GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS NOVEMBER 2003
Report by Hans Dieset
NORDEM Report 07/2004 Copyright: the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM and author(s). NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, is a programme of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main objective to actively promote international human rights. NORDEM is jointly administered by NCHR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. NORDEM works mainly in relation to multilateral institutions. The operative mandate of the programme is realised primarily through the recruitment and deployment of qualified Norwegian personnel to international assignments, which promote democratisation and respect for human rights. The programme is responsible for the training of personnel before deployment, reporting on completed assignments, and plays a role in research related to areas of active involvement. The vast majority of assignments are channelled through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NORDEM Report is a series of reports documenting NORDEM activities and is published jointly by NORDEM and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Series editor: Siri Skåre Series consultants: Hege Mørk, Gry Kval, Christian Boe Astrup The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher(s). ISSN: 1503–1330 ISBN: 82–90851–75–8 NORDEM Report is available online at: http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/publikasjonsliste.html
Preface On 31 March 2003, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human rights (ODIHR) received a formal invitation from Georgian authorities to observe the November 2003 parliamentary elections. Upon this invitation, the OSCE/ODHIR deployed a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) to Georgia in June 2003. The purpose of the NAM was to assess the conditions for elections, and to advise on the level of ODIHR involvement. The NAM recommended that a standard Election Observation Mission (EOM) be deployed to Georgia. Furthermore, the NAM advised that the OSCE participating states be asked to second 18 long-term observers (LTOs) to observe during the pre-election period and 250 short-term observers (STOs) to observe during election day. For election day 2 November the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) recruited some 450 STOs from 43 different OSCE participating states, including 21 parliamentarians from OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), 21 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and three form the European Parliament. On election day, the international observers visited some 1,200 polling stations throughout Georgia. One Norwegian LTO, Hans Dieset, was recruited to the EOM by NORDEM. Additionally, NORDEM recruited the following Norwegian STOs for the first round on 2 November. They were Lorentz Stavrum (deployed to Kvemo Kartli region), Anne Grete Nilsen (Imereti region), Jeremy Franklin (Kakheti), and John Mikael Kvistad (Kazbegi). Other Norwegian STOs included Andre Kvakkestad (PACE), and Steinar Gil, Turid Jacobsen, and Heidi Olufsen – all three from the Norwegian Embassy in Baku and all deployed to Kvemo Kartli region. For the repeat elections to take place in seven constituencies on 27 November, the EOM had initially recruted 77 STOs from OSCE participating states, OSCE PA and the European Parliament. However, because of the instability in the country after the first round, the EOM decided to cancel its observation of the second round. The information in this report is both based on the EOM’s reports and on the observations of the Norwegian observers. All opinions expressed in the report are the authors’ responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. NORDEM/ Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo July 2004
Contents Preface Contents Map of Country Introduction...... 1 Political background ...... 1 The Legislative Framework ...... 5 The Electoral Administration ...... 7 Voter and Civic Education ...... 9 Voter Registration...... 9 Candidate Registration ...... 10 The Election Campaign ...... 11 The Media ...... 12 Observation on Polling Day ...... 12 STO Election Day reports from the first round 2 November 2003 ...... 13 The Review of Complaints Process ...... 16 Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 17 Comments on the Election Observation Mission...... 19 Appendice ...... 20
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 1
Introduction
The International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) for the 2 and 23 November Georgian parliamentary elections was a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the European Parliament (EP). The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) opened in Tbilisi on 9 September and consisted of 34 election experts and long-term observers deployed in the capital and to six regional centres. On election day, the EOM deployed some 450 short-term observers from 43 OSCE participating States, including 21 parliamentarians from the OSCE PA, 21 from PACE, and three from the European Parliament. Out of a total of 2,893 polling stations the EOM observed the polling and vote count in over 1,200 polling stations. The EOM was also present in more than 30 district election commissions to observe the tabulation of results. At a press conference held on 3 November the EOM stated the following: “The 2 November parliamentary elections in Georgia fell short of a number of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. Inaccuracies in the voter list seriously challenged the fundamental guarantee of universal and equal suffrage, and lessened voters’ confidence in the State administration.” The post election period was extremely tense and characterized by mass protests from the opposition over the election results, allegations of massive frauds and falsifications. The opposition also demanded President Eduard Shevardnadze’s resignation and the cancelling of the 2 November elections The second round of elections should have taken place in seven districts where no candidates were elected in the first round. In addition, re- runs were supposed to take place in three precincts where either the Central election Commission (CEC) or the Court had invalidated the 2 November election results. The EOM was initially supposed to observe the second round on 27 November and had already recruited 77 STOs for that purpose. However, due to the political development in the country, and the fact that the President resigned on the 23 November, the EOM decided on 23 November to cancel its election observation. It was later announced that elections would not take place. On 25 October 2003, Georgia’s Supreme Court cancelled the final national protocol of the November 2 parliamentary elections vote tally issued by the CEC. The court’s ruling affected only the results of the proportional contest, while it remained unclear what would happen with the election results from the single-mandate constituencies.
Political background
After the dissolution of the USSR, the governmental structure of Georgia has changed radically and has developed into a unique system of government. When the first popularly elected president - Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1991-1992) - was ousted from office in January 1992, the presidency was abolished and the Supreme Soviet (the country’s legislature) disbanded. A military council was formed, which eventually turned over power over to a State Council. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 2
The president is the Head of State, and heads the executive power. He or she is elected by universal suffrage for a period of five years, and may not be elected for more than two consecutive terms. Any citizen, who is entitled to vote, has attained the age of 35 years, and who has lived in Georgia for 15 years is entitled to stand for the office of president. Legislative power is vested in the Georgian Parliament - a unicameral body comprising 235 members (85 are elected from single-mandate districts and 150 by proportional representation from party lists). They are elected for a term of four years by universal suffrage, with all citizens over the age of 18 being eligible to vote. Members of parliament are permitted to form parliamentary factions, if they comprise more than ten members. The Citizens’ Union of Georgia has been the ruling party up until the present. It gained over 23 per cent of the votes in the November/December 1995 parliamentary elections and in the 1999 parliamentary elections. The leading opposition party has been the National Democratic Party of Georgia, which has never gained more than 8 per cent of the votes. Other prominent parties and blocs include the All-Georgian Union of Revival, the Socialist Party of Georgia, the “Progress” bloc, the “Tanadgoma” bloc, and the United Republican Party.
Political parties running in the 2003 parliamentary elections For the 2003 parliamentary elections the CEC registered 39 political parties, of which nine formed electoral blocs and twelve ran alone. Thus, candidates form 21 party- and coalition lists competed for the 150 mandates in the proportional contest. 460 candidates were registered to contest the 75 majoritarian seats.
The most important parties and blocs include: 1.’For a New Georgia’-bloc, The electoral bloc consists of the following parties: • Citizens' Union of Georgia, led by State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze • Socialists Party, led by Vakhtang Rcheulishvili • National-Democratic Party, led by Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia • Green Party of Georgia, led by Giorgi Gachechiladze • Christian-Democratic Union, led by former State Minister Vazha Lortkipanidze • Abkhazia's Liberation Party, led by head of Abkhaz government-in-exile Tamaz Nadareishvili • Political Union - "Strong Regions - Strong Georgia", led by businessman Merab Samadashvili. • Political Union - "Transporters' Hall", led by Omekhi Darjania • "Georgia in First Place - Language, Motherland, Religion", led by Guram Sharadze
The president-backed election alliance For a New Georgia, which consists of nine political parties, was established on the eve of the 2 November parliamentary elections. Most observers agree that the alliance has no common ideological ground. The bloc mainly unites forces of the power base of the government. However, many former rivals of President Shevardnadze unexpectedly joined the bloc, including Irina-Sarishvili Chanturia - leader of National-Democratic GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 3 party who, before joining For New Georgia, held merger talks both with opposition parties and with the leader of the Socialists Party Vakhtang Rcheulishvili - former member of the Revival Union. During its modest election campaign the bloc stressed Shevardnadze's role as a guarantor of the country's stability. The bloc publicly advocates a pro-western stance, however, the opposition accuses the bloc of being pro-Russian, especially after the entry of Russian energy giants Gazprom and United Energy Systems into Georgian markets. The Citizen’s Union of Georgia party, which now forms the bulk of the president-backed electoral alliance, performed poorly during the June 2002 local government elections. In Tbilisi, the party received only 2,5% of votes.
2. Democratic Union of Revival Party: The Revival Union is the political power base for the Head of the Adjarian Autonomous Republic - Aslan Abashidze - who has unilaterally been ruling this south-western Georgian province for the last past ten years. The Revival Union has managed to secure guaranteed seats in parliament. The party regularly receives at least 95% of votes in Adjara during each parliamentary election since 1995, thus casting doubts over the free and fair elections in the autonomous republic. The votes of Adjarian residents are quite enough to clear the 7% barrier necessary to win seats in the parliament. The popularity of the party is low in other parts of Georgia. Aslan Abashidze claims he is the only one who can guarantee stability in Adjara. Abashidze, whose main goal is to maintain absolute control of his province and who harbours no national interests, claims he has saved Adjara from the bloodshed of civil war that flooded west Georgia in the early nineties, as well as from the impact of the war in Abkhazia. The Revival Union has extremely tense relations with other opposition parties, especially with Mikheil Saakashvili's National Movement and the Burjanadze-Democrats election alliance, led by Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze and former Parliamentary Chairperson Zurab Zhvania. They accuse the Revival Union, together with the For a New Georgia alliance, for being responsible for the failure to endorse the so-called Baker Plan on composition of the CEC on the parity bases.
3. Saakashvili National Movement bloc: The bloc comprises the following parties: • United National Movement, led by Mikheil Saakashvili • Union of National Forces of Georgia, led by Zviad Dzidziguri • Republican Party, led by Davit Berdzenishvili The National Movement bloc was a radical opposition to Shevardnadze's government. It unites Mikheil Saakashvili's National Movement, the Republican Party and some of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia supporters in the Union of National Forces. It is led by Mikheil Saakashvili, Chairman of the Tbilisi City Council. In August of 2001, Mikheil Saakashvili launched a radical protest against the president by resigning his post as minister of justice. The National Movement received a majority of the votes in Tbilisi during the June 2002 local government elections. However, it was not so successful in the regions. Observers claim that the movement's organization and regional capacity has increased since last June. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 4
Curbing corruption and "dismantling the Shevardnadze's clan" are the key principals of the National Movement's election platform. The bloc actively advocates passing of a law that would allow for the confiscation of assets illegally acquired by officials in high positions It also advocates a strong pro- western stance.
4. Labour Party of Georgia The Labour Party is chaired by Shalva Natelashvili - one of the most popular politicians in Georgia. The Labour Party with its strong socialist platform supports free health care, education and social services. Thus, the party's ideas are particularly appealing to the elderly. The Labour Party demands nationalization of strategically important facilities. Recently, Shalva Natelashvili started to advocate a pro-western policy, particularly Georgia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Shalva Natelashvili claims the Labour Party is the only real opposition group to Shevardnadze's government and considers all other opposition parties to be Shevardnadze's allies. Natelashvili has especially tense relations with Mikheil Saakashvili's National Movement party. The party gained 25% of the votes in Tbilisi in the June 2002 local government elections. "Dismantling Shevardnadze's Regime" was party’s the slogan in the local elections The Labour Party has one representative in the Central Election Commission.
5.The Burjanadze-Democrats bloc The bloc consists of the following three parties: • United Democrats, led by Zurab Zhvania • ‘Traditionalist’ Union of Georgia, led by Akaki Asatiani • Christian-Conservators, led by Shota Malashkhia The electoral alliance Burjanadze-Democrats was established after Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze in August 2003 joined the United Democrats - the party of former Parliamentary Chairman Zurab Zhvania's. Later, the Traditionalists party, led by Akaki Asatiani, the first Chairman of Parliament of post-Soviet Georgia, joined the Burjanadze-Democrats. The prominent featuring of Nino Burjanadze's face on the bloc’s campaign banners clearly indicated that Zurab Zhvania put all his stakes on Burjanadze's high popularity for these parliamentary elections. Domestic observers say that Zhvania and Burjanadze created a perfect political match and a very strong political team. The latest opinion polls before election day put Burjanadze ahead of many high- profile politicians. Meanhile, Zurab Zhvania has a huge amount of political experience but his opponents claim that Zhvania is a master of backstage politics. Among the ideas Burjanadze advocates is a constitutional amendment to limit the concentration of power in the presidency. She favours the formation of a powerful cabinet of ministers, which in its turn could create a post of prime minister. The Burjanadze-Democrats platform also includes paying the backlog of salaries and pensions, improving the investment climate, protecting business against corruption and unwarranted government interference, and updating the armed forces to NATO standards. The popularity of Nino Burjanadze has made her, as she says a "target of black-PR and smear campaign from the authorities." In almost every public speech on the eve of the elections President Shevardnadze was harshly slamming Burjanadze for "poor performance as Parliamentary GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 5
Chairperson." The President also accused Burjanadze of "telling lies." Earlier the President-backed election bloc blamed Burjanadze for cooperation with the Russian secret services. The Burjanadze-Democrats have one member in the Central Election Commission.
6. The New Rights bloc: The New Rigts bloc consists of two parties: The New Rights, led by Davit Gamkrelidze; and the Georgian Liberal Party, led by Revaz Shavishvili. It has a 13-member faction in the outgoing parliament. The New Rights election alliance united the New Rights Party, the bulk of the alliance and the Liberal Party, led by Revaz Shavishvili (former chief of state audit) and Vakhtang Khmaladze, who was actively engaged in developing the new election code. The New Rights Party was established in 2000 after Davit Gamkrelidze and Levan Gachechiladze left the then-ruling Citizens' Union of Georgia party. The party advocates a strong pro-Western stance. In domestic politics the New Rights promotes liberalization of taxation and creation of a favourable investment climate. The party enjoys huge economic backing, as it is led by two of the leading Georgian businessmen: David Gamkrelidze - longtime head and founder of insurance giant Aldagi, and Levan Gachechiladze - head of a successful exporter of Georgian wine and spirits. In the June 2002 local government elections the New Rights gathered 11.3% of votes in Tbilisi. The New Rights party has one representative on the Central Election Commission.
7. ’Industry Will Save Georgia’ bloc The Industry Will Save Georgia bloc consists of the political movement ’Industry will Save Georgia’, led by Gogi Topadze, and the politial unity ’Sportive Georgia’, led by Roman Rurua. The bloc emerged in the Georgian politics after the success in the 1999 parliamentary elections and has a 14- member faction in the outgoing Parliament. The bloc is led by the Georgian beer magnate Gogi Topadze and other older-generation businessmen, who advocate liberalization of taxes. After securing seats in the parliament in the 1999 elections the party tried to maintain non-alliance politics with at that time major political forces - the ruling Citizens' Union of Georgia party and the Revival Union. The bloc’s neutral position has since faded away and in 2003 it supported the government’s proposed budget. The speculations over co-operation between the ‘Industrialists’ and the pro-president alliance have gained momentum since the former also voted against reforming the method of appointment of members to the CEC.
