979 Afghan census and does not necessarily present an ^ accurate picture of ethnic composition today. *Of which 5% are Southern Pashtuns There are a number of factors contributing to the low recruitment of southern Pashtuns including the challenge to security in the southern provinces, competing (illegal) employment opportunities and a perception that the ANA is dominated by other ethnic groups. New initiatives are in place to recruit southern Pashtuns into the Army, and to allow them to serve in the south. It must not be forgotten that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as a whole, are fighting this campaign. This includes the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Helmand, who are predominantly southern Pashtuns. The Committee was also interested in whether the occurrence of civilian casualties has had a negative effect on recruiting. Nationally, ANA recruitment goals are being exceeded. The occurrence of civilian casualties may be having an effect on recruiting at a district or village level but specific data on this is not collected.

Q.158—The Committee requested a brief description of NCO training at the Helmand Police Training Centre, including attendance and completion figures The NCO course, which received Ministry of Interior approval in May 10, gives students an intensive grounding in the theory and practical application of junior leadership in order to grow the capability of the ANP through a professionally trained NCO cohort. The eight week course, which runs alongside the patrolman’s course, has a capacity of 30 students drawn from across Helmand Province. By December 2010, 216 individuals had attended the course with a 60% pass rate.

Q.163, 169 & 170—The UK’s strategy in Helmand in 2006 Please see separate classified letter.

Q.173—Percentage of personnel breaching harmony guidelines The table below provides the detail of the percentages of personnel from each service who have breached harmony guidelines since 2008. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 199

HARMONY STATISTICS—ALL CODES OF SEPARATION Royal Marines Royal Navy Army RAF As at Trained Trained UKTAP^ Trained 01/10/2008 0.2% 0.9% * 5.9% 01/01/2009 0.2% 0.9% 5% 6.1% 01/04/2009 0.3% 1.1% 5% 5.4% 01/07/2009 0.3% 1.2% 5% 5.0% 01/10/2009 0.6% 1.4% 6% 5.0% 01/01/2010 0.5% 1.8% 6% 4.3% 01/04/2010 0.3% 1.6% 6% 3.0% 01/07/2010 0.5% 1.3% 6% 2.8% 01/10/2010 0.7% 1.0% * 2.7%

Harmony periods RN/RM—Harmony Snapshots of personnel who had spent more than 660 days on Separated Service in preceding 3 yrs Army—30 month rolling period—over 415 days. (source- Army Separated Service Report, as at 1 July 2010 (Table 2a)) RAF—of personnel breaching 280 days of separated service in the preceding 24 month period

Notes: * Denotes not available. Army figures are to no decimal places. UKTAP—UK Trained Army Personnel^

The information goes back only as far as 2008. Before then, the information (where available) was collected and collated in very different way across the Services which made any considered comparison impossible.

Q.175—Air Marshall Peach offered to write with the detail of the numbers of personnel who have been on multiple deployments and the number of deployments in each case. The Committee has asked that figures should include deployments to Iraq as well as those to Afghanistan. The Committee recognises that the tour length is also a factor here and would welcome the information broken down by tour length

While information released on the number of personnel identified as having deployed on operations is co- ordinated centrally by the Defence Analytical Services and Advice organisation (DASA), there is currently no single source of information on whether individuals undertook multiple deployments in operations. In order for this information to be collated, it would be necessary to undertake a trawl of the personnel records of all those who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan which would be costly in terms of both time and resources. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system first came on line in 2006 and data held before this time on the various single Service legacy systems would not be directly comparable with JPA data or between each of the Services, as they recorded this information differently. Legacy information available to DASA does not contain deployment dates only recording whether an individual has deployed and this would not therefore identify multiple deployments. In addition, it is now difficult to extract data from these legacy systems and we are aware that there are some gaps in the historical data. The Air Marshal offered to provide this information in good faith being unaware of the difficulties involved in delivering the detail requested.

Duty of care to our personnel, of which harmony guidelines are an important component, is a major consideration for the Armed Forces and at unit level care is taken to strike a balance between deploying people to do the job they joined up for, training or spending time with their families, wherever possible. Unfortunately, at a time of high operational commitment, breaches of harmony guidelines do occur but initiatives and regulators are used to help ameliorate the situation. These include flexible appointing between ranks, mobilisation of Reservists, financial retention and re-engagement incentives, contractorisation, and reviewing the numbers of posts required for each operation on a regular basis. Less than 2% of Royal Navy, 6% of Army and 3% of RAF personnel are operating above harmony guidelines.

