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BITS Policy Note 05.3 ISSN 1434-3274 May 2005

Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and

Should end U.S. 'nuclear outsourcing'?

Otfried Nassauer

Fifty years after the arrival of the first nu- And therefore I support the endeavour to clear on German soil a - perhaps achieve a withdrawal of these weapons in decisive - debate on their future has begun. concert with NATO”.3 Public demands to withdraw the remaining Presently, the Federal Government plans to nuclear weapons from Germany are becom- arrange for consultations with Belgium, Italy ing more numerous.1 Furthermore, relevant and the Netherlands, since these countries - decision-makers have recently joined the like Germany - stockpile American nuclear chorus being either in favour of a with- weapons on their territory as part of their drawal or at least regarding such a demand nd nuclear sharing agreements in NATO. In a worthy of consideration. On May 2 For- second step it is planned to approach the eign Minister referred to U.S. and NATO on this issue. A meeting of this demand as a “reasonable initiative”, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), sched- which the government will "seriously" take uled for June 9th and 10th in Brussels, would into consideration.2 Defence Minister Peter th offer an opportunity for this. It will be the Struck announced on May 6 “that we will first meeting of this NATO body after an 18 mention this issue in the relevant NATO month long break. bodies”, and stated: “Together with those other allies, on whose territory nuclear The course of action proposed by the Fed- weapons are deployed, we will deliberate eral Government is to look for ways to end this". Furthermore, one can assume that the deployment of nuclear weapons in Kurt Beck (SPD), Prime Minister of the Europe in concert with those European State of Rhineland-Palatinate, which is the NATO states being in a similar situation. It sole remaining federal state still housing points in the right direction. Since most nuclear weapons, has conferred with Struck security policy experts agree that these before their recent visit of the U.S. Air weapons have no real military value nowa- Force Headquarters at Ramstein, where he days and are presumably kept mainly for added: “I completely share the view of the symbolic reasons, it is time to talk about Federal Government that the we no longer their withdrawal. have a threat situation which justifies in any way maintaining this storage permanently.

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It is to be welcomed that the Federal The Proposal Republic, being of particular importance as The Federal Government of Germany Europe's largest deployment site, has should pushed this debate and wants to strive for a consensus on the withdrawal. 1. declare Germany's willingness to abandon existing technical capabilities Nevertheless, the Federal Government and of the German Air Force to use U.S. German Parliament () should also nuclear weapons during NATO op- take a second step which could help to un- erations in times of war; derline the seriousness of their intentions and avoid a crucial disadvantage of the 2. initiate consultations with other Euro- charted course of action: Sticking to the pean member states of NATO, which original plan would mean, that the German possess similar capabilities, on their decision to give up nuclear weapons and the readiness and willingness to follow associated capabilities to employ them on- suit; board German aircrafts inside the frame- 3. initiate consultations with these Euro- work of NATO would come too late to pean NATO member states in order influence the ongoing and extremely diffi- to achieve a common position to cult negotiations on the future of the Nu- work together in NATO for a with- clear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in a drawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons positive fashion. These will end on May 27th from European soil; - two weeks before a possible decision by 4. introduce such an initiative in pursuit NATO. Therefore, Germany is about to of a positive decision in time for the miss an opportunity to substantially session of the NATO defence minis- strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and ters on June 9th and 10th, when they nuclear disarmament. meet as the Nuclear Planning Group; In his statement at the opening of the Re- 5. inform the participants of the NPT view Conference on the Nuclear Non- Review Conference in New York as Proliferation Treaty on May 2nd Germany's soon as possible on the measures Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer remarked taken by Germany. in an explicit fashion: “We should re- examine the existing arsenals of strategic The Bundestag should add a corresponding and sub-strategic (formerly 'tactical' - ON) resolution as a supplement to the present nuclear weapons and energetically work to resolution on support for the NPT Review further reduce them. (...) What we need now Conference. is a new impetus for nuclear disarmament.” Thereby, Germany would leave the technical And further onward: “It is our objective to dimension of NATO's nuclear sharing ar- reduce and eliminate these weapons on all rangement. It declares its readiness to aban- 4 sides”. Fischer made clear, that the Federal don the capability of German aircrafts and Government hopes that the Review Confer- pilots to use U.S. nuclear weapons in times ence could achieve a 'balanced' outcome in of war once the U.S. President authorised regard to the two main goals of the NPT, their use. Practically, this would mean, that non-proliferation and disarmament. Germany This policy paper presents and explains a · will no longer provide aircraft and pi- proposal, by which the Federal Government lots for future nuclear missions of can independently contribute to a successful NATO, conclusion of the NPT Review Conference this month. · will phase out its nuclear-capable air- craft,

