ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: EMOTION, FRAMING, AND COGNITIVE

LIBERATION IN GEORGIA'S ROSE REVOLUTION

By

Kelli Hash-Gonzalez

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of l D \ , . l . I . (..Y \"-A Q \. ~ f', f'\Ct\ 0 /) the Requirements for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy

In

ath

/I . ~ , l,·t~I -~~L.·· .·· . /(... , ... ~··-/, Dr. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. ~ ··· ~~x CJW--1~ /Dr:-Miguel Carter J b w OtJDh_ Dean of the School /<; 0fsT Date

2008 American University Washington, D.C. 20016

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Copyright 2008 by Hash-Gonzalez, Kelli

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by

Kelli Hash-Gonzalez

2008

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED This is dedicated to Kate Lomtatidze, Vera Gogokhia, and all hopeful people. ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: EMOTION, FRAMING, AND COGNITIVE

LIBERATION IN GEORGIA'S ROSE REVOLUTION

BY

Kelli Hash-Gonzalez

ABSTRACT

This dissertation looks at popular mobilization during Georgia's Rose Revolution

(November 2003). It asks why a relatively large number of people joined the movements and protests, despite the apathy and resignation that pervaded the political culture. An inductive, comparative analysis examines the responses of protestors and non-protestors, in an effort to understand what made the difference in their behavior: Why did some people become active, while others remained at home? Why did this instance of election fraud provoke such a reaction, in contrast to previous instances? While other factors were also necessary, I argue that we can only understand the popular mobilization if we look at the role emotion played in moving people to protest. In order for a sufficient number of people to join the protest movement, the old mindset of resignation and passiveness had to change. Some Georgians experienced such a change in consciousness, as they made the transition from frustrated resignation to outraged and empowered defiance. A sufficient number of people began to believe that they might have the power to cause change. I argue that this transformation, sometimes known as cognitive liberation, was possible because of emotion. This is because emotions and beliefs are intimately

11 connected and therefore able to influence each other. They work together, in turn, to

influence human behavior. In the Georgian case, one means by which emotions and

beliefs impacted protest behavior was the collective action frames. In their framing work, activists appealed to people's emotions, as well as to their beliefs and values. Thanks to this framing work and its emotional component, activists were able to amplify beliefs that supported participation and transform beliefs that did not. They were able to overcome the resignation and apathy and mobilize a critical mass of people.

111 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the Fulbright Organization and Institute for International

Education for supporting the language study that made this research possible. Charles

Fairbanks and the American-Georgian Initiative for Liberal Education provided financial

support that allowed me to conduct the field work. I am grateful to all of the people who

shared their stories and their homes with me in Georgia, and to my committee and other

scholars for their input and encouragement: Cathy Schneider, Charles Fairbanks, Miguel

Carter, Louise Shelley, Jerrold Post, James Jasper, and Louis Goodman. Finally, I thank my husband Ed for his enduring patience and generosity. My 'paper' is finally done.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

LIST OF TABLES ...... vi

LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... vii

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... l

2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MOBILIZATION ...... 6

3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMAND: GEORGIA UP TO 2001...... 40

4. CREATION OF THE SUPPLY ...... 76

5. MOBILIZATION: THE ROSE REVOLUTION ...... 102

6. FINDINGS ...... 141

7. DISCUSSION ...... 155

8. EPILOGUE ...... 187

APPENDIX ...... 199

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 200

v LIST OF TABLES

PRELIMINARY ELECTION RESULTS ...... 105

vi ACRONYMS

ALPE Legal Education Association

CEC Central Election Commission

CUG Citizens' Union of Georgia

GFSIS Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

GYLA Georgian Young Lawyers' Association

IS FED International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSGF Open Society Georgia Foundation

PVT Parallel Vote Tabulation

RR Rose Revolution

TSU Tbilisi State University

vii CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We finally saw a revolution with our own eyes. We had been taught that the 1917 revolution was the greatest thing, and then we saw one with our own eyes. There aren't many revolutionaries in history-Lenin, Castro, but not Chavez. Saakashvili is now one of their number. Revolution is an operation without anesthesia, and you observe while they cut you open. But the living body was already dying, and the operation had to be done. We saw it all on tv, without anesthetic. We all watched the operation. Where else will you ever see such a thing? It's a very interesting thing to watch and go through, an historic event. And we were afraid. Who isn't afraid of an operation? Even the doctor's hands shake. When I watched it, my hair stood on end. We knew something big was happening, and didn't know how it would end. 1

This 'operation' was the 2003 Rose Revolution, performed on the critically ill

Republic of Georgia.2 The country was dying--ofpoor governance and total corruption.

Years of ineffective, corrupt leadership had reduced the country, once a relatively prosperous Soviet republic, to poverty. By 2000, Georgia had received more than a billion dollars in US aid,3 and a common perception was that elites were siphoning off funds for their own use. People saw the extravagant homes and expensive suits and watches that government employees could not have afforded on their official salaries. At the same time, people could see the country's infrastructure crumbling before their eyes.

1 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, October 10, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (22). 2 There is a lack of agreement on whether this event was indeed a revolution in the classical sense. I bracket this question in my work and refer to it as a revolution, because that is how it has come to be known. 3 "Country Report: Georgia," Economist Intelligence Unit (November 2003), 24, http://www.eiu.com (accessed May 21, 2006). 1 2

The country was also falling apart in a literal sense, as Shevardnadze had proved unable to restore Georgia's territorial integrity. Two breakaway regions had remained de facto independent for ten years by the time of the Rose Revolution (hereafter referred to as the

RR). The parliamentary elections of November 2003 proved to be the last straw. After

President Shevardnadze and his allies tried to steal the election, thousands of Georgians protested in cold, rainy weather for weeks, sometimes overnight. The size of the crowd fluctuated, from a few hundred up to about 100,000.4 First, the people demanded the true election results, and later-the president's resignation. Shevardnadze resigned after three weeks of protest, and even more impressive is the fact that there was so little violence involved.

In hindsight, people's reaction is not surprising, but it could not have been taken for granted at the time that so many would rise up in protest. 5 Georgians had good reasons not to participate in the protest movement. The poverty that angered people also exhausted them. Some who might otherwise have been politically active were too busy trying to support families. Also, cynicism and distrust of political authority are part of

Georgia's Soviet legacy. Politics is popularly considered a truly 'dirty' business, activist

Giorgi Kandelaki writes: "Georgia was a typical post-Soviet society, where the popular attitude towards any kind of political participation was subject to widespread nihilism and

4 "5,000 People Come to Rally of Opposition in Tbilisi," !TAR-TASS News Agency, November 14, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008); Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union (Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2005), 184. 5 Cory Welt, "Regime Vulnerability and Popular Mobilization in Georgia's Rose Revolution," (paper presented at the 'Waves and Troughs of Post Communist Transitions' workshop, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, April 28-29, 2006), http://www.csis.org/media/ csis/pubs/061005_ruseura_no67welt.pdf(accessed April 19, 2008). Welt also makes this point in his analysis. 3 distrust."6 Political apathy and feelings of inefficacy were deeply entrenched. A student protestor explained that many did not participate because of hopelessness and passiveness: "In Georgia there had often been attempts to improve the existing situation, but unfortunately they produced no results. People no longer had any hope that their efforts would win any results."7 Fear was another reason to stay home: there was the memory of the April 1989 protests, during which Soviet troops had attacked and killed demonstrators. There was also the memory of the civil unrest under President

Gamsakhurdia in 1991-92 and the subsequent years of civil war, which no one wanted to revisit.

The puzzle is, given the cynicism, apathy, and resignation, why were so many people willing to stand outside for hours, days, or even weeks in bad weather to fight for a political cause? Assuming the average protestor began as a frustrated but cynical or pessimistic citizen, why did so many become active participants? Did the apathy and resignation simply disappear? Also, it was widely believed that all elections were marred by some amount of fraud, and many Georgians expected fraud in November 2003.

Previous elections had not provoked such protest movements, so what made this time different? Finally, what distinguished participants from non-participants?

While many factors contributed to the RR, I will argue that we can only understand the popular mobilization if we look at the role emotion played in moving people to protest. In order for a sufficient number of people to join the protest movement, the old mindset of resignation and passiveness had to change. Some Georgians experienced such

6 Giorgi Kandelaki, "Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report no. 167 (July 2006): 8, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl67.pdf (accessed February 8, 2008). 7 Personal correspondence with a protestor by email, June 6, 2006. 4

a change in consciousness, as they made the transition from frustrated resignation to

outraged and empowered defiance. A sufficient number of people began to believe that they might have the power to cause change. I argue that this transformation, sometimes known as cognitive liberation, was possible because of emotion.8 This is because

emotions and beliefs are intimately connected and therefore able to influence each other.

They work together, in turn, to influence human behavior.

In the Georgian case, one means by which emotions and beliefs impacted protest behavior was the collective action frames. In their framing work, activists appealed to people's emotions, as well as to their beliefs and values. They understood and addressed what people believed and what they felt. To fight against resignation, leaders evoked indignation and focused people's attention on the injustices they had suffered. To combat the apathy, they made emotional appeals to people's duty as citizens, and to personal and national dignity. Finally, activists addressed the widespread inefficacy beliefs, inspiring people to believe in their power and the possibility of change. Thanks to this framing work and its emotional component, activists were able to overcome the resignation and apathy and mobilize a critical mass of people. Empirical data support these propositions: many respondents had been motivated by the emotions and beliefs contained in outrage, dignity, and duty, and also by a new feeling of efficacy. The fact that many protestors spoke of these, while few non-protestors did, suggests that they influenced protest behavior.

8 Courtney Nero, "Georgian Social Movements and the Post-Soviet Georgian State: Mobilization under a Dissident Nationalist Discourse" (MA thesis, American University, 2000), 59. Nero suggests looking at cognitive liberation against the background of post-Soviet political culture. 5

In the next chapter, I examine conventional theories of social movement

mobilization. These approaches emphasize factors that were also necessary in the

Georgian case, but they overlook the crucial influence of emotion and belief on protest participation. I then elaborate on my alternative theoretical approach incorporating emotion, framing, and cognitive liberation. Chapter 3 provides a historical context for the events of November 2003. To borrow Bert Klandermans' term, this chapter shows the

development of the 'demand' for protest.9 Chapter 4 describes the creation of the 'supply'

as I discuss the development of civil society and movements leading up to the RR.

Chapter 5 tells the story of the event itself, and Chapter 6 presents my findings on why people did or did not join in the collective action. The findings are discussed in Chapter

7, and post-RR developments are addressed in the Epilogue.

9 Bert Klandermans, "The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements," in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004). CHAPTER2

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MOBILIZATION

Within the social movement literature, mobilization is typically seen as depending

upon one or more of the following factors: deprivation and grievances, availability of resources, changes in political structures that create opportunities for action, and framing work. Variants of strain theory, which focus on absolute and relative deprivation, look at desperate social conditions and how they can make those most affected more likely to engage in protest. 10 Given the extreme levels of poverty in many parts of the world, however, one would expect much more protest action. If protest behavior depends on grievance or deprivation, why is mass protest not more common? Piven and Cloward refer to strain and deprivation approaches as 'pressure' theories, which associate mass protest with either economic improvement or decline; in either case people's unfulfilled expectations can motivate them to act collectively. However reasonable this perspective may seem, Piven and Cloward note, it fails to take into account the fact that economic ch ange 1s· common, not extraord' mary. II

On the contrary, one could argue that it is the availability of a different type of resources that leads to collective action-the kind that activists can use to organize and

10 David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Daniel M. Cress, "Identifying the Precipitants of Homeless Protest across 17 US Cities, 1980 to 1990*," Social Forces 83, no. 3 (March 2005): 1187. ProQuest. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.proquest.umi.com (accessed June 30, 2008). 11 Frances F. Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage, 1979), 9. 6 7

mobilize protest. Within this category, some scholars include moral, cultural, social-

organizational, human, and material resources. 12 For this theoretical approach, resource

mobilization theory (RMT), such "resources are a sine qua non determinant of the course

and character of social movement organizations and their activities."13 In fact, Bob

Edwards and John McCarthy note the strong correlation between the success of an attempt to mobilize and an increase in available resources. 14 However, James Jasper questions the conceptual stretching of the term 'resource.' The fact that it is sometimes used to mean almost anything weakens it and makes RMT arguments almost tautological.

Considering moral, psychological, or cultural factors as resources also prevents scholars from seeing their complex and dynamic nature. 15

RMT also emphasizes actors' rationality, in response to earlier crowd theories that saw collective behavior as spontaneous, irrational, and disorganized. 16 Therefore, participation "is seen not as the consequence of predisposing psychological traits or states, but as the result of rational decision processes whereby people weigh the costs and benefits of participation."17 With reference to John Maynard Keynes, J.M. Barbalet points out a flaw in applying a rational model to such decision making. Because

12 Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 125. 13 Daniel M. Cress and David A. Snow, "Mobilization at the Margins: Resources, Benefactors, and the Viability of Homeless Social Movement Organizations," American Sociological Review 61, no. 6 (December 1996): 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20963 l 0 (accessed June 30, 2008). 14 Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 116. 15 James M. Jasper, The Art ofMoral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 31-32. 16 Myra Marx Ferree, "The Political Context of Rationality: Rational Choice Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory,'' in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University, 1992), 29. 17 Bert Klandermans, "Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory,'' American Sociological Review 49, no. 5 (October 1984): 583, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20954 l 7 (accessed June 30, 2008). 8

economics and sociology have generally ignored time in their analyses of action, there has been insufficient attention to the ways uncertainty about the future limits rationality

in the present: "As the future is necessarily uncertain, and as all action is future-making,

action is necessarily based on interpretation rather than precision, relevant information is

limited, and calculation is therefore difficult when not impossible."18 This certainly does not preclude trying to decide rationally based on costs and benefits, but it does challenge the assertion that protest behavior is decided by rational calculation alone.

Political process theory (PPT) acknowledges the role of resource availability in movement formation. Especially important is the presence or absence of networks and social organization, as these facilitate recruitment and communication. 19 Prior work has shown the importance of such pre-existing networks, whose members have gained experience in earlier waves of protest.20 In contrast to RMT, however, PPT also considers two other factors essential to the emergence of collective action: 1) an opportunity to act, such as a change in the political context, and 2) the recognition of that opportunity for taking action. All three factors-resources such as organized networks, an opportunity, and the perception of an opportunity-are seen as necessary for the emergence of social msurgency.. 21

First, the closedness or openness of the political space makes it more or less difficult for weak or excluded social groups to have a voice. Normally, elites resist attempts to

18 J. M. Barbalet, Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1998), 92-93. 19 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development ofBlack Insurgency, I 930-I 970, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 44-46. 2°Cathy Lisa Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet's Chile (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); Aldon Morris, "Black Southern Student Sit-in Movement: An Analysis oflnternal Organization," in Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Co., 1997). 21 McAdam, Political Process, 51. 9

alter the status quo; whether or not they oppose the goals of a challenging group, they do not want to allow any change in the power relationship. Nevertheless, challengers

sometimes find openings they can utilize to further their own interests. 22 Doug McAdam writes that "any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities."23 Per Sidney Tarrow, the events and processes that give rise to

opportunities include the following: when challengers gain increased access to the

political process, when elite alignments are unstable, when challengers have influential allies who can protect them or negotiate for them, and when the elites become divided.

Other factors are the strength of the state and the willingness of the state to use repression against challengers. 24

Second, McAdam emphasizes the importance of the subjective in the development of a social movement. Even if challenging groups are organized and ready to act and an opportunity presents itself, the challengers will not act unless they perceive the opportunity as such: "Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations. This crucial attribution process has been ignored by proponents of both classical and resource mobilization perspectives."25

Other scholars have shown that the perception of an opportunity is possible even when one does not exist in an objective sense. Charles Kurzman found that the protests leading to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 occurred in the absence of a structural opportunity. It

22 McAdam, Political Process, 39. 23 Ibid., 41. 24 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85-95. 25 McAdam, Political Process, 48. 10 was the perceived strengthening of the opposition-not perceptions of a weakening state-that signaled an opening for collective action: "The Iranian Revolution may be a case in which people saw the door was closed, but felt that the opposition was powerful enough to open it. ... It turns out that Iranians were able to open the door on their own. "26

This perception of opportunity cannot be taken for granted, so an important question for research is how it occurs. McAdam uses the term 'cognitive liberation' to describe the change in perception that allows people to recognize opportunities. The concept originates in the work of Piven and Cloward, who found that collective action is usually accompanied by certain changes:

The emergence of a protest movement entails a transformation both of consciousness and of behavior. The change in consciousness has at least three distinct aspects. First, 'the system'-or those aspects of the system that people experience and perceive-loses legitimacy. Large numbers of men and women who ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements come to believe in some measure that these rulers and these arrangements are unjust and wrong. Second, people who are ordinarily fatalistic, who believe that existing arrangements are inevitable, begin to assert 'rights' that imply demands for change. Third, there is a new sense of efficacy; people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot. 27

McAdam applies this concept to his study of the US Civil Rights movement: cognitive liberation explains the transformation that enabled activists to mobilize formerly inactive but aggrieved African Americans. 28 Sharon Nepstad applies it to the

US-Central American peace movement, demonstrating how North American activists

26 Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979," in Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Co., 1997), 68, 76. 27 Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, 4. 28 Doug McAdam, Political Process. 11 became aware of the effects of US policy in Central America, began to perceive those policies as unacceptable, and then fought to change them. 29

In an effort to shed light on the liberation process, on how people move from one stage to the next, Nepstad relates cognitive liberation with the concept of framing. Per

William Gamson, frames are like metaphors and help us organize our thinking about certain issues. 30 Some frames used in American social and political debates are 'guns don't kill people-people kill people,' or 'pro-choice' vs. 'anti-abortion' (not 'pro- abortion' or 'anti-choice'). Frames give meaning to events and help us understand what has happened and what we should do. This is especially important with collective action frames, whose purpose is to win support for a cause and inspire action. 31

As Robert Benford and David Snow point out, the fact that a social movement exists

"indicates differences within a society regarding the meaning of some aspect ofreality."32

This means that challengers' collective action frames compete with other frames, such as those legitimating the existing political system. 33 In Nepstad's case study, for example, activists' framing of the Contra/Sandinista conflict competed with the picture offered by the Reagan administration.34 Collective action frames may have to contend with those of prospective recruits, as well. Because many interpretations of reality are possible, there is

29 Sharon E. Nepstad, "The Process of Cognitive Liberation: Cultural Synapses, Links, and Frame Contradictions in the US-Central America Peace Movement," Sociological Inquiry 67, no. 4 (November 1997). 30 William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 71. 31 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," Annual Review ofSociology 26 (2000): 614, http://www.jstor.org/stable/223459 (accessed June 30, 2008). 32 Ibid., 626. 33 Gamson, "Social Psychology of Collective Action," 68. 34 Nepstad, "Process of Cognitive Liberation," 482. 12 no guarantee that activists and their potential members will agree on what the problem is

(diagnostic framing) and what should be done about it (prognostic framing), or that activists will be able to mobilize enough people to take effective action (motivational framing). 35

Therefore, one task for movement leaders is to align their views with those of potential members. Whether this concerns the need for action, the action that should be taken, or the chances of success, the activists and their potential recruits need to agree in order to act together. 'Frame alignment' is this strategic process, by which "individual interests, values, and beliefs" come to match a social movement's "activities, goals, and ideology."36 This convergence can be achieved by bridging, amplifying, extending, or transforming the frames held by the people and the social movement, but it must happen for participation to occur.37

Frame bridging is the linking of compatible but as yet unconnected frames on a certain issue, i.e., the frame of a social movement and that of another movement, individual, or group. This can be the joining of a movement frame with what McCarthy calls "unmobilized sentiment pools" within society.38 These are "aggregates of individuals who share common grievances and attributional orientations, but who lack the organizational base for expressing their discontents and acting in pursuit of their

35 Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," 615. 36 David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (August 1986): 464, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/2095581 (accessed June 30, 2008). 37 Ibid., 467. 38 John D. McCarthy, "Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Mobilization: Infrastructure Deficits and New Technologies," in Social Movements in an Organizational Society, ed. Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (New Brunswick, ME: Transaction, Inc., 1987), 59. Cited in Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes," 467. 13 interests."39 For Snow and his colleagues, the mobilization of such people or groups does not require a transformation of consciousness, only the establishing of a structural connection between the people and the movement. Frame extension refers to the widening of a social movement frame in an effort to recruit more people. A movement frame can be extended to include issues important to prospective members, even if those issues. are not centra1 to movement goa1 s. 40

Sometimes, activists must work to amplify frames held by prospective members in order to counteract uncertainty and lethargy.41 This typically involves the amplification of certain values or beliefs contained within the frames. Value amplification directs attention to or idealizes a value or values held in the society, such as those connected with democracy, religion, or family. 42 These "may have atrophied, fallen into disuse, or have been suppressed because of the lack of an opportunity for expression due to a repressive authority structure or the absence of an organizational outlet."43 Alternatively, society might not realize the connection between an event or problem and a particular value, or the threat to the value might not seem serious enough to provoke action. In such cases, movement activists must focus prospective members' attention on the affected value. Activists also work to amplify beliefs relevant to the movement. These can be about the serious nature of an issue or problem, as well as who is to blame for it. Beliefs about the possibility for change and the propriety of taking action are also amplified and

39 Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes," 467, 468. 40 Ibid., 472. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 469. 43 Ibid. 14

are key to mobilization.44 This can require persuading people who agree with movement

goals that they can have an impact. Activists must urge prospective members to 'stand up

and be counted,' convincing them that they are needed and have a moral obligation to

become active.45

Occasionally, more significant frame change is required for mobilization, so that prospective recruits begin to perceive some aspect ofreality in a new way. Such frame transformation can impact a specific domain of life or be more global in scope. It can involve the creation of an injustice frame, so that "what was previously seen as an unfortunate but tolerable situation is now defined as inexcusable, unjust, or immoral."46

Then, to encourage action, the blame for the situation is transferred, often from the self to the system. This can mean moving from fatalism to activism-a change Snow et al. suggest must not be taken for granted.47

In light of the above, it is easy to imagine a connection between cognitive liberation and framing work. In Nepstad's study, each type of framing (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational) corresponds to a step in cognitive liberation and furthers the liberation process.48 Agreement on both the existence of a problem and its nature, that something can be done to solve the problem, and that the people could implement the solution all apply to both cognitive liberation and framing work. Through the frame alignment process, activists who already perceive problems and solutions, and who feel empowered to act, try to influence the perceptions and frames of many other people with the goal of

44 Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes," 470. 45 Ibid., 471. 46 Ibid., 474. 47 Ibid. 48 Nepstad, "Process of Cognitive Liberation." 15 acting collectively. This frame alignment is one means by which people could achieve cognitive liberation.

Robert Futrell takes the connection between cognitive liberation and framing a step further in his look at NIMBY protest against chemical weapons disposal. He suggests that the transformation in consciousness is social as well as cognitive and that the process should be seen as more interactive and less mechanistic.49 He also argues that either cognitive liberation or framing can begin first: even before social movement organizations form and begin active framing work, people can develop a sense that something isn't right. 50 Gamson makes a related and important observation: a people's quiescence to a legitimating frame should not be mistaken for their acceptance of it. They may find the prevailing situation unjust long before any mobilization or collective action begins: "Quiescence can be produced, even when injustice is taken for granted by a dominated group, through the belief that resistance is hopeless and fraught with peril."51

While Futrell's work sheds some light on the process of cognitive liberation, he acknowledges that it is still unclear how it happens. 52 Taking a broader view might reveal more about the process. Cognitive liberation requires a transformation of people's fundamental beliefs-about the legitimacy of their government system, the fairness or unfairness of sociopolitical structures, and the power of regular people to change their lives and national histories, for instance. Referring to this as cognitive liberation implies that the transformation is effected through information alone, as if in binary code. If the

49 Robert Futrell, "Framing Processes, Cognitive Liberation, and NIMBY Protest in the U.S. Chemical-Weapons Disposal Conflict," Sociological Inquiry 73, no. 3 (August 2003): 360. 50 Ibid., 362n2. 51 Gamson, "Social Psychology of Collective Action," 68. 52 Futrell, "Framing Processes, Cognitive Liberation," 359. 16 transformation of such beliefs leads people to take action that puts their lives in danger

and promises to recreate at least some aspects of their reality, then is cognition really

doing all of the work?

There is a growing understanding that some of the concepts used to study social movements derive some of their power from emotion. As Jasper writes, "many

phenomena that scholars point to as crucial in the emergence of a protest movement- injustice frames, cognitive liberation, suddenly imposed grievances, framing-are meant to sound austerely cognitive, but in fact they are dripping with emotions."53 Aminzade and McAdam suggest that cognitive liberation may depend upon emotion, in fact: anger may accompany perceptions of injustice, and hope come with the belief that the situation is subject to change. "When joined together, these two emotions would appear to serve as the necessary bedrock on which many movements are built."54 Speaking on framing,

Nepstad and Smith acknowledge that it "has been studied as a predominantly cognitive phenomenon that more or less lacks affect. We know little about the emotional effects of frames and framing tasks."55 Benford and Snow also comment on the neglect, and consider the lack of work in this area one of "the more glaring unresolved issues and concerns. "56

Theory in this area is relatively undeveloped, but in recent years scholars have examined some emotional aspects of framing. Belinda Robnett examines the emotional

53 Jasper, Art ofMoral Protest, 126. 54 Ronald R. Aminzade and Doug McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics," in Silence and Voice in the Study ofContentious Politics, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 I), 30-31. 55 Sharon E. Nepstad and Christian Smith, "The Social Structure of Moral Outrage in Recruitment to the US Central America Peace Movement," in Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 200 I), 172. 56 Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," 633. 17

resonance of strategic framing in a Civil Rights movement organization, and determines

that it depended on participants' social location. The race and gender frames that were

introduced did not enjoy the same emotional resonance among both black and white

activists. 57 Michael Young argues that emotion was essential to the transformative

experiences of American evangelical abolitionists. Movement leaders associated slavery with sin, which resonated powerfully among followers. A typical instrumental analysis of

framing could not capture the 'emotional liberation' that occurred, Young contends:

"Cognitive mediation between organized interest and objective opportunities fails to

grasp how abolitionists made slavery immediate to northerners-made itfelt."58 Jorge

Cadena-Roa shows how the Asamblea de Barrios in Mexico City utilized the emotional

symbolism of dramatic wrestling (good vs. evil, justice vs. injustice) to fight for change.

He found that "movement actors try to appeal not only to audiences' reason and self- interest but also to their values and normative judgments, and they do so by tapping an audience's emotions."59 Schrock, Holden, and Reid found that frames used in a transgender movement appealed to potential recruits' needs for solidarity, authenticity, pride, and self-efficacy, and also to their indignation at their treatment by society. The authors conclude that such emotionally resonant frames might be what trigger political

57 Belinda Robnett, "Emotional Resonance, Social Location, and Strategic Framing," Sociological Focus 37, no. 3 (August 2004). 58 Michael P. Young, "A Revolution of the Soul: Transformative Experiences and Immediate Abolition," in Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 112. 59 Jorge Cadena-Roa, "Strategic Framing, Emotions, and Superbarrio-Mexico City's Masked Crusader," in Frames ofProtest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 70. 18 consciousness raising. 60 I propose to extend this research by investigating how emotion in frames contributed to cognitive liberation and protest mobilization in Georgia in 2003.

Theory on Emotion and Cognition

Emotion

As Neta Crawford notes, our word 'emotion' was originally used in Latin and French to refer to "moving from one place to another, and exciting or stirring up."61 She offers a working definition specifically for the study of emotion in international politics: emotions are the inner states we often describe as feelings, which can be "associated with biological, cognitive, and behavioral states and changes. Thus emotions are first of all subjective experiences that also have physiological, intersubjective, and cultural components. "62 Within the psychological literature, definitions of emotion usually include references to "feelings, shifts in the control of behavior and thought, involuntary and impulsive behaviors, the emergence or tenacity of beliefs, changes in the relationship with the environment, and physiological changes not caused by physical conditions."63

Emotions typically have objects, Jon Elster explains; they are 'about something.' One loves or is angry at another person, is proud of oneself, etc. Moods, on the other hand,

60 Douglas Schrock, Daphne Holden, and Lori Reid, "Creating Emotional Resonance: Interpersonal Emotion Work and Motivational Framing in a Transgender Community," Social Problems 51, no. 1 (February 2004): 77, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148760 (accessed June 30, 2008). 61 Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 124, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25393 l 7 (accessed June 30, 2008). 62 Ibid., 125. 63 Nico H. Frijda, "The Psychologists' Point of View," in Handbook ofEmotions, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Lewis and Jeanette M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 60. 19 typically do not have objects.64 Emotions can be involved in short-term reactions or longer-term affects-both positive and negative-which Jasper terms reactive and a f:i:-iect1ve• emot10ns.• 65

Emotion is theorized as having various sources: biology, personality structure, social structure, and culture (social construction). 66 Depending on the emotion under consideration, as well as the context, one or another of these approaches is more or less appropriate. For social and political contexts, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta suggest that emphasis should be placed on the more constructed and cognitive emotions. These include moral outrage, shame, pride, indignation, and joy, and "are related to moral intuitions, felt obligations and rights, and information about expected effects, all of which are culturally and historically variable." At the same time, a more cultural approach, they argue, is not incompatible with biology, personality, or other influences.67

Cognition and Belief

According to Spezio and Adolphs, political psychology refers to cognition as

"conscious, intentional processes" or "thought-knowledge." Within the fields of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the term is used to describe information processing which can come under conscious control; this includes "perception, attention,

64 Jon Elster, Alchemies ofthe Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 271-72. 65 James M. Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements," Sociological Forum 13, no. 3 (1998). 66 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, "Introduction: Why Emotions Matter," in Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 10-12. 67 Ibid., 13. 20

memory, language, learning, reasoning, judgment, and higher-order thought."68 Beliefs

are cognitive appraisals, or "states that link a person or group or object or concept with

one or more attributes, and this is held by the believer to be true. "69 Beliefs can be about the causes and consequences of events, the way the world works, or why people do what they do, for example.7°Frijda, Manstead, and Bern distinguish between knowledge and belief by saying the former implies objectivity and truth. To believe, however, "is not so much to claim to have true knowledge as to take a 'risk' ... and be prepared to take action." 71

Emotion and Belief

While distinct phenomena, beliefs and emotions are intimately connected. Beliefs can be the antecedents of emotion or the consequences. Someone's action angers me based on what I believe about it: I will become angry if I think someone stepped on my foot intentionally, but probably not ifl perceive it as an accident. Conversely, what I believe about a situation is affected by my emotional reaction to it: the more fear I feel in reaction to an event, the more likely I am to consider that event threatening. 72 As cognitive appraisals, beliefs give meaning to events, and they are contained within

68 Michael L. Spezio and Ralph Adolphs, "Emotional Processing and Political Judgment," in The Affect Effect: Dynamics ofEmotion in Political Thinking and Behavior, ed. W. Russell Neuman et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 76. 69 Nico H. Frijda, Anthony S. R. Manstead, and Sacha Bern, "The Influence of Emotions on Beliefs," in Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts, ed. Nico H. Frijda, Anthony S. R. Manstead, and Sacha Bern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5. 70 Nico H. Frijda and Batja Mesquita, "Beliefs through Emotions," in Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts, ed. Nico H. Frijda, Anthony S. R. Manstead, and Sacha Bern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 45. 71 Frijda, Manstead, and Bern, "The Influence of Emotions on Beliefs," 4. 72 Ibid. 21 emotions. 73 Frijda, Manstead, and Bern therefore suggest that "emotions can awaken, intrude into, and shape beliefs, by creating them, by amplifying or altering them, and by making them resistant to change."74

Emotional feelings provide us with information which can influence our beliefs, as

Clore and Gasper explain: "Emotions are informative. One of their prime functions is to provide immediate, attention-getting feedback about aspects of situations appraised as goal-relevant." We tend to trust this information since we know it through experience: emotions are more believable than logic. 75 Clore and Gasper hypothesize that this information interacts with the beliefs we hold: "Beliefs are adjusted to be compatible with internal evidence in the form of feelings, just as they are adjusted to be compatible with external evidence from perceptual experience."76 Furthermore, "highly evaluative beliefs about something are usually capable of eliciting strong feelings, and strong feelings tend to elicit a search for supporting beliefs."77 The authors suggest as an example the way our beliefs about a person can change based on our feelings: while we are in love, the other person is wonderful. After a breakup, we may consider the person vile.

Frijda and Mesquita acknowledge that insufficient research has been done so far to investigate these propositions, although there is a large amount of anecdotal evidence that

73 Frijda and Mesquita, "Beliefs through Emotions," 52. 74 Frijda, Manstead, and Bern, "The Influence of Emotions on Beliefs," 5. 75 Gerald L. Clore and Karen Gasper, "Some Affective Influences on Belief," in Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts, ed. Nico H. Frijda, Anthony S. R. Manstead, and Sacha Bern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 39. 76 Ibid., 25. 77 Ibid. 22 can be seen as supporting them. 78 Political propaganda is one example. Describing other people or issues in emotional terms evokes emotion: "It thereby slips the belief that the emotion is about into the listener's mind. Presumably, it slips the beliefs into the listener's mind more easily, smoothly, and unquestioned than would happen when the information alone was transmitted."79 Looking at the former Yugoslav case, Frijda and

Mesquita suggest how the leadership (on various sides) might have used emotion to instill beliefs. Propaganda referring to past glory evoked pride, and reminders of past suffering at the hands of the other side evoked fear and anger. The authors suggest that this made it easier for the leaders to convince their people of the other side's evil intentions. This in tum might have increased support for the government's policies.80

Other forms of political communication also rely on emotion to influence people's thinking. The goal in political rhetoric and campaign speeches is to persuade, where persuasion is "the use of verbal and non-verbal symbols to affect audience perceptions and thus to bring about changes in thinking, feeling, and/or acting."81 In his treatise on rhetoric, Aristotle described three means of persuasion: the speaker's character (ethos), his argument (logos), and the emotion he could evoke in his listeners (pathos). Regarding the latter, he explained that "[there is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [pathos] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile."82 Cicero later taught that a gifted orator is "one who by his eloquence can either awaken or compose all the emotions of the

78 Frijda and Mesquita, "Beliefs through Emotions," 46. 79 Ibid., 47. 80 Ibid. 81 Charles J. Stewart, Craig Allen Smith, and Robert E. Denton Jr., Persuasion and Social Movements, 5th ed. (Long Grove, IL.: Waveland Press, Inc., 2007), 21. 82 Aristotle Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse 1.2.2-5. 23 human soul, from whatever cause they may proceed." Armed with this ability, the orator becomes "one whose tongue can expose to the hatred of his countrymen, and to punishment, fraud and guilt; ... who can rouse a spiritless desponding people to glory, reclaim them from infatuation, point their rage against the wicked."83

Emotion, Belief, and Action

Emotions and beliefs influence not only each other. They also impact behavior, and each can have a positive or negative effect on outcomes. On a very basic level, emotion and feelings guide our attention and decision making. Based on his study of the brain and clinical work, neurologist Antonio Damasio suggests that, by relying only on logic and

'cold cognition' to perform a cost-benefit analysis, a person would find it extremely difficult ever to arrive at a decision. The analysis involved would overtax the brain's working memory and require too much time. Instead, Damasio hypothesizes that components of emotion (feelings) work together with cognition to aid in decision making. As we consider options, positive or negative feelings direct our attention toward what is relevant and provide warnings or incentives. This makes the process more manageable. As support for this hypothesis, the author presents cases of people with certain types of brain injury. With their intellects intact, but emotional centers damaged, they are incapable of functioning as independent adults in part because they can no longer make decisions. 84

83 Cicero de oratore XLV. 84 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Quill, 1994), 170-175. 24

Some scholars maintain that emotion is needed for the next step, as well: once an actor has a decision made or a position defined, he or she requires a push from emotion in order to take action. Frijda, Manstead, and Bern write that "no matter how rational your thoughts about helping the needy may be, you need an emotional impulse before you actually volunteer to help. Emotions are prime candidates for turning a thinking being into an actor."85 Robert Zajonc makes the same assertion, arguing that passions "are the sources of energy for action that reason alone cannot generate. It is passions that direct the will and move the organism to action. "86 Empirical work supports this proposition. In her study of Roosevelt's 1938 intervention to avert a European war, Barbara Farnham concludes that "strong emotion, then, was apparently behind Roosevelt's transformation from a detached observer of someone else's crisis to a sort of participant."87

Frijda and Mesquita also note that anticipated emotions influence human behavior.

