Military Review August 1978

Military Review August 1978

See "The Electric Piranha," page 36 ... THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY

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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL J. R. THURMAN Commandant BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT ARTER Deputy Commandant

MILITARY REVIEW STAFF'

Colonel Edward M Bradford. Ed,tor m Chief

EDITORIAL STAFF' Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E Burlas. AssIstant EdItor. Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Martinez­ Boucher, Spanish. AmerIcan EdItor. Lieutenant Colonel Jamie W Walton. Features Editor

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EX OFFICIO General Donn A Starr.,. Commanc1pr. Trammg and Doctrme Command lleutenant General J R Thurman Commander Combmed Arms Cenfer MalOI General Homer 0 SmIth. Commanaer. LogIstIcs Center. Major General Henry Mohr Chief US Army Reserve. Major General laVern E= Weber Ch,P! National Guald Bureau Major Generdl Lows G Menetrey Deputy Commander. Combmed Arms Combat Development Activity Major General BenjamJl1 l Hamson. Commander. Admln/stratlOn Center Bngad1er General Fred K Mahaffey Deputy Commander. Combined Arms Trammg Developments Actllrfty ACTIVE Colonel T E Blagg Department of Tactics and Department of Command, Colonel J E Sutton Department of Resource Management. Colonel R A Mallion Department of Unlfted and Combmed Operations. Dr Dudley T Corlllsh John F MorrIson Chair of MIMarr Hlstorv Colonel Carl Acree National Guard Bureau. Mr Roy Root Office of the Chief. Armv Reserve, Colonel W S Bayer Combmed Arms Combat DevelDpment Actl\flty. Major W J Chantelau Adm/lllstratlOn Center lieutenant Colonel K 5 Cropsey, Combmed Arms Trammg Developments Act/lrltV. Major C W McInnIS Logistics Center. Colonel Harry A Heath, Forces Command t< Military Review

VOLUME LVIII AUGUST 1978 NO 8 CONTENTS

PAGE 2 A TACTICAL EVOLUTION- FM 100-5 by General Donn A Starry, US Army 12 KAMCHATKA NONNUCLEAR DETERRENT by Colonel W"liam V Kennedy, US Army Reserve 19 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS RECENT EXERCISE PATIERNS by Graham H Turblville Jr 36 BORIS POPOV AND THE ELECTRIC PIRANHA by Lieutenant Colonel James B Channon. US Army 46 THE PUERTO RICAN MILITARY FORCES by Captam Shaun M Darragh, Puerto Rican ARNG 54 SUCCESSFUL EVALUATION by Colonel Ronald J Rabm, US Army 62 INTER OPERABILITY OF ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE PART I by Benlamm Franklm Coolmg and Lieutenant Colonel John A Hixson, US Army 74 ARMY TRAINING DEVELOPMENT -A QUIET REVOLUTION by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L Wendt, US Army 84 REVIEWS the best from other lournals 86 STUDIES 87 LEITERS 89 NEWS 92 BOOKS contemporary readmg 'for the professIOnal

COVER us Almv pholos COur\eSv Sold,ers In/antI" and DARCOM s Test and [valuatIOn Command

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Summer IS drawing to a close. The trauma .of your latest change of station IS beginning to wear oft. MemOrIes of the famIly vacatIOn are fading. Bad moment, are forgotten. and the good ones reluctantly slIp away It's tIme again for work and school.

However. in addition to education and the• job. another cycle b begInning one that is the IIteblood of mllItar) communities around the world. It IS time for every famIl) to a"e" Its needs. deSIres and talents. Each member must decIde on what he or she wanh from the communIty and what he or she can contrIbute to It.

In other words. it's volunteer tIme. The number and talents of volunteers determine how active and successful our mIlitary eommunity life WIll be for the comIng year. Th,' Army CommunIty SerVIces, Red Cross, Teacher AIdes Program. TutOrIal Program and Crafts acti\ltles Just scratch the surfaee. Scouting and Explorers, Youth ActIvitIes. sports and hospitab all need volunteers to operate.