· halts all training measures for these purposes,

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· cancels the respective agreements that those of the nuclear power USA.9 constitute the legal basis for the tech- Numerous reasons and arguments can be nical dimension of nuclear sharing. listed in favour of implementing this pro- For many years now, a majority of the NPT posal during the NPT Review Conference. member states have regarded NATO's prac- This measure tice of nuclear sharing as a violation of the 1. is the only step by which Germany, as spirit, if not even the letter of the NPT. This a non-nuclear state, can actively con- view was again voiced repeatedly and explic- 5 tribute to disarmament of existing itly at the present Review Conference. military nuclear capabilities and the The above mentioned proposal corresponds respective delivery systems; with the mid- and long-term plans of the 2. can facilitate long overdue discussions German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). The on the inclusion of tactical or sub- Bundeswehr wants to convert its two re- strategic weapons, into the arms con- maining Tornado units, which can contrib- trol debate - or respectively actively ute to nuclear sharing capacities. On January encourage to push for such a discus- 29th, 2001, the "Order of the Day", issued by sion - especially with respect to Rus- the Air Force Chief of Staff outlining plans sia; to adopt the “Air Force Structure 5”, stated, 3. is a clear signal that Germany consid- that the 31. and 33. Fighter-Bomber Wings ers nuclear weapons to have a lesser “will be equipped with the multi-role capa- role for security policy in the future; ble EF 2000 between 2007-2010 and 2012- 4. constitutes a confidence-building 2015”. The multi-role Eurofighter is not measure; designed as a nuclear-capable aircraft. Par- liamentary Secretary of State of the Ministry 5. strengthens the Nuclear Non- of Defence, , reassured the proliferation Treaty, because by Ger- Bundestag in July 2004: “It is not planned many terminating nuclear sharing, a and no steps are undertaken to make the practice is ended which the majority Eurofighter system capable for a of the state parties to the NPT regards mission with nuclear weapons.”6 Therefore: as a violation of the spirit, if not the In about ten years time the German contri- letter of the treaty; and bution to the technical dimension of nuclear 6. explicitly demonstrates that Germany sharing is scheduled to be phased out any- is committed to pursue a restrictive way. This raises the question, why this can’t interpretation and strict adherence to happen now - or asking the other way the NPT without any compromises. around: which reasons justify maintaining this expensive capability for another ten In addition, regarding the other non-nuclear years? NATO member states which are at present also parties to the nuclear sharing mecha- The proposal would not prevent other, nism, Germany takes a leading and con- more far-reaching but also more complex structive role, encouraging the other states. and time-consuming attempts to reach an to follow suit in an analogue fashion. agreement with the U.S. on a complete withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from The legions of arguments which have been Germany and Europe.7 Instead, it could fielded throughout Germany's 50 years of serve as a first step on the way towards history in favour of maintaining the techni- achieving these longer term goals. The pro- cal dimension of nuclear sharing, have either posal falls inside Germany’s national deci- become outdated or are now only of com- sion-making authority and therefore doesn’t paratively marginal relevance. Since a long require advance approval of third parties.8 It time, providing nuclear capable delivery can be realised without infringing on the systems is no longer a prerequisite for full domain of other NATO states, especially membership and a full say of non-nuclear

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Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) 4 states in the Nuclear Planning Group, where Appendix: Background Information the members of the Alliance discuss poten- tial courses of action. Canada and Greece, 1. Nuclear Sharing two non-nuclear states, which previously The concept of nuclear sharing was devel- have operated nuclear capable delivery sys- oped during the fifties, when Germany’s tems, are still fully involved in the NPG. armed forces, the Bundeswehr, were being Furthermore, all new NATO member states set up and NATO was gradually shifting do have unconditional access to and a full towards its strategy of massive retaliation say in the NPG even though they are not (MC 14/2). In March 1957 NATO’s Su- contributing any nuclear delivery systems. preme Commander, General Norstadt, con- Before their accession to NATO, they were firmed for the first time that the U.S. was assured that they would not become second- storing nuclear weapons in Germany. A class members because of not owning such couple of days later he went one step further systems. The argument “We have to go by stating, that in the event of war the USA along in order to have a say" is not valid were willing to hand over nuclear weapons anymore. Otherwise the assurances given to to the allies, for example Germany, for use the new NATO states would be worthless by their delivery systems. Shortly afterwards and they would be de facto second-class Chancellor Konrad Adenauer publicly members. However, this step would not voiced interest in equipping the Bundeswehr mean a complete de-nuclearisation of with nuclear capable delivery systems.13 NATO’s strategy. In case of an emergency, Leading up to these statements, bilateral British and U.S. nuclear submarines could talks had been held between the U.S. and be still assigned to the Alliance. Finally, even Germany since autumn of 1956. They re- the argument, that only the deployment of sulted in an agreement in principle that nuclear weapons in Europe and the avail- Germany would purchase nuclear delivery ability of European delivery systems signals systems while the U.S. would later provide the willingness of European NATO states the required nuclear ammunition. This ar- to carry their fair share of nuclear risks, roles rangement was codified legally through bi- and responsibilities has lost weight. This is lateral agreements and technically put into revealed by various facts, e.g. the fact, that practice. After 1963 - U.S. President John F. the Nuclear Planning Group only meets Kennedy, being a great deal more concerned annually or that it now takes months instead about the safety of nuclear weapons than his of weeks or even minutes, as was the case in predecessors and wanting to minimise the earlier times, to achieve full scale nuclear 10 risk of an accidental nuclear war - the USA readiness for delivery systems. Today, began to equip their nuclear weapons with there simply is no military requirement for new safety systems, Permissive Action maintaining the technical dimension of nu- Links. They were supposed to guarantee, clear sharing and there is no justification for that nuclear weapons could only be used if the additional expenditures associated with authorised by the U.S. President. this practice.11 Therefore the vast majority of the arguments supports the conclusion The negotiations on the NPT were a deli- that Germany can end its participation in cate issue for all NATO states. The treaty the technical dimension of nuclear sharing would - that became quickly obvious - di- and publicly announce this step in order to vide NATO members into two categories: strengthen the NPT as a German contribu- those, who could own nuclear weapons le- tion to disarmament and non-proliferation.12 gally and those who would join the treaty as The current Review Conference offers the non-nuclear states. This put the established opportunity for this. system of nuclear sharing in jeopardy. The non-nuclear NATO states wanted to safe- guard their future involvement in NATO nuclear strategy and planning. They had already been pushing for quite some time