Q.177—The Committee requested confirmation that changes to the operational deployment package have not been to the detriment of members of the armed forces

Service personnel deployed on operations receive a number of allowances depending on their posting and work undertaken. These include Unpleasant Living Allowance, Unpleasant Working Allowance, Longer Separation Allowance, Operational Allowance and Deployment Welfare Package (Overseas). The package of allowances that Armed Forces personnel deploying on Operation HERRICK receive has recently increased with the doubling of the Operational Allowance. Ev 200 Defence Committee: Evidence

Q.179–180—The witnesses agreed to write with numbers on personnel who are fit for service but not for further deployment. This information is given below: Statistics verified by Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) show that, as at 1 August 2010, there were 8,610 full time UK Armed Forces personnel trained and serving against requirement who were recorded as fit for Service but Medically Non Deployable and as having deployed on operations at least once. Of these, 1,940 personnel were recorded as permanently Medically Non Deployable, 6,400 were recorded as temporarily Medically Non Deployable and for 280 personnel it is not possible to distinguish whether the downgrading is temporary or permanent.

Q.183—Harmony guidelines for 3 Commando Brigade Formed Royal Marines units work to the 6:24 ratio ie a six month deployment followed by an interval of 24 months before the next six month deployment. 3 Commando Brigade was the lead Brigade during Herrick 9 (Oct 08–Apr 09) and has returned as part of Herrick 14 (Apr–Oct 11). As alluded to by Maj Gen Capewell, due to normal manpower movements, a small minority of individuals may have experienced a higher operational tempo than this rotation implies. These cases are in the minority and are not unique to the Royal Marines, usually occurring at the request of the individual concerned or in response to promotion.

Q.191—Profile of WARTHOG delivery to training and theatre We have delivered WARTHOG, a new tracked armoured vehicle which is better protected and has greater capacity than VIKING which it has replaced in Afghanistan. The exact number of Warthogs in theatre is operationally sensitive information and cannot be released but all required vehicles have been delivered. WARTHOG has gained a high degree of confidence from users; it is doing an excellent job and is proving to be a world-class vehicle.

Additional Question—The Committee would like further information on the challenges of operating with contractors and contractor casualties Contractors provide invaluable support to the Ministry of Defence on operations overseas. Recent trends have been for a greater use of contractors on operations. One reason for this is the trend towards longer operations and the existence of some benign locations in operational areas which provide industry an opportunity to deploy The resilience shown by our contractors has been impressive and we regularly review the level of service provided by our contractors to ensure delivery against requirements We do not collate figures on contractor injuries and fatalities. There would be inherent difficulties in doing this—our ability to track is limited to the reporting of incidents by contractors themselves. Due to the inability to be wholly accurate in reporting contractor casualty figures, we refrain from publishing any information which may ultimately be misleading. MoD response to follow up questions from the House of Commons Defence Committee 17 November evidence session:

Q.233—Statistics on the training of the Afghan National Army: Development and progress of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Nov 2009–Nov 2010 Between November 2009 and November 2010, the ANA grew from 95,523 to 146,352, an increase of 53%. ANA daily training capacity grew from 15,440 to 22,442 (as of 5 November 2010), a 45% increase, and the number of ANA Instructors grew from 459 to 1946, a 324% increase. The Basic Rifle Marksmanship qualification rates of ANA recruits has grown from 35% to 94% indicating the increasing professionalism and capabilities of ANA instructors. Since November 2009, the ANA has fielded a Corps HQ, 10 Brigade HQs, 26 Infantry Kandaks, six Combat Service Support Kandaks, eight Garrison Support Units, three Commando Kandaks, 42 Companies, and eight Special Forces Teams. [Data correct as of 14 November 2010] As of May 2011, ANA strength was 168,037. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 201

Branch Schools Branch Schools are the backbone of training the ANA and reflect a shift in focus from quantity to enduring quality. As at May 2011, all 12 of the planned ANA branch schools are open and delivering trained “specialists” to the ANA. Mobile Education Training Teams (METTs) are “re-training” already fielded forces. The focus for 2011 is “balancing the force” through a focus on fielding and training the critical supporting enablers.

Women in the ANA The female Officer Candidate School (OCS) is now established at Kabul Military Training Centre and a female Programme of Instruction (POI) is complete. The POI is divided into two, ten-week sections: — Phase I includes ANA policies, knowledge, and leadership; self defense, weapons familiarization and range (M-9 and M-16 rifles), map reading, signal communications and counterinsurgency training. — Phase II prepares the cadets for their military jobs in the finance or logistical branch. The first female course ran in September 2010 and 29 female OCS cadets commissioned as Second Lieutenants in the Afghan National Army. The second class started on 27 November 2010 and graduated 19 May.

ANA Literacy Training Literacy training is given as a component of training and promotion courses as follows: — Basic Warrior Training (8-Wk)—64 hours literacy training. — NCO Leaders Course (4-Wk)—48 hours literacy training. — NCO Battle Course (8-Wk)—40 hours literacy training. — Sgt Majors’ Course (22-Wk)—120 hours literacy training. — 1st Sgts’ Course (10-Wk)—120 hours literacy training. — Training Sgts’ Course—120 hours literacy training. — Legal School—40 hours literacy.

Recruitment of Southern Pashtuns [Please see Q155–6 from 10 November session].

ANA Readiness for Transition Assessment of readiness is a series of judgments against detailed key capabilities and goals for each institution. Once an institution is assessed as capable, it will transition, but not until it is capable. The strategic transition plan is led and synchronized by ISAF HQ in close cooperation with the Afghans and is based on three pillars: — Ministerial transition (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior)—led by NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). — Institutional transition (institutions like the ANSF school)—led by NTM-A. — Operational transition (district and region)—led by ISAF Joint Command. The Institutional Development Plan sets the concrete actions necessary for transition and progress is tracked through a standardized, objective assessment tool, updated quarterly

ANA Monthly Attrition Goals The objective for ANA attrition is 1.4% per month. The table below gives monthly attrition rates since November 2009. Attrition is the percentage of losses relative to overall force, calculated as a sum of losses divided by average strength over one time period. It does not include separations due to retirement or completion of service contract. ATTRITION RATES FROM NOVEMBER 10 TO MAY 11 November 2009 3.1% December 1.9% January 2010 1.9% February 2.2% March 1.2% April 1.7% May 1.2% June 1.6% Ev 202 Defence Committee: Evidence

July 3.0% August 2.4% September 2.0% October 2.8% November 3.2% December 2.7% January 2011 2.7% February 2.8% March 2.6% April 1.9% May 1.3%

ANA Retention The table below gives ANA retention levels since November 2009. November 2009 65% December 62% January 2010 68% February 71% March 85% April 83% May 86% June 54% July 68% August 55% September 58% October 76% November 66% December 70% January 2011 70% February 65% March 77% April 70% May 61%

Q. 253–254—Statistics on the training of the Afghan National Police There are currently over 128,500 (31 May 11) police officers in the Afghan National Police (ANP), ahead of the growth rate required to meet the target of 134,000 by October 2011. Between November 2010 and April 2011, 18,519 ANP were recruited by the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A). Between November 2009 and April 2011, NTM-A trained the following: Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) 91,731 Afghan Border Police (ABP) 19,638 Afghan National Civil Order Police 10,123 (ANCOP) On 16 May 2011, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) announced an increase in the length of the basic Patrolman’s course from six to eight weeks. This will increase the core police training from 200 to 268 hours, broadening the curriculum to include important courses on Human Rights and Gender Integration; Transparency and Accountability; The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program; and Intelligence-Led Policing.

ANP Attrition The monthly ANP attrition rate has been decreasing over time. In recent months it has matched is matching or been lower than the target of 1.4%. In April the overall ANP attrition rate was 1.4% and was less than 1% in March 2011, significantly lower than the set target of 1.4%. Even the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—the gendarme style arm of the ANP—which had unacceptable levels of attrition has seen attrition rates reduced to 1.3% per month by April 2011. Attrition within the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is still at unacceptably high levels. ANCOP attrition was at 85.2% per annum in November 2009 and was reduced to 55.85% per annum by September 2010. Using the last six months of attrition data, annualized attrition within ANCOP was 35.96%; this illustrates the steady, slow decline of attrition. High operational tempo, casualty rates, attractive pay from private security companies and consistent deployments are common contributing factors to ANP attrition levels. The Afghan Government, together with international partners, have implemented a range of measures that are successfully reducing levels of attrition. These include an increase in pay to close the pay gap between the army and the police, and more effective Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 203

training programmes which have raised standards of leadership and discipline and are helping police to defend themselves. A recent increase in pay has brought ANP salaries in line with the ANA, and more effective training programmes have raised standards of leadership and discipline and helped police to defend themselves. Though still a work in progress, we are also working to implement an operational deployment cycle. Growth targets for the ANP have been exceeded and attrition rates have significantly reduced, showing that these measures are having a positive effect.

Women in the ANP In line with the Afghan National Police Strategy, the Government of Afghanistan and International Community are working to create opportunities for women within the police force. At the end of 2010 there were approximately 1,000 female officers in the ANP. 310 of these joined in 2010—a 45% increase from 2009 strength—and the Ministry of Interior is working to reach their target of 52,000 female recruits in the ANP (by April 2013). Latest figures for women trained by NTM-A are 133 Basic Patrolmen, four non-commissioned officers and eight Officers. In 2010, the Jalalabad Women’s Training Centre opened its doors and trained a total of 458 female ANP. In May 2011, EUPOL conducted a one-week Mobile Support Unit course for female police officers and the Mission is also opening a dedicated female police training academy in Bamyan province. In Helmand, UK police officers are providing support and training to the 14 female police officers in the province. The women have their own training facility at Provincial Headquarters and the PRT Rule of Law team also fund a scholarship programme to support the next intake of women to the AUP. Four females are in the current scholarship scheme in Lashkar Gah which is due to finish in June. A further seven females are due to take part in the next scholarship scheme which will begin in July.