Perhaps you are not a camper and can't tell a square knot from a half hiteh, but you Cdn as"st the scouts b) proVIdIng transportation, workIng WIth awards or actIng as an admInIstrator. Maybe you don't feel qualified to eoach a sport, but you can be a team parent, work on the grounds crew or keep ,core. NeIther do you have to be a doctor or nurse to be a Red Cross volunteer. Our hospItals and Red Cross staff need you As an Arm) CommunIty ServIces volunteer. you can work In the office. act as a coumelor or serve on varIOUS worthwhile committees.

Socral programs are necessary and Important IngredIents In our communIty. Such actIvItIes are Integral parts of our lIves, and all of us soldIers. wIves and children-mUSI partiCIpate In them lest our communities WIther into factory-type regImens and our social endeavors die. .

Each of you has a special talent you can share wIth the rest of your eommunity. You are the heart and soul of its aetivlties. WIthout you. we all lose. You miss a r;ewardIng pastIme. and we mISs the opportunity to share in your knowledge and learn from you When Slgnup time comes around, actively JOIn In the programs available. From top to bottom, our soldiers and dependents make the eommunity live. They sustain all the endeavors and activitIes which make a meanIngful Army­ career lIfe. Be involved! DE PARTMfNT Of THE ARMY POSTAGE AND fEES PAID MILITARY REVIEW DEPARTMENT Of THE ARMY US ARMY COMMAND & GENERAL STAff COLLEGE ODD 314 rORT LEAVENWORTH. KANSAS 66027 OFFICIAL BUSINESS !~l ' PENALTY fOR PRIVATE USE $300

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CGSC LBL <; 15 fEB 78 The operational concepts set forth in FM 100-5 weren't arbitrarily set forth in ci vacuum. During the 1970-73 time frame, when the Army staff was trying to restructure the Army of the future, three factors influenced its thinking. First, there was ho well-articulated military policy. Second, there was a strong determination to avoid the pitfalls of training to win the last war instead of looking to the future. Last, the Army realized that the modernization program had been set aside during Vietnam and it would take years to catch up. Of the two possible wars in the future, a mechanized war in NA TO Europe, while the least likely, was the most important in terms of national survival and the well-being of Western civilization. By analyzing the po­ tential enemy and studying more than 1,000 tank battles, it was apparent that the smaller side did not necessarily lose to the numerically superior enemy. From this grew the operational concepts which appear in FM 100-5. Using terrain as a combat multiplier, the defender has to see deep to find the following echelon, move fast to concentrate forces, strike quickly before the enemy can break the de­ fense and finish the fight quickly before the second echelon closes. The active defense is not the old mobile defense renamed. It is new, and, the sooner we realize the differ­ ences, the sooner we can get on with the job at hand. Our tactics drive our force structure and equipment development. They also point out the need for improvements in training. The combined arms team we place on that future battlefield must be capable of winning both the first and last battles. As with most things, there is room for improvement, for re­ finement. If we are to get the most from our operational concepts, a continuing dialogue is necessary to keep our tactics dynamic. General Donn A. Starry, US Army A