The Legislative Framework
The elections were conducted under the Unified Electoral Code (UEC), which was substantially amended in August 2003. The late amendments to the election legislation were generally considered by the EOM as improvements over the previous legislation. The EOM furthermore assessed that “The UEC provides an adequate framework for the conduct of elections if implemented impartially and uniformly. It incorporates a number of recommendations GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 6 made by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission”. Lastly, the UEC provided more detailed provisions regarding equal campaign conditions and gave greater latitude for election observers to carry out their activities
However, according to the EOM, the UEC failed to ensure the equality of the vote, as some constituencies have many more electors than others, which challenges OSCE commitments and other international election standards. Also, while the electoral code ensured the full transparency of election results at the central level, it failed to ensure the same level of transparency at district levels. The basic legal documents governing presidential as well as parliamentary elections are the Constitution, the Unified Electoral Code (UEC) and ordinances and decrees of the CEC. Subordinate to the Constitution is the UEC, which was adopted in 2001 and amended in April 2002 and also in late August 2003. Subordinate to the UEC are ordinances and instructions issued by the CEC.
Amendments to the UEC included a number of positive reforms such as: • Computerized voters list; • Voter marking; • The abolishment of supplementary voter lists: A voter who is not included in the general or special voter lists will not be able to vote; • Ballot papers are stamped and signed on the backside in a specially designated place; • Abolishment of the voting license, and • The rights of IDPs to vote in the single-mandate contests.
Election system The law provides for a mixed election system with 150 deputies elected on a proportional basis where the whole country is considered to be one electoral district. A further 85 deputies are elected from single-mandate constituencies on the basis of a two-round plurality-majority election system. It was not possible to conduct elections in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, therefore elections took place in 75 constituencies only. The qualifying threshold for party/bloc representation in parliament is 7 % of the votes cast. The tabulation of the proportional vote is made by the CEC on the basis of the results protocols from the PECs. The 85 single constituencies correspond with the territorial-administrative division of the country, except for Tbilisi, which was allocated ten mandates. For a candidate to be elected in a single-mandate constituency, he/she must secure a qualified majority of the votes equaling no less than one third of the total number of persons having participated in the elections. The elections are only considered valid if at least one third of the constituency’s total number of registered voters participated. In case none of the candidates are elected in the first round, a second round will be held for the two candidates with the best results from the first round. In the 2003 parliamentary elections, a second round was supposed to be held in 7 constituencies but was cancelled due to the political developments.
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It was the LTOs’ impression that the late amendments to the UEC caused problems in disseminating the information to all levels of the electoral administration. However, the amended UEC included a number of positive reforms, such as a more transparent system, improvements related to the voter lists and new polling procedures. Despite these improvements, fraud and falsifications took place during election day and in the immediate days afterwards. The improved procedures appeared to be rather complicated, and required intensive training of commission members beforehand. However, not all commission members received such training. Unfortunately, both the Georgian government and the electoral administration seemed not always to be accountable to the UEC.
The Electoral Administration
In its preliminary statement, the EOM noted that the new CEC appointed for these elections functioned much more transparently than its predecessor. Furthermore, the appointment process of DEC Chairpersons was a controversial issue, due to the clear political imbalance in the nomination process. Virtually all of those appointed were nominated by a coalition of FNG, Revival and Industrialists. The same applied to the appointment of PEC Chairpersons.
Territorial-administrative division The administrative-territorial division of Georgia is organised on a number of levels. At the first (regional) level the country is divided into twelve territories as follows: • 2 autonomous republics (Abkhazia & Ajara) • 1 City, Tbilisi (region 1) • 9 Regions; Kakheti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Shida Kartli, Kvemo Kartli, Imereti, Samtske Javakheti, sangrel-Zemo Svaneti, Guria and racha-Lechkhumi&Kvemo Svaneti. The local government at the regional level is a branch of the national government, except for in the autonomous republics.1 A presidential appointee (Governor) represents the national government at the regional level and liaises with local authorities within the region.
At the second level the regions are divided into territories (districts or raiony). Tbilisi is divided into five administrative districts.
Composition and appointment of election commissions The electoral code establishes a three-tier election administration according to articles 128, 128.1 and 128.2:
1 Abkhazia is de facto outside the control of central authorities in Tblisi. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 8
At the top is the Central Election Commission (CEC) consisting of 15 members. Then follows 75 District Election Commissions (DECs) and a further 2,864 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). According to Georgia’s electoral code, the CEC is a permanent body, which is responsible for preparing for and conducting the elections. It provides for the complete and unconditional execution of the Georgian citizens’ right to vote, and controls within the framework of its authority equal use of the election legislation of the whole territory of Georgia. Furthermore, the CEC examines the legitimacy of decisions taken by election commissions and in case of misconduct, rejects or amends them. It presides over and manages preparation of ballot papers and the special ballot envelopes, supplies DECs with the ballot papers and envelopes; examines applications and appeals on decisions and actions of the DECs, including those on results of the elections. The current CEC was created in early September 2003 after heated debates. The government and the opposition parties were in deadlock over the rules of appointment to the new CEC. The visit of former U.S. Secretary of State - James Baker, dispatched to Georgia by the U.S. government in early July – contributed to breaking the deadlock. James Baker proposed an election guideline to Georgian politicians envisaging composition of the new 15-member CEC that would include five representatives of the pro-president parties/blocs and nine members from the opposition parties. Baker recommended appointing the CEC chairperson from among candidates proposed by the OSCE. However, debates over the CEC’s composition continued even after the visit of James Baker. The National Movement, the New Rights, Burjanadze-Democrats and some other opposition parties insisted on distributing nine CEC seats evenly among the opposition, while the Revival Union and Industrialists demanded three and two seats respectively. Finally, as a result of Revival’s and the Industrialists’ support for the current government, parliament adopted the latter demand, which resulted in widespread protest from the opposition. On September 1 President Shevardnadze appointed Nana Devdariani as CEC Chairperson. Devdariani was among three candidates proposed to the President by the OSCE. The DECs and the PECs have the same composition as the CEC. The DEC Chairperson is appointed by the CEC and is also a permanent body. It is the DEC’s responsibility to appoint the PEC Chairperson.
It is the LTOs’ assessment that the close cooperation between the electoral administration and the local administration most probably had an impact on the final result in favour of ‘For New Georgia’. The late disbursement of funds from the CEC was a controversial issue, and had a negative impact on the overall administration of the election. Due to lack of training, DEC- and PEC members were not able to conduct their duties efficiently. During the post election period it was reported from several districts that the final results rather were negotiated than calculated based on the real votes cast during election day. A case report that describes how one DEC functioned is attached (appendix 3). GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 9
Voter and Civic Education
The civic society and the media were the main actors that conducted voter education. Programmes, which explained the voting procedures, were shown on television. Furthermore, organizations like UNDP, IFES and SOROS foundation were all involved in voter education. They trained personnel, printed brochures and posters which were distributed and posted all over the country. In addition, several political parties were running election educational programmes through their party headquarters and branch offices.
The LTOs noted that the TV programmes were informative and gave clear instructions to voters on procedures prior to- and on election day. On election day it was reported to the observers that voters seemed to be well informed and familiar with the election procedures.
Voter Registration
The EOM stated in its Preliminary Statement that the authorities’ decision to make a serious effort to address shortcomings in voter lists was necessary, but unfortunately was long overdue. The EOM further assessed that an initial lack of co-ordination by the bodies involved in their compilation and dissemination compounded the problem related to the voter lists, and that the scale of the technical challenge appeared to be underestimated by both authorities and election commissions, with deadlines slipping by the day. According to the UEC (Art 9.1) the general list of voters is a list of persons with an active electoral right, who are registered in a manner established by legislation according to election precincts.2 The CEC was responsible for electronically processing the general voter list and for placing it for public inspection. The list was based upon the latest available information provided by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Refugees and Settlement, and the housing departments of cities and municipalities. The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) finalised the computerisation of the data and the list was posted for public inspection. In addition to the general voter list, the UEC gives provision for a special list of voters, which includes election administration staff, voters hospitalised on election day, voters abroad or at sea or voters who are under preliminary detention. A supplementary voter list (for the mobile ballot box) was introduced for the disabled, military personnel, etc. The supplementary list should only include incapacitated voters who are unable to come to the precinct to cast their vote. On 28 September when the PECs held their first meeting, the deadline for publishing voter lists expired. The supplementary list should be posted immediately after its compilation.
2 UEC, amended 14 August 2003 Art. 9. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 10
In Georgia, voter registration is passive, i.e., it is the responsibility of the authorities to register voters. However, voters, observer organizations, parties and election commission members were entitled to suggest changes or additions to the voter lists until 18:00 hours on 31 October. Unfortunately, the computerized voter lists proved to be inaccurate, and caused a lot of frustrations, complaints and allegations at all levels during the pre- election period. During October, voter registration overshadowed all other electoral preparations and became a tense political issue as well. Because of all the difficulties with the voter lists, on 26 October the CEC unexpectedly decided to cease work on the voter lists and allow election commissions to use either handwritten or computerized lists, which led to more frustration and confusion. The consequence was that a variety of different lists was used during election day. The LTOs noted that the difficulties with the voter lists created problems during the pre-election period, as well as on election day. Furthermore, the fact that voters were unable to find themselves on the lists was a violation of their electoral rights, since this prevented them from voting on election day. The LTOs noticed that the CEC decision to allow election commissions to use handwritten voter lists created even more mistrust and confusion on the eve of election day. This resulted in many parties becoming extremely active and putting tremendous pressure on the DECs and PECs to include their supporters in the voter lists. The overall voter registration process was scandalous. Lack of proper understanding of the process, as well as lack of secure routines related to registration and gathering of data, seemed to be some of the most crucial areas that affected the process.
Candidate Registration
The EOM raised the following points in its evaluation of the candidate registration: • A wide range of parties and candidates participated in the election. It indicated the existence of political pluralism and offered a genuine choice for voters; • Observers reported a lack of uniformity in handling candidate registration at DEC level, with some failing to apply correct legal procedures; and • In the large majority of cases DECs applied equal criteria to candidates and the process went relatively smoothly. In a few instances, the candidate registration process did raise serious concern. In order to successfully register as a candidate, the electoral code outlines the following procedures to be followed: All candidates in single – mandate constituencies (SMC) must collect the signatures of at least 1,000 voters to be registered as a candidate, unless they are sitting members of the parliament (MPs). The signature list is submitted to the DEC, which then scrutinizes the list in accordance with the UEC. The CEC has the final decision on which candidates that are qualified to run in the SMC. Independent candidates nominated by citizens’ initiative groups are either registered or rejected upon the decision of the DEC Chairperson.
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 11
A party without parliamentary representation had until 15 August to collect a list with no less than 50,000 signatures to obtain registration. A party list must contain no less than 100 names of candidates with the right to passive vote. The electoral code does not require that the party or bloc’s candidate must be a member of that electoral entity. Candidates included in the party/bloc list can also run in SMCs. The decision to register or reject party/bloc candidates wishing to run in SMCs is taken by the CEC Chairperson. From what the LTOs saw, the candidate registration was generally conducted according to the regulations described in the UEC. However, in a few cases candidate registration process did raise serious concern. Apparently, pro- government political forces tried to prevent rival candidates from standing for election.
The Election Campaign
In its Preliminary Statement, the EOM noted that a large number of campaign meetings were held peacefully. However, as the election approached, tensions were raised and the tone of the campaign became antagonistic, particularly between the FNG bloc on the one hand, and the Burjanadze- Democrats and National Movement on the other. Misuse of State property and public employees during the campaign was frequently reported. The UEC regulates election campaigns, pre-election rallies and the scope of agitation in detail.3 Agitation through sources of mass media after 24.00 on the day prior to election is prohibited. The UEC also regulates who are not entitled to take part in campaigning, e.g. representatives of the local authorities. For instance, the local authorities (Gamgebelis) were not politically neutral and gave strong support to the FNG, including serving as campaign managers, in breach of the above law.
The LTOs noticed that campaigning mainly took place in the form of small local meetings. The majority of the parties did not announce these meetings in advance, mainly due to the fear of interference from other contestants. This strategy was common in Tbilisi. Despite a generally calm pre-election period, a few violent incidents took place in Bolnisi (26/9-03) and in Batumi (23/10-03). Misuse of public property was observed, as well as active participation in the election campaign by state employees and local authorities. Campaign material was on display inside public buildings and in other prohibited locations.
3 UEC: Articles 73,74 & 75. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 12
The Media
Regarding the media’s role in these elections, the EOM reported that the media offered the electorate a diverse range of political opinions that enabled voters to compare parties and candidates. The media provided a forum for the opposition to present their views and criticise the Government. The EOM noted, however, that the state owned media favoured the FNG during the campaign period. According to the UEC, public television and radio broadcasters are obliged to allocate parties/blocs two hours of free airtime daily starting no later than 15 days prior to election day. Paid airtime on TV or radio must not exceed 15% of total daily broadcasting time per day. The airtime shall equally be distributed among the contestants. In accordance with the electoral code, all parties had some free time for advertising on state TV. As far as the LTOs understood, the free airtime seemed to be distributed fairly equally among the parties In addition, all parties and candidates had the opportunity to buy air time on both state- and private channels. One private channel (Rustavi 2) was accused of being pro-opposition, while state channels were accused of displaying overt support for the government.
Observation on Polling Day
The EOM in its Preliminary Statement gave the following summary of polling day: • Observers reported from more than 1,200 polling stations in Georgia; • In many places polling was disorganised and slow; • Significant delays occurred in the Kutaisi area, parts of Tbilisi and Kakheti; • Observers reported tension in 21% of polling stations visited, unrest in 15%, and 22 cases of violence; • Inaccurate voter lists and inadequate polling premises were largely responsible for most problems witnessed on election day; • Relatively large numbers of voters were turned away due to the omission of their names from voter lists; and • In general, PECs attempted to follow correct voting procedures; invisible ink was usually applied to voters’ fingers, although many polling stations, especially in rural areas, did not check voters upon their arrival.
Election day procedures Polling stations (PS) are established by the 75 DECs and each PS serves a maximum of 2,000 voters.4 Polling stations open at 7 am to allow for the distribution of responsibilities among commission
4 UEC: Art. 16 GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 13 members by casting a lot. Pre-opening procedures include unpacking the sealed voting materials and sealing the ballot boxes in presence of party proxies and observers. The polling station is normally open for polling from 8 am to 8 pm. However, during the evening of the election day the CEC extended the opening hours with one hour to 9 pm. This information did not get through to the PECs, and therefore many polling stations closed at 8 pm. Detailed procedures and duties of PECs are described in a PEC Members’ Guide (appendix 4) approved by the CEC. The manual was distributed to all DECs and PECs.
