Leibniz on Contingency and Freedom: a Molinism Friendly Account
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Leibniz on Contingency and Freedom: A Molinism Friendly Account Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Juan Garcia, MA Graduate Program in Philosophy The Ohio State University 2018 Dissertation Committee: Tamar Rudavsky, Advisor Julia Jorati, Advisor Lisa Downing William Taschek © 2018 by Juan Garcia All rights reserved. Abstract: Some philosophical ideas, like metals, reveal their most interesting qualities when stretched. As I see it, the intelligibility and plausibility of the concept of contingency, as a condition for freedom, is stretched significantly by three of Leibniz’s major philosophical commitments: i) a robust version of the principle of sufficient reason; ii) strong theological commitments like divine foreknowledge and robust providence; and iii) Leibniz’s distinctive thesis of complete individual concepts – the doctrine that every substance has an individual concept which includes predicates denoting everything that will ever happen to it. Many interpreters think that these Leibnizian commitments stretch contingency to the breaking point: Leibniz cannot retain a genuine type of contingency. In this dissertation, I argue that these interpreters are mistaken and that Leibniz can accommodate a plausible type of contingency. Two important steps in reaching this conclusion are the following. First, I identify a kind of explanation of rational action according to which the explanans does not necessitate the explanandum. Second, I develop an account that makes sense of individual concepts including contingent truths as contingent. This account both sheds new light on some of Leibniz’s central views on contingency and freedom, and expands our substantive understanding of contingency as a condition for freedom. The first major goal of my dissertation is to show that Leibniz has remarkable affinities with the Molinist tradition – something that is commonly overlooked and misunderstood in the secondary literature. I identify two substantive tenets of Molinism and argue that Leibniz endorses a version of each; in fact, he utilizes them for the same theoretical purposes as Molinists. These two substantive Molinist tenets are: 1) free actions follow contingently from their sufficient conditions; and 2) God’s knowledge of what creatures would freely do in different possible circumstances is prevolitional (i.e., prior to God decreeing or willing anything). In Leibniz’s hands, these tenets are significantly molded by his other philosophical commitments, most notably a strong i version of the principle of sufficient reason. Importantly, Leibniz rejects a libertarian account of freedom and the kind of contingency that it requires, and instead adopts a more traditional Thomistic account of the will, as a rational inclination towards apprehended goodness, whose acts are contingently moved and ultimately explained by the apprehended goodness of the object of choice. From this I conclude that Leibniz is much closer to Molinism than is typically acknowledged. Leibniz is best characterized as a friend – rather than a foe – of Molinism. I further argue that Leibniz’s views constitute an important development in the history of the Molinist controversy and that they deserve serious consideration in contemporary debates on the plausibility of Molinism. The second major goal of my dissertation is to defend Leibniz’s views from a traditional challenge that threatens to undermine his ability to retain an intelligible sense of contingency, and thus threatens to undermine the success of the first part of the dissertation. This traditional challenge comes from Leibniz’s notorious thesis that every substance has an individual concept that includes predicates denoting everything that will ever happen to it. The challenge is that it appears that if everything that will ever happen to a substance is included in its individual concept, then it is not possible for the substance to be different from the way that its individual concept has it as being. In response to this traditional challenge, I introduce a novel way of reading Leibniz’s account of individual concepts. I argue that an agent’s essence grounds her modal profile – what is possible, impossible, necessary, or contingent for her – and that this gives rise to a cluster of individual concepts which describe this modal profile. I argue that how an agent would utilize her powers to act settles which individual concept describes everything that will ever happen to her and which individual concepts only describe non- actualized alternative possibilities for her. The kind of contingency accommodated by this model is analogous to the kind of contingency accommodated by contemporary accounts that involve transworld identity – the thesis that individuals exist in more than one possible world. My account, I argue, makes intelligible Leibniz’s otherwise obscure claim that individual concepts include contingent truths as contingent, and, importantly, it enables us to see how things could have been different for an agent even given Leibniz’s commitment to individual concepts. ii These two main goals of the dissertation form a coherent picture. In the first part of the dissertation, I assume that it makes sense to talk about the very same agent doing something other than what she in fact does; more precisely, I assume it is metaphysically possible for an agent to be otherwise than she is. Leibniz’s version of both Molinist tenets presupposes this assumption. It is only in chapter three that I vindicate, on Leibniz’s behalf, this important assumption. Furthermore, the developments in the first part of the dissertation play a crucial role in the very articulation of my novel proposal on individual concepts in the second part. Out of the several chapters in this dissertation emerges a unified account of contingency and freedom that has remarkable similarities to traditional Molinism. I end this dissertation with a chapter in which I address several objections to the advocated proposal on individual concepts. In the process of answering these objections, I illustrate how my proposal fits in the Leibnizian system more generally. Importantly, I illustrate how my proposal relates to notorious Leibnizian commitments like the principle of sufficient reason and the nature of explanation, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and important aspects of Leibniz’s distinctive theodicy, most notably. I argue that the view advanced in this dissertation enables Leibniz to get what he wants – namely an intelligible and plausible sense of contingency as a condition for freedom – without giving up any of his other theoretical commitments. Leibniz, I conclude, is entitled to an intelligible and plausible conception of contingency as a condition for freedom. iii Dedication To my much beloved late grandfather, a wonderful example of kindness and perseverance, Jacinto Garcia iv Acknowledgements Throughout the years, my work and my life have been enriched by the presence of many outstanding people. Here are some highlights. First, my thanks go to both of my advisors, Tamar Rudavsky and Julia Jorati, for their dedication to my work; such dedication is highly appreciated. It goes without saying that their many contributions have been indispensable for this dissertation. My thanks also to the other members of the dissertation committee, Lisa Downing and William Taschek, and to the many professors and graduate students at The Ohio State University, including expatriate David Sanson, whose discussions on philosophical matters have enriched my academic career. Particular mention goes to Hope Sample for her time and effort reading different drafts of this dissertation and for her insightful comments on them. I am also grateful for the many contributions to my life and career of both Lisa Shabel and William Taschek who have been there from my philosophical infancy, and who have played important roles in my academic development. Special gratitude goes to my beloved wife, Kate Ellen Garcia, for her love and support. She is a central pillar of our wonderful family, which brings so much joy and meaning to my life. And to our adorable children, David and Dahlia; their innocent smiles and overall zest for life continually rejuvenates my own life and endows it with a clear purpose. Lastly, I would also like to thank my extended family, including my in- laws, for their love and companionship; they have made my life outside of academia a happy one. The years spent toiling at this dissertation have been all the more pleasant because of their presence in it. Multas gratias v Vita 2007 B.A. Philosophy, The Ohio State University 2014 M.A. Philosophy, The Ohio State University 2011 until Present Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University Publications “Libertarianism, Moral Character, and Alternative Possibilities in Thomas Reid”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 35.1: 59-75, 2018. “Leibniz, a Friend of Molinism”, Res Philosophica, special edition New Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, July 2018. Fields of Study Major Field: Philosophy vi Table of Contents Abstract i Dedication iv Acknowledgments v Vita vi Table of Contents vii List of Abbreviations x Introduction 1 Philosophical Methodology 6 Chapter Summaries 8 Summary of Chapter 1 8 Summary of Chapter 2 10 Summary of Chapter 3 12 Summary of Chapter 4 14 Chapter 1: Leibniz, a Friend of Molinism 17 Introduction 17 Molina and the