This article IS an adaptation of an address made by General Starry on 30 March 1978 at the "actlcs/lnter· University Sernlnar Symposium at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas " : TACTICAL EVOLUTION UR Army has regulations that To understand any description of Ocover many subjects-almost all war and the proposed fighting of it­ subjects it would seem save military both complex problems-it is useful tactics. Whether this is by design-to and quite necessary to understand the protect the ignorant-or by oversight is circumstances under which the liturgy not at all obvious. Most probably, it's was laid down. Let's begin with that. because, since we all consider ourselves The time was 1970-73. The US mil­ tactical experts, we can never agree itary was withdrawing from Vietnam. sufficiently and for long enough to The US Army, Europe, was in dis­ write a regulation about tactics. array, rent asunder by its role as part However, we do set forth opera­ of the rotation base for forces deployed tional concepts-tactics-in field in Vietnam. The Army training base in manuals. Normally, these manuals live the Continental United States had a pretty quiet life, serving as references concentrated almost exclusively for or as exhibits for various inspectors' eight years on providing units and checklists. In many cases, one finds individual replacements to Vietnam. they are little read, less often followed The combat development community and not exactly the prime topic of had concentrated on Vietnam to the Army conversation-professional or exclusion of work to modernize the social. Army's ability to fight in other That was true at least until the 1976 theaters. Doctrinal development was edition of Army Field Manual (PM) still in the mind-set of the 1950s . . 100-5, Operations, appeared. It's safe to In the Pentagon, the Army staff say that no Army manual has ever was trying to restructure the Army, to been so widely commented on, debated find for it a size, shape, composition and, to a large extent, misunderstood. and operational concept consistent It is indeed out of the ordinary for a with the needs of the US nlOltional field manual to generate such wide military policies-whatever those discussion. I'm not quite prepared to might be. Three major factors strongly say-why the discussion developed in influenced this restructuring. this case-but develop it has. First, there was no well-articulated First, I must say that this dis­ national military policy. Second, there cussion is not all bad. About anything was the strong feeling that, after every important, a dialogue is essential. Op­ war, armies always set out to figure out erational concepts are the stuff on ,how they might have fought the last which armies feed and nurture them­ war better. There was an even stronger selves, and, so, a dialogue about them determination to avoid that pitfall, and is essential to an army's well-being. this time to look ahead, not back. My purpose is not to be defensive about Finally, there was the grim realization the tactical concepts we have espoused that modernization of the Army­ for our Army. I don't believe they need normally a constant process-had been all that much defending. But enough of set aside for Vietnam. No matter what the dialogue has struck recurring operational concept was derived, the themes that it is appropriate to offer Army was faced with a desperate need some perspectives on the evolution of for a massive' and expensive materiel those tactics. acquisition program that obviously MIlITARY REVIEW would take years and cost billions. ations with light forces, while perhaps So, in the context of 1970·73-times less important to our national survival, of social, political and economic up­ were still probably likely although heaval in our society-what did we see perhaps less so than in former times. for our country and our Army as we With the' Nixon Doctrine beginning tried to look ahead? We saw the possi­ to reaffirm our national interest in bility of two wars: mechanized war­ Western Europe, our military focus s\lch as we might have to fight in narrowed to NATO. Here, our NATO Europe-perhaps even in the strongest and most dangerous enemy Middle East; the other war-a Korea, a was much stronger than when we Vietnam, a Lebanon CriSIS, a turned our backs on him to go to Dominican Republic. Each war obvi­ Vietnam. And he was growing ously would require different kinds of stronger daily. forces-mechanized on the one hand, So, we decided to begin with devel­ light infantry on the other. oping operational concepts to cope Estimating likelihood of occurrence, with our most difficult problem, the war in NATO Europe, while probably mechanized war. Here was a battlefield least likely, was certainly the most dense with a wide variety and im­ important from the standpoint of our pressive quantities of sophisticated national survival and the well-being of weapons systems, many more than we Western civilization. Contingency oper- had ever seen before. The air over the battlefield, controlled by modern air defenses, was exceptionally dangerous. Obstacles on the ground-mostly man­ made-seriously hampered ground force operations. Command and control was difficult in the sophisti­ cated electronic warfare environment. Obviously, only a well-integrated and highly trained combined arms team could win. What might we have to fight against? Almost every potential threat mechanized army used Soviet opera­ General Donn A. Starry lS commander, US Army TramlnR and Doctrme Command. lIe tional concepts, organizations and receIVed a B S from the USMA, an M.S from equipment. Key concepts were mass, Georf{e Washmgton Unwerslty and lS a graduate of the [lSACGSC. the Armed Forces momentum and continuous land Staff Col/e{ie and the Army War College. He combat. Mass meant numbers and has sert'ed as daector of the OperatlOns concentration of forces. Momentum Directorate In the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for MIlztary OperatIOns, commanded meant sustained advances of 40 to 50 the 11th Armored Cavalry RegIment durmg kilometers a day. Continuous combat one of three tours In Vietnam and was com­ meant echelonment of forces; when one mander of V Corps. US Army, Europe. prior to becoming TRADOC commander. HIs ar· unit was consumed in the battle, the ttcle "Sergeants' Busmess" appeared in the next one was committed without a May 1978 Mlhtary Review, pause. Modern vision equipment on both sides enabled the fight to continue

