Towards a Theory of Features in Object-Oriented Philosophy
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PHI 351 Nominalism
Philosophy 351 September 9, 2008 Prof. Clare Batty Universals: Nominalism 1. Recap Metaphysical realism: the world contains both universals and particulars. Certain things (particulars) are alike in attribute (property, relation, kind) because they exemplify the same universal. Metaphysical realists claim that their two-category framework not only provides us with the machinery with which to explain attribute agreement/similarity/resemblance but also a pair of important phenomena: i. The truth of subject-predicate discourse ii. Our use of abstract reference. 2. Issues we have raised about metaphysical realism a. What universals is the metaphysical realist willing to allow into his/her ontology? • Does he/she allow the universal bachelor or just unmarried, adult, male (does he/she even allow unmarried?). What about he universal green or just green (or light green)? 52 b. Are there unexemplified universals? • Certainly there might have been different properties in the world. Are there universals corresponding to these non-existent, but possible, properties? c. Is the relation of exemplification itself a universal? If so, doesn’t this commit the metaphysical realist to an infinite regress? • Suppose a and b are both F. That is, they exemplify the universal F-ness. But now they have an additional thing in common: they are both exemplifications of F-ness. That is, they both exemplify the universal exemplification of F-ness. Can you see where this is going? d. Doesn’t the metaphysical realist overestimate the degree of agreement/likeness/resemblance in the world? • Grass, peas and wasabi paste are all similar; but they are not exactly alike. 3. -
Philosophy in the Epoch of Alternative Facts: an Invitation from East Asia
Volume 9 Number 1 Spring 2020 pISSN 1848-4298 oISSN 2623-8381 THESIS - Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2020 International Research Journal ISSN: 1848-4298 (Print) ISSN: 2623-8381(Online) Philosophy in the Epoch of Alternative Facts: An Invitation from East Asia Naruhiko Mikado How to cite this article: Mikado, N. (2020). Philosophy in the Epoch of Alternative Facts: An Invitation from East Asia. Thesis. Vol. 9, No. 1. (35-57). Published online: June 30, 2020 Article received on the 8th of March, 2020. Article accepted on the 4th of May, 2020. Conict of Interest: The author declares no conict of interests. Review Article Philosophy in the Epoch of Alternative Facts: An Invitation from East Asia Naruhiko Mikado Osaka University, Osaka, Japan Email: [email protected] Abstract The primary aim of this essay was to elucidate the unique philosophical concept of “the non-interpretive”, which Masaya Chiba, one of the most prominent philosophers in East Asia, formulated mainly by bridging the theories of Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman, who have generally been reckoned as two of the most pivotal proponents in the contemporary philosophical movement dubbed Speculative Realism. In order to achieve the aim, the first part clarified the chief arguments and doctrines of Meillassoux’s Speculative Materialism and Harman’s Object-Oriented Philosophy. Thereupon, the second and main part investigated how Chiba invented the concept, what it precisely meant, and what insights it could offer for us. The concluding section summarized the chief arguments of this paper and sketched a worldview which we could adopt in order to survive the turbulent epoch of alternative facts and post-truth. -
The Idea of Mimesis: Semblance, Play, and Critique in the Works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W
DePaul University Via Sapientiae College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 8-2012 The idea of mimesis: Semblance, play, and critique in the works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno Joseph Weiss DePaul University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd Recommended Citation Weiss, Joseph, "The idea of mimesis: Semblance, play, and critique in the works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno" (2012). College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations. 125. https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/125 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Idea of Mimesis: Semblance, Play, and Critique in the Works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy October, 2011 By Joseph Weiss Department of Philosophy College of Liberal Arts and Sciences DePaul University Chicago, Illinois 2 ABSTRACT Joseph Weiss Title: The Idea of Mimesis: Semblance, Play and Critique in the Works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno Critical Theory demands that its forms of critique express resistance to the socially necessary illusions of a given historical period. Yet theorists have seldom discussed just how much it is the case that, for Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. -
Measuring Conceptual Similarity in Ontologies: How Bad Is a Cheap Measure?