"Emotion anticipations are the anticipations, foresights, and imaginings of actual emotions that might emerge under certain envisaged circumstances." They are not thought, but felt. 88 Examples from everyday life are the choices people make in the present to avoid feeling shame or regret, or in order to feel happy, in the future. Maria

Miceli and her colleagues use a similar concept in their work on emotion and persuasion.

A speaker can attempt to change a listener's beliefs or the beliefs' strength by arousing

85 Frijda, Manstead, and Bern, "The Influence of Emotions on Beliefs," 3. 86 Robert B. Zajonc, "Emotions," in The Handbook ofSocial Psychology, ed. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindsey (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 595-596. 87 Barbara Farnham, "Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory," Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (1992): 229. 88 Frijda and Mesquita, "Beliefs through Emotions," 58. 25 emotions or appealing to "expected emotions."89 They explain the latter thus: "A given action can be performed (or avoided) not only on the grounds of the agent's expectations about its outcome and evaluations of its costs and side effects, but also in order to feel (or not to feel) the associated emotions."90

The impact of anticipated or expected emotions on behavior is supported by experiments on the nature of the endowment effect. According to this concept, a possessed object is more valued than an identical object one does not own. Bar-Hillel and

Neter found that participants were willing to exchange one pen or token for another, but usually unwilling to exchange one lottery ticket for a different one. Even though the different lottery tickets had the same odds of winning and were in a sense identical, participants could imagine a future in which their original ticket won. Their anticipated regret over the possible loss moved them to hold on to their first tickets. 91

Work in the fields of communication and advertising shows how emotion and anticipated emotion provide an impulse for action. Public service announcements (PSAs) are designed to inform and to change attitudes or beliefs, and then to produce a change in behavior. They can address a variety of subjects, such as healthy eating habits, smoking, drug use, drunk driving, HIV/STD prevention, and cancer prevention and screening. In some cases, the PSA viewer is already aware of the need to eat more fruits and vegetables, get more exercise, see a doctor, or quit smoking, but does not perform the targeted behavior. For this reason, ad designers often rely on emotion, as well as

89 Maria Miceli, Fiorella de Rosis, and Isabella Poggi, "Emotional and Non-Emotional Persuasion," Applied Artificial Intelligence 20 (2006): 854-855. 90 Miceli, de Rosis, and Poggi, "Emotional and Non-Emotional Persuasion," 853. 91 Maya Bar-Hillel and Efrat Neter, "Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange Lottery Tickets?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70, no. 1 (1996): 26. 26 information, to produce the intended effect. For example, all packages of cigarettes come with a warning about the connection between smoking and lung disease, but millions continue to smoke. Creative PSAs go beyond the information to provide vivid images of the consequences of not quitting: people smoking through their tracheostomies or speaking with the aid of an electronic larynx. Research in this area has shown that such fear appeals can make ads more effective. High-threat appeals that point out the severity of the threat and the viewer's susceptibility to it are more persuasive, but only if the ads also include information on how to avoid or deal with the threat. If the viewer is left feeling powerless to address the problem, or the level of fear evoked is not high enough, then the ad will be less effective in changing behavior.92

Emotion and Mobilization

Finally, emotion impacts the type of action that is of most interest here-movement participation. Emotional energy and emotion work are two phenomena that some consider essential to popular mobilization. Randall Collins argues that the success of a movement depends on its emotional dynamics and energy.93 First, the emotion that initially brings movement participants together (fear, outrage, etc.) is amplified as a result of the shared focus of the group's attention. Then that initial emotion is transformed into what Collins terms 'emotional energy' or EE: this is "the emotion which arises out of

92 Kim Witte and Mike Allen, "A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns," Health Education & Behavior 27, no. 5 (October 2000): 604. 93 Randall Collins, "Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention," in Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 27 consciousness of being entrained within a collective focus of attention." 94 EE is the emotion of solidarity, enthusiasm, and morality. It helps people feel stronger as part of a group, and it gives a sense of higher purpose to the group's work. The success of a mobilization attempt depends on these two emotional changes, because emotional energy

supplies "internal commitment and forceful activity to the movement."95

Elizabeth Perry considers the Chinese Communist Revolution "a textbook illustration of how emotional energy may (or may not) be harnessed to revolutionary designs."96 In her study, she asks why the Communists (CCP) were so much more effective than the

Guomindang (GMD) at mobilizing citizens. She concludes that a fundamental difference between the two campaigns was the CCP's reliance on 'emotion work.' 97 This is the term

Arlie Hochschild applies to people's efforts to feel the appropriate type and degree of emotion for a given situation. This can be achieved either by suppressing the wrong feeling or by evoking the proper one. 98 Perry explains that, by appealing to emotions such as anger, fear, and shame through the media of theater, opera, and martial arts, CCP activists were able to instill in their audiences a strong allegiance to their cause. Their emotion work created a sense of solidarity that "was a fundamental element of revolutionary mobilization."99 The GMD, by contrast, was wary of spontaneity and tried to engage the people in a more cerebral way that was less effective. 100

94 Collins, "Focus of Emotional Attention," 29. 95 Ibid., 29, 31 96 Elizabeth J. Perry, "Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution," Mobilization 7, no. 2 (2002): 112 97 Ibid. 98 Arlie Russell Hochschild, "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure," American Journal ofSociology 85, no. 3 (November 1979): 561, 572. 99 Perry, "Moving the Masses," 112-13. 100 Ibid., 115-16. 28

An example of the CCP's emotion work is the mass meetings at which they encouraged workers to denounce their former oppressors. One goal of those carefully arranged and choreographed meetings was to 'raise emotions,' or "to arouse sufficient indignation on the part of ordinary people that they would participate actively-indeed gleefully-in the liquidation of designated class enemies." 101 Such emotion work is only one ingredient of a successful revolution, but it is a necessary one: "The translation of radical ideas and images into purposeful and effective action demands not only conducive environmental conditions, but also substantial emotional engagement on the part of leaders and followers alike."102

Jasper has encountered similar emotion work in his research on social movement mobilization. Participation in social movements is often the result of what he terms a

'moral shock.' This occurs "when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, with or without the network of personal contacts emphasized in mobilization and process theories." 103 Sometimes, such a reaction is triggered by a sudden event-a nuclear accident or the announcement of an unpopular environmental policy. A moral shock can also be gradual and modest, the 'last straw.' Reactions to the shocks vary: usually, people

"resign themselves to unpleasant changes, certain that governments and corporations do not bend to citizen protest. But others, through complex emotional processes that few researchers have described, channel their fear and anger into righteous indignation and

101 Perry, "Moving the Masses," 116. 102 Ibid., 112. 103 Jasper, Art ofMoral Protest, 106. 29

individual or collective political activity." 104 Movement activists take advantage of such

shocks and work to evoke the set of emotions that Jasper refers to as 'attack mode.' In

other words, they try to take people from anxious fear all the way to anger and moral

indignation directed at a precise target. They accomplish this by appealing in their

framing work to people's cognitive, moral, and emotional selves. 105

The Argument

In light of the above, I make the following claims regarding the role of emotion in framing, cognitive liberation, and protest mobilization:

• Three conditions are necessary but not sufficient for social movement emergence

o The existence of a network of activists

o Skilled, experienced organizers

o The perception of opportunity or of the opening of political space

• This perception of opportunity has traditionally been seen as purely cognitive-a

matter of cost/benefit calculations or beliefs about outcomes and what others will

do. I argue that such perception also depends on emotion. In order to change

people's perceptions, activists must try to influence their emotions as well as their

beliefs.

• Activists who incorporate emotion into their framing work can more effectively

influence perception. They are better able to persuade people to see an

opportunity and then become active, for three reasons:

104 Jasper, Art ofMoral Protest, 107. 105 Ibid. 30

o Emotion has the power to awaken and amplify beliefs that support

participation.

o Emotion can weaken or transform beliefs that do not.

o Emotion and emotional energy motivate people to act on their beliefs.

• Such framing work can transform a context characterized by resignation and

apathy to one characterized by collective empowerment, solidarity, and activism.

In 2003, circumstances in Georgia were favorable for social insurgency. There was a relatively open political opportunity structure and a system of personal and professional networks. These included skilled activists who had participated in earlier mass protest movements in 1978, the 1980's, and 2001. The missing ingredient was perception of opportunity. It was hard for many people to perceive any opportunity to challenge the status quo, because their experience had shown them that they had little power. Many people wanted change, but for objective and subjective reasons they felt they had no means to achieve it.

Some activists and certain politicians perceived an opportunity. They felt empowered, but in order to recruit people to fight with them, movement leaders and activists had to align their frames and those of the people, so that the people would also see the opportunity to fight for the change they wanted. Without such a change in outlook, no amount of experience or organization could have mobilized tens of thousands. To persuade enough people that they did have an opportunity to cause change, those movement leaders and activists had to influence people's emotional reactions to the 31

circumstances, in addition to influencing their beliefs about the situation and the possibilities.

To bring people into attack mode, RR leaders appealed in their framing work to people's emotions, beliefs, and values. They understood and addressed what people believed and what they felt. To fight against resignation, leaders evoked indignation and focused people's attention on the injustices they had suffered. To combat the apathy, they made emotional appeals to people's duty as citizens, and to personal and national dignity.

Activists also amplified people's democratic values. Finally, activists worked to transform the widespread inefficacy beliefs by inspiring people to hope.

Thanks to this framing work and its emotional component, activists were able to amplify beliefs that supported participation and transform beliefs that did not. Through their actions and words, RR leaders tapped into people's hopes and their desire for change. They generated contagious emotional energy (mukhti), which continued to spread among the people and within society. When people felt this emotional energy and saw what was happening on the streets, it gave them more hope that change was possible. It gave people the impulse to become active, and some began to believe that they had more power than they had previously thought.

The people most likely to protest were those 1) whose feeling of dignity had been offended, 2) who felt it was their duty to protest, and 3) who either had or acquired a feeling of empowerment. These things helped overcome the resignation and apathy, to mobilize a critical mass of people. 32

Methods

The focus of my inquiry was popular participation in the RR. This included both joining social movements and simply participating in protests and demonstrations.

'Participation' meant joining a movement or going to a protest and standing there with others before the 23rd, before the outcome was known. I wanted an explanation for why a relatively large number of people became active and demonstrated for three weeks in poor weather conditions, given the country's history and apathetic political culture.

Initial research consisted of gathering background information from first-hand accounts of the event, surveys, analyses, and media coverage. I conducted some preliminary email interviews with Georgians who did and did not become active. Further research and 98 interviews with a total of 118 people were conducted from mid-

September to mid-December 2006, in Tbilisi, Batumi, Ozurgeti, and Kutaisi, and with people from Rustavi (although in Tbilisi). 106 Fourteen of these were follow-up interviews done in Tbilisi. In Tbilisi, interviews took place in various parts of town. An additional seven interviews were conducted for me by an acquaintance who was interested in my research. He volunteered to speak with people in his home town of Chiatura, in western

Georgia, and then he emailed me the responses. He did not know that I was interested in the role emotion played in the revolution.

I explained to each respondent that this was for my dissertation, and that I was speaking with many different kinds of people who had had different attitudes toward the

106 The numerical interview names used in this work refer to the digital audio files for particular interviews. A range (e.g., 91-103) indicates that recording was stopped for phone calls or other interruptions. Therefore, the numerical names of the interviews do not reflect the total number of interviews conducted. See the appendix for information about interview questions. 33

RR in 2003. I told them I was interested in the protests and protest mobilization, but did not tell anyone that I was studying emotion. I never asked people about their emotions in

2003, preferring to have them speak about their motivations without any leading questions. However, I did pursue the subject of emotion if a respondent raised it. The discussions and interviews were semi-structured, to allow flexibility but ensure some degree of comparability. The schedule of questions evolved as I talked with people, and when something new and significant arose, I was sure to cover it with previous respondents during the follow-up interviews. I asked for permission to record the interviews, and was allowed to in almost every case. I also made it clear that everything would be confidential. Several respondents did not care about confidentiality, but some were concerned. Given the brutal education-system reforms underway at the time, several academics refused to meet with me out of fear for their jobs. One who met with me did not want to be recorded. Some non-academic people also seemed nervous about interviewing.

Interviews were sometimes with groups (especially students), but usually in-depth one-on-one conversations. Interviews typically lasted about one hour, but some were much longer. As I had previously lived in Georgia and studied the country and its language, I was able to conduct the interviews in Georgian, Russian, or English. This enlarged the pool of possible respondents and meant that I was not limited to the English­ speaking elite. About a third of the interviews were conducted in Georgian, a third in

Russian, and the rest in English with proficient speakers. This proportion was not intentional, and I never used language skills as a selection criterion. I made it clear that respondents should speak the language they felt most comfortable with. 34

I found respondents by various means, beginning by interviewing some of my friends and acquaintances from my previous trips to Georgia, as well as their friends, relatives, and coworkers. I also interviewed contacts made this time, which included members of political parties-Traditionalists, Conservatives, Republicans, New Rights, and the

National Movement-and NGOs: the Liberty Institute, the Legal Education Association

(ALPE), the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), the Open Society Georgia

Foundation (OSGF), the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

(GFSIS), and others. I also spoke with members of Parliament, ministers and ministry employees, and activists: a member ofRevCom (Revolutionary Committee), two members of ArtCom (Artists' Committee), and members of the youth movement Kmara.

I employed the snowball method, asking each person I knew or spoke with if they could recommend others who might be interested.

I also relied on random sampling to avoid obtaining a biased picture. I talked with people from different social circles, including strangers in the parks and at various universities during dry weather, and with people at work in their shops if business was slow. In the three years that had passed since the RR, there had been time for 'standard stories' to develop. I was less likely to hear the same stories if I found respondents through these different avenues. 107

Finally, I employed purposive, theoretical sampling, seeking people within certain categories: students and people in their 20's, 30's, 40's, 50's, and 60's. Within each age group I spoke with people who had protested and those who had not, in roughly equal

107 Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002). 35 numbers. I did not begin with a goal of a particular number of interviews, not knowing how much interest I would encounter as I began fieldwork. However, since my research design involved comparing protestors with non-protestors, I wanted to meet with a good number of people in each category. Furthermore, I wanted to speak with people in each of these categories in different age groups and different parts of the country.

My goal was not simply to obtain answers to a series of questions and maximize the number of interviews, but to have people talk for a while about the revolution. I was able to conduct so many interviews because I had a very free schedule that allowed me to spend time almost every day talking with people. Well before the end of my stay, the data had reached the saturation stage. I was hearing the same responses repeatedly. However, because of the small number of respondents, my results are not representative of the national population.

How can I be sure that during fieldwork I was 'measuring' what I claim to be? The object of study was people's motivations for protesting or not protesting. Respondents spoke of these, often without being asked. The goal of this study was not to explain why the RR happened, nor was I interested in respondents' recollection of specific events and dates; other sources provide such information. Instead, I was looking for information about their subjective experiences-their perceptions and interpretations of events, their expectations, and their motivations for the actions they took, as they remembered them.

This required an inductive, qualitative approach. Although I anticipated hearing people speak about emotion, I did not expect exactly what I found: before and during fieldwork,

I was thinking about the connection between hope, anger, and protest behavior, as this 36 question has been raised in the literature. Ios While there were references to hope and anger, I noticed that more protestors spoke of the defense of dignity and feelings of duty.

Therefore, these seemed more relevant to the Georgian context.

A key question is whether respondents remembered 'correctly.' First of all, even people inclined to be completely honest might not have remembered accurately, because three years had passed. Second, there had been time for social construction processes to mold people's recollections of the RR. This is inevitable as people work to make sense of events and fit them into their culture. As Alessandro Portelli reminds us, memory is not

09 an archive or freezer, but a processor. I Next, social psychological experiments have suggested that, once people change their position on an issue, it is hard for them to remember if they ever thought differently-what Anthony Greenwald refers to as the

"rapid aging of new opinions." I I °For this reason, Greenwald calls the human ego an unethical and biased personal historian that rewrites our history. He notes that people also tend toward selective recall and overconfidence in the accuracy of their recall. Therefore, if respondents' attitudes toward the RR had changed since 2003, they might not have been aware of this in 2006.

While Gregory Markus found similar results in his work, he also discovered that some types of people can be aware of their own attitude change and can remember prior attitudes reliably. In his study, individuals were asked their attitudes on certain social and

108 Aminzade and McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics," 30-31. See also Jean-Pierre Reed, "Emotions in Context: Revolutionary Accelerators, Hope, Moral Outrage, and Other Emotions in the Making of Nicaragua's Revolution," Theory and Society 33 (2004). 109 Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1997), 44. 110 Anthony G. Greenwald, "The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History," American Psychologist 35, no. 7 (July 1980): 607. 37

political issues in 1965, 1973, and 1982. Only in a third of cases were respondents able to

recall accurately in 1982 what their attitudes had been in 1973. 111 Per Markus, this stems

from the fact that most of those policy issues were not integral parts of the respondents'

self-schemata and did not have strong cognitive anchors. Therefore, when trying to recall what they had thought before, respondents employed short cuts, such as "inferring one's

own attitude evolution from knowledge about population trends."112 In contrast, those who had more ideological self-schemata were able to recall any changes in their attitudes:

"For those persons whose policy preferences are integral to their views of themselves,

cues about prior policy attitudes will be cognitively available and recall of such attitudes will be reliable." This group included former political protestors, who were "more likely than nonprotesters to recall their past political attitudes reliably."113 Therefore, if the factors that decided Georgians' protest behavior were connected with beliefs about self,

such as personal efficacy/inefficacy and dignity, then their reports on their 2003 attitudes

should be more reliable.

Another potential problem is that much of their subjective experience from 2003 might have remained outside conscious memory. During those three weeks in 2003, people were processing a great deal of sensory, cognitive, and emotional input; during our interviews only part of that was remembered or expressed. For this reason, Becker and Geer advise that observation is a better method than interviewing. It is true that, sometimes, respondents simply do not want to reveal information. Yet it is worse when the interviewer doesn't think to ask, and the respondent doesn't think to tell because it

111 Gregory B. Markus, "Stability and Change in Political Attitudes: Observed, Recalled, and 'Explained,' "Political Behavior 8, no. 1 (1986): 29. 112 Ibid., 41. 113 Ibid. 38 remains 'under the radar.' 114 Observation was not possible in my case, as the event had occurred in the past. Furthermore, my object of study (motivation) is not directly observable. In my defense, the fact that many who had protested chose to speak of emotional motivations-without being asked to-supports my claim that those were indeed salient in 2003. Had I asked them to speak about their emotions during November

2003, I might have obtained information even more supportive of my thesis.

It is also possible that some respondents adjusted their answers paint a more dramatic or self-flattering picture. While this might have happened during my interviews, respondents did volunteer unflattering information about themselves and admitted to having been wrong about the protest outcome. Respondents who had not protested did not seem apologetic or ashamed, but some of them spoke ofregret for not having been able to protest. It is possible that people lied about having protested, yet I didn't have trouble finding people who said they had not. Some who were relatively pleased with the improvements since 2003 said they hadn't protested, and those who were subsequently disappointed in Saakashvili admitted they had supported him in 2003. With some exceptions (members of the National Movement and New Rights Party, and Liberty

Institute and Kmara activists), people didn't seem concerned with proving they'd been right about what would happen or right in choosing to protest or stay at home. Finally, the patterns of responses among protestors and non-protestors support the overall findings. If there were some dishonest answers, it is not likely that everyone was lying-with the same story-since respondents came from different classes, neighborhoods, and cities.

114 Howard S. Becker and Blanche Geer, "Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison," in Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader, ed. George McCall and J. L. Simmons (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 326. 39

How well, then, do my data correspond to the 'reality' of the RR? For

methodological triangulation I gather information from news and primary and secondary

sources: in addition to Western news sources available through Lexis Nexis and World

News Connection, I rely on the Georgian newspapers 24 saati (24 Hours) and rezonansi

(Resonance) and information from the RFE/RL Georgian website. The things respondents described-events, speeches, actions of activists and the government, the mood--correspond to what the press was reporting at the time. Nevertheless, in doing my research, I did not expect my respondents to provide me with an undistorted mirror of that reality. 115 The interviews themselves are acts of construction, as Elizabeth Wood notes in her work. 116 The strength of my data lie in the patterns they show, with respondents offering relevant information I did not ask for. My argument is supported by member checks with respondents and others who were in Georgia at the time of the RR.

115 Jody Miller and Barry Glassner, "The 'Inside' and the 'Outside': Finding Realities in Interviews," in Qualitative Research: Theory, Method, and Practice, ed. David Silverman (London: Sage Publications, 2004). 116 Elizabeth J. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 49. CHAPTER3

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMAND: GEORGIA UP TO 2001

In order to help the reader imagine a Georgian's mindset during November 2003, I will provide some relevant history in this chapter. What is now Georgia has existed as separate or unified kingdoms since approximately the 4th century B.C. 117 The people have survived repeated invasions and occupations over the centuries, without losing their religious, cultural, or linguistic identity. Georgians are still intensely proud of this fact, and the collective memory keeps the past close at hand. One activist in Tbilisi expressed this particularly well:

Georgia is about 2000 years old. This town is about 1500 years old. At some stages, thinking, rule, and different warriors here were the most powerful in the world. We're surrounded by 3 whales-Iran, Turkey, and Russia, and also Arabs and Mongols who passed through. Despite this, we're still a country. We have a historical memory of 2000 years. I know for a fact that my ancestors lived here and did such and such, and I also live here 2000 years later and do the same. I know this, and I feel it. Everyone does. We have 3 pillars: memory, religion, and language. This gives. strengt h . 118

Through a treaty intended to protect the weakened kingdom from further invasions,

Georgia became part of the Russian empire in 1801. Georgians later reclaimed their independence in 1918, after the Bolshevik Revolution threw Russia into turmoil. They enjoyed this independence for a few short years, until the Red Army invaded in 1921 and

117 Charles van der Leeuw, Storm over the Caucasus: In the Wake ofIndependence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 128-29. 118 Confidential interview with RevCom member, by author, December 2, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 17 4-177). 40 41 incorporated the new republic into the nascent Soviet Union. The Soviet period is seen as a continuation of the Russian Empire, hence the frequent references to 200 years of

Russian rule. After establishing their control, the Bolsheviks set about repressing every form of civil society, including the Orthodox Church, Louise Shelley writes. The only organizations allowed to exist were those controlled by the Communist Party, even those for children, and "every aspect of personal expression and collective activity was subject to Party regulation."119 This control was aimed at preserving the new state and the power of its rulers, and protecting the revolution from internal enemies.

In addition to this social atomization, the Soviet population was subjected to terror, which was necessitated by the government's weak legitimacy: "In the Soviet anthem it is written 'the one who was nobody will become everything.' Bolshevism was the rule of marginal people. It soon became clear that they had no moral authority, so the only way the USSR could be preserved was through terror, torture, and threat."120 The terror was at its peak during the Stalinist era (1924-1953), which was at least as hard on Georgia as any other part of the USSR; the fact that Stalin was Georgian did not spare his compatriots. Several respondents spoke about how relatives and friends had been killed or exiled during Stalin's rule:

Our generation is a product of the USSR, and we were always afraid. I was always afraid personally, because they arrested my father. He was sent away, where he died. They arrested my cousin in 193 7. I remember when another cousin came and visited. We were talking, and he said 'quieter, quieter, they even listen through the walls.' He was so afraid, but they arrested him too, around 1944 or 1945. It was later, so I remember that. It's hard to forget. I personally knew some young people who were

119 Louise Shelley, "Civil Society Mobilized against Corruption: Russia and Ukraine," in Civil Society and Corruption: Mobilizing for Reform, ed. Michael Johnston (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), 5. 12°Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, December 4, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 179-181 ). 42

arrested in 1946. They made student newspapers advocating Georgian independence, and they were all arrested and sent to Siberia. Whoever was still alive came back after Stalin died, but I only remember them from photographs. In 1952, people who had relatives living abroad were sent from Tbilisi. A friend of mine had a relative living in Paris, part of the royal family. He was against the USSR and had left in 1922. My friend was exiled from Tbilisi, even though she was a Komsomol [member of the Communist Youth League] and studied well. It was because of her uncle, whom she didn't even know. 121

The Thaw

After Stalin's death in 1953 came a sort of sociopolitical renewal, per Vakhtang

Guruli et al. 122 For this reason, the period after his death was called a warming, or thaw.

The interior ministry and security services purged such Stalin confederates as Lavrenti

Beria, and former leaders were tried and found guilty of the arrest, torture, and execution of innocent people. In 1954, the new government began the sometimes posthumous rehabilitation of some who had been unlawfully repressed or exiled. 123 According to

Soviet dissident and emigre Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Khrushchev created 90 commissions to oversee this process, which freed 10,000 political prisoners between 1953 and 1956. 124

The de-Stalinization continued at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, in

February 1956. At that closed meeting, Khrushchev made a now famous Secret Speech criticizing the dictator's excesses. He denounced the cult of personality that had formed around Stalin and noted how this had weakened the government. 125 Although the speech

121 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (144). 122 Vakhtang Guruli et al., eds. Sakartvelos istoria: XX saukune [Georgia's history: XX century] (Tbilisi: Tbilisi University Press/Artanuji, 2003), 180. Translated by author. 123 Ibid. 124 Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming ofAge in the Post-Stalin Era (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1990), 70-71. 125 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 181. 43 was not published, it was read all over the USSR at Party meetings. The contents of the speech then made their way down through the Komsomol and trade unions, and then into the press, Alexeyeva explains. People at all levels of society began to discuss the Stalin era: "The Congress put an end to our lonely questioning of the Soviet system. Young men and women began to lose their fear of sharing views, knowledge, beliefs, questions ....

That was the time of our awakening." 126 Acceptable criticism was limited to the subject of Stalin's crimes, "but even such a limited enlarging of the boundaries of what was permitted, along with a refusal by the authorities to engage in mass terror, turned out to be sufficient for irreversible changes in the minds of people and in public life." 127 The thaw seemed to bring an opening of the political space, and "the process of democratization that had begun aided the growth of social activism, and the people believed in their own power."128

March 9, 1956

Soon, criticism of Stalin's personality cult began to take on an anti-Georgian tone.

This was offensive to many Georgians-not necessarily because they loved Stalin, but because they associated Stalin with love of their country. 129 Thanks to the more relaxed atmosphere, some Georgians decided to express their displeasure over the criticism. On the third anniversary of Stalin's death, March 3, 1956, students in Tbilisi began a series of protests. Within a few days, thousands of Georgians were holding around-the-clock

126 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, Thaw Generation, 4. 127 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 7. 128 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 181. 129 Ibid.; Confidential interview by author, October 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording. (25- 26). 44

demonstrations in other cities, as well. In addition to Khrushchev's resignation, protesters

demanded a stop to the criticism of Stalin and the insults to the Georgian people. Fearing

that the nationalistic sentiment would spread to other republics, Khrushchev sent an army

division with tanks to the Tbilisi protest. These soldiers attacked the protesters during the

130 night on March 9th, killing at least 150 and injuring an unknown number. This

response, along with the brutal repression of Hungarian protesters in November of that

year, made it clear that Moscow would still tolerate no open challenge. The government

was so much more powerful than the people, that the next mass demonstration would not happen for another twenty-two years. 131

The political opportunity structure had closed again. Collective action was obviously very risky, but the national movement for independence continued its work underground.

In Georgia, they met after 1956 in very small, secret groups, spreading ideas about

independence and trying to rally the people. One of these illegal groups was the

Gorgasliani, formed by the teenagers Merab Kostava and Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Their message in response to the March 9th massacre was that "our people face the question of to be or not to be, and it is time that we united under one flag to fight against our motherland's occupier. ... There is no one else to save us, but ourselves. We must fight to achieve independence!"132 Alexeyeva explains that the strengthening of such groups and the process of social awakening proceeded slowly. First of all, the people were in a state of shock after the years of Stalinist terror. Second, any defiance had to be kept secret, both for fear of being caught and because there was no way to make the defiance public:

130 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 182. 131 Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 106. 132 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 183. 45 the government maintained a total monopoly on information and ideas. 133 Eventually, she writes, all of the known groups were exposed and punished within two years of their creation. 134

Soviet Life

For the overwhelming majority of the population, the non-dissidents, life was less dangerous. Wth time, the government's use of terror gave way to other techniques, such as buying people's acquiescence with extra privileges or access to resources. Professional advancement beyond a certain level required Party membership, and this system of carrots was an easier means of influencing people's behavior. As before, Soviet citizens had to be careful about what they said to whom, but the majority of people lived in peace if they were not overtly disloyal to the system.

The environment of control and repression shaped the mentality of the people in several ways. First, it prevented them from expressing themselves freely: "We had a terrible dictatorial regime with double and triple standards, saying one thing and thinking another. Shouting pro-government things on the street and at night whispering to your wife 'how can we survive in this disaster? They will catch us.' " 135 It contributed to what some respondents called a closed-off consciousness and slave-like mentality: "For 200 years the Georgian people were subject to the Russian empire and never expressed what they had in their hearts, but did what they were required to do. A person remembered that

133 Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 3. 134 Ibid., 11. 135 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, December 4, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (I 79-181 ). 46 he couldn't say what he thought. He was a zombie."136 Second, there was a disconnect and between the people and their government. The general view was that the government was alien, imposed as it was from outside: "People didn't identify with the government.

They thought 'it isn't ours, not for our brothers, sons, grandchildren.' " 137 Millar and

Wolchik address this in their 1994 study of the Communist legacy. Under Communism, citizens had extremely limited access to the political process, and very little voice:

The lack of any meaningful way to participate in the political process and reliance on the part of most communist leaders on material rewards or coercion to keep the population in line also led to high levels of alienation from politics and to the adoption of the view that politics was not really the business of ordinary or honest people. The alienation and disgust with the corruption, privilege, and lack of rationality that came to characterize these political systems led many citizens to retreat to the private sphere. 138

An antagonistic relationship developed between the people and the authorities. By

Brezhnev's time, people joke, there was the understanding that 'we pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us.' I was told that "Brezhnev himself didn't believe the people could live on their salaries. No one did. So people had to steal." 139 It was normal and acceptable to have an illegal income and cheat the state. 140 There was something almost honorable about this behavior, as it was a way of defying or sabotaging the enemy. Finally, people became dependent on the state to meet all of their needs. If there was a problem, the government would come and fix it: "In the Communist period entire generations grew up,

136 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 137 Confidential interview with ArtCom member, by author, December 1, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 171-172). 138 James R. Millar and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds. The Social Legacy ofCommunism (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1994), 2-3. 139 Confidential interview with former National Movement member, by author, October 24, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (59-60). 14° Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (163-164). 47 and they were accustomed to the government doing everything for them. The people only had to sit down and eat, and the government wanted it that way."141

The Detente during Brezhnev's rule encouraged the development of a small, underground civil society, Shelley notes. Political dissidents and human rights activists, writers and artists, and others began to form groups, and the number of protest actions increased beginning from the 1960' s. 142 The first non-Communist organizations allowed in the USSR-Helsinki Groups-were formed in the 1970's. This was possible because

Brezhnev signed the 1975 Helsinki Agreement, which called for protection of the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and also for national self-determination.

People in authoritarian systems might not have electoral access to power, as Tarrow points out, but they can take advantage of informal opportunities such as this. 143 Yuri

Orlov, who helped found the Moscow Helsinki Group, understood that Brezhnev's decision offered a means of "forcing the authorities into a dialogue with society." 144 The fact that Brezhnev had signed the Agreement meant that Soviet dissidents could involve other countries in monitoring the Soviet performance on human rights: "We would gather information on Soviet performance under the humanitarian articles of the Helsinki Final

Act and send our reports to the nations that had signed the document. ... Brezhnev would get a report too." 145 This development of ties with foreign allies gave dissidents more informal access, and perceived changes in US politics and foreign policy gave them even more courage and hope:

141 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, December 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (190). 142 Shelley, "Civil Society Mobilized against Corruption," 6. 143 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 86. 144 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, Thaw Generation, 279-281. 145 Ibid. 48

The US Congress had formed a commission to perform virtually the same tasks as our group. By December, news stories that originated with the group began to move from page 19 to page 1 of US newspapers. Meanwhile, the American political climate had undergone profound changes. President-elect Jimmy Carter was vowing to bring decency to US foreign policy. Our most optimistic projections now seemed within reach: it appeared likely that the new US foreign policy would include insistence that the Soviets live up to the promises made in Helsinki. The alliance of Western politicians and Soviet dissidents was starting to merge. 146

Helsinki Groups formed in other republics, as well. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Merab

Kostava, and others formed the Georgian Helsinki Watch Group in 1976. Per Guruli et al., this group called for an end to the Soviet annexation, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and acknowledgment of Georgian independence. 147 Despite its small size, the Georgian

Helsinki Group had a significant impact on the views of the students, youth, and intelligentsia. 148 Nodar Natadze, another leader in Georgia's dissident movement, gives

Gamsakhurdia and his group much of the credit for preparing the younger generation to rise up again in 1978. Thanks to the group's mobilizing work, this new generation was moved by "freedom, national dignity, and a yearning for hope" to stand up to the authorities for the first time since 1956. 149

What sparked the mass protest was a proposed change in the Georgian constitution, which would have removed a clause making Georgian the official language of the republic. 150 The Georgian republican government was scheduled to decide on the issue

April 14, 1978. In the days leading up to this, students worked to organize a

146 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, Thaw Generation, 288-289. 147 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 211. 148 Ibid., 212. 149 Nodar Natadze, Rats vitsi: Paktebi da analizi [What I know: Facts and analysis] (Tbilisi: Pirveli Stamba, 2002), 34-35. Translated by author. 15°Kevin Klose, "Soviets Retreat on Language after Protests; Soviets Back Down on Georgian Language," Washington Post, April 18, 1978, Final Edition First Section, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 49

demonstration, with the goal of persuading the government to leave that part of the

constitution unchanged. KGB agents and parents alike tried to dissuade student

orgamzers:

I was in the student movement in 1978. I thought it would be bad for my kids to have to learn Russian instead of Georgian. That was my motive. It was around April 14th, and someone in the KGB informed my father that I was a figure in the movement. So my father came and got me and simply did one thing. He put me in his car and took me along the central streets, where we were going to protest the following day. It was Rustaveli Ave. Then we went down by the river, and then up to the top of Mtatsminda [hill overlooking part of downtown Tbilisi]. The area was full of tanks. They were getting ready, and he wanted me to see that. He said 'look, it could happen.' He had witnessed what happened in 1956, and said no one would have any excuse. 151

Republic leader Eduard Shevardnadze reminded everyone of what had happened in

1956 and implored the students to stay home. 152 Despite the warnings and the presence of tanks and soldiers, thousands of people did come to protect the status of the Georgian language. The collective action achieved its goal, and there was no violence or repression. No one but a camera man was punished. 153 The solidarity of the various

Helsinki Groups and their foreign allies probably encouraged people that they could protest more openly. The fact that the groups shared information on rights violations with other countries made it harder for the Soviet government to employ open repression against them. 154

Unfortunately, this opening in the political space did not last. After Helsinki groups formed in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia, the central government began to feel threatened: "The authorities were so alarmed by this commonality of

151 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, December 5, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 182-183). 152 Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 111. 153 Ibid., 112. 154 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 211. 50

interests, which sprang up quickly and rapidly grew stronger, that even the loss of Soviet

credibility in the West did not stop the regime from crushing Helsinki groups and other

unifying centers." 155 During the 1980's, instances of protest were met with frequent

detentions and arrests. Often, many of those arrested were released, but some were

sentenced to labor camps. 156 Some activists, like Gamsakhurdia, were exiled. Others were medicated into submission in psychiatric hospitals.

One notorious instance ofrepression occurred in Georgia in 1983, after a failed hijacking attempt. A group of Georgians tried to redirect to Turkey a plane headed for

Batumi and then Leningrad. The pilot tricked the hijackers and turned the plane back to

Tbilisi. After it landed, special Soviet troops stormed the plane, which resulted in the deaths of several people on board. The next year, four of the hijackers-including a priest-were sentenced to death, and a fifth to 14 years in prison, all with no chance for appeal. An airport worker who unwittingly helped them smuggle their weapons aboard was given a 5-year suspended sentence. Some of the defendants reportedly refused a deal in which they would have confessed that the hijacking attempt was drug-related. The defendants announced during their trial that the attempt had been a political statement and an attempt to leave the USSR. 157 Because of the youth of the hijackers, some

Georgians called upon the government to be more lenient, to no avail.

