The Contributions of Chinese Anthropology a Conversation Between Roberto Malighetti and Yang Shengmin
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© 2013 Yi-Ling Lin
© 2013 Yi-ling Lin CULTURAL ENGAGEMENT IN MISSIONARY CHINA: AMERICAN MISSIONARY NOVELS 1880-1930 BY YI-LING LIN DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013 Urbana, Illinois Doctoral committee: Professor Waïl S. Hassan, Chair Professor Emeritus Leon Chai, Director of Research Professor Emeritus Michael Palencia-Roth Associate Professor Robert Tierney Associate Professor Gar y G. Xu Associate Professor Rania Huntington, University of Wisconsin at Madison Abstract From a comparative standpoint, the American Protestant missionary enterprise in China was built on a paradox in cross-cultural encounters. In order to convert the Chinese—whose religion they rejected—American missionaries adopted strategies of assimilation (e.g. learning Chinese and associating with the Chinese) to facilitate their work. My dissertation explores how American Protestant missionaries negotiated the rejection-assimilation paradox involved in their missionary work and forged a cultural identification with China in their English novels set in China between the late Qing and 1930. I argue that the missionaries’ novelistic expression of that identification was influenced by many factors: their targeted audience, their motives, their work, and their perceptions of the missionary enterprise, cultural difference, and their own missionary identity. Hence, missionary novels may not necessarily be about conversion, the missionaries’ primary objective but one that suggests their resistance to Chinese culture, or at least its religion. Instead, the missionary novels I study culminate in a non-conversion theme that problematizes the possibility of cultural assimilation and identification over ineradicable racial and cultural differences. -
Introduction This Statement Is Submitted to the U.S.-China
USCC Hearing China’s Military Transition February 7, 2013 Roy Kamphausen Senior Advisor, The National Bureau of Asian Research Introduction This statement is submitted to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to address issues related to the transition to the new top military leadership in China. The statement addresses the composition of the new Central Military Commission, important factors in the selection of the leaders, and highlights salient elements in the backgrounds of specific leaders. The statement also addresses important factors of civil-military relations, including the relationship of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to China’s top political leadership, potential reform of the military-region structure of the PLA, and the likely competition for budget resources. Composition of the China’s New Central Military Commission As expected, new Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping was appointed in November 2012 as the Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman. Additionally, army general Fan Changlong and air force general Xu Qiliang were promoted to positions as vice chairmen of the CMC—Fan from Jinan Military Region commander and Xu from PLA Air Force commander. Other members of the new CMC include General Chang Wanquan, who will become the next Minister of National Defense when that position is confirmed in early spring 2013; General Fang Fenghui, chief of the General Staff Department (GSD), who previously had been Beijing Military Region commander since 2007; General Zhang Yang, director of -
Marriage Practice of the Chinese Communist Party in Modern Era, 1910S-1950S
Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 8-23-2011 12:00 AM From Marriage Revolution to Revolutionary Marriage: Marriage Practice of the Chinese Communist Party in Modern Era, 1910s-1950s Wei Xu The University of Western Ontario Supervisor James Flath The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in History A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Wei Xu 2011 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Asian History Commons, Chinese Studies Commons, Cultural History Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, Gender and Sexuality Commons, History of Gender Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons, Social History Commons, Women's History Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons Recommended Citation Xu, Wei, "From Marriage Revolution to Revolutionary Marriage: Marriage Practice of the Chinese Communist Party in Modern Era, 1910s-1950s" (2011). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 232. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/232 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FROM MARRIAGE REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTIONARY MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE PRACTICE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN MODERN ERA 1910s-1950s (Spine -
Chinese Military Leadership After the 17Th Congress: Hu’S Guys Or Whose Guys?
