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ASD 134

SPRING 1987 0 Av1at1on Safety Digest is prepared by the Department of Transport and Communications and is published by the Australtan Government Publishing Service. It is distributed to Aus tralian licence holders (except student pilots). Contents registered owners and certain other Editorial persons and organisations having an operational interest in safety within the Aus· tra/1an civil aviation envlfonment. 4 Spring is in the air Flying has its ups and downs D1stnbutees who expenence delivery - especially in the Spring. problems or who wish to notify a change of address should contact:

The Publications Distribution Officer (EPSD) Department of Transport and Communicat10ns 6 Afterthoughts? P 0. Box 1986, Carlton South. Vic. 3053, A safe flight is nicely finished off by a post-flight AUSTRALIA T'S SPRING at last. The birds are singing and it's time for us inspection. Telephone (03) 667 2733 to get back into the air after the winter lay-off. Most of us have just been through our leanest period of aviating for the year and we may be more than a little rusty. Our Covers familiarity with the aircraft and its systems, with procedures and Front. When the going gets tough ... the 7 The power of nature checks is at its lowest ebb. Our handling techniques - the vis­ Av1at1on Safety Digest is also available on tough get going. A major element in Thunderstorms deserve respect ual judgments and control inputs - are less automatic and may subscription from the Australian Government landing accidents is a late decision to go Publishing Service. There is a subscription - and a wide berth. need greater conscious effort. around. He who floats and flies away, form in this issue. lnqu;,ies and notifications It may be a wise precaution to have a dual ride wi th the CFI of change of address should be directed lo. lives to float another day? before we let ourselves loose on the world. Some study would Photograph by Brenton Hollitt be good value and so wou ld some 'air conditioning'. Mail Order Sales Pen tax SP 1OOO - Kodacolor Australian Government Publishing Service 8 Arrival - the best part of the journey? In the southern States. Spring weather can be changeable , with G.P.O. Box 84, Canberra, A.C.T 2601, Wha l does it take to make every landing a safe landing? frontal passages and gusty winds. The weather can turn fairly Back. In every walk of life. we have to fit AUSTRALIA quickly from sunny to heavy downpours. The rmal activity is in, to accommodate each other - there Telephone (062) 95 4411 . Telex AA62013 increasing and there can be significant mechanical turbulence. must be some give-and-take and there is Spring can ge a time of crosswinds. windshear and perhaps wet usually some unwritten code of behaviour. Subscriptions may also be lodged at runways. Aviation is no different. 'Do the right Commonwealth Government Bookshops m 13 How do I land thee? Let me count the thing' unto others and they will 'do the the capital cities. ways As we trundle the faithful craft ou t of the hangar, it is worth right thing' unto you. ['Do the right thing' reflecting on these conditions and our limitations and making There is more than one technique for landing an aircraft. unto the aeroplane also.] su re we are as prepared as the aircraft for the coming flights. My thanks to the N.S.W. State Pollution A major portion of this issue is devoted to the subject of the Control Comm1ss1on for permission to use approach and landing. Landing an aircraft safely, consistently material from their highly successful The views expressed in the Aviation Safety and well is the greatest challenge that we have to face. That is . campaign. Digest are those of the editor or the 14 Choosing the best approach individual contributor and are intended to not to say that all are poor. Attitude is the vital ingredient. stimulate discussion in the fields of aviation The vast majority of the thousands of Jandings carried out each safety and related areas. They do not year are safe and those that result in an accident or incident necessarily reflect the policy of the usually do not result in death or injury. Nevertheless. there are a Department. The articles are mtended to significant number of landing accidents and incidents (more serve as a basis for discussion and even argument in an effort to identify and resolve 15 A flare for landing than during all other phases of flight combined) and most of problem areas and potentially hazardous A new visual cue for initiating the flare. them are caused by you and me (the pilots of the ai rcraft) and situations. most of them are avoidable - if we pay attention to three aspects: decisions, Unless otherwise noted. articles in this publication are based on Australian • application, accidents, incidents or statistics. 18 The gentle touch • technique. Let the aircraft land itself. Reader comments and contributions are Some of you may have seen the new video, The Gentle Touch, welcome but the editor reserves the right to produced by the Department. It has been circulated to all flying publish onl'f those items which are assessed training organisations in Australia free of charge and may be as being constructive towards flight safety. shown and copied without restriction. I urge you to see it and 19 When everything turns to worms please let me know what you think of it. It is designed to pro· Reader contributions and correspondence mote discussion - as are the articles in this issue. Please talk shoufd be addressed to: Escape clauses - always check them. about them with your colleagues and only experiment when you have an instructor with you and when you have previously The Editor, briefed what you are going to try. Aviation Safety Digest Department of Transport and Communications Seat belt, belt, belt, belt, belt, belt, belt Editor: David Robson G.P.O. Box 367, 20 Editorial Assistant: Karen Hutchison Canberra, A. C. T. 2601 , AUSTRALIA I hear you knocking but you can't come in. Graphic Design: Lesley Gordon ©Commonwealth of Australia 1986 Photographs: P 4 Mike Cleaver ISSN 0045-1207 p 7. 8 BAS/ R85/979(7) Cat. No. 86 0310 3 DAVID ROBSON p 12, 13 Michael Jensen 22 Airflow Editor p 20 Steve Small Printed by Ambassador Press Ply Ltd The readers' column. 51 Good Street, Granville, N.S.W. 2142, Diagrams: Soussanith Nokham AUSTRALIA Aviation Safety Digest 134

There are four main types of turbulence - A wind gradient means that there is a graded mechanical, shear, thermal and wingtip vorti­ change, which is often sharp and pronounced ces. In our allowed airspace (below 500 feet (almost always an increase) in the wind vel­ agl), we can expect to find all of these types of ocity with height. The basic reason for this turbulence, at various times. situation is friction of the air with the earth's surface. A wind gradient is usually more severe 0 0 during stable conditions. Unstable conditions (usually caused by thermal activity) result in vertical air movement which mixes the air and evens-out the velocity at heights close to the Wingtip vortices are more likely to be found ground. The main times in which wind gradi­ near airrields, particularly joint-use GA/ UL ents can affect us are during a or turn fields. The vortex from an aircraft of equal within 100 feet of the ground (although it can wing-loading is quite noticeable; from a heavier be a problem even higher). aircraft it can be uncontrollable. Even a Cessna 150 produces vortices which may severely Turns in a wind gradient may also cause diffi­ affect ultralight aircraft. Since wingtip vortices culty because the wingtips are in air moving at flow rearward and downward from an aircraft, different speeds, so response w ill be dif­ avoid flying below and behind anot her aircraft. ferent - and in an ultralight t he wind velocity A certain amount of t urbulence could mean a Take off shorter than a preceding aircraft and represents a significant proportion of air­ slight bump in an airliner. However, the same land further down the runway than a preceding speed. If you are t urning downwind the lower Spring is in amount could have a quite severe effect on an air craft. Better still, wait for a couple of min­ wing will have more airspeed (hence more lift) ultralight, due to its very low size, mass and utes - and stay well clear of helicopters. so bank tends to decrease (or more control is needed): if you are turning into wind the situ­ the air wing-loading. The effect on GA aircraft also Shear turbulence often occurs at the meeting of ¥aries with wing-loading and would l>e some­ ation is the opposite and bank tends to increase cold and warm air masses. Air masses with dif­ - if the lower wing sta lls you are in serious where between the above two extremes. The ferent temperatures tend to move with differ­ danger is not so much the likelihood of struc­ t rouble, so either don't turn low down in strong ent velocities, due to their different origins or winds, or else fly faster near t he ground. tural damage from the thrashing of the air, but response to a pressure system. A cold or warm r ather the loss of control authority. Loss of con­ front , a sea breeze or simply an inversion will Thermals are rising parcels of air which arc trol at altitude could be recoverable or it could often present shear t urbulence. Shear turbu­ warmer than the surrou nding air . Typically, t he lead to manoeuvres outside the aircraft's envel­ lence can occur at the top of a 'pool' of cooler air has been warmed by contact with a patch of Garry Leach is a former GA pilot who also had some glid­ ope. Unfortunately, there have been a number air that fills a valley in t he morning or evening, ground which, due to its nature or colour ing and hang-gliding experience before becoming an of reported accidents, particularly overseas, when the ambient wind blows over the top of (ploughed field, burnt grass, asphalt, rocks, ultralight aircraft pilot. He has logged about 350 flying hours. from structural damage due to loss of control. the valley from the plains or hills surrounding water), has been absorbing heat from the sun at Structural damage should not occur if the air­ 0 the valley. The shear may be either at a hori­ a faster rate than nearby areas. His main flying interests include cross-country trips and craft is flown below its t urbulence penetration zontal or vertical surface. The airflows in a t hermal arc not usually even, trying to catch thermals. One cross-country trip included speed. If this speed is not provided by the Mechanical turbulence results from the wind since some parts arc warmer than others and crossing Bass Strait both ways by ultralight. manufacturer, it can be calculated as the stall encountering an object such as a building, t ree some other parts are cooled by mixing with speed mult iplied by the square root of the or hill. The resulting disturbance to the airflow non-rising air. In addition, there is often strong sinking air nearby, in part moving to replace Garry has been the AUF Vice-Presiden! for two years and aircraft's design load. Since the limit load for is felt as turbulence. The amount of t urbulence is an active member of the AUF committee for proposed ultralight aircr aft is supposed to be + 4 g and depends on the velocity of the wind and t he the rising air of the t hermal. This 'mixture' of airworthiness standards. He would like to see the develop­ - 2 g, then the manoeuvring speed should be size of the object. If there are many objects, fast-rising, s low-rising and sinking air can push ment of ultralight competitions. stall speed t imes two for normal flight and less t hen t he airflow is disturbed in a much more an ultralight aircraft in all directions. for downward gusts. If properly designed, con­ complex way and results in even more turbu­ A parcel of air which is still sitting on t he structed and maintained, your structm-e should lence. If you wer e to fly close to an object of ground, becoming warmer by the minute, can be not fail if you keep wit hin these speeds, the size of a VW micro-bus in a 15-knot wind, disturbed by a passing vehicle or low-fl ying air­ CAN ONLY touch briefly on the topics in this because t he wing stalls before becoming over­ shm·t article. If you wish to have a better you would expect to find the turbulence quite craft or, event ually, by its own buoyancy. The loaded. (It is essential that the accuracy of your noticeable, and it may extend for a considerable release of the thermal usually triggers an • understanding of t his area, then you should ASI be know n when you operate close to your read some of the relevant books. One book on distance downwind, depending on many inflow of air , from all directions, to take its aircraft's limits.) However, the factor for nega­ place. This can create a temporary tailwind. It t hese subjects, which I have found to be com­ meteorological factors. tive loads is quite low and t his is where some could also create a whirlwind, which could pre'hensive and reasonably easy to follow, is The airflow on the lee side of a hill or ridge aircraft have failed - there have been two cause control dif ficulties, and may be less 'Micro-meteorology' by Dennis Pagen. Australian examp les in the past 15 months. The will most likely include a downdr aft, which can be q uite strong in a moderate wind as well as noticeable in spring than the typical 'dust-devil ' It is likely t hat you. have not been flying in the other aspect, t hough, is what degree of control of summer . past t hree or four mont hs, due to wintry you have after the aircraft has stalled due to being quite turbulent, and may even include weather . It is quite possible that your last excessive 'g' loading. occas ional reversals of the surface wind direction. flight was in t he ideal conditions of an Autumn Flying in t urbulence is an acquired taste, like high-pressure system. This article is intended_t o eating blue vein cheese. Because of t his, some Large objects, such as a row of tall trees or Another weather-related factor which can cause remind you that spring weather is usually qmte pilots never fly in turbulence. The ability to buildings can cause a wind 'shadow' as well as difficulties close to the ground is a microburst. different from autumn weather in sout hern operate in turbulence depends on t he severity mechanical t urbulence. The wind shadow forms A microburst is triggered by an increase in Australia. of t he turbulence, the skill of the pilot and t he a wedge wit h its t riangular profile sloping from moisture (such as rain falling), which cools the Plants like to grow in spring because they get behaviour of the aircra ft (reaction to turbu­ the top of t he obstruction out to the ground. air and causes it to sink, sometimes at speeds of Wit hin this wedge, the wind speed can be ,plenty of what t hey need for growing - t~ain lence and controllability), more or less in t hat 0 0 thousands of feet per minute. The sinking air and sun. So spring is characterised by rapidly order (for lightly loaded ultralight aircraft). virtually 2ero. However, the turbulence is more can cause under-shoot ing, a heavy landing or alternating periods of sun and _rain (often both Pilot skills need to be developed gradually, by hazardous than the calm air is beneficial, so worse. As t he downd raft approaches the in the same day) and fast-moving pressm·e sys­ starting wit h mild turbulence and slowly pro­ such obstructions should be t reated with ground, it spreads outwards in all directions, tems and fronts. gressing to more severe condit ions. respect. often raising dust and producing increasing Aviation Safety Digest Aviation Safety Digest 134 134