From 1985, the political opportunity structure began to open once again. When

Gorbachev came to power that year, it was clear to him and others that the USSR

155 Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, 17. 156 Ibid., 119-120. 157 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 214; Dana Priest, "Soviet Court Sentences 4 to Death in Hijacking," Washington Post, August 16, 1984, Final Edition, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 51 required some fundamental change if it was to survive. Gorbachev's goals were to preserve the Communist system by reforming it, through perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost' (openness). The intent was to make the system more democratic and dynamic, with the understanding that problems would have to be openly acknowledged in order to be resolved. Thanks to this opening, established groups that had been repressed, imprisoned, or exiled were now able to reemerge. 158 With time, protest became less risky and more open, especially among the youth. As Gorbachev's doomed attempts at reform exhausted the country politically and economically, the people's discontent increased and the national movements for independence grew stronger. 159

These nationalist movements created problems for Moscow and other parts of the

USSR. Within Georgia and other constituent Soviet republics, national minorities had been given varying degrees of autonomy. In Georgia, there were the Autonomous

Republic of Abkhazia and the Autonomous Regions of South Ossetia and Ajara. Between

Ajara and the rest of Georgia, there were no perceived ethnic or linguistic differences, but the Ossetians and Abkhaz had their own separate identities. Even today, Georgians refer to these two regions as 'slow-acting mines' that were designed by early Soviet leaders to explode many years later. As the USSR approached its end, this is exactly what happened, and not only in Georgia. Whereas most Georgians saw the weakening of the central government in Moscow as an opportunity to fight for independence, the South

Ossetian and Abkhaz regions preferred Moscow's rule to that of Tbilisi. As part of an

158 Shelley, "Civil Society Mobilized against Corruption," 7. 159 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 214. 52 independent Georgia, the two groups could lose the privileged status they enjoyed within the Soviet system.

In South Ossetia, local residents formed their own dissident movement in opposition to Tbilisi, and they appealed to Moscow to change their status to that of autonomous republic. Among their longer-term goals was to be unified with the North Ossetian

Republic located on the other side of the Caucasus Mountains, within the Russian

Federation. The Georgian leadership refused to allow this, and Georgians living in South

Ossetia protested against the plans. Similar processes were underway in Abkhazia. In

March 1989, 30,000 regional leaders and inhabitants met and decided that their autonomous republic should be made a (Soviet) union republic independent of

Georgia. 160 People across Georgia demonstrated in protest. The Ilia Chavchavadze

Society began a permanent protest, at which supporters demanded that Abkhazia's autonomous status be revoked altogether. Other political groups joined the rally and raised the stakes by calling for Georgian national independence. 161

April 9, 1989

By the late 1980's, the future of the USSR itself was in question, and such open revolt posed too great a threat to the center. The Communist authorities therefore decided that harsh measures were needed to address the unrest, and on April 8th sent tanks and helicopters to intimidate the protestors gathered in Tbilisi. This had the unintended effect

160 Alexei Zverev, "Ethnic Conflict in the Caucasus 1988-1994," in Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. Bruno Coppieters (Brussels: VUB University, 1996), 40. 161 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 219. 53

162 of bringing out even more people. On the morning of April 9th, Soviet troops attacked the peaceful demonstrators on Rustaveli A venue, using poison gas and sharpened shovels. Depending on the account, nineteen to twenty-one people were killed, including

16 women. Up to hundreds more were injured. 163 In subsequent days, people continued to show their defiance by having sit-ins and small street demonstrations, distributing leaflets, staging strikes, and picketing. 164 Georgian historian Merab Vachnadze writes

1 that students came to Tbilisi State University on the morning of the 10 h to continue the protest, despite the presence of soldiers armed with machine guns. These young people were infuriated with what had happened the day before and were ready to give their lives for national freedom. 165

In contrast to 1956, this massacre did not end the protest movement. As Opp and

Roehl attest, repression can actually promote protest under certain conditions: if the repression is very harsh and visible and perceived as unjustified, and if people are involved in networks that offer positive incentives to protest, then repression can have

166 1 such an unintended effect. This helps explain the impact of April 9 \ 1989. In 1956 the people felt far too weak and alone to stand up to the government, but the networks devoted to national consciousness and independence were much stronger and larger by

1989. Members of these movements and networks encouraged each other to fight for

162 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 219. 163 Ann Imse, "Soldiers Charge Protesters in Soviet Georgia; 16 Killed," Associated Press, April 9, 1989, International News AM cycle. LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 164 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 43-44. 165 Merab Vachnadze, "Mghelvare otkhmotsdatskhra: Istorikosis chanatserebl'' [Turbulent 89: An historian's notes] (Tbilisi: [Tbilisi State University?], 2002), 7-8. Translated by author. 166 Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, "Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest," in Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Co., 1997), 202. 54

Georgia, and parents who attended rallies later shared "the ideas and emotions of

independence" with their children at home. 167 Furthermore, the repression was shocking

in its brutality. It was seen as so unjust and cruel that it emboldened the movement instead of weakening it. The massacre destroyed any legitimacy the USSR still had, while it strengthened the Georgians' desire for independence. It further radicalized the

Georgian political opposition and made any calls for moderation or compromise with

Moscow extremely unpopular-political suicide for ambitious opposition leaders. 168 The massacre was another nail in the Soviet coffin: "April 9, 1989 was the bloodiest act on the part of the USSR. After that, it was too late to ever talk about 'friendship of the peoples' again. This is considered the beginning of the end." 169

Independence

Moscow's control soon began to wane. Beginning from the summer of 1989, leaders in Moscow were increasingly distracted by strikes, riots, and massive demonstrations in

Russia itself. As the Soviet authorities became increasingly divided over the nature and pace of reform-and the fate of the USSR itself-the union republics took more power for themselves. 170 Gorbachev also devolved some power intentionally. He made a point of giving the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe their autonomy. Leaders of those countries were free to reform or not, without any interference or support from

167 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, September 27, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (19). 168 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 44. 169 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (25-26). 170 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 2°d ed. (London: Routledge, 1996), 8-9. 55

Moscow. 171 This is sometimes referred to as the 'Sinatra Doctrine,' because those countries were allowed to go their own way. Gorbachev held a referendum in March

1991, asking the Soviet people whether they wanted to preserve the USSR. The Georgian leadership boycotted the Soviet referendum but conducted their own the same month.

That one showed that 98% supported independence, which was officially declared the following month, on April 9th. 172 Moscow did nothing in response. August 1991 saw an attempted coup against Gorbachev, and by the end of the year the Soviet experiment was over. Gorbachev announced on December 25, 1991 that the USSR no longer existed.

In the Georgian referendum, the newly independent republic had also chosen for itself a president. Long-time dissident figure Zviad Gamsakhurdia won 87% of the vote. 173 As the results indicate, Gamsakhurdia was highly popular, and many saw him as the one capable of restoring Georgian statehood. As one respondent said, "during

Gamsakhurdia's time people were happy about independence. We didn't care if we had to eat grass, just to be independent from Russia. He was a purely Georgian person, who didn't want to be with the USSR or the USA. He had different ideas."174

Gamsakhurdia soon began to lose his popularity, however. The president's dictatorial and capricious behavior alienated some of his previous allies, which no doubt contributed to his growing sense of paranoia. 175 One of his 'different ideas' was a purely ethnic definition of Georgian-ness, which some found alarming: "He went against social norms

171 Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation ofEastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California, 1997), 54-56. 172 Edgar O'Ballance, Wars in the Caucasus, 1990-1995 (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 98. 173 Ibid. 174 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, October 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (71-72). 175 O'Ballance, Wars in the Caucasus, 104. 56 and wasn't a reasonable person anymore, but not crazy. It was scary. I remember seeing in papers around that time 'let any woman pregnant with a non-Georgian child be cursed.' This was a state newspaper, and that was already too much."176

Gamsakhurdia was a gifted and charismatic leader who-some say-should never have become president: "I wanted to trust Gamsakhurdia-who was a good friend of mine. He was wonderful, but he was not a politician."177 He tried to govern the country using the same methods he had employed as a protest leader, and he wasn't able to take the next steps once in office. 178 In other words, Jonathan Wheatley observes, what made

Gamsakhurdia a successful opposition leader-populist rhetoric and a radical, uncompromising position--conflicted with the qualities needed in a president: the ability to unite, compromise, and negotiate. In all fairness to Gamsakhurdia, Wheatley points out that any other Georgian leader elected president at that time would have found himself with the same problem, given the political context. 179 As it happened, Gamsakhurdia's character flaws exacerbated his political problems, leading him to make serious policy mistakes. For example, the president's refusal to compromise worsened the standoff between Tbilisi and South Ossetia. 180 This degenerated into a separatist war and added to the number of IDPs already coming from Abkhazia.

Gamsakhurdia's time as president was to be very brief: in less than a year it would end in civil war. For several months beginning in August, groups for and against

176 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, October 16, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (29-31 ). 177 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 14 7). 178 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (163-164). 179 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 60-61. 180 Ibid., 54. 57

Gamsakhurdia held demonstrations downtown. The opposition and their supporters denounced the president and his policies and demanded his resignation. Protests became violent and were followed by rioting and armed clashes, which were facilitated by the growing black market in Soviet weapons. 181 The president also had to contend with warlords and paramilitary leaders who had gained power and followings. One of the main groups was Jaba Ioseliani's Mkhedrioni, a collective of armed bandits who sometimes supported the official government. There was also the National Guard, which

Gamsakhurdia had founded in collaboration with Parliament. When the president made an unpopular decision concerning the Guard, their leader Tengiz Kitovani left Tbilisi and took most of the soldiers with him.

In December 1991, Gamsakhurdia and what remained of his government came under siege. For weeks, both Kitovani's National Guard and Ioseliani's Mkhedrioni bombarded the government building where the president was hiding, unable to drive him out. During the first week of January, Gamsakhurdia was allowed to escape and leave Tbilisi, in order to avoid further conflict. 182 Kitovani, Ioseliani, and Tengiz Sigua formed a Military

Council, announced they would be the temporary government, and declared a state of emergency. Gamsakhurdia left for Chechnya. He later returned to Georgia in an attempt to regain his power, but in December 1993 was killed or committed suicide.

181 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 56. 182 O'Ballance, Wars in the Caucasus, 109. 58

Shevardnadze's Return

At the invitation of the Military Council of Kitovani, Ioseliani, and Sigua,

Shevardnadze returned to Georgia from Moscow in March 1992. Shevardnadze had been

the leader of the republic, as the Georgian Communist Party's first secretary, from 1972 to 1985. He then left for Moscow to become Gorbachev's foreign minister. While in that

position he helped engineer the end of the Cold War, which earned him the respect and

support of the West. Some Georgians had good expectations and remembered

Shevardnadze's return favorably: "He was the people's, the people brought him in.

Ioseliani brought him. When he came in 1992, in March, there were elections later that year, and he really got about 96% of the vote. People stood in line to vote for him, at almost all voter precincts, not like now." This respondent remembered that Shevardnadze had resigned in protest as Soviet foreign minister in 1990: "He seemed more or less honest, since he'd taken a stand against dictatorship in the USSR."183

Others were not as pleased at his return. Although he was Georgian, he was also

Soviet, and people doubted that he could have changed. The older generations could remember what he had done earlier in his career, before serving under Gorbachev. Before becoming the republican leader in 1972, Shevardnadze had served as Georgia's interior minister. While in that role, he had arrested more than 25,000 people, including members of the Party, government ministers, and KGB officials: "This campaign and the purges he initiated as first secretary earned him the undying enmity of many Georgians."184 One

183 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (138-139). 184 Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze (University Park, PA: Penn State University, 1997), 12. 59 respondent talked about Shevardnadze's involvement with police corruption, and about how he had arranged "accidents" for his enemies. She had heard that some people committed suicide because ofhim.185 Another respondent remembered how cruel

Shevardnadze had been in the case of the airplane hijackers in 1983-84. She considered him responsible for their executions. In her opinion, the time Shevardnadze ruled Soviet

Georgia had been the worst time since Stalin, and she expected nothing good from him the second time. 186

Despite the dislike and distrust some Georgians held for Shevardnadze, many placed all their hopes in him in the early 1990's. There is a colorful Georgian phrase to describe the attitude people had toward him: this leader was tsqaltsaghebulis imedi-the hope of one being carried away by water. People had to latch onto something when the storm blew. 187 Georgians could see how weak and endangered their country was, and they were aware that this man was known and respected in the West. "People here were afraid of everything, and they had this hope that Shevardnadze would protect them from Russia, for example. Because he had authority, especially in the West, and his authority would protect us from outright aggression." 188 They thought that he would manage to bring international attention to Georgia's plight and put things back in order. "When

185 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, September 27, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (19). 186 Confidential interview with activist, by author, November 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (13 7). 187 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 5, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 184-185). 188 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (25-26). 60

Shevardnadze came back from Russia, you could say the country was in anarchy, and I don't know of any other person who could have done what he did."189

The situation Shevardnadze inherited was deplorable. There was indeed anarchy- almost no state to speak of. Georgia had declared its independence less than a year before, and there had been insufficient time for state-building. In the Soviet system, the republican capitals and governments had been highly subordinated to the federal government in Moscow. As Sakwa explains, "official jargon represented Moscow as the

'centre' and all the rest of the country as the 'periphery' or the 'localities'. The reality of

Soviet federalism was an extremely centralised political system with little authority vested in the republican capitals."190 Building its own capacity and the necessary institutions would have required some time under the best of circumstances, but the civil wars further delayed the work.

When Shevardnadze returned, there was no state that could have maintained a

"monopoly oflegitimate physical violence," to use Weber's expression. 191 The warlords and their paramilitaries were in charge. While ostensibly leading the country, Ioseliani's

Mkhedrioni, Kitovani's National Guard, and other such groups fought with each other for a share in the contraband weapons trade and control of the black market. 192 There were still two separatist wars being waged-in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The civil war

189 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, December 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (I 90). 190 Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective (London: Routledge, 1998), 118, in the Ebrary, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/americanuniv/Doc?id=l0054858&ppg=l35 (accessed July 8, 2008). 191 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 33. 192 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 72, 80. 61 between the Military Council and the Gamsakhurdia supporters (Zviadists) was still unfinished, although there were no longer any tanks or snipers in Tbilisi.

Ioseliani, Kitovani, Sigua, and Shevardnadze created a State Council of 50 people, led by the Military Council as cabinet, with Shevardnadze at the head. 193 Later in 1992, in national elections Shevardnadze was popularly elected head of state. He moved to create a sort of armed force and to regain control of territories or cities occupied by Zviadists, but for some time the Georgian armed forces were weak, unorganized, and poorly armed. 194 Shevardnadze's work was made still harder by the fact that Ioseliani and

Kitovani had decided to limit him to more symbolic power, while making most of the decisions themselves. They were loath to surrender their considerable economic and political power to anyone. Although he was a member of the leadership, Sigua was less powerful because he had no personal army. 195

Aslan Abashidze, leader of the autonomous region of Ajara, took advantage of

Tbilisi's weakness to consolidate his personal hold on his territory from the early 1990's.

He gradually transferred power from the elected regional government to a body composed of loyal members of his new party, Revival. Abashidze ruled by decree and closed off Ajara from the rest of the country. 196 He in effect created a border, complete with checkpoints. Also, by refusing to remit taxes to Tbilisi, Abashidze deprived the central government ofrevenue from trade through the port ofBatumi. Besides this,

193 O'Ballance, Wars in the Caucasus, 112. 194 Guruli et al., Sakartvelos istoria, 235. 195 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 70. 196 Ibid., 71. 62

Abashidze conducted his own foreign policy independent of Tbilisi and maintained

relationships with the separatist leaders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 197

The matter of the separatist wars is a complex one outside the scope of this study.

Suffice it to say here that Georgian, Russian, and separatist interests proved

irreconcilable, and that the still weak Georgian army was a poor match for the Abkhaz

forces backed by Russian troops and hardware, and by mercenaries from the North

Caucasus. By 1993, Shevardnadze was desperate, and it looked as if Georgia really was going to lose the territory altogether. In addition, the country could not continue under the trade embargo that Moscow had imposed and effectively deal with new Zviadist revolts

at the same time. Therefore, in return for promised Russian help, Shevardnadze brought his country into the Commonwealth oflndependent States, or CIS, in October 1993. This organization is an economic/trade successor to the USSR, so the decision was not a

popular one. The Russian support did help Shevardnadze put an end to the Zviadist uprisings. 198 Unfortunately, Shevardnadze was still unable to bring Abkhazia or South

Ossetia back into the Georgian state. Despite the many ceasefires, high-level talks, and international involvement, the two areas remain de facto independent to this day.

Impact on Society

Georgia and other newly independent republics endured extreme hardship during the early 1990's. First of all, people's standard ofliving took a severe blow. Georgians could no longer enjoy cheap gas, electricity, and heating in their buildings subsidized by

197 Ghia Nodia and Alvaro P. Scholtbach, eds., The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects (Delft, The Netherlands: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2006), 16. 198 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 84. 63

Moscow, because the country was now independent. This meant that people often had to rely on alternative sources of energy. A woman described to me how, in her neighborhood, people had heated water for cooking and bathing on wood fires built in the street. She was proud of the fact that she had managed to graduate from the university despite having had to study by candlelight for years. 199 In similar accounts about the early

l 990's, Armenians have told me that, since their country had so few trees to begin with, they had to use their furniture as firewood. Second, people's physical security was frequently threatened. During these years of conflict and disorder, there was easy access to weapons and no security for the citizens against armed thieves. People were not even safe in their own homes:

There were so many thieves, and thieves-in-law, and bands of armed men wandering around the country. We had a party once, when a neighbor came back from Russia. We had the table set, and then these local men with weapons and masks came in and took our money. We lived in fear of things like this. After 4 pm no one went outside. We sold our car so no one would steal it. People stole everything.200

In some key areas, things did improve by 1995. That year Georgia had a new constitution, as well as presidential and parliamentary elections. Shevardnadze was elected president, and his party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), did very well.

Georgia also created a national currency: since 1991 it had been using a nominal one. In

1995, inflation was reduced to around 183%. Rates for the three previous years had been

809; 3,125; and 18,916%, respectively. 201 Also significant, in 1995 the president sent

Speaker of Parliament Zurab Zhvania to America to persuade Mikheil Saakashvili to

199 Information from unrecorded conversation at TraCCC center, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia. 20°Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (121 ). 201 "Country Profile: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 1996-1997," Economist Intelligence Unit, 16, http://www.eiu.com (accessed October 14, 2007). 64

return home. The latter left a position in a New York law firm to return to Georgia, and

he became one of a group of progressive 'young reformers' in the Shevardnadze

government. In addition, in October 1995 an oil-company consortium known as the

Azerbaijan International Operating Company announced its decision to have one of its

pipelines built through Georgia. 202 The transport of Caspian oil across Georgia and then

down to the Turkish Mediterranean coast promised to bring Georgia energy

independence from Russia, a share of transit fees, foreign investment, and international

attention.

In the Doldrums: Stagnation and Corruption

After these initial achievements, nothing much improved. Politically and

economically, Georgia began to stagnate, and corruption became an increasing problem

in every part of life: "Shevardnadze traded bandits with guns for bandits with ties, and that's progress. But the government had done all they could and were moving

backward."203 This period oftime corresponds to the first stage in a transformation of

consciousness, per Piven and Cloward, when "large numbers of men and women who

ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers and the legitimacy of institutional

arrangements come to believe in some measure that these rulers and these arrangements

202 "Turkey Pleased with Dual Pipeline for Early Caspian Oil," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 9, 1995, BC Cycle, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 203 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (51-53). 65 are unjust and wrong."204 Georgians could see how unfair things were for regular people, and the corruption and stagnation affected the way they viewed their leaders.

In his discussion of Georgian politics under Shevardnadze, Wheatley makes the useful distinction between administrative corruption and state capture. The first implies that groups or actors within society pressure a weak government to further their interests.

With the second, which more aptly describes Georgia, "the political elite uses the apparatus of the state to further its own private interests."205 This had begun during the

Soviet period and continued after, because many of the faces remained the same. To some extent, Wheatley explains, Shevardnadze had to tum to these same people because of the economic and political chaos and the extreme weakness of the state. Shevardnadze for a while lacked the strength to unseat the paramilitary leaders, so he had to rely on other powerful members of society to counterbalance them. The president rewarded such people with good government posts but couldn't afford to pay them more than about $50 per month, since there was so little money in the government coffers. The appointees found their own informal ways of financing operations, and this became the system. 206

The political/business elites benefited from this arrangement and therefore wanted to preserve it. As a result, election fraud became part of the system. It would have been too personally risky to compete in honest elections, because losing one's seat in Parliament could have meant losing everything. The many parties competing with each other for positions (and the associated resources) didn't depend on the people for their power. This

204 Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, 4. 205 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 104. 206 Ibid., 104-106, 109. 66 came from above, and not from below.207 Elections were held to preserve the appearance of democracy, but results were typically manipulated to suit the needs of the CUG. In different regions and cities of Georgia, Shevardnadze's people controlled the election process by doctoring the voter lists and altering the totals. In addition, there was a practice known as a 'voter carousel' in which people were driven around to various polling stations so that they could vote more than once. Thus, even though the dictatorship of the Communist Party had given way to multi-party elections, many regular citizens still had somewhat limited access to the political process. They could make a real choice in an election, unlike before, but their voices sometimes went unheard because of the fraud.

The system of higher education was also devastated by pernicious corruption. In the words of a former student, the system fell apart: "Shevardnadze put his old party allies in charge of big universities. The only job they had before him was to assure that no political threat was coming from universities. Then they could do anything they wished, and that was making money."208 Because of the resulting corruption, many good faculty members left the universities or were fired. Other faculty who sat on admissions committees privately tutored high school students to help them enter, which some saw as unethical. Grades could be bought, and sometimes one had to pay a bribe to be allowed to take an exam. Admission to prestigious departments such as journalism, law, and international affairs required bribes of up to $20,000 by several accounts.209 Some

207 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 135. 208 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, September 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 17-18). 209 "Country Profile: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan," 16. This is even worse when one considers the following: the minimum monthly wage in early 1996 was 30 dollars for a private sector job, and 5 for state- 67

prospective students refused to pay and tried to enter by merit, others knew they wouldn't

be able to study without paying, and those in a third category paid just in case. This

frustrated young people and their families, as one student explained: "Smart people

couldn't get in by means of their own intelligence. They had to buy a place. When a person has the desire to be a student and become an educated person, and criminal groups and some in government don't give him the means, there appears a very big feeling of

dissatisfaction."210 Still worse, once the students gained admission-by whatever means-it became clear to some that the education provided was in too many cases sub-

standard:

I was in the department of international law and international relations. When I entered, that was the most prestigious department, hard to get into. I was very ambitious and proud to be there. But after I began I realized it was nothing-after I graduated I would know nothing and wouldn't be able to find a job. I wasn't getting any education, the level of education was so bad. Friends of mine who studied abroad saw that higher education works completely differently in other countries. So you can compare, and you understand you are doing nothing.211

In addition to the damage caused to the political, electoral, and educational systems, the corruption had a negative impact on the country's infrastructure. A walk through parts of the capital-let alone small towns and villages-made it clear enough that insufficient money was being invested in the country itself. Roads were in horrible shape, and old buildings in historic neighborhoods were literally splitting in half for lack of repair after earthquakes. In some cases people were still living inside because they had no other place

sector; "Country Profile: Georgia and Armenia," Economist Intelligence Unit, (2000): 15, http://www.eiu.com (accessed October 14, 2007). By the end of 1998, officially 50% of the population was living in poverty, and urban unemployment was about 20%. 21 ° Confidential interview with 2 non-protestors, by author, December 6, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (187). 211 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (67-68). 68 to go. Parents told me the school facilities for their children were in unacceptable condition. The public water supply was not guaranteed safe, and there were constant energy crises. A typical schedule for electricity supply was a few hours in the morning, and a few in the evening. Plus, it was understood that one needed to carry a flashlight at all times and have candles ready at home because of frequent outages. Sometimes, there was no electricity for days at a time.

Some of the problems people endured were the result of the difficult transition from the Soviet system, or of the civil wars. However, other problems were caused or compounded by the corruption and government neglect. For example, it was unclear why

Georgia's energy infrastructure was in such poor condition, after so much international money had been given to repair it. It was also confusing why blackouts occurred in some neighborhoods and not in others. Two women who work in Parliament talked about the energy problem and corruption, and how these impacted their daily lives:

2 Do you understand the kind of conditions we were in? In America, they allocate N millions of dollars for upkeep of the electricity infrastructure, and in Germany they give something, but here how could we have light? In the evening, we looked at the clock and saw it was 11 :30. We ran like cockroaches trying to do everything we needed to do, like get the beds ready [before the electricity was shut off at midnight].

1 We had no light, no heat, no nothing. We lived that way 10 years. It was horrible. When I went to Germany for a Parliament business trip, and they said 'we gave you half a million for your energy,' I lost my mind. What?! What money? When I returned home I wanted to know who had eaten that money.

Because there was nothing to show for it?

1 Nothing.212

212 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 69

These problems did not yet lead to the development of social movements, but they gave rise to frequent protest actions that were small in scale and short-lived. Typically, protesters went on strike, blocked streets or railroad tracks, or began hunger strikes. In some cases, they sewed their mouths shut. In one tragic instance, a woman set herself on fire in front of Parliament, to bring attention to the misery that people lived in. She was not expected to live.213 These protests were tolerated by the government and rarely repressed. In this sense, the political space was open enough for people to come out and demand that the government do something. Protests usually ended when officials promised to look into the problem or gave the people some relief. Yet because the underlying cause of many problems-corruption-was not eliminated, the protestors were unable to bring in fundamental change. This led to a feeling of political powerlessness. Millions of Georgians were miserable and couldn't really do anything about it.

During the winter of 2000-2001, the affluent Vake neighborhood of Tbilisi saw more significant energy protests. In November, residents began to block traffic on major streets with burning tires. For several days they called for the government's resignation if it could not supply the energy. Students demonstrated, too, demanding not only electricity and gas, but also more jobs and control over corruption.214

We were simply without electricity. People went out into the street and yelled, demanded electricity. The government was scared. I thought to myself, it was better to stand in the street than sit at home. It was warmer on the street. But after a few

213 "Woman Sets Herself on Fire," The Independent (London), April 1, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 214 David Stern, "President's Credentials Come under Scrutiny: Demonstrations against Power Blackouts Have Exposed a Wider Discontent," Financial Times (London), November 27, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 70

minutes I thought it was better to sit at home in the dark. I was afraid of punishment from the government. The people in Vake and in Georgia didn't trust the government and were afraid they would use guns against the people. Because we were afraid we d1'd n ' t go out anymore. 215

This person might have been afraid because of a threat from the Minister of Internal

Affairs Kakha Targamadze, who warned protestors that they were being videotaped and that there could be punishment for protest leaders.216 According to other sources, the protests ended when the government promised Tbilisi residents they would be receiving more hours of electricity each day. 217 This was because Russia had agreed to supply more electricity, for which Georgia would pay the following summer.218 Unfortunately, the next day the government revealed that it would not be able to keep its promise. That weekend, Shevardnadze held an emergency meeting and created a commission to address

. 219 t h e issue.

Framing and Liberation

The people who lived with all of the problems described in this chapter could see that something was wrong, and it appears that a diagnostic frame developed by the late

1990's, if not earlier. If, like Nepstad, we link the three stages of cognitive liberation with

215 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (191 ). 216 Douglas Frantz, "Tbilisi Journal; Where It's Dark and Cold Outside, and Inside, Too," New York Times, December 23, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 217 Tengiz Pachkoria, "Tbilisi Residents Protest against Power Cutoffs," !TAR-TASS News Agency, November 15, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 218 "Thousands Protest as Energy Crisis Continues in Georgia," Agence France Presse, November 16, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 219 Iya Barateli, '"Tbilisi May Have 6 Hours of Electricity a Day,' Minister," !TAR-TASS News Agency, November 17, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008); Tengiz Pachkoria, "Georgia Govt Has Extraordinary Meeting on Energy Situation,'' !TAR-TASS News Agency, November 18, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 71 diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing, the formation of a diagnostic frame means some part of Georgian society had reached at least the first stage of cognitive liberation. They no longer saw the president and government as legitimate. Georgia wasn't moving forward, and the Shevardnadze regime was to blame. People felt it was unfair that they had to live this way, when better governance could have brought some improvement. It goes without saying that this step in framing and cognitive liberation did not occur simultaneously for different people, or for everyone.

The second stage of cognitive liberation should be divided into two steps for this analysis. Piven and Cloward write that, "[s]econd, people who are ordinarily fatalistic, who believe that existing arrangements are inevitable, begin to assert 'rights' that imply demands for change."220 It was not a difficult transition from acknowledging the existence of serious problems to wanting them to change: "Society's desire for change was so great. Shevardnadze caused everyone pain. There was no need to tell people we had a stupid government because everyone knew it. If someone had tried to organize a protest around the idea that our government was stupid, no one would have gone."221 Life was becoming worse and worse, and big problems like Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not being dealt with. It seemed like everything would be better if Shevardnadze left. 222 In other words, some part of Georgian society had formed a prognostic frame: what the country needed was a change in leadership. The fact that protestors in November 2000 were calling for the government's resignation is evidence of this. An activist's

220 Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, 4. 221 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (122-123). 222 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 17, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (33). 72

description of the attitude toward Shevardnadze captures the diagnostic and prognostic

frames and the blame that accompanied them: "Shevardnadze's face was the sum of all

evil and the hope to get rid of it. That concentration of evil was the work of years. People

would take something bad and put it on his image, and then at a certain point it became

'if we get rid of him, we will get rid of our problems.' "223

Why didn't this level of anger lead to something like the RR before 2003? Anger,

frustration, and a desire for change are not enough. People must also believe that change is possible, and that they could make it happen. Before 2003, this was hard for too many

Georgians to believe. Therefore, further progress in cognitive liberation was more difficult. That required overcoming the fatalism and the sense that the existing situation was horrible but inevitable. It also required developing a sense of efficacy: "People didn't like Shevardnadze, but didn't know what to do about it. They had no idea how to act against the government, even though people talked about it at home. People had lost hope that Shevardnadze would ever go."224

There were good reasons for the widespread resignation. First of all, there was the fact that Shevardnadze had been in power for most of the time since 1972. The president seemed like Zeus sitting in the clouds.225 For people who had grown up under decades of his rule, it was hard to imagine a different person in his chair: "It was inconceivable.

He'd been in power all my life. It was like knowing that your pet or relative will die

223 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (46-48). 224 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (75-77). 225 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (25-26). 73

someday, but not being able to imagine it. "226 Second, Georgians' fear of radical change encouraged acquiescence. The civil war and chaos of the 1990's were still fresh in their minds: "We didn't want revolution, civil war, to fight with each other. At the end of

Gamsakhurdia's time there was a terrible civil war. We were scared and didn't want to be in that position again."227 There was fear that the state couldn't survive another wave of destabilization.

Besides another dangerous coup, the only alternative was to replace Shevardnadze and the Parliament through elections. Along with the absence of any other viable candidates, the systematic election fraud made this all but impossible:

1 People understood after a series of many falsified elections that it was impossible for a change in government to come through elections. That's why this revolution was a little late in happening.

2 After the Communist period came the Shevardnadze period, and people believed that they couldn't participate. 'How can I change this situation? By means of elections? Shevardnadze does what he wants.' I couldn't do anything to get him out of government. 228

This systematic electoral fraud and lack of a real alternative to Shevardnadze meant people had little power to cause change, in an objective sense. The powerlessness was also subjective. Competing with the diagnostic and prognostic frames that had developed by this point, there was the old 'What can I do? Why bother?' frame. Beyond the discouragement and frustration over not being able to vote in new leadership, there were the political attitudes inherited from the Soviet past, mentioned earlier in the chapter.

226 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (I 6 I). 227 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 191 ). 228 Confidential interview with 2 non-protestors, by author, December 6, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 187). 74

Many respondents spoke of this legacy during fieldwork-protestors, non-protestors, and activists alike:

After the fall of the USSR, the Soviet way of thinking persisted: 'What can I do?' It was a lasting influence. There was a nihilistic attitude, and pessimism. Before the RR, there was horrible pessimism. Everyone was trying to go somewhere else, in every sphere, even sports. There was no connection with politics. People believed 'what can we do? Why bother? Nothing will change. What could make things right?' 229

When speaking of this mentality and hopelessness, and the change that occurred in

2003, respondents sometimes used the word 'awakening.' For some, this meant that

Georgians had been 'asleep' before: "After April 9t\ after Gamsakhurdia, the civil war, people were so tired and afraid of everything .... After 5:00 it was already dangerous to be out on the street. People just decided to go to sleep then. We thought, 'if we're quiet, everything will be ok.' ,mo Others suggested that the people had been 'daydreaming' before the RR, or that society had been suffering from a post-Soviet hangover. Some were irritated by the suggestion that people had been 'asleep' before, assuring me that

Georgians are always paying attention.

When I use the term 'awakening' in this work, it is to denote the process of becoming activated. This corresponds to the emotional and cognitive liberation that helped mobilize people to protest. If some part of society had been 'sleeping' before

2003, it was in the sense that they were passive and living by inertia-not because they were unaware of the problems in the country. The process of liberation and awakening from the inertia required time, as one Kmara activist makes clear: "People didn't just

229 Confidential interview with ArtCom member, by author, November 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 146). 23° Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 189). 75 wake up one day when Saakashvili was speaking loudly. I think everyone knew. They realized it was the right time. There were steps taken to get people ready. It wasn't instant."231 The next chapter will examine this awakening process and look at what civil society actors and NGOs did to prepare the people.

231 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (67-68). CHAPTER4

CREATION OF THE SUPPLY

By the year 2001, Georgia had had ten years of independence. The first years were marked by war and devastating economic, political, and social disruption. Shevardnadze then managed to put the country back on its unsteady feet, after which stagnation set in.

The elites competed amongst themselves for power and the resources that came with it, and society was left to its own devices, forced to adapt itself to a harsh new reality outside of the Soviet system. Of all the unfavorable things that can be said about

Shevardnadze's governance, he does still earn praise for the freedoms that existed under his rule. Even though there were some attempts to limit them, the freedom of the press, expression, and religion flourished under him. "Shevardnadze's regime wasn't repressive or a dictatorship. It was anarchy. Steal what you want, say what you want, he didn't repress anyone."232 Possibly, he and the rest of the leadership were too preoccupied with their own affairs, or perhaps they underestimated the power of those freedoms.

The political opportunity structure that evolved was open in the sense that there was so little repression, in contrast to what people had endured under Stalinism and during the

Soviet era. Nevertheless, the general public's exclusion from politics and power meant that the context was closed in objective and subjective ways, as discussed in the previous chapter. People wanted change but had difficulty believing it was possible or that they

232 Confidential interview with ArtCom member, by author, December 1, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (171-172). 76 77 could do anything to solve the problems they saw. This chapter looks at the development of Georgian civil society-how its various networks and organizations worked to transform those perceptions and awaken the people.