Mulvenon, China Leadership Monitor, No. 23 Chinese Military Leadership After the 17th Congress: Hu’s Guys or Whose Guys? James Mulvenon The civilian political leadership changes at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 have received close scrutiny from outside observers, but important and interesting personnel adjustments in the military have garnered less attention. This article examines recent Chinese military leadership changes in detail, focusing principally on the Central Military Commission but also tracking significant moves at the Military Region and Service level. Military Leadership Changes Leading Up to the 17th Congress Prior to the 17th Party Congress and the selection of the new Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee, systematic and sweeping changes were made in the leadership structures of all seven military regions and the services. These reshuffles were not a purge, but an unusually intense round of the PLA’s regular command rotations and age-based removals of personnel. According to a reliable, Beijing-owned newspaper, commanders of the Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Chengdu, and Shenyang Military Regions were replaced, as well as the heads of important units such as the General Staff Headquarters, General Armament Department, Air Force, and National Defense University.1 Table 1 Major Military Region Leadership Changes, 2007 Name Previous Position New Position Fang Fenghui COS, GZMR2 CDR, BJMR3 Zhao Keshi COS, NJMR CDR, NJMR4 Zhang Qinsheng DCOGS (Intel), GSD CDR, GZMR5 Li Shiming DCDR, CDMR CDR, CDMR6 Zhang Youxia DCDR, BJMR7 CDR, SYMR8 Wang Guosheng COS, LZMR Commander, LZMR9 Liu Chengjun DCDR, PLAAF CDT, AMS Wang Xibin COS, BJMR CDT, NDU Zhang Yang Dir., Poltical Dept., GZMR PC, GZMR Li Changcai DPC, NJMR PC, LZMR Chen Guoling DPC, GZMR PC, NJMR Zhang Haiyang DPC, BJMR PC, CDMR Tong Shiping Asst. -
Chinabrief Volume IX Issue 15 July 23, 2009
ChinaBrief Volume IX Issue 15 July 23, 2009 VOLUME IX ISSUE 15 JULY 23, 2009 IN THIS ISSUE: IN A FORTNIGHT By L.C. Russell Hsiao 1 THE XINJIANG CRISIS: A TEST FOR BEIJING'S CARROT-AND-STICK STRATEGY By Willy Lam 2 KMT'S CHANGE OF GUARD: MA’S POWER PLAY IN TAIWANESE POLITICS By Parris Chang 4 CHINA MAKES STRIDES IN ENERGY “GO-OUT” STRATEGY By Wenran Jiang 7 CHINA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS AND POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL TENSIONS By Vijay Sakhuja 10 Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou China Brief is a bi-weekly jour- In a Fortnight nal of information and analysis covering Greater China in Eur- By L.C. Russell Hsiao asia. HU CONFERS HARDLINER TOP MILITARY RANK China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation, a eijing instituted a new round of personnel changes among the top-ranking officers private non-profit organization Bof the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its general departments. According based in Washington D.C. and to official state-media, Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman and PRC is edited by L.C. Russell Hsiao. President Hu Jintao conferred three senior military officers the rank of general on July 20 (Xinhua News Agency, July 20). A raft of personnel changes that were made The opinions expressed in recently runs the gamut of the PLA’s general departments: General Staff Headquarters, China Brief are solely those General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Department (Nanfang Daily, July 10; China Military Online, July 10). -
Master for Quark6
Special feature s e Finding a Place for v i a t c n i the Victims e h p s c The Problem in Writing the History of the Cultural Revolution r e p YOUQIN WANG This paper argues that acknowledging individual victims had been a crucial problem in writing the history of the Cultural Revolution and represents the major division between the official history and the parallel history. The author discusses the victims in the history of the Cultural Revolution from factual, interpretational and methodological aspects. Prologue: A Blocked Web topic “official history and parallel history” of the Cultural Memorial Revolution. In this paper I will argue that acknowledging individual vic - n October of 2000, I launched a website, www.chinese- tims has been a crucial problem in writing the history of the memorial.org , to record the names of the people who Cultural Revolution and represents the major division be - Idied from persecution during the Cultural Revolution. tween the official history that the Chinese government has Through years of research, involving over a thousand inter - allowed to be published and the parallel history that cannot views, I had compiled the stories of hundreds of victims, and pass the censorship on publications in China. As of today, placed them on the website. By clicking on the alphabeti - no published scholarly papers have analyzed the difference cally-listed names, a user could access a victim’s personal in - between the two resulting branches in historical writings on formation, such as age, job, date and location of death, and the Cultural Revolution. -
Encountering Miao Shamanism
EPILOGUE: “GHOST MASTER” AT LANGDE: ENCOUNTERING MIAO SHAMANISM The previous chapters have examined the construction of the national- ist ideology in modern China, the research and investigation of southern Chinese minority nationalities, the concerned intellectual debates and polit- ical tensions, as well as the public representation of minority culture. In the epilogue, I will shift my focus to the village-level minority communal life and power relations to illustrate the continuity of shamanism in China and the symbiotic relationship between the shamanistic authority and political power. The main players here are the retired CCP Party secretary of a Miao I want to point out that the use of the terms “shaman” and “shamanism” is due to the convenience of understanding and the fact that Langde “ghost master” (guishi in Han Chinese) share the functional roles as the shaman in Manchuria and northeast Asia of being spiritual medium and communicator to the dead. Yet there are also two differences: one is linguistic, the word “shaman” has very probable Tungstic origin, and the other is gender. While North Asian shamans have traditional women, at Langde, the Miao ghost masters are usually men, and other ethnographic accounts about southern Chinese minority groups depict male shamans more than female shamans. For discussion of Manchu/northeast Asian shamanism, see Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 235–241. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 187 G. Wu, Narrating Southern Chinese Minority Nationalities, New Directions in East Asian History, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6022-0 188 EPILOGUE: “GHOST MASTER” AT LANGDE … village, and a practicing shaman, “ghost master,” in that village. -
U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress
U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress Shirley A. Kan Specialist in Asian Security Affairs October 27, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32496 U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress Summary This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding military- to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and records major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA’s aggressive maritime and air confrontations. Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. -