STO Election Day reports from the first round 2 November 2003 The following election day reports have been prepared by Anne Grete Nilsen and Lorentz Stavrum, deployed to Imereti and Kvemo Kartli regions respectively. On election day they visited in all 16 polling stations and one DEC.
Election Day Report from STO Anne Grete Nilsen General information The STO team was deployed to East Imereti region, including the Lower Svaneti and Zestaphoni districts. All together 19 STO teams were deployed to the region and in the team’s area of responsibility (Zestaphoni district) there were two other STO teams. The STOs were told that in Zestaphoni district the opposition to Shevarnadze was strong. Apparently, a week before the elections eleven of 18 PEC Chairmen were fired on the grounds of holding two positions. Most of the fired chairmen were from FNG.
Observation of opening The STO team observed the opening of a polling station in Kutaisi city. The team stayed for the opening from 07:30 to 08:30. However, voting was postponed until 14:00 because the PEC had received neither voter list nor ballots from the CEC. The voting material only arrived at 13:00.
Observation of polling The STOs visited nine polling stations during election day. In some polling stations voting was poorly organised. The premises were too small and with poor lighting. The number of unauthorized personnel, both police officers and others, was generally high at the polling stations (ranging from 2 to 5 persons). In some polling stations the STOs observed multiple and proxy voting. In addition, a high number of voters who had found themselves on the voter list were turned away because they did not have sufficient documentation to prove their identity. At PS # 5117 Kvaliti the election was cancelled at 18:10. The team arrived at the polling station at 17:50 and was met by an angry and agitated crowd of 2-300 persons. Entrance to the polling station was blocked by police officers from within. Inside the polling station, an additional crowd of 50-70, both authorised and unauthorised persons met the team. It turned out that the voters were frustrated over the inaccuracy of the voter list as many were not included in the lists. The voter list was from 1979 and apparently 2/3 of its entries belonged to people deceased. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 14
After the election was cancelled at the above polling station, things calmed down and the angry crowd dispersed. The pressure upon the PEC Chairman to cancel the election was very apparent, not in written complaints, but by its physical and psychological nature. The STOs stayed at the polling station until 20:30 and then accompanied the ballot box to the DEC in Zestaphoni. The team did not observer aggregation of results at the DEC.
Conclusions The team’s general assessment of the electoral administration (PECs) was good Both PEC chairmen and members were well prepared and trained in election procedures and some of the PEC chairmen had 25-30 years of experience However, the inaccuracy of both handwritten and computerized voters lists posed the greatest challenge for the PECs and all expressed disappointment with the lists. In the STOs’ AoR, some voters failed to find their names on either lists. Furthermore, the time frame was too short for voters to verify whether they were included or not in the voter lists. The voter lists were posted on Friday 31 October and it was difficult for voters living far away from their polling station to come and check the lists. Some of the voter lists received from Tblisi were very old, in one instance from 1979. The team also noted that the number of voters on some voter lists was altered from Saturday to Sunday (election day).
Comments on the EOM This STO’s impression of the EOM is that they were very professional. Logistic and administrative information was comprehensive and thorough. Operationally, the STO briefing in Tblisi was good. The only thing missing was a broader presentation of the latest amendments to the Unified Election Code. This would have given the STOs a better grip of understanding before being deployed to the field.
Election Day Report from STO Lorentz Stavrum General information The STO team’s AoR was the district of Tsalka in Kvemo Kartli region. Another STO team was deployed to the same area and the two teams divided the district’s 45 Polling Stations (PS) between themselves. This team was also designated a DEC (District Election Commission) team. On election day the team visited nine PSs and accompanied the voting material to the DEC, where the team stayed until midnight. The district of Tsalka is very special. There is no public accommodation and there are hardly any means of communication. The roads are bad and the landscape is naked and rough. The population speaks hardly any Georgian and consists of different ethnic minorities – mainly of Armenian or Greek origin, speaking Armenian, Greek or Turkish with Russian as the most common second language. The STOs spent the day preceding polling day familiarizing themselves with the area. They located PSs, planned routes and made other preparations for polling day.
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 15
Observation of opening The team observed the opening of a PS in Tsalka. Opening procedures were rather poor and the Precinct Election Commission was clearly unqualified and and did not follow the procedures as stipulated in the electoral code. The most prominent shortcoming was, however, the inaccuracy of the voter list. Voters left the PS without having voted because their names were not on the list. Also, the voter list contained what turned out to be multiple entries. The ballot box was not sealed and actually broke during the first observation period. It was carefully reconstructed by PEC officials.
Observation of polling At some PSs, the procedures were acceptable, but in most PSs procedures were irregular and PECs were inadequately trained. However, no blatant fraud was visible to the STOs and the problem was due not to local shortcomings, but to a lack of information and first and foremost to the poor quality of voter lists. At one PS the voter list contained 900 names, although the village only had 170 voters. At another PS the team was asked to wait outside until the PEC chairman had arranged the interior properly (the PS had already been open for 8 hours). As it turned out, there was no voter list and apparently PEC members were out in the district collecting votes! No violent incidents were observed and the election officials treated all voters politely. Voting facilities were poor, mainly due to substandard locations. A prominent trait of the team’s AoR was the language problem since all voting material was in Georgian, which only few people spoke. The overall assessment of polling was that the will to conduct proper elections was there, but that personal qualifications were insufficient, as was the material from the CEC.
Observation of counting The counting procedure was very poor. Initially, the PEC chairman asked the STOs to leave and questioned their right to be present. The situation in the polling station was rather tense, but after a while it became more relaxed and the team was able to observe the counting procedures. The chairman read and controlled the ballots on his own, while a secretary took notes. No results were announced.
Observation at the DEC The STOs followed the voting material from their counting PS to the DEC. Upon arrival, the situation at the DEC was rather unclear. Due to poor understanding of the counting procedures PECs had brought their ballot boxes with the ballots inside to the DEC and were counting the ballots in the dark corridors. There were tendencies to unrest and even some violence at the DEC office. At one point the STOs decided to leave the DEC both because of the rather tense atmosphere, and because it was difficult to observe the tabulation process.
Conclusion The team’s AoR was somewhat special, mainly due to its ethnic minority composition. However, despite inadequate knowledge and training, the STOS’ impression was that there was hardly any intentional fraud. The election results were obviously questionable due to the poor quality of the voter lists. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 16
General results from election day 2 November Voter turnout Total number of voters: 3,178,593 Total number of votes cast; 1,909,215 -of which invalid 65,641 -undetermined ballots 871 -undetermined envelopes 2,023 The turnout on election day was 60,06 %, of which 3,44 % cast ballots which were deemed invalid.
Results for the proportional contest Party/bloc Percent Seats 1. For New Georgia 21,32 % 38 2. Democratic Union of Revival Party 18,84% 33 3. Saakashvili-National Movement bloc 18.08 % 32 4. Labour Party of Georgia 12,04% 20 5. The Burjanadze-Democrats bloc 8,79% 15 6. The New Rights bloc 7,35% 12 7. Industry Will Save Georgia bloc 6,17 % 0
On 25 October, the Supreme Court of Georgia cancelled the final protocol of the November 2 parliamentary election vote tally. The court’s ruling affected only the results of the proportional voting, while the election results of the single-mandate constituencies remain unclear.
The Review of Complaints Process
Regarding the complaints and appeals process, the EOM stated that: • The UEC contained clear procedures for lodging election complaints and appeals; • The relatively large number of court cases indicated willingness by parties to challenge decisions of the election administration through the legal system; and • With few exceptions the judiciary operated transparently, efficiently, diligently, and with respect for deadlines.
Recent amendments to the UEC adopted in august 2003 provides for clear and precise procedures for the resolution of election-related disputes. Article 77 in the UEC reads “A breach of the electoral code may be appealed against at the appropriate election commission or in court of law. If the dispute refers GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 17 to the constitutional nature of the election, a complaint may also be lodged with the Constitutional Court of Georgia”. The following diagram summarizes the appeals available for disputes regarding the conduct of the poll and vote counting at each level:
PEC
Rayon (city or regional) Appeals from the court of first instance A dispute regarding an action Court follow the civil, criminal or administrative or decision of a PEC during procedure as defined by the law. polling.
Rayon Court: Within 2 A dispute regarding the vote District Court: Within 2 days the decision days the case must be counting and PEC protocol. can be appealed and the Court has 3 days to submitted. The Court then decide. The decision is final. has 3 days to decide.
DEC Rayon Court: Within 2 A dispute regarding the days a case must be District Court: Within 2 days the decision invalidation of PEC results by submitted. The Court has 2 can be appealed and the Court has 3 days to the DEC. days to decide. decide. The decision is final.
A dispute regarding the summary protocol of results District Court: An appeal can be lodged within 2 days. The by the DEC. Court has 3 days to decide. The decision is final.
CEC Supreme Court: The appeal must be filed within 2 days A dispute regarding a CEC ordinance determining the and the Court has 3 days to issue a decision. elections were or were not held.
Supreme Court: The appeal must be filed within 3 days. A dispute regarding the CEC summary protocol of election The Court has 8 days to decide. The decision is final. results
Similar procedures were established for complaints related to candidate- and party registration, voter lists, appointment of election commission members etc. Having observed the counting and the tabulation procedures and the consequent complaints and appeals that followed, the LTOs were under the impression that few court decisions were in favour of the government. The courts seemed to work efficiently and generally adhered to the deadlines set by UEC Party proxies, as well as by DEC and PEC members, were well acquainted with the complaints and appeals procedures. Voters were not that familiar with their rights to file complaints.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The EOM recognized some positive aspects of this election, including: GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 18
• An improved legal framework for the conduct of elections; • A generally fair and efficient candidate registration process; • Political pluralism and a genuine opposition offered voters a real choice of parties and candidates; • Election candidates were generally free to campaign and promote their views; • Internally displaced persons (IDPs) were in principle permitted to vote in the single-mandate races as well as the proportional contest; • The media offered the electorate a diverse range of views, enabling voters to make a reasonably well-informed choice on election day; • During the pre-election period, courts generally acted independently and provided effective remedy for plaintiffs; • In order to increase the transparency of results, the CEC issued regulations that permitted the DECs to release a record of the results precinct by precinct, although the law does not actually stipulate this requirement; • Multi-party PECs and the presence of domestic civic observers and party representatives helped to maintain transparency in most areas; and • PEC members used appropriate complaint mechanisms rather than disrupting the process.
However, the EOM also notes several issues of distinct concern, including: • Serious delays and changes in the electoral preparations, which extended to election day, contributing to an atmosphere of widespread uncertainty and mistrust; • Serious acts of violence during campaign events, (e.g. in Bolnisi and Batumi), which cast a long, if isolated, shadow over the pre-election period; • A failure on the part of the FNG to distinguish between political party and state resources led to unequal campaign conditions; • The political environment in Adjara dissuaded political parties from campaigning; • There were numerous and credible reports of intimidation and pressure on voters; • With the exception of freely allocated airtime, the State media including TV Adjara, failed to provide politically balanced reporting on the election contestants’ campaigns; • Serious irregularities on election day, although in a relatively small number of polling stations, included direct observations and allegations of ballot stuffing, use of pre-marked ballots, multiple voting, and destruction of ballot boxes; • A presence of large numbers of unauthorised persons inside polling stations, including police and local government officials, some of whom interfered in or directed the process; • Attempts to unduly influence voters in or around polling stations, including instances of intimidation; • Reports that domestic civic observer groups faced obstruction in conducting their activities and on occasion intimidation and even violence; • As in the past, there was failure to ensure the secrecy of the vote; GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 19
• Anomalous and late increases in CEC voter turnout data in a number of districts; and • Implausible turnout figures in some districts, potentially affecting national election results.
Election day irregularities were particularly evident in Adjara and Kvemo Kartli, where observers reported a very low confidence in the election process. During the post election period (2-23 November 2003), the EOM focused on the tabulation process both at CEC and DEC level. Serious irregularities, fraud and falsifications, like those found at the Samgori DEC in Tbilisi, were observed at all levels. Similar reports were received from all over the country, and will reflect the major findings in the EOM`s final report.
Comments on the Election Observation Mission
The EOM for the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia was one of the largest election observation missions ever to have been deployed. The core team and long term observers seemed to be highly qualified and dedicated people who did their utmost for the mission to succeed under difficult circumstances. OSCE/ODIHR has conducted several observation missions to Georgia the last few years. In spite of this, this year’s mission started more or less from scratch, gaining its own experience through trial and error methodology. Had information and experience from previous missions been saved and taken care of, this year’s EOM would have been far more efficient from the beginning. To be more specific, this LTO would like to mention a few points: Firstly, the core team was requesting different types of information during the mission, and quite often the same type of information. Some information is considered to be basic information, which the ODIHR by all accounts should have available in their archives from previous elections, such as the number of PECs in each district, their contact details and emergency information regarding police, hospitals, etc. For such a large mission good coordination is required. Communication between the core team and the LTOs should go through the LTO co-ordinator. This was not always adhered to by other core team members, and caused confusion from time to time as LTOs would receive conflicting messages and instructions from different core team members. The same occurred regarding requests for information. Quite often core team members requested the same type of information, but in different formats. The consequence was a lot double work for the LTOs, which certainly could have been avoided by better coordination from the team’s headquarters. The size of the mission made it necessary to implement some bureaucratic rules and regulations. However, the EOM sometimes seemed to be too bureaucratic, especially related to reporting procedures. The LTOs were more than once asked to report on the same issue.
Short-term observers The mission divided the STOs in three categories: (i) parliamentarians, (ii) embassy teams, and (iii) ordinary ODIHR teams GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 20
The status of these three types of STO teams was different. While the last category was of the ‘working type’, the two other categories were more or less exempted from following ordinary STO guidelines, especially regarding working hours and reporting. The parliamentarians had a separate organizational set-up, with separate briefing and reporting routines. This made it difficult for LTOs to properly plan the deployment and coverage of the different districts. The parliamentarians also had special arrangements regarding transport; on the list of accepted vehicles and drives the LTOs could read the following comment: “Vehicle recommended for parliamentarians”. This special treatment elicited a few ‘comments’ both from the local and international staff, and the practise does not necessarily correspond with the overall policy of ODIHR being an advocate of equality and democratic principals.