Development of Civil Society

During the permissive Shevardnadze era, Georgia experienced what Gia Nadia calls the "NGO-sation of civil society."233 During the 1990's, several thousand NGOs dedicated to various causes were formed. Speaking on the development of Georgian civil society before 2003, an activist said that in the ten years of Western involvement preceding the RR, "the most successful work was in the non-governmental sector, in civil society. Such financing came into that sector, and maybe 1 out of 10 NGOs became a success. That was still a lot, considering how many thousands there were."234 Because of the economic situation inside the country, NGOs and those interested in developing civil society had to depend on Western donors for their funding. For this reason, Wheatley argues that the Georgian NGO community of the 1990's may not qualify as civil society: defining this "in terms of the gradual deepening of social networks for the exchange of information and the establishment within these networks of norms of reciprocity or mutual trust casts doubt on the claim that civil society can be built within the space of a few years by the creation of a few foreign-funded NGOs."235

233 Paata Gurgenidze, "An Assessment of Georgian Civil Society (2005): Strong Commitment to Democratic Values in a Challenging Environment" (Tbilisi: Centre for Training and Consultancy, 2005), 16. 234 Confidential interview with RevCom member, by author, December 2, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 17 4-177). 235 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 152. 78

This assessment does not take into account the networks and norms that had long existed in Georgian society. Their construction certainly did not begin in 1991. Georgian society is traditional in the sense that personal relationships and connections are more important than impersonal rules. It is thanks to these long-standing connections that people have been able to survive years of economic hardship. Under Gorbachev and in the 1990' s, these preexisting networks facilitated the rapid growth and strengthening of civil society. A person with the NGO ALPE explained how, despite the need for external financial support, he and others in his networks were able to contribute to the process:

When borders opened, my generation had the opportunity to leave and see what was happening elsewhere. It was a mental revolution. We understood that the way we lived wasn't right, and we needed to create new possibilities for ourselves. Our parents' generation was wrong. The feeling of freedom was so strong after civil war too-we wanted a new way of life. When the law on NGOs passed, people like me and Ugulava began to unite. We knew each other from the university, from neighborhoods, from school, etc. We got together, acted and thought together-read on freedom and liberty. We had big support from Zhvania. Then Saakashvili came from the US with other ideas, and we had contact with them. This was growing day by day, and civic organizations became very strong. The international community played a big role, providing funding for civil society. Very key, because there is still no local charity. We completely depend on international donors' help. 236

Another NGO figure, who had worked for Soros' Open Society Georgia Foundation for years, explained the influence that civil society development had on the population.

Even though significant changes had accompanied the fall of the USSR, people were still unsatisfied with the country's governance. From the late 1980's through the 1990's more informal social groups were forming. They got together and participated in general meetings, and thanks to the freedom of speech they were able to lead public discourse on issues that before only a few had talked about. With time, the groups became more

236 Confidential interview with activist from ALPE, by author, November 3, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (91-103). 79 organized, and people began to understand that they shared some of the responsibility for the country's future:

This understanding did exist, that something did depend on us too. This all led to the situation where the ruling elites could no longer govern the way the population understood their rights. A situation arose in which it became clear some changes were necessary in the government. Because of the loss of territory, corruption, poverty ... many lost confidence in the future. This all accumulated and had to find a vent somehow.237

Social and Political Movements

Student Government

One arena in this fight for change was the universities. As mentioned above, corruption in the system of higher education reached extreme levels under Shevardnadze.

In reaction, some frustrated Tbilisi State University (TSU) students formed a Student

Self-Government in 2001, with the goal of fighting against the corruption and bringing needed change. Their efforts were not always well received within the student body, and those who joined were criticized for being different, even branded homosexual. The students turned to NGOs for guidance in conducting student council elections, as a

Liberty Institute activist related:

In April 2001 they had elections, so the Liberty Institute helped them with NDI [National Democratic Institute] materials, modem election techniques, canvassing, PR, political marketing, etc. Hundreds ran. It was a normal election, covered by the media. The government was not happy and arranged elections for a pro-government student union for the day before ours, but these were not really 'democratic.' This created more of a buzz for the alternative elections, so it created much higher turnout. Students from other universities besides TSU then started asking the Liberty Institute to help them do the same.238

237 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, November 15, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (142). 238 Confidential interview with Liberty Institute activist, by author, September 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (20). 80

A former member of the Student Self-Government was proud that the level of participation was significant, which in turn attracted more students. She was also proud that the elections were considered fair: "It was impressive. That was the first time in a

Georgian university. We had observers for it too-Fair Elections [International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED)]. They said this was the first election in

Georgia that they had monitored that met standards of democracy."239

However, the student group faced serious challenges in their fight against corruption.

Another member of the group described the cultural resistance they encountered:

We campaigned. It was not hard to expose corruption, because no one really tried to hide it, but people didn't talk about it. Corruption in education was still a taboo topic. The church can't be criticized, for example, and the intelligentsia is sacred. Academia was off-limits, so it was taboo to talk about its corruption. We were marginal, not accepted. It was hard to activate TSU students, so TSU was never a stronghold. Most students wouldn't move. So manti' of them had gotten in by paying bribes and didn't want a change in the status quo. 24

They also met with political obstacles. Despite its PR success, the student campaign wasn't able to produce results because there was no political will for change in the universities. Student activists realized that the fight against corruption would have to be waged outside of the universities in order to make any difference: "We saw that fighting from within the university alone made no sense. Behind [TSU rector] Metreveli stood

Shevardnadze and the entire government, and the government enabled all this corruption. "241

239 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (67-68). 24° Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, September 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (17-18). 241 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (38-40). 81

Mikhail Saakashvili

The development of Mikheil Saakashvili' s political career also contributed to the awakening process. After completing high school in Georgia, he attended university in

Kiev, Ukraine. He later graduated from Columbia Law School and then began work in a

Manhattan law firm. As mentioned previously, he returned to Georgia in 1995 at the government's invitation. From this point, Saakashvili's popularity gradually grew. The

Georgian media and NGO community named him 1997's Man of the Year, and the next year he was elected Chairman of the CUG-Shevardnadze's party. In January of 2000 he was elected vice-president of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, and in

October of that year Shevardnadze appointed him Minister of Justice.

Saakashvili took up the battle against corruption-out of political expediency mixed with some degree of sincerity. He spent a good deal oftime and energy trying to pass laws on the confiscation of unlawfully acquired property. During one Parliament session in August 2001, he came armed with photographs of luxurious houses, accusing certain

MPs of using public funds to build them. This made an impression on some Georgians.

One young woman explained that was the day she began to believe in Saakashvili and trust him. While others in government were trying to protect their jobs, he was cutting the branch he was sitting on: it is easier to criticize when you have nothing to lose.242

Another woman spoke about the impact Saakashvili's actions had had on her, in a way that highlights the gradual process of awakening:

242 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, September 27, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (19). 82

At home, we yelled, talked, cursed, etc., but instead of going out on the street we were patient because we didn't hope for anything out of that group [of politicians], the group in which Saakashvili got his political beginning too. Saakashvili began with Shevardnadze, was his puppy, so to speak. As if they didn't all begin that way. I liked it when Saakashvili spoke so openly [about corruption], but I didn't believe he'd be able to come out so openly and demand Shevardnadze's resignation. When he was made Minister of Justice and threw down those photos, it was something like a little bomb, for me! I didn't expect him to lay out those photos.

Even though this was something people knew about?

Everyone knew, but no one talked about it. Then, he left the post and ran for a seat in Parliament. A person who doesn't know his goal, who simply wants power, would never do something like that, not for anything. Afterward I saw that everyone was shaking, afraid for their own posts, for their own good life, and for their parliamentary money. Maybe he had it all planned out already, and had a program. But when we saw that someone could raise his voice, we began to crawl out of our shells. 243

There were other politicians more popular and better known than Saakashvili at that time, such as Labor Party leader Shalva Natelashvili. Saakashvili's image was different in meaningful ways, some people said. He was younger and had never been a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. Therefore, I was told, he was not a relic of the USSR.244 His years spent outside Georgia signified two things in people's minds.

First, he had been less influenced by the Soviet political culture: "that filth, that mentality that our children have ... when you live in an environment, you pick up traces of it.

Saakashvili escaped this. Therefore, he will not accept it. He is altogether different."245

Second, the time spent in the United States had equipped him with a different kind of thinking: "Saakashvili is different. He came of age mentally in other countries. Maybe

243 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 244 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 245 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 83 he's more American."246 This meant he spoke more freely and took more risks, which

also appealed to people.247 He was carving out a space for himself in people's hearts by

coming to constituents' neighborhoods, talking with the children, showing respect for the elderly, and addressing the issues that most concerned people, such as educational reform and corruption.248 After becoming president he would severely tarnish this image, but for now Saakashvili was fashioning himself into a real alternative to Shevardnadze.

A Turning Point: October 2001

In the summer and fall of 2001, some things would happen involving the students, activists, and certain politicians which would impact the course of events through 2003.

First, Giorgi Sanaia, a popular anchor for the television channel Rustavi-2, died that summer under suspicious circumstances. It was widely suspected that this was a politically motivated murder.249 In response to his death, "students helped organize a huge protest rally. It was the biggest in 10 years, because after Gamsakhurdia's ouster protests had been very small."250 In October 2001, Rustavi-2 was once again harassed by the government. (This same channel had been shut down in 1996, for almost a year, because of its criticism of the government.) Alleging tax fraud, the Security Ministry sent officials to the channel's offices to look for some financial documents. Channel

246 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, October 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (71-72). 247 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 248 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (191). 249 Douglas Frantz, "Killing Touches a Nerve in Ex-Soviet Land,'' New York Times, late edition, August 12, 2001, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 25° Confidential interview with Liberty Institute activist, by author, September 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (20). 84 spokespeople appealed to residents of Tbilisi to come and defend Rustavi-2, and many did, because this was seen as an attempt to limit the freedom of speech. The crowds ranged from under 100 up to 5000.251 Speaker of Parliament Zhvania commented that those responsible had evidently not expected such popular anger, but "when people are so angry because they have no gas and electricity, when the popular attitude towards the authorities is so negative, it was quite clear how difficult and serious the consequences of an attack on an independent TV company would be."252 Even Shevardnadze criticized the

253 1 Security Ministry's action as poorly thought out. The attempt to enter was on the 30 \ a Tuesday. The next day Security Minister Kutateladze resigned, and on Thursday the president dismissed his entire cabinet because of the popular pressure. Zhvania resigned the same day, possibly to counter suspicions that he was motivated by personal ambition: as Speaker of Parliament, Zhvania would have become acting president in the event of

Shevardnadze's resignation. The despised Interior Minister Kakha Targamadze also stepped down. 254 Nevertheless, the protests continued through the weekend, as did the calls for Shevardnadze to leave office.

251 "Number of Protesters Near Georgian Parliament Grows to 800," !TAR-TASS News Agency, November 2, 2001, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008); Michael Wines, "TV Station Raid in Georgia Leads to Protests and Cabinet's Ouster," New York Times, November 2, 2001, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 252 "Georgian Parliament to Demand More Government Resignations-Speaker," Financial Times information, BBC Monitoring, October 31, 2001, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 253 "Georgian President Announces Security Minister's Resignation," Financial Times information, BBC Monitoring, October 31, 2001, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 254 Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, "Georgian President Fires Entire Cabinet, Plunging Former Soviet Republic into Crisis," Associated Press, November 1, 2001, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 85

Had Saakashvili been old enough at the time to run for president, the protests might have been continued. I heard this from some as criticism of the opposition leader:

"Saakashvili came at the end, when he saw it was unavoidable. He didn't take the initiative because he wasn't 35 yet. This was the most cynical thing, and that's when he was over for me. He didn't care what was happening or what they were protesting. He only cared about his power."255 One of Saakashvili' s party allies admitted it was true; they hadn't wanted Shevardnadze out yet because there was no suitable replacement:

"Two years before the RR, we did something similar-Rustavi-2. But because it wasn't connected with elections, and Saakashvili wasn't 35 yet, we stopped those protests and took satisfaction in the dismissal of Shevardnadze's ministers."256

The October 2001 protests were significant because of what they accomplished-and because they were not suppressed by the government. They showed an opening-a way to challenge the status quo. Activists understood that mass protest could once again hold promise for national development: "This was the first moment-not a revolution, maybe it couldn't have been successful in that situation, but it was the first signal, a yellow flag.

It was the biggest thing since the 90's, when Shevardnadze felt danger."257 The Rustavi-2 event "was the first example of the power to change through protest. Saakashvili and others understood that Georgia could change the government with this force. Opposition

255 Confidential interview with activist, by author, November 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (137). 256 Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (79). 257 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (189). 86 parties strengthened after that, got ready-wanted to get ready by 2003. "258 The next parliamentary elections were scheduled for November 2003, and there was much grassroots work to be done.

Earlier in the year Saakashvili had left the CUG and his ministry position in protest, and in November 2001 he announced the creation of his political platform, the National

Movement (natsionaluri modzraoba).259 This was created as a social movement, with the intention that it would later become a political party as well.260 The movement program included resolving the crises facing the country, replacing the "destructive power existing in Georgia," ensuring fairer privatization, fighting corruption, and creating a legal basis for holding normal democratic elections.261 It was explicitly anti-Shevardnadze: a slogan in one of the movement's election campaigns was "Tbilisi without Shevardnadze."262 The

National Movement was not the only party to suggest that Shevardnadze needed to go.

Others, such as the People's Patriotic Union and the Communist Party, had used the same slogan in January 2001.263 However, those other parties were weaker and less organized, and therefore less inspiring: "There existed several weak forces who came out with the

258 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 25, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (63). 259 The name is almost the same as that of the dissident independence movement of the I980's­ erovnuli modzraoba. Erovnuli and natsionaluri mean roughly the same thing; the former has more ethnic connotations, and the latter, civic. 260 "Georgian New National Movement to Be Rearranged as Political Party, Supposedly," RIA OREANDA, January 14, 2002, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 261 "National Movement to Be Proclaimed Political Organization, September 12," RIA OREANDA, September 4, 2002, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 262 "Election Slogan by Mikhail Saakashvili 'Tbilisi without Shevardnadze' New Form of Destabilization, Georgian President," RIA OREANDA, May 20, 2002, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 263 "Opposition to Hold Mass Rallies Calling for President's Resignation," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 6, 2001, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 87 slogan 'Georgia without Shevardnadze,' but they didn't have concrete plans for how to achieve those results. So people didn't trust them. The only person who had a clear plan and spoke concretely was Saakashvili."264

Generals with Armies

Parties, activists, and the NGO community began to work on mobilizing society, so that more people would become involved and fight for change. As one respondent described it, this was the phase of 'preheating society' before the elections.265 This collective could rely on experienced members, who could apply or adapt what they had learned in previous protest movements:

My involvement began long before 2003. Back in the late 1980's, when I was about 20, I participated in the protests and acquired some experience. This was with erovnuli modzraoba, but later I switched to the other side, against Gamsakhurdia. Similar things happened then, like barricades, buses, etc. This is probably when I got the experience that was useful during the RR. I was one of the experts then. I knew how to do it, so I helped. 266

Among the organizations that contributed to the mobilization was the NGO Liberty

Institute. One of its activists was motivated by something he had heard years before on television; he remembered how, during the 1980's, Polish leader Jaruselski had belittled

Solidarity, referring to it as a group of' generals without armies':

Those words stuck in my mind, and I wondered if some in government thought the same of the Liberty Institute. So I wanted armies and more organized development. I wanted not only elites (including students) involved in the political process. I wanted the masses engaged-those who had been silent and passive, historically. We

264 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 265 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (122-123). 266 Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (79). 88

went to the countryside and talked to teachers, because education was a sector that employed people. We also talked with pensioners and feople of diverse backgrounds. We went to different cities. This was in 2002-03. 26

They did not find the support they hoped for, however. They had expected that foreign donors would offer them financial help, but activists found that many potential donors had been co-opted by the government. According to activists, some donors didn't want to join in the protest movement because of their government connections and partnerships, and the government departments involved in these partnerships didn't want to risk their access to donors by becoming involved in an anti-government movement.

This hindered recruitment:

So when we were traveling around looking for new members, we realized we had to start from scratch. We thought 2003 was too soon to make a difference, so the 2005 [presidential] elections would be our big chance. 2003 would be a challenge, a test to help us prepare for 2005 .... We looked on the internet for manuals, toolkits, advice on how to behave, what to do if arrested, how to relate to the media, political marketing. We looked also at anarchists, anti-globalization people, even Che Guevara. What we learned from the books was that we were facing a war. You had to have a clear strategy to win, to be prepared, to prepare your forces, and train them in non-violent methods. You must know your objectives, know your enemy. How is the enemy organized, what are his strengths and weaknesses, etc. We looked around for help and a model. ... We considered Thoreau, Gandhi, MLK, Mandela, Solidarity. But since we were working with young people we needed something fresh. 268

They decided on the Serbian example. In 2000, the movement Otpor

(Resistance) had toppled Milosevic after fraudulent elections. The Liberty Institute activists were inspired by the Serbian movement after finding a copy of Stephen

York's film about it, Bringing down a Dictator, on the internet. Funding from Soros'

OSGF sent a small group of Georgian civil society actors and politicians to Serbia in

267 Confidential interview with Liberty Institute activist, by author, September 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (20). 268 Ibid. 89

February 2003 to meet with some of the Otpor activists. Then during the summer of

2003, Serbian activists came to Tbilisi in order to train students in peaceful protest techniques.269 The Student Self-Government and another group, the Student

Movement for Georgia (formed in late 2002), joined to form the youth movement

Kmara, which was modeled after Otpor but adapted to the Georgian context. There were only a few thousand Kmara members by 2003,270 and they were only one of the factors that contributed to the RR. Nevertheless, it is necessary to devote some attention to this group, because Kmara played an important role in the awakening process.

First of all, the name 'Kmara' was significant. Founders considered the political culture in Georgia when they chose their movement's name, which means 'enough!'

[The feeling of having had enough] was already there and pushed the organization to come together. It was an emotion that society experienced. . . . In some ways, things changed fast in the 90' s, from Communist nation to independent, from independent nationalist to independent democratic, then some reforms, then it stopped. There was no change, no perspectives for the future, not clear what the future would bring. 'Enough!' was the emotion of ordinary citizens. 'I don't want to live like this. I want to live in a different way.' There was no iron curtain anymore­ you could see how other people lived where things were happening, and compare. Kmara was born as an emotion, a lucky catch-whoever understood that this should be the name of the organization. This contributed to the visibility of the movement. This name was the word everyone was thinking about. ' 271

One intended function of the movement was to change the culture. The activists wanted to renew trust within society and foster an understanding of the common good.

"Maybe it was utopian, but our main purpose was to change the passive mentality of

269 Hugh Pope, "Pro-West Leaders in Georgia Push Shevardnadze Out," Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2003. 27°Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, September 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 17-18). 271 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (46-48). 90 ordinary citizens, who couldn't find their place in this new [post-Soviet] world."272

Kmara members talked with ordinary Georgians, asking them about the various problems they faced: "We asked people 'what do you think about your future? What do you want to do? Do you see yourself staying in Georgia, or do you want to give up? Do you want this country or a new one?' "273 They addressed the need for change, whether it should be soft or radical, and also discussed the democratic process and the importance of elections.

Another goal was to persuade people that change was not only needed, but possible: "It was hard to show that things could change, but that was the main task of these meetings with people, to explain that things could change."274 Some people were enthusiastic about their message, but many were skeptical:

There had been attempts to mobilize people for different causes, which included freedom of expression-as when Rustavi-2 was threatened by the government. But this never lasted, to get the needed outcome. This caused a certain depression.

People thought 'why bother?'

Yes, that was the attitude, when we started to do something people thought this was one more thing, who knows ... might work, might not, but why bother ...

People said that to you?

They said we were just one of the groups doing something and they didn't see why we should be special. That was the attitude from the beginning .... There had been so much experience with small campaigns, and this had been in the news, so it was hard to see why this group should be any different. It was very hard for regular Georgians to see why we should be able to make a change. There had been campaigns before when young f:eople came out, but then-that was it. We wanted to show that Kmara was special. 2 5

272 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (46-48). 273 Ibid. 274 Ibid. 275 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, November 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (165-166). 91

Kmara and the Liberty Institute quickly became very organized in their work. Groups of people can demonstrate without any underlying organization, as Georgians often had, but activists knew they would be more effective if they formed detailed plans. "To be effective, you must do different things at the same time. For example, while some are demonstrating, others are printing leaflets, or training new people. To do all this, you need organization, instead of losing the connection between types of action. This was our plan."276 They developed both short-term and long-term plans, with a coordinator for each project. They also maintained close contact with the media, as constant news coverage would ensure that people would continue to think and talk about them.

Pre-existing networks were crucial. Without the media connections at their disposal, activists would have needed much more time to accomplish what they did. "It would have taken years to establish communication channels, but we already had those. There was some amount of independence in the media, and we could get them to cover our stories, so why should we work on creating new channels when some already existed?"277

Other types of connections also helped Kmara in mobilizing. Both the Liberty Institute's regional offices and activists' personal networks helped Kmara outside Tbilisi:

It seems like everyone knows everyone here. What role did networks play in Kmara and the RR?

This played a big role in the begilll1ing, but actually it's not like that. The thing is, it's easy to find people here. If you know someone in some town, then you can find someone else in that town through him, because he'll know them all. So this was one of our strengths. If you get someone in the movement, you could establish a network where he lived, when he got his friends on his side, or his relatives. 278

276 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (46-48). 277 Ibid. 278 Ibid. 92

In its interaction with these potential recruits and society in general, Kmara wanted to evoke a reaction of some kind, to counteract the inertia: "The point was for no one to remain neutral or indifferent to us. We wanted to create passions either for or against

Kmara. So that everyone would talk about Kmara."279 Members sometimes encountered positive reactions. When describing interaction between group members and potential recruits, a Kmara activist remembered that the group's enthusiasm and thirst for change had been influential: "When they saw our great enthusiasm and desire do to these things, many of them decided to stay, even though they might not have been completely sure we would be able to do what we told them. When they saw the desire in us, they stayed by our side."280 This activist remembered that the film Bringing down a Dictator was helpful in recruiting. The first thing new recruits did was watch it: "It was their 'primer.' They liked it very much. That film gave them enthusiasm and motivation to be actively involved."281 Kmara's non-violent methods won them support in wider society, especially in contrast to the government's nervous overreaction. Some respondents recalled how police had treated Kmara activists roughly, stuffing them into cars with their feet when arresting them. When regular people saw this on television, it acted on their emotions, and the effect was not accidental. Even neutral people began to support Kmara. 282

Kmara also irritated or even disgusted some Georgians, because members' actions- painting graffiti on the streets, yelling in public, and lying in the streets in protest-are

279 Confidential interview with Liberty Institute activist, by author, September 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (20). 28°Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (38-40). 281 Ibid. 282 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (51-53). 93 not acceptable behaviors in Georgia. The members were sometimes seen as crude opportunists who were being paid by George Soros, naYve puppets who didn't realize they were being manipulated, or stupid children who liked being beaten by the police.

Nevertheless, many of those who disliked Kmara's methods acknowledged the role the activists played. One explained that the group had provided the needed energy: "They charged the situation like a battery, so the people would be more alive."283 Another

believed they had been paid to become active and couldn't tolerate their un-Georgian behavior, but still appreciated their role in the transformation of consciousness:

They were something terrible. I hated them, but I think they played a significant part in the RR, if not a major one. Revolutions don't happen just like that. You have to bring people to the boiling point, to make them understand that it has to happen. Krnara played this role. Drop by drop you can drink the ocean-this was Krnara. They played a big role: drop by drop they prepared people's mentality for these big changes.184

One means of influencing the popular mentality was Kmara's thought-provoking television commercials. One of these showed crumbling buildings and needy people, followed by the words kmara vardnas, which meant 'enough of falling!' People were curious about what this meant and discussed it with friends. After some time, the commercial was changed to kmara she-vardna-dzes (enough of Shevardnadze!) and the message was clear.285 Such ads were effective and influenced people's thinking about what was possible:

They influenced people's mentality. The older generation didn't believe a change of government was possible through protest. They still had, or have, a Soviet

283 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 284 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, October 16, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (29-31). 285 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (38-40). 94

mentality and were afraid of protest because of 1956 and 1989. But when they saw Kmara spots on tv, which would never have happened during the USSR, and they saw that there was no punishment, their thinking changed. Some of my neighbors even demonstrated, whom I never ever expected to go out onto the street. I think it was because of Kmara ads and actions.286

In addition to broader social issues, mobilization efforts addressed the upcoming

2003 parliamentary elections. These were seen as especially important: the next

presidential elections were scheduled for 2005, and whichever party or parties did well in

2003 would have a better platform for 2005. The hope was, the higher the voter turnout,

the harder it would be for the government to steal the election. With this in mind, a voter

education campaign-Get Out to Vote-took activists all over the country. Besides the

Kmara and Liberty Institute activists, members of other organizations and political parties

worked to encourage people to vote. These included the National Movement and the

Republican Party, as well as the Burjanazde-Democrats bloc. The latter was formed by

Zhvania and Nino Burjanazde, who had succeeded Zhvania as Speaker of Parliament in

2001. 287 Members of the artistic world and civil society were also involved; they would

later transform into ArtCom (Artists' Committee) and RevCom (Revolutionary

Committee).

Georgian society was ambivalent about voting. On the one hand, the belief had

strengthened over time that Georgia was a democracy, in which people showed what they

wanted by voting. Some saw voting as an obligation: you can't complain about things if you don't vote. In support of this, a GORBI/Gallup poll conducted in August 2003 found

286 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (49-50). 287 "Georgian Speaker, Opposition Leader Officially Form Election Alliance," BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, August 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 95 that, had the elections been held that day, 72% of respondents would have voted. Just over 21 % said they would probably not or definitely not vote. 288 A different poll sponsored by the OSGF reported that "despite the nihilistic attitude, an absolute majority of people (76.8%) intended to participate in the elections." Their reasons for doing so included preventing the fraudulent use of their votes ( 41.9% ), a sense of civil duty

(32. 7%), and the desire to support their party of choice (20% ). 289

One the other hand, there was apathy that persisted from the Soviet past. During the

Soviet era, people said, they knew that elections were only a formality, not even a caricature of the real thing: 290 "No one during the USSR went to vote. We didn't even know who our deputy was, and nobody cared."291 It also stemmed from common understanding of the Shevardnadze government's dishonesty, leading to this sentiment:

'It doesn't matter whom you vote for. What matters is who counts the votes.'292 The

GO RBI poll found that "the majority of the Georgian population [87%] believed that the average man-on-the-street has no say in what the government does." About half of the public felt that it made no difference which party was in control, the results would be the same. About 67% of people expected the elections to be unfair, while 11 % thought they would be fair. 293 The OSGF poll found that 18.3% ofrespondents expected partial

288 GORBI/Gallup International, "Pre-Election Survey in Georgia, 2003 August," http://www.gorbi.com/download.html (accessed May 19, 2006). 289 Fond 'Ria sazogadoeba - saqarTvelosatvis' winasaarCevno Temaze Catarebuli raodenobrivi kvlevis angariSi [Open Society Georgia Foundation quantitative pre-election study], 2003. Provided to author by the Liberty Institute. Translated by author 29° Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 5, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 184-185). 291 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (I 91 ). 292 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 17, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (33). 293 GORBI survey. 96 falsification, and 70.3% anticipated total falsification. Those who did not plan to vote gave the following reasons: certainty that the elections would be falsified (31.3% ), no trust in any party or candidate (26.8%), not wanting to be disappointed again because of fraud ( 19 .6% ), and the belief that one's vote couldn't have an impact on the final results

(17%).294

Because the activists were aware of the expectation of fraud, they emphasized the need for fair elections in their talks with people. As one Kmara member explained, "we said to everyone the elections this fall have to be objective. People themselves must choose whom they want, and the government must not falsify the results. If it does that, then we will defend our votes and come out onto the street."295 National Movement activists delivered a similar message. Unlike some of the other activists, however, they were also trying to win seats in Parliament. Therefore, it was even more pressing for them to overcome voter apathy:

I knew the only chance to fix things was if people understood they had to stand up and have their voices heard. So we started to work on making that happen, waking people up. We were trying to tell everyone 'wake up! Fight for your rights and for a better Georgia. Don't give up, don't give in. Resist what is happening.' ... We told people, if you vote for us, and if Shevardnadze takes the votes away, then we will go all the way, even to revolution. And we expected him to do that. We said we would do such a big action that would end in revolution. . . . It took us a lot of energy to persuade people and talk with them, explain things to them. We used all possible means of communication with the public. We never stopped. Misha [Saakashvili] has so much energy and personal motivational ability. He's very persuasive, so with time our numbers grew. 29

294 Open Society Georgia Foundation pre-election study. 295 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (38-40). 296 Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (34-37). 97

Like their counterparts in Kmara, National Movement activists worked to convince regular people that change was possible, and they challenged the belief that

Shevardnadze would always rule Georgia. This was necessary to weaken the entrenched resignation, so that people could develop a feeling of efficacy. These activists also inspired confidence in the people by holding rallies in different cities, even off-limits areas, where they knew they would face resistance and violence.

Because they didn't avoid trouble or danger, they said, they gained more trust in society. By not backing down, they showed the people it was possible to resist the authorities:

We were ready to fight. We went to the most radical places, not afraid of challenges. We had our goal and wouldn't back off. In this way, we showed people little victories all the time. The government couldn't stop us even though they tried. The little success stories helped people believe we could overcome problems. Not everything is controlled by the government-we can be the victors. Our main principle was to show people that that was not an eternal government, even though people joked about how Shevardnadze was eternal or irreplaceable. There was a kind of myth that Georgia would fall apart without Shevardnadze. But at some point people understood that Georgia was already falling apart-things couldn't be worse. There was no money, no food, no statehood, no army, no justice, nothing for the public. Everything was moving logically towards this. The outrage of people was growing, and dissatisfaction increasing every day. Then there was this political party that was very honest and true to the people. We never played any games and made no back-door deals. We were very radical about the country having a better future. This little group of activists was demonstrating success every day. It looked like the Shevardnadze regime couldn't stop us, so we acquired the image of being unstoppable. We were like warriors. These radical confrontations made us the only alternative to the Shevardnadze regime.297

Western governments also became more involved in Georgian politics, taking great measures to ensure honest elections in November 2003. In July of that year, former US

Secretary of State James Baker made a trip to Georgia, mainly to encourage his old

297 Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (34-37). 98 counterpart Shevardnadze to hold fair elections. According to Saakashvili, who attended a meeting between Shevardnadze, US Ambassador Richard Miles, and opposition party leaders, the message to the president was that, if elections were unfair, it would mean

Georgia's international isolation.298 During the meeting, a new composition for the central election commission (CEC) was decided upon. This had been a source of contention and public protest, as parties disagreed on how many members each would have on the commission. Besides the diplomatic pressure, Georgia received economic aid. As Charles Fairbanks points out, the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) gave 1.5 million to cover the transfer of voter lists from paper to electronic format, and Western governments provided for more foreign election observers than ever before, through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE). In addition, NDI funded the NGO ISFED, enabling it to send its own observers and to conduct parallel vote tabulation (PVT). 299 With financial support from the Eurasia

Foundation, the British Council, and OSGF, Rustavi-2 planned to conduct an exit poll, agamst. t h e w1s . hes o f t h e government. JOO

As a result of all of this organization and mobilization, the energy level by fall 2003 was higher than usual. People were more plugged in. At least some part of society was

'pre-heated' and beginning to believe that change was possible, if not certain:

Around the beginning of October, people's thinking started to change. They were stirred up, anticipating the elections. It was like they were intellectually and instinctively expecting something, and this feeling gradually grew with the agitation.

298 "Former US Secretary of State Meets Georgian Opposition Leaders in Tbilisi," BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, July 5, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 299 Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.,"Georgia's Rose Revolution," Journal ofDemocracy 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 114-115. 300 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 182. 99

This optimism appeared a month before, that something would change to help the country's future, but they didn't completely believe it. 301

This opportunity for change was an election, which is commonplace in more

established democracies. Yet the fact that some Georgians were persuaded to see this as

an opportunity is significant, given popular attitudes about the government's dishonesty.

Whatever the actual level of fraud may have been in preceding elections, it was widely

believed that people's electoral access to power was limited. This time, however, there

was more hope that the elections would bring in a government that could lead the country

properly, and take the country in the right direction. This hope appeared because "these

elections were happening against a background of protest."302 It derived from the existence of an alternative to the old faces in power and from the mobilization campaign.

As one woman explained, before "people were passive because they thought their vote wouldn't change anything .... When you guess that something can be changed, then even passive people vote. Because of the campaign promoting voting on tv, everybody went then to vote-that time. "303

The 2003 elections were also seen as the last hope, the last chance to change anything: "Before the elections we were sure this was the last time of that Parliament.

People hated the faces they saw on tv all the time, saying stupid things trying to fool people. People saw these elections as the last chance to change it and have new faces that

301 Confidential interview with 2 non-protestors, by author, December 6, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (187). 302 Confidential interview by author, November 15, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (142). 303 Confidential interview with 2 non-protestors, by author, November 4, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (I 04-105). 100 would actually represent people's interests."304 Despite the talk of eternal Shevardnadze rule, people knew that his term was to end in 2005. The president had announced that he had no intention of altering the constitution in order to allow himself a third term. 305 He was, as Henry Hale explains, a lame duck. 306 However, there was fear that, if

Shevardnadze's clan remained in power after the parliamentary elections, nothing would change in people's lives. The fear was well-founded. In fact, Shevardnadze made it clear in an April 2003 interview that he wanted things to continue the same for many more years. In an interview about his new election bloc, For a New Georgia, he explained that it was in Georgia's interests to continue on the same path. Therefore, he was going to do all he could to ensure that his bloc won a majority in Parliament:

I must also say here without any prevarication that I have decided to lead the election bloc personally and fight for New Georgia to achieve impressive results in the parliamentary elections .... I will tell you right away what the main goal is. I will lead this bloc and use all the available constitutional, legal means to fight for victory in the parliamentary elections. That is because the main task over the next few years will be to safeguard our achievements and maintain, develop and strengthen the course and orientation we have been pursuing since the country gained its independence .... What is meant is that all the most important elements of the current policy of the state will be preserved beyond 2005.307

The stakes were very high. If Shevardnadze succeeded in this, he might be able to hand-pick a successor who would preserve the status quo (as both Yeltsin and Putin have done in Russia). In the next chapter, I present a timeline of key dates and events between election day, November 2"d, and St. George's day, November 23rd. Here, the focus will be

304 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (49-50). 305 "Georgian President to Lead New Bloc to Election Victory," BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, April 7, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 306 Henry E. Hale, "Democracy or Autocracy on the March? The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39 (2006): 308-309. 307 "Georgian President to Lead New Bloc to Election Victory," BBC Monitoring. 101 on what happened, according to Georgian and non-Georgian news sources and respondents' accounts. People's motivations regarding protest and leaders' framing work during this time will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. CHAPTERS

MOBILIZATION: THE ROSE REVOLUTION

November 2"d: Election Day

For many, election day was a bitter disappointment. A November 3rd Rezonansi article reported that the opposition's efforts to ensure a fair election had been in vain. The government had brought to the precincts its own voter lists, which suited it more than the ones that had been officially prepared. The opposition accused the government of attempting to falsify the election by changing the number of voters, and by removing people's names from the voter lists.308 According to Irakli Areshidze, it was clear as soon as September that the new lists were highly inaccurate, but little was done about it.

Certain NGO activists, including some who helped lead the RR, wanted the lists to be bad: they knew the resulting election problems would make Shevardnadze look worse and bring more people to protests. 309 The problems with the lists did make people angry:

This was the first time I was old enough to vote .... We had voter's lists that had to be posted publicly. I checked the day before. My father did in person, and I checked on the website, and we were on the list. On election day at 7 a.m. I couldn't find any of my family on the list. They basically removed us. I was fighting to prove

308 Rusiko Machaidze, "Zurab zhvania: Opozitsiam gaimarjva, magram darghvevebi seriozulia" [Zurab Zhvania: The opposition has won, but there are serious violations], Mteli kvira, November 3, 2003, no. 302(4034). Translated by author. 309 Irakli Areshidze, Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007), 145-146. 102 103

I'd been on the list the day before. I had to be at work at 8, and when I came I was almost crying. It was my first time and I really wanted to vote. I thought it was unfair, and still do. 310

Adding the names of dead souls to the lists gave the government even more possibilities for committing fraud: "There were people on the voter lists who were dead. I went to vote and saw this, and said you must change this. My mother has been dead for many years."311 Others experienced the fraud as election observers. One was a monitor for the OSCE in the 'off-limits' area ofKvemo Kartli, where National

Movement/opposition campaigners had had trouble before the election. It was governed by Levan Mamaladze, also known as Levan Pasha because of his ruling style:

Since 2003 I haven't been an observer-it's not entertaining anymore because there is less fraud now. Now it's not interesting because they follow all the procedures. Before, it was crazy, the fraud was so well organized. In Bolnisi, at every intersection there was a car of Levan Mamaladze supporters. He was Shevardnadze's special representative there, sort of like a governor of the region. Now he's in Russia, because Interpol is looking for him. So those cars were parked everywhere, and when they saw us coming, in our OSCE truck, they called each other to say 'they're coming to your polling station.' So when we got there, it was quiet, nothing was happening. Just some observers from GYLA and ISFED. Those observers would shout, 'do you know what was happening here before you arrived?!' They told us what had been going on: people not being allowed to vote, officials stuffing the ballot box. The government representatives denied it and accused us of trying to start trouble. But I left my number with the GYLA people, and 20 minutes after we left, someone called me and said 'come back, they're doing it again.' I had been taking lots of photos, so I had a photo of the ballot box from our first stop there, when there had only been a few ballots in it. When we went back, it was really full, and the top had been broken and fixed with scotch tape. I asked the chairman of the commission why it was like this. He told me a stupid story about how an old man had fallen on the box while voting. The GYLA person told me they had broken it right after we left and stuffed it. 312

31°Confidential interview with protestor, by author, November 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 168-170). 311 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (14 7). 312 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (49-50). 104

In addition to stuffing ballot boxes, some corrupt officials altered the vote counts in favor of Shevardnadze's bloc (For a New Georgia). As the reports on results made their way up the chain of command, the numbers changed. Officials did not bother to conceal what they were doing: "It happened all the time, and the officials didn't try to hide it.

