Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward Massa Coulibaly* and Michael Bratton†

Coulibaly, M and Bratton, M 2013 Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular stability Attitudes on the Way Forward. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 31, pp. 1-10, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bn

ARTICLE Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward Massa Coulibaly* and Michael Bratton†

This article asks what Malians think about their country’s political crisis, including its causes, status, and possible solutions. An Afrobarometer survey of public opinion conducted at the end of 2012 finds the electorate in an apprehensive and ambivalent mood. Malians express declining faith in democracy as well as considerable (but diminishing) trust in the army. In a sign of democratic resilience, however, a large and broad majority continues to believe in elections as the best way to reconstitute a government. But only in the context of a stable and intact state – with an inclusive constitutional settlement, trustworthy civilian institutions, and engaged citizenry – will Mali be ready again for routine presidential and legislative elections.

Mali faces a political crisis of multiple dimen- In this respect, the political crisis in Mali sions. A poorly planned military coup and displays many of the challenges highlighted the collapse of a corrupt and incompetent in the literature on democratization in post- civilian regime have together seriously set conflict societies (de Zeeuw and Kumar back the country’s progress towards democ- 2006; Flores and Nooruddin 2009; Mehler racy. Moreover, an armed conflict with ethnic 2013). Civil conflict leaves in its wake frag- separatists and religious extremists in the ile states that are ill prepared to meet pop- north has grievously undermined the integ- ular demands for security, freedom and rity of the state. These twin political trends prosperity and which may even destabilize – the emergence of an authoritarian regime the region and the world (Curtis 2013). Yet and the disintegration of state institutions the role of democratization in post-conflict – are deeply interconnected. As noted by a recovery is unclear: Do democratic proce- recent contributor to this journal, ‘the politi- dures like elections pave the way to institu- cal chaos in Bamako and the military chal- tional stability and accountable governance? lenge in the north are undeniably related: Or does a premature return to open political confusion about who has legal authority and competition raise social tensions, thus risk- political power to rule the country hinders ing renewed political conflict? What, there- efforts to organize a credible effort to reinte- fore, is the right timetable for the restoration grate the north’ (Thurston 2012: 4). of electoral politics? On balance, analysts tend to favor phased democratization (Diamond 2006). The first * Groupe de recherche en économie appliquée et order of business is to reestablish political théorique (GREAT), Mali [email protected] order by rebuilding the basic capacity of state † Michigan State University, U.S.A. institutions like the armed forces and the [email protected] police. But an equally important considera- Art. 31, page 2 of 10 Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali tion is the accountability of the state to civil however, a large and broad majority contin- society, for example through civilian control ues to believe in elections as the best way to of these agencies of coercion. The account- reconstitute a government. ability principle requires the convocation of free and fair elections as soon as feasible The Survey after the reestablishment of central state The Afrobarometer is an independent, com- authority. It seems unlikely in the short run parative survey research project that docu- that Mali can survive intact as a territorial ments the public mood on issues of democ- entity or return to a democratic path with- racy and governance in 35 African countries. out international assistance, mainly from Managed by a network of African social sci- the West. But the international community’s entists, the survey uses trained enumerators strategy has been criticized as a standard for- to gather information in face-to-face inter- mula of ‘shoot and vote’, meaning military views in the language of the respondents’ pacification followed by elections. Instead, choice. The project