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Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) 5 for a greater say and formalisation of the Contrary to this, Article I and II of the Athens Guidelines of 1962. These contained freshly negotiated treaty read provisions for the possibility of prior con- sultations among NATO’s members on the "Article I possible future use of nuclear weapons if Each nuclear-weapon State Party to time and circumstances would permit. Fur- the Treaty undertakes not to transfer thermore, the U.S. had adopted its new to any recipient whatsoever nuclear strategy of “flexible response” during the weapons or other nuclear explosive same year and was pushing for a matching devices or control over such weap- readjustment of NATO strategy. ons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to as- The difficult task of bringing the NPT and sist, encourage, or induce any non- the established NATO practice of nuclear nuclear-weapon State to manufac- sharing, or rather 'nuclear outsourcing', un- ture or otherwise acquire nuclear der one umbrella, was solved by the NATO weapons or other nuclear explosive states only after several failed attempts, such devices, or control over such weap- as the Multilateral Fleet (MLF), and only by ons or explosive devices. a highly dubious trick. Article II The result was on the one hand a modified Each non-nuclear-weapon State concept of political nuclear sharing which Party to the Treaty undertakes not to didn’t collide with the NPT: The creation of receive the transfer from any trans- the Nuclear Planning Group in 1966 intro- feror whatsoever of nuclear weapons duced the political dimension of nuclear or other nuclear explosive devices or sharing and created a body for consultations of control over such weapons or ex- on issues such as Alliance nuclear strategy, plosive devices directly, or indirectly; stockpile size, deployment of nuclear weap- not to manufacture or otherwise ac- ons and delivery systems and contingency quire nuclear weapons or other nu- and operations planning as well as for nu- clear explosive devices; and not to clear . At first, there were only seek or receive any assistance in the four permanent members (USA, Great Brit- manufacture of nuclear weapons or ain, Italy and Germany) and four rotating other nuclear explosive devices."16 non-permanent members.14 Since 1979 par- ticipation in the Nuclear Planning Group is Until today, five of the non-nuclear NATO open to all NATO members, independent states possess delivery systems which are of the level of their involvement in imple- available for nuclear missions in case of war. menting NATO's nuclear strategy. This also These are specially equipped fighter- holds true for all new members which bomber-aircraft, so-called "dual capable joined NATO after the end of the Cold aircraft" (DCA), which can be armed with War. conventional and nuclear weapons. Their However, in the run-up to the signing of the crew is taught and trained in time to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty a second, prepare and carry out nuclear missions. Nu- very tricky step was taken: Most signatories clear weapons will be provided by the U.S. were kept in the dark about the fact, that the and are stored at the airfields of the Euro- NATO states were declaring their present pean allies. During times of peace they re- practice of the technical dimension of nu- main exclusively under the control and su- clear sharing to be legal in the future. Nu- pervision of the U.S. Air Force and would clear delivery systems of non-nuclear states only be handed over to the armed forces of 17 were permitted to be employed in the event the non-nuclear allies in times of war. of a war to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons. Presently, air force units from Belgium, According to NATO's understanding the Germany, Netherlands, Italy and perhaps new treaty would not apply in times of Turkey are technically capable of being war.15 armed with U.S. nuclear weapons. In former

