Zeitenwende | Wendezeiten

Zeitenwende Wendezeiten Special Edition of the Munich Security Report on German Foreign and Security Policy October 2020 October 2020 Zeitenwende | Wendezeiten Special Edition of the Munich Security Report on German Foreign and Security Policy Tobias Bunde Laura Hartmann Franziska Stärk Randolf Carr Christoph Erber Julia Hammelehle Juliane Kabus With guest contributions by Elbridge Colby, François Heisbourg, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Andrey Kortunov, Shivshankar Menon, David Miliband, Ana Palacio, Kevin Rudd, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Nathalie Tocci, and Huiyao Wang. Table of Contents Foreword 4 Foreword by former Federal President Joachim Gauck 8 Executive Summary 11 1 Introduction: The Munich Consensus 17 2 Security Situation: Zeitenwende 26 3 Dependencies: Wonderful Together, 50 Vulnerable Together 4 Investments: Instrumental Reasoning 74 5 Public Opinion: Folk Wisdom 106 6 Decision-making Processes: Berlin Disharmonic 144 7 Outlook: Wendezeiten 166 Notes 176 Endnotes 177 List of Figures 203 Image Sources 210 List of Abbreviations 211 Team 214 Acknowledgments 215 Imprint 217 ZEITENWENDE | WENDEZEITEN Foreword Dear Reader, In recent years, the Munich Security Conference (MSC) has highlighted a wide variety of security policy issues at its events in all corners of the world – from Madrid to Minsk, from Tel Aviv to New York, from Abuja Wolfgang Ischinger to Stavanger. In doing so, we focused primarily on international challenges. At our events, however, we were increasingly confronted with questions about Germany’s positions – sometimes with fear and unease about whether Berlin was, for example, taking certain threats seriously enough – but almost always with great expectations of our country. At home, on the other hand, people still regularly underestimate how important our country is now considered to be almost everywhere in the world. People pay close attention to what is said or done in Berlin – or what is not. This was one more reason we decided to turn our gaze inwards for a change. The question of how exactly our country can contribute to meeting security policy challenges “earlier, more decisively, and more substantially,” as then Federal President Joachim Gauck and then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier demanded at the Munich Security Conference in 2014, should occupy us even more intensively in the future. 4 FOREWORD One result is this special edition of the Munich Security Report (MSR) with a focus on German foreign and security policy. Thirty years after German unification and six years after the speeches of what is often called the “Munich consensus,” we provide an overview of the strategic position of German foreign policy. The report speaks of a Zeitenwende, the turn of an era in world politics, that has seen the erosion of almost every fundamental certainty of Ger- man foreign policy. From this arises a tremendous need for adaptation – the coming years must become a turning point if we want to develop the strategies, processes, and instruments to deal with the new dimen- sion of security policy challenges. For although Germany has assumed “more responsibility” in one form or another since 2014, the demand for German leadership has grown much faster than the supply in recent years. The report highlights our country’s dependence on the liberal international order as well as German investments in foreign, develop- ment, and defense policy. Based on a representative survey conducted specifically for this report, it provides an overview of public opinion and discusses the need for reform in the foreign policy decision-making process. 5 ZEITENWENDE | WENDEZEITEN In another way, the report also marks a turning point for the Munich Security Conference itself. We have used the months during which no events could take place due to the coronavirus pandemic to further develop the MSC. This included moving our Munich headquarters to the Amerika-Haus, an internal restructuring, a strengthening of our think- tank activities, as well as a revamp of the MSC’s corporate design. This special edition is the first MSC product to appear in a new guise. In addition to improved readability of our font types and greater clarity of our graphics, we have also slightly adapted our logo to emphasize the MSC’s core idea of dialogue, debate, and interaction even more strongly. We are looking forward to your reactions! As always, we would like to thank our many partners who have contrib- uted to the report in one way or another. This applies, of course, to the staff of the research institutions and authorities who provided us with data and material. Thanks are also due to our numerous high-ranking conversation partners in the Office of the Federal President, the Federal Government, the Bundestag, and the political parties who took the time to participate in extensive background discussions, the substance of which had a defining influence on the content of this report. We would also like to thank all of the international experts whose perspectives enriched the report as well as our sponsors who have enabled the expansion of MSC activities. 