They didn't care if anyone noticed or not. It was obvious, but they didn't care who saw what."313 I heard a similar story from a man who served as a monitor in Shevardnadze's

Tbilisi neighborhood:

I was part of ISFED, in the Krtsanisi neighborhood. More than anywhere else there were fraud attempts there-that's where Shevardnadze's residence is, where the police voted, and the army too. I participated in the PVT. I was counting votes, so I knew there was fraud. At 7 pm voting stopped. We closed and locked the doors, and started counting. I ran to each polling place in my region-there were 15 of those, and I coordinated among them. We counted the ballots. The majority of votes went to the National Movement, of course. Other people in the commission didn't want to sign off on this, but how could they not? We counted 400 for National Movement, for example. Then they had to sign. Then stamp it with their seal. I had documents like this for each of the 15 polling stations, signed and stamped. They also had theirs, but the other copies were also originals, not Xeroxes. In most other polling stations in my region, the total for the National Movement had been around 42-45%, for example. The fake numbers were different, around 19%. The fact that there were two 'originals,' each with a seal on it, hurt the officials during the legal investigation. Officials said they only had theirs, said they had never seen ours. The foreign organizations, like NDI and OSCE, understood what was happening when they saw these forms. I knew such things happened and expected it when we were counting for the PVT. I was furious when the very same people who signed the forms later said to my face 'no, this one is the original. Where did you get that one?'314

313 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (49-50). 314 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (51-53). 105

November 4th

ISFED director Zurab Chiaberashvili reported on the fraud in an interview. Some votes had been counted more than once, and police had been caught conducting voter carousels. Even though the Interior and Security Ministries had assured him that order would be maintained and that no ballot boxes would be taken, some boxes had been

'kidnapped' while the police were preoccupied with the carousels.315 The official preliminary results were announced, along with those of the PVT and the exit poll. There were obvious discrepancies.

Table 1. Preliminary Election Results Official (preliminary) Parallel Vote Tabulation Exit Poll

For a New Georgia 23.4% National Movement 26.3% National Movement 26.4%

National Movement 22.3% For a New Georgia 18.9% For a New Georgia 19.0%

Labor 14.0% Labor 17.4% Labor 17.5%

Burjanadze-Democrats 8.2% Burjanadze-Democrats 10.2% Burjanadze-Democrats 10.4%

New Rights 7.9% Revival 8.1 % Revival 9.0%

Revival 7.8% New Rights 8.0% New Rights 7.1%

Source: 24 saati, November 4, 2003, no. 288(500).

316 These were not the final results-and the exit poll numbers were questionable - but they indicated that people's worst fears might be realized, that the government was trying it again. Would people react now as they had in the past, expressing their anger and disappointment to friends and relatives? Or would this time be different? After the results were announced, there was a hush as people waited to see what would happen

315 Tamta Karchava, "Kartvelma khalkhma khelisuplebas gaqalbebaze uari utkhra" [The Georgian people have said no to the government's fraud], Rezonansi, November 4, 2003, no. 303(4035). Translated by author. 316 Areshidze, Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia, 151. 106 next: "They didn't know which direction it would take, what was coming."317 In the news, there was speculation: would the people come onto the streets, or not?318

This juncture in time could be seen as a closing of the political space. It seemed that the government was trying to repress the people once again, by denying them their already limited access to political power. But what could regular people do about it? The members of Kmara, the National Movement, and other groups and parties did not see it that way. They had promised to mount a protest in the event of fraud and were ready and willing to go on fighting. They still perceived a chance to resist the government-to further their own interests at least as much as those of the people. The groundwork had already been laid during the previous months and years of organization and mobilization, and what they needed now was for large numbers of people to come out and protest with them. Generals without armies were insufficient in number to achieve anything significant, whether that was obtaining the true results, holding new elections, or ousting

Shevardnadze and his government. They had to persuade enough people that they still had a chance to bring about change. The way they went about this will be addressed in more detail in subsequent chapters. This chapter will provide a general picture of the protest event itself.

Opposition leaders rallied their supporters. At the Philharmonia Hall, Zhvania announced that the Burjanadze-Democrats would boycott the election results. After the meeting, "thousands of people insulted by the loss of their votes moved out to Freedom

317 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (122-123). 318 Tamta Karchava, "Gamova tu ara khalkhi kuchashi archevnebis gaqalbebis shemtkhvevashi?" [Will the people come out onto the streets in the event of fraud?], Mteli kvira, November 3, 2003, no. 302(4034). Translated by author. 107

Square, City Hall, Parliament, and the CEC office to demand justice from the government."319 Saakashvili called on other opposition parties to unite and fight together, but only the Burjanadze-Democrats and Patiashvili-Ertoba did so. The Labor party and

Revival were against Saakashvili and his methods. The leadership of Revival

(Abashidze's party) warned that the National Movement's actions could be dangerous for the country, and that the National Movement was trying to steal the elections.320 The leader of the New Rights also announced that his party would not be joining the opposition protests at that time. 321 Saakashvili delivered Shevardnadze an ultimatum, the

1 first of many: either acknowledge the National Movement's victory by noon on the 5 h, or face a crowd of protestors outside the Chancellery (home of the presidential administration) demanding the president's resignation.322 Saakashvili asked the people to be patient. The government could still change its position and admit the opposition's victory, but "if Shevardnadze wants a revolution, he will get one. Tomorrow morning there will no longer be an alternative to Shevardnadze's overthrow."323

319 Rusiko Machaidze, "Opozitsiis ori prtkha masobriv aktsiebs gegmavs" [Two wings of the opposition plan mass demonstrations], Rezonansi, November 5, 2003, no. 304 (4036). Translated by author; As Fairbanks points out, the area in front of Parliament is symbolic because of its connection with the April 9th, 1989 massacre. In the years since, occupying this site has given protestors more legitimacy. Personal correspondence. 320 Tengiz Pachkoria, "Call for Demonstrations Denounced in Georgia," !TAR-TASS News Agency, November 4, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 321 Gera Mamulashvili," 'Akhlebi' kuchashi ar gamovlen" [New Rights will not come out onto the streets], Rezonansi, November 5, 2003, no. 304 (4036). Translated by author. 322 Giorgi Asanishvili, "Ertad-khelisuplebis dzaladobis tsinaaghmdeg" [United against the government's violence], 24 saati, November 5, 2003, no. 289(501). Translated by author. 323 Eliso Chapidze, "Tu shevardnadzes unda revolutsia, miighebs mas" [If Shevardnadze wants a revolution, he will get one], Rezonansi, November 5, 2003, no. 304 (4036). Translated by author. 108

Shevardnadze and CEC head Devdariani asked people to calm down. The vote counting hadn't been completed yet, so why were people already protesting?324 The president met with his security and interior ministers and the general prosecutor at the

Chancellery. The leader of a special forces battalion also joined them, which fueled suspicions that the government intended to use force against protestors. Interior troops and police 'laid siege' to the Chancellery, surrounding it with four large trucks to block protestor access. In response to Saakashvili's ultimatum, Shevardnadze reminded

Georgians that the opposition leaders had grown up under him. Therefore, they knew very well that their threats would not scare him. In Shevardnadze's opinion, these elections were the most transparent in years and signified a new stage of Georgian democracy. He too was interested in fair elections, and if there were complaints about the results, those should be directed to the courts and not the CEC.325

November 5th

Another protest was held near City Hall on Freedom Square, which Saakashvili began with the assurance that there was no division among the people. The division was between Shevardnadze and his "400 dogs" on one side and the people, police, and entire society on the other. In other words, these were unlike the protests during

Gamsakhurdia' s rule. Those had pitted large groups of people against each other and resulted in civil war. A journalist noted that, this time, the crowd of protestors included

324 Tengiz Pachkoria, "Georgian Official Urges Opposition to Stop Pressuring Her Agency," ITAR­ TASS News Agency, November 4, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 32 Tamar Khorbaladze, "Qvelaperze tsamsvleli kantselaria" [Chancellery will do whatever it takes], 24 saati, November 5, 2003, no. 289 (501). Translated by author and Kate Lomtatidze. 109 people from other Georgian cities. At the first demonstration, there had been only Tbilisi residents. 326 A respondent who attended the rally that day described it this way:

I went the first time on November 5. The election results were a nightmare­ absurd, far from reality. Saakashvili announced that on November 5 there would be a protest rally in front of Parliament and that people should come. I went and saw a large number of people. More came with time. It was good that they came out in bad weather, not in order to see what was happening, but it seemed out of a sense of protest that had appeared. At the beginning, they talked about nothing except how angry they were at the government. It wasn't expressed especially well, but these were regular people, who wanted to show that this was too much.327

Saakashvili reminded people that the time had come for Georgia to wake up, and he issued a categorical demand to the CEC that it throw out the falsified results from certain regions of the country. He was not fighting for a government of his own, he said, but so that all Georgians could live without Shevardnadze and the other thieves. Aware that many were afraid, Saakashvili assured them that the opposition did not want destabilization, and that they would all be safe if many stood together. It was time for the government to fear the people-the people should no longer fear the government. And if

Shevardnadze still intended to carry out the fraud, the opposition would bring all of

Georgia to Tbilisi. 328 Afterward, Saakashvili told protesters to go home and rest, to prepare for another battle in two days' time. He declared that opposition parties that

326 Sopo Bukia, "Ultimatumi" [Ultimatum], 24 saati, November 6, 2003, no. 290 (502). Translated by author. 327 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 328 Gera Mamulashvili, "Saakashvilma khelisuplebas khval 3 saatamde ultimatumebi tsauqena" [Saakashvili has given the government until 3 o'clock tomorrow], Rezonansi, November 6, 2003, no. 305(4037). Translated by author. 110 hadn't joined with the National Movement and Burjanadze-Democrats had committed political suicide. 329

1 November 6 h

There was bad news from Ajara. According to the counts from that region, the

Revival party was now in first place nationally, with Shevardnadze's bloc in second and the National Movement in third. National Movement representatives countered in an announcement that they were the actual winners, according to the exit poll and PVT, and that they would not forgive the government for this.330 What was even worse about the

Ajaran results was their outrageousness: the number of votes allegedly won exceeded the number of registered voters. 331 This was not out of character: "I expected it of course, everyone did. We expected it from Ajara, that Abashidze would do it. ... Someone from the CEC said he was shocked at the level of falsification from Ajara, the sheer numbers.

That many people didn't even live in the region."332 After the president flew to Ajara to meet with his new 'ally' Abashidze, Saakashvili accused Shevardnadze and Abashidze of making a secret deal. 333 As Cory Welt points out, Shevardnadze needed Abashidze's support, in order for his bloc to win against the opposition. The president could not afford to anger him, either, because that could have led to further loss of control over Georgian

329 "Georgian Opposition to Resume Street Demonstrations on 7 November," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 5, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 330 "Georgia: Opposition Party Leader Calls for Mass Protest Actions," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 6, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 331 Fairbanks, "Georgia's Rose Revolution," 116 332 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (189). 333 "Bariertan" [At the barricade], 24 saati, November 7, 2003, no. 291 (503). Translated by author. 111 territory.334 Journalist Paata Veshapidze explained to Georgians what Abashidze needed: even if the befuddled government still hadn't understood, Abashidze's real goal was not to have more deputies in Parliament. The Ajaran leader was thinking ahead to the 2005 presidential elections and wanted to be able to claim legally that he had greater support among voters.335 If Shevardnadze did not challenge his numbers, they would be considered valid.

November gth

The concerned government took action against the protest movement, especially the

1 big rally planned for the 8 h. Police blocked every entrance into Tbilisi with big trucks.

They closed the roads to buses and minivans full of National Movement supporters heading to Tbilisi from all different parts of the country, east and west. According to one news source, police opened fire on a bus coming from the east. With the passengers inside, police shot at it to flatten the tires. 336 On the main highway coming to Tbilisi from the west, minivans full of opposition supporters were stopped, and their drivers were taken to a local police office under suspicion of being drunk or too fatigued to drive safely. A local police official promised that everything would be cleared up, but National

Movement supporters then embarrassed officials by closing off the road themselves, in

334 Welt, "Regime Vulnerability and Popular Mobilization," 30. 335 Paata Veshapidze, "Ras nishnavs aghordzinebis 270 atasi khma" [What Revival's 270 thousand votes mean], 24 saati, November 7, 2003, no. 291 (503). Translated by author. 336 Inga Alavidze, "Tbilisisken momavali momitingeebi politsiis sagushagoze datskhriles" [At police checkpoints, they shot at protesters coming to Tbilisi], 24 saati, November 9, 2003, Special Number 293. Translated by author and Kate Lomtatidze. 112 protest again these detentions. 337 Respondents talked about the road closings, having heard about them or experienced them personally:

You might have heard about the police road blocks .... To get to Tbilisi from Ozurgeti, you had to pass through 8 or 9 police cordons. Once, only one of our minibuses could get through. Three had to stay back because of the police cordons. The police wouldn't let them through. But you know there are other roads, and we got around them. They got around them .... Then, on the 22nd, many wanted to come to Tbilisi on trains, but the government stopped the trains. There were many who wanted to come, but not enough transport. The government was making it harder for people to come. 338

Shevardnadze's government created further obstacles to collective action. Work hours were suddenly strictly enforced for government employees. Before, "there hadn't been such strictness about work hours. It was possible to come 30 minutes or an hour late to work, or leave early, and no one said anything. But during the RR you had to be there not a minute late, and it was not allowed to leave early." Now, such employees were threatened with job loss or a decrease in salary, which they couldn't afford. "The government didn't put pressure on people directly, in order not to create more negative feeling against the government. It was as if they tried to hamper protest by legal means."339 These actions did keep some would-be protestors from coming, but they made others even more determined. On the background of a pre-heated society, government attempts to restrict people raised the temperature even higher: "The more the government

337 Kakha Mchedlidze, "Ratom gadaiketa tbilisisken mimavali avtomagistralebz'' [Why the highways to Tbilisi are closed], RFE-RL website, November 8, 2003, http://www.tavisupleba.org/special/ politics/2003/11/20031108124759.asp (accessed July 12, 2008). Translated by author. 338 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (111-113). 339 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 113 opposed us, the more we heated up. So yes, it was a bad idea for the government to do that."340

Despite the obstacles, approximately 10,000-15,000 people gathered in Tbilisi on the 341 gth_ Rallies were held inside the Philharmonia, and protestors blocked off parts of

Rustaveli A venue in front of City Hall on Freedom Square, and then in front of

Parliament. Although Burjanadze and Zhvania were to a large extent united with

Saakashvili's party in the fight, the two sides had slightly different goals. The first two were less radical: Burjanadze denounced the fraud, refusing to recognize the official results or participate in the new Parliament. Zhvania called for the elections to be

342 declared invalid and dismissed the idea of a compromise with Shevardnadze.

Saakashvili, on the other hand, wanted the election results honored, because according to the exit poll and PVT his party had won. By the evening of the gth, the National

Movement was calling for the president's resignation.343 The opposition leaders were united in urging protestors to remain peaceful and not fight with police. Despite his radical rhetoric, Saakashvili emphasized that he was not advocating a violent overthrow

34°Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (122-123). 341 Tamar Chikovani, "Natsionalurma modzraobam tbilisis tsentrshi saprotesto aktsia daitsqo" [The National Movement has begun a protest action in Tbilisi's center], RFE-RL website, November 8, 2003, http://www.tavisupleba.org/special/politics/2003/l l/2003 l l 08124637.asp accessed 11-9-03. Translated by author; Sopo Bukia, "Me, mis ha saakashvili, ar vapireb dhges akedan tsasvlas" [I, Misha Saakashvili, do not intend to leave here today], 24 saati, November 9, 2003, Special Number 293. Translated by author. 342 Tengiz Pachkoria, "Opposition Supporters Gather in Tbilisi Near Pres Residence," !TAR-TASS News Agency, November 8, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 343 Tamar Chikovani, "Natsionalurma modzraobam tbilisis tsentrshi saprotesto aktsia daitsqo." 114 or the use of force. He simply wanted to use popular pressure to force Shevardnadze out of office. 344

As soon as the protests began in Tbilisi, interior troops and policemen were sent to guard certain buildings, such as the CEC office.345 Now, over 800 armed interior troops, guardsmen, and policemen were sent to protect the Chancellery.346 In another televised interview, Saakashvili addressed all the people watching the events from home, assuring them there was no need to fear bloodshed, because he wouldn't allow weapons to be used. The police would not shoot demonstrators because they were really on the people's side. 347 RR leaders had to reassure people frequently, because many were simply afraid to go protest. People could remember 1956 and 1989 and the violent suppression of election protests in Baku, Azerbaijan the month before.348 Georgians had some concerns about what their own police and interior troops might do:

When we got to the Chancellery, there about 120 or 150 of us, and the rest were in military uniforms, or police. It was a little scary, because not long before that we had seen what happened in Baku. I thought maybe they would let us inside the gates so

344 Tengiz Pachkoria, "Georgia Opposition Leader Said No Plans to Seize Power by Force," !TAR- TASS News Agency, November 8, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 345 "Mass-meeting in Tbilisi," RIA OREANDA, November 5, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 346 "Police on Alert Ahead of Opposition Protest Rally," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 8, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July l l, 2008). 347 "Georgian Opposition Leader Tells People to March on Parliament," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 8, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July l l, 2008). 348 Christian Lowe, "At Least Two Dead in Riots Sparked by President Son's Win in Azerbaijan," Agence France Presse, October 16, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July l l, 2008); "Some 600 Azeris Arrested in Riots-Unofficial Sources," BBC Monitoring International Reports, October 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). In October 2003, President Heidar Aliev's son, Ilham, was elected as his successor, but the elections were considered suspect. Protests against the results became violent and led to clashes with police and special forces, who used truncheons, tear gas, stun grenades, and water cannons to put down the demonstrations. At least one was killed, many were injured, and hundreds arrested. 115

they could surround us, so they could say someone incited panic, and that's why they had to use force. 349

Many people experienced fear during these weeks. Certain factors overrode the fears, in the case of protestors. One was the powerful feeling of community. While some protestors might have been out there to pursue personal goals, others thought in more collective terms, such as the following young man. He remembered feeling 'surprising fear' during November-what surprised him was the fact that he hadn't tried to protect himself, even though he had felt he was in danger:

I don't know about others, but I felt it, because of the situation .... People said the Gulua division (special forces) was coming. The most surprising thing was that I was afraid but I never thought about leaving-that maybe I should go home. I never once thought about that. It's not logical, but that feeling of community was strong. I can't explain. If I'm sitting here, and I see a helicopter coming at the window, I will get out of the way immediately. Save myself, right? Then, I didn't do that. It was because of the community.350

Another mitigating factor was an awareness that the armed forces had been suffering under the same conditions as the general population. Because of this, some thought that the police and soldiers would probably not use force to protect the government and government buildings, even though they had the legal right to:

I was afraid, but I knew that those young men and soldiers standing there in uniforms had lived together with the regular people through the bad times from 1991-1997. So I was confident they wouldn't shoot the people-scare them, maybe yes. They lived the same way everyone else did. The members of the special forces weren't provided for either. They weren't stupid. They could see the country was gomg. to h e 11 .351

349 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (I I I -I I 3 ). 35°Confidential interview with protestor, by author, November 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (I 62). 351 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, ( 111-113 ). 116

Armed forces and police hadn't been properly fed or uniformed for a long time, and in the years before 2003 there had been more than one mutiny because of such problems.352 Still, just in case, activists and opposition leaders began a campaign to persuade the police and armed forces not to use violence against the people. One example from the campaign was a television commercial: "A guy and his father are having breakfast, then the son puts on a Kmara t-shirt, the father puts on a police uniform, then they go together to the protests, to stand on opposite sides. The message was 'you can't shoot us.' "353 Other elements of the campaign were to give food and flowers to the police, and pray with them:

We worked with the soldiers before, giving them flowers, feeding them because Shevardnadze's government didn't pay them salaries or even feed them while they were guarding government buildings . . . so it was hard for them to do anything against us when they were ordered to.

They were ordered to?

Yes, it's not speculation. Afterwards they said 'we never gave such an order.' Days and weeks before, our activists went to them and gave the soldiers flowers, hugged them, sang with them, prayed with them. Some soldiers opened up to this. We were showing them we are your brothers, sisters, parents. By the end, it was the government alone on the one side, and whole population on the other. Not like a civil war situation with a divided public. The regime had some authority over troops, but it was very weak. I think the armed forces people saw themselves more as a part of society than part of the authorities. It was because of the human touch with every so ld1er. stan d.mg t h ere. 354

352 "Mutiny by Georgian Troops Over, as Grievances Remain," Agence France Presse, May 26, 2001, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). The group's leader, Colonel Kryalashvili, explained that the action was provoked by the poor conditions they lived in: no shoes, poor uniforms, insufficient food, and no pay for more than a year. 353 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, September 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (17-18). 354 Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (34-37). 117

November 9th - 13th

Early on the morning of the 9th, Shevardnadze took a risk and went out to meet with protestors. He was confronted by thousands of "insulted and dissatisfied" protestors who had spent the rainy night there in front of Parliament. Someone yelled at him 'resign!

Aren't you a brave man? Resign!' Another yelled "Victory to Georgia, but not to

Shevardnadze! We will stand here until the president meets our demands!"355 A few respondents spoke about this encounter:

I remember from my childhood Shevardnadze had always had charisma. Sometimes people who were critical of him, he would invite to meet with him, and they came out of his office very different, quite pleased. He spoke well and influenced people, and people always said he had charisma. But I remember one night during the protests Shevardnadze came outside to the people and they said go away. He was probably shocked. Earlier, it never happened that way. This time he came early in the morning. The RR leaders weren't there, they were resting .... The people standing out there were very tired, and had been out there several nights. Shevardnadze thought he would go to them, was probably thinking of earlier times he had done this and it had been successful. But this time, an old man said to Shevardnadze 'go away. We have nothing we can talk about with you anymore. You are a bad person.' He must have been shocked, and probably understood that his time was up. 35

Saakashvili's rhetoric remained radical. At a rally, he promised that Shevardnadze and his regime would return all their stolen wealth and rot in jail. He assured everyone that "no one has ever been escorted to a funeral as joyfully as we will put President

Shevardnadze's regime to rest."357 He called on Shevardnadze to arrest the people

355 Rusiko Machaidze, "Ratom ver daelaparaka Shevardnadze khalkhs?" [Why couldn't Shevardnadze speak with the people?], Mteli kvira, November 10, 2003, no. 309 (404). Translated by author. 356 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 189). 357 "In Quotes: Georgia's War of Words," BBC News, November 13, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/world/europe/3267769.stm (accessed July 12, 2008). 118 responsible for the voting fraud "or become another Ceaucescu. "358 Shevardnadze and others responded to this with concern: the president worried that Saakashvili might be a

'dangerous element.' Georgia did not need another reign of Stalinist terror. 359 Leader of the pro-government Socialist Party Rcheulishvili expressed doubts that Saakashvili was in his right mind. He considered Saakashvili a fascist maniac eager for bloodshed. 360

On the 9t\ the three United Opposition leaders-Saakashvili, Zhvania, and

Burjanadze-met with Shevardnadze at his residence in order to establish dialogue. After two hours, Saakashvili left the meeting, calling it a waste of time.361 For the next several days, there were suggestions of further meetings, where they should be held, and who should attend. The opposition leaders refused to go to the Chancellery or to meet with the president separately, for fear that it would morally compromise their position.362 They also rejected the idea of including other parties in the talks, while Shevardnadze welcomed a meeting with all parties who had cleared the 7% barrier.363 The opposition accused the other parties in question (Industrialists, Revival, and the Labor Party) of bargaining with Shevardnadze for this privilege. In reality, those parties were not the

358 Dan Sershen, "Battle Lines being Drawn in Georgia Following Disputed Election," Eurasianet website, November 4, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eavl l 0403.shtml (accessed July 12, 2008). 359 "Georgian President Described Opposition Leader as 'Dangerous Phenomenon'," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 9, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July l l, 2008). 360 "Georgian Pro-Government Party Chief Slams 'Fascist' Opposition Leader," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 9, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 361 "Georgian Opposition Leader Walks out of Talks over President's 'Time Wasting,'" BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 9, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 362 "Party Leader Not to Meet Georgian President without Opposition Colleagues," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 9, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 363 "Georgian President Wants More Opposition Parties Involved in Crisis Talks," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 11, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 119

364 opposition. A meeting was planned for the 12th between Shevardnadze, Saakashvili,

Zhvania, and Burjanadze, but the three opposition leaders did not come.365

Civil society actors and cultural and scientific figures began to take on a more visible role. A very sarcastic editorial was written about the president's inability to comprehend the people's desire for him to go. 366 The group who would later form ArtCom met in a movie theater to discuss their position on what was happening. Had Shevardnadze upheld his vow to protect the security and future of the people? Had he protected the constitution and the country's territorial integrity? No.367 The next day they published a letter to the president:

Dear president! A democratic system of government is the Georgian people's basic value. The essence of democracy, however, is free and fair elections. The Georgian government has raised its hand against this sacred thing, and as a result democracy has become a front for decadence and evildoing. We refuse to live in this falseness, and we appeal to you as the one mainly responsible for what is happening, and we demand: annul the elections or leave office, because a ruler who can't see to it that the main purity of democracy is defended in his own country loses legitimacy and no longer has the right to be called a free people's president.368

The head of the CEC, Devdariani, informed the National Movement it could have 3 more seats in Parliament if it stopped the protests, but Saak:ashvili refused the offer and refused to meet with Shevardnadze, Minister of State Jorbenadze, and Devdariani.

364 "Georgian Opposition Rejects Proposed Change to Format of Talks with Government," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 11, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 365 "Georgian Opposition No-show at Truce Talks with President," Agence France Presse, November 12, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 366 Irakli Beriashvili, "Mash, mtquanis?!" [Who's lying?!], 24 saati, November 10, 2003, no. 293. Translated by Kate Lomtatidze and author. 367 "Mimartva sakartvelos presidents" [Address to the Georgian president], 24 saati, November 10, 2003, no. 293. Translated by the author and Kate Lomtatidze. 368 "Mimartva sakartvelos presidents: Sakartvelos kulturis moghvatseta da metsnierta darbazt' [Address to the Georgian president: Group of Georgia's cultural activists and scientists], Mteli kvira, November 10, 2003, no. 309 (4041). Translated by the author and Kate Lomtatidze. 120

Saakashvili emphasized that his party would make no deals with Shevardnadze and could not be bribed. Shevardnadze seemed to have mistaken Saakashvili for one of his corrupt officials. The National Movement and the United Opposition would settle for no less than official confirmation of what the real vote counts had been on the 2nd, which meant defeat for Shevardnadze and victory for the Georgian people and the National Movement. The people hadn't been standing out in the rain and cold for so long so they could have 3 more seats. 369

The cold and rainy weather seemed to be working against the opposition protestors, as one activist said: "It rained the whole time, which was strange. Even in other cities.

When Shevardnadze's people had gatherings, there was good weather, but not for us. We kept changing clothes, but we were wet all the time."370 A discouraging newspaper article warned Georgians of the long-term effect their protesting could have on their health:

"Deterioration of not only their physical but also psychological condition threatens the protestors standing in the rain and cold. Maybe most protestors are less concerned at this time with their health and health problems, but in the end there will be ruined nerves."371

Nevertheless, protestors had maintained a presence since the 5th. One news source estimated that the protestors usually numbered 1,500 during the day and 150-200 at night. 372 Those who were determined to go, went prepared. They dressed in extra warm clothing and took umbrellas. RR supporters who lived or worked near the epicenter gave

369 "Opposition Leader Ready to Meet Georgian President Only If He Admits Poll Defeat," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 12, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 37° Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (79). 371 Kety Berikashvili, "Momitingeebi uarqopiti psikologiuri zetsolis kvesh imqopebian" [Protestors are under negative psychological pressure], Rezonansi, November 13, 2003, no. 312 (4044). Translated by author. 372 "5,000 People Come to Rally of Opposition in Tbilisi," !TAR-TASS News Agency. 121 warm food and tea to those taking a break from the protests, and organizers bought long plastic sheets that people held overhead in an attempt to stay dry. One protestor remembered how Kmara members had helped him and some others warm up at one point: "At one protest, we were very cold. People from Kmara came and took us to some buses, and we warmed our feet by the bus engine. They gave us something to eat, too.

That's how we were with one another. Cigarettes were communal. You could feel that respect every day."373

Despite the cold weather, the atmosphere at protests remained warm. The mukhti

(emotional energy) generated within society by the protests and developments contributed to this, and to the persistence of the protest movement. Mukhti is a scientific term also used to describe a social phenomenon. It is electricity that 'bites' you, an electrical charge or tension that lights you up. It is emotional, connected with optimism, and easily spreads from person to person. Most importantly, it gives you an impulse to act. One of the first to talk about it described it as "a spark that can light a fire. During the period after the elections the spark was already there. Mukhti is also something else, a kind of aura. Something comes that pulls you in, and something wakes up in you.

Emotions wake up so that you want to be plugged in, to go there, to participate."374 It implies uniting: "Mukhti is the spark that caused the RR. It was those people's desire, figuratively speaking, which caused the RR. People's uniting around a national idea: the idea of freeing people from Shevardnadze's regime."375 It comes from and builds a

373 Confidential interview by Usup Bitsadze, December 2006, Chiatura, Georgia, written notes, (192). 374 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (64). 375 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 1, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (85). 122 feeling of solidarity, as well: "It always happens when people stand together in battle, like in old times: 1000 men together before battle, beating chests and weapons, feeling

'we are together.' It is a moment of mass togetherness."376 Finally, it involves the awareness that other people are experiencing the same thing you are: "Everybody feels the same thing together, in a situation. For example, it's like when you're in the theater and all the audience is feeling the same thing."377

As mukhti is an electrical charge, it can be positive or negative, but the RR's mukhti was described exclusively in positive terms: "Mukhti means that you have such a feeling that you see your hope for a better life may come true. So you are so energetic, you are like superman, and superman is not afraid of anything, even death."378 But this force is no mere good mood. Like an accumulated electrical charge, it was energy that had been gathering for about ten years:

Mukhti is, for example, anger is accumulating and accumulating, and at one point, you can gather all the anger that society has into one big ball called mukhti, and people can just explode with one idea. We want to get rid of this government, and we want a new life. This means people were ready, they were watching tv and they were ready to switch off the tv and go into the street. This means mukhti. They were ready to leave wife and child at home and stand in the street for 24 hours. In the rain. This means people's mukhti. They were ready to fight. For 5 days [in a row] we were standing in the rain. People were standing there, it means they had this mukhti. It means they'd had enough, let's change it. It's not anger. It's energy, national energy, which accumulates when they want to achieve something.379

376 Confidential interview with ArtCom member, by author, November 6, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (107-110). 377 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 1, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (86-88). 378 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 191 ). 379 Confidential interview with activist from ALPE, by author, November 3, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (91-103 ). 123

Mukhti and revolutionary spirit had to be fed and stoked-especially when so many forces were working against the protest movement: the weather, the government, and the apathy. A Kmara activist described one tactic for maintaining people's spirits: "We took a few hundred protestors around the comer to eat and then had them come back as if they were new. As if they were new forces just now coming to join. It had a direct effect on people because it kept the spirit up."38°Careful thought was given to how to stage a protest, so that it would have the maximum aesthetic impact.381 Activists and organizers tried to incorporate different art forms in their actions, such as poetry readings, dancing, and singing of national songs. Students remembered hearing Georgian traditional songs alternating with Pink Floyd's The Wall. Artists from various groups joined together as the

Rain Musicians to play for the protestors. They wrote a hymn for the protest movement,

"A New Day," which was then turned into a music video. A member ofRevCom explained why it was so important to incorporate music and dance into the rallies:

We're an artistic people. People gather together and stand for a long time, and what are they supposed to do? They start talking, then right away come the musicians .... It rained, it poured for a week without stop, and here stood thousands of people under plastic sheeting. My friends and I brought a truck here, set up a stage in the back of it, and they played for the people, all night. The people didn't leave. On the 5th day, the most decisive day, during the night the rain isn't stopping. It's hard to keep standing there. Shevardnadze and the government counted on the fact that the rain [would discourage people], but people didn't leave. And on the 6th day, in the morning Shevardnadze came and understood it was over. 500 people had stood there all night. All 5 nights, and we were with them. 382

38°Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, September 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (17-18). 381 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (38-40). 382 Confidential interview with RevCom member, by author, December 2, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 17 4-177). 124

Television was another source of mukhti. In fact, the media played an essential role

in the RR, and the channel Rustavi-2 in particular is given a great deal of credit for making the RR possible. A reporter with the channel explained that "Rustavi-2 was shock tv. We were young, aggressive, determined. We wanted change .... Shevardnadze had tried to stop us twice [in 1996 and 2001] but couldn't. The ministers were all dismissed

because of us, the Iron Man too [Kakha Targamadze]. He said we would not be able to

move him, but we did. "383 The channel supplied people with vital information, such as the exit poll and PVT results. It also waged an information war against the government.

Many of the government's attempts to stop the opposition were caught by the media-the roadblocks, the fights with opposition people as they held rallies in other cities-which

all made the government look bad: "They didn't understand they were losing the information war, because we showed it all on tv. It was a minus for them. They were aggressive, then there were fights, then it showed up on tv. 'Damn, more bad press!' It didn't help."384 This information and the way it was provided created more mukhti. In the words of one RR supporter, the channel was responsible for keeping up society's temperature after the elections, for generating mukhti:

During the whole revolution time, Rustavi-2 was broadcasting to all of Georgia that in Tbilisi something active was happening, as if irritating society. 'Come, don't stop, wake up, come to life! If not, the situation we're in, the direction we've been going in, it could get worse.' Rustavi-2 was saying we can't go backwards, can't return to that. 'Come out onto the streets! Wake up! Come to life!' ... and other messages.

In those words?

383 Confidential interview with reporter at Rustavi-2, by author, November 24, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (157-160). 384 Ibid. 125

Not so directly, but that was the idea, so that it was instantly clear. It worked in society, this PR. People didn't sit at home, but were more interested in this process. 385

For Collins, this emotional energy is related to what Durkheim called 'collective effervescence.'386 However, Durkheim's understanding differs from what happened in the Georgian case. In his description of religious rituals in Australian aboriginal societies,

Durkheim noted the emotional transformations that occurred during periodic gatherings:

"Once the individuals are gathered together, a sort of electricity is generated from their closeness and quickly launches them to an extraordinary height of exaltation."387

Consciousnesses became "wide open" and impressionable, and the emotions were amplified as they spread from person to person: "And since passions so heated and so free from all control cannot help but spill over, from every side there are nothing but wild movements, shouts, downright howls, and deafening noises of all kinds that further intensify the state they are expressing." What ensued was commotion, regulated by singing and dancing, with people willfully violating the moral rules they normally lived by. 388

This bears only a slight resemblance to the RR. Protestors did sing and dance and felt larger than themselves while together. The mukhti was contagious, but there is no evidence that it ever freed those affected 'from all control.' That is not evidenced by video footage, news reports, or interview data. There were instances of violence before the elections and during November-some fistfights and shooting incidents in various

385 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (122-123 ). 386 Collins, "Focus of Emotional Attention," 28. 387 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms ofReligious Life. Translated by Karen E. Fields (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 217. 388 Ibid., 218. 126

cities-but respondents also remembered a high level of organization during those weeks.