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Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) 6 times Canada, Greece and France have been the treaty without knowing exactly what involved in earlier years. Some other non- NATO meant by nuclear sharing, or at least nuclear NATO states like Denmark, Nor- without knowing, how NATO interpreted way and Spain have opted to only partici- the relation between the NPT and NATO's pate in the political dimension of nuclear concept of nuclear sharing. sharing. This also holds true for all new During the treaty negotiations Washington member states of NATO. dug deep into its machiavellian toolbox to bring nuclear sharing and NPT into a seem- ing compliance and possibly even negotiated 2. NPT and the Legality of Nuclear 20 Sharing under false pretences. The majority of the NPT signatories regards The thesis of NPT and nuclear sharing be- the concept of nuclear sharing as a violation ing in compliance rests on the unilateral of the treaty. Since 1998 the more than interpretation of Article I and II by the U.S., hundred states of non-aligned movement disseminated in a document titled “Questions (NAM) repeatedly have called on NATO on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty asked by states to give up this policy. In a working US Allies together with Answers given by the paper from 1998 they proposed, that the United States”. Attached to the ratification contracting state parties should reaffirm documents for the NPT this document was their commitments to implement Article I handed over to the U.S. Senate as a letter to and II of the treaty to the fullest: the European allies from the then U.S. Sec- retary of State, Dean Rusk. It explained, why "Nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT the United States regarded the existing de- reaffirm their commitment to the fullest sign of nuclear sharing not as a violation of implementation of this Article and to refrain the treaty. It is frequently referred to as the from, among themselves, with non-nuclear- Rusk-Letter. weapon states, and with states not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military pur- Starting point of its reasoning is the assump- poses under any kind of security arrange- tion that everything not explicitly forbidden ments."18 by the NPT is allowed. It goes on to declare the various elements of nuclear sharing as Despite this, NATO still believes its practice being permitted: The procedures on consul- to be in compliance with the treaty. U.S.- tations and participation in the framework Secretary of State Albright argued in 1997, of the Nuclear Planning Group, the de- that nuclear sharing and nuclear consulta- ployment of U.S. weapons on the territories tions in NATO do not violate the rules of of non-nuclear states in Europe and the the NPT in any way. arming of non-nuclear states with delivery "This question of NPT Article I and its im- systems for nuclear weapons which belong pact on NATO nuclear forces was debated to the U.S. At its core the line of argument at length during the negotiation of the NPT. always stays the same: Since only the U.S. All concerned accepted that the final lan- President can authorise their use, control guage of Article I would not preclude the over them remains with the U.S. in peace type of nuclear planning, basing, and consul- times and thereby guarantees observance of tative arrangements that have taken place in the NPT. Thus, no phrase of the treaty NATO since NPT entry-into-force in would explicitly prohibit any element of 1970." 19 nuclear sharing. This position, stating that the practice of However, the Rusk-Letter's most delicate nuclear sharing is in full compliance with the problem concerns the following question: NPT and that this was accepted by all state How should the use of U.S. nuclear weap- parties during the negotiations leading to the ons by delivery systems of non-nuclear NPT, raises serious doubts. However most states, for instance by a German aircraft members of the NPT have probably signed with a German crew, during war times be

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Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) 7 treated. Here, the control over a nuclear That a situation, in which the vast majority weapon is being transferred to citizens of a of parties would sign the treaty in ignorance non-nuclear state. The Rusk-Letter provides of the U.S. interpretation, was no accident a perplexing answer: In times of war the but actually desired, reveals a letter of the treaty does not apply anymore. The reason- then Undersecretary of Defence, Nicholas ing behind this U.S. conclusion is even more Katzenbach, from April 10th, 1968: surprising: In case a war has broken out, the "We do not believe it would be in our inter- treaty could not fulfil its purpose anymore est or that of our allies to have a public dis- to prevent the proliferation of nuclear cussion of the US interpretations prior to weapons and to prevent a war being fought the time when the NPT is submitted to the with these weapons. Therefore the treaty 22 Senate for advice and consent." ceases to be binding. From this followed logically, that almost no Indeed: the preamble of the NPT stated party to the NPT outside of NATO really according to U.S. wishes that it is the pur- knew in detail under which most relevant pose of the NPT “to prevent such ( a nu- interpretations NATO states signed the clear) war”. The U.S. interpretations deduce NPT. True, most of the NATO states de- from this their position that the NPT does posited some kind of reservations along not apply in times of war. with their signature, which did refer indi- During the negotiations the legal advisor to rectly to the interpretation offered by the the State Department, Leonard Meeker, Rusk-Letter, but none repeated the content already counselled against utilising such or substance of the Rusk-letter. tricky interpretations and procedural fine Only at the third NPT Review Conference print: in 1985, due to a Swedish initiative, a word- "Should we decide to leave the wartime ex- ing countering the NATO interpretation ception implicit we would want to make was adopted in the final document. Since perfectly clear at Geneva what we were do- then, the treaty is valid “under all circum- ing, lest we later be accused of having nego- stances” – including times of war.23 21 tiated a treaty under false pretenses." But exactly this happened. Meeker’s warning 3. Nuclear weapons in Germany was blown in the wind and the number of people aware of which interpretation the At present, normally around 150 nuclear NATO states were actually intending to weapons are deployed at two locations in apply was kept to a minimum in a similar Germany: At Büchel in the Eifel mountains cunning fashion. and Ramstein in the province of Palatinate.24 A third location in Nörvenich in North The letter with U.S. answers to the ques- Rhine-Westphalia can be reactivated if nec- tions of European allies was not – as would essary. have been usual practice – transformed into a national reservation which would be de- The Bundeswehr Airbase at Büchel hosts posited openly upon signature and thereby the 33. Fighter-Bomber Wing (Jagdbomber- accessible for all parties to the treaty. In- geschwader 33) of the German Air Force. stead, it was added only on July 9th 1968, Both flights of the wing have been equipped eight days after more than fifty states had with two-seated Tornado IDS fighter- already signed the treaty, to the documents bomber aircraft during the eighties and are send to the U.S. Senate for discussions on designated for use in air-interdiction mis- the national ratification of the NPT. Ac- sions during times of war. This version of cording to the interpretations of the U.S. the Tornado is especially designed for low- Administration, this procedure sufficiently altitude missions and can carry a variety of ensured, that the rest of the world was made conventional bombs, submunition dispens- aware of its content. ers and missiles, but also U.S. nuclear weap- ons of Type B-61. Its active nuclear role

