The London School of Economics and Political Science Why Keep
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The London School of Economics and Political Science Why keep protecting the few without external incentives? Compliance with minority rights norms after attaining IO membership in Latvia and Georgia Neal Suleimanova A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2017 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 86 243 words. 2 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Ulrich Sedelmeier for all his support and guidance throughout the project. His dedication, flexibility and concern from the first draft chapter to the last steps of printing out the thesis are greatly appreciated. I would like to thank Uli specifically for tirelessly commenting on the theoretical framework, and for following up and reaching out to me, when I was seeking refuge from the PhD stress. This project would have been impossible without the generous support of the Open Society Foundations and the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science. My sincere appreciation is also due to friends, who had been a source of inspiration and moral support throughout this journey: Magdalena Delgado and Borja Guijarro-Usobiaga – every hour spent on the 7th floor of the IR department in your company was a delight; Melissa Koluksuz – for becoming my ICE contact for life; Giorgi Cheishvili and Anastasia Goryainova – for making my fieldwork in Tbilisi and Riga an unforgettable experience; Andrea Peinhopf – for providing insights on Latvia Chapter and for being my friend since week-0 of my life in London; to Gulzat, Asel, Arzu, Kanchana, Ayşe, Imge, Aybüke and Asu – for every single laughter. Ayşe Yedekçi – you have been the ‘cherry on top’ of my revisions period. I thank my brothers, Meylan and Ziya, for sharing all the pain and for being on a support line throughout my life. I would like to extend a special thank you to my older brother for repeatedly covering my bills and giving me a safe haven from the PhD stress, every time I needed it. I hope you are as happy to have me in your life, as I am to have you both! Above all, I would like to thank my parents, Salima Ibrayevna and Alim Gusseinovich, for their unconditional love and for never failing to share my dreams. It is to them that I dedicate this work. 3 Abstract While research on developments in minority rights field in the South and East European countries has shown that political incentives in the form of International Organization (IO) membership conditionality was a driving factor in facilitating transposition of minority rights norms into domestic legislation, compliance with IO recommendations post-conditionality remains a puzzle. This thesis contributes to the broader literature on ‘Europeanisation’ by first, examining transposition of and compliance with minority rights norms once the main ‘carrot’ of membership conditionality is consumed. Secondly, it presents a comparative perspective on adoption of minority rights reforms in EU and non-EU countries (Latvia and Georgia respectively). Last, by incorporating analysis of both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of change, it contributes to the emerging research on the role of ‘bottom-up’ processes in Europeanization of domestic policies. This study shows that the influence of IOs on states after accession is very limited. However, it is not defunct. Adoption of the FCNM in both countries is explained in terms of the ruling government’s reputational concerns to safeguard an image of being ‘good European citizens.' In turn, reputational concerns, when and if present, were only effective to the extent of forging formal (as opposed to behavioural) compliance. Behavioural compliance, on the other hand, was tamed by the ruling government’s stance towards minorities and domestic political considerations (including domestic opposition to reforms). Importantly, this study also shows that bottom-up processes in the post- accession period take place indeed. While their effects on forging positive changes are limited, these processes are more influential in Latvia, rather than in Georgia. The study concludes that legacies of the communist past and their geographical location make the states in question subject to (sometimes) conflicting norms. It thus suggests, in addition to analyzing the influence of IO membership, the further research in the area should take the influence of other regional states/players into consideration. 4 Table of Contents List of abbreviations .................................................................................................... 9 List of Figures, Graphs and Tables .......................................................................... 10 CHAPTER I: Introduction ....................................................................................... 12 1 Minority studies pre- and post-Europeanisation: focus, methods, findings .......... 16 2 International Organisations: mechanisms of influence ........................................... 17 2.1 The OSCE: open membership, mutual responsibilities ......................................... 17 Copenhagen Document ............................................................................................................. 18 2.2 The CoE: ‘soft’ conditionality, comprehensive monitoring mechanisms .............. 19 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities ........................................... 21 2.3 The EU: ‘strict’ conditionality, lack of monitoring mechanisms ........................... 22 3 ‘Conditionality’: main tool for change ...................................................................... 23 3.1 ‘Post-conditionality’: the puzzle ............................................................................ 27 4 Europeanization vs. Minority Rights: Theoretical approaches and methods of study .................................................................................................................................... 31 4.1 Definitions: Europeanization as ‘EU-ization’ and beyond .................................... 31 4.2 Geographic focus: from EU member states to EU neighbours .............................. 32 4.3 Methods of study: ‘Top-down' vs. ‘bottom-up' Europeanization .......................... 33 4.4 Theoretical approaches: Rational Institutionalism & Constructivism ................... 34 Rational institutionalist approach .............................................................................................. 34 Constructivist approach ............................................................................................................. 35 5 Minority rights practices post-conditionality ........................................................... 38 5.1 ‘Top-down’ Europeanisation ................................................................................. 38 5.2 ‘Bottom-up’ Europeanisation ................................................................................. 41 6 Case selection ............................................................................................................... 46 7 Structure of thesis ........................................................................................................ 52 CHAPTER II. Theoretical Framework, Methods .................................................. 65 1 Conceptual Framework: Europeanization and Compliance ................................... 65 1.1 Compliance – dependent variable (DV) ................................................................. 66 1.2 Europeanization ...................................................................................................... 71 ‘Top-down’ Europeanization .................................................................................................... 71 ‘Bottom-up’ Europeanization .................................................................................................... 75 2 Research hypotheses – independent variables (IV) .................................................. 77 2.1 Why do states comply: ideational factors .............................................................. 77 Ruling government’s orientation/identification ........................................................................ 77 Domestic salience of norms among the general population ...................................................... 78 2.2 Why do states comply: rationalist factors .............................................................. 80 Domestic adjustment costs ........................................................................................................ 80 Alternative incentives mechanisms ........................................................................................... 82 2.3 Change might be a result of a ‘pull’ from