6 FOREWORD Finally, I would like to thank the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government for generously funding part of this project. It is my hope that this text helps promote both understanding and support for a German and European foreign policy that can successfully confront the dramatic geopolitical changes and challenges we are facing. Yours, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger Chairman of the Munich Security Conference 7 ZEITENWENDE | WENDEZEITEN Foreword by former Federal President Joachim Gauck When I opened the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014 – more than six years ago – with my call for Germany, in the face of major global political challenges, to engage earlier, more decisively, and more substantially in foreign and security policy, it was a matter close to my Joachim Gauck heart. In many respects, our country has since taken on more responsibility – in dealing with crises and emergencies, reorienting NATO, or reacting to the coronavirus pandemic within the framework of the European Union. It is also true, however, that our commitment in some key areas still falls short of both the demands of a changed world and the expectations of our partners. So my message today is essentially no different – only more urgent. For while German foreign policy is adapting to the changed situation, the situation is continuing to change. In view of what this report describes as a Zeitenwende, the turn of an era in world politics, our country needs courage and confidence. Foreign policy certainties may be dissolving, but we are not at the mercy of the passage of time. We can, if we want to, make an important contribution to holding Europe together and thus to defending our way of life, our liberal democratic order, and our inter- ests in light of new challenges. Last but not least, it is important for Germany and Europe to make a contribution to the defense of universal values. 8 FOREWORD Much is – quite rightly – expected of our country. Foreign countries sometimes have more confidence in us than we have in ourselves. We can do little on our own, and without a strong German commitment, neither the European Union nor NATO will thrive in the long term. The future of the multilateral organizations most important for Germany depends on us now more than ever before. The survey data in this report shows that foreign and security policy is by no means an issue that does not interest Germans: Almost two thirds of Germans are strongly or very strongly interested in foreign and security policy. And they see that we are facing major challenges: 75 percent believe that there will be more crises and conflicts in the coming years. Global political questions are certainly “bearable” for citizens, even if there are often no easy answers. It would be counterproductive if we tried to avoid foreign policy debates. It is evident that doing so only con- tinues to raise the price of supposedly calming the public. In view of the changing security situation, we must discuss issues of alliance solidarity, the future of European defense, or even nuclear deterrence if we want to convince the population that Germany can and must make a greater contribution to the defense of the increasingly fragile West. This brings us to issues that, by the way, already played a central role in the early years of the Munich Security Conference and are now again the order of the day. It is therefore a good thing that institutions like the Munich Security Conference have not let up and that they persist in putting foreign and security policy issues on the agenda. I wish the report many readers – and all of us a constructive debate on how Germany can live up to its responsibilities in Europe and the world. 9 ZEITENWENDE | WENDEZEITEN 10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary Thirty years after achieving reunification, Germany faces enormous challenges. Europe’s security is under threat; Europe’s democracies are on the defensive. Context We find ourselves in the midst of a Zeitenwende, the turn of an era, in which established foreign policy certainties of the Federal Republic are evaporat- ing. This new situation is characterized by the dissolution of an international order built over decades, the rise of China, and a resurgence of power politics violating international norms. In addition, we are confronted with the dramatic consequences of climate change as well as rapid technological upheaval. These trends are exacerbated by a gradual reorientation of the United States, the origins of which go farther back than 2016. Washington’s relative power has declined. Today, the US is less able to act as guarantor of the international order and less willing to take on a disproportionate burden. Under Presi- dent Trump, America no longer sees the maintenance of a rules-based international order and its institutions as a priority.

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