headwinds, crosswinds or tailwinds, so an of airspeed may even cause a stall, despite a After climbing to 8500 ft, the pilot reported expanding ring of dust is to be avoided. The low nose attitude. This is why, in an ultralight , that he could see t he lights of t he mines to the difference in speeds of the wind at either side you add an additional Y3 of the wind speed to south of Blackwater. He tracked to that area, of a microburst (i.e. the headwind on one side Lh e normal nil-wind approach speed of 1 Yz and subsequently to Blackwater town, where he and the tailwind on the other side) can be in Limes Lhe stalling speed. As you descend set himself up in a racetrack pattern at 2400 ft excess of 50 knots. Fortunately, microbursts do through the wind gradient you will need to () AMSL between 35 and 40 DME from Emerald not last for long (five t o 15 minutes) and are lower the nose to maintain speed, and possibly 0 on the Blackwater-Emerald track. There were quite localised (one to three km diameter). One add power Lo slo w your descent rate and help storms to the north and west of the area. After indication of t he possibility of a microburst is you accelerate. Because your ground speed is some time without success at arranging the 'virga', the mid-level rain which stops before higher now, the landing roll will probably be lights, t he pilot asked Flight Service to ring his hitting t he ground - it appears as a veil hang­ longer than you expected. company at Emerald and ask them to arrange ing below the cloud. for lights to be displayed. The pilot reported In light winds a temporary tailwind will also that he also changed t he engine speed over the If thunderstorms or heavy showers are in the produce problems on approach and landing. The town in order to stir someone into deploying area, they may affect the surface wind for a ground speed will be high, giving a false the lights. distance of tens of kilometres, and ult ralights impression that the airspeed also is high, and (and GA pilots) should be alert for sudden the approach path will be flatter t han usual. As changes, or should avoid flying in t hese con­ well as increasing the ground run there is a risk ditions altogether . of overshooting your intended touchdown point, and a loss of directional control as you run out Flying in rain is not recommended, due to t he of airspeed while still rolling. It may be safer to During his second racetrack pattern when marked reduction in visibility and the changed go around rather than persevere with a landing approaching 35 DME, the pilot entered cloud fl ying characteristics of wet wings. In particu­ which is going wrong in these circumstances. for the first t ime. Shortly after entering t he lar the stall speed is increased signifi cant ly and Remember the wind may be different where cloud, severe turbulence was encountered, his t he stall characteristics may be very different. you arc landing from that at the windsock, 200 headset was thrown off and his hand acciden­ Also, t he raindrops play havoc with wooden metres away. tally knocked the gear down. propellers. What I have described here is noL something The pilot reported that he made no further con­ If you are taking off through a wind-gradient that only happens to the other guy. I have trol inputs and found himse ~f about ten seconds your airspeed and rate of will increase either experienced these phenomena or have later able to v acate the aircraft which was 1w 'w quickly as you climb through it. The reverse been flying with other pilots when they experi­ on the ground. happens on descending into the slower moving enced t hem. Remember to keep your upper limit When he determined t hat the aircraft would not air on landing, causing a loss of airspeed and an of turbulence well below your level of The power of burn he returned to it in order to activate t he apparent undershoot. If you do not carry controllability and you w ill enjoy fl ying for ELB. All the li ghts and radios came on when enough excess speed to overcome this, the loss many springs Lo come D the master switch was turned on and he was o nature able to check that the ELB was operating. What to look for Shortly after this he noticed vehicles moving past not too far away, so he turned everything Afterthoughts? If you do your pre-flight with a rag in your off and went to t he road to flag down a car. hand and clean any smears, drips or pools of The driver was a woman going to t he airport to A habit that I acquired from an old hand has that touch of Someone once told me that there was more energy in a aeronautical wisdom that may have been Jost in recent oil , grease, hydraulic fluid or fuel, then the deploy t he lights for him. He asked for the important part of the post-flight inspection is to large thunderstorm than there was in a nuclear explosion. times. The Airlines do it and so do the Armed Services but Now I believe her. nearest phone so he could notify his company . their good habits and practices aren't always filtering look for leaks. Any fresh smears or runs are immediately evident, as is any damage from Evidence indicates t hat an aircraft had flown through to we pilots of wee aeroplanes. HE PILOT was conducting a charter flight, around the South Blackwater mine area at stones, gravel, hail or whatever. carrying freight from Brisbane to Emerald. HE BENEFITS of a thorough pre-flight are about 0320 at about 400 ft agl. Around 0330, The combination of a pre-flight and post-flight _ The flight was conducted with numerous an aircraft flew low over the town on a number obvious, although I am embarrassed to say inspection inunediately shows any deterioration. t hunderstorms around. Although the planned that some pilots are only cursory examiners of occasions and some witnesses reported that Seeing both the 'before' and the 'after' gives an cruise altitude was 4500 ft , Lhe pilot had the engines were varying in speed. Light rain and some pilots have been known to skip a pre­ immediate comparison or trend, like the ads on climbed to 8500 ft approaching Emerald in flight altogether. But enough of that hobby horse. was falling over most of the area. Some areas TV. Any suspect leaks can be confirmed or order to remain clear of cloud and maintain vis­ had wind gusts and heavy rain. No witnesses The tip I have to pass on is the value of a post­ watched. Any nicks in the prop can be relieved ual contact with the storm cells. During the saw the aircraft near the airport, but it appears flight inspection. The commercial operators use before the next flight and without the urgency fli ght, he observed that Thangool and Rock­ that there may have been a storm cell in the trained ground staff to inspect the aircraft of a late-discovered discrepancy in the hampt on had storms in t he area and that Black­ vicinity of t he airport at t he time. No signifi­ after each flight. We have to do our own. pre-flight. water was clear , although there were storms cant wind or rain was observed at the airport The benefits are fairly clear-cut: around. There were also storms in the Emerald for a consider able time after the accident. Method area. • you can detect an unserviceability earlier and The aircraft struck t he low scrub heading SSE get it fixed before your planned departure or My post-flight checklist is simple. I double He conducted a DME arrival into Emerald until with 40 degrees of bank to t he right and a shal­ the next scheduled sortie, (I'm sure that's check that the ignition and the Master switches forced to abandon the approach at 10 DME. The low descent angle, about 250 metres to the east why the Airlines do it - they have tight are off and I do a slow walk around concentrat­ extent of the line of storms running north/ of t he runway. After t he right wingtip con­ schedules. The Services of course need to ing on the underside of the aircraft and looking south through that area was such that he could tacted t he ground, the aircraft rotated clock­ know that the aircraft is ready to go at any for leaks, smears, drips, stone damage, chips to not divert to Clermont or make any other wise so that its nose was scraping the soft time.) the prop, tyre scuffs and loose 'bits'. attempts to position himself on their western ground and the tail was in the air. The • you can warn the next pilot that something is Then I lock the controls and tic the aircraft down. 0 0 side. The pilot initiated a climb to 8500 rt and was moving sideways as it contacted the amiss, diverted to Blackwater at 0310 hours local ground. The main gear legs were broken off and As an afterthought, it has saved me much time. A short time later, Brisbane Flight Service the aircraft slid to a halt while moving back­ • you can pick a trend towards a possible fail­ stress and avoided many delays. It has repaid asked t he pilot if he had arranged for lights at wards. The aircraft travelled 150 metres from ure, earlier. the time it takes, many times over D Blackwater, which he affir med. t he first ground strike to rest D Aviation Safety Digest Aviation Safety Digest 134 134

Normal checks were carried out on downwind From t he cockpit the bounce didn't seem all and he turned Base and Final normally. He had that bad. It was when all the wheels were on decided to use an approach speed of 70-75 the ground and the pilot couldn't control the knots instead of his usual 65 knots due to the aircraft t hat he became concerned. AUW of the aircraft and the crosswind con­ ditions and possible turbulence. He had not previously made a go-around from Arrival - the n after touch-down. The initial touch-down The aircraft was seen to fly through the wasn't dramatic and he thought it had only centreline and S-turned to regain the correct bounced a foot or two. He could feel that the best part of the approach path. It first touched down about half aircraft was rocking fore and aft. Everything way into the field and then bounced several times. happened so quickly.

journey? The pilot thought he could still land success­ 3. The Grumman Tiger appeared to make a nor­ fully but then realised that the end of the run­ mal approach for runway 23 at Birdsville way was getting quite close. He decided to go except to some it appeared hot or high. Initial around and applied full power. touchdown was well into the strip, about half­ The pilot said that he deliberately left full flap way along. selected to a void any sink. Surface wind was 300°/ 10 kt - all crosswind. The aircraft just became airborne some 150 The aircraft touched down in a fairly level at ti­ metres before the boundary fence and seemed tude and bounced. The next touchdown to hang in the air. The stall warning was appeared level if not slightly nose low and the HE LANDI NG phase can be a problem area blaring. The pilot turned the aircraft slightly aircraft bounced again. At this point an for many pilots. Statistics show that a sig­ left to avoid some heavy steel cables that he observer called out in the Australian idiom that - nificant percentage of accidents occur dur­ knew were at the end of the runway. The air­ something was amiss. ing the approach and landing· and that a major craft struck the boundary fence and skidded to The aircraft impacted the runway in a mark­ proportion of these are avoidable - that is to a halt. The pilot and passenger escaped unhurt. edly nose low attitude and skidded to a halt say they are our fault, the pilot's fault - resting on its mainwheels and nose. faults in decision-making, in judgment, in pro­ cedures, in checks or in control of Lhe aircraft. 2. The student pilot had been conducting prac­ There was no fire nor injury. Let's keep it in perspective, though. There are tice forced landings in the local training area. 4. The pilot of the Cessna 182 overflew the 610 thousands of landings each year and the vast During the overshoot from one of these majority of these are safely completed. Having metre long ALA and checked the windsock. He approaches, he noticed that the flap on his assessed a crosswind of 10 knots. said that, we still should try to reduce the acci­ Cessna 152 would not retract beyond the two­ dents that do occur - particularly as they stages-down position. As he turned Base he experienced moderate tur­ appear to be easily avoided. bulence and decided to make his approach at 80 To ensure t hat the thrust of the Depar tment's He advised the flying club of the problem, dis­ knots with 20 degrees of flap selected. He safety promotion activities was in the right cussed it with his instructor and returned for a crossed the threshold and closed the throttle. direction, the Bureau of Air Safety Investi­ landing. gation was asked to examine the overall acci­ The aircraft floated until finally touching down dent statistics for a ten-year period. This study The pilot later explained his concern or pre­ half way along the strip at 68-70 knots. The confirmed that the landing phase wa:s a signifi­ occupation with the flaps and that he wanted pilot started braking heavily but the aircraft cant problem area. The Bureau then looked to land as soon as possible and to avoid a didn't seem to be decelerating significantly. The more closely at a one-year period to see if this go-around with the flaps stuck in this position. aircraft veered off the strip, bounced through could pin down the cause of landing difficulties. three drains and crossed a road. This study gave us a close-up view of the prob­ He flew, what was in his own words, too tight a circuit and had to S-turn on final to regain the lems and the contributory factors but still did centreline. This was partly due to the distrac­ not answer the real question - why did the tion caused by an aircraft for . accident occur? What really caused t he acci­ To try to understand the steps or pitfalls dent? Why was the approach speed excessive? The surface wind was 330°/ 10 kt - a 5-6 knot associated with landing an aircraft safely, I Why did the pilot, who was presumably taught crosswind. His approach speed was 70-75 knots. t ried to break down the approach and landing correctly, mishandle the bounced landing? Why into its functional elements. I concluded that didn't he go around? Why did he misjudge the The approach appeared to be a little steep but there were three primary elements involved: flare? Why didn't he anticipate the windshear? the flare looked normal. Why did he press on when a 8afe landing was doubtful? The aircraft bounced on touchdown but with • Decisions - what decisions, whether and Why? Why? Why? Why? Why? Why? Why? his mental attitude, the pilot was determined to when. keep the aircraft on the ground and so he per­ Let's look at a few typical landing accidents: severed with the landing. 1. The aircraft flew from Port Macquarie to • Application - a combination of procedures, From outside it appeared that the aircraft was checks and standards. Aeropelican near Newcastle. The pilot joined 0 pushed onto the runway (back pressure ' the circuit and examined the windsocks. His released). The nosewheel struck the ground, estimate was that the wind was from the south­ bounced, struck the ground again and collapsed. • Technique - the visual references used, east at 8-10 knots and so he made a standard The aircraft left the runway at about 30-40 the control inputs made and right-hand circuit for runway 07. knots and overturned. escape manoeuvres. Aviation Safety Digest Aviation Safety Digest 134 134