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Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) 8 distinguishes the wing in Büchel from any Theoretically, the airbase at Nörvenich also other Tornado-wing of the German Air could be used for the storage of nuclear Force. The 33. Jagdbombergeschwader is weapons. It hosts eleven protective aircraft Germany’s contribution to the technical shelters with underground magazines for dimension of nuclear sharing. nuclear weapons. But these remain unused In peace time Tornado-crews at Büchel are since the mid-nineties when the base was trained for nuclear missions. Nuclear weap- downgraded from active to caretaker nuclear ons would be provided by the U.S. during status. The German Luftwaffensicherung- times of war onsite. Theoretically, up to 44 staffel “S” and the U.S. MUNSS at Nörven- of these weapons can be stored in the ich were dissolved. The 31. Jagdbomber- eleven nuclear weapon storage vaults (WS3- geschwader, equipped with Tornado IDS, vaults) which are located beneath the floor now is designated to carry out conventional of the hardened aircraft protective shelters. missions. Nevertheless, Nörvenich could be They are contained in extractable safety reactivated in its role for nuclear sharing magazines permitting access only after the since it still has a "caretaker" status. A simi- vault is opened. Each magazine, externally lar status existed at Memmingen Airbase monitored by special technology, can be until it was closed down completely. used to store up to four weapons. The The largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in vaults are supposed to guarantee safe stor- Europe can be found at U.S. Air Force Base age of nuclear weapons and prevent even Ramstein. Here 55 underground vaults for heavily armed terrorists’ access to the weap- nuclear weapons were built underneath the ons for at least 30 minutes. floors of protected aircraft shelters. One of About 20 nuclear weapons of Type B-61 are these vaults is obviously reserved for train- said to be deployed at Büchel. For training ing purposes. The remaining 54 can take up purposes they are not needed anymore since a maximum of 216 Type B-61 bombs. dummies are available for both pilots and About 130 weapons are said to be stored at Ramstein even though no nuclear capable technicians. Büchel still holds one dummy 25 of the older Type 3A and six of the modern aircraft are deployed on this base. Ram- Type 3E, introduced in 2001. stein, which also hosts the Headquarter of the U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE), has More than one hundred U.S. specialists are the function of a logistics hub for all other deployed at each of the airbases of the nuclear weapons stocks in Europe. There- European host nations. They are responsi- fore, it also hosts C-130 Herkules transport ble for maintenance and access to these aircraft, as part of the 86th Air Transport nuclear weapons. They serve in special units Wing . They can be used for the European- called Munitions Support Squadrons wide air transport of nuclear weapons. After (MUNSS). The 702. MUNSS (up until 2004 retirement of the last nuclear certified C-141 it was called 852.MUNSS) serves at Büchel Starlifters, transatlantic transports are now and is subordinate to the 38. Munitions conducted by C-17 aircraft. Maintenance Group, stationed at the U.S. Airbase Spangdahlem close by. MUNSS The nuclear weapons Type B-61 possess soldiers have the responsibility to prevent relatively modern safety systems. Three vari- any single soldier, especially a German sol- ants of the Type B-61 are probably stock- dier, from gaining access to a nuclear piled in Germany presently, each with a weapon without escort. Host nation air- variable maximum yield. The B-61 Mk.3 has bases, where nuclear weapons are deployed, a maximum yield of 170 Kilotons, Mk.4 has also have larger additional security units. 45 Kilotons and Mk.10 has 80 Kilotons. The Bundeswehr refers to them as 'Luftwaf- The yield of the latter version is still more fensicherungsstaffel S' – as in 'Sonderwaf- than six times larger than the destructive fen' (special weapons). They belong to the power of the Hiroshima bomb. The B-61 military airbase group and only Büchel has Mk.10 was developed at the end of the such a formation. eighties using the existing warheads of the