4 TACTICAL EVOLUTION around the clock, in smoke and in bad speed is equally important (Figure 2). weather. Operational mass-a problem in Operationally, an enemy break­ itself-combined with a larger through attack might find a whole problem-our historical propensity for tank division, more than 300 tanks, being outnumbered, losing the early employed on a front as narrow as 5 battles, then mobilizing to outnumber kilometers, deployed in first and our enemies and so win the war. Our second echelons. The numbers of look 'at the future strongly suggested systems in each echelon are indicated that logic to be bankrupt. So, we came in Figure 1. The depth of the formation to the visceral question-Can we hope in kilometers and in minutes is on the -to fight outnumbered and win? What left and right ordinates. operational concepts would defeat such Even moving to contact a motorized an enemy? While there was no rule rifle division might bc about 15 to 25 that the outnumbered side loses,

BREAKTHROUGH

1---3.5 KM 5 KM--j DISTANCE o TIME o

FLANK FLANK 10 SECURITY SECURITY 30

20 g 60

31 ~ 31 30 ... 90 2D ECHELON _82_ ...... 8 ... 23. 40 120 KM MIN

Figure 1 kilometers wide, divided in echelons­ mathematicians and statIstIcIans reconnaissance, advance guard, first would have us believe it. So, must we • and second echelon. The frontage is admit defeat in such a war-especially wider than the breakthrough, but in Europe? Had we almost five divi- MIlITARY REVIEW

~i()ns In Europe as a token-a hostage But the history of 1,000 tp.nk battles force-or had we a chance to win? told quite a different story. The proba­ The answer to those questions was bility of victory seemed to change very buried somewhere in the phenomena of little, regardless of the odds, as indi-

MOVING TO CONTACT

r-______'525KM ______~--~ !2J 7 , L:'1

10 30

30 90

2D ~ ECHELON Q

40 120 DISTANCE 4 x ..,234 TIME KM MIN

Figure 2

fighting outnumbered (Figure 3). When cated by the dashed line. Apparently, we plotted the probability of victory on there was something about battle that an ordinate and on an abscissa at­ couldn't be described using traditional tacker versus defender ratios of 1 at­ calculus. Military forces could and tacking 5 to fl attacking 1, traditional frequently did fight and win outnum­ calculus developed the solid line curve. bered. So, if you were 1 attacking fl, you So, back to the original question: couldn't win, but, if you were 5 at­ What operational concepts could we tacking 1, you won every time. This employ'? Being realistic about NATO was not very encouraging for a country Europe and a policy prohibiting first whose forces, even with allied help, attack, we would begin a war there could expect to be outnumbered at the defending-just by the circumstances. outset of a conflict and to stay that The defense also was an appealing way for a long time. problem because of the natural advan- TACTICAL EVOLUTION " tages afforded an outnumbered force- echelon, move fast to concentrate especially the advantage of using forces, strike quickly to attack before terrain as a combat multiplier. the enemy can break the defense and We considered it essential to 'use finish the fight quickly before the terrain to beat the enemy-exploiting second echelon closes; all this while his propensity to mass without regard using the defenders' natural to the ground. As you know, the de­ advantage-terrain-to multiply the fender gives up the initiative to the strength of the defense. attacker. Hut we also believed that, to Many problems intruded between a win, we needed to regain the initiative. short, snappy operational concept and Even if for short periods, it would be a full-blown field manual description. necessary to attack-attack while de­ The full liturgy didn't come easily. fending. To avoid suicidal massed as­ Ancient precepts had to be rethought, saults of our own, defensive attacks by changed or set aside.

HOW'S THE FIGHT GOING TO GO?

Pv .50

1/5 111 5/1 ATTACKER DEFENDER

Figure 3 fire and maneuver at critical times and The new operational concept un­ places would be thE! rule. veiled new and difficult problems. We Eventually, an operational concept elected to describe how to defeat the grew: See deep to find the following Soviet-style breakthrough attack, be-