Decision particular pilot in that particular state and at We go through a certain procedure to position achieve greater accuracy if we wanted to, but if that time - FOR BETTER OR WORSE. the aircraft for a landing. We go through a it isn't necessary, why bother? Perhaps we save The essential first step in any phase of flight is So there are two yardsticks: series of checks to prepare the aircraft for our concentration for those difficult occasions the decision. At this point an accident can be landing and we set certain targets for ourselves - so that we have something in reserve. Per­ caused or avoided. • The capabilities of the aircraft. in establishing the approach. These may not be haps we just accept the standards that our Some pilots didn't actually make a conscious • The capabilities of the pilot. ( j) conscious steps but nevertheless they're there instructor, chief pilot or our colleagues s et for decision but appeared to press on until some­ It is important to realise that we are talking in one form or another. It seemed valuable to themselves and they become good enough for thing forced them to change their plans. This about that aircraft's capabilities at lhal weight try to integrate them in some way. us. Perhaps we kid ourselves. often occurred too late for a safe alternative to and in that condition - and we are talking So 'Application' includes: More importantly, there are standards t hat the be chosen. about that pilot's capabilities at that time, in aircraft demands - tolerances t hat the aircraft Many pilots deferred the decision until the that aircraft, with lhat degree of training, cur­ • procedures; can accept in regard to minimum speeds at that probability of a safe alternative course of rency, experience, familiarity, confidence, • checks, and weight and configuration, maximum speeds action was seriously reduced. fatigue and well-being. • standards. beyond which it is difficult to control near the Some pilots made a decision that was less than The first decision is fairly clear-cut. We can ground or beyond which the nosewheel may optimum or not the safest or wisest option. The compare the conditions that exist with the pub­ procedures contact the runway before the mainwheels. decision-making process may seem to be second lished and tested capability of the aircraft such There is a maximum height that the aircraft nature but it is worth considering what is as runway length required, crosswind limits, We follow a procedure to enter the circuit and can accept over the threshold and still be able involved. weight limits and t hreshold speeds - all black­ position for a landing. There are set patterns to stop in the available runway. There is a Many of us pride ourselves on being able to and-white, documented criteria. Only in dire cir­ that we fly and they are not just for traffic minimum height that the aircraft needs over make a positive decision - a quick decision on cumstances would a pilot deliberately take the separation purposes. They are the basis for con­ the threshold so that it can respond to longitu­ t he spur of the moment - an 'operational' aircraft beyond those limits. sistency in the approach and they are to give us dinal control inputs and be able to flare safely. decision. We are captains of our aircraft and we The first decision then is an easy one - if we time and cues to initiate checks, to weigh up There is a maximum sink rate that t he aircraft therefore make all the necessary decisions - are honest about it and if we know the limits the conditions and to make decisions. can accept before the undercarriage and struc­ we don't shirk our responsibility. We make a and capabilities of our aircraft. ' The square circuit is not just a relic of pre-war ture will be damaged. There is a maximum sidc­ decision and get on with it. aero clubs. It is a sensible way of entering the load or drift angle that the aircraft can tolerate The second decision is the hard one. We have t o on touchdown before the gear will fail laterally. But it isn't always necessary to make such an admit to ourselves that we may not be as cur­ circuit so that we can look for other aircraft urgent decision. There is usually time to con­ rent in crosswind conditions as we should be, and know where to look and so that other air­ Don't be concerned. These tolerances are easily sider all the factors and options carefully and that we arc a little tired and hungry, that we craft can look for us and know where to look. achieved. Aircraft are designed, tested are cer­ to make a reasoned judgment - and t hen to are a bit eager to get onto the ground, that we We can stabilise the aircraft and take time to tificated to ensure that the tolerances are test the wisdom of that decision. If there are not so familiar with this particular aircraft examine the windsock, assess the drift at achievable by average pilots in normal circum­ doesn't appear to be sufficient time we can in this environment, that we are not so sure circuit height and assess the strip, the stances. Furthermore, our training and flight usually make time - by anticipating the need that we can cope safely with the conditions or approaches and the overruns. It gives us time tests are designed to ensure that we are able to for a decision, or by going around for another with an approach into this particular strip at to look at the effect of the conditions on other achieve tolerances well within those needed for approach. this time of day .. . 0 aircraft in the pattern and to adjust ours the aircraft to perform safely. All it takes is accordingly - all because we use a common application. Certainly there are occasions when a decision This is where our 'second self' comes in handy. and consistent procedure for joining the circuit. has to be made t hen and there and we do the If we cannot admit to our limitations then our Of all the factors associated with landing prob­ best we can. It is better to make a decision t han alter-ego will cast doubts in our mind and we lems excessive speed is a significant, recurrent to defer until it is made for us, but better still, should be receptive to those doubts. By all checks problem. Yet it is fairly easy to control - if we we should use the time available to make a means we can continue the approach to fully Checks are the formal way of preparing the air­ have consciously set ourselves a target. quality decision - a wise decision. explore the conditions but do so with the inten­ craft and the pilot, for landing. They also serve The tolerances aren't there to s how our passen­ tion of going around - keeping that escape to double-check the critical, life-preserving gers that we are the world's greatest pilots but route open and planning on using it. items before we are committed to concentrating to tell ourselves whether we are maintaining So there are two decisions, two yardsticks. Our on the approach. Much has been argued for and the degree of control that we should have for decisions aren't necessarily good by being against written checklists versus memorised the conditions that exist and the runway The first step in the decision-making process is quick. They are good decisions by ensuring a checks. As long as they are complete, done in a available. t o gather information - to collect data that is high probability of success while retaining an thorough and consistent manner , done in the r elevant to the decision. In the case of the alternative course of action for the safe sur­ same place each time and always repeated if approach and landing, it includes information vival of ourselves, our passengers and our interrupted, then I don't think it matters too Technique is what you look at relating to either the risk or the probability of aircraft. much whether they are written or not. success of t he landing - such as the runways and what you do about it The accidents show that there are sufficient available, t he condition of the surface, the distractions to warrant both a downwind (pre­ I deliberately risk opening this Pandora's Box direction in relation to the wind, the surface landing) check and afinal check of critical items. because of recent developments that have come wind, the slope, the temperature, the to light. approaches, the overruns, the retention of a Remember ... PUF, PUF, PUF, PUF, PUF. safe esq1.pe route and the lighting conditions. Application - the second step Let's assume that we have done the right thing standards and made a conscious decision - two in fact. It is obviously important to ensure that we We have made our decision to continue with the We have used standard procedures, thorough have gathered all the relevant data or other­ approach. We have considered the wisdom of Consciously or otherwise, we each accept acer­ checks and we have set the appropriate stan­ wise the decision may be invalidated - per­ that decision and we are now ready to do some­ tain degree of accuracy or a certain degree of dards. We have considered the conditions and haps seriously. thing about it. Application is the way we put control when we fly. Perhaps it's a compromise we are mentally prepared for a go-around while The next step is to compare the data against the decision into effect. between the workload necessary to achieve a setting ourselves up for the approach. We are some form of yardstick. In the case of the land­ While looking at the factors that would lead to 0 certain accuracy and the acceptability of on late downwind and we need to know the ing there arc two 'machines' which have to be a successful landing I came to the conclusion slacker tolerances - and whether or not some­ optimum technique for controlling the approach able to successfully cope with the conditions - that there were considerable advantages to be one is watching. The end result is t hat each of and landing and we need to know what one is the aircraft and t he other is the pilot - gained by adopting a sequential and logical us has standards that we are prepared to references to use in judging the approach and and that means that particular aircraft and that approach to landing an aircraft. accept. Perhaps we tell ourselves t hat we could flare. I Aviation Safety Digest I I If you are no~ eligible for a free issue, or if you would like additional copies of the Digest:- -~-~ 134 ! So how should we fly? I to help me to imagine an extension of the I There is no right way or so I am told. There are centreline that I can use as a reference for judg­ I pet theories, secret techniques and much folk­ ing the turn into Final. I turn as if I was turn­ ing into my driveway. I turn early rather than I lore. But the fact remains that the most crit ical I phase of flight is apparently the least under­ late - particularly in conditions where there is stood and the least conclusive as far as tech­ a tailwind on Base - and I am ready to D nique is concerned. increase bank in the early part of the turn so l that I don't find myself having to tighten the I How do you safely and consistently land an air­ I craft? I think this is where I came in! last part of the turn. I For what it's worth I will describe my way of As I line up on Final I complete my final check I doing things and why I do it this way. I will - PUF - make my final decision and if that I later introduce you to some other ideas on the decision is to continue, I lower full flap, adjust I subject. Please discuss them with your the attitude and re-trim the aircraft. instructor, your colleagues and local Examiners. From here, I aim to fly my eyes on a constant onc1udlngsur1acepos1age; For me the essence of a good approach and path to the aim-point. I make continuous small I Five iSSUeS $A 16.00 corrections and fly my eyes down the sight-line landing starts with the circuit. Above all else I aim to minimise the variables - I aim for con­ almost irrespective of where the nose of the air­ craft is pointing. It's like pushing a shopping stancy. I fly a comfortably wide and long downwind leg so that I have plenty of time to trolley down the aisle at the local supermarket assess the conditions and complete the checks - it doesn't matter so much where it's pointing - it matters where it is going. or over th irty years, the Aviation Safety fluence pilot behaviour by pos itive reinforce­ well before I have to think about flying the Digest has been an integral part of ment of sound techniques. It will examine all approach. In this way I can devote all my atten­ My primary references on Final are: Australian aviation. aspects of piloting and publish formal results tion to flying the aircraft and reading the signs. • the aim-point on the runway - t hat is as well as 'the tricks of the trade '. The 'crash In Ju ly 1986, respons ibility for the Digest was I am not vulnerable to distractions or they are whether it is maintaining a constant position comic' will become a 'how not to crash' transferred from the Bu reau of Air Safety at least minimised because I know I have set in the windscreen, comic. Investigation to the Flight Standards Division things up and I know I have completed all the • the attitude of the aircraft - that is the checks. of the Australian Department of Aviation. This Anyone with an interest in aviation will benefit nose in relation to the horizon, and move reflected the perception that civil from tapping into this unique source of the On downwind I pay particular attention to • the airspeed - which of course tells me if I aviation may have reached the limit of acci­ accumulated wisdom of the profession and selecting my threshold speed and my touch­ have the correct attitude. dent prevention through regu lation and that down point. These give me my two approach the latest research into aviation safety in My continuous scan is - aim-point - attitude the way forward is through increased Australia. Indeed, anyone with an interest in goals - the aircraft attitude for the approach emphasis on safety education in general, and and the aim-point on the runway. I turn Base in - airspeed - aim-point - attitude - air­ high technology and the roles and limitations the 'human factor' in particu lar. Rather than the same position and in the same way each speed. This constant approach technique ( of the human operator will find this publi­ enables me to arrive over the threshold at a just draw lessons from accident investiga­ cation en lightening. time - just like entering a descent - Power, tions, the Digest will increasing ly seek to in- Attitude, Trim, only in this case I lower part constant height, at a constant airspeed, in a flap. I reduce the power as I enter the Base constant attitude and in a constant configur­ turn, hold the attitude until the airspeed decays ation each time. All the variables are stabilised to the flap limit and I lower the flap as I adjust and this gives me a constant basis for starting the attitude for my approach speed. the flare. ------~- Next I take care in trimming the aircraft accu­ But hold off! Before we discuss the flare let's rately. In this way, the aircraft's nat ural stab­ digress a little and let a couple of pilots talk ility will help maintain my approach attitude about their approach - and let's recall how we (angle of attack) and hence approach airspeed. got here in the first place: · It's like riding a horse - if the aircraft is in • DECISION trim, it will go where I point it - if not, it will • APPLICATION resist going where I want it to. • TECHNIQUE On Base I have another careful look at the windsock and I look at both ends of the runway The ingredients of a safe landing 0 Feeling a little query?

The AIRFLOW column is intended to pro­ Write to: AIRFLOW mote discussion on topics re lating to avia­ Aviation Safety Digest .tion safety. Input from student pilots and G.P.O. Box 367 flying inst ructors is particu larly welcome. CAN BERRA A.C.T. 2601 Australia Anonymity w ill be respected if requested. 'Immunity' applies with respect to any self-confessed infringements that are highlighted for the benefit of others.

I i Aviation Safety Digest 134 / i l[E AGPS

Send to: Mail Order Sales Australian Government Publishing Service AND THE WINNER IS ... ' G.P.O. Box 84 The Digest photographic competition was a Three prizes will be awarded as fol1ows: CANBERRA A.C.T. 2601 great success and I would like to thank all who I wish to subscribe to ...... copies of Aviation Safety Digest for fi ve issues at $16.00, participated. There were over five hundred Category l - A Nikon including surface postage in Australia and overseas. entries and the standard was high. Judging is F-301 Program/ Motor­ complete and the winners are: Drive Camera with a Category One - the open category for the 50mmll.8 lens. best overall photograph Retail Value: was won by Ron Israel AS 1.035.00. This is a with his print titled state-of-the-art 'Scottish Pioneer'. , automatic camera Name ...... ···· · Category Two _- the category for a photo­ with manual reversion graph on a safety theme and integral film-wind. Address ...... , .. was won by Bill Young with 'What's in these Postcode ...... drums?'. Category Three - for the best black-and­ .. white photograph was won Signature ...... Date ...... by P. Crowe with 'A little low wouldn't you say, Louie?'. I enclose my cheque/money order for$ ...... payable to AGPS Category 2 -A Nikon or charge my: FG-20 Auto/ Manual Camera with a 50mm D AGPS account no...... 11.8 lens. ... I Retail Value: AS725.00. D Bankcard D Visa D MasterCard I The FG-20 is a 35mm I single-lens reflex with Card No ...... Expiry Date ...... aperture priority I exposure and manual I over-ride. I Three categories were judged: ~ ------·! Category 1 - For the best print or transparency on the general subject of Australian civil aviation I or Australian civil aircraft. The judges' emphasis I in this field was photographic and artistic quality. Dear Sir, I I Category 2 - For the best picture illustrating a ...... safety aspect or an unsafe aspect of Australian I civil aviation. A clue in this field was that the primary Category 3 - A Nikon ...... contributory factor in aviation accidents was the L35 AWAf Auto-Focus 'human factor'. The judges' emphasis was the camera with built-in flash...... : ...... 'message' and how wel1 the photographic design conveys that message. Retail Value: AS595 ...... This is the rugged, Category 3 - There was a specific prize for the waterproof. fully auto­ ...... best monochrome print. Black-and- white matic Nikon with built­ photographs in particular are a valuable in motor-drive...... contribution to the Digest. The judges looked for photographic skill and artistic composition ...... which best exploited the unique quality of the black-and-white photograph...... You may recall that Ron also won our last competition but I should add that he only just scraped in. The final selection was very close and took serious deliberation. The judges were Yours sincerely, ...... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · myself. Mr Kevin Ginnane-very experienced aviation photographer - and Mr Harvey Name: ...... c Ritchie - a previous editor of the Digest and a very experienced pilot and accident Address: ...... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · investigator. Congratulations to the winners and my thanks to all participants. 'I will be publishing several Details to be published? 0 No name D Initials okay D Full name okay entries in future issues of the Digest and the winners will appear in the next issue. ii/ Aviation Safety Digest 134 X Aviation Safety Digest 134 / iii Aircraft accident reports Second quarter 1987

The following information has been extracted from accident data files maintained by the Bureau of Air Safety Investigat ion. The intent of publishing these reports is to make available information on Australian aircraft accidents from which the reader can gain an awareness of the circumstances and conditions which led to the occurrence. At t he time of publicat ion, many of the accidents are still under investigation and the information contained in t hose reports must be considered as preliminary in nature and possibly subject to amendment when t he investigation is finalised. Readers should note that the information is provided to promote aviation safety - in no way is it intended to imply blame or liability. Preliminary data indicate aircraft type and registrat ion, location of accident, date, category of flying, pilot licence and rating, and total hours.

Cessna 152-M, VH-UFU, Bribie Island Qld., 04 May 87, Instructional - dual. Preliminary reports During a flying training sortie, the instructor simulated an The following accidents are still under engine failure by moving the mixture control to the idle cut­ investigation off position. The student closed the throttle and pulled the carburettor heat on, the instructor then moved the mixture control to rich. During the descent the throttle was opened twice. Prior to commencing a go-around, at about I 00 feet Fixed Wing above ground level, the student moved the carburettor heat Britten Norman BN2-A21, VH-SBH, Mabuiag Island Qld., control to cold. At about 200 feet, on climb, the instructor 02 Apr. 87, Charter - passenger operations. simulated another engine failure by again moving the mix­ Du ring the later stages of t he approach, the aircraft devel­ ture control to idle cut-off. As soon as the student lowered oped a higher rate of descent than desired . The right the nose of the aircraft, the instructor moved the mixture maingear subsequently struck a sand-filled drum which was control to rich, with the throttle open. However, there was located about 20 metres prior to the threshold. The impact no response from the engine and the aircraft was resulted in the right wing being buckled and one of the subsequently landed in swampy terrain. r ight engine mounts fracturing. The pilot reported that he did not believe that the landing was heavy and as a conse­ Jodel Dll, VH-DRJ, Archerfield Qld., 06 Jun. 87, Non­ quence did not discover the damage on a subsequent super­ commercial - pleasure. ficial inspection before continuing the flight. Just after the aircraft became airborne, the pilot heard sev­ eral loud bangs and noticed pieces of fibreglass from the cowls fly past the canopy. Believing t hat the cowls may Cessna T337-B, VH-DPX, Maer Island Qld., 07 Apr. 87, come adrift, he decided to land the aircraft in a small pad­ Charter - passenger operations. dock just outside the airfield perimeter fence. The aircraft The pilot reported that he had difficulty obtaining effective touched down heavily on t he soft, wet ground and after braking during the landing roll due to a grassed, wet strip travelling only five metres, the propeller struck the ground. surface. He initiated a groundloop but the aircraft drifted The aircraft came to rest after a total ground roll of 34 metres. sideways off the side of the strip prior to the upwind threshold. An inspection of the aircraft revealed that the upper and lower sections of the cowls had come apart following the failure of the fibreglass at the screw-holes where they are Cessna 337, VH-RDY, Maer Island Qld., 09 Apr. 87, connected. Charter - passenger operations. The takeoff was apparently normal up until the aircraft Cessna 402-C, VH-WBQ, Bundaberg Qld., 21 Jun. 87, Non­ encountered two areas of standing water at about the mid­ commercial - aerial ambulance. point of the strip. The aircraft was slowed considerably and The flight had been arranged to transport a critically subsequently overran the strip before encountering t hick injured patient to hospital in Brisbane. The pilot advised vegetation. the Brisbane Flight Service Unit (FSU) that the aircraft was taxiing at Bundaberg and two minutes later advised that Cessna 182-K, VH-DQR, Mt Isa Qld., 13 Apr. 87, Non­ takeoff was being commenced from runway 14. No further commercia l - pleasure. transmissions were received from the aircraft and witnesses Shor tly after touchdown the nosewheel fork failed. This reported hearing the sound of an impact shortly after the allowed the nosegear to dig into the strip surface and aircraft took off. resulted in the aircraft overturning. The investigation revealed that the aircraft had struck trees 800 met res beyond the airfield boundary. It t hen continued through medium-density timber for 177 metres before Rollason Beta Standard, VH-IW A, Kooralbyn Qld., impacting the ground. The wreckage had been almost 07 Apr. 87, Non-commercial - pleasure. totally burnt out. ( It was reported by a witness that the aircraft bounced sev­ eral times on landing and ran off the strip, collapsing the Cessna 206, VH-ESM, Tilpa N.S.W., 12 Apr. 87, Non­ maingear. commercial - business. The accident was not reported by the pilot and attempts to Enroute to the destination aerodrome, the aircraft suffered locate the pilot and wreckage have so far been an electrical system failure. The pilot selected the gear unsuccessful. down in the circuit area and then used the emergency low- A viation Safety Digest 134 / v day. During a break for a meal, the pilot discussed the pres­ Preliminary inves tigation revealed that the fuel pump ering handle. However, he believed this handle jammed Touchdown occurred on an unlit area and the aircraft ence of a power line which crossed a creek on the property. switch was not working in the high/ prime position. before the gear was fully extended. He then attempted to bounced, before stalling at a low height and landing heavily Immediately following the break, the pilot spread a portion re-cycle the gear electrically and mechanically several on a taxiway. of the load before turning and following the line of the Cessna 172-N, VH-TST, Tyabb Vic., 28 Jun. 87, Non­ times. When all efforts to positively lower the gear had creek. Witnesses believed he was proceeding towards an commercial - pleasure. failed, he carried out a safe wheels-up landing. Initial inves­ Bede 4, VH·ECW, Hoxton Park N.S.W., 07 Jun. 87, Non­ area which required clean-up runs. The right wing of the A taxiway for the particular strip is a continuation of the tigation revealed that the emergency lowering system was commercial - pleasure. aircraft struck and became entangled in the single-wire gravel centre section of the strip. The taxiway then makes serviceable and the jamming reported by the pilot was prob­ At a height of about 350 feet after a normal takeoff, the power line and the aircraft crashed into the creek bed. A a right-angled turn. After a normal landing, the pilot pro­ ably the resistance felt when the gear was in the down-and­ engine commenced to run roughly. The pilot considered that fire broke out on impact and consumed the wreckage. The ceeded along the taxiway but failed to negotiate the turn. locked position. the problem may have been caused by part of a propeller particular power line was suspended from poles on either The aircraft entered a ditch and the left wing struck the blade becoming detached. Power was reduced and the pilot side of a gully, with the span between the poles estimated ground. Cessna 210-K, VH-CHL, Dubbo N.S.W., 14 Apr. 87, Non­ commenced to turn back towards the aerodrome. A substan­ to be some 700 metres. commercial - pleasure. tial amount of height was lost during this turn and the air­ American Air 5-A, VH-SYF, Parafield S.A., 23 Apr. 87, The pilot intended to conduct a series of night circuits and craft was seen to make a number of lateral oscillations. It Pitts Sl-E, VH-XII, Bendigo Vic., 18 Apr. 87, Non­ Non-commercial - pleasure. landings in order to maintain currency. On the second cir­ then struck the ground in a tail-low, wings-level attitude at commercial - pleasure. The pilot was taking a group of mentally retarded children cuit, the gear was selected down but failed to fully extend. relatively low-forward speed. At the conclusion of an aerobatic sequence, the pilot pos­ for a flight. On the first flight, one of the children became All attempts to lower the gear were unsuccessful and the itioned the aircraft for a landing on the grass flight strip. distressed and the flight was terminated. On final for the pilot considered that the symptoms indicated a complete Smith 600, VH-BKS, Cooma N.S.W., 08 Jun. 87, Non­ At the time, there was a crosswind of about eight knots first landing of the second flight, the child seated behind loss of hydraulic fluid. The aircraft subsequently touched commercial - business. with occasional gusts. Towards the end of the landing roll the pilot became hysterical and grabbed the pilot around down on the partially extended gear which collapsed as the About 200 metres from the start of the takeoff roll, the air­ the aircraft groundlooped and the left maingear collapsed. the throat. A was carried out and another aircraft slid to a halt about 250 metres from the initial craft made a smooth turn to the left through some 15 circuit completed. As the aircraft approached for landing, touchdown point. degrees and departed the side of the runway. Shortly after Piper 28-161, VH-TRV, Morrabbin Vic., 21 Apr. 87, the child again became agitated. The pilot reported that he leaving the runway, the nose of the aircraft rose steeply Instructional - solo (supervised). was concerned about the situation and lost concentration Piper 34-200, VB-SEN, Trundle N.S.W., 20 Apr. 87, Non­ and the aircraft became airborne briefly before settling The pilot was carrying out a session of solo circuits. The during the approach. The aircraft ballooned and landed commercial - pleasure. back onto the ground. It then continued over an embank­ aircraft rounded out high and subsequently landed heavily heavily. When t he pilot arrived at his destination, it was after last ment and collided with a fence. The pilot later indicated causing damage to the nosegear. light and there was no strip lighting available. The pilot, that he had been unable to maintain directional control of Cessna 182-G, VH-DIY, Groote Eylandt N.T., 25 Apr. 87, nevertheless, decided to land and although he believed he the aircraft and he had attempted to force the aircraft into Beech C24-R, VH-EDN, Moorabbin Vic., 10 Jun. 87, Non· Charter - passenger operations. had aligned the aircraft with the strip correctly, it was in the air in order to avoid a collision with T-Vasis equipment commercial - pleasure. The pilot reported that when the aircraft was cruising at fact lined-up to the left of the strip. After touchdown, the on the side of the runway. The pilot was conducting a practice flight in the training 1000 feet above mean sea level, shortly after takeoff, the aircraft ran through a washout and the nosegear and left area when he noted that the radio had failed. He was con­ engine note changed. He immediately turned the aircraft maingear collapsed. Cessna Al88B Al, VH-EUU, Dubbo N.S.W., 11 Jun. 87, cerned because of approaching last light and made a back towards the strip and by this time the engine had Aerial agriculture. no-radio entry return to the aerodrome. A flypast of the begun to run roughly. Attempts to rectify the problem were De Havilland 82-A, VH-PFL, Camden N.S.W., 26 Apr. 87, On touchdown following a superphosphate spreading oper­ Control Tower resulted in a red light being displayed unsuccessful and the pilot stated that engine power gradu­ Charter - passenger operations. ation, the pilot heard a loud cracking noise from the left towards the aircraft and a go-around was conducted. The ally reduced to nil and a ditching became inevitable. The pilot reported that after commencing the takeoff run, side of the aircraft. Shortly afterwards, the left mainwheel pilot selected the landing gear down but there was no cock­ The aircraft was ditched at low speed and floated in a when he applied forward pressure on the control column to detached, the aircraft swung sharply and tipped onto its pit indication of the position of the gear. Because he was of 60-degree nose-down attitude. Water began to enter the raise the tail, the tail rose more rapidly than normal. He nose, before coming to rest in an upright attitude. The left the opinion that t he aircraft problem was related solely to cabin through the broken windscreen. The four passengers was unable to correct the situation and the propeller struck mainwheel axle was found to have fractured. communications, he did not consider using the emergency exited through the right door and the pilot opened and the ground several times before the aircraft overturned. gear system. The aircraft subsequently touched down with swam out through the left-side window. After clinging to Beech D55, VH-MKE, Bankstown N.S.W., 19 Jun. 87, the gear retracted. the aircraft for a short time, they all decided to swim to Cessna 172-M, VH-MWS, Port Macquarie N.S.W., 23 Apr. Charter - cargo operations. shore, a distance of about two kilometres. They were 87, Non-commercial - pleasure. Investigation revealed that the aircraft battery was dis­ Following a normal approach for a night landing, touch­ subsequently picked up by a rescue boat. The aircraft sank Prior to commencing the flight, the pilot received a briefing charged. The pilot, who was unfamiliar with the aircraft down was made on the main landing gear. The pilot then after about 15 minutes. on the meteorological situation. This briefing indicated that type, had not turned on the alternator field switch during noticed that the nose was lowering by an excessive amount the flight under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) would not be the pre-start or pre-taxi checks. and he carried out a successful go-around. Examinations possible over the route and that the conditions were Piper 28-180, VH-DMB, Mataranka N.T., 26 Apr. 87, Non­ from the ground and from a helicopter equipped with a unlikely to improve during the day. The pilot apparently Auster J5-P, VH-BYW, Balliang Vic., 14 Jun. 87, Non­ commercial - pleasure. searchlight revealed that the nosegear was inclined at about commercial - pleasure. Just after the aircraft reached the top of climb, at 1000 feet decided to check the weather situation for himself and sub­ 30 degrees to the vertical. The position of the nosegear did mitted a flight plan for a flight to Port Macquarie. The plan The observer was also the owner of the aircraft and he above the ground, the engine failed. The pilot was unable to not alter when the gear was cycled and the pilot sub­ intended to check the performance of the pilot-in-command rectify the problem and decided to land the aircraft on a indicated that the flight would comply with the Visual sequently carried out a safe landing with the maingear Flight Rules. The aircraft departed Tamworth but failed to on the type. Landings were being made into wind. On the road. During the landing roll, the left wing struck a retracted. arrive at the destination before the expiry of the nominated first touchdown, the aircraft bounced and the pilot carried roadsign and the aircraft ran off the road, then travelled a SARTIME. out a go-around. On the next approach, the aircraft bounced further 100 metres before colliding with a tree. Beech 58, VH-PBU, Bankstown N.S.W., 23 Jun. 87, Non­ again on touchdown, to a height of about 10 feet above the A land and air search was commenced but no trace of the commercial - practice. ground. The pilot held the control back and opened Piper 25-235, VH-BCP, Port Lincoln S.A., 19 May 87, aircraft was found and the search was suspended after five After having completed an endorsement on the aircraft the throttle rapidly, intending to go-around. The engine Aerial agriculture. days. Two days later the wreckage was located by an a ir­ type, the pilot was instructed to carry out a period of solo failed to respond and the aicraft landed heavily, collapsing Nearing the completion of the task the aircraft struck a craft conducting a private air search. circuit consolidation. Two days later the pilot, using the the left maingear. single power line. The aircraft remained airborne but the The aircraft had flown into tall trees on the top of a 3500 same aircraft, commenced a period of circuits. While on the pilot decided to land in a paddock and assess the damage. feet high ridge line. It had been torn apart by the impact final approach for the first landing, he realised that his air­ Cessna 182-F, VH-RYT, Beaconsfield Tas., 02 Jun. 87, He found that the top 30 centimetres of the had forces and the wreckage was spread over a distance of craft was gaining on the preceding aircraft and requested a < Non-commercial - pleasure. been torn off. some 90 metres beyond the initial impact point. touch-and-go on a parallel runway. During the subsequent The pilot was approaching to land on a one-way agricul­ landing roll, the pilot inadvertently retracted the landing tural strip. He was aware that the owner of the strip had Cessna 210-L, VH-TIZ, Leigh Creek S.A., 31 May 87, Non­ Auster J5/ 190, VH..SCO, Luskintyre N.S.W., 16 May 87, gear when he was attempting to select the flap-up prior to placed a fence across the approach end but was not aware commercial - pleasure. Non-commercial - pleasure. carrying out the next takeoff. that there was a second fence some 15 metres in from the The aircraft landed heavily and bounced three times. On The aircraft was one of a group attending a fly-in and the first. This fence was not easy to see from the air. The air­ the third contact with the ground, the rim of the nosewheel pilot had been conducting a photographic sortie in company Jodel D9, VH-PBW, Cooma N.S.W., 27 Jun. 87, Non· craft cleared the first fence but collided with the second. apparently broke, resulting in the complete oleo leg with another vintage aircraft. After the completion of the commercial - pleasure. assembly separating from the aircraft. The aircraft slid to a exercise, the aircraft was observed to descend to a low The pilot reported that the takeoff and initial climb were Transavia PL12, VH-MLJ, Gretna Tas., 29 Jun. 87, Aerial halt on the lower section of the engine cowl. level. It then collided with a set of power lines some 1.5 normal but a substantial loss of engine power had occurred agriculture. kilometres from the strip and subsequently struck trees when the aircraft had reached a height of about 400 feet. The pilot took off from Cambridge, transitted to the agricul­ Beech 76, VH-RVS, Parafield S.A., 05 Jun. 87, Instruc­ before falling to the ground. The engine regained power briefly but then failed com­ tural strip, and commenced spreading on the property with tional - dual. pletely. The pilot considered that the terrain ahead of the the fuel selector positioned to the left tank. Shortly after When the pilot selected the gear lever to the down position, Piper 28, VH-UZT, Bankstown N.S.W., 27 May 87, Non· aircraft was unsuitable for a forced landing and he elected becoming airborne on about the fifth or sixth takeoff, the only the maingear responded. Attempts to lower the commercial - pleasure. to attempt to return to t he strip. During the turn, the air­ engine failed due to fuel starvation. The pilot immediately nosegear were unsuccessful and the aircraft was landed The pilot intended to conduct a short flight using Night craft descended rapidly and struck the ground about 56 ( changed tanks and placed the fuel pump switch in the high/ with the nosegear retracted. After touchdown, both propel­ VMC procedures. The aircraft had reached a height of about metres s hort of the runway threshold. prime position; however, the engine did not respond. The lers were feathered; however, the right propeller did not 250 feet above the ground when the engine commenced to pilot dumped the load and carried out a forced landing stop in the horizontal position and as the nose of the air­ run roughly, with an associated loss of power. The pilot Cessna Al88B Al, VH-ESB, Sunbury Vic., 02 Apr. 87, which resulted in the aircraft nosing-over. Prior to depart­ craft was lowered, the propeller dug into the runway. The applied carburettor heat but was unable to regain climbing Aerial agriculture. ing Cambridge, the left tank capacity was reduced by a right engine was torn from the aircraft and the aircraft power. A skidding turn was made and the pilot positioned The pilot had been engaged in superphosphate spreading small quantity but the· right tank was full. slewed to the right, damaging the left wing and propeller. the aircraft for a downwind landing on the aerodrome. operations on the particular property since the previous Aviation Safety Digest 134 /vii vi / Aviation Safety Digest 134 Cessna 182-G, VH-DGI, Boyup Brook W.A., 23 May 87, Hiller UH12-E, VH-FFX, Pomona Qld., 23 May 87, Ultralights It was considered likely that the takeoff had been com­ Sport parachuting (not associated with an airshow). Commercial. Maxair Drifter 503, N/R, Hungerford Qld., 03 Jun. 87, mt>nced with the fuel selector positioned to the almost The pilot was conducting a parachute drop from 9000 feet. The pilot stated t hat the helicopter was cruising at an alti­ empty rear tank. During the takeoff roll, the fuel low­ She reported that t he cloud base was broken at about 4500 tude of 2000 feet when without warning the engine suf­ See circumstances below. The pilot had flown the aircraft to Hungerford to attend a quanity bell and associated light had activated and the pilot feet and that she climbed the aircraft through a break in fered a complete loss of power. Tht> aircraft was sub­ had changed the fuel selector by feel while continuing with the cloud cover to reach the drop altitude. After the para­ sequently force landed in a tail-down attitude. The tail Field Day. The following morning he adjusted the aircraft brakes and apparently decided to take the aircraft for a the takeoff. With the fuel supply turned off, the engine had chutist had exited the aircraft, the pilot found a break in boom was bent and the tail rotor gearbox separated from failed from fuel starvation and the aircraft had sub­ the cloud cover and descended. However, s he was t hen the aircraft. test flighl. After taking off from the local racecourse, the 1 aircraft climbed to about 150 feet above the ground before sequently stalled at too low a height above the ground to unable to locate the strip and spent some time fl ying in permit recovery bt>fore impact. Initial investigation revealed that the t>ngine-accessory descending to fly just above the tops of the trees. The flight various directions until s he decided to land and ascertain drive had failed, causing both magnetos to cease operation. her location. A paddock was selected and after aerial continued at this altitude until the aircraft struck a single inspection a landing approach was conducted. The aircraft power line and spun to the ground. Piper 32-300, VH-CLF, Melbourne Vic., 09 Dec. 86, CPL/ Hughes 269-C, VH-KLQ, Scartwater Qld., 22 Jun. 87, Non­ Cl. 4/Flt. Inst., 380 hrs. touched down about 150 metres into the paddock in com.mercial - Aerial mustering. tailwind conditions. It then ran through a fence, across a Maxair Drifter, N/ R, Macksville N.S.W., 31 May 87, Non­ Prior to departure, the pilot had been made aware of a The helicopter had been engaged to spot cattle for a ground commercial - pleasure. Notam advising pilots to disregard temporary displaced road and strnck another fence before the nosegear leg col­ muster party. During what had apparently been the first lapsed. The aircraft then nosed over and came to rest inverted. The a ircraft had completed several successful flights during threshold markings for runway 27 at the destination. Dur­ sweep of the muster area, just inside the property boundary the day. On this occasion, the engine commenced to run ing the subsequent approach, the pilot noticed red and The accident site is located about 47 kilometres south-west fence, the aircraft struck a single power line. There were no roughly when power was reduced prior to a descending white lighting and associated this with the displaced of the Hillman Farm strip. witnesses to the accident and the wreckage was not located turn. The engine subsequently failed completely and the threshold. Tt was his intention to land beyond these lights, until about eleven hours after the wire strike. l pilot attempted to carry out a forced landing. During the which were in fact the approach lights. Very late in the Cessna 421-C, VH-URT, Bagga W.A., 16 Jun. 87, Charter approach, the aircraft collided with power lines which approach, the pilot realised he was too low but before - passenger operations. Bell 47 G3Bl, VH-SJI, Mountain Valley N.T., 31 May 87, 1 crossed a gully about 300 feet above the gully floor. One power could be applied, the aircraft struck the lights 180 On arrival in the circuit area, the pilot elected to land on Aerial mustering. line contacted the pilot's throat, inflicting severe lacer­ metres short of the runway. The maingear legs were torn runway 27. During the final approach to that runway, he The pilot was approaching the rear of a mob of cattle when ations, and the aircraft descended to the ground out of control. off and the nosegear collapsed before the aircraft slid to a considered that the wind velocity favoured the opposite he attempted to climb the aircraft. As he raised the collec­ halt on the side of the runway. landing direction and carried out an overshoot, retracting tive control, the engine rpm started to decrease. There was Chinook, N/R, Streaky Bay S.A., 07 May 87, Non­ The pilot had been confused by the Notam relating to the both the gear and flap. The pilot does not recall lowering no suitable landing site below the helicopter, so the pilot commercial - aerial application/survey. the gear at any stage during the subsequent circuit. Neither was forced to manoeuvre the aircraft around several trees displaced threshold but had not sought clarification prior to The pilot had intended to go fish spotting in his aircraft. At departure. He had limited night-flying experience and was he nor any of the passengers recall hearing the gear warn­ to get to a suitable landing area. As he flared the aircraft about 1730 hours, the aircraft was observed flying at about ing horn when the second stage of the flap was extended on for a landing, the tail rotor contacted the ground and the unfamiliar with the presentation of High Intensity 100 feet above ground level and heading towards Streaky Approach Lighting. It was evident that during the the base leg. The aircraft was subsequently landed with the main rotor severed the trunks of a tree and two saplings. 13ay. No further sightings of the aircraft wt>re reported and gear retracted. The helicopter yawed to the left and slid sideways collaps­ approach, he had focused his attention on these lights, to when the pilot failed to return home, a search was t.he exclusion of the runway lighting. ing the left landing skid. commenced. The wreckage was subsequently lo('ated the following morning. The aircraft had impacted in light mulga Hiller UH12-E, VH-HKJ, Perth W.A., 13 Apr. 87, Construc­ scrub in a steep nose-down attitude. Piper 25-235/Al, VH-FAN, Horsham Vic., 28 Nov. 86, tion work. CPL/ Ag. Cl. 1, 1500 hrs. The pilot intended to position a beacon on the roof of t he Inspect ion of the wreckage revealed an apparent fatigue Spraying runs were being conducted over a paddock which failure of the body tube. Rotary Wing Perth Control Tower. The task was to be accomplished by had power lines along one boundary. The pilot had been sling-loading the beacon, which weighted 199 kilograms, passing beneath the Lines during each run; however, after Hughes 269-C, VH-HFC, Cairns Qld., 11 Apr. 87, Aerial below the helicopter. The aircraft was positioned about 40 completing about two-thirds of the task, the wire deflector mustering. metres to the north and about 25 feet above the tower. The on the aircraft snagged and broke the power Lines. The pilot The pilot was attempting to bring the helicopter to a hover pilot carried out an approach to the roof and deposited the carried out a precautionary landing and discovered that the in the lee of a hill but found that t here was insufficient load. The load was then released from the rope which was rudder of the aircraft had been substantially damaged by power to arrest the rate of descent. The aircraft struck the attached to the helicopter. The aircraft was then man­ the wire strike. ground and rolled over. The pilot reported that t he con­ Final updates oeuvred across the roof with the rope being dragged over At the point where the wire strike occurred, there was less ditions were very windy and believes that he overpitched the surface. The hook on the rope became s nagged on the The investigation of the following clearance between the wires and the ground than that avail­ the rotors during the manot>uvre. guard rail and the helicopter pitched nose-down and rolled accidents has been completed. The able during previous swath runs. The pilot was aware of rapidly to the right. lt fell to the ground at the base of the Hughes 269-C, VH-CHM, Coolangatta Qld., 13 May 87, information is additional to or replaces that I he situation but had been subject to a visual illusion which tower, caught fire, and was burnt out. had led him to believe that there was sufficient clearance to Non-commercial - pleasure. previously printed in the preliminary report allow the aircraft to pass beneath the wires. By the time he The heli copter was on late final approach when the pilot Aerospatiale SA330J, VH-WOF, North Rankin A Rig attempted to open the throttle. The engine did not respond realised that the clearance was insufficient, he was unable W.A., 07 May 87, Charter - passenger operations. I to take avoiding action and had elected to allow the wire to to the throttle movement and the helicopter was entered The pilot reported that when the aircraft was in the cruise Fixed Wing into an autorotational descent. However, the rate of descent strike the deflector rather than risk the landing gear con­ at 3500 feet, he heard a noise, followed by severe vertical De Havilland DHC2, VH-AAY, Walcba N.S.W., 22 Dec. 86, tacting the ground. The anti-snag deflector plate on top of was not arrested and the aircraft landed heavily. and less severe lateral vibration. The aircraft was CPL/ Ag. Cl. 1, 8950 hrs. the rudder had failed, allowing the wire to contact the rud­ An inspection of the aircraft found that t he bolt attaching descended and checks carried out in an attempt to ascertain Superphosphate spreading was being carried out, with the der. The upper portion of this component had been torn the throttle cable to the collective/throttle linkage was the cause of the vibration. The cause of the vi bration was aircraft uplifting one-tonne loads every six minutes. Fuel from the aircraft. missing. The bolt and nut were later found on the floor of not determined and the pilot decided to hover taxi the air­ endurance with both tanks full was approximately two This accident was not subject to an on-site investigation. t he aircraft between the seats. craft back to the platform. The aircraft was subsequently hours. The pilot was conducting his 25th takeoff for the landed on a barge without further incident. day, about one hour after refuelling. Witnesses observed Bell 206-B, VH-BLI, Coen Qld., 23 May 87, See circum­ An inspection of t he aircraft found that one of t he two lugs that the aircraft did not become airborne at the usual point, Cessna Al52, VH-BYS, Dry Creek S.A., 07 Jun. 86, PPL/ two-thirds of the way along the 675-metrc strip. Liftoff stances below. on a main rotor blade flapping hinge had failed. Cl. 4, 287 hrs. The helicopter was engaged to transport two hydrographers finally occurred at the end of the strip but almost immedi­ The pilot had intended to carry out aerobatic practice in the ately afterwards, the aircraft clipped a fence. It was seen to to various remote sites on the Cape York Pensinsula. Dry Creek Aerobatic Training Area. After departure, the sink slightly before climbing at a steeper-than-normal angle pilot requested, and was cleared, to operate in the Dry About 20 minutes after departing Coen, the Engine Chip until some 250 metres beyond the fence. At this point, the Creek area up to an altitude of 3500 feet. The aircraft was Warning Light illuminated. This was immediately followed nose dropped suddcndly and the aircraft dived into rising by a s harp mechanical noise from the engine area and other then observed to be spinning and crashed into a salt evap­ ground in a steep nose-down altitudle. Fire broke out on oration pan. signs of an engine failure. The pilot is reported to have impact and consumed much of the wreckage. Preliminary commenced an autorotational descent from an altitude of Gliders • investigation revealed that the fuel selector was in the 'off' The investigation revealed no pre-existing defects with the aircraft or its systems which may have contributed to the about 600 feet above ground level and to have headed the Eiri Avion PIK 20-E, VH-MQN, Lilydale Vic., 02 Apr. 87, position. pilot's inability to effect recovery from the . However, aircraft towards a cleared area. One of the passengers Non-commercial - pleasure. stated that the aircraft struck trees, then impacted t he This had been the first occasion that the pilot had flown it was found that at the time of the accident, the weight of The particular aircraft is a glider fitted with a retractable t his particular aircraft. The fuel selector in this aircraft ground in a tail-down attitude. The aircraft was torn apart the aircraft exceeded the maximum allowable by about 26 engine. Shortly after takeorr for a soaring flight, the pilot was different to that in the other Beaver the pilot had oper­ by the impact forces but both passengers were able to get kilograms. noticed that the airspeed indicator appeared to be operating ated. In the previous aircraft, rotating the fuel selector clear of the wreckage before it was destroyed by fire. erratically. The flight was cont inued with the p ilot estimat­ through 180 degrees anti-clockwise changed the selection The pilot was a member of a local acrobatic club and had An on-site inspection of the wreckage revealed that the ing the airspeed , but no thermals were round and the pilot from t he rear to the forward fuel tanks. In the accident air­ accumulated some 30 hours of aerobatic flight. He had been Power Turbine Rotor Assembly had disintergrated and was decided to return to the departure point using engine craft, a similar movement of the selector changed the selec­ assessed by his instructors and other experienced club missing from the area of the wreckage. The aircraft had power. The aircraft stalled during the landing flare and the tion from the rear tank to the 'off' position. This difference members as a competent aerobatic pilot. been on fire prior to impact with the ground. When the left wing struck the ground. The aircraft s lewed to the left had not been brought to the pilot's attention and it was The circumstances surrounding the entry to the spin and engine was inspected, it was found that the number four and touched down while t ravelling sideways. The fuselage possible that he had not thoroughly familiarised himself reasons for the pilot's apparent inability to recover from bearing had failed. was fractured during the ensuing ground slide. with the aircraft prior to commencing operations. the manoeuvre could not be determined. viii / Aviation Safety Digest 134 Aviation Safety Digest 134 / ix Cessna 150-K, VB-EIS, Wondagee Stn. W.A., 15 Jun. 86, Hughes 269-C, VB-THY, Kalumburu W.A., 01 May 86, Cessna 150-F, VH-RWI, Roy Hill Stn. W.A., 16 May 87, CPL/Cl. 4, 415 hrs. CPL-H, 1500 hrs. Non-commercial - aerial application/snrvey, PPL, The aircraft was being flown at about 250 feet above The pilot was engaged in mustering operations and was 716 hrs. ground level in a left turn while the pilot was attempting to attempting transition from a low-forward speed to an out­ The pilot was carrying out a cattle-spotting operation prior locate some sheep. The pilot reported that the aircraft of-ground-effect hover in order to turn a breakaway beast. to the commencement of the muster. He descended the air­ stalled and that during the recovery it struck a bush. This As it approached the hover, the helicopter experienced a craft to 500 feet above the ground to get a better view of resulted in damage to the right mainplane, right wing strut, sudden partial power failure. The pilot maintained the air­ some animals amongst the trees. The pilot reported that as right horizontal stabiliser and the brakelines on both craft heading, lowered the collective lever and attempted to the aircraft was being returned to level flight, it was affec­ mainwheels. The pilot was able to maintain control of the gain some forward airspeed. In the attempted landing, with ted by severe turbulence and the pilot's door became aircraft and land at a nearby airstrip. partial power, the helicopter struck the ground heavily and unlatched. While attempting to close the door, he noticed The p ilot's attention was diverted from the operation of the its main rotor blades hit a small sapling. The forced landing that the indicated airspeed had reduced and that the air­ aircraft w hilst he searched for the sheep and directed the was made in light downwind conditions. craft was continuing to sink. A turn to the right, to clear ground party. He had been working long hours and was Investigation revealed that the number two cylinder the area of turbulence, was commenced but during the turn only obtaining about four hours sleep each night and con­ exhaust valve had failed in fatigue and the valve seat and the aircraft stalled and entered a spin. Attempts to recover sidered that fatigue was a factor in his allowing the air­ retaining cap had failed in overload. Further testing indi­ from the spin were unsuccessful and the aircraft struck the speed to decay unnoticed. cated that the exhaust valve had been subject to higher­ ground in a nose-down attitude while turning to the right. than-normal operation temperatures which would have Cessna 172-F, VH-DFW, Musgrave Stn. Qld., 13 Mar. 87, contributed to the premature failure of the valve. PPL/Cl. 4, 630 hrs. Ultralights The pilot was aware that there was an area of soft ground Birdman Chinook WT-25, N/R, Maroota N.S.W., 24 May on the strip. The area was marked by a cone marker which 87, Non-commercial - pleasure, N/A. was about ten metres in from the edge of the strip. The Gliders During the takeoff run, the engine developed a maximum of pilot intended to land some 100 metres beyond the cone; about 5800 rpm, almost 1000 rpm lower t han expected. The however, turbulence and strong sink was encountered dur­ Glasflugel H206 Hornet, VH-GSC, Tomingley N.S.W., 24 aircraft became airborne but did not achieve t he climb per­ ing the latter stages of the approach. As the aircraft Oct. 86, Glider. formance necessary to clear trees along the takeoff path. touched down, the tailplane struck the cone marker which The pilot had been carrying out a solo cross-country train­ The observer called to the pilot that he was assuming con­ was made of galvanised iron. ing flight when deteriorating lift forced him to make an trol, closed the throttle and turned off the fuel and ignition This accident was not subject to an on-site investigation. outlanding. The approach to the paddock selected involved system. The aircraft collided with the trees and fell to the passing over a line of high trees. Severe sink was encoun­ ground. tered and the pilot realised he would not clear the trees. He therefore applied full spoilers and attempted a landing No mechanical defect was subsequently found with the short of the planned area. During the landing roll, the glider engine or systems of the aircraft. A number of reports have collided with a flock of sheep killing five of the animals on been received concerning induction icing in this type of impact. engine in which there is no provision for directing warm air to the carburettor. It was considered likely that induction The pilot was a Japanese national who was visiting the icing occurred on this occasion. The pilot had not aban­ Rotary Wing area. Before departure, he had advised the soaring club doned the takeoff attempt when the loss of power became that he wished to undertake a local flight. As a result, he apparent. Enstrom F28-C, VH-IYP, Carlingford N.S.W., 20 Sep. 86, was not briefed on cross-country procedures and out­ CPL-H, 1418 hrs. landings. When thermals were encountered after takeoff, he This accident was not subject to an on-site investigation. The pilot had been conducting a series of joy flights as part had elected to conduct a longer flight. When the outlanding of a school fund-raising program. Refuelling equipment was became necessary, the pilot had misjudged the strength of Thruster Gemini, N/ R, The Oaks N.S.W., 03 Jun. 87, positioned some 100 metres from the passenger loading the wind and had continued downwind beyond the point Instructional - dual, N/ A. area. The pilot had offered to take two boys with him as he where a successful approach to the selected paddock could The student had about 75 hours experience in ultralight air­ air-taxied the aircraft prior to refuelling. After takeoff be made. craft and was undergoing a training program to enable him from the passenger area, the pilot decided to carry out a to become an instructor. At about 100 feet above the short local flight, but as he turned back towards the fuel ground after takeoff, the instructor closed the throttle to dump, the engine lost power. The pilot was unable to reach simulate an engine failure. The student was slow to react a cleared area and attempted to land in a street. The heli­ and the airspeed rapidly decayed. The instructor took con­ copter collided with trees, then stuck the roof of a house trol and applied full power but was unable to prevent the before coming to rest on its s ide in the driveway of the house. aircraft from contacting the ground heavily. This contact During joy flight operations, the pilot did not rely on the resulted in the lower fuselage striking the ground and the fuel gauge inside the aircraft. He briefed an assistant, who throttle control became jammed. The aircraft became relayed information relating to the fuel remaining by refer­ airborne again with full power applied and the instructor ence to sight gauges on the fuel tanks. There had evidently turned off the ignition system. A second heavy touchdown been a communication breakdown between the assistant and Final reports occurred before the aircraft came to rest. the pilot as to the amount of fuel remaining prior to the last joy flight. The flight had been made on the spur of the The investigation of the following Hang Glider Ultratrike, N/ R, Holbrook N.S.W., 05 Jun. moment, in order to give two handicapped children an accidents has been completed 87, Non-commercial - pleasure, Hang Glider, 300 hrs. opportunity to see their school from the air. The engine h ad Although the pilot was experienced in operating unpowered failed from fuel exhaustion while the aircraft was over an hang gliders, he had only limited exposure to powered ver­ area which was unsuitable for a forced landing. Fixed Wing sions. He had been conducting a short local flight and s ubsequently advised that he had probably misjudged the landing flare. The aircraft struck the ground in a relatively Robinson R22, VH-UXI, Greta N.S.W., 19 Nov. 86, CPL-H/ Piper 32-300, VH-TPJ, Sweers Island Qld., 17 May 87, steep nose-down attitude. The landing gear collapsed and Cl. 4./Flt. Inst., 2089 hrs. Non-commercial - pleasure, PPL, 1038 hrs. the aircraft overturned before coming to rest on the flight Following a period of circuit practice, the instructor was The pilot reported that just after touchdown, he felt a strip. demonstrating some enroute emergency procedures. An bump. As t he aircraft slowed, the nose of the aircraft sank autorotation was entered from 2000 feet, with the pilot slightly allowing the propeller to strike the strip surface This accident was not subject to an on-site investigation. a iming for a paddock on the side of a river. He advised that several times. An inspection of the aircraft revealed that a descent was continued to about 250 feet above the ground. wallaby had struck and bent the nosegear strut. Shortly after power was re-applied, the helicopter collided This accident was not subject to an on-site investigation . with a set of power lines and dived to the ground. The pilot had noted two other sets of wires in the area but had not Beech 200, VH-MSZ, Tibooburra N.S.W., 15 Apr. 87, Non­ sighted a set of three cables between the others until commercial - aerial ambulance, CPL, 4575 hrs. immediately before the collision. The pilot was making a night landing approach. Late in the The helicopter was being operated outside the designated flare a thump was heard and shortly after touchdown, the training area. The grey oxidised power lines, which were nosegear collapsed. The aircraft came to rest on the strip c estimated to be between 80 and 100 feet above ground 390 metres further on. It was discovered that a large level, were very difficult to see against the overcast sky kangaroo had struck the nosegear and that a number of conditions. The span between supporting poles was greater other kangaroos were in the immediate vicinity. than those between the other sets of cables. This accident was not subject to an on-site investigation. x /Aviation Safety Digest 134 Aviation Safety Digest 134 / xi Aviation Regulatory Proposals

Aviation Regulatory Proposals (ARPs) are an important means by which the Department consults wit h industry about proposed changes to operational legislation and requirements. Copies of all proposals are circulated to relevant organisations, and occasionally to individuals for information and comment. The comment received provides a valuable source of advice which greatly assists the Department in the development of the completed documentation. Each edition of the Digest contains a listing of those ARPs circulated since the previous edition . • Should you wish further information about any of the ARPs, please contact your industry organisation.

Number Subject Status 87/ 4 Review of Aircraft Maintenance Issued 21 April 1987 .. Engineer licensing system Comments due 1 June 1987 • 87/ 9 Suitability of aerodromes; minimum Issued 4 June 1987 - runway widths, operating criteria Comments due 31 August 1987 87/ 13 Medical standards for Flight Crew Issued 14 May 1987 members of aircraft and Air Traffic Comments d ue 19 June 1987 Controllers - colour perception standards

87/ 3 Review of ANO 95.4; Gli ding Issued 23 July 1987 operations Comments due 30 September 1987

87/8 'Hot' (engines running) refuelling of Issued 9 June 1987 helicopters Comments due 31 July 1987

86/ 18 Aircra ft registrat ion Issued 24 July 1987 Comments due 30 September 1987

Discussion paper; loading of aircraft Issued 7 July 1987 ANO 20.16.1 Comments due 3 1 August 1987

c

Aviation Safety Digest 134 / xiii AIP & AN 0 PURCHASE 0R DER Fr-=-=DR..:.:.:.:M=------===== OFFI CE USE ONLY DATE RECE I VEO Listed below and overleaf are publications (including prices) available from this Department. If you require publications, please complete persona/details and payment method requested overleaf. DESPATCH DETA ILS

Initial order 1 year urrent i ssu + 1 year amendment only - no Descr iption Tota l amendment amendment

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Thirdly, the best approach airspeed (which is The traditional difficulties associated with predetermined for each aircraft) changes with learning, teaching and making an approach varying atmospheric conditions and aircraft would be simplified if we could just adopt a weight. The pilot must remember different constant approach angle - and t he simplest airspeeds for different occasions. way to maintain a constant approach angle is to Choosing the All other areas of flying are taught as sequen­ maintain a constant lift/ drag ratio throughout tial routines: takeoff, turns, climbing, descend­ the approach. If the lift/ drag ratio remains con­ A flare for best approach ing - even st all recovery. The student stant, the approach angle must remain constant. practises the routine until eventually it becomes What affects the lift/ drag ratio of the aircraft? landing second nature to him. This is because within the limits of each procedure, the routine never • the aircraft body angle - the attitude of the varies. aircraft as it moves through the air, But with the approach and landing, the routine • the power setting - thrust, affecting lift and is not so clearly defined. Because the approach drag, technique varies, individual instructors find it Controlling rate of descent with throttle and airspeed with difficult to teach a standard procedure. Beyond • the aircraft's configuration - undercarriage elevator is one way of making a landing approach. The a few theoretical facts, the student is often left position and the setting of flaps or other constant attitude approach is another. Here Warren Wilks to his own devices - almost forced to teach devices which alter the camber of the wing. himself - to learn by trial and error. ·discusses his development of this latter technique and No mention of airspeed - because airspeed is a proposes to remove even the attitude change due to flap What then is so different about the approach product of these t hree. Thus, the lift/ drag ratio extension. and landing? Captian David Jacobson is a training captain on DC-9s (and the approach angle) can be maintained by with Australian Airlines and is a Grade 1 instructor at the Warren is CF! at the Austavia Flying School in Albury, three pilot-controlled variables: attitude, power, RAAF Point Cook Flying Club. His system sounds compli­ N.S. W. A flying instructor for over 20 years, he has been and configuration. cated at first but in rea lity is delightfully simple. It works an advocate of the constant attitude approach for some for little aircraft too. Now the object of our endeavours has been to time. He has even developed an approach aid that is All other areas of flying are taught with refer­ based on this attitude reference technique. minimise t he number of variables the pilot must ence to aircraft attitude - the position of the recognise and manipulate during the approach. HE MOST important, and certainly the most horizon on the windscreen. Airspeed is just a Bearing in mind the relationship between atti­ · unavoidable part of any flight is the land­ check, a confirmation that the attitude is tude, power and flap setting, it becomes obvi­ correct. T..:__ ing. And for student pilots in particular, the ous that the only two variables that will affect FALL THE manoeuvres performed in the approach angle, once the attit ude has been difficulties in learning to make good landings But for this approach, the student is told to fixed-wing aircraft, the landing flare is an are often brought about by making poor ignore aircraft attitude except as it relates to a established, are power and flap. _ enigma. It is crit ical to the safe and satis­ approaches. It's often been said that it takes a reference airspeed. This is a complete contradic­ During a normal approach we lower flap, so the factory conclusion of flight and yet, despite good approach to make a good landing. tion of all that he has just learned. And contra­ wing configuration varies. How do we compen­ international research, remains more an art The pilot can make a good approach only if he dictions confuse. Think of it. Except for the sate for a variation in wing configuration and than a science. The way the pilot judges the has the correct mental picture of what he and approach , she has been told that the safest, thus a change in the approach path? - by sim­ flare is still not fully understood. easiest, most natural way to fly is by attitude. his aircraft are doing [and tr ying to do], all the ultaneously adjusting the power. As the wing Student pilots and experienced pilots alike find way down the approach path. Now she is asked to change from being an lift/ drag ratio decreases, the aircraft begins to attitude-reliant pilot to being an airspeed­ it at times alternatively satisfying and The traditional method of approach was based move down a steeper approach path. To main­ frustrating, simple and complex, safe and reliant pilot - but only during an approach. tain t he initial approach path, we restore the on airspeed as t he primary reference. The pilot Where once the right attitude and throttle set­ hazardous. controlled the airspeed using the elevator and lift/ drag r atio by an increase in power. Nothing ting meant the right airspeed for the prevailing else is required. In Digest 129 t he Bureau of Air Safety Investi­ the rate of descent using the throttle. However , conditions, she must now make corrections to gation identified improper landing flare as the there are a number of problems and shortfalls the reference airspeed for extremes of weight, third most significant of t hirteen factors in associated with this method. wind and weather. instances where pilot factors were assigned to Firstly, because he uses the elevator to control The only words of encouragement I can offer to accidents involving private pilots. airspeed, the attitude of the aircraft varies con­ the student pilot in this position is that she is It's that simple. For a change in flap, we use In an age of technical precision, this critical tinuously as the aircraft moves down the in good company. We all find it difficult. manoeuvre remains imprecise. approach path. Thus the aircraft doesn't go balancing power and the aircraft continues where it is pointed - a problem that becomes So why do we use air speed as a reference dur­ along the r equired approach path at a reduced This proposal discusses a practical technique more obvious and more disconcerting the closer ing the approach? Simply because there didn't airspeed. for establishing a consistant flare point which it gets to the grotJ.nd. seem to be a better way. Airspeed was the cue Throughout the approach, the aircraft acts as does not rely on the pilot's perception of verti­ for angle of attack and we therefore made cer­ its own approach computer. By maintaining a cal height. It embraces the physical principle of Secondly, for given atmospheric conditions and tain of not going too far above or below a par­ motion parallax to provide a simple cue for aircraft weight, the airspeed achieved during constant attitude, any requirement for more or ticular airspeed. Airspeed was the critical less power (compensating for changes in commencement of the flare. No device or modi­ t he approach is a product of three pilot­ parameter on final approach. fication is required and t herefore no costs are controlled variables: weight, temperature, pressure, headwind etc.) Over the past few years, we at Austavia have will become obvious by the movement of the incurred. Safety is enhanced and the technique • aircraft attitude, been convinced that attitude reference is a pilot's approach path away from the desired is 'pilot-portable'. • aircr aft configuration, and better way. aim point. The pilot makes automatic adjust­ • power setting. The ideal approach is one which has a constant ments for t he above variables using one control Current practice The pilot must juggle these variables in just the and consistent approach angle. If we could - the power lever. The landing flare is one of the last critical right proportions all the way through the guarantee to maintain a constant approach 0 What could be simpler and safer? Using this phases of flight to which the term 'seat-of­ approach in order to maintain a desired angle each time, we could start each approach method of approach, any pilot, after a suitable the-pants' may still be applied. The vast approach path. The ability to combine these from the same point every time and land at t he period of training, can make a safe, consistent majority of landings, worldwide, are practised variables correctly is very much a matter of same point on the air strip ever y time. And how and confident approach and landing. What mor e by pilots utilising highly developed qualities of experience. much safer that would be! could we ask? 0 judgment, co-ordination, experience and skill. Aviation Safety Digest Aviation Safety Digest 134 134

Existing flare techniques involve a critical esti­ Another way mation of height above the landing surface. When properly taught, pilots have little diffi­ This is very difficult to achieve because the culty with the concept of selecting and flying estimation of height and the particular height an approach to a nominated aim point on the are subject to many variables, such as: landing surface. With or without glide-slope • Aircraft type. guidance, pilots can learn to fly a consistent reference distance • Aircraft size. and stable approach angle to the aim point. Flare height • Aircraft configuration. Accepting that the glide-path angle may be • Glide path angle. fixed within reasonable tolerances, it follows that any point located longitudinally on the • Pilot total experience. approach path, short of the aim point, will cor­ • Pilot recent experience. respond with a particular vertical height • Pilot experience on type. (simple triangulation). Pilot seating position. • Pilot performance or skill. • Landing surface. Calculation of this distance from the aim point For a given aircraft type, the distance between • Day versus night. to the flare cut-off point involves energy/ the aim and impact points has provided suitable geometry considerations, quickly determined in quantification for the flare-point estimate. This • Visibility. practice but complicated to derive by analysis. distance accommodates the critical variables of • Wind and turbulence. However, a suitable approximation, based on glide angle, eye height above mainwheels and aircraft/ approach geometry, and thorough prac­ horizontal distance between the mainwheels tical testing, has provided a simple and effec­ and the pilot's eye - when the aircraft is on a Historically, instruction in determining a suit­ tive alternative technique with near universal stable approach in the landing configuration able and consistent flare point has been inad­ application. and attitude. equate to say the least. We are attempting to recognise and extract one flare point from a Therefore, a flare-height of greater consistency range of acceptable flare circumstances. Gener­ than is possible using mere perception could be ally, the best that instructors have been able to provided by a suitably chosen point along the manage is to demonstrate a suitable flare point approach path and overflown by the aircraft. for a particular aircraft as being 'about here'. Much has been written on t he subject of the reference distance aim point being the centre of expansion of a The student pilot has no proper model except in eye path flow pattern, providing the pilot with a visual ( his memory, and that in itself is inconsistent. illusion as points surrounding the aim point Trial and error are the arbiters in determining accelerate radially outwards as the aircraft the soundness of his developing judgment. approaches the ground (motion parallax). Unfortunately, even after the basic skills are mastered, the problem still exists because every aircraft type requires a different flare height. As a pilot converts to successive aircraft types, he faces the same problem over and over. He has no proper model at the very time he needs one most, and there lies a clue. The Jacobson Flare The flare is initiated when, on a stable Just as the student pilot consolidates his flare­ approach, the pre-determined impact point, height judgment, so does the experienced pilot On final approach, the aircraft occupies space appearing t o move downward from the aim after conversion to another aircraft type. After vertically, in practical terms between the pilot's point, reaches the cockpit cut-off angle and dis­ a time, he becomes comfortable with his air­ eye and the main wheels. Two parallel paths appears from view under the aircraft. In prac­ craft (if he consolidates and flies regularly), may be traced down the approach path: the tice, it is the simplest of tasks to notice the and can land it as well as any flown previously. pilot-eye path which intersects the landing sur­ aircraft overtake the impact point while flying Probably, this is a subconscious recognition of Points beyond the aim point will appear to face at the aim point; and assuming, no flare, move upward from the aim point, while points an approach using standard techniques. It does something visible to the pilot through his wind­ the lower mainwheel path which would inter­ not detract from the pilot's attention because shield that is providing a useable cue for flare. short of the aim point will appear to move sect the landing surface at a point called the downward. It is a point in this 'six o'clock' sec­ the point in question is on the approach centre­ Obviously, to achieve consistency some recog­ impact point. line in t he pilot's normal field of view. nition and quantification is necessary. tor of the pilots' view which has proven useful. The exact formula for computing the position of Vague terms such as the height of a double­ If such a point were selected and could be the impact point is simplified as follows: simply identified, a consistent longitudinal fix decker bus, 20 feet, when the individual blades of grass are discernible, when the ground starts for the flare point for a given aircraft could be 60 obtained as the preselected point appeared to Distance short = ( x vertical height) + horizontal to 'rush', when you feel that your feet are just of aim point glide-path angle of eyes above distance of about to reach the threshold or 'about here' are move down the windshield (due to increasing (Reference mainwheels eyes from too imprecise or inconsistent. And for a student depression angle) to the point where it reached distance) mainwheels the lower vision or cut-off angle (limit they are almost incomprehensible. For example: a light aircraft w ith the p ilot's eyes 5 feet above the mainwheels depression angle) of the cockpit. This angle is and no significant horizontal distance between them -- on a 3% glide -path angle; We need to bring this 'something' out into the dictated by the geometry of the pilot's seating open so that we know exactly what we are position in relation to the aircraft structure, Reference distance = 60 x 5 =100 feel (i.e. flare reference point is 100 feet short of the approach aim-point and looking for, what works for us, and what to use where, within limits, some design consistencies 3 when that point disappears below the coaming, ii is time to start the flare.) in t he future. exist between aircraft types. I Aviation Safety Digest Aviation Safety Digest 134 134

The next important step is to locate the calcu­ But what to aim to reach? lated impact point on the landing surface, short of the aim point. Many aviation authorities I found with my students that if I could con­ have developed runway surface markings as vince them to actually aim to reach the centre dist ance guides, oft en at 500, 1000 and 1500 of the far end of the ruriway, then the aircraft feet from the approach threshold. would land itself. They knew exactly what to When everything The gentle '--' aim for and they didn't 'tense up '. From initiation of the flare the original aim­ touch point serves no further purpose - it has turns to worms already positioned us over the threshold at the desired height. We then need something else to There are many ways to skin a cat - and it seems there aim for. The point at the centre of the far end are just as many ways to land an aeroplane. Many of us of t he runway is useful for several reasons: have our pet theories. This is mine. it is a constant point if we are flying directly It happens to all of us occasionally! by David Robson towards it [and we are not trying to guess height or flight path from rapidly moving Every contact should have an escape clause. I 11 K HA VE discussed the control of the air­ peripheral cues], VV craft. I have mentioned the constant atti­ • it is t he best reference· for distance-to-go - tude app roach technique that I favou r . information, f F THE APPROACH doesn't turn out to be as Simple interpolation of these markings by the Warren Wilk's article modifies that technique to • it is t he best reference for tracking or direc­ Bcont rolled or as accu rate as planned, then pilot satisfies the practical requirements for a include the use of power to offset the drag of tional information, - _ there are always escape routes - provided the flap - without changing attitude further. visual fix along the approach axis. Where dis­ • it is t he best reference for drift infor mation. we have left ourselves an 'out'. tance markers do not exist on a landing surface, Captain David Jacobson has described his novel • it is the best reference for flight-path It is possible from any stage of a normal the pilot can estimate the position of the impact and successful cue for initiating t he. flare. Well approach or landing to go around and start again. we are almost on the ground - but not quite. information. point using variations in surface colour or tex­ Within the approved limits of loading, environ­ ture for identification. For night operations The major problems that I observed as an ment al conditions and runway criteria, a light from these surfaces, calculations based on the instructor were related to the actual process of aircraft can safely climb away from a mis­ known distance between runway-edge lights flaring t he aircraft , such as: When I'm sure that the momentum of t he air­ judged approach or mishandled landing if the provid~ t he pilot with a similar cue. craft will carry me to the approach aim-point, I • early or late , correct technique for that particular air craft is This flare-point concept is e.>..1;remely tolerant transfer my attention to the centre of the far used. • too fast or too slow an attitude change, end of the runway. I simply start to flare, close when compared with traditional perception Check the technique described in the flight techniques. For a standard 3° glide path, any • too much or too little rotation, the throttle and continue to actively fly the air­ craft in an attempt to get my eyes to actually m anual for your air cr aft and rehear se it both error of judgment of flare height will, w ithin • overcontrolling in the flare, reach the centre of the far end of the runway. I mentally and actually so that when the time limits, be magnified approximately 20 times, comes, you are prepared. longitudinally. In marked contrast , any longitu­ • the controls fixed and wait ing for the .strive to get there. 'crunch ', dinal inaccuracy will be reflected as only 5 per This refer ence then causes the aircraft's flight As a gener al guide, my normal p rocedure for a cent of the figure, vertically. The expanded • pushing the controls forward to keep t he path to converge on the far end of the nmway go-around is: scale of the approach axis (approximately 20 runway in sight or to get the landing over with. - both laterally and vertically. The aircraft • smoothly apply full power (taking the propel­ times the vertical dimension), t ogether with a It was my feeling that t he reason for all of descends ever so slightly until the wheels ler and mixture levers forward with the visual fix, provides a model that is visible and these problems was t hat the pilot didn't have a touch. There is no tendency to overcontrol nor throttle), which provides unparalleled consistency of reference point to aim for. There was a tend­ for a divergent flight path to go undetected. • set the normal climb attitude, and judgment for student and experienced pilot ency to gaze at the approach aim-point, the far It only remains for the pilot to correct any drift • partially retract the flap. alike. horizon, the expected touchdown point, some before touchdown and to hold the attitude on When the aircraft is positively climbing, I other part of the run way or even the nose of touchdown until the nosewheel is lowered. Non-standard approaches the aircraft. retract the undercarriage. For landings with less than full flap or for The impact point calculated for a normal I would now like to introduce a way of When the aircraft is safely clear of the ground, taildraggers, it may not be possible to keep the I retract the remainder of the flap. approach also serves for non-standard landing controlling the aircr aft in the flare that has flare aim-point in sight until touchdown - the configurations, with their likely variations in helped me and my students to land safely and nose gets in the way. I find that I can imagine For a bounce on touchdown , I force myself to aircraft attitude. An aircraft on approach at a consistently. t he nose is transparent and I can picture the concentrate on the far end of the ru nway and higher attitude (body angle) than normal would The flare is initiated by raising the nose atti­ position of aim-point as if the nose weren't to set an attitude that will get me there. require a higher flare point to accommodate the tude to reduce the r ate of descent and to there. There are enough cues to be able to If the bounce is bad or the aircraft gets 'hung reduced mainwheel clearance. The higher atti­ change the flight path. The power is reduced t o imagine this without difficulty - in fact, this up', then I go aroun d. tude self-compensates beca use the lower cut-off cause the speed to decay, either ahead of, dur­ may well be what we have been doing There are rarely situations in flight where the angle is reached further back up the approach ing or after the attitude change. The timing of unconsciously for years. pilot hasn't sufficient control or where the air­ path, providing an earlier cue to flare, as would this power reduction is lar gely a matter of craft hasn't sufficient perfor mance to 'escape' be expected. The converse also applies. whether the threshold speed was slightly high, for another try provided: low or spot -on, whether the descent angle was Conclusions With this flight -path aim-point and a deliberate • the decision is made as soon as the pilot feels steep or shallow and what the shear and turbu­ attempt to reach it, I have found that it is rare less t han comfortable with the way t he This technique is simple, practical and lence is like. for students to misjudge the flare and they approach is going, extremely effective. It was developed and But let's consider the reference point a little seem to develop confidence in their ability to tested over a period of three years in many air­ further . • the procedure for our aircr aft is rehearsed - land consistently. There is just as much need to at least mentally. craft t ypes, ranging from single-engine light air­ We can all fly visually - fly the aircraft so have t he correct threshold speed and approach craft t o large jet transports, by civil and t hat it will actually hit an aim-point. So why path and to start the flare at the right place Both of these precautions save time and con­ military pilots of varied ages, abilities and not use the same tech nique for landing the but t he landing itself becomes consistently fusion when the landing 'turns to worms'. experience - and it works D aircraft? · easier - and the touchdown more gentle D See? Landing's not so difficult after all D Aviation Safety Digest 134