Appendices
1. OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 21
GEORGIA: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 4 JANUARY 2004
Report by Hans Dieset GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 22
Preface The International Election Observation Mission for the 4 January extraordinary presidential election in Georgia was a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the European Parliament (EP). The 4 January 2004 presidential elections were the fourth since independence in 1991. The deeply flawed 2 November 2003 parliamentary election was followed by mass demonstrations throughout the country that culminated in the “Rose revolution” on 22 and 23 November 2003 were Eduard Shevardnadze finally resigned from his post as the President of Georgia. Following his resignation, the interim president decided to hold an extraordinary presidential election and according to the Constitution of Georgia such an election must take place within 45 days after the resignation of the president. The date for the new presidential election was set to 4 January 2004. The International Election Observation Mission (EOM) recruited 24 long-term observers (LTOs) and some 450 short-term observers (STOs) from 38 OSCE participating states to monitor the elections. In addition, the EOM was made up of a core team of 13 international election experts to head the Mission. On election day the international observers monitored the voting in 1,500 polling stations out of a total of 2,850. One Norwegian LTO, Hans Dieset, was recruited to the mission by the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM). Additionally, NORDEM recruited the following STOs to observe on election day: Lorentz Stavrum (deployed to Samgrelo region); Merete Dyrud (Imereti region); Bjørg Hope Galtung (Kakheti), and Gunnar Johannesen (Shida Kartli). Furthermore, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the following STOs: Rune Aasheim, Toralv Nordbr and Henrik Foyn Skjerve. The Norwegian Embassy in Baku sent two STOs: Heidi Olufsen and Ilia Utmelidze, both deployed to Kvemo Kartli region.
The information in this report is both based on the EOM’s reports and on the observations of the Norwegian observers. All opinions expressed in the report are the authors’ responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. NORDEM/ Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo July 2004 GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 23
Contents Preface Contents Introduction...... 24 Political background ...... 24 The Legislative Framework ...... 25 The Electoral Administration ...... 26 Voter and Civic Education ...... 27 Voter Registration...... 27 Candidate Registration ...... 28 The Election Campaign ...... 29 The Media ...... 29 Observation on Polling Day ...... 30 STO Election Day Reports ...... 30 The Review of Complaints Process ...... 36 Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 37 Comments on the Election Observation Mission...... 38 Appendices...... 39
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 24
Introduction
The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) to monitor the 4 January presidential elections opened in Tbilisi on 5 December and consisted of 36 experts and long-term observers deployed in the capital and to ten regional centres. On election day, the EOM deployed some 450 short-term observers from 38 OSCE participating states, including 22 parliamentarians from the OSCE PA, 13 from PACE, and three from the European Parliament. Out of a total of 2,895 polling stations, the observers visited 1,500, of which the vote count was observed in some 130 polling stations. In addition, EOM observers were present in more than 40 District Election Commissions to observe the tabulation of results. At a press conference held on 5 January 2004 the OSCE/ODIHR EOM stated the following: “The authorities showed the political will to conduct democratic elections, making a welcome contrast to the deeply flawed 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections.” Six candidates were running in the extraordinary presidential election on 4 January 2004. The pre-election period was calm, with surprisingly little political campaigning taking place.
The information presented in this report is both based on and reflects the findings of the observers and the EOM Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. In chapters where information relevant to Georgia’s previous elections is still applicable, references have been made to the previous election report Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003 in order not to unduly repeat the same information.
Political background
For a historical overview of political developments in Georgia up to the present, see previous report “Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003”
Political development after the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections On 25 November, the Supreme Court annulled the results of the proportional component of the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections as apposed to the majoritarian results, which were inexplicably permitted to stand. The partial cancellation of the election results implied that 58 elected Members of Parliament did not take their seats and as a result the Parliament elected in November 1999 was reconvened. As a further consequence, four re-runs and eleven second round majoritarian elections were held on 4 January. The date for the re-run of the proportional component was set to 28 March 2004.
The political environment changed dramatically in the run-up to the presidential election. The parties that had led the November events - the Saakashvili National Movement and the Burjanadze-Democrats - consolidated their executive power. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 25
On the other hand, the pro-Shevardnadze parliamentary coalition For a New Georgia (FNG) dissolved, and the once dominant Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG) no longer appeared to be functioning as a political party. Several previously influential parties, including the Labour Party, the New Rights, and the Revival Party, lost support by distancing themselves from the November events and both the Labour Party and Revival announced their intention to boycott the presidential election in January. The participation in this election of the autonomous republic of Adjara remained uncertain until 29 December. Even after the decision was taken to participate, conditions in Adjara were not in place for the conduct of a meaningful and democratic election process. Regrettably, as in previous elections, elections did not take place in Abkhazia and in most of South Ossetia.
Candidates running in the 2004 presidential election For the 2004 presidential elections 13 candidates initially applied to be registered as presidential candidates with the Central Election Commission (CEC). However, on 4 January only six candidates contested the election: 1. Mikheil Saakashvili – supported by “ United National Movement”, Burjanadze- democrats and Unity (Ertoba). 2. Roin Loperteliani – supported by the “Davit Agmashenebeli” bloc 3. Zurab Kleksashvili – supported by the “Mdzleveli” bloc 4. Kartlos Gharibashvili – supported by the political union “Advocates” 5. Zaza Sikharulidze – supported by an initiative group, Chairman of the Union of Lord’s Children (NGO advocating rights of the disabled) 6. Teimuraz (Temur) Shashiashvili – supported by an initiative group (former Special Representative of the president in the Imereti region)
The Legislative Framework
In its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (Preliminary Statement), the OSCE/ODIHR EOM concluded that: • The election was conducted according to a combination of general and transitional provisions of the Unified Election Code (UEC), which provides an improved framework for democratic elections. Amendments passed on 29 November were assessed as improvements; • These amendments included the simplification of complaint procedures, and the universal use of voter marking (inking) to limit double voting, rather than limiting this safeguard to urban areas only as during the November election; and • There were considerable uncertainties regarding the applicable legal framework, as the transitional provisions foresaw neither an extraordinary presidential election nor a new voter registration. The basic legal documents governing the presidential, as well as the parliamentary elections are the Constitution, the Unified Electoral Code (UEC) and instructions and decrees of the CEC. Subordinate to the Constitution is the Unified Electoral Code of Georgia, which was adopted in 2001 and amended GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 26 in April 2002 and again in late August 2003. Subordinate to the UEC are CEC instructions and decrees. Amendments as of 29 November 2003 to the UEC include that voter marking (inking) has been introduced in all polling stations; the complaints procedures have been made simpler; and that bilingual ballot papers are to be issued in areas containing minorities
The 4 January elections were both presidential and parliamentarian as they also included re-runs and second rounds in constituencies where the results were cancelled, or where no candidate was elected. The 85 single-mandate constituencies (SMCs) correspond with the territorial-administrative division of the country, except for Tbilisi, which is allocated 10 mandates.5 For the presidential election the following legal requirements apply: The Constitution requires a 50% voter turnout and that the winning candidate must receive 50 % of the ballots cast. Because of additional voter registration, including registration on election day, the exact of registered voters was not known before election day on 4 January.
The November 2003 amendments to the UEC represented a significant improvement over the previous code. However, the improved procedures appeared to be rather complicated, and required intensive training of election commission members beforehand. Not all commission members received such training, even though training was much more widely conducted this time compared to the 2 November parliamentary elections.
The Electoral Administration
The EOM stated in its Preliminary Statement that after the resignation of the previous CEC Chairman in December, the CEC for this election functioned more transparently than its predecessor, and it demonstrated a greater political will to conduct democratic elections. After the 2 November elections, 49 District Election Commission (DEC) chairpersons formally resigned and were replaced by people that predominately represented the new interim government. The same applied to 331 DEC members who were dismissed. Most changes affected the election commissions’ five presidential appointees. Also a great number of Precinct Election Commission (PEC) chairpersons- and members were replaced in front of these elections.
The CEC is a permanent body and has 15 members. It is responsible for preparing for and conducting the elections. It provides for the complete and unconditional execution of the Georgian citizens’ right to vote, and controls within the framework of its authority equal use of the election legislation of the whole territory of Georgia. The CEC’s responsibilities remain equal as to the Parliamentary elections. The 75 DECs have a similar composition to the CEC and the DEC chairpersons are appointed by the CEC.
5 For more details on Georgia’s administrative-territorial division, see “Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 27
For these elections there were 2,864 PECs, whose chairpersons were appointed by the DECs. The law stipulates that a PEC should have no more than 15 members. The duties of the DEC and the PEC are outlined in the UEC (Chapter IV, Arts. 34,35,38 & 39). As witnessed in the previous elections, LTOs noticed that the close cooperation between the electoral administration and the local administration seemed to continue in several parts of the country. In some districts the campaign for Mr. Saakashvili was led from governmental premises The disbursement of funds from the CEC was certainly better during these elections than the previous, and observers were able to verify that both DEC- and PEC members were paid their salaries after the elections. Due to lack of training, not all DEC- and PEC members were able to conduct their duties efficiently, although training took place to a greater extent this time.
Voter and Civic Education
As like in the November 2003 parliamentary elections, voter education was mainly carried out by the civic society and media. Programmes, which explained the voting procedures, were shown on television. Furthermore, organizations like UNDP, IFES and SOROS foundation were, as previously in the 2003 Parliamentary elections, all involved in voter education. However, this time, education material was also available in minority languages, which was a great improvement over the previous elections. Additionally, some political parties were running election educational programmes from their party headquarters or branch offices. The most dominant in this respect was the joint campaign of the National Movement/Burjanadze democrats. The latter party distributed voter education material sponsored by the OSCE, EU and the Council of Europe to be used by the CEC and NGOs contracted by CEC. From what the LTOs saw, the TV programmes were informative and gave voters clear instructions on pre-election-and election day procedures. On election day it was reported that voters seemed to be well informed and familiar with the voting process. Election material in minority languages proved to be a great improvement.
Voter Registration
The EOM assessed that the authorities’ decision to make a serious effort to address shortcomings in voter lists was necessary with reference to the dissatisfaction with the voter list of 2 November 2003. Consequently, the CEC decided to create a new list. The EOM further commended the election administration for its substantial efforts to improve the public confidence in the voter lists. In spite of this, the voter lists still must be considered incomplete. On December 30, the CEC decided to allow same-day registration of voters, including those abroad. The EOM rated this decision reasonable in the given circumstances. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 28
Voter lists6 are based upon the latest available information provided by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Refugees and Settlement and housing departments of cities and municipalities. The new general voter list was mainly created by door to door registration, done by PEC members. However, the PECs were supposed to be open for voters to register on their own initiative. Many PECs did not open before election day, due to the cold climate and lack of facilities like electricity and heating. 29 December was the deadline for publishing the general voter list and the supplementary list (for the mobile ballot). Due to difficult weather conditions and extremely bad conditions of a great number of polling stations many PECs did not display the voter lists until election day.
In spite of all the difficulties commission members faced during the work with the voter list(s), they managed to produce a list, which the public trusted more than the previous one. The decision of same- day registration was correct, considering the time limit and special conditions surrounding these elections.
Candidate Registration
Two political parties and five initiative groups succeeded in submitting candidate support lists with a minimum of 50,000 signatures to the CEC before the 12 December deadline. One candidate, Igor Giorgadze, was denied registration because he did not meet the residency requirement. The candidacies of the six remaining candidates were confirmed on 17 December (one candidate withdrew the day before the election). Two of the six candidates had previously contested in the presidential elections in 1995 and 2000 where they obtained less than 1% of the vote. In general, the candidate registration was done according to the procedures described in the UEC.
The Election Campaign
The EOM said in its Preliminary Statement that the new political environment and short timeframe could have discouraged several potential contenders from running and besides the National Movement and the Burjanadze Democrats, none of the major political parties presented candidates. Regarding the majoritarian contests, no choice was offered to the electorate in five of the 11 second- round contests. This was a result of late withdrawals of candidates. The campaign witnessed a very small number of events organized throughout the country and several candidates stated that they had insufficient funds to prepare campaign materials or organize events.
6For more details on voter lists, see previous report ”Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003”. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 29
The candidate recognized as the frontrunner focused on encouraging broad participation in registration and voting.
The UEC regulates election campaigns, pre-election rallies and the scope of agitation in detail.7 For instance, campaigning through sources of mass media after 24:00 on the day prior to election is prohibited. The UEC further describes who are not entitled to take part in campaigning, e.g. representatives of the local authorities.
Campaigning was mainly conducted through small public meetings where parties met with the electorate. Most of the meetings were not publicly announced out of fear that other parties would interfere in the meetings. The observers witnessed misuse of public property on behalf of certain political contesters, as well as active participation in the election campaign by state employees and local authorities. Like during the previous elections, campaign material was on display inside public buildings and in other prohibited locations.
The Media
According to the EOM, the media offered the electorate a diverse range of political opinions that enabled voters to compare parties and candidates. Furthermore, the media provided a forum for the opposition to present their views and criticise the Government. Both the printed and electronic media mainly focused on the candidacy of Mr. Saakashvili and government officials’ activities. Other candidates were largely absent from the media. Unlike during the November elections, the media generally showed a greater degree of objectivity and a more critical approach.
According to the UEC, public television and radio broadcasters are obliged to allocate parties/blocs two hours of free airtime daily starting no later than 15 days prior to election day. Paid airtime on TV or radio must not exceed 15% of total daily broadcasting time per day. The airtime shall equally be distributed among the contestants. All candidates were allocated free time for advertising on state television. In addition all candidates had the right to buy airtime on both state and commercial channels. However, some candidates chose not to utilize even their free airtime.
7 UEC: Articles 73,74 & 75. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 30
Observation of Polling Day
The EOM Preliminary Statement included the following points regarding election day: • Observers reported from more than 1,500 polling stations in Georgia; • Voting proceeded smoothly and in a calmer atmosphere than the November elections; • The voter turn out was announced to be 85 %; • Observers reported tension/unrest in 20 polling stations visited. In general, few serious violations were reported; • Single-mandate re-runs and second rounds from the November parliamentary elections were held in 15 districts. The polls proceeded smoothly except in Kashuri, where violence outside a polling station where a re-run was to be held kept it closed the whole day, and in Akhalkalaki where there was unrest in one polling station; • Election day registration occurred in most polling stations. People were added to the lists if they met residency requirements. In about 4% of cases registration was done without a proper residency check; and • In general, PECs attempted to follow correct voting procedures; ink was usually applied to voters’ fingers without incidents, although the use of ink was inconsistent in many regions, especially in polling stations located in rural areas.