In addition to the activists and movement leaders, some protestors themselves worked

hard to maintain peace and order:

Part of the reason why the RR remained so peaceful was that things were so organized, even if not formally. People organized themselves quite well. For example, who would protest on which 'shift.' And lots of people took the lead, unofficially. I saw other groups making plans the way my friends and I did. People just worked together, with crowd control, for example. There were lots of others who also tried to stop people from doing something stupid or violent. ... I was impressed to see this, because it's so hard to control such a large crowd.389

November 14th

Appealing to popular fears, President Shevardnadze urged Georgians not to attend the rally scheduled for this day. The potential for provocation and civil conflict was too great.390 Now, Georgians needed to go home and let the new Parliament begin its work, and resolve the crisis. Maybe after things calmed down he would resign, but now it would lead to so much instability.391 Despite the warnings, thousands came. By the opposition's accounts, 40,000 gathered in front of Parliament. According to the police, there were 8,000-10,000 protestors.392 Another 200 demonstrated in front of the CEC building.393 Saakashvili gave Shevardnadze another ultimatum: 'come out here and look

389 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (49-50). 390 "Shevardnadze Warns against Civil War Ahead of Mass Protest," Xinhua General News Service, November 14, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 391 "5,000 People Come to Rally of Opposition in Tbilisi," /TAR-TASS News Agency. 392 "Opposition Says 40,000 Take Part in Tbilisi Rally, Police Denies," /TAR-TASS News Agency, November 14, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 393 "Saakashvili, Supporters Rallying Near Central Elections Commission," News Bulletin, November 14, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 127 your people in the eye within one hour, or we will no longer consider you our president.'

When Shevardnadze did not come, Saakashvili led some of the protestors from

Parliament to the Chancellery, so they could surround the building with a human chain.

Opposition leaders made it clear that the goal was not to storm the building, but for

Shevardnadze to be aware of the people, and to hear them shouting for his resignation.394

November 15-20

After the previous day's massive rally, some members of the opposition parties began a hunger strike by the CEC building. The United Opposition called for a time out, and announced that protests would resume on Monday in front of Parliament. 395 On

Sunday, however, they announced protest was postponed until after final election results were given. Instead, the focus was shifted to a campaign of massive civil disobedience. In response to the opposition's continued calls for citizens to bring the functioning of the government to a halt, Shevardnadze met with his ministers of the interior, security, and defense. They announced that attempts to hinder state operations would be punished according to the law. 396 Despite the level of protest against him, Shevardnadze refused to leave, dismissing the idea that a few angry politicians could force him out of office. Such decisions should be made by the people. However, after the new Parliament began its work, he could look into the opposition's complaints. As Shevardnadze gave his weekly

394 "Georgia: Protesters Urged to Go and Shout outside Presidential Office," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 14, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 395 "Georgian Opposition Takes Timeout," News Bulletin, November 15, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 396 Nikolai Topuria, "Georgian Opposition to Press Calls for Shevardnadze to Resign," Agence France Presse, November 16, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 128 radio address on Monday, hundreds of cars honked their horns in protest outside

Parliament, while hundreds of anti-government protestors shouted in solidarity. 397

Saakashvili told journalists about a plan to have United Opposition supporters come to the capital from all over Georgia.398 They would show Shevardnadze they had had enough of his regime. Saakashvili also wanted people to know that about 2000 Ajaran police were coming to counter their anti-government protests, because Shevardnadze no longer trusted the police in Tbilisi. Opposition leaders called again for their supporters to prevent the government from doing its work, by means of civil disobedience.399 To add to the complexity, the widow of former President Gamsakhurdia gathered a few hundred protestors on Rustaveli A venue. They also called for Shevardnadze and his government to resign, but they also protested against the radical United Opposition, led by

Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Burjanadze. They wanted to see Gamsakhurdia's government restored. 400

The Ajaran contingent arrived on the 18th and began pro-government demonstrations in front of Parliament. A protestor remembered that the opposition rallies had been attended by all kinds of people: women, men, and children. The Ajarans, on the other hand, were only men between the ages of 18 and 45, and they were "equipped for battle,

397 Jim Heintz, "Georgian President Insists He Won't Give in to Protesters," Associated Press, November 17, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 398 "Georgian Opposition Calls for 'Peaceful March' to Demand That President Resign," BBC Monitoring, November 17, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 399 "Georgian Opposition Calls for Civil Protests," RIA Novosti, November 17, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 400 "Georgian Opposition Rally Splits into Two Groups," News Bulletin, November 17, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 129 to put it bluntly."401 These men were not necessarily Abashidze or Shevardnadze

supporters: those who worked for the regional government had been given the choice of

going to Tbilisi or losing their jobs, as an Ajaran activist told me in Batumi:

Some Saakashvili supporters left from Ajara-those people left quietly. It was hard because only pro-Abashidze people could leave Ajara then. The border was closed. People with jobs in the public sector were ordered to go support the Ajara regime or face job loss. I could only go if I went as an Abashidze supporter, but once in Tbilisi I moved to the Saakashvili side. I didn't keep taking money from Asian's men once in Tbilisi, so I didn't have much money to stay very long.402

People in Tbilisi were aware of this pressure and therefore sympathetic: "Once I was on a bus, and a woman asked how to get to the train station. I could tell by her accent that she was from Ajara. I was surprised that none of the other people in the bus said anything unkind to her, nothing like 'why did you come here?' We explained to her how to get there. We felt bad for them."403 Some people hung signs from their balconies directing Ajarans to the train station, so they could return home more easily.

At this time, opposition politicians, activists, and supporters were traveling to all corners of the country to bring more willing protestors to Tbilisi. One place that received particular attention was Tsalenjikha, in the western region of Mingrelia. Former President

Gamsakhurdia's family was from the region, and the people there remained loyal to him after he was ousted in 1992.404 The region had suffered because Gamsakhurdia made it his base during the 1993 fight to regain his presidency: "During the conflicts of 1991-93,

401 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 402 Confidential interview with 2 protestors, by author, November 10, 2006, Batumi, Georgia, digital recording, (13 0-131). 403 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 404 "Tbilisi Forces Push into Gamsakhurdia Stronghold," Agence France Presse, October 23, 1993, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 11, 2008). 130 this region had days of fire. Entire families were destroyed. This is the region that suffered the most, so we wanted to begin there."405 Understandably, many there harbored animosity toward Shevardnadze. A member of the National Movement who helped gather people for this last wave of protest said that "in Mingrelia, people wouldn't take our food. They didn't want to take anything more because they felt that the National

Movement was taking them on a holy mission: 'We'll take care of our own food. We've been dreaming of this for 10 years.' "406

1 On the l 9 h, Saakashvili announced that if Shevardnadze admitted the fraud and threw out the results, the opposition would withdraw its demand that he resign.407 But the

1 next day, the 20 \ the final results were announced: Shevardnadze's bloc, For a New

Georgia, 21.32%; Revival, 18.84%; the National Movement, 18.08%; the Labor Party,

12%; United Democrats, 8.8%; and the New Rights, 7.4%. Those members of the CEC representing the opposition refused to recognize these results. 408

Shevardnadze dismissed the opposition's references to the Romanian and Serbian precedents and suggested bringing the national crisis to a close by convening the new

Parliament. Perhaps afterward he would consider resigning, but to do so now would worsen the destabilization. 409 After the announcement of the official results, the president

405 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (111-113). 406 Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (79). 407 Jim Heintz, "Georgian Opposition Leader Alleges Government Wants to Provoke Violence; President Holds His Ground," Associated Press, November 19, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 408 Alexander Lobzhanidze, "Elections' Results Finally Announced in Georgia: Georgian Central Elections Commission Pronounced the Final Results of Parliamentary Elections Valid," RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest, November 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 409 "5,000 People Come to Rally of Opposition in Tbilisi," !TAR-TASS News Agency. 131 issued a decree that the new Parliament would convene on Saturday the 22nct_4io

Legitimation of the new Parliament would fatally weaken the opposition, because it would bring in a new Speaker to replace Nino Burjanadze. If that happened, and ifthe protests succeeded in forcing the president's resignation, Burjanadze would not replace him. Instead, it would be the speaker chosen by the fraudulently elected Parliament, loyal to Shevardnadze and Abashidze.

United Opposition leaders intensified their efforts to stop what they called a coup attempt. Zhvania announced that the Burjanadze-Democrats were turning to the Georgian

Supreme and Constitutional Courts and to the European Court of Human Rights to stop the process by declaring the official election results invalid. Zhvania pointed out that any party going along with the convening of the new Parliament was in effect usurping power, because this Parliament was not the one the people had chosen. If he went through with it, Shevardnadze would forfeit his right to remain president. It was unfortunate that

Shevardnadze had let things go so far, and now the only way for him to resolve the confrontation was to resign. Burjanadze announced that both the Burjanadze-Democrats and the National Movement were going to boycott the new Parliament, as was the Labor

Party. All opposition parties should do the same.411 For some time, there were doubts about whether the new Parliament would be able to convene, because of the boycott.

Finally, the New Rights party decided to go, which meant that there would be a quorum.

They felt they were choosing the lesser of two evils:

410 Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, "Georgian Election Commission Confirms Validity of Parliament Vote," Associated Press, November 20, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 411 "Georgian Opposition Elections Bloc to Appeal to European Human Rights Court," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 20, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 132

Even after the CEC official results, it was like this: 40% Shevardnadze/Abashidze supporters, 60% opposition parties. It was an ideal Parliament which would have reflected the entire spectrum of political forces in the country. Even though it was the result of fraud, it would have been better than what we have now. We said ok, because no one knew whether there would be bloodshed. Better this falsified way than heaven knows what. But Saakashvili decided to take the risk. We think it wasn't a justified risk from the point of view of govemment.412

November 21st

In a blow to Shevardnadze, National Security Council head Tedo Japaridze announced that, once again, there had indeed been election fraud. There were 'major irregularities.' However, he believed that the new Parliament session should still be held the next day, as scheduled. This could be a temporary Parliament, and new elections could be held in 2005, at the same time as the next presidential elections. Japaridze warned that there was a real possibility of bloodshed because of all the protests. Things had gotten out of hand, and if they continued like this the situation would become worse than in the early 1990's. If violence broke out, it wouldn't be stopped quickly. OSCE and

EU representatives called on the Georgian leadership to make things right, and on all

Georgians to remain calm and obey the laws.413

The potential for violence did increase by the evening, when convoys of United

Opposition supporters converged on the capital from different parts of the country. The

Ajarans were still rallied in front of the Parliament building, and there was concern about confrontation between the two sides:

412 Confidential interview with non-protestor in New Rights party, by author, October 31, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (80-81 ). 413 "Georgia Security Chief Admits Poll Fraud but Says Parliament Should Meet," AFX News Limited, November 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 133

We stood there the whole time, always hoping, afraid there would be shooting since the ones from Ajara had guns. This was an anti-protest measure. After what we lived through during civil war, whoever thought of having these boys there should be shot, because the crowd was so electrified. People in the crowd had weapons, the Ajaran guys probably did too. It doesn't matter. Even without weapons, if fistfights had begun there would have been people hurt. It would have been a second civil war, and Georgia wouldn't be able to recover from a second one. It was horrible, horrible.414

Rustavi-2 broadcast footage of one of the convoys shot from a hill in Mtskheta, just outside of Tbilisi. One newspaper dubbed this influx of opposition supporters the 'march of angry Georgians.'415 Since it was growing dark as they arrived, the long line of headlights created a visually compelling scene. People were moved by this, whether they saw it on tv or with their own eyes: "The day the convoy came I was at a birthday party in Dighomi where all the restaurants are, and I saw all those cars go by ... and I was shocked. It made an impression on me and I thought a revolution would happen because of this. It was a good show."416 A young woman who couldn't protest remembered that

"during that time I was standing on the balcony of my apartment and could see this convoy clearly, since I live near the entrance of Tbilisi. I can't convey to you the feeling .

. . . I was excited. I felt Georgian."417 Along with others already in Tbilisi, they gathered

Friday evening on Freedom Square near City Hall. While speaking to this rally,

Saakashvili urged all supporters to come to Tbilisi on Saturday (22nd) to force

Shevardnadze out of office in a 'bloodless velvet revolution.' He called on Shevardnadze

414 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 415 24 saati, November 22, 2003, no. 304. Translated by author. 416 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (189). 417 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 134 to resign, because the next day would be too late.418 Saakashvili invited the police and

soldiers to come over to the people's side and warned that anyone who used force would be held accountable.419 Burjanadze and Zhvania also addressed the crowd, urging peacefulness and predicting victory.420

November 22nd

Tens of thousands of protestors gathered on Freedom Square in the afternoon.

Saakashvili addressed them and issued Shevardnadze another ultimatum: 'Come out and meet with your people within an hour, or we will come to you.' 421 The president did not come, so the protestors moved to the Chancellery. To do so, they had to break through police cordons.422 A protestor described how smoke grenades were thrown at them and then thrown back at the soldiers and police, after which some fistfights broke out:

Then all of a sudden the soldiers stood apart and said to us, 'go in.' I remember hugs and kisses all the way through to the Chancellery. The soldiers were hugging us, or giving us their shields, telling us to go in and do our thing. We were crying, couldn't stop crying. When we came closer to the building, the US trained battalion [presidential body guards] were there. They had masks and machine guns. I remember their faces. They were so scared and didn't know what to do. They couldn't shoot us, there were so many of us. And they didn't want to. They were

418 Tengiz Pachkoria, "Georgian Radical Urges Supporters to Join Huge Meeting Sat," !TAR-TASS News Agency, November 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed Julyl2, 2008). 419 Tengiz Pachkoria, "Georgian Radical Promises Velvet Revolution to Oust Shevardnadze," ITAR­ TASS News Agency, November 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed Julyl2, 2008). 420 "Georgian Opposition Leaders Address Their Supporters," News Bulletin, November 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 421 "Opposition Leader Gives Georgian President One Hour to Meet People Outside," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 22, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 422 Christian Lowe, "Georgian Protestors Break through Police Cordon, Demand Shevardnadze Resign," Agence France Presse, November 22, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 135

backing up, didn't want to hug us, but they all said finally, 'we won't do anything.' We went inside and took control of the building where government sat. 423

According to one of the organizers who was present, Saakashvili, Zhvania, and

Burjanadze then discussed what should happen next. Saakashvili pushed for marching to the Parliament building right away, to prevent the new cohort from gaining official legitimacy. Burjanadze would come 300 meters after him, while Zhvania led the protestors who were still on Rustaveli Avenue.424 Saakashvili then told some of the protestors at the Chancellery to remain there, and others to come with him to

Parliament.425 Because of the Ajarans still gathered in front of the Parliament building,

Saakashvili and his supporters entered it through the back door. As can be seen in video footage, Saakashvili entered the meeting hall surrounded by his own supporters and bodyguards. Holding up a rose in his hand, he yelled at Shevardnadze 'Resign! Resign!'

A protestor who was at the Parliament described what happened next:

A couple hundred people went in from the back side through the huge wooden door. Some friends and I tried to keep everyone from going in, to keep people out. We made a live chain-we didn't want any aggressive people coming in and destroying property. I stood in one of the windows with 2 friends and a stranger. Saakashvili goes inside, his supporters too, and there's a small fight. Shevardnadze is brought out through the front side, makes a small stupid speech to the Ajarans, and leaves. This is when the buses blocking off the avenue were moved, and the 3000 Ajaran Shevardnadze supporters either disappeared, or merged with us. When I went out of Parliament after all this, there was no one, only our supporters. I remember Gogitidze [a Revival leader] went back into Parliament with some Ajaran supporters. I was in the window and decided not to go in and to keep others out. I thought it would be sorted out, and I didn't want anything destroyed by aggressive protestors.

While I was standing in the window, the current Minister of the Interior Merabishvili opened it and said come in, we need some more people [to counter

423 Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 18, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (34-37). 424 Ibid. 425 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (189). 136

Gogitidze's group]. I went inside and saw Gogitidze and his supporters being beaten. People were jumping on him. He was kicked out, then our side took over. Some started throwing documents in the air. One banged the Speaker's gavel on the lectern, my friends and I told people to calm down, why are you doing that? But nothing was destroyed. I still have the package of documents that I took that day. These had been distributed to each of the new members.

Burjanadze came in and made a brief speech to calm people down. We left by the front doors and saw several thousand standing there. It was hard to get out. The demonstrations hadn't stopped, because we were still waiting for an answer from Shevardnadze. Parliament was occupied, and rallies continued while we waited. We heard rumors that Shevardnadze was sending tanks to attack us, but no one really believed this. Someone said there were tanks in some neighborhood of Tbilisi, but then someone called a friend there and said no it's not true. We heard many rumors, 426 l1.k e t h e R ussians . were commg..

As Shevardnadze's bodyguards carried him out of the building, he yelled he would not resign. He declared a thirty-day state of emergency, but it is not clear how he could have implemented it. His Security Council chief, Japaridze, had undermined the president the day before with his announcement that the elections had been falsified. Then a few military and police officials announced they would not use force to support

Shevardnadze.427 Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov flew in to mediate a resolution between Shevardnadze and the opposition. Saakashvili attended a meeting at the general prosecutor's office, and later they met at Shevardnadze's residence. These meetings continued all night, while many protestors remained in front of Parliament, waiting to hear the outcome. One protestor remembered being afraid: if the government were going to use force, it would be in the middle of the night, when people were half asleep. "We were afraid and nervous. We made a fire. There was nervous laughter, and it was a very

426 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (49-50). 427 Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, "Georgia's Shevardnadze Declares State of Emergency after Opposition Breaks into Parliament, Declares Interim Rule," Associated Press, November 22, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 137 emotional moment, when you wait and wait, and then nothing is happening. Then

Shevardnadze announced a state of emergency and I thought that's it, he will use force. "428 At some point, Saakashvili assured the people gathered that Shevardnadze did not intend to harm them, and the mood lightened:

What was happening out there? People were singing Georgian songs outside, musicians were there, someone brought a camera and microphone. People were already having fun, not afraid anymore. Saakashvili deserves credit for this. He had come into the crowd and announced there was no need for panic, that Shevardnadze didn't intend any use of force. However, there were a few men who protected the people. Big men. They would stand between the people and the police. There were some people there who knew karate, too. A karate teacher brought his students there to protect people. Now it was almost morning, and the negotiations were going on with Shevardnadze, Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Burjanadze. The people were dancing, singing, some are sleeping. They're tired people. It had been a long day, and a long mg. ht. 429

November 23rd (St. George's Day)

Protests continued during the night. Saakashvili went to Krtsanisi to meet with

Shevardnadze at his residence. According to news accounts, Saakashvili warned the president that, if he didn't resign, all the protesters gathered outside would storm the residence as they had the Chancellery and Parliament.430 After Shevardnadze announced his resignation, saying he had some memoirs to write, Saakashvili praised him for

428 Confidential interview with activist from ALPE, by author, November 3, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (91-103). 429 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, November 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (145). 430 Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, "Protest Leader Saakashvili Offers Hope to Exasperated Georgians," Associated Press, November 23, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 138 making a brave decision in the interests of the entire country. It would spare the country further destabilization and would be remembered kindly by history.431

When the protestors heard of the decision and realized they'd won, there was euphoria. As if out of nowhere, a fireworks show began. People drank champagne, danced, sang, and kissed each other out of pure joy: "What CNN showed was probably only a tenth of what really happened. I don't know where the champagne appeared from, don't know who kissed me, whom I danced with. We were beside ourselves! No New

Year's could compare."432 After the announcement of victory, many more came out to the streets so they could join the celebration:

I came at the end of the revolution, when everything had already happened. My friend had a wedding on November 23rd, and after the wedding I passed by a protest rally around the time they announced Shevardnadze was gone. Misha came out and I wanted to see his face. I felt he was powerful. He was a winner, and I felt like a winner too even though I didn't participate. But I remember this emotion, and it was great. And the emotion of the people was great. It came to me, and I was very happy. At that time everybody believed that everything would be ok. This was great after years of moving nowhere. We believed that something would change-no, something had already changed. We had changed.433

In accordance with the constitution, Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze assumed the role of interim president and announced presidential elections would be held in 45 days. In the January 4th elections Saakashvili won by a wide margin-with 96% of the vote. New parliamentary elections were held in March, in which the National Movement

431 "Georgian Opposition Leader Praises President's Decision to Resign," BBC Monitoring, November 23, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 432 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 433 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (51-53). 139 and Burjanadze-Democrats together won more than 67% of the vote. The only other party to clear the 7% barrier was the New Rights, at 7.62%.434

A power struggle ensued between Saakashvili and Abashidze and became much worse than the one in November 2003. Abashidze never acknowledged the new political situation in the country and feared the same thing might happen to him within his region.

Soon after the January elections, Abashidze declared a state of emergency in Ajara, which he had no constitutional right to do.435 In the spring of 2004, some Ajarans began to demonstrate in protest, and Abashidze responded with harsh measures: police used water cannons against the protestors and beat them with iron bars. Abashidze had the highway bridges connecting Ajara with the rest of the country blown up, and had train rails pulled up. Saakashvili gave him a choice: give up within 10 days and acknowledge central power in Tbilisi, or face removal by force. At first the Ajaran leader threatened that war was the only way out of the situation.436 Then after a meeting with Prime

Minister Zhvania and Igor Ivanov (now Russia's Security Council secretary), Abashidze quietly left for Russia.437

This was a victory, bringing the country closer to actual territorial integrity.

Ironically, it may be that Abashidze's attempt to gain power in November was his

434 "Georgia's Ruling Party Wins Landslide Victory in Parliament Election," Xinhua News Agency, March 31, 2004, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 435 Abe Rein, "Georgian Officials Criticize Adjar Crackdown," Eurasianet Georgian Daily Digest, January 9, 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/georgia/hypermail/200401 /0008 .shtml (accessed July 12, 2008). 436 Mark MacKinnon, "Georgian Rebel Leader Crushes Student Protest," The Globe and Mail (Canada), May 5, 2004, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 437 Agence France Presse, "Georgian Renegade Hands Back Power," The Australian, May 7, 2004, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 140 undoing: the Ajarans who were brought to Tbilisi took the revolution back home with them. They served as a virus that infected Abashidze's regime: "They were probably so confused in Tbilisi: why were they there defending Shevardnadze, who had been an enemy of Abashidze for so many years? All of a sudden they were allies? They saw how revolutions were made, and when they went back to Ajara they helped get rid of

Abashidze. "438

438 Confidential interview with Liberty Institute activist, by author, September 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (20). CHAPTER6

FINDINGS

As a reminder to the reader, the puzzle in this research was the following: given the overall high level of apathy and pessimism, why did up to 100,000 people suddenly engage in protest? What distinguished protestors from non-protestors? Here, I will first address what the two groups had in common. These shared themes and viewpoints do not help us understand why some people protested and others did not. I will then present differences between the two groups of respondents, beginning with protestors, as these differences offer insight into why some people became active. The findings are discussed in the next chapter.

Common Themes

A great thirst for change was a key theme. To one degree or another, all respondents spoke of frustration with the national situation and/or their personal circumstances before

(and since) 2003:439 "If the RR hadn't happened, I probably would have died of grief. I couldn't have taken it anymore if Shevardnadze hadn't left."440 People in both groups

439 Those who benefited from the Shevardnadze regime did not want things to change. I was unable to find such people for interviews, because admitting they had wanted Shevardnadze to remain in power would have been tantamount to admitting a personal connection with the corruption. One person who had long been a friend of Shevardnadze did meet with me a few times to talk in general terms. He challenged the myth that Shevardnadze himself had arranged the entire RR as a way of making his exit from politics, but this person did not want to be interviewed. 44° Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 141 142 also spoke with anger about Shevardnadze's leadership over the previous decade:

"People were very angry with Shevardnadze. He was doing nothing for the country, and the country was going down so low in world ranking .... Georgia has great culture, but under Shevardnadze we sank lower and lower."441 Fear was another very common theme, with few claiming they had not been afraid at that time: "There was some fear about what was going to happen. Would the situation become more tense? Such radical steps were being taken that somewhere inside you were afraid that something horrible would happen, that there would be bloodshed .... It was such an influence."442

People in both groups mentioned distrust of, or dislike for, Saakashvili. Those who protested anyway did so because they supported the movement's goal-a Georgia without Shevardnadze. A leader was needed to achieve that goal, and Saakashvili fulfilled that role: "I went not because I was such a Saakashvili supporter ... but because

I wanted the corruption and the outdated regime to change. Someone had to make it happen, and Saakashvili did, simply. He was a step ahead of everyone else. If it hadn't been him, it could have been someone else."443 Some non-protestors also expected him to succeed, and that worried them. One NGO figure saw the RR as a parody of the Russian

Revolution, because the techniques and discourse were so similar. Fearing a new reign of terror, he refused to participate and tried to persuade his friends not to: "They invited me to participate, but I didn't even want my friends to be active because I was afraid of what

441 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 16 l ). 442 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (64). 443 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 15, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (141 ). 143 might happen after, something dangerous, along the lines of what happened to

Zhvania. "444

People in both groups agreed that the mobilization had involved manipulation. They thought that leaders had used the people and manipulated their emotions in order to draw them outside. For some this was a problem. One non-protestor who had been active in the late 1980's stayed home because of this: "You forget that you didn't want to go outside, but at some point, you go-you are pulled out. They push your buttons. During the RR I felt I wanted to be there too. I'm a Georgian too, and I have something to say. But after my experience, I no longer wanted to participate in protests."445 Others agreed that the

RR was in some ways a 'show,' but protested nevertheless:

Sometimes they did manipulate. When you put on a show you manipulate when you are trying to produce an effect, to make people watch it on tv. But the people were also ready on their own, ready to rebel. The urge to rebel was probably inside people, and when the leaders began to manipulate, it came out of their heads and bodies. It had been building up gradually, and maybe the people weren't aware of it, but they already had the feeling that they'd had enough. As soon as someone said 'come on, let's help others have enough of this too,' they went. 446

444 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, October 23, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (58); Niko Mchedlishvili, "Georgian PM Found Dead, Gas Poisoning Suspected: 'Tragic Accident': President is Left to Face Political Chaos Alone," National Post (Canada), February 4, 2005, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008); Anna Arutunyan and Oleg Liakhovich. "Death of Georgia's Prime Minister Fuels Speculation," Moscow News (Russia) February 9, 2005, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008); Zurab Zhvania died in February 2005. The medical report indicated that he had suffered carbon monoxide poisoning from a faulty gas heater. The circumstances seemed strange to some, however, and it was suspected that he had actually been murdered. 445 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (188). 446 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 189). 144

Protestors: Distinguishing Factors

Two things best distinguished protestors from non-protestors: references to duty and dignity. Not all protestors addressed these explicitly. Very few non-protestors did, but that does not imply that non-protestors did not value dignity and duty. The overall pattern, however, shows that these were salient themes for people who became active.

Duty

Respondents spoke of duty in various ways. It was an idea, a feeling, and a moral obligation. People felt a duty to themselves, to others, and to their country. They felt a need to defend their values, such as the ideals of democracy and fair elections. This included protecting their stolen votes: "They didn't give me my constitutional right to choose-therefore, I went to the protests. I thought, who would defend my rights and my vote if not me?"447 A protestor and election observer felt the need to protect others' votes as well: "When I saw the obvious fraud, I couldn't restrain myself. I felt obligated to defend those ballots."448

Protestors felt a civic duty to participate. A writer and member of ArtCom explained that a feeling of duty had motivated him and others to become active. Under

Communism, writers who became involved in politics were looked down upon as opportunists. Later, however, it became clear that creative people were also obligated to become involved in the country's development. Soviet rule was over, and people needed

447 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 448 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (51-53). 145 to begin to identify with their independent government: "Everyone has a civic duty. We said, this is our government, we have to say something. We need the will to change something. There were those who said poets should write. Others should steal and kill in the streets. But how could I sit at home and write about heaven with that happening?"449

The feeling of civic duty entailed not only the pursuit of a noble ideal-it also stemmed from a sense of desperation. Many felt a duty to protect the Georgian nation from

Shevardnadze. They believed they had to save the country they loved from oblivion. One woman felt the stakes were so high during November that she had no choice but to go: "I personally decided I had to be there. It was our 'to be or not to be.' My country was in such a condition that I had to be there. I personally stood there until late, for the good deed, for a better Georgia."450

The feeling of duty involved moral emotion, which is "driven by events deemed relevant to moral values. There is moral joy when one sees the tyrant perish; there is moral indignation when someone offends truth, or friendship, or humanity."451 Protestors felt an emotional compulsion to act against certain things in defense of others. When I mentioned my surprise at people's willingness to stand outside in bad weather, a young woman explained that she had felt emotionally compelled to act and resist: "I never actually thought about the weather. ... It was just something inside me, saying 'you have to go there, you have to stand there and to fight, not with weapons, but by standing there.'

449 Confidential interview with ArtCom member, by author, December 1, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 171-172). 45° Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 451 Nico H. Frijda, "Emotions and Action," in Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium, ed. Anthony S. R. Manstead, Nico H. Frijda, and Agneta Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 168. 146

I never explained things to myself, it was just something coming from inside. On a very emotional level."452 Another protestor remembered his emotional feeling of duty, which motivated him to act on the behalf of people he had never met: "We had the emotional feeling that we had to do something-civil will. Citizens' will. ... I was just a student, but I never thought that I should stay at home and study. I knew I had to stand there myself because it was very important for me and for the Georgian people. "453

People felt a responsibility toward other protestors. They couldn't let those other cold, tired, and hungry people carry the weight alone: "Once I was there with my cousin, then we left and went to her place. It was about 1 am, and the people demonstrating were under plastic sheeting because of the rain. She said to me she felt ashamed to be sitting there in a warm place while the others were outside. I said 'Lali, let's go?' And we went, at 1 am."454 This applied all the more to protestors who came to Tbilisi from other towns and villages. If those Georgians were willing to go to such trouble, it would have been wrong not to stand with them: "The convoy was very emotional. If you weren't there on the square you were guilty. These people came from villages and you're here in the city doing nothing, warm at home. "455

This feeling of responsibility toward others also drove people to serve as good examples, so others would be motivated to protest. Two students explained that this idea pushed them to go at the very beginning, before there were many others out there: "We

452 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, November 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (168-170). 453 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 25, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (63). 454 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 455 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, September 27, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 19). 147 were some of the first to show up. Others said 'nothing will change,' but we knew if they saw that everyone was trying to change something, others would also want to take part."456 A former Kmara member was also very conscious of the need to be a leader: "Of course I wanted many to be there, but ifthere were few I still went. There was mukhti, positive mukhti. And I felt responsible. We were Kmara, and many looked to us. If we hadn't come, maybe others would have stayed home too. We had to give an example."457

Dignity

References to dignity also incorporated emotions, beliefs, and values. These included ideas about what it meant to live a 'normal' life without needing to resort to bribery.

Dignity meant being able to find a job and support one's family, and being able to chase one's dreams and realize one's talents. Corruption and socioeconomic conditions made the honest pursuit of these things very difficult. References also included the idea that the

Georgian people and the country itself had been denied their dignity by the government for too long, which provoked indignation and outrage.

One man compared the American Dream with that of the Georgians. His people had grown so tired of living without elementary things like electricity and basic comfort.

Such conditions contradicted their self-image as progressive and modem people and led to the build-up of discontent: "What else should people think about but to live with dignity? The American Dream, for example. It is normal to think about comfort, about achieving some success. In our eyes, we are no less dreamers. We also have our dream,

456 Confidential interview with 2 protestors, by author, September 9, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (12). 457 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (121 ). 148 since we are people too."458 A Kmara member was motivated by a similar desire: "I demonstrated because I wanted better opportunities to be successful in my life. The old regime gave no good chances. It was saying you had to overcome your values, do some bad things to be personally successful. I was fighting for my values and the possibility of a better future." She was tired of having the door to a promising future closed by corruption. With a degree in international relations, she would have needed to do an internship at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to find a good job in her field.

Under the Shevardnadze system, she would have had to pay a bribe to obtain one. Later, she would have had to buy a job, as well: "To get an internship cost money. To get even a low-paying job you had to pay $100,000 for it. It was unrealistic. So I wanted other choices. "459

In addition to the undignified circumstances they lived in, people were tired of the government's obvious disregard for them. To borrow Fuller's term, they were tired of being 'nobodied.' As he explains, "dignity grounds us, nurtures us, protects us. It's the social counterpart of interpersonal love. To be treated with dignity confirms our status as a valued member of a group."460 To be treated with disregard, to be 'nobodied,' can be threatening, because it can mean the loss of social or material resources that we need to survive.461 In the view of one NGO activist, this was the true reason why people protested:

458 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (25-26). 459 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, October 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (67-68). 460 Robert W. Fuller, All Rise: Somebodies, Nobodies, and the Politics ofDignity (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2006), 23. 461 Ibid., 22. 149

There are two versions-one for public use: 2001 showed that Georgian people tolerate everything but when faced with loss of freedom of information, they took to the streets and said that's enough. This is true, but superficial. As for the RR, saying it was about loss of voice is true but superficial. People didn't care so much about that. It was the last straw, which generated mukhti. In reality the cause of the RR was the ten previous years. People were fed up with simple things-not with democracy or religious and minority rights. People had been deprived of dignity, treated as nobody by the government, by everybody, by the international community, by political forces out of power too. They would follow anyone who touched those painful nerves. Saakashvili played on those very well.462

This disregard was clearly manifested in the periodic election fraud. The government's falsification of the results meant that it did not care what the people wanted. Georgians had known about or suspected fraud before, but "November 2003 was the peak. Insult-not to one's personal life or well being, but the insult to one's feelings.

There was no less prosperity in the country. It was one's feeling of dignity, and this led people out. It was the last straw. That's all."463 What made things worse was the sense that the government was mocking them, and the suspicion that some arrogant officials were confident they could cheat the people again:

People understood .... We had no electricity, and of course we had protested about that before, but the RR was something different. The elections were your last chance to change anything, and then they take it away from you. Then you have no other choice. That's why I was standing there. People understood that the worst insult for a people is not to do without electricity, have small pensions, etc. The worst insult for a people is if they say 'we want this person' and you say 'noooo, this will be your Parliament.' Most people were standing there because of this. They felt they had nothing left to lose. They treat me like livestock, they don't ask me, they laugh at me. That kind of fraud had happened before, but it hadn't been documented like this. It hadn't been proved like this.

This protestor also spoke of a desire to defend the nation's dignity-not only that of individual people. He described how he had become ashamed of his country and the

462 Confidential interview with activist, by author, November 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (137). 463 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Owrgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (111-113). 150 amoral leadership. He was tired of the myth that the people were virtuous, and only the government was bad. It was becoming a joke: "The foreigners seemed to be laughing at this: 'if you're all good, then why do the few bad people rule?' I was tired of talking about how the Georgian people had a good history, how we joined in the Crusades. It doesn't matter what is in our history in the lih century. Now we are corrupted." He participated because he wanted to help restore the nation's self-respect.464

Non-Protestors

The above responses contrast with those of many non-protestors. This group of people often expressed apathy or resignation. They often used the 'why bother?' frame and seemed to feel little political efficacy. Even though they also wanted change, some thought protesting would only be a waste of time. One young woman's response demonstrates the resignation and apathy that many still felt in November 2003. She expected the fraud because "it always happened. I had no reaction." She didn't expect

Shevardnadze to leave because of the protests, and like others she referred to the RR as a play put on by powerful forces inside and outside Georgia: "When I saw the protests on tv I felt indifferent. When the RR happened, when Shevardnadze left, it didn't mean anything. Nothing would change but the faces. The politics wouldn't change." She was also afraid of what might happen as a result of the protests: "I was in the position where I

464 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (51-53). 151 was used to my fate and afraid of changes. It is better to have your own problems than new, unknown ones."465

Non-protestors spoke about feeling distant from politics. One young woman went so far as to avoid watching the news or reading newspapers: "It's better to find some escape, to rest. It impacts you when you have enough personal problems already. Why look for more bad news?" Her friends weren't engaged in politics either: "They take a passive position and watch from the wings. They feel far from politics. They prefer to deal with science, literature, languages."466 A middle-aged man hadn't protested for the same reason. "I didn't want to participate, I couldn't. It happened without me. I stay out of politics. I don't get involved, but I do analyze what happens." He referred to Soviet-era politics as an influence: "I hated Soviet politics. Russia made us zombies, and now I want to live in peace. I want them to leave me alone."467 Others seemed to feel less distanced from politics, but still apathetic. One man didn't expect the protestors to succeed and didn't see why it was necessary for him to stand with them:

I wasn't against them, but didn't feel like it. Maybe it was laziness. 'Why should I be standing there?' It was interesting for them, but it was more interesting for me to watch them on tv. I didn't really have much hope that the protestors would be successful. I didn't think about victory. I thought people would just stand there and yell. I didn't expect it to happen so easily.468

By contrast, the following respondent did expect Shevardnadze to go-because his time had come and not because of the protestors. But like others, she did not go

465 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 161 ). 466 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, September 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (15-16). 467 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, October 10, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (22). 468 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (138-139). 152 because she felt powerless. It did not seem to her that she could make a difference by standing with the others:

I understood the protestors. It was nice. It was good. I was proud that they were there all night, in the rain, freezing, in my place, where I should have been. But I was not there. They were there for everyone .... I was passive in this case because I didn't know what I could do. I wasn't indifferent. But I didn't think I could make any difference being part of the masses. In front of tv I am in the right place, and I will know what is happening. If I'm in the crowd I won't know what is going on nationally. 469

The 'why bother?' theme also arose frequently. Some thought nothing could drive

Shevardnadze out of office, and that the protests would be suppressed. Resistance was futile. "I remember exactly what I thought during those protests. The situation by then was unbearable. Nothing was changing, just the same thing ... but I didn't believe in this revolution, and thought my participation in it would be in vain. It didn't mean anything."470 The following young women wanted change but didn't participate, because they didn't believe protesting could make a difference. The elites would maintain their grip on power, and the people could do nothing about it, so why try?

