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Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction

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Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for Nuclear Risk Reduction ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ NUCLEAR FUTURES: WESTERN EUROPEAN OPTIONS FOR NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION MARTIN BUTCHER OTFRIED NASSAUER STEPHEN YOUNG ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ ...............................................................................................................................BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL................. BASIC RESEARCH REPORT 98.5 ..................................................................................................................BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent research organization that analyzes international security issues. BASIC works to promote public awareness of defense, disarmament, military strategy, and nuclear poli- cies in order to foster informed debate on these issues. BASIC facilitates the exchange of informa- tion and analysis on both sides of the Atlantic. This is the third of a series of BASIC Research Reports looking at the future of Nuclear Weapons Policy. BASIC in the UK is a registered charity no. 1001081. BASIC in the US is a not-for-profit organization constituted under section 501(c)(3) of the US Internal Revenue Service Code. London Washington Carrara House 1900 L Street, NW 20 Embankment Place Suite 401 London, WC2N 6NN Washington D.C. 20036 Tel: +44 171 925 0862 Tel: +1 202 785 1266 Fax: +44 171 925 0861 Fax: +1 202 387 6298 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.basicint.org Nuclear Futures: About the authors Western European Options for Martin Butcher is the Director of the Centre for European Nuclear Risk Reduction Security and Disarmament (CESD), a Brussels-based non- governmental organization. Currently, he is a Visiting Fellow at BASICs Washington office. By Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer, and Stephen Young Otfried Nassauer is the Director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic Securtiy (BITS). Published by the Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst as BASIC. Previously, he worked for 20/20 Vision and for ACCESS: A Security British American Security Information Council Information Service. He has a Masters in International Affairs December 1998 from Columbia University, and a BA from Carleton College. ISBN: 1 874533 35 0 Acknowledgements Price: £7.00 / $10.00 The authors would like to thank the many people who pro- vided help of various kinds during the writing of this report. They include: Nicola Butler, for her inestimable assistance; Ambassador James Leonard, for his helpful comments on the reports recommendations; Professors Paul Rogers and Patricia Chilton, for their comments on early drafts; Daniel Plesch, for his comments on the entire report; and Camille Grand, for his guidance and support in compiling the section on France. Special thanks to Lucy Amis and Tanya Padberg for excellent proofing and copy-editing work, and to Christine Kucia and Kate Joseph for advice and assistance on the layout and design of the report. Support This report was made possible by the generous support of W. Alton Jones Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 4 Exectutive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 5 Chapter One: Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy in Western Europe 1.1 Outline ....................................................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Decision Points .......................................................................................................................................... 8 1.3 Cracks in the Foundation? ....................................................................................................................... 8 Chapter Two: The United Kingdom 2.1 Nuclear Posture ........................................................................................................................................ 10 2.2 Nuclear Doctrine ...................................................................................................................................... 11 2.3 Alert Status .............................................................................................................................................. 12 2.4 Fissile Materials ....................................................................................................................................... 13 2.5 New Labour in Government ................................................................................................................... 13 2.6 Labour Party Policies and the Strategic Defence Review........................................................................ 14 2.8 UK Stance on Disarmament at the UN .................................................................................................. 15 2.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 16 Chapter Three: France 3.1 French Nuclear Weapons Doctrine........................................................................................................ 17 3.2 Shifting Defence Priorities and Resources ............................................................................................. 19 3.3 French Nuclear Forces ............................................................................................................................ 19 3.4 A European Nuclear Deterrent?............................................................................................................. 21 3.5 Concerted Deterrence ............................................................................................................................ 22 3.6 Involving the Germans .......................................................................................................................... 23 Chapter Four: Nuclear Co-operation 4.1 US-UK Nuclear Co-operation ................................................................................................................. 24 4.2 Ongoing US-UK Co-operation ............................................................................................................... 24 4.3 UK-French Nuclear Co-operation .......................................................................................................... 24 4.4 Ongoing UK-French Co-operation ........................................................................................................ 25 4.5 Co-operation Between UK and French Nuclear Weapons Laboratories ............................................. 26 4.6 US-French Co-operation ........................................................................................................................ 27 4.7 Current Projects ..................................................................................................................................... 28 4.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 29 Chapter Five: NATO Europe 5.1 US Nuclear Deployments in Europe ...................................................................................................... 30 5.2 NATO: Nuclear Weapons for Non-Nuclear-Weapon states .................................................................. 31 5.3 The Effects of NATO Enlargement ......................................................................................................... 33 5.4 Current NATO Nuclear Doctrine........................................................................................................... 34 5.5 NATOs Future Nuclear Doctrine .......................................................................................................... 35 5.6 US Perspectives on NATO Nuclear Strategy .......................................................................................... 35 5.7 European Perspectives on NATO Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................. 36 5.8 Perspectives on NATOs Nuclear Posture .............................................................................................. 36 5.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 37 Chapter Six: Nuclear Risk Reduction in Western Europe 6.1 Commit to and Take Programmatic Action Toward the Rapid Elimination of Nuclear Weapons .. 39 6.2 Reduce the Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons....................................................................................... 42 6.3 End the Deployment of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Give Up the Option of Wartime Nuclear Weapons Use by Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.................................................... 43 6.4 Halt First-Use Policies by France, the UK, and NATO ......................................................................... 46 6.5 Include Commitments by France and the UK on the Future of their Nuclear Arsenals in the START III Context ......................................................................................................................
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