Polling stations open at 07:00 to allow for the distribution of tasks among the PEC members. The PS officially opens for polling at 08:00 and normally closes at 20:00. More detailed procedures and duties of PECs are described in a PEC manual approved by the CEC and distributed to all DECs and PECs.8
Election Day Report from STO Lorentz Stavrum General information The STO team’s area of responsibility (AoR) was the district of Khobi in the Samegrelo region in northwest Georgia. The team’s AoR comprised 29 polling stations. The team’s main task was to observe the activities of the District Election Commission (DEC) in Khobi. Prior to election day the team visited some polling stations and acquainted themselves with election officials at the DEC. In addition to observing at the DEC, the STO team visited six polling stations during election day. Observation of polling Bearing in mind that this was a DEC team, the STOs visited only a limited number of polling stations on election day. The team’s general impression was that the polling was carried out in a relatively ordinary way, compared to polling in the previous elections in November 2003. All voter lists were handwritten, based upon the latest information from the CEC and supplemented by local door to door visits and on personal contact with the voters. No incidents of inaccuracy of the voter lists were reported to the observers.
8 Included as appendix in previous report ”Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003”. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 31
The STOs also noticed that the general knowledge of election procedures among the PECs was rather good, and most election officials seemed to be well trained and following the CEC manual, which was present everywhere. The team did not register any complaints, nor did the PEC logbook contain any remarks on complaints or disputes.
Observation at the DEC The team arrived at the DEC at approximately the time the close of polling, i.e. 20:00. The DEC was satisfactory organized, and all DEC members were present and cooperative towards the STOs. Other observers were accredited and present all the time, mainly from the domestic ISFED organization. The tabulation of results was mainly carried out according to the election manual and the UEC. The team followed the counting, proclamation of the results, the handling of lists, ballot boxes and the election material in general, and crosschecked the tabulation. Irregularities were few and insignificant. As it quite early became clear as to which direction the election results pointed to, the possibility of shortcomings inflicting upon the election result was relatively minor. The tabulation process was transparent, and there was a good atmosphere at the DEC. Tabulation was completed at approximately 4 am on 5 January, and serious irregularities were neither observed nor reported to the STOs.
Conclusion This STO also observed the parliamentary elections in November 2003 and in comparison, the 2004 presidential elections were carried out in a quite different way. The main difference was the improved accuracy and reliability of the voter lists. Also, the general competence of the election officials had improved significantly. It is reasonable to believe that three elections over a two-months period resulted in a certain upgrading of skills, especially since the election manual, the voting material and the general information had been greatly improved.
Election Day Report from STO Merete Dyrud General information The STO team was deployed to Chiatura in Imereti region and was responsible for monitoring the District Election Committee (DEC) located in Chiatura city, and five local polling stations (PS) on election day. Two other STO-teams were covering the same district. Of the 45 polling stations in the area, about 60% were in rural areas and 40% urban/close to the city centre. The three STO teams visited in all 30 polling stations, which means that a total of 67% of the PSs were monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR. In addition to the presidential election, a second-round in Chiatura single-mandate constituency was to take place between two candidates. Mr Sergo Iakobidze was an “independent” candidate and Mr Tengiz Mosradze was running for “For a New Georgia” (FNG).
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 32
Economically, the area around Chiatura city is dominated by agriculture. During Soviet times, Chiatura used to be an important mining area for manganese extraction, but for the past ten years the mining activities have drastically declined. Parts of the area look like ghost towns and most industrial plants are derelict and not functioning. Unemployment rate is therefore high and many inhabitants, mostly younger people, are working outside their areas of origin.
Pre-election day Before election day the team met with the chairperson of the DEC. As she was very busy this was a short meeting. Instead, the STO-team observed several PEC-members coming to collect their election materials at the DEC. Among other materials, the PEC-members where given additional voter lists and individual blue certificates for each voter (to be used for registering new voters on election day). This distribution of material at the DEC was conducted in a somewhat unorganised manner, at times with lack of necessary control. The DEC confirmed that there had been made several changes in the voter lists since the November 2003 elections. In 2003, the district’s official voter list included 41,787 names. Domestic observers from ISFED informed the STOs that they until the end of October-2003 had undertaken their own verification of the voter lists: They had deleted the names of all who were dead or had moved away and their calculations indicated that the correct number of eligible voters in the district for the November 2003 elections was closer to 26,000. The DEC chairwoman confirmed the ISFED’s findings, but said that the decision before the November election was that there was not to be made any changes in the original voter list. By comparison with the previous voter list, the official number of voters for this election was 23,186. This was due to both active and passive control of the voter list in December. The DEC had approved this number by stamping all voter lists on 27 December and the chairwoman confirmed that this was the official voter list, submitted to the CEC. She further confirmed that the PECs had been instructed to not add further voters to the general voter list before election day.
Observation of opening The team observed the opening procedures at a polling station with 815 registered voters. All procedures were according to the law.
Observation of polling The polling was largely in accordance with the UEC. The election law included many control mechanisms at the polling station, and some deviations from the law were observed. However, as far as the STO-team was able to see, the irregularities were a consequence of complicated control mechanisms, organizational problems and lack of training, rather than any kind of organised fraud. One observation worth mentioning concerns the controls done by polling PEC members when signing and stamping the ballot after the voter had marked it. By doing this there was a possibility for PEC members to see how the voters had marked the ballot. This was due to negligence from voters, and not imposed by any of the election officials. Still, the procedure could potentially violate the voters’ right for secrecy. The STOs furthermore noted that the ballot boxes were just sealed with ordinary tape, not with proper seals. Seemingly, there would be no problem to open the ballot box and close it again without it visibly GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 33 being tampered with. However, the box was guarded by a PEC member at all time and with local observers present, the probability for such an action to take place was low. Two of the PECs used, in their term the “old voters’ list”, which was explained to be the list approved by the DEC on 27 December 2003. From 29 December the DEC had denied several of the voters the right to vote and had demanded their removal from the list. This had not been done by the PECs; instead they had an additional paper they claimed contained the names of those the DEC had denied to vote. Nothing was however marked in the general voter list and the control of the voter lists can therefore be questioned. In each of the five PSs visited several voters were registered on election day. As far as the STO-team understood, all voters registered on election day had to confirm their place of residence by showing valid documents. In most PSs visited, local observers were present. None of them had anything to remark to the STOs.
Observation at the DEC The STOs were present at the DEC from 20:30 on 4 January until 13:00 hours the following day. During this period the DEC received voting material from all the district’s 45 PSs. The chairwoman at the DEC had not been replaced since the previous election. However, some of the other DEC members had been changed. A lawyer, who had been asked to assist the commission, was also present. The lawyer, who was not a DEC member, was active in assisting the DEC the days before election day, but was less involved during election day and the following day. His status remained somewhat unclear to the team. The chairwoman was stressed, which lead to quarrels among DEC members and between the DEC and PEC members coming to submit their protocols. The police had to be present all time; one policeman was inside the DEC office and three were outside the entrance - keeping order of the impatient and sometimes angry crowd of waiting PEC members. On two occasions people tried to break through the door and the atmosphere was tense throughout the whole of the team’s stay. Generally, proceedings at the DEC were slow, ineffective and at moments rather chaotic and the problems started already upon the arrival of the first PEC. The main concern was the accuracy of the voter lists.
Problems concerning the voter lists and protocols For election day, 30 out of 45 PECs had made changes to the general voter list, contravening the DEC decision not to make alterations after 27 December. In addition, about 25% of all the district’s voters were registered on election day by the PECs. An administrative problem was that there where no place to put down the number of the additional voters registered on election day in the final PEC protocol. It was only possible to include this figure in the summary of all the four voter lists. This, in addition to incorrect calculations in the protocols, resulted in a situation where very few protocols were correct. There were, for instance, discrepancies between the total number of valid ballots and the summarized number of votes cast for all candidates. The consequence of this was that PEC chairpersons were correcting their protocols at the DEC. They altered the figures in the protocol and wrote additional papers explaining the reason for the corrections. Several PECs were advised by the accountant at the DEC on how to correct the figures in the protocols. It turned out that changes to 50% of the protocols were made by PECs at the DEC. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 34
The results for the presidential election showed that around 85% of the votes were in favour of Mr. Saakashvili. As for the district’s single mandate re-run, the independent candidate won by a huge majority.
Election Day Observation Report from STO Bjørg Hope Galtung General information The STO team was deployed to Telavi in the Kakheti region. The team mainly observed at the DEC in Telavi town. Kakheti Region is the most eastern region in Georgia and is bordered in the north by Dagestan (Russia) and in the east and south by Azerbaijan. It is Georgia’s principal wine-producing region. Three ridges running from northwest to southwest dominate the landscape, of which the Caucasus mountain range is the most prominent - rising to over 5,000 meters. The main roads are quite good, except for some stretches. The quality of secondary roads varies. The regional capital is Telavi, where also the Governor resides. The Governor is the representative of the President and is not elected. Tamaz Khidasheli, who won the majoritarian race in Telavi last November, was appointed governor after the revolution.
Observation of opening Opening procedures were correctly followed. There were no complaints, no campaigning, nor any campaign material in or near the polling station (PS). Some confusion arose over the candidacy of one contestant since he had announced his withdrawal the day prior to election day. However, the CEC had not accepted his withdrawal, but because the current PEC received this information late, they had deleted the candidate from the ballot paper and around 50 voters had already voted before this was known to the PEC. The already cast votes (ballots) were, however, deemed valid during the count. In addition to police, an observer from ISFED was present during the opening.
Observation of polling Although the team was designated a DEC team, the team visited 8 PSs during the day. The voting procedure was followed according to the election law but some mistakes were observed. In most PSs not all voters were checked for ink. In some PSs voters were not inked before leaving the PS. The checking of voters in the voter list went well in all PSs. In every PS there was an additional list where people who were not on the regular voter list could be added on election day. Quite a lot of voters did so after their residency had been checked. A few voters were refused to vote since they were non-resident in the precinct. Family voting was observed in one case. No proxy voting took place. No problems with identification of voters and disturbance inside or outside the PSs were observed. Police was present at a few PSs - both inside and outside. In all PSs, the team saw domestic observers - mainly from ISFED. There were no comments or complaints from local observers or PEC members. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 35
In the team’s AoR everything proceeded quietly. People were indeed enthusiastic about this election and had great expectations for a brighter future with a new president; some PSs were decorated with roses inside, the symbol of the National Movement.
Observation at the DEC The team did not observe counting since its main task was to observe at the DEC in Telavi. In total 43 PECs were to submit election materials and protocols to the DEC during the night. Before the PECs started to arrive, the DEC secretary phoned all the PECs and obtained preliminary results of the percentage of voters that had participated in the election. These figures were forwarded to CEC. A majority of the PECs experienced problems completing the single- page protocol. The main problem was how and where to enter the figures from the additional and special voter lists. The uncertainty about this issue was also evident in the protocols since they had been filled in with a pencil. Approximately ten protocols were corrected by the DEC. The corrections did not change the number of total votes cast. The DEC worked quite efficiently even though conditions were slightly chaotic when the PEC members queued up to hand over the election materials to DEC officials, who then checked them. The results of the voting from each PS were immediately entered into a computer and were then ready to be transmitted to the CEC. At 04:15 all the election material from all PSs had been submitted to the DEC. No material was lost or missing. The DEC did not finalize their protocol during the night. Instead, they agreed to meet within the next four days, which was within the deadline to submit the protocol to the CEC in Tblisi.
Election Day Observation Report from STO Gunnar Johannesen General information The STO team was deployed to Kareli South in Shida Kartli region. On election day, the team visited ten polling stations - seven rural and three urban. The team also stayed at the DEC for about two hours during the night - copying down the protocols from the PSs.
Observation of polling Generally, the elections in Kareli South were satisfactory. The atmosphere was calm and quiet. There was no tension or unrest and no serious violations of the election process took place. The election was well organized in a friendly, sometimes quite enthusiastic, atmosphere. Some minor irregularities did, however, occur. The use of invisible ink was quite random. Especially in villages where everybody knew each other, the inking did not seem to be taken seriously. In one PS, voters were checked for traces of invisible ink after having voted. The understanding of the importance of secret voting was inadequate, especially among village voters. Many voters failed to fold their ballots – making easy to see whom they had voted for. In all PSs the voting booths had only three walls, lacking a fourth wall or a curtain. With regard to the registration of voters, there was quite a number of people being registered on election day. On 3 January, a lot of people were queuing up at the police station to get an identification card, but apart from that the registration process seemed to work fairly well. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 36
In one PEC, the chairperson told the STOs he had been trained by the National Movement (NM) for his electoral tasks and not by the DEC. He added that they did not really distinguish between the two “parties”. However, most PEC chairpersons stated that they had been appointed by the DEC, and only a few claimed that the NM had appointed them. The team’s impression was that there sometimes lacked a clear distinction between the DEC/PEC apparatus and the NM. In several PSs there were roses – the NM symbol. In some PSs Sakrebulo members were present, as well as the police, who had been let in because it was cold outside. No domestic observers were seen. No proxy-, multiple- or family voting was observed. However, voters who needed assistance always got it from a PEC member (although against the law). It turned out that many PECs had problems with filling out the protocols in a correct manner. There seemed to be problems regarding the additional and the special voter lists. According to the chairperson of one PEC, the translation of the voter lists into Georgian was unsatisfactory and people tended to confuse/mix the two lists. At the DEC the team noticed that many PECs had used a pencil to fill out the protocols so that they with the help of the DEC could correct them if necessary. Seemingly, this was done out of insecurity, and not in order to manipulate the results. Incidentally, the Labour Party boycotted all the PECs in the team’s AoR. All the other PEC members were present.
Election results The Central Election Commission announced on January 15 the final results of the 4 January presidential elections: According to the CEC, out of 2,2 million registered voters, more than 1,9 million voted participated in the 4 January elections. Mikheil Saakashvili of the National Movement party received 96,27% of the votes. The five other contenders for the presidential post received less than 3% of the votes in total: Temur Shashiashvili garnered 1,85% of the vote; Roin Liparteliani – 0,26%; Zaza Sikharulidze – 0,24%; Kartlos Gharibashvili – 0,21%; and Zurab Kelekhsashvili – 0,1%. The opposition Labour Party representative to the CEC, Badri Niauri, refused to sign the final protocol, claiming that the voter lists had not been compiled according to the law.
The Review of Complaints Process
The EOM emphasised the following points regarding how election related complains were handled by the electoral administration and courts: • The UEC contained clear procedures for lodging election complaints and appeals; • Very few formal complaints were brought to either courts or to election commissions. This is in contrast to previous elections; • The few cases heard by the CEC, DEC and courts were resolved within the legal deadlines and without obvious bias.
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 37
Compared to the 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections9, no significant changes were made to procedures regulating the complaints process. The low number of complaints might be related to the limited campaigning and lack of co-operative environment. The court seemed to work efficiently and complied with deadlines as outlined in the UEC. The procedures for submitting complaints seemed to be well known by party proxies, as well as DEC and PEC members. On the other hand, voters were not that familiar with their rights to file complaints.
