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Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward Massa Coulibaly* and Michael Bratton†

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Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward Massa Coulibaly* and Michael Bratton† Coulibaly, M and Bratton, M 2013 Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular stability Attitudes on the Way Forward. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 31, pp. 1-10, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bn ARTICLE Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward Massa Coulibaly* and Michael Bratton† This article asks what Malians think about their country’s political crisis, including its causes, status, and possible solutions. An Afrobarometer survey of public opinion conducted at the end of 2012 finds the electorate in an apprehensive and ambivalent mood. Malians express declining faith in democracy as well as considerable (but diminishing) trust in the army. In a sign of democratic resilience, however, a large and broad majority continues to believe in elections as the best way to reconstitute a government. But only in the context of a stable and intact state – with an inclusive constitutional settlement, trustworthy civil- ian institutions, and engaged citizenry – will Mali be ready again for routine presidential and legislative elections. Mali faces a political crisis of multiple dimen- In this respect, the political crisis in Mali sions. A poorly planned military coup and displays many of the challenges highlighted the collapse of a corrupt and incompetent in the literature on democratization in post- civilian regime have together seriously set conflict societies (de Zeeuw and Kumar back the country’s progress towards democ- 2006; Flores and Nooruddin 2009; Mehler racy. Moreover, an armed conflict with ethnic 2013). Civil conflict leaves in its wake frag- separatists and religious extremists in the ile states that are ill prepared to meet pop- north has grievously undermined the integ- ular demands for security, freedom and rity of the state. These twin political trends prosperity and which may even destabilize – the emergence of an authoritarian regime the region and the world (Curtis 2013). Yet and the disintegration of state institutions the role of democratization in post-conflict – are deeply interconnected. As noted by a recovery is unclear: Do democratic proce- recent contributor to this journal, ‘the politi- dures like elections pave the way to institu- cal chaos in Bamako and the military chal- tional stability and accountable governance? lenge in the north are undeniably related: Or does a premature return to open political confusion about who has legal authority and competition raise social tensions, thus risk- political power to rule the country hinders ing renewed political conflict? What, there- efforts to organize a credible effort to reinte- fore, is the right timetable for the restoration grate the north’ (Thurston 2012: 4). of electoral politics? On balance, analysts tend to favor phased democratization (Diamond 2006). The first * Groupe de recherche en économie appliquée et order of business is to reestablish political théorique (GREAT), Mali [email protected] order by rebuilding the basic capacity of state † Michigan State University, U.S.A. institutions like the armed forces and the [email protected] police. But an equally important considera- Art. 31, page 2 of 10 Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali tion is the accountability of the state to civil however, a large and broad majority contin- society, for example through civilian control ues to believe in elections as the best way to of these agencies of coercion. The account- reconstitute a government. ability principle requires the convocation of free and fair elections as soon as feasible The Survey after the reestablishment of central state The Afrobarometer is an independent, com- authority. It seems unlikely in the short run parative survey research project that docu- that Mali can survive intact as a territorial ments the public mood on issues of democ- entity or return to a democratic path with- racy and governance in 35 African countries. out international assistance, mainly from Managed by a network of African social sci- the West. But the international community’s entists, the survey uses trained enumerators strategy has been criticized as a standard for- to gather information in face-to-face inter- mula of ‘shoot and vote’, meaning military views in the language of the respondents’ pacification followed by elections. Instead, choice. The project employs national prob- the critics of this approach often argue, ‘pro- ability samples representing the adult popu- viding security, feeding people and resettling lation of each country. Data are weighted to refugees should take precedence over stag- represent each respondent proportionally ing elections’ (Thurston, 2012, 6). and each country equally. While there is merit to this view, it does Three features should be noted about the not take into account the need for politi- Round 5 Afrobarometer survey in Mali. cal reform or the prevailing preferences of First, fieldwork was conducted from Malian citizens. Where do ordinary people December 16 to 31, 