7 MIlITARY REVIEW

Heving that, if we could do that, we just to gain time, but to deceive the could solve the other problems. We enemy as to the whereabouts of our found that an attacking enemy com­ main battle area and to draw him out bined arms army deployed t9 a depth from under his air defenses. The of about 100 kilometers. Its first­ covering force simply could not afford echelon divisions were 30 kilometers to fire a little-too little-move back deep. About 50 to 60 kilometers back too soon and too far-traditional were second-echelon divisions of the' modus operandi of covering forces. first-echelon army; 120 kilometers back Now, the covering force was to defend. were reconnaissance elements' of the Its battalionR and squadrons would second-echelon army. fight, just as would similar units in a According to our operational main battle area, where the decisive concept, we had to "see deep." How defensive battle was to be fought. deep? In what detail? To what level? In Where the real fight was-at bat­ what time frame? How and with what? talion and below-the battle co.uld be As the tactical concept developed, some won by destroying enemy systems­ answers to these questions began to servicing targets. A simple explanation appear-a scheme of maneuver of target servicing in the defense is to evolved. determine how many targets must be We came to believe that the brigade destroyed in time and space in order to commander must have information of defeat the enemy attack. The battalion second-echelon regiments of the first- might have to destroy as many as 250 , ec-helon division; the division com­ targets in about 10 minutes; the di­ mander must have information of vision more than 2,000 targets in second-echelon divisions of the first­ hours, or perhaps days; the corps more echelon army; the corps commaiIder than 3,000 targets in perhaps three to must know about the second-echelon five days. army. Generally, the deeper he had to Next, we turned our attention to see, the more a commander had to rely "move quickly." If a US division, de­ on sources he didn't control directly. To ployed across about 40 kilometers, was get the right information, each com­ attacked by anything like a break­ mander had to mount a tough re­ through attack, the division com­ lentless operation using his own and mander would have to concentrate outside resources-target acquisition seven or eight of his 11 or 12 battalions and surveillance resources. very quickly. He filled in areas that he To defend successfully, the defender had denuded of ground forces by using needed to deploy forces to find the air cavalry and attack helicopter units. enemy and force him to start his main We called this the active defense. attack before coming on the main In the main battle area, we believed defending forces. Borrowing an old we could win by servicing targets, term, this was called the covering concentrating on the flanks of the force. The use of an old term didn't attack and deploying deep at its front. help many tacticians because they The battle would be fought in a series transferred the old mission along with of successively deeper battle areas and it. However, this covering force was positions until the attack was killed. different. It was meant to FIGHT, not There would be, however, no tradi-

8 TACTICAL EVOLUTION tional massive counterattack to eject it was not likely that it would be the enemy. We were outnumbered; the employed using the terms of reference luxury of a large reserve force was once set forth for the reserve in the beyond our means. No idea in the mobile defense. For the same reason active defen'se doctrine has been that we believed it possible to annihi­ harder to get across than the absence late large numbers of armored forces of a large reserve. It meant everybody coming at us in mass formation, it was else has to do his job right-the first possible for them to do likewise unto time. us. That's what was different about the Some perceive that we intended no active defense; that set it apart from reserves at all. That was not the case. the mobile defense. What we were trying to say was that The alternative-maintaining a the target servicing problem was likely large reserve as a counterattack force­ to be so acute, especially against a seemed and still seems out of the \. breakthrough attack, that commanders question. There just aren't enough would not be able to afford to hold out forces to bcgin with. a reserve. If a reserve was held out, it Now, it also was true that a lot of would most likely be a force disposed counterattacking would be necessary. in depth astride a major avenue of Remember, we talked of attacking by approach, where it could defend in fire, and by fire and maneuver, always depth, should the main attack develop bearing in mind that, when the de­ there, or be used elsewhere by moving fender got up out of the terrain to quickly to wherever the main attack maneuver, he gave up the terrain ad­ might be. These were terms familiar in vantages that were his as a defender .. armor-mechanized doctrine for years­ Apparently, that was a harder concept when forces are slim, the reserve is the to grasp than we realized. But it also uncommitted or least committed force. was true that our enemy paid little Battalions probably would not have attention to terrain, and, therefore, it a reserve, and brigades mayor may was the battle multiplying effect of not, depending on the division com­ terrain that could be one of our mander's decision. If the division had greatest advantages, if we learned to a reserve, brigades would not. The use it properly. Counterattacks were corps commander may direct his divi­ important, but done in smaller incre­ sions to echelon brigades in depth ments and more quickly than before, along a main avenue of approach in . and done carefully-not cautiously, but the main battle area; these brigades to carefully. be deployed under command of the The division normally was to be the division commander, but not to be lowest level at which a counterattack employed without approval of the plan was formally prepared. A counter­ corps commander. These would be both attack was by definition a hasty the corps and division reserve. This attack, and, if it was not successful, condition would have to obtain until then the division may have to conduct reinforcement units arrived in suffi­ a deliberate attack. Thinking about cient strength and/or the battle stabi­ this for awhile, it became more and lized enough for a reserve to be created. more logical. Those who criticized this Even when a reserve was possible, concept for the lack of a large counter-