Conclusions
The EOM noted the following positive elements that distinguished these elections from previous ones: • Improvements to both the legislative framework and the administration of the voting process; • Enhanced transparency, professionalism and openness of the CEC; • Commendable efforts to improve the voter lists; • A high degree of freedom of expression enjoyed by the media, except in Adjara; • A largely peaceful and free pre-election period, although there was little active campaigning; • Resolution of the few cases heard by the CEC and courts within the legal deadlines and without obvious bias; and • Efforts were made to increase the participation of national minorities in the elections, including the printing of bilingual ballot papers.
However, some aspects of the process need to be addressed in order to remedy issues of concern and continue forward progress, including: • The continuing lack of a clear separation between State administration and political party structures, and the ongoing potential for abuse of state administration resources; • The political imbalance in the composition of the election administration at all levels, and the failure of some DECs and PECs to maintain an appropriate distance from some participants in the election process created, at a minimum, the perception of a lack of impartiality and independence of the election administration; • The incompleteness and inaccuracies in the voter register; • The lack of commitment by the authorities of Adjara to guarantee sufficient conditions for the conduct of a meaningful democratic election in that area; and • Less scrutiny by domestic observers in both the pre-election period and on election day.
9 For more details on procedures regarding complaints, see previous report ”Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003”. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 38
According to the EOM, voting was conducted in a generally spirited and calm atmosphere. The turnout was unusually high, and PECs processed the high number of voters in a relatively efficient manner. Election day registration occurred in most polling stations, and the identity and residency requirements were scrupulously checked. However, the inking of voters as an anti-fraud measure was devalued due to inconsistent application, increasing the risk of multiple voting. The atmosphere during the vote count was generally positive with no significant disturbances or unrest, although a large number of unauthorized persons were reported present. However, in Kvemo Kartli, past irregularities including ballot stuffing and tampering with protocols were reported.
EOM recommendations With regard to the forthcoming parliamentary elections, a summary of recommendations that the EOM would urge the authorities to act upon include: • Ensure that administrative resources are not abused and therefore guarantee equal conditions for all parties; • Provide equal media access for all parties in order that the electorate is kept informed of all political choices; • Ensure that opposition political parties are adequately represented in election commissions at all levels, in order to increase public confidence in the process and promote transparency; • Immediately commence the computerization, consolidation and centralization of the voter register; • Continue a dialogue with the local authorities in Adjara to guarantee an environment more conducive to a meaningful democratic contest, including issues of voter registration, media access, equal conditions for parties, and securing the basic political right for parties and candidates to convey their message to the electorate; • Guarantee that internal reforms of the election administration proceed quickly, and especially at the CEC, and ensure a professional Secretariat for effective administrative support; • Ensure the uniform implementation of the marking (inking) of voters, in order that this important anti-fraud mechanism is not devalued due to inconsistent application; • Sustain efforts to ensure comprehensive training of election officials, particularly on vote count and tabulation procedures, in order to enhance professional standards and guarantee uniform implementation of the legal requirements and administrative regulations; • Uphold the integrity of the democratic election process in Georgia, by continuing to hold any persons responsible for violations of election related laws fully accountable; • Further efforts to increase national minority participation and understanding of the election process through the production of both ballots and result protocols in minority languages; • Ensure that a realistic timetable be established in order for the above recommendations to be seriously and sufficiently addressed.
Comments on the Election Observation Mission
The International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) to the 4 January presidential elections in Georgia was one of the largest election observation missions ever to be deployed. The core team and long term observers seemed to be highly qualified and dedicated people who did their utmost for the mission to succeed under difficult circumstances. OSCE/ODIHR has sent several observations missions to Georgia during the last few years, the latest being in place from September to December 2003. This mission benefited from the previous mission, employing many of the same core team members and LTOs that worked during the previous GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 39 parliamentary elections in 2003. This was a great asset to the mission and made it far more efficient. However, vital information from previous missions had not been taken care of, such as maps, contact details, etc. For this reason, LTOs who had not been deployed to his/her previous region had to start from scratch. Routines for storing and handing over such material should be adopted to avoid such inefficiency. The mission based most of the communication between the core team and LTOs on electronic mail. In some areas electronic communication systems are not very well developed, resulting in LTOs having to depend totally on local infrastructure. Telephone lines were in some areas not available, and the choice of using electronic communication became a major problem, with the consequence that LTOs did not receive or received very late important information. Using mobile or satellite phones could have solved this problem had the funds and competence been available. For future missions this is certainly an area where there is room for improvement. For such a large mission good coordination is required. The communication line between the core team and LTOs was improved. For instance, reporting procedures were simplified and less time consuming this time and the coordination among core team members was better than during the previous mission.
Appendices
1. OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 40
GEORGIA: REPEAT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 28 MARCH 2004
Report by Hans Dieset GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 41
Preface The 28 March repeat parliamentary elections concluded the election of the fourth Parliament since independence in 1991. Following the flawed 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections, the Supreme Court annulled the results of the proportional component (150 of 235 parliamentary seats). However, the results for the majoritarian10 component (85 seats) were not cancelled. Therefore, only the proportional component of the elections was repeated on 28 March. The resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze on 23 November triggered extraordinary presidential elections that were called for 4 January 2004. The National Movement leader Mikheil Saakashvili was elected President with 96.3% of the vote. The IEOM concluded that while that election “[…] demonstrated notable progress over previous elections” some issues of concern remained to be addressed and the upcoming parliamentary elections would be “a more genuine indicator of Georgia’s commitment to a democratic election process.” On 28 January 2004 the International Election Observation Mission (EOM) deployed 27 long-term observers (LTOs) throughout Georgia. The EOM’s core team consisted of 13 international election experts. Ambassador Michael Wygant headed the EOM. On election day 28 March, some 440 short-term observers (STOs) representing 43 different countries observed voting in 1,400 polling stations out of a total of 2,850. One LTO – Hans Dieset – was recruited to the EOM by NORDEM. Additionally, NORDEM recruited the following Norwegian STOs to observe on election day. They were Marit Aaberg (deployed to Stamskhe Javakheti region), Gunnar Baustad (Racha and Imereti region), Vibeke Chistie (Kakheti), Hans Cato Haddal, Linda Kartawich and Bror Gevelt (all deployed to Adjara) Two Norwegian parliamentarians from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) participated as STOs on election day. They were Bjørn Hærnes (Shida Kartli region) and Thore Nistall (Kvemo Kartli). The Norwegian embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, provided the following STOs: Heidi Olufsen, Ilia Utmelidze, Turid Jacobsen and Steinar Gihl – all deployed to Kvemo Kartli region. The information presented in this report is both based on and reflects the findings of the Norwegian observers and the EOM’s Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. In chapters where information relevant to Georgia’s previous elections is still applicable, references have been made to the previous election report Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003 in order not to unduly repeat the same information. NORDEM/ Norwegian Centre for Human Rights University of Oslo July 2004
10 I.e. single-mandate constituencies. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 42
Contents Preface Contents Introduction...... 43 Political background ...... 43 The Legislative Framework ...... 45 The Electoral Administration ...... 45 Voter and Civic Education ...... 46 Voter Registration...... 46 Candidate Registration ...... 47 The Election Campaign ...... 48 The Media ...... 48 Observation on Polling Day ...... 49 STO Election Day reports ...... 49 The Review of Complaints Process ...... 58 Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 59 Comments on the Election Observation Mission...... 60 Appendices...... 60
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 43
Introduction
The International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) for the 28 March repeat parliamentary elections in Georgia was a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the European Parliament (EP). The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) opened in Tbilisi on 14 February 2004 and consisted of 40 experts and long-term observers deployed to the capital and ten regional centres. On election day, the IEOM deployed some 440 short-term observers from 43 OSCE participating states, including 27 parliamentarians from the OSCE PA, 15 from PACE, and four from the European Parliament. The international EOM observed the polling and vote count in over 1,400 polling stations throughout Georgia out of a total of 2,860, and counting was observed in some 130 polling stations The EOM was also present in more than 40 district election commissions to observe the tabulation of results. At a press conference held on 29 March 2004 the OSCE/ODIHR EOM stated the following: “The 28 March repeat parliamentary election in Georgia demonstrated commendable progress in relation to previous elections. The Georgian authorities have seized the opportunity, since 4 January presidential election, to further bring Georgia`s election process in closer alignment with European standards for democratic elections, including OSCE commitments and council of Europe standards.” Sixteen parties and blocs were running for the repeat parliamentary elections on 28 March 2004. The pre-election period was calm, and with surprisingly little political campaigning taking place.
Political Background
For a comprehensive overview of Georgia’s political background and situation up to the present, see previous reports “Georgia: Parliamentary Elections November 2003” and “Georgia: Presidential Elections January 2004”.
Following the flawed 2 November 2003 parliamentary elections, Georgia’s Supreme Court decided to annul the results of the proportional component, in which 150 out of 235 parliamentary seats are elected. The results of the majoritarian races where 85 seats are distributed among 85 single-mandate districts were not affected by the Court’s decision. Consequently, only the proportional component of the elections was to be repeated on 28 March. Following the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze on 23 November, extraordinary presidential elections were called for 4 January 2004. The National Movement leader Mikheil Saakashvili was elected President garnering 96.3% of the vote. Those elections were generally positively assessed by the IEOM, but the mission noted that there were still issues of concern that remained to be addressed in the upcoming repeat parliamentary elections scheduled for 28 March 2004. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 44
The political environment shifted dramatically in the run-up to the presidential elections, as the parties that had led the November events - the National Movement and the Burjanadze-Democrats - consolidated their executive power. In contrast, the pro-Shevardnadze parliamentary coalition For New Georgia (FNG) dissolved, and the once dominant Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) appeared to no longer function as a political party. Several previously influential parties, including the Labour Party, New Rights, and the Revial Party, lost some level of support by distancing themselves from the November events. The participation of the autonomous republic of Adjara in these elections remained uncertain until late March. Even after it became clear that she would take part, conditions were not in place for the conduct of a meaningful democratic election process in Adjara. Regrettably, as in previous elections, the presidential election did not take place in Abkhazia and most of South Ossetia.
Political parties and blocs participating in the 2004 repeat parliamentary elections For the 2004 repeat parliamentary elections the Central Election Commission (CEC) initially registered 41 political parties and blocs, of which only 19 remained on the ballot on election day. However, a further three of these withdrew the day before election day (Nos. 6, 9 & 17 on the below list), leaving 16 parties/blocs for the voters to choose among. They were, in the order they appeared on the ballot: 1. Socialist Party 2. Democratic Revival Union 3. Block “Right Opposition, Industrialists-Novas” 4. Labour Party of Georgia 5. National Movement-United Democrats 6. United Communist Party of Georgia 7. Block “National Democratic Party-Traditionalists” 8. National-State Political Union of Georgia “Mdzleveli” 9. Party of Protection Constitutional Rights 10. Nationalists 11. Block “Samshoblo” (Motherland) 12. Block “National Revival” 13. Block Jumber Patiashvili-Political Union “Ertoba” (Unity) 14. Party of Democratic Truth 15. Party of National Ideology of Georgia 16. Party “Nodar Natadze-Peoples’ Front” 17. Samartlianoba (Justice) 18. Political Movement “Tavisupleba” (Freedom) 19. Peoples’ Alliance of Georgia GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 45
The Legislative Framework
In its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (hereafter Preliminary Statement), the EOM said that the Unified Election Code (UEC) overall provided an adequate foundation for the conduct of democratic elections. However, some significant recommendations provided by international organizations were not acted upon: Furthermore, the outgoing parliament failed to adapt amendments to the UEC proposed by the CEC.
The basic legal documents governing the presidential, as well as parliamentary elections, are the Constitution, the Unified Electoral Code (UEC) and ordinances and decrees of the CEC. Subordinate to the Constitution is the Unified Electoral Code of Georgia, which was adopted in 2001 and amended in April 2002 and in late August 2003. The latest amendments to the UEC of 29 November 2003 included simplified complaint procedures and the issuing of bilingual ballot papers in areas where minorities live. The latest amendments to the UEC proved to be a significant improvement over the previous code. However, the 7% threshold seems to be unduly high and represents a threat to the democracy. Consequently, only two parties/blocs are currently represented in the Parliament. For a more comprehensive presentation of the election system applicable to these elections, see previous report “Georgia: Parliamentary Elections November 2003”. No significant changes were made to the electoral system in front of the elections on 28 March.
The Electoral Administration
The EOM noted the following positive elements that distinguished this election from previous elections • The computerization and consolidation of voter lists into a central database • A more streamlined and professional election apparatus at the central level • A willingness to hold accountable those responsible for election violations • The introduction of a DEC protocol that includes a matrix of PEC results, thereby enabling parties to verify the calculation of results at the district level. This may serve to deter fraud or enable identification of fraud • A greater emphasis on training of lower-level election officials, particularly regarding the procedures to complete results sheets (protocols) • The introduction of ballots and voter information materials in minority languages. However, providing protocols in these languages in future elections would also be also desirable • The adoption of a decision on the method of calculating the total number of registered voters • Improved procedures for filing complaints on election day.
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 46
As like in previous elections, the UEC establishes a three-tier election administration.11 The Central Election Commission (CEC) has 15 members. Subordinate to that body are 75 District Election Commissions (DECs), each having 15 members. 2,864 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) make up the lowest level of the election administration. Each PEC has maximum 15 members.12 Very late in the pre-election period the President offered to reduce the number of his appointees on the DECs and PECs (but not on the CEC) from five to three - thereby partly addressing concerns regarding the lack of political balance in commissions. Ertoba (Unity), the NDP–Traditionalists bloc and to a lesser extent the Socialist Party, benefited from this “redistribution” of commission members. However, due to the lateness of the decision, the lack of clarity about its implementation, and other ongoing changes regarding staffing of election commissions, the President’s offer caused a degree of confusion at DEC and PEC levels.
From what the LTOs saw, the close cooperation between the electoral administration and the local administration seemed to continue in several parts of the country. In some districts the campaign for Mr. Saakashvili’s party was led from governmental premises. The training of DEC- and PEC members was better this time, compared to previous elections. Nevertheless, some commission members were not capable of conducting their duties efficiently.
Voter and Civic Education
As like in previous elections, the UNDP, IFES and SOROS foundation conducted voter education. Voter education material in minority languages was again made available. Some political parties were conducting voter education programmes through their electoral headquarters and branch offices. The most dominant in this respect was the joint campaign of the National Movement and the Burjanadze Democrats. Spots aired on national broadcasters explaining election and voting procedures were informative and gave clear instructions to voters. On election day it was reported that voters seemed to be well informed and familiar with the election procedures. Election material in minority languages was very beneficial to voters who had other than Georgian as their mother tongue.