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Pershing-II missile which became superflu- the Athens Guidelines of 1962. Since 1992 ous once the INF Treaty went into force. these consultations are held on basis of the After their reconfiguration, the warheads “Political Principles for Nuclear Planning returned to Europe. and Consultation” of the NPG. Aside from Germany four other states pro- Nuclear consultations can be initiated either vide NATO with dual capable aircrafts for by Major NATO Commanders or by the potential use in nuclear missions: Belgium, member states. These consultations cover Netherlands, Italy and possibly Turkey. issues of risk assessment, measures to im- Greece has participated until 2001. All in all, prove the combat-readiness, adjustments in a total of about 480 nuclear weapons are deployment according to new operational deployed in those states and Great Britain – requirements as well as the nature and scope a number which has remained unchanged of the operation itself.27 On the one hand, for the past ten years. NATO's military structure is tasked to plan In all of these NATO states, these nuclear in such a timely fashion in order to allow for consultations as an element of political con- capable aircrafts need to be replaced by new trol over nuclear weapons. On the other models in the next 10 to 20 years. Already in 2001 the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Re- hand, it is supposed to guarantee sufficient military flexibility to act without consulta- view called for a decision to be reached after consultations in NATO whether the option tions should, for instance, a surprise attack should be drawn to design the Joint Strike be imminent. In the end, these consultations are still following the maxim that they only Fighter as a dual capable fighter aircraft of the future and therefore as the nuclear de- occur if time and circumstances are permit- ting. If this is not the case, the nuclear livery system for NATO states. In the power concerned decides on basis of mili- meantime though, one of the most impor- tant advisory bodies to the Department of tary advice whether the use of nuclear weapons will be authorised. Defense, the Defense Science Board, sug- gested to opt out entirely from operating If consultations do occur, they can include such dual capable aircrafts.26 all aspects of NATO's planning work: The Aside from the technical dimension of nu- North Atlantic Council or rather the De- fence Planning Committee - advised by the clear sharing Germany, like all other non- nuclear states in NATO, participates in the Military Committee and Major NATO political dimension of nuclear sharing. Ger- Commands - will not only discuss the neces- sity, the political and military objectives of a many is fully integrated into the working structures of NATO's Nuclear Planning nuclear campaign but also questions of tar- get selection, the choice of weapons and the Group, in which all non-nuclear NATO consequences of using or not-using nuclear states can participate. The NPG did meet twice per year, today it is convening annu- weapons, or the question if and how NATO will communicate its intentions to employ ally. It discusses – mostly on basis of sub- missions by the USA – a wide range of is- nuclear weapons to an adversary. The Gen- sues which are of relevance to NATO. This eral-Secretary of NATO has the responsibil- ity to inform the nuclear powers about the includes NATO's nuclear armaments, their modernisation and technical aspects of results of the consultations in time for their decision on authorising the use of nuclear those weapons as well as questions of nu- weapons. During their deliberations special clear arms control and disarmament. The NPG is a forum for discussions on nuclear weight is supposed to be given to the views of those states whose territories or armed strategy, on concepts for the role of nuclear weapons as military assets for NATO and forces would be most directly affected by for consultations on the use of nuclear the use of nuclear weapons. weapons. The possibilities for nuclear con- In all of these discussions - though they sultations have been redone repeatedly since never pre-empt the national decision to be

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Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) 10 reached by the nuclear powers - Germany is the state parties to the NPT on the best involved, independent of its participation in course of action to strengthen the treaty in the technical dimension of nuclear sharing. the future. Led by the U.S., the nuclear powers and their allies are striving to im- prove the non-proliferation dimension of 4. The NPT Review Conference the treaty. The majority of the non-nuclear On May 2nd, 2005 another Review Confer- states are instead insisting to bring nuclear ence on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation disarmament to the centre of attention. Treaty began in New York. It will end on While the first group fears that the NPT will May 27th. The member states have agreed erode because more and more states will use to convene every five years. Currently, 188 civilian nuclear programmes to cover their states are participating in the NPT process, inching closer towards obtaining nuclear almost all states of the world. Many states weapons, the second group argues that sig- regard the NPT as a cornerstone of the legal nals given by the nuclear powers, that they and political 'Acquis' on arms control, or will hold on to their nuclear weapons in- rather on non-proliferation issues. This year definitely, will allow those weapons to be- more bad omens than usual loom above the come more important again and have coun- conference.28 Many fear that the conference terproductive consequences for the main might fail completely and that the non- aims of the NPT. This could be seen as an proliferation regime could be weakened in invitation for nuclear proliferation. the short-run and even undermined in the The Federal Government of Germany is mid-term. These worries are based on three looking with mixed feelings to New York. It reasons: hopes that the conference won't fail and One reason is the growing suspicion that approves a 'balanced' outcome between the more and more non-nuclear states will cov- aims to strengthen non-proliferation and ertly become nuclear powers by using civil- disarmament. With involvement of the For- ian nuclear programmes before eventually eign Ministry, the Bundestag has passed a opting-out of the NPT. North Korea and resolution which outlines the German posi- 29 Iran can be cited as examples. tion. Furthermore, the European Union has agreed on a Common Position in which A second reason is the growing dissatisfac- the member states take a united stand to- tion with the limited headway the nuclear wards the Review Conference.30 Both powers make in regard to nuclear disarma- documents contain a number of proposals ment and that, triggered by U.S. nuclear to strengthen non-proliferation and improve plans for the future, this might even herald a nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the renaissance of nuclear weapons. measures to make the proliferation of nu- Finally, fears grow that the nuclear potential clear weapons more difficult dominate of India, Israel and Pakistan - states which quantitatively and qualitatively in both have not joined the NPT - and their nuclear documents. status could be tolerated on a permanent basis. The first worry is primarily held by the nu- Endnotes 1 clear powers, but many non-nuclear states Among others Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/5257, 13.4.2005 (FDP-Fraktion), Deutscher Bun- share their view. The second is regarded as destag, PlProt. 169.Session, Top 6, 14.4.2005 (Win- relevant mainly by the considerable majority fried Nachtwei, MdB, Grüne), Berliner Zeitung, of the non-aligned and non-nuclear states. 25.4.2005 (Angelika Beer, MdEP, Grüne), Frankfur- The third fear is shared primarily among the ter Rundschau, 29.4.2005 (, MdB, western states but increasingly resonates FDP), Reuters 1.5.2005 (, MdB, SPD), AFP 2.5.2005 (, MdB, Grüne) among others. 2 "Fischer begrüßt Forderungen nach Beseitigung This explains the different interpretations by von US-Atomwaffen", AFP, 2.5.2005