9 MILITARY REVIEW attack force frequently complained page count and graphic presentations, about the porous nature of the main that may be true, but these aren't very battle area-everything was forward. relevant. Lack of stress is in the eye or Now, holding out a large reserve mind of the reader. It may be that, for couldn't make a battle are~ any more nearly 20 years, we've been a dense. Indeed, the reverse occurred. defensive-minded Army. We need to You couldn't have it both ways. change that, but printing the offense . To attack, we found it appropriate chapter in blood isn't the way to do it. to study how the enemy defends. Eche­ It has to be instilled in soldiers' minds. lonment of forces was characteristic of The best defense is still-as in his defense doctrine. The enemy de­ football-a good offense. The active fense attempted to canalize and Illis­ defense was designed as it is to stop direct any attack. Massive counterat­ the enemy, to destroy his attack force, tacks at times and places of his own so that we could go on the offense. choosing also were important. The two One final point is important. We most singular features were density of believed in 1970-73 that, by describing troops and the massive size of the the battle, we could develop a package counterattack forces-for a Soviet of tactics, force structure, equipment front, an entire tank army. and training. The operational Again, our operational concept was concept-the tactics-is now the pace­ to see deep, concentrate, suppress setter for force structure and enemy fires, strike into enemy rear equipment development. But we didn't areas. The principles of seeing deep forget the last part-training. From the already discussed apply once again. tactics, we derived essential training This attack concept was somewhat principles. changed from before. Attacking ~nemy These principles perceive that wars rear areas was now to be a key feature are won by the courage of soldiers, the of any attack rather than a special quality ofleaders and the excellence of operation. This was so because the the training. Of the courage of soldiers, main fight must be with the second there was no doubt, nor should there echelon; otherwise, we would be caught be. The other two principles are related in a battle of attrition that could return and require some discussion. us to the tactics of World War 1. When considering war, it was ob­ Striking enemy rear areas went hand vious that, to win, one must think. But in glove with the see deep idea. The thinking takes time, and, in battle, rear area facilities of command, there was no time. We must train all control, communication and logistics our soldiers-officers and enlisted-to were the vulnerable parts of an enemy think things through in advance. Only defensive operation. They must be if we were mentally prepared ahead of destroyed. If we could destroy these by time could we be successful. The fire, maneuver or by overrunning pressure of combat left no margin for them, the cohesion df the defense error. would be broken. We and our enemy have similar FM 100-5 has been the target of but weapons. We fight on the same terrain, one major criticism about offense­ in the same weather, and we both fight critics say we didn't stress it. Now, in fear. Only in the ability of our leaders

10 TACTICAL EVOLUTION was there "any difference. Therefore, we unit training, they all support concepts must train our leaders to think logi­ set forth in FM 100-5, Operations. cally about difficult problems and do it This, then, was the evolution of the quickly and under pressure so. the tactics that eventually were described decisions are on time and right-the in FM 100-5. In my mind, one im­ first time. portant result of this evolution has Our commanders must know best been the subsequent discussions-the what to do in complex situations-the di(llogue I mentioned earlier. Improve­ rub 'is that, in battle, commanders ments can be made in any operational couldn't be everywhere. Complex situa­ concept-FM 100-5 is no exception. The tions would develop where the com­ direction for those improvements can mander wasn't present or couldn't get only be found through honest and there. Soldiers must be trained to logical discussion. I hope that this handle complex situations with dialogue will continue, for 1t is truly standard drills-to do something right what keeps the concepts dynamic. un til the boss arrives. But, first and foremost, the opera­ To get things done in battle, deci­ tional concepts must be regarded, by sions must be made and orders given. one and all, as the driving force behind A complex battlefield called for our development of organization, ma­ complex orders, and these could easily teriel and training. Only by recog­ go wrong. In battle, such difficulties nizing this purpose can the US Army could be fatal, so we must train the put soldiers in organizations and whole team through complex situa­ equipment on the battlefield in an tions regularly. effective fighting outfit-the combined Our training system was built on arms team. That team is the only these principles. From Skill Qualifi­ viable solution to the question of how cation Tests and Soldiers' Manuals for to fight and win the first and last the individual soldier to Army battles of the next war. Training and Evaluation Programs for "'i..

Army Supersonic Missile Targets. The US Army has awarded Beech Aircraft Corporallon a $4 B-mlilion follow-on contract to continue production of the supersonic rocket-powered AOM37A missile target The award extends production of the Beech missile targets through December 1979. The contract IS for the Beech Model 7702. latest version of the AOM37A The target system has been used since 1963 by the Navy. Army and Air Force and several foreign nallons in evalu­ allng air-to-air and surface-to-alr missile weapons systems Capable of simulating aircraft and missile intrUSions, the 13.5· foot-long, 560-pound AOM37A can be operated to a 70,OOO-foot ailitude and mach 2.5 (1,650 miles per hour) speed. After launching from an aircraft at up to 50,000 feet, the target IS controlled In flight through a preprogramed electronic gUidance system.

11 " Kamchatka:" Nonnuclear Deterrent

Colonel William V. Kennedy, US Army Reserve

As the Soviets achieve strategic parity with the United States, our nuclear deterrent becomes less credible. In times of crisis in Europe or the Middle East, do we have or could we develop a deterrent capable of offsetting Soviet iniUa­ tiL'es without threatening a general nuclear exchange? Perhaps the answer lies in the Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula in the North Pacific. Far removed from the major population and industrial centers of European Russia, this landmass contains the only open ocean base for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Any US move to control Kamchatka would demand an immediate Soviet response. Since the United States is strate­ gically stronger than the USSR in the North Pacific and Kamchatka is not within the vital heartland of the Soviet Union, a general nuclear exchange as a result of US action against Kamchatka is unlikely. This option is not a plan of aggression but should be an added deterrent, just as is our nuclear options deterrent, geared to reducing the chance of confrontation in some more critical area-for example, the Middle East or Europe.

OR the past 30 years, the United the Soviets acted directly. When they FStates has kept peace between t~e have seen, or thought they have seen, major world powers by maintaining an an opportunity for aggrandizement overwhelming margin of strategic without effective American response, nuclear power. Even at its most they have acted indirectly, but no less awesome, however, that power was not ruthlessly, as in Korea and Vietnam, sufficient to prevent the Soviet Union and now in Angola. from the exercise of military force. During the 1973 Middle East crisis, Where they considered their vital the Soviets, for the first time, indicated interests to be at stake, as in Hungary a willingness to introduce Soviet land in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, forces into an area where a direct

Copynght « 1978 by Colonel Wilham V Kennedy, US Army Reserve

12 KAMCHATKA

i' confrontation with the United States employ American forces on a scale would have been almost certain. The equal to the possible demands. relationship between this threat and Experience has shown that Europe the fact that the Soviets are rapi,dly cannot be depended upon as a base achieving at least equality with the from which to oppose Soviet actions United States in strategic nuclear force not directly aimed at the NATO allies. seems obvious. US forces deployed from the Conti­ The casualty lists of Vietnam and nental United States to the Middle Korea make a mockery of the idea that East must operate at extreme distances the past quarter-century was a period and under severe handicaps in regard of peace. But, to the degree that a to overflight rights and the use of relative peace was maintained, it territorial waters. Use of US land seems plain that Soviet aggression was forces anywhere in the Middle East restrained only because the United almost certainly would provoke the States could pose a direct threat to the hostility of most of the governments existence of the Soviet state without a and peoples of the region. In this comparable risk to itself. Soviet equal­ situation, a relatively small com­ ity in nuclear weapons introduces an mitment of Soviet forces could tie down element of increasing doubt into this a disproportionate share of the Amer­ relationship. The Middle East and ican military establishment, largely Angola experiences have shown that, in protection of long and vulnerable as this element of doubt increases, the lines of communication. The opportu­ Soviets will become increasingly nities this would provide for -Soviet bolder. How, then, do we re-establish mischief elsewhere are almost li­ the deterrent as a significant and mitless. dependable constraint on Soviet am­ Faced with such disadvantages, it bition? seems reasonable to suggest that we For the moment, the most volatile look for areas where a smaller US force area of potential US-USSR confron­ could exert such a compelling influence tation is the Middle East. Yet the that the Soviets would be forced to Middle East also is one of the most moderate their policies. From past difficult areas in the world in which to and current experience, such an alter-