Voter Registration
In its Preliminary Statement, the EOM commended the election administration for the substantial efforts made to improve the public confidence in the voter list. In spite of the new computerized voter
11 According to Arts. 128, 128.1 & 128.2 in the UEC. 12 For composition and duties of election commissions, see previous report ”Georgia: Parliamentary Elections November 2003”. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 47 list, the CEC decided to allow same-day registration of voters, including those abroad – a decision the EOM deemed reasonable in the given circumstances. The authorities’ decision to make a serious effort to address shortcomings in voter registers was necessary with reference to the two previous elections. With this background the CEC decided to create a single computerized database of voters based on the voter lists used on 4 January 2004.The new list came through mainly by door to door registration done by PEC members before 4 January 2004.13 The new printed voter lists were displayed publicly for a two-week period, thereby enabling citizens to recheck entries and to register to vote if they were not on the list. During the re-registration period, observers reported that the majority of PECs were open. However, in a significant minority of districts, most PECs were closed or did not display lists publicly. In general, procedures were followed correctly. Citizens were allowed to register on election day. Although not foreseen in the UEC, this practice was justified in the current circumstances, but should not be repeated in future elections. It became incumbent on PECs to ensure that the eligibility of those citizens who registered on election day was checked properly and to follow other procedures rigidly to ensure that no multiple voting was possible. Observers noted that the residency requirement was being less rigorously applied in these elections. The voter lists in Adjara remained one of the most contentious issues of this election, with the potential to influence the outcome of the election. Following an instruction from the CEC Chairman, five DECs in Adjara transferred voter lists used for the January 2004 presidential election. While entering these records into the central database of electors, it became apparent that the quality of the data was generally very poor. This left the CEC with no option but to begin a complete re-registration of voters. The uncertain and tense pre-election environment in Adjara affected the voter registration process there. Fearing for their security, some PEC members did not participate in the work of PECs, and some voters were dissuaded from registering.
The LTOs noted that the computerized voter list was highly appreciated at both DEC- and PEC level. However, the list contained some spelling mistakes, some double entries and sometimes voters’ date of birth was missing. All this made the version on public display incomplete. This was later rectified by PEC members who carefully went through the list and corrected the mistakes. The LTOs assessed the decision to allow same-day registration as correct, given the time limit and special conditions for this election.
Candidate Registration
A total of 47 political parties and movements registered with the CEC. The deadline for registering electoral blocs was extended twice, first from 11 to 19 February, and then until 21 February. A total of five electoral blocs were registered, each comprising at least two parties. On 26 February, the deadline for submitting candidate lists expired. Ultimately, a total of 19 political subjects submitted candidate lists and ran for the 28 March elections. These include 14 parties and five
13 For more details regarding voter lists and their compilation, see previous report ”Georgia: Parliamentary Elections November 2003”. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 48 electoral blocs. Two of these blocs united the New Rights and IWSG, and the National Democratic Party and the Traditionalists, respectively. However, three parties withdrew just before election day.
From what the LTOs observed, the candidate registration was generally done according to regulations prescribed in the UEC.
The Election Campaign
The EOM stated in its Preliminary Statement that the local authorities (Gamgebelis) were not politically neutral and lent strong support to the National Movement – United Democrats, including serving as campaign managers, in breach of the law. The election campaign was very low-key. The parties were allowed to campaign freely throughout most of the country. In spite of this there were few public meetings or party rallies. The lack of sufficient funds after the 2 November elections may partly explain the passive approach of many opposition parties.
The UEC regulates election campaigns, pre-election rallies and agitation material in detail.14 Furthermore, the UEC regulates who are not entitled to take part in election agitation, such as representatives of the local authorities. Campaign silence comes into effect after 24:00 hours on the day prior to election day.
The LTOs observed hardly any opposition to the ruling party. The few campaign events that took place were mainly in the form of small meetings with people where they lived. The majority of the parties did not announce these meetings beforehand, mainly due to fear of interference from others. Despite a generally calm pre-election period, a few violent incidents took place (e.g. in Marneuli, Gardabani, Tkibuli and Adjara) Again the LTOs observed misuse of public property, as well as the active participation of state employees and local authorities in the election campaign. Campaign material was seen displayed inside public buildings and other prohibited locations.
The Media
The EOM’s assessment of the media’s role during these elections was that it operated in a pluralistic environment and enjoyed freedom of expression. It furthermore provided a forum for the opposition to present their views However, the state owned media favoured the leading party during the campaign period. On the other hand, the print media generally provided more balanced coverage than the TV stations monitored by the EOM.
14 UEC Articles 73,74 & 75. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 49
In Adjara, regional TV Adjara favoured the Adjarian authorities and the Democratic Revival Union - the party of Mr. Aslan Abashidze – head of the Adjara autonomous republic.
For these elections, the same regulations applied to public TV and radio broadcasters as they did for previous elections,15 and in accordance with the law, all parties had some free time for advertising on state TV. This was distributed fairly well among the parties.
Observation on Polling Day
In its Preliminary Statement, the EOM summed up election day in the following points: • Observers reported from more than 1,400 polling stations in Georgia; • Voting proceeded smoothly and in calm atmosphere in 80% of the polling stations observed; • The voter turnout was announced to be around 67%; • Observers reported tension/unrest in Marneuli, Gardabani and Tkibuli districts; • Election day registration occurred in 90 % of the polling stations; and • In general, PECs attempted to follow correct voting procedures; ink was usually applied to voters’ fingers without incident, although inking was inconsistent in many regions, especially in rural polling stations.
Polling stations open at 07:00 to allow for the distribution of tasks among the PEC members. The PS officially opens for polling at 08:00 and normally closes at 20:00. More detailed procedures and duties of PECs are described in a PEC manual approved by the CEC and distributed to all DECs and PECs.16
STO Election Day Reports The six Norwegian STOs visited some 30 polling stations, plus three DECs on election day. Their observations can be summed up in the following points: • Observation of opening: Smooth and according to the law; • Observation of polling: Minor mistakes were observed, but mainly procedures were according to the law. Among the irregularities observed were incorrect inking procedures, lack of ID checks and additional list registration; • Lack of information at PEC level on the withdrawal of three political partie • In Tkibuli district, ballot box stuffing and multiple voting was observed;
15 See also ”Georgia: Parliamentary Elections November 2003”. 16 Included as appendix in previous report ”Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003”. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 50
• Observation of aggregation and verification of results: Some problems observed mostly due to inaccurate protocols and lack of competence filling out the protocols, while in Telavi the results were computerized at the DEC; and • Problems were reported in Kobuleti, Adjara region.
Overall, the STO findings corresponded with the general impression of the conduct on polling day.
Election Day Report from STO Marit Aaberg General information The STO team was deployed to Akhalkalaki in the Samtske-Javakheti region. The area is mountainous and isolated, and 90% of the inhabitants are ethnic Armenians. The team’s main task was to observe at the DEC.
Observation of polling During election day, the team observed polling in three polling stations in Akhalkalaki. No serious irregularities were observed. However, inking and checking for invisible ink was rarely carried out. Also, incidents of family voting were observed.
Observation at the DEC The Akhalkalaki DEC was responsible for 65 polling stations, many of them located in remote villages with poor means of transport. The DEC consisted of 15 members, but the Labour member was never present. The Chairman (no party affiliation) was accommodating and friendly. One CEC member was present from time to time and the NGO FEF was present almost all the time. The overall performance of the DEC and the Chairman in particular can be described as fairly competent and correct. The DEC Chairman told the STOs that ten PSs never received the “withdrawal-stamp”. He explained that it was practically impossible to reach the most remote polling stations, but it turned out that many of the nearby polling stations also had failed to receive it. The first PEC protocol arrived at 21:30 and the last at 13:00 the next day. Only one PEC Chairman was let in at a time, which caused a long queue and some unrest in the corridor. The police acted as guards and organised the queue. Few PECs had sealed the protocols upon arrival at the DEC. There was confusion regarding some of the questions in the protocol due to conflicting wording between the Georgian and Armenian version. None of the protocols had been signed by all 15 members, but no complaints were attached to the protocols. In many protocols, the figures did not add up. Consequently, many protocols were corrected at the DEC, using correction fluid, in order to clarify it, not to amend it. One PEC had counted 60 spoilt ballots (where allegedly ballot box stuffing had taken place). GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 51
Most PSs received far more ballots than prescribed by the law;17 some received 2-300 extra ballots. It turned out that some PECs had recorded a 100% turnout.
The DEC protocol was signed by all members present (14) at 18:00 on 29 March. One member filed a general complaint, saying that the elections were not free and fair due to interference in the voting. The National Movement - United Democrats bloc got approximately 24,000 out of 30,000 votes in the district. On second place came the Industrialists-Novas and on third the Traditionalists.
Election Day Report from STO Gunnar Baustad General information The STO team was deployed to Tkibuli in the region of Racha and Imereti where there were about twelve polling stations (PS) to cover. Unfortunately, the team was not able to visit all the polling stations because of poor road conditions. Before election day the team visited 7-8 PSs to asses the voting facilities. Most of the PSs had access for the disabled. In some PSs campaign material was on display. The STOs spoke to a few inhabitants and to the several election committee members. In this area there were signals about boycotting the election, because a local member of the parliament had been arrested two weeks before election day, but all the people the team spoke to wanted to vote.
Observation of opening At the two first polling stations the team visited, everything was done in accordance with the legal framework. Both PEC chairpersons were very well prepared. They had received all the voting material. The other commission members also appeared ready for their tasks. The atmosphere at the opening PSs was good.
Observation of polling In almost all the of polling stations the team visited in the village, there was a lack of understanding of some of the routines in the PEC manual. For instance, polling officials did not always request voters to show their ID-cards - the argument was that everyone knew each other. The inking was another problem: In two of these PSs voters were inked, but there was no UV-lamp to check for ink. Apparently, the mobile voting team had taken the lamp with them. At two polling stations the ballot box was not sealed at all. Towards the end of polling day, the STOs were instructed by their LTO to go to a polling station in Tkibuli where allegedly ballot box stuffing had taken place. The team arrived at this PS at 19:30. During the next hour the team observed almost all possible violations that could have taken place beyond the election framework: Inside the PS there were unauthorized people who seemed to be ‘running the show’ and they did not leave when the counting started. Some of them behaved strangely and there was a young man who was particularly hostile towards the STOs. After a lot of questioning he showed the team an ID-card issued
17 The UEC stipulates that each polling station should receive a quantity of ballots that is equivalent to the number of registered voters rounded off to the closest upward hundred. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 52 by some NGO. Later the team heard that representatives of this “NGO” had appeared at three other polling stations too. Nobody knew which organisation he belonged to. The team saw undisguised ballot box stuffing and multiple voting. One PEC member attempted to insert 6-7 ballots at a time into the ballot box. However, since one STO was standing next to the ballot box, he decided not insert the ballots. Later, during the counting, the team saw that the above ballots were stealthily put onto the counting table. The chairman decided to delay the closing of the polling station until twenty minutes past eight. He told the team that this was because of the shift to summertime and some voters could have forgotten it. After 20:00 the team saw some passports being delivered, and the voters who voted after eight o’clock were PEC members.
Observation of counting The counting started in a very chaotic atmosphere and the team witnessed many incidents of fraud: One of the PEC members was seen swiftly putting down fake signatures in the voter list. Many envelopes without a stamp were seen in the ballot box and when the counting was over, about 60 envelopes lacked the stamp, of which some were stamped afterwards. During the counting and the filling out of the protocol, the above ‘NGO’ representative seemed to be in charge. The PEC chairman asked the team’s interpreter several times for help regarding the routines that were outlined in the manual. The chairman did not at all appear to be comfortable with the situation. After the counting finished, the team saw one of the commission members actually making changes in the numbers of votes cast. When writing the protocol, the PEC faced the problem that the number of voters who had voted neither matched the number of ballots, nor the number of envelopes in the ballot box. It looked like the PEC tried hard to make the numbers match. The STOs obtained a copy of the protocol, which was signed by all PEC members. When it became clear to the PEC members that the team wanted to stay at the polling station until the end, they started to argue with each other. The representative of the Labour Party did not want to sign the other copies of the protocol. The other members told him that everything was as they had agreed upon earlier, which lead the team to suspect that everything at this polling station had been rigged from beginning to end. When members of the PEC were ready to leave for the DEC, the STOs followed them and the voting material to the DEC.
Election Day Report from STO Vibeke Chistie General information The STO team was deployed to Gurjaani district in Kakheti region. Kakheti region has eight administrative centres, which are also electoral districts. Telavi is the regional capital. The region is the most eastern in Georgia and borders Dagestan to the north and Azerbaijan to the southeast. There were 13 STO teams observing the election in Kakheti region, and this team was one of three teams observing in the Gurjaani electoral district. Gurjaani district has 75,000 inhabitants. There were 46,000 registered voters for the January 4 elections, of which of 42,000 voted. The district has 45 polling stations. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 53
Prior to the election, there had been almost no campaigning in Kakheti, except some for the Labour Party and for the Freedom Party.
Observation of polling As the team was assigned to observe at the Gurjaani DEC throughout election night, it did not observe the opening or closing of any polling stations, but it did observe the voting process in five polling stations. The team met with well-organized PEC members who had all had extensive training. Also voters seemed to understand the voting procedures and were generally aware of the withdrawal of three of the parties on the ballot paper. The team saw no family voting, proxy voting, or voters voting without a legitimate voter’s identification. Nor did voters vote without being inked. A couple of times the team saw voters who were forced to be inked, while most of the polling stations informed the STOs that they had turned away a couple of voters who refused to be inked. At all the polling stations visited party observers were present, as well as observers from NGOs, such as ISFED and/or GYLA.
Observation at the DEC The team observed the processing of the incoming results from the 45 polling stations at the Gurjaani DEC from 20:00 on election day until 09:30 the next morning. Until six o’clock in the morning the atmosphere was calm and the process orderly. All the 15 DEC members were present, in addition to party observers, one NGO observer, and a special representative from CEC. The STO team and the other observers all had access to the PEC protocols, which were read out loud. However, the complaints were not dealt with there and then, but registered and put aside. The team only managed to read a couple of them and was told to come back another day to see the rest.
