CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY Richard B Lovelock The General as Statesman? Exploring the professional need for commanders to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as typified by the UK military approach DEFENCE ACADEMY COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED SCIENCE, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE PhD THESIS CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DEFENCE ACADEMY COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED SCIENCE, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE PhD THESIS Academic Year 2009-2010 Richard B Lovelock The General as Statesman? Exploring the professional need for commanders to support viable political outcomes in peace and stability operations as typified by the UK military approach Supervisor: Professor C D Bellamy August 2010 © Cranfield University 2010. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the copyright owner i Abstract The problem of theatre level politico-military arrangements during peace and stability operations is important because the intervening actors, working in complex and often ambiguous circumstances, need to calibrate the application of military and political means as a coherent interdependent whole. This is necessary in order to build peace, secure viable political outcomes and hence strategic successes; however it is not easy in practice. This thesis examines the hypothesis that, beyond their security-related tasks, military commanders should provide direct support to civilian interlocutors in order to facilitate and sustain the local political process. This requires military co- operation with other relevant actors, responsiveness to political direction and the specific shaping of military operations to impact decisively on political outcomes. This work establishes that Western and United Nations doctrinal guidance extols political primacy and civil-military cooperation but does not fully explain the central importance of the political process, nor does it capture the potential peace building role of the military component. Analysis of practice in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that military commanders retain a uniquely influential position and have generally used their military means to positively influence political progress and help coordinate multi-dimensional plans. On occasion, to secure momentum and fill a void, commanders have quietly assumed a political function. Doctrine now needs to be refreshed to reflect practice. It should explain the military role in supporting the political process, elaborate the politico-military relationship as the inner core of a comprehensive approach to peace building and provide candid guidance on the difficulties to be expected where politico-military and coordination arrangements are incoherent. Moreover further work is needed on the wider application of this doctrine by the United Nations and the preparation of civilian leaders for politico-military relationships. ii iii Acknowledgements My association with the business at hand stretches back into the Balkan campaigns of the 1990s. I am mindful of the many local people that I encountered in the course of my military duties in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Iraq. It is they who bear the real burden of our difficulties in bringing peace and it is for them that we need to make a better job of it. This thesis has had a long gestation period and I am truly grateful to my supervisor Professor Chris Bellamy for seeing the potential in me, for his forbearance throughout and for his succinct guidance. Thank you Chris: I know I have not exactly been a model student. In the course of writing a chapter in The Quest for Viable Peace I became firm friends with Mike Dziedzic, Len Hawley and Jock Covey in the United States. It is through that project and their continuing support that much of the insight inherent in my thesis was developed. I would also like to thank Professor Bill Flavin at the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute who has been a long time friend and source of help and advice. I have been struck by the passion and commitment of all those, civilian and military, whom I have interviewed about the challenges that I have tried to capture in this thesis. Without exception they were generous with their time and perceptive analysis. I am particularly grateful to General Rupert Smith and General David Richards for their candid observations and support. Colonel Alex Alderson provided an inspiring example with his own PhD thesis and has offered warm encouragement, helpful guidance and pertinent material. Finally, but most importantly, my wife Stephanie has provided enormous moral support and practical help throughout the project. With a keen professional knowledge and insight, she has always been ready to read and comment incisively on texts. She has also put up with the inevitable disruption to normal domestic life which writing entails. Thank you Stephanie for doing so much to keep me going: this would not have been possible without your unbounded support and forbearance. iv v Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iv Contents vi List of Tables xii List of Figures xii Chapter 1 – Introduction 1 1. Setting the scene: complex operations demand political sensitivity 1 2. Reasons for undertaking the study 8 3. Research topic 11 4. Hypothesis 11 5. Aim 12 6. Objectives 12 7. Scope 12 8. Methodology 13 9. Thesis Structure 14 Chapter 2 - British Doctrine for Peace and Stability Operations 25 1. Scope of the Literature Review 25 2. Clausewitz – The General as Statesman? 25 3. A Successful Politico-Military Relationship in Kosovo in 1999 28 4. UK Military Doctrine for Stability, Counter Insurgency, and Peace 29 Operations 4.1 The Purpose of Doctrine 29 4.2 Contemporary Stability Operations and Counter Insurgency 30 Doctrine 4.3 Earlier Experiences – Small Wars and Imperial Policing 31 4.4 Countering Insurgency 32 vi 4.5 Peace Operations Doctrine 35 4.6 Contemporary UK Peace Support Operations Doctrine 38 4.7 A ―Comprehensive Approach‖? 38 4.8 Contemporary Literature - Reflections by senior commanders and 40 others 5. Conclusions 43 5.1 The literature 43 5.2 A Doctrinal Gap To Be Filled 44 5.3 An Emerging Model To Test Against The Multinational Challenge 45 Chapter 3 – Contemporary US, UN and NATO Doctrine for Peace and 55 Stability Operations 1. Introduction 55 2. The United States 56 2.1 The US Army and Marine Corps Counter Insurgency Field 56 Manual (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5): ―A moon without a planet‖ 2.2 FM 3-07 The US Army Stability Operations Field Manual 61 2.3 Recent Doctrinal Developments in US Civil Military 63 Cooperation 2.4 Conclusions on US doctrine 67 3. The United Nations 69 3.1 The Brahimi Report on United Nations Peace Operations in 2000 69 3.2 UN Doctrine Following The Brahimi Report 72 3.3 UN Capstone Doctrine 2008 73 3.4 Updated UN CIMIC Policy in 2010 75 3.5 Peace Challenges Forum – Emerging Guidance For Senior Leaders 76 3.6 Conclusions on UN Doctrine 77 4. NATO 78 4.1 Why Discuss NATO? 78 4.2 NATO‘s Policy Challenges 78 4.3 NATO‘s Comprehensive Approach 79 4.4 NATO‘s Military Counterinsurgency Doctrine 80 vii 4.5 Conclusions on NATO doctrine 82 5. Conclusions 83 Chapter 4 - Kosovo: Keeping the Show on the Road 97 1. Introduction 97 2. The Problem Faced by the International Community in Kosovo in 1999- 98 2000 2.1 Security and the Rule of Law 99 2.2 The Local Economy 100 2.3 Social Issues and Attitudes in Kosovo 101 2.4 Mandate 101 2.5 Other Defining Instruments and Instructions 103 2.6 KFOR‘s Internal challenges 104 3. The Big Ideas: Campaign Design 106 3.1 Approaches to the Politico-Military Relationship, Process and 106 Strategy 3.2 Communicating the Big Ideas: A Plan For Kosovo Without An 108 End State 3.3 An Example of Integrated Planning at the Local (Tactical) Level 111 3.4 Planning with local actors 113 4. Executing the Big Ideas: Campaign Execution 113 4.1 Achieving a Positive Political Effect Through Military Activity 113 4.2 Constraints on Delivering Progress 117 5. Conclusions 119 5.1 Practical Results 120 5.2 Implications for Doctrine 121 Chapter 5 Iraq 2003-2008: Hard Lessons 133 1. Introduction 133 2. Post Invasion Iraq in 2003 135 2.1 The Situation 135 2.2 The Mandate 137 3. The Coalition Provisional Authority 2003-2004 138 3.1 Approaches to the Politico-Military Relationship by Bremer and 138 Sanchez viii 3.2 The Coalition Provisional Authority‘s Priorities and Plans 139 3.3 Campaign Design under CJTF-7 143 3.4 Campaign Execution 144 3.4 Campaign Results under CPA and CJTF -7 146 4. 2004-2006: Transition 147 5. The Crocker-Petraeus Team In Iraq in 2007-2008: ―Relentless‖ 148 5.1 The Politico-Military Relationship 148 5.2 The Big Ideas 149 5.3 Executing the Big Ideas 151 5.4 Campaign Results under Crocker and Petraeus 155 6. Conclusions 157 6.1 Reflections on the Campaign 157 6.2 The General As Statesman? 158 6.3 Doctrinal Implications 159 Chapter 6 - Afghanistan 2001-2010 171 1. Introduction 171 2. Post Invasion Afghanistan 172 3. The Evolution of the Mandate, the Afghan Government, and International 174 Military Engagement 4. ISAF under General Richards (4 May 2006 to 4 February 2007) 177 4.1 Politico-Military Relationships 177 4.2 Campaign Design under Richards 179 4.3 Campaign Execution under Richards 183 4.4 Campaign Results under Richards 184 5. ISAF 2007 – 2009: A Deepening Crisis And A Developing Understanding 187 6. ISAF Under General McChrystal 2009-2010 190 6.1 Politico-Military Relationships 190 6.2 Deriving an Updated Campaign Strategy: The Big Ideas 191 6.3 Campaign Design: Communicating The Big Ideas 193 6.4 Executing the Big Ideas 194 6.5 Campaign Results under McChrystal 196 ix 7.