employs national prob- the critics of this approach often argue, ‘pro- ability samples representing the adult popu- viding security, feeding people and resettling lation of each country. Data are weighted to refugees should take precedence over stag- represent each respondent proportionally ing elections’ (Thurston, 2012, 6). and each country equally. While there is merit to this view, it does Three features should be noted about the not take into account the need for politi- Round 5 Afrobarometer survey in Mali. cal reform or the prevailing preferences of First, fieldwork was conducted from Malian citizens. Where do ordinary people December 16 to 31, 2012. The survey there- stand with regard to alternate methods – fore followed the military coup conducted force or negotiation – for resolving armed by a group of disgruntled soldiers under Cap- conflict? How can legitimate authority be tain Amadou Sanogo on 22 March 2012.2 It reconstituted in Bamako if not through also occurred in the aftermath of the fall of elections? Most importantly, when it comes major towns in northern Mali to a coalition to charting a way forward, what do Malians of Taureg and Islamist insurgents (April), as themselves prefer – the installation of a well as after a physical assault on the interim newly elected government or the continua- civilian president Dioncounda Traoré (May), tion of some form of transitional, even mili- and the arrest by soldiers and forced resigna- tary-backed, regime? tion of Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra This article asks what Malians think about (December). But the survey preceded the their country’s political crisis, including advance of jihadi fighters on Konna (towards its causes, status, and possible solutions. Sévaré, a city with a major airport) and Dia- An Afrobarometer survey of public opin- baly, as well as the French-led intervention ion conducted at the end of 2012 finds the that repelled them (January 2013). The electorate in an apprehensive and ambiva- results reported here therefore represent a lent mood.1 A large majority thinks that the snapshot of public opinion at a particularly country is moving in the wrong direction. dire moment midway through a tumultuous They attribute this negative momentum period of political instability. to the incompetence of civilian politicians Second, the survey sample (N=1200) was and the frailty of state institutions. They truncated. Due to armed hostilities in the are split on whether warfare or talks are north, the geographical scope of the pro- the best way to put an end to armed insur- ject was restricted to the six southernmost gency. In searching for solutions, Malians regions of the country (Bamako, Kayes, Kou- express declining faith in democracy as well likoro, Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso). Excluded as considerable (but diminishing) trust in were Gao, Kidal and Tomboctou regions, the army. In a sign of democratic resilience, which encompass more than 50 per cent Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali Art. 31, page 3 of 10 of Mali’s land area but less than 10 per cent towards the regime and the state. Five such of its population. One consequence is that surveys in Mali since 2000 allow analysts to ethnic Tauregs and speakers of Tamasheq, track trends over time in these attitudes. But as well as other ethnic minorities resident the surveys have less to say about the sources in the Sahara zone, were not sufficiently and trajectory of civil conflicts and the role available for interview. Security conditions therein of armed forces, whether national permitting, the Afrobarometer intends to or international. include northern cities in a follow-up survey to be conducted later in 2013. Otherwise, Attitudes to Democracy the existing sample is representative of all Are Malians democrats? As of December adults, aged 18 and older, in the six southern 2012, a clear majority (62 per cent) said that regions. For that large segment of the Malian they ‘prefer democracy to any other forms population, the data are reliable within a of government’.3 But the proportion that margin of sampling error of plus or minus expressed allegiance to democracy was 3 per cent at a 95 per cent confidence level. down by ten percentage points from 2008 Third, the Afrobarometer’s comparative (See Figure 1). And almost two out of five advantage is to record mass political attitudes adults felt either disillusioned, wondering