2 We knew the election results wouldn't be real, but we couldn't do anything to change it, or to protect our votes. When this movement began I wasn't sure they would change anything, but I was happy when they did. These people had such strong desire, and everybody around me was participating in the protests, and the situation was new for me. I didn't go. I worked, and I didn't believe that something would change, so maybe that's why I didn't participate.

3 I also thought like that. I thought it would be a waste of time to go vote in the elections. I thought my vote would be lost one way or the other. The party in power would have the result it wanted. I never voted, and didn't believe in the revolution. Why are they standing there wasting their time? I was afraid too, that there would be bloodshed, because it had happened like that in our history. In the 90's nothing good happened for our people.

469 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (14 7). 47°Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, December 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (190). 153

2 Those protests were very interesting. Before the RR nobody protested the fraud of their votes. Before, everybody thought the government would do as they wished, and we had no power to change anything. When they began protesting this time I was very surprised. That's why I didn't believe anything would change. I thought they had to falsify our votes, it was so common. Why protest? We can change nothing, it will bring no results. I thought people would give up and go home. I thought the government wouldn't give up and would go on the same. 471

Protestors heard similar things as they tried to convince their friends and relatives to participate: "Some of my relatives thought no one could change anything. Shevardnadze would do what he wanted. Protest wouldn't help. Some of my friends also thought the protesting was stupid and didn't make sense. They laughed at us for going." 472 A young woman full of hope that the people would finally be able to change things was sometimes unable to inspire others. Those others stayed home, believing there was no point in supporting the opposition movement:

I talked with them about how many years we'd lived in this bad life, because of Shevardnadze and because of people who believed it was not possible to change anything. 'This is our chance, we should be out there supporting the brave people,' I said. It was bravery to say no to Shevardnadze and his government, since he'd been in power for so long. Many people said it was impossible to change, that the protests were just a show put on by Shevardnadze. 'Protests won't change anything. Why should we support this? They're making false promises.' My aunt was one of these people. 473

These responses exemplify the inefficacy frame that civil society architects, activists, and then regular citizens worked to transform. Such responses came from people of different age groups-not only those who had lived as adults in the Soviet system. These

471 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (51-53). 472 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (49-50). 473 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (75-77). 154 data show that the mobilization campaigns were unable to motivate everyone to act collectively, no matter how dissatisfied people might have been with the status quo.

The following chapter looks in more detail at cases where the mobilization was successful, by examining protestors' motivations in the context of RR framing work. I will show how leaders' mobilizing frames appealed to the emotions, beliefs, and values connected with dignity, duty, and other themes. Further evidence from interviews will offer support for the claim that emotion is needed for cognitive liberation to occur. CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION

More than anything else, references to dignity and a sense of duty set protestors apart from those who did not protest. Not all participants referred to them, while a few non­ protestors did. However, the latter cases were typically about the felt duty to vote, an understanding of others' felt duty to protect the country, or to relate what RR leaders had said about dignity in their messages to the people. This does not imply that non-protestors did not value dignity and duty, but the different pattern in responses does show that these were motivating and salient for people who became active.

An important question is why these motivated people in November 2003. Dignity and duty were not new concepts that inspired thousands to go protest, but the RR frame alignment process brought them out of storage and into people's hearts and minds. In order to bring enough people into attack mode, leaders and activists appealed to the emotions, beliefs, and values contained within dignity, duty, and other themes. RR leaders addressed the injustices perpetrated by the Shevardnadze government, people's right to live with dignity, and the moral responsibility of each Georgian to help bring change. In addition to asking Georgians to think about the future they wanted, RR leaders asked Georgians to act based on what they wanted to feel in the future-pride or regret.

This framing work amplified emotions and beliefs that supported participation in the protests. 155 156

Protest leaders also worked to transform the inefficacy beliefs and the 'why bother?' frame, which worked against participation. They urged Georgians to believe in their power, not in their helplessness. They reminded people how things could and should be, and challenged them to think differently about what could be done to bring change. This is in agreement with Gamson's recommendation: although emotion is a key part of collective action frames, organizers should not appeal only to prospective recruits' emotions. They should also draw out or nurture a dormant sense of agency in their audience: "One doesn't transform people who feel individually powerless into a group with a sense of collective efficacy by pushing hot buttons."474 RR leaders accomplished this, with the help of emotion. Emotion and emotional energy helped generate a feeling of empowerment and weakened the old belief that the people themselves had no power to change anything.

This frame alignment helped overcome the feelings of resignation and 'why bother?' and led to the cognitive liberation of a part of society: thousands and thousands of

Georgians now felt some power and perceived a chance to fight for change. If they weren't sure of success, many still felt that they needed to be out there, that they were needed out there. These frame messages were especially effective coming from

Saakashvili, thanks to his charismatic and emotional leadership style. His personality contributed further to the frame alignment and cognitive liberation.

474 William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 185-86. 157

Rose Revolution Frames: Content

Injustice Frame

In the runup to the elections, opposition leaders had been warning the Shevardnadze regime not to falsify the election results. They had been promising the people that, if fraud occurred, they would go to the streets. They expected it to happen, as did much of the population. When people's worst expectations were fulfilled, it proved to be the last straw. Some Georgians came to this conclusion independently: "We had tried to change the Shevardnadze government before, in two previous elections: when Shevardnadze came back from Moscow, and in 2000. This third time was too much. Too many lies, too much fraud."475 As another said, "the elections were like cold water in the face. Then the masses woke up."476 Others needed to be persuaded that this was the last straw, so opposition leaders seized upon the opportunity and worked to amplify the sense of moral shock and outrage. To achieve this, they used an injustice frame, which helped bring thousands into attack mode.477 They focused people's attention on what the government had done and how unacceptable it was:

The RR leaders were saying to people 'look, the government has falsified the elections and we must defend our votes.' This was the main point. This became the focal point for people, to defend their votes, but this was not the only reason. Previously too the government had falsified elections. Everyone knew it. Archimedes said 'give me some resistance and a focal point, and I will turn over the earth.' This was the point from which we could make a revolution and kick out that government. 4 78

475 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, November 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (167). 476 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (I 21 ). 477 Jasper, Art ofMoral Protest, I 06. 478 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (I 89). 158

As the post-election contention was beginning, opposition leader Zhvania met with supporters in the Philharmonia Hall and asked: "should we accept it when the government announces that it does not care what we think, or should we fight? ... To tolerate this is a crime. Today, society must make the government see that there really is a line, and if you cross it, it's an abasement of dignity." He pointed out that the election fraud was not only a loss for the opposition, but for the people: "this means that the rights of each of you have been violated. This fight is the fight of each one of you."479 The next day at another rally, Zhvania appealed to people's sense of outrage. "Remain angry," he urged them: "We must be ready to gather not here, but in front of Parliament. And not for just an hour, but for victory."480

According to interview data, the injustice frame did bring some Georgians into attack mode by combating the resignation and apathy. Fewer people might have seen the fraud as the last straw, had it not been for this framing. People who might have resigned themselves once again to a dishonest election decided that this was too much. This time thousands of people resisted it, instead of sharing their anger with each other at home. A young woman remembered seeing the head of ISFED, Zurab Chiaberashvili, and a lawyer allied with the opposition, Tina Khidasheli, on television calling the people to come defend their votes.481 She considered their use of an injustice frame effective: "If not for Chiaberashvili, Saakashvili, and others coming out and telling people 'look what the government is doing with you, what it has done with your votes, with your

479 Rusiko Machaidze, "Opozitsiis ori prtkha masobriv aktsiebs gegmavs." 480 Rusiko Machaidze," 'Darchit gabrazebulebi'-zurab zhvania" ["Stay angry"-Zurab Zhvania], Rezonansi, November 6, 2003, no. 305 (4027). Translated by author. 481 "Georgian Authorities 'Take Interest' in Parallel Vote Count," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 12, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 159 constitutional right to vote,' then maybe we would have swallowed this too, like so many other things."482 One respondent had attended the meeting at which Zhvania called on people to stay angry. In her opinion, his words changed how people felt and thought about the fraud:

Zhvania knew how to say what people needed to hear. He said we needed to be very offended about how they stole our votes-took away our right to vote. Everyone there believed him because he said it so well. They said 'yes, we should be upset.' People didn't pay so much attention until that, since the fraud wasn't unusual, and people knew elections weren't democratic. They became more upset after he said that.483

Dignity and Duty Frames

In their appeals to the people, RR leaders made many references to dignity (or the defense of dignity), one's moral duty, and the need to stand up to the government. These were part of the continued effort to bring people into attack mode. Since these themes often overlapped in the framing, I will address them together here. Saakashvili called the election fraud an insult to Georgians' dignity and argued that it required a response. The questionable election results made protest more legitimate-the right thing to do.

Saakashvili assured supporters at a rally that "we do not intend to tum back. They are wrong if they think a Georgian person has no dignity; they are wrong if they think that the Georgian people are so easily cheated; enough of the rule of thieves and robbers!

New blood should enter politics. We will not free the territory around the Parliament building until the Chancellery is free of Shevardnadze." He then challenged other parties

482 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, November 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (168-170). 483 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (I 88). 160 that considered themselves to be in the opposition, accusing them of being silent in return

for promises from the government that their parties would pass the 7% barrier to make it

into Parliament. Did those parties think the Georgian people were stupid, and wouldn't

guess this?484

In a television interview, Saakashvili predicted that tens of thousands of people

would come to a rally scheduled for the next day. There were already so many at the protests, but many more were still needed, so that the people could reclaim their dignity:

The authorities have to admit their catastrophic defeat in these elections. If they do not admit, the president will have to resign, Shevardnadze will have to go. May he not carry it to the extreme so that he will not be given a chance to go and be stopped on his way. So, let him go quietly. I am not in favour of violence even with regard to the president. I am in favour of a peaceful and quiet transition. But to achieve this, the whole of Georgia should close ranks. The whole of Georgia is watching us today. We have a historic chance. Look, how many people have gathered here. The whole of Georgia should stand at their side. There is no way to retreat. We have a chance to live in a normal country, to implement our plans, to see our dreams come true, to unbend our backs and begin a life worthy of human beings. Therefore, we all have to close ranks starting from this evening and continuing tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. We all have to stand together and everything will be all right.485

At the Philharmonia, Zhvania appealed to Georgians' feelings of duty and dignity as he announced the beginning of the civil disobedience campaign. He urged Georgians to no longer recognize Shevardnadze as president, because he had trampled upon the constitution. This was the right action to take-peaceful and legitimate, called for by the constitution. This means of struggle would be difficult and would depend on each citizen, not only on the leadership:

How quickly we will achieve success will depend on how many hundreds and how many thousands of Georgians will demonstrate sufficient courage and bravery to say

484 Sopo Bukia, "Me, misha saakashvili, ar vapireb dhges akedan tsasvlas." 485 "Opposition Leader Sees 'Historic' Chance for Ridding Georgia of Shevardnadze," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 8, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 161

at their work place, at their residential neighbourhood, among people they communicate with that the current authorities, Shevardnadze's authorities are unacceptable to them. Georgia, the people should say once and for all that they do not obey Eduard Shevardnadze, that they do not recognize Shevardnadze as their president and that Georgia opts for the course of civil disobedience.

I would like to assure you that what we are doing, the course that we have opted for is not only a peaceful course, not only a course guaranteed by the constitution but it is what the constitution makes our mandatory duty. In the circumstances in which the president not only refuses to protect the constitution but on the contrary violates it and tramples on its provisions, in the circumstances where the authorities are not protecting laws but rather carry out unlawful acts of violence at every step, it is your mandatory duty, the duty of citizens, proud citizens to protect your constitution, your dignity and to protect your motherland from encroachment. That is why we have opted for this course and are appealing to you to turn this day into the day of the first expanded session of the headquarters of the civil disobedience, to turn it into a historic moment which will start a truly nationwide movement in Georgia, which will bring ultimate freedom to each individual, each family today and will bring freedom and happiness to the generations that are to live after us in a happy and victorious Georgia. 486

After the final results were announced and it became clear that Shevardnadze was not going to back down, Saakashvili announced that he and other activists were going to all corners of the country to gather supporters for one final protest in Tbilisi. Together, they would demonstrate their moral refusal to tolerate dictatorship and violence against the people: "Georgia will not put up with its dignity being trampled upon. We are not going to put up with Shevardnadze's dictatorial manners. As of today this man is a dictator and any peaceful protest against him will be legitimate, fair and justified in the eyes of the entire world and Georgian history."487

486 "Georgia: Opposition Party Leader Presents Civil Disobedience Plans," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 16, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 487 "Georgian Opposition Leader Says New Parliament 'Illegitimate,'" BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 20, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 162

5 On the 21 \ he drew people's attention to the convoys of protestors entering Tbilisi.

While urging other Georgians to join the protest that day and the next, Saakashvili proclaimed that Georgia had arisen. Thousands of citizens were defending the national dignity and democratic values from the Shevardnadze government:

Since yesterday, starting from Tsalenjikha and Lagodekhi, Marneuli and Rustavi, tens of thousands of our fellow countrymen have been on the move to liberate the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi, and the whole motherland. I accompanied these people today and I have to say that never before in my life have I been as happy as today. I have never seen so many hopeful, so many delighted, so many courageous, so many radiant faces. Georgia has arisen. Georgia has arisen to defend its dignity and its future. Today, we are witnessing a European-type, velvet, bloodless, democratic and nation-wide revolution which aims at the bloodless removal of President Shevardnadze from his post, the removal of President Shevardnadze's government from power by democratic means, the restoration of our dignity and the return of our country's future.

Today is the day of our unity. We are beginning our manifestations in Freedom Square. Those who cannot come today, the whole of Tbilisi should come and stand here tomorrow morning. . . . We all must gather together and ensure that Georgia can greet the dawn of St. George's day free, that St. George's day can become the celebration of Georgia's victory. Today and tomorrow, we will gain our future and our freedom, restore our dignity and prove to the whole world that we, Georgians, every citizen living in Georgia, are a very strong and very free nation with a highly successful and great future. We shall be victorious.488

To evoke feelings of duty and create a sense of urgency, Saakashvili spoke of the severity of the crisis and the need for people to resist the government. He described the threats the country and citizens faced if Shevardnadze and his allies succeeded in stealing the election. Saakashvili accused Shevardnadze of colluding with Ajaran leader

Abashidze, of forming a deal in which Abashidze would assume the presidency in 2005.

This, Saakashvili warned, would be even more devastating to the country and its people, because Abashidze was a tyrant who had turned his region of Georgia into a police state.

488 "Georgia: Opposition Leader Describes Movement as 'Velvet Revolution,'" BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 21, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 163

Abashidze would do the same with the rest of the country, because that would be the only way he could maintain power after international organizations stopped supporting a

Georgia bankrupted by its own corruption:489

Georgia is our homeland. Today the fate of each one of us is being decided. Today is a decisive day for Georgia. Each additional minute that Shevardnadze remains in power means a new threat of instability and bloodshed, a threat of Georgia being broken up, a threat of economic destruction and a lack of education and the real destruction of our future. There comes a day in the life of every people, when indifference is a crime. Today is such a day for each Georgian. If we want to save ourselves from darkness, if we want to save ourselves from the regime of thieves, if we want to provide ourselves and our children a future, then today at 4 o'clock everyone-students, professors, workers, scientists, the unemployed, businessmen­ everyone should stand on Rustaveli Ave and show Shevardnadze our strength.490

These frames asked people to think about what was happening and what was needed from them. They also made people feel-indignation, outrage, and hope. When speaking on these issues, Saakashvili also tried to evoke emotion anticipations. He wanted his listeners to imagine how proud they would be in the future, if they acted to save the country now: "Each one of our descendents will be proud that we took part in Georgia's emancipation, and in setting the country on its feet." 491 On the other hand, if they didn't come and help now, they would regret it for years to come:

I would like to say to every person who is sitting in front of television sets now. If you do not want to whimper during the next four years, to say that elections were rigged, to say that we all are being choked by taxes, to say that bandits have been flourishing and have trampled down the families of every one of you, your place is here now. Do not be afraid, we are organized well. Thousands of people are here completely calm and composed.

If you want Georgia to survive, if you want you and your children have a future,

489 "Georgian Opposition Leader Calls for Street Action against President," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 13, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 490 "Sakartvelos mosakhleobas!" [To the Georgian population!], 24 saati, November 14, 2003, no. 297(509). Translated by author. 491 Ibid. 164

come here and stand here next to us. Do not remain in front of television sets because then all of you will be sorry. Do not let Shevardnadze and Abashidze have a medieval dictatorship in Georgia. Allow Georgia and each of you to live in a normal, European country. This is a historic chance.

I beg you, each person, do not sit at home, do not sit there. It is Sunday today, a public holiday, a day of prayers in churches. Today, there is no time for anything but being here. Do come all of you. Thousands of people are coming here and I would say to you once again - do you want us to be sorry afterwards? Believe me, you will have to recall my words many times then.

While he is so frightened, while the government, together with Shevardnadze, are so confused, people, let us take our fate in our hands. Do not let this fire get extinguished because then you will see our misery, you will see dictatorship in Georgia, then you will see the kleptocratic governance of bandits in Georgia. If they win now, then you will see their arrogance. Therefore, today, every person who is watching television now, do stop doing anything you are doing and come here because otherwise, your fate will be brought into question. It is not my fate that is being decided here. Your fate is being decided.492

This framing did not create the feelings of dignity and duty. Georgians love their country very much and feel strongly about protecting it. They are proud of their long and sometimes glorious history, and proud that they are still a nation with their own language, religion, and culture. What the framing did was remind people of these things after the years of stagnation and inertia had dulled them: "The duty was to save your own rights, your own country, in this case from Shevardnadze. These feelings had been repressed in the Georgian people, but during the RR, they were awakened in many."493 Feelings of dignity were amplified, as well: "Before, people had always thought, 'what could

492 "Georgia: Opposition Leader Wants to Make the Most of President's Confusion," BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 9, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 493 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 165 overthrow them?' The government would always be lying to them, would be treating people like infants. Then I saw that the feeling of dignity had awoken in the people."494

Appeals to dignity and duty helped overcome potential obstacles to mobilization.

First, these frames helped neutralize the impact of fear. Saakashvili' s dire predictions might have replaced a paralyzing fear with one that spurred people to protest. In other words, fears of civil unrest might have been trumped by even worse fears-how intolerable life would be if Shevardnadze won, or if Abashidze managed to come to power: "I couldn't contemplate this in my worst nightmares."495 While they had the chance, Georgians were obligated to fight against such a possibility. In addition, a feeling of duty toward others sometimes led people to put aside their personal concerns. One man fought his fears and remained at protests because he felt responsible for less experienced people. He wanted to be able to protect them if violence erupted:

Inside, I was preparing myself. Afraid-no, I was preparing myself. I couldn't let myself be afraid, because my friends were standing there behind me. It was their first time, and I couldn't abandon them. In such situations, bullets aren't as dangerous as panic-panic could kill and cripple more people. You can always get out without panic, and be victorious. But when there's panic, with someone who shoots and people running away, that's horrible. 496

Second, dignity and duty frames were a powerful weapon against apathy and resignation, for a people who love their country so strongly: "Even my very passive mother said to me after seeing this on tv, 'I'll never forgive myself ifl don't go.' She went to a protest and stood there for several hours. I was surprised, and thought 'way to

494 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (111-113). 495 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (163-164). 496 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (111-113). 166 go, Mama.' ... Other people came who thought the same, who had never protested before. "497 The words communicated in these framing speeches had an impact on listeners. Their motherland was in danger, and this was the chance they had been waiting for. What were they going to do about it? It was their duty to help-the fate of the country and their personal futures depended on it. A family of protestors remembered

Saakashvili' s message, because the words affected them both intellectually and emotionally:

1 He said things like 'come, help me, stand by me.'

2 'We will do what needs to be done. Help me.'

3 He was persuading people that they had to do this themselves.

1 And that he needed help, for him not to be alone. They were such words, that in your heart you wanted to go help him.

2 He said if he was doing something wrong, 'come here and tell me, talk to me, show me.'

3 Saakashvili used words to touch people's hearts. He needed support. He put the responsibility on the people: 'This is your business.' Here you have a chance to change the country, to play a role in building a new country. I felt that if I didn't go, I would feel very guilty.

1 I remember seeing my husband crying while listening to Saakashvili speak on tv.498

Efficacy Frame

Finally, RR leaders were aware of the need to convince enough people that they could accomplish change. While appealing to and amplifying people's emotions, beliefs,

497 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, December 7, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (189). 498 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, September 27, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (19). 167 and values, organizers had to help people feel powerful enough to achieve what they were being called to do. As an ArtCom activist explained, "the basis for the RR was that people had to believe they could change things, and this was not a Soviet mentality.

People couldn't be there for someone else's sake-although some people were there because they loved Saakashvili or for their own interests-but because they believed they could change something."499 The same message came from Kmara activists: "The whole point of our entire undertaking was to convince people who felt useless that each person was important and could contribute to the people power. We were telling people 'wake up! You know it's bad, but if you don't change it no one will do it for you.' ,,soo

Before election day, Saakashvili and other National Movement activists tried to inspire their listeners at a rally: Georgia had overcome much worse occupiers than those in the current government bloc. They mentioned the names of fierce conqerors from

Georgia's distant past: "Remember Shah Abbas, remember Tamerlane?" Together,

Saakashvili said, the people could escort out of power one of the last dictatorships in the modern world-Shevardnadze's. The government was planning big falsification, but the

National Movement was planning a big victory. National Movement member and activist

Koba Davitashvili promised that the opposition and the people would achieve everything, if they didn't lose heart and give up: "If three million eight hundred thousand come out onto a big field together and breathe one message, this will create a storm to inundate

499 Confidential interview with ArtCom member, by author, November 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (146). 50°Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, November 17, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (143). 168

Shevardnadze and his clan. Let us be united, and nothing will defeat us. We must fight, and we will definitely win." 501

The message continued after election day. Saakashvili frequently told people during

November that they had power, which was a very pleasant and novel idea for many:

"They had never heard this before, and it was nice to believe after so long."502

Saakashvili was trying to challenge the belief that the people were weak and doomed to live under corrupt governments: "These were very common feelings before the RR.

Saakashvili always spoke about how this was not true-how society had enough resources to self-mobilize and break down the corruption problem .... They believed him, and a sense of power came from what he said. Energy was coming from Saakashvili and his people."503 On the front page of a pro-opposition newspaper, he explicitly addressed the common feeling of powerlessness:

I would like to address every one of you who ever believed and still believe that you cannot decide anything in the life of your own nation. . . . It is a lie that Shevardnadze will not resign no matter how many people come out onto the streets. Much more powerful rulers in Eastern Europe were forced to submit to the will their peoples demonstrated en masse. Shevardnadze's regime is much more cowardly and much weaker. We should not be weaker than other nations. Victory is very near. Power is in unity! If we all stand together, we will definitely win. 504

This effort to transform the inefficacy frame was successful in many cases. People who had felt useless or powerless before now acquired a feeling of hope. During the RR they felt useful again, because they saw what they could do and believed they could make

501 Sopo Bukia, "Mkholod chven vitsit, rogor davibrunot sakartvelo" [Only we know how to return Georgia], 24 saati, November 1, 2003, no. 286(498). Translated by author. 502 Confidential interview with activist, by author, November 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (13 7). 503 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (163-164). 504 "Sakartvelos mosakhleobas!" 169 a useful contribution. A respondent who no longer supported Saakashvili by the time of the interview still considered him the man who changed everything, because of this message of power: "Saakashvili's message was 'you can cause change-if you come here and join us.' I will remember this feeling for the rest of my life-the feeling of hope, being full of hope, being helpful, of being able to change something myself, of not being useless. I thank Saakashvili for this."505 The framing work created hope, and it helped transform inefficacy beliefs into a willingness to believe in one's power. The words moved people to act:

People talked a lot about politics before, but were reluctant to participate in anything. They thought 'no matter what I do it will be the same.' People were conforming, or lazy, bored, I don't know why. Maybe each believed he could change nothing: 'Why should I do anything if I can't change anything?' Before the November elections, I wanted to change something but didn't know how. Then I was thinking that no matter what I do, the change happens above, in the government, and I can have no influence. Then Saakashvili comes with his speeches. He has this kind of impulses that come directly, you can feel it, and you really believe him, and you feel turned on, charged. You really believe that you can do a lot. People got power from him. During the RR I saw the opportunity to influence something. That's why I was there. It was a test to see what happened, to see whether I could change anything or not. And thank God it was successful. 506

It was more than the content of Saakashvili's message that impacted Georgians.

People also gained power from the way he spoke to them. While Saakashvili was only one of many activists working to mobilize the Georgian people, it is fair to say that he was exceptional. Because of his own high level of emotional energy and emotional intelligence, he was better able to inspire and influence his listeners. This was essential for the motivational framing work and for transforming inefficacy beliefs.

505 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (75-77). 506 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, November 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 168-170). 170

Saakashvili was a primary source of emotional energy, or mukhti: "Saakashvili always connects. People feel connected with him, together, the same. Mukhti is created from this unity, from feeling together."507 A National Movement activist felt that

Saakashvili's personality contributed to the success of the 2003 protests: "The main source of mukhti was Misha. Before him, we tried to do something, but nothing worked.

When Misha showed up, it worked because he has God-given intuition. He is very driven and determined and has such energy. There was no pause. He has to keep moving, and this spread to other National Movement members and the people."508

This contagious energy and confidence inspired other people to believe change was possible. According to one news source, Saakashvili's temperament and style earned him the nickname 'Misha Armageddon' early in his career. 509 A respondent recalled how he had been impressed and inspired by Misha Armageddon after seeing him up close at a rally: "It was like he had flames in his eyes. I thought if someone came close to him, the person would be destroyed. Such energy. I thought to myself, this person could make revolution happen. He would have believed it more than anything, that he could change something, and look what happened."510

Saakashvili's power as a leader and framer was enhanced by his emotional intelligence, which allowed him to make excellent use of emotion and emotional energy.

Emotional intelligence is the ability to appraise, express, and manage emotions--one's

507 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 14 7). 508 Confidential interview with National Movement member, by author, October 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (79). 509 Maria Martova, "Fors-mazhor po-gruzinski: Burdzhanadze-ne tsaritsa Tamara, Saakashvili-ne Zviad Gamsakhurdia" [Force majeure in Georgian: Burdzhanadze is not Queen Tamara, and Saakashvili is not Gamsakhurdia], Moskovskii komsomolets, November 11, 20003, http://www.mk.ru/numbers/703/ article20439.htm (accessed November 11, 2003). Translated by author. 51° Confidential interview by author, 7 December 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording. ( 189) 171 own as well as those of others. 511 Jennifer George argues that high emotional intelligence allows one to lead more effectively. Leaders need to create a sense of enthusiasm in their followers; they must be able to persuade followers that problems can be overcome and that each person's contribution matters. To accomplish this, a leader must understand how the others feel and then must be able to influence those feelings. 512 Saakashvili was able to read society's emotions and then guide them: "The Georgian people played a key role in the RR. Saakashvili' s contribution was that he felt the situation, the mood of society, and found the ability in himself to guide this mood. It coincided with what his mood was."513

This was not incidental-Saakashvili is aware of the need for this kind of emotion work. Days after the RR, he is quoted as saying that his detractors considered him a radical because they didn't understand what he had been doing: "They don't realize you can't mobilize people without these kinds of speeches .... That's the style that mobilizes people here."514 As three friends explained, this awareness and ability set Saakashvili apart from the other two RR leaders and their opponents:

2 Saakashvili has great charisma. Zhvania is clever, as are many others, but Saakashvili has more charisma. He is more emotional and can give emotions to the people. His emotions work in the people.

3 The crowd, the mass of people, they needed to be led. Saakashvili did it, he is a good speaker, and emotional. He performed beautifully, and today too.

511 Jennifer M. George, "Emotions and Leadership: The Role of Emotional Intelligence," Human Relations 53 no. 8 (Aug 2000): 1034. 512 Ibid., 1041. 513 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (122-123). 514 Peter Baker, "Called Home to Rebuild, Georgian Led Revolution; Reforms Expected ofU.S.­ Educated Saakashvili," Washington Post Foreign Service, November 26, 2003, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). Cited in Stephen F. Jones, "The Rose Revolution: A Revolution without Revolutionaries?" Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19, no. 1(March2006). 172

1 Burjanadze speaks in such a polished manner, so coolly, without emotion.

2 With such words, without emotion .... And Zhvania can give info, but can't

1 but can't fire them up.

3 Zhvania was too intelligent for that.

1 No, not too intelligent. I think Saakashvili is much smarter than both the others, but knows you can't speak with the crowd the same way you speak in the Council ofEurope.515

The combination of Saakashvili's personality and skills and the people's thirst for change was decisive. His emotional communication-what he said and the way he said it-helped weaken old inefficacy beliefs. It created more mukhti and gave people the impulse to act:

As I told you, in 1998, 1999, and 2000 people saw the fraud. Everyone knew about it, but they thought those in power had such strength that there was nothing the people could do to stop it, no matter how much they wanted to. 'Nothing we can do.' But when they believed in the power, they did it.

In your opinion, why did they believe? Politicians always lie ...

Because of Saakashvili' s charisma. Because he said what everyone knew and told people how to change it. He talked about what the people thought and about how they wanted to change it. It coincided. Maybe he thought it up himself, or his PR people, but his charisma worked together with the popular demand. When that happens, you can overturn a mountain, as they say.516

Conclusion

By summer 2003, the social and political context in Georgia was favorable for social insurgency. There was a relatively open political opportunity structure. The political

515 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (51-53). 516 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (111-113 ). 173 context was quite permissive, especially in comparison with the Soviet one. As October

2001 made clear, people were able to speak their minds and openly criticize the government, and political elites were willing to tolerate significant levels of protest.

There was a system of networks populated with enough skilled organizers. By summer

2003, networks of NGO workers and activists had been spreading and strengthening for several years. These people had been working to develop a civil society that could engage regular citizens in the running of their country. However, one key ingredient was not available in sufficient quantity: the perception of opportunity for change.

By this time, Georgian society had formed its own diagnostic and prognostic frames.

By analogy, then, some part of Georgian society had made it to the second stage of cognitive liberation. Many leaders and institutions had long since lost their legitimacy: not only had the elites not resolved serious problems facing the country-they were compounding them with their indifference and venality. In the words of one Kmara activist, this produced a constant feeling of injustice. People wanted change badly, for their own sake and for the survival of the country.

Yet certain aspects of the political culture made it difficult for many to pass out of stage two into stage three. That is to say, it was hard to change the fatalistic belief that the situation was horrible but inevitable. As a result, it was hard to develop a feeling of efficacy. These difficulties were the legacy of Soviet colonization, and the system that emerged under Shevardnadze reinforced them. People's experience had shown them that they had little power to improve anything. It seemed like most of the power was in the hands of the elites, and that all the decisions were made on high. Many people wanted new leaders, but they believed election fraud limited their ability to vote the old ones out 174 of office. Also, Shevardnadze and his allies had been in power for so long that it seemed like they couldn't be moved. Combined with the Soviet legacy of political alienation and apathy, this resulted in fatalistic resignation. As a consequence, large parts of the

Georgian population still looked at politics through the 'why bother?' frame: 'I want change, but what can I do to cause it? I can do nothing, so why should I bother?' From this perspective, it was hard for many to perceive any opportunity to challenge the status quo.

After the October 2001 protests, some activists and certain politicians saw such an opportunity, and they believed in their own power. However, they knew they could not accomplish significant change without the participation of the general population. In order to recruit armies to fight with them, the generals had to align their frames and those of the people, so that the people would also see the opportunity to fight for the change they wanted.

While working to mobilize the people in November, activists and leaders framed the apparent election fraud as an intolerable injustice-the last straw. It was the final insult to individual and national dignity, and to democratic values. The people ought to be furious about this and not allow the Shevardnadze government to get away with it yet again. As evidenced by interview data, this injustice frame helped bring people into attack mode.

Movement leaders also framed the situation in terms of dignity and duty, and they appealed to the emotions, beliefs, and morals that inhere in them. The Georgian people should believe in their own dignity, even if the government did not. The country itself had also been deprived of its dignity, as it sank further and further into poverty. It was not right for a government to 'nobody' its country and its people, and those people had a duty 175 to fight back. The country they loved needed them to get up and protest. Their own hopes for a normal life and a future demanded that they go out to the streets. It was the right thing to do, and they would be proud of themselves later. If they stayed home, they would regret it for years to come.

These frames did not present people with new information, but they awakened and amplified relevant beliefs and emotions. They drew people's attention to the ideas contained in dignity and duty, as they evoked indignation and moral emotions connected with doing the right thing. These emotions helped some overcome the apathy, resignation, and fear. They turned thinking beings into actors.

Finally, movement leaders worked to transform the common 'why bother?' frame, to bring it in line with their own efficacy frame. This meant confronting people's hopelessness and the deeply entrenched beliefs about their powerlessness and the impossibility of change. By many accounts, Saakashvili was the main force behind this frame transformation. Because of his high emotional intelligence and charisma, he was better able to influence people's thinking. His emotional character and speech helped him convince people that they had more power than they had believed. His confidence, excitement, and hopefulness proved contagious. They spread the mukhti. After listening to him, people said, they felt inspired to act. No longer so hopeless, they decided to take a chance and protest.

In the end, Saakashvili and the other leaders and activists were able to persuade thousands of people that they really might be able to change something if they acted together. In one activist's words, people finally began to believe that they no longer had to accept the status quo: 176

During November many felt useful, engaged in something good for the people, for self and for society. There was an understanding of civil unity. The feeling of strength and the idea that we could change things came from being so tired of the way things were. Enough! Kmara! It was the counterweight to this, as when a sick person begins to fight against the illness. It was no longer possible to participate in the Shevardnadze system, to live like that, to lie to yourself and others. Lie-that nothing could be done. 517

These findings offer answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this work.

They help explain why so many people became active participants in the protest movement, despite the prevailing apathy and inefficacy beliefs. They show why this instance of fraud was perceived as the last straw, even though this fraud was not unusual or unexpected. The differences between the responses of protestors and non-protestors offer strong support for the claim that emotional factors impacted protest behavior. Had I asked respondents to speak of their emotions, I might have obtained a wealth of data on how they felt and how their feelings influenced their actions. I intentionally did not ask about this, unless they raised the subject; I wanted to know about their motivations without asking what might have been leading questions. Although this limited me, it allows me to claim with more confidence that emotion did indeed play a key role. First, many, but not all, protestors spoke of having been motivated by feelings of duty and a desire to defend personal and national dignity. They volunteered this information without being asked to because it was significant for them. Second, ideas and feelings of dignity and duty both correspond to the messages in the collective action frames. Even though non-protestors had been exposed to the same frames through the media and

517 Confidential interview with ArtCom member, by author, December 1, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 171-172). 177 conversations, almost none of them spoke of these framing themes. This pattern offers strong support for my thesis.