Aug 81 Bell 20fi Charter Every aircraft scat should possess a secured Pilot heard a loud clapping noise; declared a PAN passenger, piloL, student or empty-but-tied-up and landed. Passenger 's seat-belt was hanging harness. outside. Apart from the considerable loss of revenue due Sep 81 Cessna 152 Training to these aborted sorLies, there is always' the Shortly after takeoff t he pilot heard a loud noise potenLial for a more serious outcome due to the accompanied b y v ibration. Returned for landing. distraction alone. Probable seat-belt p rotrusion. There are Lwo other aspects that come to light May 82 Hughes 269 Charter in these incidents: Pilot reported noisy blades. Aircraft landed safely. • the aborted takeoff, Paint on fuselage suggested that seat-belt was • the attempted in-flight cure for the problem. flapping. Nov 82 Cessna 206 Private Pilot r eported loud flapping noise and returned for The aborted takeoff . Seat-belt found protruding from When the pilot detects something unusual dur­ door. ing the takeoff roll, there is a critical decision Dec 82 Cessna 152 Private period - a period in which the pilot has to Pilot reported unusual loud noises coming from out­ assess the extent of the problem and decide side the aircraft and r equested an immediate landing. which is the lesser of the two evils - to abort Seat-belt trapped outside the cockpit. or to continue with the t akeoff. J ui 83 Grumman A7 Charter Certainly at the very beginning of the takeoff roll there is no reason to continue and the air­ Pilot realised that the sound from the right fuselage was caused by a seat-belt. He aband oned the takeoff. craft can be brought to a halt without diffi­ culty. As the aircraft accelerates, the problem J ui 83 P A38 Private becomes less clear. Aborting the takeoff may Jun 79 BN2 Charter Just after t akeoff a loud banging noise was heard at cause more damage than it cures. There again, Seat belt, belt, Knocking noise from side of aircraft. Returned fo r rear of cockpit. The aircraft was landed. Lap belt continuing the takeoff with an aircraft that landing. Unused harness hanging out. and buckle hanging out. may be less than serviceable has inherent Jul 83 Cessna 210 Charter dangers. Mar 80 belt, belt, belt, Cessn a 206 Charter Pilot reported t hat he was experiencing a thumping There is no clear-cut, black-and-white criterion Returned for landing due to seat-belt flapping in the noise outside the aircraft. He returned for a landing. - the pilot must decide on the basis of the slipstream. A few inches of the strap for the cargo net was symptoms and his or her assessment of the risks. belt, belt Oct 80 Cessna 152 Training hanging out of the door. I recently had a door come open on a Duchess Loud flapping noise and vibration experienced during Aug 83 PA28 Private just as I lifted off. That of course is a critical A stitch in time .. . t urn at 500 feet during nigh t VMC solo training After takeoff the pilot heard a severe banging noise time for things to happen in a twin-engined air­ flight. Seat-belt fl apping outside. craft and there is only an instant t o decide For the sake of a . . and returned for a landing. Metal end of seat-belt was flapping against side of fuselage. what is occurring. I think that I waited a sec­ Nov 80 Cessna 210 Privat e of ond to see if there were any changes in aircraft S THE PRINT folded out the BASI com­ Aircraft returned due to loud banging noise from side Aug 83 Cessna 152 Training puter I was frankly amazed at the results. I behaviour or performance, in cont rol response of aircraft. Protruding seat-belt was banging against After takeoff the pilot heard a loud banging noise or flight pat h, and I elected to continue the :._Aknew of' the occasional aborted sortie due side of aircraft. which he thought was corning from the engine cow­ takeoff and reassess the situation when I was to noises and vibrations - noises and ling. The pilot declared a PAN and returned for a .ran 81 Boeing 727 RPT safely clear of the ground. vibrations caused by the seaL-belt or buckle landing. Seat-belt was found protruding from the door. oscillating in the breeze - but I had no idea of Returned due to strap caught in rear galley door. the frequency of these occurrences. Nov 83 Beech 58 Charter Feb 81 Cessna 172 Pilot advised s he was r eturning for a landing due to Have a look for yourself: Private The in-flight cure Returned due to knocking noise after tak coff. Seat­ a seat-belt hanging out of the door. After rectifying belt banging against side of fuselage. the seat-belt she advised that she was landing with In one of the incidents described above, the Oct 76 Boeing 727 RPT the door open. pilot attempted to recover the protruding seat­ Mar 8 1 PA38 Training belt in flight and was then left with the prob­ Pilot aborted takeoff due to report from cabin crew. ... and so on. Strap h anding out _o f buffet door. Instructor heard a very loud banging noise and sus­ lem of flying around with a door that couldn't pected an engine fa il u re. Scat-belt was d iscovered be closed and locked. It is difficult if not Oct 77 Cessna 150 Training hanging from door and flapping against fuselage. impossible to close a door in flight - you can't Aborted takcorr due to banging noise. Scat-belt hang­ Apr 81 Bell 20() Business open it enough to slam it shut and often there ing out. Climbing through 1000 feet a loud clunking noise is some negative pressure that prevents it fully Oct 78 Cessna 206 Charter was heard. Pilot landed in allotment . Seat-belt hang­ There are several lessons to be learnt here: closing. It is noisy and somewhat distracting Returned for landing due to flapping noise. Seat-belt ing out. • most of these incidents involved charter or though and it makes it even more important for hanging out. training sorties - understandably the pilot to concentrate on the job-at-hand - Apr 8 1 PA3 l Charter • almost every pilot correctly aborted the flight and to fix the problem when safely back on the F'eb 79 Cessna 150 Training Returned after pilot repor ted a door problem. Seat­ ground. Pilot m ade a precautionary landing on the field due belt was h anging out. and returned f or an immediate landing. It is worthwhile to muse occasionally on the 1 to a loud met allic noise emanating from under the As pilots-in-command, we are responsible for foselage. Seat-belt found protruding from door. Jun 8 1 Cessna 152 Private the safety and security of all on board. Inst ruc­ possible events and our options in various scen­ Pilot thought that t he engine was running roughly arios. This I believe is one of the vital benefits Mar 79 PA32 Ch arter tors are ultimately responsible for their and returned. Seat-belt was flapping against students and pilots are ultimately responsible of publications such as the Digest. Heturncd after r eport of seat-belt hanging out of door. fuselage. for their passengers - or their vacant seats. Think about it - please 0 Aviation Safety Digest Aviation Safety Digest 134 134

Gentlemen: Dear Sir , Dear Sir, Dear Sir, We read your recent article 'I wouldn't be seen Why the change of ruling with respect t o DME In his account of a flying trip to Wolf Creek I thought you might be interested to hear of the dead without my bone-dome' with interest. We limits in HOLDING PATTERNS? The old rule Crater (Airsport, J anuary 1986), Claude following incident involving my A36 Bonanza congratulate pilot Gavin Thomson for his wis­ where the time could be exceeded as long as the Meunier reported crossing paths with five recently. The aircraft had been parked in the dom in persevering and wearing his helmet in DME limit was adhered to seemed quite logical. wedge tail eagles, two of which dropped into open on a country airstrip 25 miles south of spite of his original discomfort. Could you explain why the inbound t urn must vertical dives, and he posed the question, 'Is Goulburn and had been left unattended for this their way of dodging aircraft?' The Gentex SPH-4 helmet has been in service in now be commenced prior to the 0 / B time limit, about three weeks. When I carried out my t he U.S. Ar my since 1969 and during those 18 even if wit hin DME limit? preflight inspection, I noticed bird droppings on The great English glider pilot, Phillip Wills, the right main gear wheel. A careful inspect ion years has been responsible for saving many Yours sincerely, writing of his experience while flying in Africa, lives. Consequently, it continues to be the hel­ of the undercarriage-well revealed a Swallow's Brent McColl pointed out that large soaring birds such as mud nest. I removed the nest at that t ime. met of choice in the Army, Navy (SPH-3C) and eagles and vultures are much too heavy to even Air Force. Nonetheless, there has been a con­ sust ain flight by flapping, much less climb to · On another occasion, about three weeks later, t inuing effort to make it better as technology on inspecting the undercarriage-wells I found I am advised as f ollows: any marked degree. From the ground it requires advances, and the result is a completely new a supreme effort to become airborne and to another Swallow's nest in more or less the same SPH helmet currently known as the SPH-5. The AIP IAL-2-6 para 3.4 descri bes how to fly the elevate themselves to a perch in the nearest location. On this occasion there were no telltale features which distinguish t his helmet from the standard holding pattern. Sub-para (b) t ree. They are only able to flap briefly to bird droppings to suggest the presence of a nest. SPH-4, t o which it looks outwardly identical, specifies the drift allowance to be used on the launch themselves into thermals and if they Accordingly, when aircraft .are parked in the are as follows: outbound leg. Procedure designers use this drift didn't find lift almost immediately, they would open it is important to carry out a careful • new lightweight shell of fibreglass on Kevlar allowance coupled with the proce'dure time and return t o their perch. inspection of all possible locations for nests. On the maximum !AS to assess separation from the occasion when I found the first Swallow's • new thicker, less dense impact liner with obstacles and other aircraft. If, as you propose, Many moons ago while flying cross-country in a great er area of coverage nest in the undercarriage-well, there was also you continue outbound for a longer time than sailplane, I spotted an eagle on the same head­ one in the engine compartment, which of course • new cust om-fittable thermoplast ic fitting has been allowed, you have the potential to gen­ ing about 200 metres ahead and slightly below, became perfectly obvious as part of the rout ine liner erate a greater cross-track error than that for so I decided to sneak up on it and give it a fright. preflight check. It becomes apparent that an • new energy-absorbing earcups which protection has been provided. Therefore, undetected bir d's nest could be a cause of As is their habit and purpose in such a situ­ • new adjustable universal retention the use of DME is to control the absolute length malfunction of the undercarriage mechanism. of a p rocedure for f ast aircraf t and for strong at ion, the bird had its head down, scanning the • new 300 pound chinstrap tailwinds and not to allow slow aircraft to ground in search of a meal, and it was about I might mention another hazard which is prob­ • new lightweight dual visor system. lengthen p rocedures. three metres ahead and two metres inboard of ably rather more obvious. The aircraft had again been left in the open during some of the (Total weight for an ext ra-large-size helmet is the starboard wingtip when it became aware of company. torrential rain last year. My initial check for less t han 3 lbs with dual visors.) w ater contamination was done with one of The helmet now complies with a revised U.S. I still retain a mental snapshot of the look of those narrow plastic tubes which has a screw­ Government specification which substantially terror in its beady eye in the instant it raised driver at one end. This did not demonstrate any increased t he impact resistance requirements, Several readers have writt en t o me regarding its head and saw its attacker. The reaction was fluid level but the colour of the drain contents bot h in the cranial and lateral regions. This the accident to VH-WRV at Bankstown. Briefly, immediate as it rolled to the right, folded its did not look quite t he normal fuel colour, means t hat the 'g' forces transmitted to the the aircraft landed at night, wheels-up. The wings and plunged straight down. although it did have a tinge of dye. Also when I head through the helmet in a crash are con­ pilot vacated t he aircraft after turning off the tipped the contents over my hand, the surface siderably less than before. Master switch. A Cessna 172 was cleared for It seems probable that eagles only take this tension did not appear to be that of fuel. takeoff, with the Aerostar st ill occupying the The Aust ralian Forces have for years flown t he evasive action when they are t aken by surprise Accordingly, further fuel was drained off into a st rip. Luckily, t he instructor in the Cessna saw or feel menaced - only two of five birds small soft-drink bottle and after about three or SPH-4A which was a variant of the SPH-4 the other aircraft in the beam of his landing designed to their own requirements, and not a encountered by Claude Meunier did so - and it four litres had been drained, the fluid level lights and managed to clear the Aerostar by 20 is not unusual for eagles to share thermals with became apparent. It was necessary to drain a standard U.S. Ar my SPH-4. It was a heavier , feet. dual-visor helmet syst em. In switching to sailplanes when t hey have had the opportunity further two or three litres before t he fuel pre­ another helmet, the RAAF did not take into Comments that I have received suggest that the t o become accustomed t o the presence of the sented free of water contamination. It is appar­ consideration the properties of t he SPH-5, wording of the accident summary implied criti­ other large birds. ent that if on inspection of the drained fluid which we consider to be unfortunate. cism of the pilot for shutting everything down Considering that the best glide speed for the there is no fluid level, it may be assumed that before advising t he tower that the aircraft was eagle is probably about 25 to 30 k nots and its there is no water contamination when in fact Please continue to encourage your readers to. still on the runway. the drained fluid consists entirely of water. utilise their life-support products whenever fly­ ability to climb in an emergency is practically ing. Whatever d iscomfort there may be is com­ Both the tower cont roller and the instructor in nil, there is only one way to go - down. It This experience confirms the wisdom of pensated for by the benefits of having the item the Cessna were t ricked into believing t he seems likely t hat when eagles are said to have checking for the presence of water with the in place when disaster strikes. We in the indus­ Aerostar was clear because it veered left just attacked aircr aft, they were in fact simply water-detection paste should any doubts exist t ry will in turn cont inue to strive to make the before it stopped. seeking to escape by the only path available to about water cont amination. products more user-friendly, while maintaining My view is that the pilot of the Aerostar acted them for a rapid exit. If one has doubts whether the drained fluid the highest possible levels of protection. correctly in switching-off and vacating t he air­ consists entirely of water a small quantity of In view of t he above, it would seem that the craft immediately it came to a st op . However , I water can be added which will of course pro­ rule for avoiding our feathered friends is Sincerely, am not in the business of attributing blame. 0 vide a fluid level if in fact the drained fluid is Both t he controller and the instructor were around or over, NEVER UNDER! all Avgas. GENTEX INTERNATIONAL, INC. deceived and perhaps should have double­ G.A. Charles G. Rudolf checked that t he runway was clear - but it Your s sincerely, Managing Director does illustrate how easily such an incident can I agree. In my experience birds do indeed head Worldwide Defence Market ing occur. f or the gr o'J,.tnd when they see you coming. Edward W. Gibson