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China's Military Calls for Putting Its Nuclear Forces on Alert

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China's Military Calls for Putting Its Nuclear Forces on Alert China’s Military Calls for Putting Its Nuclear Forces on Alert Gregory Kulacki January 2016 © 2016 Union of Concerned Scientists All Rights Reserved Gregory Kulacki is the China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program. The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous, independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative, practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. More information about UCS and the Global Security Program is available on the UCS website: www.ucsusa.org/our-work/nuclear- weapons This report is available online (in PDF format) at http://www.ucsusa.org/ChinaHairTrigger The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the organizations that funded the work or the individuals who reviewed it. The authors bear sole responsibility for the report’s content. NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC, OFFICE WEST COAST OFFICE MIDWEST OFFICE Two Brattle Square 1825 K St. NW, Ste. 800 2397 Shattuck Ave., Ste. 203 One N. LaSalle St., Ste. 1904 Cambridge, MA 02138-3780 Washington, DC 20006-1232 Berkeley, CA 94704-1567 Chicago, IL 60602-4064 t 617.547.5552 t 202.223.6133 t 510.843.1872 t 312.578.1750 f 617.864.9405 f 202.223.6162 f 510.843.3785 f 312.578.1751 Summary Therefore, at some point in the near future, quite possibly during the current process of drafting the next For the first time, China is discussing putting its nu- five-year plan, military leaders may ask President Xi clear missiles on high alert so that they could be Jinping and China’s new generation of leaders to con- launched quickly on warning of an attack, similar to sider putting China’s nuclear forces on high alert. the current state of U.S. and Russian missiles. This U.S. policy makers should be aware that U.S. would be a significant—and dangerous—change in statements and actions regarding nuclear weapons in- Chinese policy. The experience with U.S. and Sovi- fluence Chinese thinking and decisions about its nu- et/Russian warning systems, especially early in their clear forces. Indeed, the nuclear weapon policies of the deployment and operation when hardware and proce- United States are the most prominent external factor dures were not yet reliable, illustrates the dangers of influencing Chinese advocates for raising the alert lev- maintaining the option to launch on warning. Such el of China’s nuclear forces. risks are especially acute in a crisis. U.S. leaders should take steps to persuade China not to put its weapons on high alert. Doing so would increase U.S. security by reducing the risk of a Chi- The nuclear weapons policies of nese accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken nuclear the United States are the most launch. prominent external factors influencing Chinese advocates for raising the alert level of Introduction China’s nuclear forces. China maintains a small nuclear arsenal—well under 300 warheads—that is kept off alert: the warheads are According to newly translated Chinese sources, separated from the missiles (Kristensen and Norris discussions of putting missiles on high alert appear to 2015). The arsenal’s limited size and conservative pos- stem from increasing Chinese military concerns about ture are the consequence of a nuclear weapons policy retaining a credible nuclear retaliatory capability in the established by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the first face of accurate U.S. nuclear weapons, the develop- generation of Chinese communist leaders. While many ment of high-precision conventional weapons, and areas of Chinese public policy have changed in the missile defenses. In addition, U.S. unwillingness to wake of the passing of those leaders, including Chi- acknowledge mutual vulnerability in bilateral nuclear nese foreign and defense policies, China’s nuclear talks with China creates the impression that the United weapons policy has not. States is still seeking to render itself invulnerable to a Many U.S. analysts believe it is only a matter of Chinese retaliatory strike. These sources suggest that time before Chinese nuclear weapons policy changes the Chinese military, which is already developing as well. Some argue that a change is already well un- more survivable mobile missiles and submarine- derway (USCC 2015). Their arguments are based on launched missiles, believes that putting the nation’s assessments of China’s continuing effort to improve its missiles on high alert would be a step toward assured nuclear-capable missiles, particularly the development retaliation. of a new mobile intercontinental-range missile that UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 1 reportedly can carry multiple warheads, as well as the alert. Moreover, they saw keeping nuclear weapons off development of a submarine-launched missile. Some