Published in J. Saatsi (Ed.) Routledge Handbook of Scientiûc Realism
[email protected] (¬ÏÊ), London: Routledge, pp. t;–tEÊ doi:10.4324/9780203712498 Realism about cognitive science Mark Sprevak University of Edinburgh Ï January ¬ÏÊ his chapter starts from a puzzle. Realism about X is oen glossed as the idea that Xs are mind independent: Xs exist, and have their nature, independently of our beliefs, interests, attitudes, or other mental states. Xs are, in a sense ‘out there’, getting on with it independently of our mental life.If this is right, how should we understand realism about cognitive science? Mental processes and states are not mind independent: they don’t take place independently of our beliefs, interests, attitudes, or other mental states. Hence, it seems that we cannot be realists about them. Nevertheless, in line with other areas of philosophy of science, there seems scope for asking the realist question about the posits of cognitive science even if those posits make up our mental life. But unless we state realism diòerently, there is no way to sensibly ask the realist question about cognitive science. In this paper, I explore the right way to state realism about cognitive science. I introduce three diòerent types of mind dependence and evaluate their merit to stating realism about cognitive science. Ï Introduction his chapter is about a puzzle. Realism about X is oen glossed as the claim that Xs are mind independent: Xs exist and have their nature independent of human beliefs, interests, attitudes, and other mental states. Xs are out there, getting on with it, independently of human minds.