Edward Bates to , Wednesday, May 04, 1864 (Opinion on Fort Pillow massacre)

From Edward Bates to Abraham Lincoln1, May 4, 1864

Attorney General’s Office,

May 4. 1864.

Sir,

I insert your brief note, of the 3d instant, entire, in order that my remarks, by way of opinion, may appear to be pertinent and comformable.

Executive Mansion,

Washington, May 3d, 1864.

Hon. Attorney General,

Sir:

It is now quite certain that a large number of our colored soldiers, with their white officers, were, by the rebel force, massacred after they had surrendered, at the recent capture of Fort-Pillow. So much is known, though the evidence is not yet quite ready to be laid before me -- meanwhile I will thank you to prepare, and give me in writing, your opinion as to what course the Government should take in the case.

Yours truly,

A. Lincoln."

I foresaw the great probability of such horrid results as those exhibited in the massacre of Fort Pillow (and, as reported, at other places); and that was one of the reasons, why, from the beginning, I was unwilling to employ negro troops, in this war. Not because, in my judgment, there is anything in the mere fact of the employment of such troops, legally or morally wrong, but upon grounds of policy, which seemed to me prudent and wise.

All history teaches us that men, (especially in the excitements of open rebellion and revolutionary violence, when all legal barriers are broken down, and all moral restraints removed, are always more swayed by their passions and prejudices, than by reason and judgment -- more prone to indulge the fierce passion of revenge, than to practice the mild virtues of prudence, moderation, and justice, the end of which is commonly wisdom and peace.

I knew something of the cherished passions and the educated prejudices of the Southern people, and I could not but fear that our employment of negro troops would add fuel to a flame, already

© Taylor & Francis 2014 fiercely burning, and thus, excite their evil passions to deeds of horrors, shocking to humanity and to Christian civilization. If they alone were doomed to bear the shame and curse of such barbarity, I might have viewed the subject with less of alarm, content to see them sink under a load of moral infamy, superadded to their political crimes. But I feared that it could not be so. I feared that, the crime once begun, we might be drawn into the vortex, and made, however unwillingly, sharers in their guilt and punishment. That we might feel ourselves, in a manner, constrained to practice the like cruel severities, in just retaliation for the past, and in prudent prevention for the future. What I then foresaw, only in apprehension, is now realized in fact; and we are forced to choose between evils, and in the midst of opposite difficulties, what measures are wisest and best (in view of all the circumstances) to punish past atrocities, and prevent their repetition.

Wiser men than I determined the good policy of employing black soldiers; and I (freely acquiescing in their wisdom and authority) accept the new condition, with all its consequences. Surely it is not for the enemy to dictate to us what kind of troops we shall employ against them. They did not ask our consent to their employment of indian savages, in the far west, and yet, (as I am credibly informed) some of our wounded soldiers were tomahawked and scalped, by their red troops, on the bloody field of Pea Ridge.

Every belligerent must and will choose for himself, what soldiers he will employ; and having chosen, it is not a debatable question whether he shall protect and (if need be) avenge them. It is a simple duty, the failure to perform which would be a crime and a national dishonor.

Having said this much, in explanation of my position and relations with the subject, I proceed to the precise point suggested by your Excellency, which is, what course should be taken by the government, in relation to the case.

This, it seems to me, presents not a question of law, but questions of prudence and policy only; for, as far as I can judge, the law is clearly with you, to inflict such punishment or exact such retribution for the outrage, as may be, at once, within your power and sanctioned by your wise discretion. The case, however, is so complicated in its relations, and the consequences of your resolution, so important and diversified in themselves, and, possibly, so terrible, in their results, that the utmost care and deliberation, are, it seems to me, necessary to a successful and honorable result.

With these views, I give my opinion, and advise as follows--

1. Adopt no plan of action, and especially, make no threat of vengeance or retaliation, without resolving at the same time, to act it out, to the letter, meeting all its consequences, direct and contingent.

2. Demand of the enemy (through your proper military officer) to know whether he avows the massacre at Fort Pillow, as a governmental act, or disavows it as a personal crime.

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3. If he disavow the act, then demand that he surrender to you, the two generals Forrest and Chalmers,2 who commanded the army which took Fort Pillow and perpetrated the attrocities complained of, to be dealt with, at your discretion.

4. If he avow and justify the act, then issue an order directed to all your commanders of armies, and all commanders of separate or detached ports and forts, and to all naval commanders, to the effect, that, whenever any one or more of the army of the enemy which captured fort Pillow and committed the massacre there, shall come within the power of such commander, he, the commander, shall cause instant execution to be done upon all such, whether officers or privates.

5. I would have no compact with the enemy for mutual slaughter -- no cartel of blood and murder -- no stipulation to the effect that if you murder one of my men, I will murder one of yours'!

Retaliation is not mere justice. It is avowedly Revenge; and is wholly unjustifiable, in law and conscience, unless adopted for the sole purposes of punishing past crime and of giving a salutary and blood-saving warning against its repetition. In its very nature it must be discretionary.

I will not say that there is no danger that a desperate enemy, in pretended answer to such a course, may make the closing scenes of this war (already replete with horrors) one disgusting spectacle of blood and fire. If that be the demoniac spirit of our enemies (which God, in his mercy forbid) still, be it so -- we, of necessity, must accept the consequences. But upon their souls be the guilt, and upon them be the punishment, both here and hereafter.

The subject is full of difficulties, and we have at best, only a choice of evils. And I pray God that your mind may be so enlightened as to enable you to choose a course of measures, most for the good of our country, and least productive of evil consequences.

All which is respectfully submitted3

By your obedient Servant,

Edwd. Bates

Attorney General

[Note 1 Lincoln convened a meeting of his cabinet on May 3 and requested each member to submit a written opinion that recommended a course of action for the government to take in response to the massacre of black soldiers at Fort Pillow, Tennessee on April 12. See Lincoln to William H. Seward, May 3, 1864 and Lincoln to Cabinet, May 3, 1864.]

[Note 2 Nathan Bedford Forrest and James R. Chalmers]

[Note 3 At a cabinet meeting on May 6, each member read his opinion on the case and after receiving this advice, Lincoln began to draft a set of instructions for Stanton to implement in response to the massacre. Apparently Lincoln became distracted by other matters, such as Grant’s campaign against Lee and these instructions were neither completed nor submitted to the

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War Department. For the written opinions of the cabinet, see William H. Seward to Lincoln, May 5, 1864; Edwin M. Stanton to Lincoln, May 5, 1864; to Lincoln, May 5, 1864; to Lincoln, May 6, 1864; Salmon P. Chase to Lincoln, May 6, 1864; and John P. Usher to Lincoln, May 6, 1864. For Lincoln’s unfinished instructions to Stanton, see Collected Works, VII, 345–46. For an account of the May 6 cabinet meeting, see Howard K. Beale ed. Diary of Gideon Welles (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1960), Vol. II, 24– 25.]

Source: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress. Transcribed and Annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College. Galesburg, Illinois.

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