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3 "Struck kündigt Vorstoß in der NATO zu US- ington slashed out at his proposal that NATO should Atomwaffen an", dpa, 6.5.2005 give up its nuclear first-use option . Today Washing- ton could use the same line of reasoning again against 4 Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister of the demands for a complete withdrawal of its nuclear th Foreign Affairs at the Opening Session of the 7 weapons from European states since in the meantime Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on it has assigned those weapons a supporting role in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New the U.S. strategy for operations of CENTCOM in York, 2.5.2005, p.7f. the Near and Middle East. The argument would be 5 "Nuclear-weapon States, in cooperation among weaker compared to the situation in 1998, since it themselves and with non-nuclear weapon States, and would be a U.S. claim to infringe unilaterally upon with States not Parties to the Treaty, must refrain the national sovereignty of the European host nation. from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any Therefore, it can be assumed that the U.S. will re- kind of security arrangements." Statement by the spect the political will of the involved host nations. Hon, Syed Hamid Albar, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nevertheless, the demand for a withdrawal of all U.S. of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned States nuclear weapons from one or more European coun- Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear try should include appropriate consultations at Weapons at the General Debate of the 2005 Review NATO as a precept of fair cooperation. Another Conference, New York, 2.5.2005, p.3; Or: "Whereas frequently used argument is simply not valid any- the IAEA is the final arbiter in the case of compli- more: "No nukes, no troops" - implying that Wash- ance with article III, assessing compliance with arti- ington deploys troops only where it is permitted to cles I & II compels us during this conference to store nuclear weapons. Today Europe is the only review the policies and doctrines of some military place on Earth where the U.S. maintain troops and alliances, such as "nuclear sharing" in order to deter- nuclear weapons but definitely not the only place mine whether they conform with the obligations of where U.S. troops are deployed. states under the NPT or not. Such a review must take 10 NATO: NATO’s Nuclear Forces in the New Secu- place in tandem with any other allegations regarding rity Environment, Brussels, 18.2.2005 non-compliance; otherwise we would fail to fulfil the standards of fairness and equality of rights and obli- 11 A military requirement could theoretically only be gations for all states parties, standards which must constructed if NATO’s strategy would be adapted to continue to be the bedrock for credibility of this the U.S. national strategy and NATO would retain Treaty." Statement by H.E. Ambassador Ahmed the option to use nuclear weapons to combat prolif- Fathalla, Assistant Foreign Minister for Multilateral eration targets pre-emptively and preventively. This Relations before the General Debate of the 2005 option is not only doubtful in regard to its military Review Conference of the NPT, New York, effectiveness. NATO states have repeatedly - lastly in 3.5.2005, p.3 1999/2000 - rejected U.S. attempts to open NATO strategy for such an option. Its usefulness is also 6 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 15/3609, p.27. contested in the U.S., even by the most important In addition, it can be regarded as highly unlikely that scientific advisory body of the Pentagon, the Defense the producing states of the Eurofighter or the in- Science Board. Quoting from a statement on Non- volved industry would be willing to provide the U.S. strategic nuclear systems: "OSD Policy should consider Administration with a deep insight into the used eliminating the nuclear role for Tomahawk cruise technology - which would be necessary in order to missiles and for forward-based, tactical, dual-capable receive nuclear certification. aircraft. There is no obvious military need for these 7 Among others see the proposed draft resolution systems, and eliminating the nuclear role would free "Glaubwürdigkeit des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungs- resources that could be used to fund strategic strike regimes stärken – US Nuklearwaffen aus Deutsch- programs of higher priority. To a great extent, their land abziehen" of the FDP-Faction in the German continuation is a policy decision." Defense Science Parliament in: Deutscher Bundestag, DS 15/5257 of Board: Future Strategic Strike Forces, Washington, 16.4.2005 or the demand formulated by the Green February 2004, p.5-13f. Party MEP, Angelika Beer, in: Ingo Preissler: "Beer 12 Proposals by German Foreign Ministry officials to verlangt Abzug der US-Atomwaffen", Berliner Zei- attach further pre-conditions to such a measure tung, 25.4.2005. The Belgian Senate did pass such a which have to be fulfilled by the nuclear-weapon resolution - unanimously - in April. states are rather counterproductive. Not only could 8 It would be appropriate that Germany should ex- they result in delays but they also could lead to a plain such a measure at NATO. questioning of the already initiated political changes. This even holds true for the resort to an otherwise 9 Occasionally the U.S. used this argument if propos- most interesting working paper on tactical nuclear als of their NATO allies infringe upon the implemen- disarmament which Germany presented in 2002 at tation of U.S. national nuclear strategy. Foreign Min- the Preparatory Committee for the current Review ister Joschka Fischer experienced this when Wash- Conference and which at the time received only a