100

90 86 82 81 82 80 71 72 68 70 60 63 62 57 60 59 49 50

40 32 33 30 31 30 24 20 12 10

0 2000 2002 2005 2008 2012

Prefer democracy Perceive a full democracy Satisfied with democracy Attached to elections

Figure 1: Attitudes to Democracy, Mali 2000–2012* Percentage of adults who offer this opinion. For question wordings, see text. *Six regions only in 2012 (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso). All nine regions 2000–8. Art. 31, page 4 of 10 Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali whether the country’s desperate circum- among all ethnic groups, at least in the six stances called for a non-democratic alterna- most populous regions of the south. tive (19 per cent), or ambivalent, claiming that they didn’t care what kind of political Attitudes to the Military regime was in office in Bamako (18 per cent). How, then, do Malians feel about military Malians also recognize that democracy rule? A majority (58 per cent) rejects this form building is a disappearing option in their of government. But the proportion of the country. True, the proportion seeing Mali adult population who approve of a regime in as ‘a full democracy’ rose gradually between which ‘the army comes in to govern the coun- 2000 and 2008.4 But by the end of 2012, fol- try’ rose from 25 per cent in 2008 (before the lowing the fall of a weak civilian administra- coup) to 34 per cent in 2012 (after the coup) tion at the hands of military plotters, just (See Figure 2). These data lend credence to 12 per cent felt this way. This bleak popular early press reports that at least some Malians assessment of the extent of democracy in welcomed the military takeover of govern- Mali compares unfavorably with that of four ment in March 2012, just weeks before the other West African countries in 2012, where country’s next national elections.7 Relative to an average 25 per cent of the electorate saw other African countries, popular support for their country as ‘a full democracy.’5 military rule in Mali has always been high. In A downturn in public opinion about democ- twelve other African countries in 2012, just racy is also reflected in popular satisfaction 11 per cent of the electorate said they would with ‘the way democracy works.’ After peak- approve a military takeover of government.8 ing in 2002, this indicator began to decline, That the level of expressed support for mil- plummeting to less than a third of the elector- itary rule is three times higher in Mali than ate in 2012. Indeed, the rot set in well before elsewhere in Africa is puzzling in the light of the coup; by 2008, fewer than half of Malians the evident ineptness—on the battlefield and expressed satisfaction with the democratic in governance—of the Malian armed forces. performance of the Amadou Toumani Touré But Malians have always placed a consider- (‘ATT’) administration. By this time, almost able degree of trust in military institutions. half of all citizens thought that ‘all’ or ‘most’ Around eight out of ten expressed ‘quite a lot’ government officials were ‘involved in corrup- or ‘a very great deal’ of trust in the army from tion.’ Moreover, the degree to which citizens 2000 onwards (the question was not asked in expressed satisfaction with democracy was 2008). Their faith was somewhat shaken by negatively associated with these widespread the coup of March 2012 because, thereafter, perceptions of official graft.6 popular trust fell by 20 percentage points (to But Mali’s previous reputation as a prom- 67 per cent in December 2012). But two out ising African democracy has not entirely of three Malians still trusted the military. dissolved. Malians remain attached to elec- A comparison with mass skepticism about tions. In 2012, fully 82 per cent continued civilian politicians helps to put popular to favor ‘choosing leaders through regular, support for the military in perspective. In open and honest elections’ rather than some December 2012, fewer than half of adult ‘other method.’ Indeed, competitive elections citizens (43 per cent) expressed trust in have become an institutionalized feature of the interim civilian president, Diancounda Malian political life, with more than eight Traoré, who was installed as a compromise out of ten respondents supporting elections candidate following the military coup. A in every survey since 2002. And it is note- similarly low proportion had confidence in worthy that a preference for elections cuts the National Assembly. Thus, when asked to across society; it is shared between men and contrast the trustworthiness of civilian and women, young and old, urban and rural, and military institutions, Malians apparently feel Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali Art. 31, page 5 of 10

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90 87 79 80 80 81 71 70 70 65 72 62 67 60 61 50 43 42 40 34 30 24 24 25 19 20

0 2000 2002 2005 2008 2012

Approve of military rule Trust the army Trust the President Trust the National Assembly

Figure 2: Attitudes to the Military, Mali 2000–2012* Percentage of adults who offer this opinion. For question wordings, see text. *Six regions only in 2012 (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso). All nine regions 2000–8. more comfortable with the latter than the Attitudes to the State former, though it not clear whether they are Despite the fact that insurgents have violated thinking about the armed forces in a narrow the country’s territorial integrity, citizens sense as defenders of national security or in continue to confer legitimacy on the institu- a broad sense as leaders of a national politi- tions of the Malian state. The 2012 Afroba- cal regime. rometer survey reveals a ‘rally round the flag’ When asked whether ‘the crisis in Mali effect, at least among the residents of the had changed your perceptions of the army,’ southern regions of the country. Compared however, a majority of survey respondents with earlier years, these citizens now indicate (55 per cent) offered a positive response. a greater willingness than before to comply By contrast, only half as many (27 per cent) with the commands of central state institu- said that the crisis had improved their per- tions, such court decisions, police orders, and ceptions of ‘politicians and political parties,’ requests for tax payment. with 71 per cent saying that recent events Moreover, an overwhelming majority of had caused them to lower their opinions of respondents surveyed (88 per cent) believes civilian leaders and institutions. that ‘it is important to obey the government Art. 31, page 6 of 10 Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali

100 90 80 70 60 50 31 36 40 30 16 20 11 6 10 0 L W F I O a o n c e r c th k a e om e o kn ig r f e n p p s t et a s er e tr of r n io t o ce t h ri o is e st f m st s th a a e m te p o o n li g ti le ca ad l c er la s ss