Q.256—Details of the five pillars of the Police Force The five pillars of the Afghan National Police are the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) and the Ministry of Interior / Enablers.

Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) The AUP provides community policing, traffic policing, and the fire service.

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) ANCOP provides civil order patrols, an anti-riot capability and a crisis or counter terror response capability within urban and metropolitan areas. It is the principle element of the ANP for counterinsurgency operations.

Afghan Border Police (ABP) The ABP provides legal freedom of movement, encourages the development of commerce, the prevention of illegal border crossings and the policing of airport points of entry.

Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) The AACP provides specialist police expertise, counter terrorism, counter narcotics, Major Crime Task Force (governance and anti-corruption) and forensics. The AACP Special Support Units (SSU) conduct limited undercover, surveillance and tactical operations in support of the Anti-Crime capability areas.

Ministry of Interior / Enablers This includes logistics and support, medical, training and education, and fire and rescue.

Q.257—Information on the Pol-i-Charki prison facility We estimate that prison capacity in Afghanistan is currently around 9,260 places. The Afghan Government does not have precise details on the number of prison places. This is due in part to the security situation in some areas where correctional facilities are situated and in part to the ongoing nature of prison building and refurbishment programmes in Afghanistan. Pol-i-Charki prison is currently undergoing extensive refurbishment which will increase capacity from 5000 to 10,000 prison spaces. The US is looking at rebuilding or extending prison capacity across Afghanistan. This US-led programme is expected to produce 4,000 extra prison spaces, taking the total number of available prison spaces to around 18,000. Her Majesty’s Government recognises that a functioning Justice sector is fundamental to creating lasting stability in Afghanistan. We know that the prison sector is an essential link in the Criminal Justice chain. This is why the UK has provided two Senior Prisons Managers, two Operational Managers and two Senior Prison Ev 204 Defence Committee: Evidence

Officers to promote the development of a fair and robust prison sector by sharing best practise through training and mentoring. The UK also co-funded the building of a High Security Unit within Pol-i-Charki which we continue to support and structurally maintain. We work closely with the US, the main international partner on prison reform, and the Afghan Central Prison Department.

MoD response to follow up questions from the House of Commons Defence Committee 15 December evidence session:

Q.314—The Committee has requested information on the number of judges and prosecutors in Afghanistan today and comparative figures for 2008

See information provided in confidence to the Committee from the Afghan Government.

Q.318—The Committee has requested information on the number of prison places in Afghanistan with additional context on the number of prisons and the situation in Helmand province

A functioning prison sector is an essential part of the Criminal Justice system. In January 2011 there were 8,76313 official prison places in Afghanistan across 34 provincial prisons with an actual prison population of 17,132. Historically, the prisons sector in Afghanistan has been severely under-resourced leading to issues of non-existent or poor infrastructure, overcrowding, little separate provision for women and children and a lack of accountability.

UK Offender Management experts have been working closely with the US, the main international partner on prison reform, to promote the development of a safe and secure prison sector and there has been some progress in this area: — 95% of prison staff now have basic standardised training, some secure transportation training, and emergency response capability; — oversight of prisons is greater; and — some infrastructure projects have been completed.

The standard of prison facilities in Helmand is in line with that in other provinces. To help address the issues referred to above, the UK is funding the construction of a prison in Lashkar Gah which will conform to international standards. Phase 1 of the Lashkar-Gar prison build was completed in 2009 and provided 350 spaces. Phase 2 is due for completion June 2011 and will provide 350 additional spaces. The build includes High Security, Pre-Trial and additional Residential Wings, Administration, Guards Barracks, Healthcare, Reception and a Kitchen. Although the prison was originally designed for 700, we envisage the facility detaining 1,000 prisoners comfortably, remaining within advised guidelines of the International Committee of the Red Cross Guidelines on space per prisoner.

The main prison (which ultimately will hold men only) will be completed in June 2011. On completion of the main prison, the facility will continue to hold females and juveniles in separate dedicated temporary facilities until the permanent female and juvenile facilities are completed. The new female and juvenile prisons will be in the same area as the main prison, but outside the main wall of the main prison, in dedicated and secure areas. A new dedicated juvenile facility will be completed by Spring 2012 and will provide 60 spaces for boys and 20 for girls. We now expect the new dedicated female facility to be started in 2012 (subject to funding). We are also working on rehabilitation programmes to prepare prisoners for release and divert them away from crime. The build of a separate National Directorate of Security facility with a capacity of 152 spaces has been completed.

The Lashkar Gah prison is benefitting from ongoing prison building and refurbishment programmes in Afghanistan designed to tackle overcrowding and poor infrastructure. Pol-e-Charki prison is also undergoing extensive refurbishment to increase capacity from 5,000 to 10,000 prison spaces. The US led programme looking at improving capacity across Afghanistan is expected to produce 4,000 extra prison spaces, taking the total number of available prison spaces to around 18,000. 13 Information previously given to the Committee gave the number of official prison places as 9,260. The discrepancy reflects the fact that the Afghan Government does not have precise details on the number of prison places in Afghanistan: the Afghan Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) has no formal system of monitoring the number of spaces. Instead, they rely on estimates of spaces made by the International Committee of the Red Cross or members of the International Community who are funding the construction of prisons. Improving the capacity of the CPD is central to ensuring long-term sustainability of the prisons sector. The figure of 8,763 prison spaces is an estimate by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This estimate was made two years ago. The 9,260 figure is based on estimates of additional capacity which has been built since. Since the above evidence was first submitted to the Committee, the UN Organisation on Drugs and Crime have published new figures on prison spaces in Afghanistan. In March 2011, UNODC put prison capacity at 10,000 spaces. As with previous figures, this is an estimate only. Figures on prison spaces in Afghanistan should be treated with caution. The task of estimating prison places is complicated by security concerns restricting access to prisons in some areas and ongoing building and refurbishment programmes. In addition, figures quoted vary depending on different methods of estimating prisons spaces by different sources. Some, for example, do not include separate female or juvenile facilities in estimates. Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 205

Q.336–339—The Committee has requested information on the level of ex-gratia and other payments for civilian casualties or damage caused by UK Forces annually for the financial years 2006–07 to 2010–11 (to date)

The table below shows total expenditure on compensation and ex-gratia payments in Afghanistan, broken down by financial year, since FY06/07: 2010–11 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 (as at 30 Nov) £136,361 £380,569 £452,707 £1,142,000 £1,049,000

Q.346—The Committee has requested details of the DFID system for monitoring aid money passed to the Afghan Government

Virtually all UK aid money provided to the Government of Afghanistan is channelled through a multi-donor trust fund (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund), managed by the World Bank and monitored by an external agent, or through other third party mechanisms. Money from the ARTF is provided on a reimbursement basis and only released once proof of legitimate expenditure has been provided. All funding is subject to strict accountability requirements. We are confident that we have the right safeguards in place given the security and governance situation. Note—we have delayed our most recent payment to the ARTF because Afghanistan currently does not have an IMF programme in place. We will resume routine payments when a new programme has been agreed.

Q.348—The Committee would like to know what percentage of all UK development aid for women is passed through the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and what percentage is passed through NGOs or other agencies

DFID does not channel any funding directly through the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA). However, donors including the Canadian International Development Agency, Swedish International Development Agency and UNIFEM (the women’s fund at the United Nations), do provide Technical Assistance to MoWA and several line ministries to help mainstream gender across departmental strategies and their implementation.

DFID is providing support to WomenKind and International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) both of whom are trying to address the human rights and practical needs of women in Afghanistan. This funding is detailed below: Direct: Womenkind Worldwide £234,271 (This is the total project figure for a one year project covering seven countries, including Afghanistan). IPPF £3.6 million (This is the total project figure for a one year period, covering 10 countries including Afghanistan. Indirect: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).

Since 2002, DFID has invested around $837 million (around £517 million at current exchange rates) through the ARTF. We have delayed the most recent payment to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund as Afghanistan does not have an IMF programme in place at the moment. We fully expect to continue routine payments to the ARTF when the IMF programme is agreed.

Q.352—The Committee has requested the latest figures on the recruitment of Pashtuns to the Afghan National Security Forces

The strength of the Afghan National Police in May 2011 was 126,880 policemen. The ethnic makeup of the total force is 43% Pashtun, 42% Tajik, 5% Hazara, 5% Usbek, and 5% other. The other Category includes: Turkman, Balooch, Nooristani, Bayat, Sadat, Pashayee, Arab, and Alevi people. Police training is provided to both new recruits and to “serving-but-untrained” policemen.

For information on ethnic composition in the Afghan National Army, please see the information supplied to the Committee following the 10 November [Q155–6] session. Ev 206 Defence Committee: Evidence

Q.385–389—The Committee has requested a definition of Urgent Defence Requirements as opposed to Urgent Operational requirements. It would also like a copy of the agreement with the Treasury about Urgent Defence Requirements. The Committee would also like further explanation of the transition from the UOR funding mechanism to that of the UDR as the Armed Forces come closer to the point when there are no longer combat troops in Afghanistan Urgent Operational Requirements: The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process is used for the rapid purchase or modification of equipment to address urgent and unforeseen theatre specific capability gaps in support of a current or imminent military operation. To qualify as a UOR, it must be possible to introduce the equipment within the urgent time frame in order to make a contribution to the operation. UOR capability will often be delivered within six to eight months of the requirement being raised. However, for complex integration challenges and large fleet fits, this may, by exception, increase to up to 18 months. UOR equipment must be theatre specific. The Reserve will not fund a generic capability that could be widely deployed on future operations. UOR business cases have to clearly articulate why it is theatre specific. In 2009–10 we provided the Treasury with an estimate of UOR expenditure with an agreement that MoD would contribute towards any overspend in financial year 2011–12. In the event MoD did not overspend in 2009–10.