679274.Pdf (978.7Kb)
The Case of the Missing Indigene: Debate Over a “Second-Generation” Ethnic Policy The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Elliott, Mark. 2015. “The Case of the Missing Indigene: Debate Over a ‘Second-Generation’ Ethnic Policy.” The China Journal 73 (January): 186–213. doi:10.1086/679274. Published Version doi:10.1086/679274 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34306000 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA The Case of the Missing Indigene: Debate Over a “Second-Generation” Ethnic Policy Mark Elliott* ABSTRACT e last few years have seen a vigorous public policy debate emerge over a “second- generation” ethnic policy (di’erdai minzu zhengce) which, if implemented, would constitute a major revision of ethnic politics in China. Despite the fact that nationalities policy is a notoriously sensitive subject within China, the debate is happening openly in newspapers, academic journals and on the Internet. e prominence accorded to anthropological theory and international comparison is a notable feature of the debate. is article rst explores the main positions in the ongoing policy discussion, then goes on to argue that, rather than comparing China’s non-Han peoples to minority immigrant populations in the industrial- ized democracies, a better comparison is to indigenous peoples. It then considers why this perspective is completely missing from the present debate. -
“Young Guards”: the Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part I: Purges and Reshuffles)
Promoting “Young Guards”: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part I: Purges and Reshuffles) Cheng Li The continuing consolidation of power has been the most noticeable trend under the leadership of Xi Jinping since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012. Undoubtedly, a key component in this strengthening of both Xi’s personal power and his new administration’s authority has centered on the military domain. Xi has gone about the consolidation process through several important political and tactical moves, including the purges of the two highest-ranking generals under the previous administration on corruption and other charges; the arrest of over 40 senior military officers on various charges of wrongdoing; large-scale reshuffling of generals between regions, departments, and services; ongoing efforts to reform the PLA structure and operations; and, most importantly, the rapid promotion of “young guards” (少壮派) in the Chinese military. All of these bold measures will have profound implications—not only for Xi’s political standing in preparation for the next leadership turnover in 2017, but also for the trajectory of civilian-military relations in the country and for the assessment of China’s military modernization. The first installation in this series focuses on the recent purges and reshuffling of military leaders, which has significant consequences in the political dynamics of present-day China. It is an old saying in the history of the Chinese Communist movement that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”1 Although this famous Mao Zedong slogan emphasizes the Communist doctrine that the party commands the army in seizing and retaining state power, a top party leader’s consolidation of personal power cannot be achieved without strong support from the military. -
China's New Military Leadership
77\12 25 November 2012 CHINA’S NEW MILITARY LEADERSHIP Jayadeva Ranade Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi Except for the top post of Chairman, China’s military leadership “ He pointedly added that Hu Jintao “has pushed China’s military was essentially decided and formally announced before the development one giant step forward based on achievements Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 18th Party Congress opened made under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, Chairman in Beijing on November 8, 2012. The unusually early Deng Xiaoping and Chairman Jiang Zemin.” Hu Jintao, in turn, announcement of key appointments was clearly indicative of asserted that Xi Jinping was qualified and ready to lead the Hu Jintao being firmly in charge of the PLA and that his influence People’s Liberation Army (PLA). will continue. Xi Jinping, at the same meeting, took visible charge and laid In addition to appointment of the entire top echelon of the PLA, down his criteria—visible also in the new appointments—for appointments to the Military Commission’s Secretariat, which the PLA. He said: “The military must promote and appoint cadres continues to be an entirely civilian body, were additionally based on their political performance and guarantee that ‘guns’ effected. Xi Jinping would have been consulted in the are always controlled by reliable people with loyalty to the appointments, especially as all but two of the newly appointed Party.” He ordered the military to ‘always put the country’s officers will serve co-terminus with him. Hu Jintao’s decision to sovereignty and security first, comprehensively improve the relinquish the post of Chairman of the Central Military military’s deterrent power and capability of real combat to protect Commission (CMC) should be viewed in this backdrop, as also China’s sovereignty, security and development interests at an in the context of reports emanating from information-based age’. -
The Bo Xilai Affair and the PLA
The Bo Xilai Affair and the PLA James Mulvenon On 15 March 2012, Chongqing Municipality leader, princeling, and aspiring national elite Bo Xilai was stripped of his party posts, following the dramatic flight of his former deputy police chief Wang Lijun to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu and revelations about the possible involvement of Bo’s wife in the murder of a British businessman. In the wake of his purge, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Falungong-controlled media were rife with rumors about Bo’s relationships with senior military officers and even a possible coup attempt in Beijing. This article examines Bo’s ties with the PLA through his career, assesses the validity of various claims about the fallout in the military from his purge, and speculates about any possible implications for party-military relations. Introduction On 15 March 2012, Chongqing Municipality leader, princeling, and aspiring national elite Bo Xilai was stripped of his party posts, following the dramatic flight of his former deputy police chief Wang Lijun to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu and revelations about the possible involvement of Bo’s wife in the murder of a British businessman. In the wake of his purge, Hong Kong and Taiwan media were rife with rumors about Bo’s relationships with senior military officers and even a possible coup attempt in Beijing. This article examines Bo’s ties with the PLA through his career, assesses the validity of various claims about the fallout in the military from his purge, and speculates about any possible implications for party-military relations.