Causes identified by Malian survey repondents

Figure 3: The Perceived Causes of Political Crisis “What, according to you, is the principal cause of the current crisis in Mali?” Open-ended question, one answer allowed, coded in the field by interviewers. in power, no matter who you voted for.’ Thus first to ‘a lack of patriotism among leaders,’ Malians apparently harbor a deferential perhaps implying that civilians in the ATT respect for the authority of the state that has administration were too complacent when it worked to the advantage of military putch- came to defending the integrity of the state. ists and the shaky civilian-military coalition In a similar vein, respondents also point to government now in place in Bamako. Appar- ‘the incompetence of the political class.’ The ently, despite their preference for elections, second most common response is ‘the weak- citizens do not condition their popular rev- ness of the state,’ by which they may mean erence for state institutions on the way that the inability of state institutions to respond governments are constituted because they to challenges from its political environment. think that the commands of the state must Citizens seem to recognize that the capacity always be obeyed. of Mali’s state institutions has been “eroded In attributing causes to the political crisis from within”, by official corruption, ethnic in Mali, citizens are prone to blame civil- separatism and foreign invasions (White- ian politicians (See Figure 3).9 They point house 2013). But they prioritize domes- Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali Art. 31, page 7 of 10 tic causes as the main drivers of the crisis here. Almost half of all survey respondents because only 11 per cent implicate ‘foreign (48 per cent) opted for elections. And 15 per terrorists,’ a third-ranked factor. cent wanted ‘respect for the Constitution,’ Among all political institutions in Mali— which soldiers had suspended when the state and non-state—the weakest of all are army stepped in. Only 7 per cent saw advan- political parties. Almost three out of five tage in a military coup. On balance therefore, Malians (58 per cent) do not identify with a majority of the residents of the populous (‘feel close to’) any political party. As a result, south seek a return to legitimate constitu- the country suffers a shortage of demand- tional rule, almost all of whom consider elec- side institutions capable of linking citizens tions as the best way to get there. to the state. Leading politicians, including Malians also seem to recognize that the ATT, ran for office either without party affilia- restoration of democratic rule is an essential tions or at the head of loose and shifting coa- component in the recovery of an intact and litions. As a result, once elections were held, sovereign state. As such, they would probably citizens had few institutions at their disposal agree with the Western diplomat who said to offset the top-down orders of a bureau- that, ‘stabilization requires an election’ and cratic state, even an increasingly weak one. that a fair poll is as important as the army’s re- conquest of the country’s northern half’ (The Which Way Forward? Economist 2013). But, at the same time they The Malians interviewed in the latest Afroba- continue to harbor doubts about the compe- rometer survey are disturbed by their coun- tence and probity of civilian politicians, espe- try’s political distress. As of December 2012, cially in relation to the army, whose leaders three quarters (75 per cent) said their coun- they tend to trust more. The convocation of try was moving ‘in the wrong direction.’ This elections in a context of high levels of politi- single statistic alone indicates that citizens cal instability and low levels of popular con- perceive a crisis and seek a way out. fidence in civilian institutions remains one of But people are undecided about the best Mali’s largest governance challenges. way forward. Asked about their priority solu- tion to ‘the current crisis,’ Malians express Policy Implications ambivalent views (Figure 4). At the end of What are the implications of public opinion 2012, a plurality (38 per cent) wanted ‘war for policy actors involved in security, govern- against the armed groups in the North.’ ance and development in Mali? What practi- Within this group, however, twice as many cal prerequisites must be in place before any preferred the Malian army rather than the popular preference for electoral democracy Economic Community of West African States can be credibly met? (ECOWAS) to lead any retaliatory strike. The First, international and domestic authori- survey, conducted prior to the French inter- ties should work together to fill the existing vention of January 2013, did not ask about power vacuum and establish a semblance of France.10 On the other hand, 29 per cent pre- political order. This will require more than ferred ‘dialogue’ among the various combat- military pacification. Peace negotiations ants, presumably including ethnic militias, with domestic ethnic minorities – condi- Islamist elements, the Malian armed forces, tional on their disarmament – are essential and the remnants of the country’s civilian for creating enough political space for all regime. And, recognizing the parlous condi- Malian peoples to express themselves. At tion of core administrative institutions, 12 minimum, the residents of the north, both per cent called for a return to ‘a strong state.’ within and beyond major population cent- A related question asked, ‘What is the best ers, will require opportunities to participate way to move beyond a regime that is corrupt in political life without putting their lives and incompetent?’ Clearer answers emerge at risk. In this regard, an international sta- Art. 31, page 8 of 10 Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali

100 90 80 70 60 50 38 40 29 30 18 20 12 10 3 0 W D A C O

a ia st iv th rf lo ro ic e a g n e r re ue g d w w s uc i i ta a th th t ti e o ar a n m rm ed e d gr g o ro up u s ps