The DEC neither checked whether the PEC protocol numbers added up (the team noticed that they quite often did not), nor did they confront the PEC members when they did not. Five of the 45 PEC protocols had only 13 or 14 signatures from the members. This was not looked into, or given any explanation for. The chairlady informed the team that these problems were to be handled by the CEC at a later stage. No dissenting opinions in any of the 45 PECs were registered in the protocols. All the voting material observed arrived properly sealed, protocols were written in ink and everything was adequately secured at the DEC. None of the PEC protocols were completed or changed at the DEC. There were very few invalid ballots. This DEC had received criticism during the last elections due to bad organization, which lead to a chaotic process. This time, DEC members were adequately trained and were much better organized. However, the process was so slow that two polling station commissions got tired of waiting in the line (some had to wait for six hours). They took the election material home, or back to the polling station and went to sleep. As the police outside the DEC also had gone home to sleep around 4 or 5 in the morning, the chairlady, finally getting hold of a car, went out at six o’clock to collect the material from these two last polling stations. This resulted in the last PEC protocol being processed at 09:30, with only the STO team, the chairlady and one other member of the DEC present. Consequently, the 45 PEC protocols were not summarized and the final DEC protocol was not completed. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 54
The team was told to hand over the copied PEC protocols and the DEC from the same morning to the LTO, and the team had no debriefing together with the other STO teams who went back to Tbilisi that day. As a consequence the team is not able to give correct information on the voter turnout, or the final results from Gurjaani district However, the team believes the turnout to be considerably lower than in the January elections - between 50-60%, and a vast majority of the voters voted for the National Movement – Democrats. The team regrets the fact that it was not debriefed in Gurjaani, or in Tbilisi the next day - where it was not even possible for the team to get a copy of the OSCE/ODIHR Preliminary Statement.
Election Day Report from STO Hans Cato Haddal General information The STO team was deployed Kobuleti district in the autonomous Republic of Adjara. The team’s primary responsibility was to observe at Kobuleti DEC, which was responsible for 50 polling stations. In the district there were in all four STO teams, which partly covered the polling stations.
Political situation The tension between central and regional authorities, and the state of emergency introduced in the autonomous Republic of Adjara after the “Rose Revolution” in November 2003 has been the predominant feature of political life in Adjara prior to these elections. Fundamental political rights such as the right to campaign and hold public meetings have been suspended. Access to media coverage has for the same reasons been biased. On 14 March 2004 there was open confrontation between the central and regional authorities at the border checkpoint of Cholaki in the Kobuleti district, when president Saakashvilii attempted to enter Adjara with military forces. After three days the crises was overcome when president Saakashvilii and Mr. Abashidze met and reached an agreement according to which elections in Adjara on the 28 March should be held in a free and fair manner, political parties would be allowed to campaign freely, and political prisoners would be released.
The Revival Party and its leader Mr. Aslan Abashidze controlled all political life in Adjara, strongly supported by the local media, especially by regional TV Adjara. Aslan Abashidze has particularly enjoyed strong support in the Kabuleti district. Nevertheless, the situation was polarised between Revival and all the other parties, which joined forces under the ‘Our Adjara’ (OA) coalition. OA claimed that both voters and PEC members were subjected to intimidation prior to election day. One PEC member representing the National Movement told STOs that two people had approached him on 20 March, physically assaulted him and threatened him with a machine gun.
Pre-election day The team met with the Kobulati DEC, and the secretariats of the political parties to learn about the political situation in the region. The team also visited two polling stations to observe how the PECs were organised, and to check that the election officials had received the appropriate training on the election code and on election day procedures. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 55
Observation on election day On election day the team returned to the two polling stations it had visited the previous day. The team was particularly interested in the registration process of new voters. The registration process prior to the elections started de facto on 18 March after President Saakishvilii’s visit to Adjara. According to the DEC chairman the total number of registered voters in Kobuleti district would be about 33,000. This figure significantly contradicted the figure given by the National Movement (15,562). Special attention had therefore to be given to registration of new voters on election day. When the team left the last polling station at around 19:30 the situation was tense. A crowd had gathered in front of the polling station. The team was approached by a group of people numbering around 20. They complained about the information that was passed on to the outside world about the situation in Adjara. The situation was unpleasant, as some of the threats clearly were addressed to the team members. However, the situation was never dangerous but interlocutors were nervous that the situation could get out of control during the night.
Observation at the DEC At the beginning of the verification of results, the situation at the DEC seemed uncontrolled. As the results started to come in things calmed down considerably. To the team it appeared that both sides were relieved. The Revival Partly were pleased with the fact that they still were the dominant party in the district. The OA, on the other hand, seemed pleased with the fact that OA had gained considerably ground, especially in the capital city of Batumi. The work of the DEC started around 22:00 and was transparent and well organised. The STOs had access to all information in the room. As well as observing all stages of the aggregation and verification of results the team managed to copy all 50 protocols from the district. Local observers had the same access to information as the international observers. The process was handled in an expedient manner, and the work was completed around 4 o’clock in the morning. However, PEC members were observed filling out the protocols in the halls. One PEC member arrived only with the voter list. When the STOs asked him where the ballots were, he informed us that he kept them in his car outside the DEC. The ballots were submitted over an hour later. From 23:00 it was difficult to verify what was going on in the halls and outside the DEC. In the hall people were constantly going in to another room before submitting lists and ballots to the DEC. When the STOs entered the room they found unused election material. When the team brought this to the attention of the DEC chairman, the room was locked.
The aggregated results showed that there were 42,011 registered voters; voter turnout was 33,695 (80.2%); and voters registered on election day numbered 10,189.
GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 56
Election Day Report from STO Linda Kartawich General information The STO team was deployed to Khulo district in the autonomous Republic of Adjara. Khulo is considered to be a Revival stronghold. The district is a rural and mountainous inland area 3-4 hours drive from Batumi - the capital of Adjara. Roads are in bad shape and infrastructure and other facilities are very basic. Khulo district has 45 polling stations. Before election day, only 3,680 voters were registered in the voter lists. In comparison, 23,942 persons voted in the November 2003 elections. The many voters that needed to register on election day lead to expectations of problems.
Observation of opening All opening procedures were according to the prescribed rules and no irregularities were observed. Before opening the polling station, the PEC chairman cast lots to determine election day functions among PEC members. All the members were present, as well as party observers and a domestic non- partisan observer from the Fair Elections NGO.
Observation of polling In general, all polling stations visited were well equipped and well organised. No campaign material around the polling stations was seen. The presence of representatives of various political parties was balanced, and PECs consisted of both new and old members. Neither the PEC members, nor the domestic observers approached the STOs with any complaints and the STO team was well received by all the PECs. The team did not observe any serious problems concerning the registration of voters during election day. In only one polling station did the STOs see that the PEC had failed to mark off the parties that had withdrawn from the election. However, in one polling station the team both observed, and was told about evident irregular election procedures that where not in accordance with the PEC manual and the electoral code: At the PS there was armed police in civilian clothes. No voters were checked for ink upon entering the polling station and busses marked with the Revival Party flag were escorting women to the polling station. Furthermore, no domestic election observers were present at the polling station. A representative from the National Movement told the team that the domestic observers had been refused entrance to the polling station. The same representative also alleged that members of the Revival Party had bribed voters to vote for Revival.
Observation of counting The STO team observed the closing and counting at a polling station in the centre of Khulo, close to the office of the District Election Commission (DEC). The polling station was closed in accordance with proscribed procedures. The chairman checked the ballot box seal in the presence of the commission members and observers. The counting was done in a calm and efficient way; except for a loud argument between the PEC members regarding the validity of one ballot. The chairman called on a DEC member to make a GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 57 decision. The DEC member however, refused to give his opinion on the validity of the ballot paper, because he felt that the PEC should be independent of the DEC. The election results were freely available for recording, and the transparency of the process was adhered to. All authorised representatives were given hand written copies of the protocol, included the STO team. The result showed that the Revival Party was the winner (67, 6% votes) followed by the National Movement Party (25%). The STO team accompanied the sealed ballot papers and the protocol to the DEC at about 1 a.m. The DEC STO team there reported later that only three of 45 precincts had submitted results to the DEC before 3 a.m. and therefore the DEC decided to close.
Election Day Report from Bror Gevelt General information The STO team was deployed to Khelvachauri in the autonomous Republic of Adjara. The team’s AoR was Khelvachauri West - extending from north to south from Batumi to the Turkish border, and from west to east from the Black Sea to Khelvachauri. Due to the prevailing political situation in Adjara, the LTOs were not able to attend meetings or the STO briefing in Tbilisi. Consequently, no regional briefing was given to the STOs until their arrival in Adjara. Here, each STO team received a district-specific briefing from the LTOs. Low pre-election voter registration in Adjara and consequently high registration activity on election day was anticipated to be a general election day problem.
Pre-election day The schedule allowed for visits to all polling stations (PS) before election day. The district consisted of 13 PSs. Based on the LTOs’ advice, two specific PSs, Akhalsopeli and Gonio, were to be given special attention. The former PS had had its chairman arrested a few days earlier, and the latter had been closed under both previous elections due to unrest. In Akhalsopeli, the uncertainties about the PEC chairman still prevailed and in Gonio no indication of any future unrest was discovered.
Observation of opening No problems were observed during the opening. However, one domestic observer expressed concern over the security situation at the PS and “begged” the team to stay there for some time. The team later revisited the PS but problems were neither observed nor reported.
Observation of polling The enthusiasm observed at PSs the previous day seemed to be preserved during the elections. Generally, most PECs seemed well organised and in control of the situation. The electorate behaved mostly in a disciplined manner. No direct election fraud was observed by the team but sometimes too many people at a time were let into the PS due to poor queue control. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 58
Regarding the three political parties that withdrew the day before the election, most PECs failed to stamp those parties as withdrawn on the ballot paper. Apparently, they found it sufficient to submit this information to the electorate through a hand-written note on the wall. As for the above PS in Akhalsopeli, no problems were observed. The PEC consisted of only 14 members. A female chairperson had apparently replaced the originally elected chairman. Questioned whether any PEC members had been ejected, dismissed or replaced, the chairwoman’s answer was negative.
The STO was requested by their LTOs to go to a PS in Khelvachauri where there allegedly were registration problems and unrest. Several voters were refused to cast their ballots although they were on the voter list in the above PS. The PEC claimed that the previous registration was incorrect. According to the PEC, the affected voters’ passports indicated that they were resident in villages outside Khelvachauri. An additional identification paper, provided and stamped by some ‘local authority’ and proving their residency of Khelvachauri, was deemed invalid by the PEC. Consequently, these voters were to cast their ballot at another PS. Reportedly, as many as 200 voters had been refused to vote for this reason. Meanwhile, a crowd of about 30 persons had gathered outside the PS. They claimed to represent the disenfranchised voters and frequently entered the PS unauthorised where they behaved threateningly and caused disturbance. The arrival of members of the DEC seemed to calm down the situation. While monitoring the above-mentioned situation, the team was asked by a DEC member to go to a PS where the mobile ballot box allegedly was attempted stolen by a military unit. On arrival at the PS the situation was under control. The PEC had prevented the removal of the ballot box by exercising female tactics, e.g. by screaming (PEC consisted only of females). The team monitored the closing of the PS in Gonio and the subsequent counting of ballots. All activities were conducted in accordance with the legal provisions.
Election results Only two parties/blocs were able to overcome the 7 % threshold. The National Movement – Democrats received 66,24% of the vote and the Rightist opposition 7,26%.
The Review of Complaints Process
According to the EOM’s Preliminary Statement, the UEC contained clear procedures for lodging election complaints and appeals. It turned out that very few formal complaints were brought to either court or the election commissions. The few cases heard by CEC, DEC and courts were resolved within the legal deadlines and without obvious bias. The legal provisions for complaining and the handling of complaints have not undergone significant changes since the previous elections in November 2003 and January 2004.18
18 For more details regarding relevant procedures and regulations, see previous report ”Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, November 2003”. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 59
Similar to the previous elections in January, the LTOs believe that the reason for the limited number of complaints might be related to the limited campaigning and lack of cooperative environment. Again for these elections, the complaints procedures seemed to be well known by party observers, DEC and PEC members. Voters were not that familiar with their rights to file complaints.
Conclusions
The EOM noted the following positive elements in this election: • Improvements to the administration of the election process; • Enhanced professionalism and openness of the CEC; • Commendable efforts to improve, computerize and consolidate the voter lists, although they remain incomplete; • With exception of Adjara, a peaceful and free pre-election period, although there was a late and very limited campaign; • Freedom of expression enjoyed by the media, with the exception of Adjara; • Efforts made to increase the participation of national minorities in the elections, including the printing of bilingual ballot papers and voter information material; • Improved training for lower-level election officials; • Increased secrecy of the ballot; and • Less police presence in and around polling stations.
However, issues of concern remain: • A complete lack of commitment by the authorities of Adjara to guarantee sufficient conditions for the conduct of a meaningful democratic election in that area; • The continuing lack of a clear separation between State administration and political party structures, and the ongoing potential for misuse of State administrative resources; • Inability to ensure the balanced composition of election commissions at all levels; • The interference by some local authorities in the functioning of a number of lower-level commissions, thereby lessening their independence; • The failure of the State TV to provide a balanced coverage of the election campaign, and a forum for political debates with exchange of views; • The unwillingness to lower the 7% threshold for seat allocation when constitutional amendments were recently adopted; and • In contrast to the 2 November Parliamentary elections, a reduced scrutiny by domestic observers in the pre-election period. However, on election day domestic observers were present in substantially more polling stations than in the previous election. GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY & PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2003-2004 60
On election day, international observers reported that voting was conducted in a calm and peaceful atmosphere. PECs generally operated in a collegial manner and had benefited from the additional training provided by the CEC. Observers evaluated 80% of PECs visited as having good or excellent organization of the poll and understanding of the process. Election day registration occurred in about 90% of polling stations visited. In Adjara, there appeared to have been less systematic irregularities, although isolated violations were reported. Once again, problems were particularly noticeable in Marneuli, Gardabani and Tkibuli, where observers reported cases of multiple voting and ballot stuffing, as well as suspiciously high turnout figures.
Comments on the Election Observation Mission
The International Election Observation Mission to Georgia’s repeat parliamentary elections on 28 March was one of the largest election observation missions ever to be deployed to a country. The core team and long term observers seemed to be highly qualified and dedicated people who did their utmost for the mission to succeed under difficult circumstances. OSCE/ODIHR has done several observations missions to Georgia during the last few years, the latest being for the January presidential elections. This mission benefited from the previous missions by employing many of the same core team members and LTOs that worked during the previous elections. This was a great asset to the mission and made it far more efficient. In spite of this, the mission decided not to deploy LTOs to the same area for the third time. This decision had some negative impact on those affected. On the other hand, it is this LTO’s opinion that the decision made by the core team was correct, taking into consideration that staying in the same area over a longer period may result in observers getting too involved with the people or the local environment there, which again may be in conflict with the observers’ status as being neutral. The mission based most of the communication between the core team and LTOs on electronic mail. In some areas electronic communication systems are not very well developed, resulting in LTOs having to depend totally on local infrastructure. Telephone lines were in some areas not available, and using electronic communication therefore became a major problem, with the consequence that LTOs did not receive or received very late important information. Using mobile or satellite phones could have solved this problem had the funds and competence been available. For future missions this is certainly an area where there is room for improvement. A few countries recruited STOs without sufficient English language skills. The mission’s working language was English and all communication and briefings were conducted in English. This LTO recommends that this issue be brought up with the ODIHR headquarters in Warsaw.
Appendices
1. OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions