Philosophy 351 September 9, 2008 Prof. Clare Batty

Universals: Nominalism

1. Recap

Metaphysical realism: the world contains both universals and particulars. Certain things (particulars) are alike in attribute (property, relation, kind) because they exemplify the same universal.

Metaphysical realists claim that their two-category framework not only provides us with the machinery with which to explain attribute agreement/similarity/resemblance but also a pair of important phenomena: i. The truth of subject-predicate discourse ii. Our use of abstract reference.

2. Issues we have raised about metaphysical realism

a. What universals is the metaphysical realist willing to allow into his/her ontology? • Does he/she allow the universal bachelor or just unmarried, adult, male (does he/she even allow unmarried?). What about he universal green or just green (or light green)? 52 b. Are there unexemplified universals? • Certainly there might have been different properties in the world. Are there universals corresponding to these non-existent, but possible, properties? c. Is the relation of exemplification itself a universal? If so, doesn’t this commit the metaphysical realist to an infinite regress? • Suppose a and b are both F. That is, they exemplify the universal F-ness. But now they have an additional thing in common: they are both exemplifications of F-ness. That is, they both exemplify the universal exemplification of F-ness. Can you see where this is going? d. Doesn’t the metaphysical realist overestimate the degree of agreement/likeness/resemblance in the world? • Grass, peas and wasabi paste are all similar; but they are not exactly alike.

3. Nominalism

Nominalism denies the existence of universals.

Nominalists remind us that metaphysical realists are in the business of theory construction. Given this, we can evaluate metaphysical realism along the following lines: i. Does the theory succeed in explaining the phenomena it aims to explain? ii. Does the theory attain theoretical simplicity? Ockham’s Razor: “Do not multiply entities beyond necessity”. Given two theories with the same explanatory power, the theory that posits fewer irreducibly distinct kinds of things is preferable. Concerns (a)-(c) above belie the suspicion that, where metaphysical realism is concerned, the answer to (ii) is ‘no’. Concern (d) above belies the suspicion the suspicion that, for metaphysical realism, the answer to (i) is ‘no’.

4. Price

Price raises concerns of type (d) and, thus, raises concerns with question i.

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The phenomena to be explained: attribute agreement, resemblance, likeness, similarity. According to the metaphysical realist, resemblance is always derivative: a resembles b because they are both instances of the same universal. a. Problem: Consider the following collection of things: a patch of freshly fallen snow, a piece of chalk, a piece of writing paper, a dusty handkerchief, and an old, worn, bow tie. All of these objects are white, we say. According to the metaphysical realist, these objects are all instances of the same universal, whiteness. But, these things are not exactly alike. They are more or less alike. But, if all of these objects are instances of the same universal, it ought to be that they are exactly alike in color. b. The nominalist diagnosis: Metaphysical realism aims to account for the resemblances between things but it treats resemblance as if it doesn’t come in degrees—either a fully resembles b or a doesn’t resemble b at all. But this doesn’t seem right. We all would admit that grass, green peas and wasabi paste resemble each other in some sense—although, admittedly, not fully or exactly. c. How do we account for this resemblance in some sense without positing the existence of universals? “The Philosophy of Resemblance” (Nominalism) Resemblance is not derivative. It does not depend on a relation to any further entity, like a universal. Consider the class of (what we call) white objects. Particular white objects do not exemplify objects of a further kind (namely, the universal whiteness); rather, they resemble each other. White objects form a set. In this set, there will be a sub-set of exemplars or paradigmatic white things. A white object is any object that resembles these exemplars as closely as they resemble each other. This is all we need to explain resemblance/likeness/similarity in the world. We do not need to posit any further entities, like universals.

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