Measuring Conceptual Similarity in Ontologies: How Bad is a Cheap Measure? Tahani Alsubait, Bijan Parsia, and Uli Sattler School of Computer Science, The University of Manchester, United Kingdom falsubait,bparsia,[email protected] Abstract. Several attempts have been made to develop similarity mea- sures for ontologies. Motivated by finding problems in existing measures, we design a new family of measures to address these problems. We carry out an empirical study to explore how good the new measures are and to investigate how likely it is to encounter specific task-oriented problems when using a bad similarity measure. 1 Introduction The process of assigning a numerical value reflecting the degree of resemblance between two ontology concepts or the so called conceptual similarity measure- ment is a core step in many ontology-related applications (e.g., ontology align- ment [7], ontology learning [2]). Several attempts have been made to develop methods for measuring conceptual similarity in ontologies [22, 32, 23, 20, 4]. In addition, the problem of measuring similarity is well-founded in psychology and a number of similarity models have been already developed [6, 30, 26, 19, 29, 8, 12]. Rather than adopting a psychological model for similarity as a foundation, we noticed that some existing similarity measures for ontologies are ad-hoc and unprincipled. This can negatively affect the application in which they are used. However, in some cases, depending on how simple the ontology/task is, using a computationally expensive \good" similarity measure is no better than using a cheap \bad" measure. Thus, we need to understand the computational cost of the similarity measure and the cases in which it succeeds/fails. -
A Model of Human Categorization and Similarity Based Upon Category Theory Michael Healy
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of New Mexico University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository Electrical & Computer Engineering Technical Engineering Publications Reports 7-1-2008 A Model of Human Categorization and Similarity Based Upon Category Theory Michael Healy Thomas Caudell Timothy Goldsmith Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/ece_rpts Recommended Citation Healy, Michael; Thomas Caudell; and Timothy Goldsmith. "A Model of Human Categorization and Similarity Based Upon Category Theory." (2008). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/ece_rpts/28 This Technical Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Publications at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electrical & Computer Engineering Technical Reports by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO A Model of Human Categorization and Similarity Based Upon Category Theory Michael John Healy Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering e-mail: [email protected] Thomas Preston Caudell Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Department of Computer Science e-mail: [email protected] Timothy E. Goldsmith Department of Psychology e-mail: [email protected] University of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131, USA UNM Technical Report: EECE-TR-08-0010 Report Date: June 19, 2008 Abstract Categorization and the judgement of similarity are fundamental in cognition. We propose that these and other activities are based upon an underlying structure of knowledge, or concept representation, in the brain. -
Materialism Is Not the Solution Graham Harman
Materialism is Not the Solution On Matter, Form, and Mimesis Graham Harman abstract This article defends a new sense of “formalism” in philosophy and the arts, against recent materialist fashion. Form has three key opposite terms: matter, function, and content. First, I respond to Jane Bennett’s cri- tique of object-oriented philosophy in favor of a unified matter-energy, show- ing that Bennett cannot reach the balanced standpoint she claims to obtain. Second, I show that the form/function dualism in architecture gives us two purely relational terms and thus cannot do justice to the topic of form. Third, I argue against Greenberg, Heidegger, and McLuhan that content cannot be trivialized in favor of deeper form. I close with a new conception of mimesis as performance rather than as the fabrication of copies. The form underlying any work’s content is provided by the spectator herself as the only real object that does not withdraw from the aesthetic scene. keywords Formalism, materialism, mimesis, Jane Bennett, Patrik Schu- macher, Clement Greenberg, Martin Heidegger, Marshall McLuhan Object-oriented philosophy is often included on lists of recent materialist philosophies. Let me begin by decisively rejecting the term “materialism,” which I view as one of the most damaging philosophical temptations of our time. Nonetheless, the people who call object-oriented philosophy ma- terialism are not fools. There is a reason why they see a close proximity between my approach and that of other nearby authors who sympathize with materialism, whereas no one has ever called object-oriented philoso- phy “Hegelianism” or “Marxism,” for instance. -
PROPOSITIONS, OBJECTS, QUESTIONS Graham Harman, in Conversation with Jon Roffe