Elements of the 2000 presidential election offer further support. There are some interesting parallels and differences between Shevardnadze's rival in 2000, and

Saakashvili and the opposition in 2003. In a 2000 election campaign speech, candidate

Jumber Patiashvili spoke to voters about the problems he knew they were facing, because he faced them too. He spoke of duty-his own duty to run for president and that of the people to stand together to fight corruption and save the country. He challenged the myth that there was no alternative to Shevardnadze. Patiashvili also assured his listeners that he was not fighting for himself, but for the country. He would fight alongside the people, and they would surely win. He spoke of the dignity of Georgia and the Georgian people.

He warned his listeners that the existing situation could not be allowed to continue, if the country was to remain free. Finally, he warned the government that, if people's right to vote was violated, there would be consequences.518 There was an exit poll to support

Patiashvili' s allegations of fraud following the election. Conducted by a sociological agency and Rustavi-2, it showed that Patiashvili had won 24% of the vote, with

Shevardnadze winning 51.3%. The official preliminary results gave Shevardnadze 76%, and Patiashvili 20%.519 Patiashvili voiced complaints over the suspected fraud, but a survey of the Georgian press from the time reveals no instances of popular protest. Why

518 "Presidential Hopeful Patiashvili Challenges Incumbent President," BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, April 7, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 519 "Early Results Show Shevardnadze as Winner in Georgia," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 9, 2000, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 178 was the reaction so different, even though he addressed many of the same things as the opposition in 2003?

I can speculate based on information from the press and interviews. First, neither set of results gave Patiashvili the victory, so there was less at stake. The government had lied again, but it hadn't stolen anything from the people. Next, and more importantly, more than three years had passed between 2000 and the RR. This might have been sufficient time for people's patience to run out, as I was told it had. Third, NGOs and civil society had had more time by 2003 to strengthen and impact society. This was an important factor in the cognitive liberation process and one of the necessary ingredients for collective action in 2003. Fourth, the RR happened after the mass protests in defense of

Rustavi-2 in October 2001. As respondents and activists explained, that was an eye­ opening event, after which civil society began mobilization campaigns. These also contributed to cognitive liberation.

Next, there were the differences between Patiashvili and Saakashvili. Patiashvili was associated with Georgia's past: he had replaced Shevardnadze as Communist head of the republic in 1985. Even worse was the fact that Patiashvili had been leader of the

Georgian SSR at the time of the April 9, 1989 massacre. After that tragedy, someone spray painted his name on a university building: 'Patiashvili is a murderer! ' 520 This spot on his record was hard to overcome, as it frequently resurfaced. In contrast, Saakashvili and his team represented the future. Saakashvili and the team around him inspired many in 2003 because they were seen as a powerful new force and a real alternative to

Shevardnadze-era politics. Compared to Misha Armageddon, Patiashvili had a "staid

520 Vachnadze, "Mghelvare," 7. 179 image" and was considered a protest vote against Shevardnadze. 521 Patiashvili lacked

Saakashvili' s charisma and emotional intelligence, which meant he could not evoke the necessary emotions in his listeners. This undermined his ability to frame effectively, making it difficult to bring enough people into attack mode and to transform the inefficacy frame.

What my data do not reveal is why cognitive liberation happened for some people and not for others-why some people were stranded at the second stage. They wanted change but didn't protest because it seemed pointless to them. This transformation, and protest behavior in general, did not seem to correlate with geographic location or age group. For example, one might expect members of older generations to have had more difficulty in becoming 'liberated,' as they were plausibly more influenced by the Soviet legacy. Yet I encountered many young people who still looked through the 'why bother?' frame in 2006, and politically active grandparents who believed in their power. Nor did protest behavior seem to depend on personal or family history: among both protestors and non-protestors there were people who had never been active before, and people who had.

Some non-protestors came from politically active families, while some protestors were the only ones in their family to participate. People in both groups spoke of family members having been executed or exiled under Stalin's repression.

To place this emphasis on the role of emotion, belief, and perception of opportunity is not to deny the essential contribution of other factors. Deprivation and grievances did move thousands to protest against Shevardnadze after the election fraud. Had people not

521 Lawrence Sheets, "Georgian President a Grudging Favourite; Eduard Shevardnadze Runs for Another Term; In Midst of Poverty, Corruption and Alienation," The Globe and Mail (Canada) April 4, 2000, National Edition, Lexis Nexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 180 been so frustrated, they would not have taken such a stand. All the same, the deprivation and grievances cannot explain some aspects of the Georgian case. First, according to news accounts, during November 2003 the largest gathering of protestors at any given time numbered approximately 100,000.522 This was around 2.3% of the country's population of 4.35 million.523 World Bank data indicate that, by 2003, around 80% of

Georgians lived on $4.30 or less per day; approximately 50% lived on $2.15 or less. 524

With so many affected by the economic conditions, why did more people not protest?

Secondly, if economic conditions drove the protest, then why did something like the RR not happen years before? The level of poverty had been high for a long time: the number of Georgians living below the poverty line (less than $4.30 per capita per day) between

1996 and 2000 fluctuated between 52 and 68% of the population. 525 A third problem for deprivation and strain theories is why 'color revolutions' haven't occurred in more former Soviet republics, where people have lived in similar conditions. Ukraine and

Kyrgyzstan subsequently had their own color revolutions, but the outcome in Kyrgyzstan was not as positive. Therefore, while these horrible conditions were necessary for the RR protests, they were not sufficient. Personal economic hardship was a motivating factor, but emotion was even more important:

There was extreme poverty, of course, but I don't think they came only because of that. There was a lot of violation of rights and laws, a lot of falseness. Yes, people wanted a better life, but in my opinion, the emotion had the greatest influence. This

522 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, 184. 523 "Country Report: Georgia," Economist Intelligence Unit (November 2003): 5. http://www.eiu.com (accessed May 21, 2006). 524 World Bank, "Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Chapter 1: Nature and Evolution of Poverty, 1998-2003," 55, http://go.worldbank.org/12MK6K5P20 (accessed June 1, 2008). 525 World Bank, "Georgia Poverty Update, Report No. 22350-GE," (January 10, 2002): 10, http://go.worldbank.org/XFOQ7JQETO (accessed June 1, 2008). 181

was a big factor in the change. It was the mood. There was a general mood that we would change the government. Emotions characterize any revolution. Euphoria is needed. There was a demand for it, and for leaders too. A leader was needed-a leader who appeals with emotion to people everywhere. The slogans, the leaders, everything was intended to get people to go to the protests on Rustaveli, to change the government. Just so long as the government changed. 526

Certain resources were needed to make something like the RR happen. Organized networks of activists were an essential ingredient, because they facilitated recruitment and mobilization in many parts of the country. In addition, networks of friends, coworkers, classmates, neighbors, student governments, and regional youth organizations were utilized and appropriated, to use McAdam's term. 527 These further aided recruitment and mobilization, and allowed the movement to grow more quickly. Despite the poverty, the Georgian activists and members of the NGO community also had other resources at their disposal, if we use the very inclusive definition suggested by Edwards and McCarthy. For them, resources can be moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material. 528 Among the Georgian cultural resources, there were people who had helped organize earlier social movements; there were also web-savvy young adults who obtained essential information and formed contacts over the internet. The NGO workers and activists benefited from the endorsement and participation of respected members of the Georgian artistic community. This, along with the high position the opposition enjoyed after the government destroyed its last bit oflegitimacy, was a key moral resource. Human resources included the art and theater students who designed posters and television commercials for free, as well as the Serbian activists who helped train their

526 Confidential interview with 4 protestors, by author, October 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (44). 527 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 2001), 47 528 Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 125. 182

Georgian counterparts. Finally, key material resources were the independent television channels, especially Rustavi-2, and the foreign grants to parties and organizations.

Without many of these resources the RR might not have happened, or might not have been successful. They created the setting in which the 'liberated' people could act effectively. We should remember, however, that many of these resources were not inert: some of their power stemmed from their emotional content. For instance, people were impacted by Rustavi-2 not only because of the information it transmitted. The channel's coverage of protests, debates, and opposition and government statements intentionally evoked emotion in viewers-hope, outrage, fear-which then sometimes influenced viewers' behavior. Along the same lines, the interaction among people and between activists and prospective recruits did involve the essential sharing of information, but it also led to the spread of mukhti, which contains hope, enthusiasm, and power. In sum, these various resources worked together with the beliefs and emotions to mobilize a critical mass. For example, a Kmara activist explains how careful organization and planning made the best possible use of the mukhti:

You can plan well, but you can't have a perfect plan for everything. Sometimes things just have to work. You can't create it, but you can expect it-this mukhti­ where it's most probable. It's most probable that young people will be most enthusiastic. But you never know how long it will last, or whether it will spread to others. You can build the engine, but when you start it, it works by its own rules .... When there was organization and readiness on the part of certain groups to organize something, it helped to mobilize people more actively. If there had been only people power without organization and proper management, it could have simply dissolved . . . . You always need someone to take responsibility for organizing things, because you can lose mukhti without it. It gets wasted without organization, if you don't know what to do with it. You can have people who are willing to support your cause, and you don't know what you want. That's the worst thing. That's what happened in Belarus. The people came onto the streets, and the leaders said 'it's great that you came, now go home. We'll figure out what we want to do and then you can come back.' The people thought 'are you crazy? I risked everything to come here, and now 183

you tell me to go home?' That's what happened. They didn't have a plan, didn't expect people to come. 529

Something on the scale of the RR required financial resources, an ArtCom activist acknowledged. However, beliefs, feelings, and emotional energy were even more important for mobilization:

To bring out such a large number required financing and work. Of course it couldn't happen spontaneously. Money played a role, but if there's no idea, people won't stand in the rain. People stood in the rain because of mukhti. If there's no mukhti, no amount of money would be enough. For example, [leader of pro-Russian Justice Party] Giorgadze might have funding from Moscow, but when you have no support, it doesn't work like an organism. If there is no idea, you can't bring people out. People won't come out onto the street for social reasons, like salaries or the price of bread. There are always small protests about these things, but they can't gather large numbers of people. They won't come out in massive numbers unless there's an idea-like independence and freedom, and dignity. A feeling of personal and national dignity, and the defense of dignity .... One of the main things was dignity. This doesn't work 100%, but is an essential idea. Whether it's hate bringing you out or love, you should know yourself. If it concerns dignity, it's more important and more effective. The USSR couldn't kill this quality, by lying to people .... Another main thing is that a person should feel that he is a citizen and should initiate change, beginning from his business, to the country's business. If the law isn't accountable to you, you have to manage to change things yourself. 530

A rational choice approach has difficulty addressing my research question because of its focus on cost/benefit analysis. Considering the atmosphere that prevailed before the

RR, I suggest that such an analysis would have led rational people to stay home, in order not to waste their time and to remain safe. It was necessary for the attitude of many people to change, and rational choice theory cannot explain how that happened. Another challenge is the fact that many protesters had not been sure they would succeed. If people acted only according to cost/benefit analyses, then why did they go to such trouble-

529 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, November 30, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (165-166). 53° Confidential interviews with ArtCom member, by author, November 6 and 20, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording. (107-110, 146). 184 standing outside for hours, days, or weeks in cold, rainy weather-if they weren't reasonably confident that it would pay off? Some protestors were confident that

Shevardnadze would leave: "Yes, I knew he would go, or at least thought he would." 531

Others were less sure: "We hoped for it but didn't expect it."532 One remembered that he had been driven more by his feeling of indignation than by specific expectations or calculations:

Did you and your friends believe that protesting would make a difference?

Yes, although it's hard to say now that I believed it would. What I believed then was that I couldn't stay at home. I never thought of Shevardnadze resigning, but I had some kind of protest inside and couldn't stay home because I wanted to change the government. People around me too. A few people on high didn't want it to change and didn't care what we thought, so I had a huge protest inside. This is what I thought and realized. I didn't really think about government resigning or Shevardnadze going home. I really believed that by not stopping and doing something we could achieve something, and we did. 533

Other studies of the RR look to identify factors that made the event possible. For

Stephen Jones, the RR was caused by the effects of globalization, the impact of international organizations and media, the sudden economic decline after 1991, and the

1 534 ideas of l 9 h century Georgian philosophers like Ilia Chavchavadze. For Welt, the weakness of the Shevardnadze regime set the stage for the RR, but it was "the interaction between social actors and the state" that made it happen. This interaction included NGO and media attention to the government's unpopularity, the fraud, and the protests;

Shevardnadze's alliance with Abashidze; the non-political elite's support for the United

531 Confidential interview with Kmara member, by author, November 9, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (121). 532 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 533 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (49-50). 534 Jones, "A Revolution without Revolutionaries?" 185

Opposition; and the government's reluctance to use force against protestors.535 Lincoln

Mitchell argues that the key was a combination of Shevardnadze's weakness and missteps, an open civil society, international support for reform, the degree of fraud, the unity of the opposition, and the destructive role of the Revival party. 536 James Wertsch takes a similar stance, pointing to civil society, a free press, the lack of state authority, and appeals to national identity and unity.537 Hale sees the color revolutions in Georgia,

Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan as stemming from "elite divisions brought about by a lame- duck syndrome and unpopular patronal presidents."538

These are well-made arguments, but one essential factor is conspicuously absent from the analyses: the people themselves as subjects, not as objects. Wertsch, for example, writes that the "people were the main actors and heroes of the events of

November 2003," but doesn't say much more about them as thinking, feeling, decision- making actors. 539 Jones acknowledges that the RR "would not have succeeded without the dissatisfied multitudes willing to brave the authorities and the weather or the foolish stubbornness of the old leaders."540 But why were they suddenly willing? Hale's argument deals only with the elites and does not explain why the Georgian protestors did what they did-especially in light of the pre-RR political culture. The lame-duck status of a president may create an opening for elites to maneuver, but any elite faction that wants

535 Welt, "Regime Vulnerability and Popular Mobilization," under Introduction. 536 Lincoln Mitchell, "Georgia's Rose Revolution," Current History 103, no. 675 (Oct. 2004): 345, 348. 537 James V. Wertsch, "Georgia as a Laboratory for Democracy,'' Demokratizatsiya (2006). 538 Hale, "Democracy or Autocracy on the March?" 311. 539 Werstch, "Georgia as a Laboratory for Democracy," 521. 540 Jones, "A Revolution without Revolutionaries?" 42-43. 186 to come to power in a legitimate manner must have the support of a large part of the population. That support cannot be taken for granted.

The other factors were at least as important as the popular participation. However, to focus on these things while treating the people as an analytical afterthought-albeit an important one-is to side with the Georgian belief that everything is decided by the powerful domestic and international players and that the regular people have no real say in what happens in their country. 541 The truth is, they did have a say. It was a very small percentage of the population that came out to protest, but it was large enough. Without them, no other factor or combination of factors-the NGOs, the media, the government vulnerability, civil society-could have achieved a legitimate regime change.

In light of this, we must devote more attention to the people's perspective and motivations. This study complements the existing analyses by examining the RR from the point of view of the people who made it happen-people who might have continued to resign themselves to their fate, had it not been for the way things were framed in 2003.

During that time, Saakashvili and other movement leaders framed the situation in such emotionally compelling terms that tens of thousands of people felt inspired to act.

Movement leaders were no altruists and were certainly motivated by personal ambition.

Yet however pure or impure their motives were, these leaders succeeded in motivating thousands of people to act in pursuit of their own goals: a chance at something different and perhaps better: 'anything but Shevardnadze.'

541 Fairbanks, "Georgia's Rose Revolution," 118. EPILOGUE

While conducting fieldwork in 2006, I asked during interviews and many informal conversations what people thought of the results of the RR. Had things improved in the three years since Shevardnadze left? Some expressed measured optimism. There was the admission that, of course, significant change requires time. It had taken Shevardnadze decades to bring the country to such a low point. Recovery could not be instantaneous.

"Things aren't perfect, but all the same there is progress. You can't even compare. Before we lived in total darkness. No light, no gas, no nothing. People cut down forests so they would have something for heating and cooking. That might have been normal 500 years ago, but not in the 21st century."542 Some respondents praised Saakashvili for standing up to Russia and for repairing badly deteriorated roads. There was growing trust in the new traffic police force, much less corrupt than its notorious predecessor.

People were also disappointed with the Saakashvili government. Some might have had unrealistically high expectations of the new leadership in 2004, which had not been met by the time of the interview. Yet the criticism I heard went beyond this. For example, some respondents felt that there was less freedom of speech under Saakashvili than under

Shevardnadze: "People are more afraid to criticize now. If they lose their jobs, it's so

542 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, October 28, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (78). 187 188 hard to find another one."543 Rustavi-2 is no longer the force it was. Its popular and critical show along the lines of "60 Minutes" was neutered, a change defended by a

Saakashvili supporter at ALPE: "[Rustavi-2 news anchor Eka] Khoperia's talk show was closed down, and reopened with a different format. Before, the talk show's goal was to anger people and mobilize them. The situation is different now. We need to calm society down now, be more professional."544 Many criticized the government's efforts as superficial-painting buildings that line main streets and constructing fountains, but not doing enough yet to create new jobs:

Jordania Street was painted for Bush's visit, but on streets behind it things are in bad shape. There, buildings are falling apart and have no hot water. We should start at the foundation. What they're doing is like makeup covering sores. The makeup slides off, and then you see the sores. Those need to healed. There have been some good changes, but mostly on the government level, not on a level that helps the regular people. For me personally nothing has changed, for younger people things may be better. For the middle generation like me, no. People are left to their own devices, have no confidence in t~morrow, can't save. If you have enough for today, you are grateful-that would mean you live pretty well.545

Others had harsh criticism for Saakashvili personally. In a discussion on popular attitudes toward the RR and Saakashvili in 2006, one young woman said many people she knew were disappointed in him and regretted having supported him by protesting in

2003. Her friend qualified that statement: "What people regret is that they stood by

Saakashvili. No one regrets that they stood by the people or that Shevardnadze is gone.

This was a regime that had to be brought down. Then, no other leader appeared. The

543 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, November 14, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (138-139). 544 Confidential interview with activist from ALPE, by author, November 3, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (91-103). 545 Confidential interview with non-protestor, by author, September 26, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (l 5-16). 189 leader was Saa.kashvili. But today some doubt that he is such a worthy leader."546

Saakashvili's detractors criticized him for acting like a king, for taking too much power and not enough responsibility. 547 Soon after the RR, he began to change the constitution to increase his presidential powers. By 2006, Parliament was sometimes described as the president's notary, and the judiciary was also extremely weak. This discouraged people looking for signs that justice and the rule of law were strengthening. Even avid supporters who still believed in him in 2006 were disappointed, and they feared that Saakashvili might end his career the same way Shevardnadze had. A RR organizer and member of

RevCom explained to me how badly Georgians had wanted the new government to be good-how badly they had wanted a break with the Shevardnadze era and Soviet past:

People looked and thought 'come on, come on, young people,' and people hoped. And to this day they believe. We wanted so badly that they would prove to be good people, so we are still forgiving them for being bad now. But the revenge . . . People won't forgive what the new regime is doing: murders, barbaric things, violating laws. Saakashvili had a brilliant future before him, the road was open before him. He was like Bill Gates, something out of nothing. And then he took the easier road-total concentration of power in his hands. 548

Saakashvili' s policies and methods have also cost him support within the political elite, as some of the leaders who stood beside him in 2003 subsequently joined the opposition against him. A former National Movement member and activist expressed bitter disappointment in Saakashvili and shame for his own contribution to the RR: "I can say our disappointment came immediately after the presidential elections in January

2004. What Saakashvili said before the RR was like night and day to what he said after.

546 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). 547 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 8, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording. (21 ). 548 Confidential interview with RevCom member, by author, December 2, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (174-177). 190

Of course politicians promise a lot and fulfill only some. But he changed his principles.

He was a different person before the RR in his ideas and principles." This activist described how he was afraid to go to the town where he campaigned during 2003:

When I was head of staff, when this happened, I felt like I would be the favorite son in that town, 'Our savior! Everyone will want me to visit.' But actually things have gone in such a way that if I drive to Batumi or Kobuleti, and if I have to pass through that town, I step on the gas to get away from there as fast as possible, so they won't see me. I am ashamed. I made such promises, 'after the revolution it will be like this, we'll do that if Shevardnadze is gone, etc.' ... And now they would ask me 'what were you saying to us?' I was sincere, I believed it, but the people don't understand. In their eyes I'm a liar. That's why I'm in the opposition today and we fight against Saakashvili. 549

After talking about why soldiers hadn't shot at protestors in 2003, some respondents speculated about what would happen if Saakashvili faced his own RR scenario: would the police shoot this time?550 The fall of 2007 showed exactly what Saakashvili would do. In

September, former minister Okruashvili publicly launched serious accusations against the president. First, he announced that Saakashvili had asked him to 'eliminate' billionaire oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili. Second, Okruashvili suggested that the circumstances of

Prime Minister Zhvania's death in February 2005 had been strange, and that too many aspects of the case had not been investigated. 551 After Okruashvili was arrested, thousands gathered in protest. A crowd of between 8,000 and 15,000 people demanded new presidential and parliamentary elections. 552 An opposition politician explained that

549 Confidential interview with former National Movement member, by author, October 24, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (59-60). 55° Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, November 21, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (148-153). 551 "Former Georgian Defence Minister Levels Accusations against President," BBC Monitoring, September 27, 2007, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 552 Neil Buckley, "Georgians Protest as Critic of Saakashvili is Arrested," Financial Times (London, England), September 29, 2007, Europe Edition, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 191 this response was not for Okruashvili' s sake, but that it came out of anger against

Saakashvili. In her opinion, the situation could lead to another revolution if Saakashvili did not increase the accountability of the government. 553

Unfortunately, the situation became a constitutional crisis as the protests escalated. In early November 2007 demonstrators were attacked by riot police using copious amounts of tear gas, water cannons, truncheons, rubber bullets, and an acoustic weapon. A state of emergency was imposed and civil liberties suspended for more than a week. The key independent television channel, Imedi, was shut down, some of its journalists brutally b eaten an d its. eqmpment . d estroye d . 554

1 Saakashvili announced new presidential elections would be held on January 5 h,

2008, and resigned from office in order to campaign for re-election legally. Burjanadze became acting president. The short time allowed for campaigning hurt the opposition, as did the temporary loss of Imedi tv. The channel was allowed to recommence broadcasting in early December, but shut itself down later that month. This was both in protest against government pressure on channel personnel, and because a channel co-owner-

Patarkatsishvili-was one of the presidential candidates. 555 Patarkatsishvili had to suspend his election campaign after a sting operation apparently caught him plotting a

553 Shaun Walker, "Huge Protests in Tbilisi Demand Election after Corruption Claims," The Independent (London), September 29, 2007, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 554 "Georgia Leader Calls Early Election to Decide His Fate," New York Times, November 9, 2007, http://www. nytimes .com/2007I11109 /wor ld/europe/09georgia.html?_r=2&ref=wor ld&oref=slogin&oref=sl ogin (accessed November 28, 2007). 555 "Georgian Imedi TV Station Temporarily Halts Broadcasts," BBC Monitoring, December 26, 2007, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 192 coup against the Saakashvili government. Soon thereafter he died suddenly in his U.K. residence. 556

Saakashvili won the elections with 53.47% of the vote. The opposition coalition candidate Levan Gachechiladze received only 25.69%.557 International organizations pronounced the elections more or less free and fair, but with irregularities that had to be addressed before the early parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2008.558 The

Georgian opposition coalition, along with some international observers, did not accept the official results and believed there should have been a runoff. Two weeks after the elections, they submitted to the government a memorandum with demands including a recount of the votes, a lifting ofrestrictions on the media, and an investigation into the complaints filed by the opposition. Gachechiladze warned that if the demands were not met, "we will have permanent protest rallies and we will launch the second wave of the national democratic movement in order to restore justice in Georgia."559 As part of their campaign, the coalition adopted the slogan 'Georgia without Saakashvili.' 560

New parliamentary elections were held on May 21. Of the 75 majoritarian seats, the

National Movement won 71. Of the 75 seats won through proportional, party-list

556 Keith Dokvants, "Did a Secret Spy Sting Lead to Assassination?" The Evening Standard (London), February 13, 2008, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 557 See map of election results: http://www.civil.ge/eng/category.php?id=32 (accessed July 12, 2008). 558 International Republican Institute, "Preliminary Statement: Georgia's Election Broadly Meets International Standards-Technical Improvements Needed," January 6, 2008, http://www.iri.org/eurasia/ georgia/2008-01-06-georgia.asp (accessed July 12, 2008); National Democratic Institute, "NDI Delegation Concludes that Key Aspects of Georgian Election Were in Line with Democratic Principles, but Identifies Flaws in the Process," January 7, 2008, http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2257_ge_release_ elections_010708.pdf(accessed July 12, 2008). 559 "12 Opposition Parties Lay Out Demands," Civil Georgia, January 29, 2008, http://www.civil.ge /eng/article.php?id= 17007 (accessed July 8, 2008). 560 "Opposition Launches 'Georgia without Saakashvili' Campaign," Civil Georgia, February 4, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=l 7046 (accessed July 8, 2008). 193 competition, the National Movement won 59.18%. Only three other parties or blocs managed to win at least 5% and therefore make it into the Parliament. One was the opposition bloc 'United Opposition-National Council-New Rights,' which won 17.73%.

The others were the Christian Democratic Party (8.66%) and the Labor Party (7.44%). 561

Observers noted some problems with the conduct of the elections, including ballot box stuffing and damage to ballot boxes, repeat voting, intimidation of observers, and fights.

Consequently, the results from 39 polling stations were annulled. 562 International observers also encountered some irregularities but considered the elections satisfactory overall-an improvement. 563

Opposition factions gathered supporters to protest against suspected fraud, and the

United Opposition-National Council announced its plan to boycott the new Parliament.564

Eleven newly elected MPs renounced their mandates.565 There was talk of setting up an alternative Parliament in the New Rights headquarters,566 but the first meeting of the body, scheduled for June 10, did not take place. Some bloc members were alarmed at the idea of an alternative legislature and withdrew-a similar arrangement had contributed to the civil war under Gamsakhurdia. Others left the bloc because of personality conflicts or

561 "CEC Releases Final Vote Tally," Civil Georgia, June 5, 2008, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id =18471 (accessed July 11, 2008). 562 "39 Polling Stations Annulled," Civil Georgia, May 29, 2008, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id =18421 (accessed July IO, 2008). 563 "International Observers Say Georgian Election Positive in General Terms," BBC Monitoring International Reports, June 13, 2008, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 8, 2008). 56 "Georgian Opposition to Boycott Parliament," BBC Monitoring, May 23, 2008, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 565 "Parliament Renounces MP Mandates of Eleven Opposition Leaders," Civil Georgia, June 20, 2008, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=I 8582&search=opposition%20bloc (accessed July 8, 2008). 566 "Georgian Paper Says Opposition Regained Supporters by Promising Revolution," BBC Monitoring, June 13, 2008, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 194 disagreements on strategy. The opposition thus undermined itself, by failing to achieve unity. Georgian analysts worried that the opposition had lost its battle, and that this would be felt for years: "The things that happen in the opposition camp nowadays 'disorder, reciprocal reproaches, accusations and insults' signal that the opposition movement has come in nowhere."567

A 24 saati journalist wondered how this conflict and tension-constant since

September 2007-would affect Georgia's economic and political development. How would they affect the people? The journalist also referred to the mukhti that could be felt once again in society, but worried about the ultimate impact of so much instability. 568 For some people, the uncertainty and upheaval were exhausting. Georgians have weathered more difficult situations, but their reserves are limited:

Unfortunately mukhti doesn't last long, and we keep losing it. It takes some time to develop and then disappears quickly-because of new failure, or disappointment with the results of the RR. There can be a crash afterwards. You feel the emptiness. You feel the inability of the nation, doubts about whether it will survive. How many times can you go through these ups and downs? People have limits. Georgians over history are quite steady, which is why we've survived. We are steady against crises, external disappointments, invasions, wars, failures. Mukhti is strong internal force­ spiritual and physical-to recover after long and painful periods of depression and start over. But there is a limit-at some point you say you can't bear anymore and you JUSt. stop. 569

The ups and downs are part of a cyclical pattern in Georgian politics, where history seems to repeat itself. One might observe events with a feeling of deja vu. As mentioned

567 "Georgia's Opposition Splits into Factions," Kommersant (Moscow), June 11, 2008, World News Connection. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://wnc.dialog.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 568 "Georgian Paper Says Opposition Regained Supporters by Promising Revolution," BBC Monitoring; Original version: "Politikuri dejaviu" [Political deja vu] 24 saati, May 30, 2008, http://24saati.ge/index. php? lang_id=G EO&sec _ id=2&info _ id=3 834 7 &date=2008-05- 30&new_ month=05 &new_year=2008 (accessed July 8, 2008). Translated by author. 569 Confidential interview with protestor, by author, October 27, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (69). 195 above, Saakashvili built his early political career on the fight against corruption and corrupt officials-including Shevardnadze. The latter had similar beginnings. Georgian political scientist Ketevan Rostiashvili notes that Shevardnadze came to power in 1972 thanks to his own anti-corruption credentials. He was chosen to replace his predecessor

Vasily Mzhavanadze, because Shevardnadze was seen as the one who could fight the corruption overtaking the republic. 570 At one meeting, Shevardnadze reportedly asked all the officials present to raise their left hands: "He then fulminated against the large number of expensive Swiss and Japanese wrist watches on show in the 'egalitarian'

Soviet society."571 As history made clear, he was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to continue the fight. 572

This cyclical pattern describes not only the office of the president but party politics in general, as one activist explained:

There was an old man, one of the old dissidents, who told me a story when I was about 17. We had been discussing whether the Soviets would ever leave, and he said something to me: 'Such a party no one can destroy. It will destroy itself from the inside, because the ground it is standing on is going to give way. The party will do something that destroys itself.' Look at the people in charge now-who consider themselves democrats: the president, the former premier minister, and Burjanadze. Before, they were with that other power [Shevardnadze and the CUG], but it gave birth from inside to the thing that destroyed it. Now I'm afraid the same will happen again with this government. Because if you don't let the opposition at least say what it thinks, give it a chance to tell the truth, then sooner or later your party or government will give birth to something that will bring it down. 573

57°Ketevan Rostiashvili, Politikuri korufcia msoflios kontinentebze: Leqciata mokle kursi [Political corruption on the world's continents: A short course of lectures]. (Tbilisi: Poligrafi, 2006), 81. Translated by author. 571 John Greer Nicholson, "The Georgia Strongman Filling Gromyko's Shoes," The Globe and Mail (Canada), August 2, 1985, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 572 See George Nizharadze, "The End of the Age of Nomenklatura in Georgia," in Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic ofGeorgia 2003, ed. Zurab Karumidze and James V. Wertsch (Tbilisi: Nova Science Publishers, 2005). 573 Confidential interview with activist in the Traditionalist Party, by author, November 8, 2006, Ozurgeti, Georgia, digital recording, (111-113). 196

It is too soon to tell how this might happen to Saakashvili and the National

Movement. There are some possibilities, though, because Saakashvili is said to 'lose people' easily. The opposition coalition fighting against him in 2008 includes people who fought with him in 2003. Perhaps most damaging is Nino Burjanadze's departure from the party. She announced in April 2008 that she would not be running for office in

Parliament, because National Movement leaders could not come to an agreement over their party lists.574 Although she assured reporters that she had no intention of joining the opposition, naturally there is speculation. 575 In July, she opened a new think tank, the

Foundation for Democracy and Development, and didn't deny the possibility that she might later form a political party. 576

Hale offers an analytical framework for looking at such regime cycles. After 1991, he writes, social scientists often made the mistake of seeing post-Soviet states as moving in a particular direction-toward or away from democracy, for example. In reality, Hale argues, some of these states have been moving in both directions, in relatively predictable cycles. 577 This is because many of them have a patronal presidential system of government. In such a system, "the president and elites are mutually dependent in that the president depends on elites for implementing decisions and delivering votes while elites

574 "Ruling Party Hit by Burjanadze's Withdrawal," Civil Georgia, April 21, 2008, http://www.civil. ge/en~/article.php?id= 17648&search=Burjanadze (accessed July 10, 2008). 75 "Georgian Speaker Not to Run for Parliament," BBC Monitoring, April 22, 2008, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 576 "Former Georgian Speaker to Remain in Politics," BBC Monitoring, June 22, 2008, LexisNexis Academic. American University Library, Washington, DC, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed July 12, 2008). 577 Henry E. Hale, "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia," World Politics 58 (October 2005): 134. 197 depend on the president for resources and/or continuation in their posts."578 As long as the president is powerful, there is a high degree of cohesion among the elites, Hale writes.

However, as a transfer of presidential power approaches (due to illness, decline in popularity, term limit, etc.), elites must decide who they think the next president will be, and ally themselves accordingly. This period of elite contestation resembles democratic politics, but the consolidation that occurs after the election looks more authoritarian. 579

Therefore, Hale suggests that color revolutions like the one in Georgia "may be better understood not as 'democratic breakthroughs' but as contestation phases in regime cycles where the opposition wins."580

The discussion of cycles brings to mind a sad story one Georgian told me: Once upon a time a people in a beautiful land lived in fear of a dragon in a nearby castle. From time to time, a brave young man would volunteer to go to the castle and slay the dragon, so that they could all live in peace. The people never again heard from these young men, and assumed that each one was being killed by the dragon. In fact, something else was happening. Each time, the warrior killed the dragon, but afterward he looked around at the treasure inside the castle and fell under its spell. Each man decided to stay there and enjoy the riches, and then became a dragon himself.

Another respondent described this cyclical process in a more optimistic way:

Shevardnadze didn't really get democracy. He saw it and liked it, but didn't get it. Of course, under him some things developed quite a bit, like NGOs and mass media, but he perverted the regime. It was total corruption then. Now, there's only elite corruption. Now, only a few clans control everything. People beneath them, no, because they would be put in jail for corruption. The elites live how they want. They're authoritarian, not democratic. Democracy is something for the masses. This

578 Hale, "Regime Cycles," 138. 579 Ibid., 140-142. 580 Ibid., 161. 198

process is like when you boil meat for soup stock. You have to spoon off the nasty foam that comes to the top a few times, then it's ok. 581

Like him, I choose to be optimistic about Georgia's future. It is true that the current government has serious flaws. It has revealed a willingness to repress the people, but the people and political culture are changing. Thanks to the positive experience of November

2003, there are more people in Georgia who feel their political power and know what they can do: "The most positive outcome is that the people woke up. Today, if they don't like something, they tell the government directly, 'I don't like this. I want to take an active role in the governing of the country, because I brought you into power by electing you. You need to act so that I can have a better future.' "582

Some progress in democratization could happen peacefully through a series of elections, each slightly more honest than the last-spooning off the 'nasty foam' a few more times. Although there are forces working against such a possibility, it is conceivable. Such change could establish confidence in the political system and trust in the election process. Political change could also happen with another dragon slaying. As

Georgians know, that comes with the risk of civil war or worse. What happens in the future will depend on the national leadership, the media, civil society, and the international community, but it will also depend on the Georgian people.

581 Confidential interview with RevCom member, by author, December 2, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, ( 174-177). 582 Confidential interview with mixed group, by author, October 19, 2006, Tbilisi, Georgia, digital recording, (42). APPENDIX

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Tell me about the RR. 2. Did you vote? 3. How did you find out about the fraud? Had you been expecting fraud? 4. What was your reaction to the news of fraud? 5. Did you protest? 6. If yes, how did you make that decision? 7. Did it matter to you how many people were already there at the rallies? 8. What did you expect to happen during November? 9. Did you think protests would make a difference? 10. Why did it remain peaceful? 11. Why hadn't such a thing happened earlier? 12. What did you think of Saakashvili? What kinds of things did he speak about then? 13. Why was a leader necessary? 14. What did you think of the group Kmara? 15. Did the media play a role? 16. What did your friends and family do and say? 17. What is mukhti, and did it play a role? 18. Some people say the RR happened because people 'woke up.' What do you think? If yes, then were people 'asleep' before?

19. Some people say they had felt useless before, but useful during November 2003. What do you think about this? Did you hear people talk about this?

20. Did the government seem strong at that time?

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