alert as distinguishing China’s nuclear weapons policy analysts believe those developments may herald a sig- from U.S. and Soviet policies in a way they believed nificant increase in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal. would strengthen China’s international standing. Chinese analysts, on the other hand, state that any Understanding this early decision to keep nuclear increase in the number of China’s nuclear-capable weapons off alert requires some familiarity with the missiles will be modest. They contend that China is history of China’s communist government, its relation- seeking to maintain its ability to launch a retaliatory ship with the United States, and the events that in- nuclear strike in the face of U.S. technical advances in formed the establishment of China’s nuclear weapons missile defense, long-range precision guided muni- program. tions, and the ability to track and target mobile mis- siles. U.S. refusal to assure China that the United China’s Development of Nuclear Weapons States is not seeking invulnerability to a Chinese retal- iatory strike appears to legitimize Chinese concerns The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was estab- (Roberts 2013). Most importantly, Chinese analysts lished by the communists in 1949 at the dawn of the argue that China’s new missiles do not portend a Cold War in the shadow of the United States’ dropping change in the nuclear policy established by the found- of the atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima ers of China’s nuclear weapons program and main- at the end of World War II. The United States refused tained by their successors (CEIP 2015). to recognize the PRC and worked to keep it out of the With the discussion focused on the size of China’s United Nations. Within a year, the newly established nuclear arsenal, indications that China is considering Chinese government was fighting U.S-led United Na- raising the alert level of its nuclear forces has been tions forces in Korea. During the Korean war, the largely overlooked. Arguably, a higher alert level United States threatened to attack the PRC with nucle- would signal a more significant and worrisome shift in ar weapons. According to PRC historians, these threats China’s nuclear policy than its deployment of some precipitated the Chinese government’s decision to de- additional land or sea-based nuclear-armed missiles. velop nuclear weapons (Sun 2013). This report describes China’s historical position on The PRC released a statement in 1964 on the day of alert levels, presents evidence that the Chinese military its first nuclear weapons test that describes U.S. influ- is discussing raising China's alert level, and examines ence on China’s decision to build the bomb (People’s why Chinese proponents believe it is necessary. Daily 1964). The statement called the test a “major achievement” in a struggle “to oppose the U.S. imperi- alist policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats.” China’s Low Alert Level is a Basic Principle It explained that China developed nuclear weapons “for protecting the Chinese people from U.S. threats to Unlike the United States and Russia, China currently launch a nuclear war.” The statement defended the keeps its nuclear weapons off alert, with nuclear war- decision to conduct the test by saying China was doing heads not mated to the delivery vehicles. For this rea- it “under compulsion (People’s Daily 1964).” son, under the counting rules of the 2010 New START China’s statement, however, was not addressed to agreement between the United States and Russia, the U.S. policy makers or the U.S. public. The intended total number of “deployed” Chinese nuclear weapons audiences were the non-nuclear weapons states in gen- would be counted as zero (UCS 2010). eral and the newly independent, non-aligned nations of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the founding gener- the developing world in particular—nations whose ation of China’s communist leaders chose to keep votes in the UN General Assembly China was pursu- China’s nuclear weapons off alert. They only planned ing to override continuing U.S. efforts to deny it ad- to use nuclear weapons for retaliation after China was mission to the United Nations. attacked first, so they did not require a high state of 2 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS The non-aligned nations took a strong stand against such an attack against China would be nothing more nuclear weapons when they met for the first time at the than the crackling of a “paper tiger (Mao 1977).” Bandung Conference in 1955 and continued to urge China to refrain from developing nuclear weapons for A Credible Arsenal Requires Survivability years afterwards (Prashad 2007). Zhou Enlai’s extem- poraneous speech in Bandung, which renounced the The requirements for a credible ability to retaliate to a use of force and Chinese interference in the domestic nuclear first strike from another nation are subjective.
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