PARRHESIA NUMBER 21 • 2014 • 23-52 PROPOSITIONS, OBJECTS, QUESTIONS Graham Harman, in conversation with Jon Roffe The following is a near-verbatim transcription of a long conversation between Graham Harman and Jon Roffe on 30 November 2014 in Melbourne, Australia. Bryan Cooke, who transcribed this event, and I made only very minor edits in order to clarify the few moments in the recording that were par- ticularly unclear; otherwise, this is a full record of a wide-ranging discussion, including a number of questions from the floor. Parrhesia would like to thank the Cluster for the study of Organisation, Society and Markets, who hosted Graham Harman’s visit, and the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy for their support in running the event and publishing this transcript—Jon Roffe Jon Roffe Well, first of all, thanks for being a part of this. Graham Harman Happy to be here in Australia for the first time. We’ve had a wonderful visit. We’ve been in Melbourne for two weeks. We’re going to Sydney next; I’ve heard great things about Sydney too. JR Well these people are from Melbourne so they won’t believe anything nice you say about Sydney. [laughter] So, as I’ve said, we’re keen to sort of make this a conversation more than an … interrogation. If you feel the questions are too hard, you can respond, well, as if you were being interrogated! That’s fine as well. So I sup- pose I’d like, first of all, to just begin with some very preliminary kinds of questions and sort of introduce those people who are here to your thought in a kind of very introductory way that we can delve into as time goes on. -
Progress According to David Hume and Adam Smith Ecem Okan
Between history and analysis : progress according to David Hume and Adam Smith Ecem Okan To cite this version: Ecem Okan. Between history and analysis : progress according to David Hume and Adam Smith. Eco- nomics and Finance. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2018. English. NNT : 2018PA01E050. tel-03041539 HAL Id: tel-03041539 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-03041539 Submitted on 5 Dec 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne École d’Économie de la Sorbonne PHARE ENTRE HISTOIRE ET ANALYSE : LE PROGRÈS SELON DAVID HUME ET ADAM SMITH / BETWEEN HISTORY AND ANALYSIS: PROGRESS ACCORDING TO DAVID HUME AND ADAM SMITH Thèse pour l’obtention du titre de Docteure en Sciences Économiques Présentée et soutenue publiquement le 4 décembre 2018 par Ecem Okan Sous la direction d’André Lapidus Professeur à l’Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne COMPOSITION DU JURY : Daniel Diatkine, Professeur Émérite à l’Université d’Evry/ ParisSaclay Laurent Jaffro, Professeur à l’Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne André Lapidus, Professeur Émérite à l’Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne (Directeur de recherche) Spencer Pack, Professeur au Connecticut College, ÉtatsUnis (Rapporteur) Nathalie Sigot, Professeure à l’Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne Michel Zouboulakis, Professeur à l’Université de Thessalie, Grèce (Rapporteur) L’Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne n’entend donner aucune approbation ni désapprobation aux opinions émises dans cette thèse ; ces opinions doivent être considérées comme propres à leur auteur. -
DISPOSITION CONCEPTS and EXTENSIONAL LOGIC ------ARTHUR PAP------Not Be "Contrary-To-Fact") : If I Pull the Trigger, the Gun Will Fire
DISPOSITION CONCEPTS AND EXTENSIONAL LOGIC ------ARTHUR PAP------ not be "contrary-to-fact") : if I pull the trigger, the gun will fire. It would be sad if belief in such an implication were warranted only by knowledge of the truth of antecedent and consequent separately, for in that case it would be impossible for man to acquire the power of Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic even limited control over the course of events by acquiring warranted beliefs about causal connections. Notice further that frequently pre sumed knowledge of a causal implication is a means to knowledge of the truth, or at least probability, of the antecedent; if this is an acid then it will turn blue litmus paper red; the reaction occurred; thus the One of the striking differences between natural languages, both con hypothesis is confirmed. Knowledge of the consequences of suppositions versational and scientific, and the extensional languages constructed by is independent of knowledge of the truth-values of the suppositions, no logicians is that most conditional statements, i.e., statements of the form matter whether the consequences be logical or causal. "if p, then q", of a natural language are not truth-functional. A state The difference between material implication and natural implica tion has been widely discussed. The logician's use of "if p, then q" ment compounded out of simpler statements is truth-functional if its in the truth-functional sense of "not both p and not-q", symbolized by truth-value is uniquely determined by the truth-values of the component "p :J q", is fully justified by the objective of constructing an adequate statements. -