2012. The survey there- stand with regard to alternate methods – fore followed the military coup conducted force or negotiation – for resolving armed by a group of disgruntled soldiers under Cap- conflict? How can legitimate authority be tain Amadou Sanogo on 22 March 2012.2 It reconstituted in Bamako if not through also occurred in the aftermath of the fall of elections? Most importantly, when it comes major towns in northern Mali to a coalition to charting a way forward, what do Malians of Taureg and Islamist insurgents (April), as themselves prefer – the installation of a well as after a physical assault on the interim newly elected government or the continua- civilian president Dioncounda Traoré (May), tion of some form of transitional, even mili- and the arrest by soldiers and forced resigna- tary-backed, regime? tion of Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra This article asks what Malians think about (December). But the survey preceded the their country’s political crisis, including advance of jihadi fighters on Konna (towards its causes, status, and possible solutions. Sévaré, a city with a major airport) and Dia- An Afrobarometer survey of public opin- baly, as well as the French-led intervention ion conducted at the end of 2012 finds the that repelled them (January 2013). The electorate in an apprehensive and ambiva- results reported here therefore represent a lent mood.1 A large majority thinks that the snapshot of public opinion at a particularly country is moving in the wrong direction. dire moment midway through a tumultuous They attribute this negative momentum period of political instability. to the incompetence of civilian politicians Second, the survey sample (N=1200) was and the frailty of state institutions. They truncated. Due to armed hostilities in the are split on whether warfare or talks are north, the geographical scope of the pro- the best way to put an end to armed insur- ject was restricted to the six southernmost gency. In searching for solutions, Malians regions of the country (Bamako, Kayes, Kou- express declining faith in democracy as well likoro, Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso). Excluded as considerable (but diminishing) trust in were Gao, Kidal and Tomboctou regions, the army. In a sign of democratic resilience, which encompass more than 50 per cent Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali Art. 31, page 3 of 10 of Mali’s land area but less than 10 per cent towards the regime and the state. Five such of its population. One consequence is that surveys in Mali since 2000 allow analysts to ethnic Tauregs and speakers of Tamasheq, track trends over time in these attitudes. But as well as other ethnic minorities resident the surveys have less to say about the sources in the Sahara zone, were not sufficiently and trajectory of civil conflicts and the role available for interview. Security conditions therein of armed forces, whether national permitting, the Afrobarometer intends to or international. include northern cities in a follow-up survey to be conducted later in 2013. Otherwise, Attitudes to Democracy the existing sample is representative of all Are Malians democrats? As of December adults, aged 18 and older, in the six southern 2012, a clear majority (62 per cent) said that regions. For that large segment of the Malian they ‘prefer democracy to any other forms population, the data are reliable within a of government’.3 But the proportion that margin of sampling error of plus or minus expressed allegiance to democracy was 3 per cent at a 95 per cent confidence level. down by ten percentage points from 2008 Third, the Afrobarometer’s comparative (See Figure 1). And almost two out of five advantage is to record mass political attitudes adults felt either disillusioned, wondering 100 90 86 82 81 82 80 71 72 68 70 60 63 62 57 60 59 49 50 40 32 33 30 31 30 24 20 12 10 0 2000 2002 2005 2008 2012 Prefer democracy Perceive a full democracy Satisfied with democracy Attached to elections Figure 1: Attitudes to Democracy, Mali 2000–2012* Percentage of adults who offer this opinion. For question wordings, see text. *Six regions only in 2012 (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso). All nine regions 2000–8. Art. 31, page 4 of 10 Coulibaly and Bratton: Crisis in Mali whether the country’s desperate circum- among all ethnic groups, at least in the six stances called for a non-democratic alterna- most populous regions of the south. tive (19 per cent), or ambivalent, claiming that they didn’t care what kind of political Attitudes to the Military regime was in office in Bamako (18 per cent). How, then, do Malians feel about military Malians also recognize that democracy rule? A majority (58 per cent) rejects this form building is a disappearing option in their of government. But the proportion of the country. True, the proportion seeing Mali adult population who approve of a regime in as ‘a full democracy’ rose gradually between which ‘the army comes in to govern the coun- 2000 and 2008.4 But by the end of 2012, fol- try’ rose from 25 per cent in 2008 (before the lowing the fall of a weak civilian administra- coup) to 34 per cent in 2012 (after the coup) tion at the hands of military plotters, just (See Figure 2).
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