Urgent Defence Requirements For financial year 2010–11 only, the Treasury has, exceptionally, provided up to £150 million of additional Reserve funding for Urgent Defence Requirements (UDRs), which will be paid back in full from the Defence budget in financial year 2012–13. This money is for requirements that meet most of the UOR criteria but which are not theatre specificand thus have an enduring utility to Defence, or for accelerating core programmes. It formalises the arrangements through which MoD has previously contributed, using its core budget, to fund equipment urgently needed for operations but which would have wider utility within the core defence programme. It is a long established principle that Defence should contribute funding towards measures which accelerate delivery of equipment which is either in future procurement plans or will have utility beyond the current operation. To date, we have approved over £53 million for Urgent Defence Requirements such as upgrading Chinook helicopter engines, improving information and communications services and procuring additional Surveillance and Target Acquisition equipment. We based the £150 million estimate on our anticipated spend. It is right that MoD should help the Treasury manage the Government’s spending and these financial arrangements encourage us to do so whilst not limiting our in-year spend. There are currently no plans to extend the UDR arrangements into financial year 2011–12, although this will be subject to discussion with the Treasury during negotiations to establish the agreed 2011–12 UOR estimate. There are no plans to transition from UORs to UDRs and where requirements meet the UOR criteria we can expect the Treasury to meet the full costs from the Reserve. All the Net Additional Costs of Military Operations in Afghanistan will continue to be met in full by the Treasury Reserve next year.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED ON DESERTION, ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL), INITIAL TRAINING WASTAGE RATES AND VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW The Committee has been provided with information regarding Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police attrition. The British Army does not apply a comparable all encompassing term. Rather it looks at the individual elements separately. It is therefore difficult to draw a direct comparison with the Afghan Forces. Data for desertion, absence without leave and voluntary outflow (retention) for the UK Army is provided below.

UK Army Personnel Convicted of Desertion at Court Martial Between November 2009–November 2010 An absentee can become a deserter if it is proven that they have no intention of returning to Her Majesty’s Service or intend to evade duty before the enemy. Number of Month Personnel Convicted Nov 09 1 Dec 09 0 Jan 10 2 Feb 10 2 Mar 10 3 Apr 10 1 Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 207

Number of Month Personnel Convicted May 10 2 Jun 10 1 Jul 10 4 Aug 10 2 Sept 10 3 Oct 10 1 Nov 10 2

Please note that the Court Martial statistics are based on date of sentencing and not all convictions for desertion result in discharge from the Army.

Absence Without Leave (AWOL) There are many types of absence, ranging from unavoidable (being absent through factors beyond a soldier’s control, eg, transport problems) to short-term (periods up to 48 hours) and long-term (periods in excess of 48 hours). In more serious cases, an absentee is the term applied to a person subject to Military law who absents himself from the place at which his duty requires him to be, without leave to do so. To be guilty of this offence a soldier must knowingly and intentionally be away from his unit, or place of duty, without reasonable explanation. The figures for the Army only are as follows: AWOL STATISTICS (UK ARMY) FOR THE PERIOD 2009–10 Statistical Year Incidents of Reported No of personnel remaining (a) AWOL AWOL (b) (c) 2009 2129 102 2010 1941 344

Please note column (b) is the number of incidents of reported AWOL. The number of personnel who remain AWOL from a given calendar year is at column (c). Of the reported numbers at column (b) a percentage of these will include those reported in error (extensions of leave, sick at home, clerical errors or discharged Service Personnel, etc). Therefore the figure that should be considered relevant is column (c). To protect the integrity of the data it must be explained that REDCAP is a policing tool and database which has been used to provide the data. It is a live policing tool and therefore the figures extracted may change with a greater frequency than daily. Although column (b) is unlikely to fluctuate (it is improbable that someone would be reported AWOL now from previous years), column (c) will however change as Service personnel return to duty from periods of absence or are discharged and therefore to provide these figures as definitive and without explanation could be decidedly misleading. Please note that not all incidences of AWOL will result in discharge from the Army.

Wastage in Initial Training The current rate for wastage in initial training for the UK Army—based on a 12-month rolling figure—is 27.1%. As at 4 January, 32.18% of those who have dropped out of initial training during the course of this financial year have been because of voluntary outflow.

Voluntary Outflow Information on voluntary outflow is provided in the tables attached. These are produced in the “UK Armed Forces—Quarterly Manning Report” which is available—on the DASA website, www.dasa.mod.uk. Ev 208 Defence Committee: Evidence

Table 7a OUTFLOW FROM TRAINED UK REGULAR FORCES1 OFFICERS BY EXIT REASON Financial Year 12 months ending Number and rate 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2007–08 2008–09 30 Sep 31 Dec 31 Mar 30 Jun 30 Sep All Services

Total Outflow number2 2,340 2,120 ll 1,860 1,740 1,620 1,530 1,540 Total Outflow rate3 8.1 7.4 ll 6.5 6.1 5.6 5.3 5.3

VO4 number .. 1,260 1,030 900 830 750 760 VO4 rate3 .. 4.4 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.6

Time Expiry number ...... Time Expiry rate3 ......

Redundancy number .. − −−−−− Redundancy rate3 .. − −−−−−

Other Wastage number ...... Other Wastage rate3 ......

Naval Service

Total Outflow number2 460 410 390 380 360 300 310 Total Outflow rate3 7.0 6.4 6.1 5.8 5.5 4.6 4.8

VO4 number 280 260 260 240 220 160 160 VO4 rate3 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.4 2.5 2.5

Time Expiry number 140 130 120 130 120 120 130 Time Expiry rate3 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.0

Redundancy number −− −−−−− Redundancy rate3 −− −−−−−

Other Wastage number 30 20 10 10 20 20 20 Other Wastage rate3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4

Army5,6

Total Outflow number2 1,160 1,110 ll 960 900 840 840 820 Total Outflow rate3 8.4 8.1 ll 7.0 6.5 6.1 6.0 5.9

VO4 number .. 750 570 490 450 440 440 VO4 rate3 .. 5.5 4.2 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.2

Time Expiry number .. 210 260 280 340 340 330 Time Expiry rate3 .. 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4

Redundancy number .. − −−−−− Redundancy rate3 .. − −−−−−

Other Wastage number .. 150 130 130 60 60 50 Other Wastage rate3 .. 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.4

Royal Air Force

Total Outflow number2 720 590 500 470 420 390 400 Total Outflow rate3 8.3 7.0 5.9 5.5 5.0 4.6 4.7

VO4 number 260 250 190 180 160 140 160 VO4 rate3 3.0 2.9 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.8

Time Expiry number7 320 ...... Time Expiry rate3 3.7 ...... Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 209

Financial Year 12 months ending Number and rate 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2007–08 2008–09 30 Sep 31 Dec 31 Mar 30 Jun 30 Sep

Redundancy number 60 − −−−−− Redundancy rate3 0.7 − −−−−−

Other Wastage number7 80 ...... Other Wastage rate3 1.0 ...... Source: DASA (Quad-Service) 1. UK Regular Forces comprises trained and untrained personnel. It does not include Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service personnel and mobilised reservists. 2. Figures show outflow from the trained UK Regular Forces, including personnel leaving the Services, deaths, recalled reservists on release and outflow to the Home Service battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment (which disbanded on 31 March 2008). They do not include promotion from ranks to officers or flows between Services. 3. Rates are the number of people who leave per 100 of the trained strength. 4. Voluntary Outflow is defined as all exits from trained UK Regular Forces which are voluntarily generated by the individual before the end of their agreed engagement or commission period. 5. Outflow figures up to and including 12 months ending 31 March 2009 include the net flow of between 100 and 200 personnel from the Regular Army to Long-term Absentee (LTA). Outflow figures for 12 month periods ending after 31 March 2009 do not include this net flow to LTA. See glossary for more details. 6. Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, Army Officer reasons for exit, including VO, are unavailable from the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007 to the 12 month period ending 31 December 2008. 7. “Time Expiry” and “Other Wastage” exit reason totals and rates for RAF Officers and Other Ranks personnel for the 12 month ending periods post 30 June 2008 have been excluded. Since 1 July 2008 there has been an increase in “Unknowns” (which are grouped in the “Other Wastage” category), which has had a significant effect on “Other Wastage” and “Time Expiry” exit reason totals and rates. Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, all statistics shown in this table are provisional and subject to review. Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the UK Armed Forces Monthly Manning Report Table 4 which can be found at www.dasa.mod.uk. Table 7b OUTFLOW FROM TRAINED UK REGULAR FORCES1 OTHER RANKS BY EXIT REASON Financial Year 12 months ending Number and rate 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2007–08 2008–09 30 Sep 31 Dec 31 Mar 30 Jun 30 Sep All Services

Total Outflow number2 15,670 13,950 ll 11,770 11,230 10,660 10,650 11,140 Total Outflow rate3 11.1 10.0 ll 8.4 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.7

VO4 number .. 7,710 6,470 5,930 5,600 5,320 5,500 VO4 rate3 .. 5.5 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.8

Time Expiry number ...... Time Expiry rate3 ......

Redundancy number .. − −−− −− Redundancy rate3 .. − −−− −−

Other Wastage number ...... Other Wastage rate3 ......