Solutions proposed by Malian survey repondents

Figure 4: Proposed Solutions to Political Crisis “In your opinion, through what means can one move beyond the current crisis?” Open-ended question, one answer allowed, coded in the field by interviewers. bilization force under the United Nations – Third, the structure of the state requires including police as well as soldiers – ought review and renewal. Ideally, any first election to be in place before elections are held would be to a representative constituent (MacFarquhar 2013). assembly charged to examine constitutional Second, the Malian army must be induced questions including the rule of law, civilian to soon return to barracks. The international control of the military, regional autonomy, community can offer incentives by helping religious freedom, and minority rights. But to provide the equipment, training and bene- this approach was apparently rejected, or not fits that the soldiers feel they were previously considered, in favor of a direct path to presi- denied and which were triggering factors in dential and legislative elections under the the coup. In return, military commanders existing constitution. A thorough review of must cease the arbitrary dismissal or intimi- the basic law will remain necessary after the dation of civilian officials and withdraw from election, however, and should be conducted political life in order to resume their pro- with broad popular consultation, including a fessional functions as leaders of a national referendum on any new constitution. army. The civilians in the present transitional Fourth, civilian leaders should seek to government must take charge of a roadmap restore popular trust in the political system to accomplish these tasks, preferably before by building or strengthening institutions elections are convened. responsible for corruption control (for exam- Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali Art. 31, page 9 of 10 ple, parliamentary oversight committees and rection. At the regional level, the several independent commissions) and popular rep- Core Partners coordinate survey and oth- resentation (like local government, political er activities: the Institute for Democracy parties, and civic associations). Important in in South Africa (Idasa), the Institute for this process of institutional development are Empirical Research in Political Economy political parties, which are particularly weak (IREEP) in Benin, and the Institute for De- in Mali; yet multi-party dialogue is critical for velopment Studies (IDS) at the University the protection of human rights, the preven- of Nairobi, Kenya. Michigan State Uni- tion of conflict, and the conduct of a credible versity and the University of Cape Town election (ten Hoove and Scholtbach 2008). provide analytic and technical support Fifth, citizens themselves have critical roles services. The Afrobarometer Network to play. The international community should gratefully acknowledges contributions fund, and non-government organizations from the UK Department for Internation- should implement, a coordinated campaign of al Development (DfID), the Swedish In- civic education to engage Malians in debates ternational Development Agency (SIDA), about the importance of elections and the the United States Agency for Internation- need for constitutional reform. Special atten- al Development (USAID), the World Bank, tion must be paid to boosting the country’s and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Grants depressingly low voter turnout rates, for from these donors support research, ca- example by teaching citizens about their own pacity building and outreach activities in responsibilities for demanding accountability Afrobarometer Rounds 5 and 6, 2010–15. from elected leaders and equipping them with Afrobarometer researchers, rather than the necessary informational, organizational sponsoring agencies, take responsibil- and lobbying skills. In the meantime, public ity for all results and interpretations. For opinion research can continue to explore the more information, see: www.afrobarom- role of ordinary people in political change and eter.org socioeconomic development. Finally, in order 2 Whitehouse (2012) summarizes the events to draw the correct lessons, policy makers surrounding this ‘accidental coup,’ in need to examine their own past performance, which the president and public offered lit- especially as it relates helping to offset the tle resistance to a small band of mutineers. stark inequalities in levels of economic and 3 The question asked respondents to social development between Mali’s northern choose which of three options was ‘clos- and southern regions.11 est to your own opinion’: (a) ‘Democracy Of course, elections alone do not a democ- is preferable to any other kind of gov- racy make. Nor does widespread popular ernment’; (b) ‘In some circumstances, a support for elections necessarily make Mali- non-democratic government can be pref- ans democrats. Only in the context of an erable,’ and; (c) ‘For someone like me, it intact state – with an inclusive constitutional doesn’t matter what kind of government settlement, trustworthy civilian institutions, we have.’ and an engaged citizenry – will Mali be ready 4 For more details on earlier Afrobarome- again for routine presidential and legislative ter surveys see GREAT 2013. elections that lead in a democratic direction. 5 Benin,Cape Verde, Ghana and Liberia. 6 Pearson’s r = -.129, p <.001. Notes 7 ‘Pressed on All Sides, Coup Leader in Mali 1 The Afrobarometer is a collaborative is Digging In,’ New York Times, March survey research project conducted by an 31, 2012. international network of social scientists. 8 Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, The Center for Democratic Development Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, South (CDD-Ghana) provides overall project di- Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe. Art. 31, page 10 of 10 Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali

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How to cite this article: Coulibaly, M and Bratton, M 2013 Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 31, pp. 1-10, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bn

Published: 3 July 2013

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