Object-Oriented Philosophy Graham Harman
Object-Oriented Philosophy Graham Harman M. Unies Ananda Raja 1 INTISARI Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan asumsi dasar dari filsafat Graham Harman (1968– ) yang disebut dengan Object-Oriented Philosophy. Latar belakang pemikiran Harman adalah kritiknya terhadap tendensi filsafat barat yang cenderung menjelaskan realitas secara problematis dengan dua cara, yakni mereduksi objek ke unit terkecil (undermining) atau menolak unifikasi objek dalam satu hal (overmining). Masalahuntuk dari kecenderungan kepentingan pertama adalah peninjauan ketidakmampuan menjelaskan kemunculan dan ketahanan objek, sedangkan masalah kecenderungan kedua adalah ketidamampuan menjelaskan perubahan objek. Untuk mengatasi dua kecenderungan tersebut, Harman mengembangkan pemikiran tentang objek yang didapat dengan pembacaan kritis atas gagasan intensionalitas Husserl, peranti Heidegger, dan monadologi Leibniz. Dua kesimpulan penting Harman untuk mengatasi problem tersebut adalah: pertama, membagi objek dan kualitas menjadi masing-masing dua bagian, sehingga terdapat empat hal dalam objek, yakni objek real, kualitas real, objek sensual, dan kualitas sensual. Kedua, memperluas relasi yang tidak hanya terjadi antar objek dan kualitas, tetapi juga antar objek dengan objek, dan kualitas dengan kualitas, sehingga terdapat sepuluh model hubungan dalam objek. Kedua jawaban Harman tersebut membuatnya dapat menjawab problem perubahan dengan penempatan kausalitas pada ranah sensual, dan problem kemunculan dan ketahanan objek dengan gagasan Fisi–Fusi. Konsekuensi dari filsafat -
Objects, Technology, Existence: Engaging with Graham Harman's
Annual ETHU Seminar Objects, Technology, Existence: Engaging with Graham Harman’s OOO -online- Wednesday February 24th, 2021, 6–10 PM CET Abstracts & Bios Ecological Humanism and Our Entanglement with Things Hans Alma My presentation will focus on the question of what Graham Harman’s rejection of anthropocentrism means for contemporary humanism. In his book Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming (2017) the political philosopher William Connolly argues that we need new ways of thinking about how humans relate to other forms of being. He criticizes the modernistic and dualistic worldview of many forms of humanism, but doesn’t reject humanism as such. Connolly advocates an ‘entangled humanism’ that takes the inextricable interdependency of all forms of being into account, but that leaves room for human qualities and responsibilities. For the sake of clarity, I speak of an ‘ecological humanism’ and try to develop it in ways that are fruitful for the Belgian context. In this paper, I will study whether the archaeologist Ian Hodder’s view on the entanglement of humans and things is helpful for my endeavor to rethink humanism in non-anthropocentric ways. I will confront his view with the criticism of Harman that Hodder’s approach retains a nature/culture dualism and consider what object-oriented ontology contributes to ecological humanism. Hans Alma is Full Professor Religious Humanism and Compassion at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU Amsterdam). Trained in cultural psychology and psychology of religion at the Radboud University Nijmegen, her research interest focuses on the human search for meaning in life. From this perspective, she explores what humanism can mean in the face of existential questions raised by the ecological crisis. -
Wittgenstein and Religion
Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy 8-3-2006 Wittgenstein and Religion Daniel Patrick Corrigan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Corrigan, Daniel Patrick, "Wittgenstein and Religion." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2006. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/13 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WITTGENSTEIN AND RELIGION by DANIEL CORRIGAN Under the Direction of Robert L. Arrington ABSTRACT This thesis considers the implications of Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy for the issue of religious belief, as well as the relation of religion to Wittgenstein’s thought. In the first chapter I provide an overview of the Tractatus and discuss the place of religion within the Tractarian framework. I then provide an overview of Philosophical Investigations . In the second chapter I consider interpretations by Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch of Wittgenstein’s comment that he could not help seeing every problem from a religious point of view, as well as Kai Nielsen’s famous critique of ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism.’ The third and final chapter takes up the issue of construing religious belief as a distinctive language-game. I consider arguments from D. Z. Phillips and criticisms of Phillips from Mark Addis and Gareth Moore. INDEX WORDS: Wittgenstein, Religion, Language-games WITTGENSTEIN AND RELIGION by DANIEL CORRIGAN A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University 2006 Copyright by Daniel Patrick Corrigan 2006 WITTGENSTEIN AND RELIGION by DANIEL CORRIGAN Major Professor: Robert L.