MALI: AVOIDING ESCALATION Africa Report N°189 – 18 July 2012 Translation from French TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE OBSCURE TWISTS AND TURNS OF ATT’S NORTHERN POLICY ............ 2 A. TUAREG REBELLIONS, THE NATIONAL PACT AND THE ALGIERS ACCORDS ................................... 2 B. LONG-TERM, DEEPLY-ROOTED ESTABLISHMENT OF AQIM IN NORTHERN MALI .......................... 5 C. THE FINAL FAILURE OF ATT’S SECURITY POLICY: THE SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN MALI ................................................................... 6 D. FROM THE MNA TO THE MNLA: A REBELLION IN THE MAKING ................................................. 7 III. NOW OR NEVER? THE RESURGENCE OF THE REBELLION ............................ 8 A. THE LIBYAN FACTOR: QADHAFI AND NORTHERN MALI ............................................................... 8 B. THE RISE OF THE MNLA ........................................................................................................... 10 C. IYAD AG GHALI’S THWARTED PERSONAL AMBITIONS AND THE ISLAMIST AGENDA .................. 12 IV. THE FRAGMENTED AND VOLATILE DYNAMICS OF THE REBEL MOVEMENT ................................................................................................................... 13 A. THE LIGHTNING MILITARY CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED BY THE ARMED GROUPS IN THE NORTH .... 13 B. THE EVENTS OF AGUELHOC AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE NORTH .............. 14 C. THE GRADUAL EVICTION OF THE MNLA BY ANSAR DINE AND AQIM’S ARMED OFFSHOOTS... 16 V. THE COUP: COLLATERAL DAMAGE FROM THE NORTHERN REBELLION OR CONSEQUENCE OF THE LONG DECLINE OF THE STATE? ................................................................................................................... 18 A. THE BRUTAL END OF A TWENTY-YEAR DEMOCRATIC CAREER ................................................. 18 1. A longstanding malaise within the armed forces ....................................................................... 18 2. A political history typical of West Africa .................................................................................. 19 3. Weakness and corruption of the state at a time of globalisation ................................................ 20 B. THE COUP’S AFTERMATH: CONFUSION AND CHAOS IN THE SOUTH ............................................ 21 1. Polarised political circles ........................................................................................................... 21 2. ECOWAS actions and the junta’s reactions .............................................................................. 22 3. Controversial ECOWAS efforts at mediation ............................................................................ 24 VI. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR MALI? ................................................... 26 A. POLITICAL ALLIANCES, SPLITS AND REORGANISATION IN NORTHERN MALI .............................. 26 B. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT SIXES AND SEVENS ......................................................... 28 C. HALT THE DECLINE OF THE MALIAN STATE AND PREVENT REGIONAL DESTABILISATION .......... 29 1. Get the Malian state back on its feet .......................................................................................... 30 2. In the north: promoting a political approach while pursuing the restoration of military capacity ......................................................................................................................... 31 3. Harmonise international action and avoid doing more harm than good .................................... 32 VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 33 APPENDICES A. MAP OF MALI .................................................................................................................................. 34 B. MAP OF MALI AND THE REGION: ARMED CONFLICT AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS ...................... 35 C. LIST OF ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................... 36 D. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOLEMN COMMITMENT OF 1 APRIL 2012 .............................................................................................................................. 37 E. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY POLITICAL EVENTS ...................................................................................... 40 F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 42 G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2009 ..................................................... 43 H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 45 Africa Report N°189 18 July 2012 MALI: AVOIDING ESCALATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS In a little more than two months, Mali’s political regime ation of the MNLA. By taking control of the north, Ansar has been demolished. An armed rebellion launched on 17 Dine has established a modus vivendi, if not a pact, with January 2012 expelled the army from the north while a a range of armed actors, including former regime-backed coup deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) on Arab and Tuareg militias and, in particular, al-Qaeda in 22 March. These two episodes ushered Mali into an un- the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The latter is responsible for precedented crisis that also threatens regional political sta- kidnappings and killings of many Westerners in Mali, bility and security. An external armed intervention would Niger and Mauritania, attacks against the armies of the nevertheless involve considerable risks. The international region and involved in criminal transborder trafficking. community must support dialogue between the armed and Northern Mali could easily become a safe haven for jihadi unarmed actors in the north and south that favours a polit- fighters from multiple backgrounds. ical solution to the crisis. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) must readjust its media- Considered for twenty years a model of democratic pro- tion efforts to avoid aggravating the already deep fault lines gress in sub-Saharan Africa, Mali is now on the brink of in Malian society. Strengthening the credibility of transi- sheer dissolution. The prospects of a negotiated solution tional institutions to restore the state and its security forces to the crisis are receding with the consolidation of hard- is an absolute priority. Finally, coordinated regional securi- line Islamist power in the north and a continued political, ty measures must be taken to prevent once foreign groups institutional and security vacuum in Bamako. Although from turning northern Mali into a new front in the “war on ECOWAS initially sent out positive signals, the credibility terror”. of its diplomatic action was seriously compromised by a lack of transparency in the attempts at mediation led by In Bamako, the capital, the transitional framework agreed Burkina Faso, which was bitterly criticised in the Malian by ECOWAS and the junta, composed of junior officers led capital and beyond. Pressure is mounting in favour of an by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, has failed to establish external armed intervention as specific security and politi- undisputed political arrangements. The junta has rallied cal interests of foreign actors – neighbouring states and grassroots support by capitalising on the anger of a signif- others – prevail over those of the Malian population in both icant minority of the population towards ATT’s govern- the north and south. ment, with which it associates the interim president, Dion- counda Traoré, former head of the National Assembly. It would be wise to ignore calls for war and instead to con- Traoré was physically attacked, and could have been killed, tinue with existing initiatives to promote a political settle- by supporters of the coup leaders in the presidential palace ment of the conflict, while ensuring that security issues are on 21 May 2012. Flown to France for treatment, he had not neglected. ECOWAS countries willing to send troops still not returned to Bamako in mid-July. The destruction do not appear to fully grasp the complex social situation of the military apparatus and the weakness of the transi- in northern Mali, and underestimate the high risk of inter- tional authorities, notably the government of Prime Minis- tribal settling of scores that would result from external ter Cheick Modibo Diarra, soon to be reshuffled, impede military intervention. Such an intervention would turn Ma- the Malian forces’ ability to restore territorial integrity in li into a new front of the “war on terror”, at the expense the short term and avoid serious collapse. of longstanding political demands in the north, and rule out any chance of peaceful coexistence between the dif- In the north, the Tuareg group that launched the rebellion, ferent communities. Finally, it would expose West Africa the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad to reprisals in the form of terrorist activity to which it is (Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, MNLA) not equipped to respond. AQIM’s logistical links with has been outflanked by an armed Islamist