This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 70-6878 SHANAB, Robert E lias Abu, 1939- LOGICAL POSITIVISM, OPERATIONALISM, AND BEHAVIORISM. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1969 Philosophy University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan LOGICAL POSITIVISM, OPERATIONALISM, AND BEHAVIORISM DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Robert Elias Abu Shanab, B.A., A.M. ******** The Ohio State University 1969 Approved by / Adviser Department of Philosophy Dedicated to Professor Virgil Hinshaw, ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am especially indebted to my adviser, Professor Virgil Hinshaw, Jr. Several of his suggestions have been incorporated in the final manuscript. I wish also to express my thanks to Professor Charles F. Kielkopf. Finally I wish to extend affection and gratitude to my wife for encouragement, patience and for the hours spent typing and retyping manuscripts. ii VITA September 29, 1939 B o m - Jerusalem, Palestine 1962 ........ ........... B.A. , San Jose State College, San Jose, California 1964 ................... M.A., San Jose State College, San Jose, California 1965-1966 ............. Instructor, College of San Mateo, San Mateo, California 1967-1968 ....... Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1969 ................... Lecturer, The Ohio State University, Newark, Ohio iii CONTENTS. Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..... ....................... ii V I T A ..............................................iii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ............................ 1 II. THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION ............. 7 III. THE TRAN SLA TABILITY CRITERION............. 45 IV. OPERATIONALISM ............................ 92 V. WATSON AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM............ 133 VI. TOLMAN, LOGICAL POSITIVISM, AND OPERATIONALISM ...........................161 VII. CONCLUSION ............................... 219 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 230 Iv CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The primary aim of this study is to exhibit the influence of both logical positivism and operationalism on neo-behaviorism. Specifically, I shall attempt to show how logical positivists and Bridgman influenced the neo- behaviorist, E. C. Tolman. My secondary aims include critical examinations of the logical positivists' quest for an adequate meaning criterion, of Bridgman's opera­ tionalism, and of Watson's behaviorism. Just as logical positivism aimed at severing philos­ ophy from its ontological heritage, and just as operation­ alism -- spearheaded by Bridgman -- strove to cleanse phy­ sics of its last vestiges of metaphysics, so behaviorism -- as prophetically advocated by Watson — struggled to sunder psychology from its introspective armchair specu­ lations and to erect a science of man. The avowed intention of the logical positivists in the early 1920's was to declare their independence from , traditional philosophy which they considered as being bur­ dened with too much speculation. What the logical positi­ vists wanted to fashion was a philosophy that was in con­ formity with the results of the current formal and factual sciences. They asked: What is the proper business of philosophy? What should a contemporary philosopher do? They decided that the task of philosophy is the analysis of knowledge, especially of science, and that the chief method of philosophy is the logical analysis of the inter- subjective language of science.^- Hence at the inception of the Vienna Circle the logical.positivists wanted to for­ mulate a meaning criterion whereby they could decide whether statements are cognitively meaningful — and there­ by discern meaningful science and its logical analysis from meaningless metaphysics. In their various attempts to formulate such a criterion, the logical positivists were led to several difficulties. In Chapters II and III, I shall attempt to trace some of the changes which occurred during the formulations of the meaning criterion. An early and important statement of the meaning ^•Carnap, "Scientific Empiricism," in D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1942, p. 285. criterion was Schlick's version in the form of the well- known slogan, "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification." Schlick's formulation prompted other philosophers such as Carnap, Hempel, Ayer and Popper to reformulate Schlick's version. Many objections were directed toward these various reformulations. Chapter IX will be devoted to discussing the verifiability criterion which seems to embody two main views: first, complete verifiability; second, partial verifiability. In Chapter III I shall examine the criterion of translatability from two main views: first, translatability into an empiricist language; second, translatability into the ordinary idiom. Chapter III also proposes and defends a meaning criterion which parallels Marhenke's version of translatability into the ordinary idiom. The proposed criterion takes account of meaningful statements which are excluded both by the verifiability criterion and the criterion of translata­ bility into an empiricist language. Spearheaded by Bridgman's The Logic of Modern Physics, operationalism became another movement which focused its attention upon getting rid of the last vestiges of meta­ physical obscurity still residing in some parts of science. In his book Bridgman set forth a program for judging the 4 admissibility of scientific concepts. Briefly, his view was that for a concept to be scientifically acceptable, one must be able to perform a set of relevant operations which ensure its applicability. Undoubtedly this general view has influenced schools of thought in physics and other sciences. However, the main purpose of Chapter IV is not so much concerned with Bridgman*s influence upon other schools of thought as it is (1) to present Bridgman's views on operationalism and (2) to compare and contrast Bridgman's operationalism with logical positivism. Although in Chapter IV I shall attempt to show the striking resemblance between the methodological views of Bridgman and the logical positivists, I want to make one point clear. Whereas the logical positivists had pain­ stakingly devoted a great deal of time to elaborating a precise formulation of a meaning criterion, Bridgman, on the other hand, did not seem to bother about such an enterprise. I shall contend rather that Bridgman's main 4 concern was to "operationize" scientific concepts without actually presenting any elaborate theory of meaning. The various quotations from Bridgman's writings will, I hope, bear me out that: he was interested in presenting a certain technique for the formation of scientific concepts. Behaviorism, as propounded by Watson early in this century, was a movement directed against the old mentalis- tic psychology. In Watson’s writings one comes across one of the earliest attempts to rid psychology of its specu­ lative vestiges. Chapter V will be devoted to pointing out some of the salient characteristics of Watsonian behaviorism, and then to contrasting these ideas with logical positivism. Whereas Watson’s views were attractive to the logical positivists, the latter were interested in the logical commitment underlying Watson's behaviorism. In this con­ nection I shall discuss the physicalistic views of Carnap and Hempel and try to show how, according to the physi­ calistic thesis, psychological terms are analyzed. Neo-behaviorism can also be viewed as an attempt to cleanse psychology of its past and to provide for psy­ chology a more effective scientific methodology. Neo- behaviorists who followed in the footsteps of Watson were significantly influenced by the logical positivist- operationalist views on concept formation and the integral part it plays in the formulation of laws. As basis for my analysis, I shall concentrate in Chapter VI on Tolman. It is my contention that the methodological views championed by logical positivism and by Bridgman deeply influenced 6 Tolman who was genuinely concerned with (a) finding an adequate base to anchor securely his purposive behaviorism, and (b) finding sound ways of introducing intervening variables in his pursuit of psychological law. In Chapter VI I shall also attempt to defend Tolman's claim that behavioristic psychology need not forfeit its scientific status despite his admission in 1959 that intervening variables are derived from "intuition, common sense and phenomenology." I shall contend that the chief reason for this admission was Tolman’s desire to stress the importance of the context of discovery, about which we know so little, when psychologists are faced with the problem of speci­ fying the various functions that relate intervening variables to the independent and dependent experimental variables. CHAPTER II THE VERIFIABILITY CRITERION Introduction A brief glance at the recent literature of logical positivism would baffle a reader who is interested in finding a formulation for the meaning criterion of logical positivists. Bafflement would primarily result because of the various formulations for the meaning criterion which have been propounded at various times by its advocates. Indeed, one wonders whether it is even appropriate to ask "What is the meaning criterion?" in light of the diverse formulations and highly controversial issues centered around it. The answer to this question varies. Some might contend that it is; others, that it is not. But, let us grant for our purpose that