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limited positive resonance. "Non-strategic nuclear Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 6. July 1966, original weapons", Working Paper submitted by Germany, classification: Confidential. NPT/Conf.2005/PC.1/WP.5, New York, 11.April 22 2002. Interestingly enough, some ideas from this Evans Gerakas, David S. Patterson, and Carolyn B. paper were incorporated into Fischer’s speech on Yee (eds.) "Arms Control and Disarmament", Foreign May 2nd - providing reason enough for an inclusion Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Volume of this warning in a footnote. X. United States Government Printing Office, Wash- ington, 1997, S.574. 13 Adenauer defended his view on 5.4.1957 with the 23 famous statement: "Just differentiate between tactical Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference and large nuclear weapons". And: "Tactical weapons of the NPT, reprinted in: Goldblat, Jozef, Twenty are nothing more than just a further development of Years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty – Implementa- the artillery. Naturally we can not refrain from per- tion and Prospects, Oslo, 1990, p.138ff. mitting our troops to also follow the newest devel- 24 For the following also see: Hans M. Kristensen: opments in regard to normal armaments". Quoted U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Natural Resources from "Die Welt", 5.4.1957 Defense Council, February 2005, Washington DC. 14 The NPG was opened in 1979 for the full in- 25 The newsmagazine "" reports that the volvement of all NATO members. nuclear weapons at Ramstein recently have been 15 More details on this approach can be read in the temporarily relocated to the US due to extensive section "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Legal- construction work at the site. See Ralf Beste and ity of Nuclear Sharing", as well as in: Martin Butcher, Alexander Szandar: "Atomarer Anachronismus", in: Otfried Nassauer et.al.: A Question of Command Der Spiegel, 21/2005, p.48-49. and Control, PENN-Research Report 2000.1, Berlin, 26 Defense Science Board: Future Strategic Strike London, Washington, March 2000 Forces, Washington, February 2004, p.5-13f. see 16 Translation of the Treaty to be found at footnote 11. www.auswaertiges-amt.de 27 Even the deployment of delivery means or nuclear 17 Once the President of the USA authorises the use weapons geographically close to a region of crisis of nuclear weapons upon request of NATO's Su- could have an escalating or de-escalating effect. preme Commander and after the required authorisa- Therefore, such measures are also part of the possi- tion codes are transmitted through secure U.S. lines ble consultations. of communications to Europe, local U.S. units can 28 During the first week of negotiations the activate the weapons and - together with allied sol- participating states could not even agree on a diers - equip the fighter aircraft with them. During working agenda. According to Egypt the issue of the mission, planned by NATO staffs in advance, no nuclear disarmament has received not enough U.S. soldiers would be on board. attention. Egypt belongs to the group of states which 18 Working Paper Presented by the Members of the explicitly criticise NATO nuclear sharing. Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, Parties to 29 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/5254 the Treaty, 1998 Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non- 30 Council of the European Union, Document Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 28. April 1998. 7633/05 approved as Document 7768/05 on This critique was repeated at the present Review 25.4.2005 Conference. See footnote 5 for the exact formula- tion.

19 Written answers by Secretary of Defense Cohen in This research note was written by response to questions of Senator Harkin, posed at a Otfried Nassauer. He is the Director of hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee BITS. October 21st, 1997

20 A more extensive and detailed presentation of these thoughts can be found in: Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer et.al.: A Question of Command This policy note is a translation of the and Control – NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the previously published BITS Policy Note NPT, PENN Research Report 2000.1, Berlin, Lon- 05.2 and was made possible by the don, Washington, March 2000. The wording of the generous support of Greenpeace e.V., Rusk-Letter is reprinted on page 41. Hamburg. 21 Leonard Meeker, "Proposed Revised Articles of The translation was done by Christopher US Non-Proliferation Treaty, Memorandum", US Steinmetz. Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor,

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