Naval Service

Total Outflow number2 2,660 2,840 2,440 2,280 2,080 2,020 2,010 Total Outflow rate3 9.5 10.2 8.7 8.2 7.4 7.1 7.0

VO4 number 1,760 1,680 1,450 1,300 1,170 1,060 1,000 VO4 rate3 6.3 6.0 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.5 Ev 210 Defence Committee: Evidence

Financial Year 12 months ending Number and rate 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2007–08 2008–09 30 Sep 31 Dec 31 Mar 30 Jun 30 Sep

Time Expiry number 380 520 510 520 500 530 500 Time Expiry rate3 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8

Redundancy number − − −−− −− Redundancy rate3 − − −−− −−

Other Wastage number 520 630 480 460 410 440 500 Other Wastage rate3 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.8

Army 5,6

Total Outflow number2 9,310 8,240 ll 6,980 6,840 6,730 6,880 7,340 Total Outflow rate3 11.6 10.2 ll 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.3 8.8

VO4 number .. 4,310 3,730 3,530 3,510 3,480 3,700 VO4 rate3 .. 5.4 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.4

Time Expiry number .. 1,400 1,160 1,100 1,270 1,300 1,390 Time Expiry rate3 .. 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7

Redundancy number Redundancy rate3

Other Wastage number .. 2,530 2,090 2,260 1,940 2,090 2,250 Other Wastage rate3 .. 3.1 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.7

Royal Air Force

Total Outflow number2 3,710 2,880 2,360 2,100 1,850 1,750 1,790 Total Outflow rate3 11.3 9.3 7.7 6.8 6.0 5.6 5.7

VO4 number 1,670 1,720 1,290 1,100 910 780 800 VO4 rate3 5.1 5.5 4.2 3.6 2.9 2.5 2.5

Time Expiry number7 900 ...... Time Expiry rate3 2.8 ......

Redundancy number 740 − −−− −− Redundancy rate3 2.3 − −−− −−

Other Wastage number7 400 ...... Other Wastage rate3 1.2 ...... Source: DASA (Quad-Service) 1. UK Regular Forces comprises trained and untrained personnel. It does not include Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service personnel and mobilised reservists. 2. Figures show outflow from trained UK Regular Forces, including personnel leaving the Services, deaths, recalled reservists on release and outflow to the Home Service battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment (which disbanded on 31 March 2008). They do not include promotion from ranks to officers or flows between Services. 3. Rates are the number of people who leave per 100 of the trained strength. 4. Voluntary Outflow is defined as all exits from trained UK Regular Forces which are voluntarily generated by the individual before the end of their agreed engagement or commission period. 5. Outflow figures up to and including 12 months ending 31 March 2009 include the net flow of between 100 and 200 personnel from the Regular Army to Long-term Absentee (LTA). Outflow figures for 12 month periods ending after 31 March 2009 do not include this net flow to LTA. See glossary for more details. 6. Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, Army Other Ranks reasons for exit, including VO, are unavailable from the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007 to the 12 month period ending 31 December 2008. 7. “Time Expiry” and “Other Wastage” exit reason totals and rates for RAF Officers and Other Ranks personnel for the 12 month ending periods post 30 June 2008 have been excluded. Since 1 July 2008 there has been an Defence Committee: Evidence Ev 211

increase in “Unknowns” (which are grouped in the “Other Wastage” category), which has had a significant effect on “Other Wastage” and “Time Expiry” exit reason totals and rates. Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, all statistics shown in this table are provisional and subject to review. Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the UK Armed Forces Monthly Manning Report Table 4 which can be found at www.dasa.mod.uk.

Voluntary Outflow Rate from the UK Regular Forces Graph 7.1 NAVAL SERVICE VO RATE AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE TRAINED STRENGTH Naval Service Officers Naval Service Other Ranks 7

6

5

4

3 Rate (%)

2

1

0 31-Mar-05 31-Mar-06 31-Mar-07 31-Mar-08 31-Mar-09 31-Mar-10 12 months ending

Graph 7.2 ARMY VO RATE AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE TRAINED STRENGTH Army Officers Army Other Ranks 7

6

5

4

3 Rate (%)

2

1

0 31-Mar-05 31-Mar-06 31-Mar-07 31-Mar-08 31-Mar-09 31-Mar-10 12 months ending Ev 212 Defence Committee: Evidence

Graph 7.3 ROYAL AIR FORCE VO RATE AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE TRAINED STRENGTH RAF Officers RAF Other Ranks 7

6

5

4

3 Rate (%)

2

1

0 31-Mar-05 31-Mar-06 31-Mar-07 31-Mar-08 31-Mar-09 31-Mar-10 12 months ending

Due to ongoing validation of data from the Joint Personnel Administration System, Army reasons for exit, including VO, are unavailable from the 12 month period ending 31 March 2007 to the 12 month period ending 31 December 2008. Monthly information on Voluntary Outflow is published in the monthly TSP graphs 4.1–4.3 which can be found at www.dasa.mod.uk. 22 June 2011

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