Colonel William V. Kennedy. US Army Reserve. IS with, the StrategIc Studies In­ stttute, US Army War College, Carlisle Bar­ racks, Pa. He IS a graduate of Marquette Unwerslty and the USACGSC. He has served as an mtelltgence off,cer in the Strategic Air Command. as an Army public affairs officer in the National Guard Bureau and currently is a mobtl,zatwn designee to the Office of the Deputy Ch,ef of Staff for Operations and Traming. Headquarters. First US Army. Fort Meade. Md.

13 MILITARY REVIEW native should possess the following Japan from the Soviet-occupied Kurile principal characteristics: Islands would be reduced. The at­ • Pose a direct threat to Soviet vital tention of the Soviet forces on China's interests, but at a level belo"," strategic borders would be diverted and the nuclear reaction. security of their strategic base • Be free from political restrictions threatened. The eventual return of the on use of air and sea space. entire Kurile Island chain and of Sa­ • Support rather than detract from khalin to Japan and the possibility of the security interests of other major even more dramatic gains by China powers. would become much less a remote There is only one area-the North possibility than is now the case. Of the Pacific-that appears to offer the four major powers in the area, only the means to achieve so special a combi· Soviet Union would lose. In short, the nation. vital interests of the Soviet Union in The United States and the Soviet the Northeast Asian power rela­ Union share a common border in the tionship would be truly engaged but Bering Strait. The landmass directly without threatening either the exis­ opposite Alaska-the Chukotski tence of the Soviet Government or of Peninsula-is of minimal strat 'gic im­ the Russian homeland-the only two portance to either the United States or entities for which there is any the Soviet Union because of its re­ plausible likelihood of a strategic moteness from any center of major nuclear response. human activity. To the south, however, To understand the existing and lies an area of considerably greater potential strategic significance of strategic importance-the Kamch{ltka Kamchatka, it is necessary to examine Peninsula. its relationship to the Soviet Union as Although icebound for several a whole. Kamchatka is outposted by months during the year, Petropav­ the Komandorskiye (Commander) Is­ lovsk, on the southeastern coast of lands, essentially an extension of the Kamchatka, is the only Soviet Pacific Aleutians, and by Karaginski Island Fleet base on the open ocean. Forces closer in to the neck of land, largely based at Vladivostok and the other tundra, that connects Kamchatka to Soviet Pacific coast ports must pass the Siberian mainland. one of several restricted passages to The peninsula itself is 750 miles gain the open sea. In short, the denial long and 260 miles across at its widest of Petropavlovsk to the Soviet Union point. Two mountain ranges divided by coupled with air and sea surveillance the Kamchatka River Valley run most of the exits from the restricted of the. length of the peninsula. The passages to the south would reduce the river is navigable by shallow-draft status of the Soviet Union drastically boats for about 200 miles from its as a Pacific and world power. mouth on the Pacific coast. The The detachment of the Kamchatka western range of mountains contains Peninsula itself from Soviet control many extinct volcanoes. There are would have a far-reaching influence on active volcanoes in the eastern range, the overall strategic balance in North: including Klyuchevskaya Sopka, 4,860 east Asia. The threat now posed to meters high. One of the volcanoes,

14 KAMCHATKA

North Pac,ftc Ocean

Stubel, erupted in the winter of 1907 Siberian mainland sweep bare the and covered the entire peninsula with sand and gravel beaches. ashes to a depth sufficient to stop dog There are forests of mountain birch, sled traffic. A vacha, 30 kilometers Japanese stone pine, alder and northeast of Petropavlovsk, erupted in mountain ash on the slopes and in the 1926 and continues to emit vapors and mountain draws. There are meadow­ sulphurous gases. As would be ex­ lands and bogs in the Kamchatka pected from the volcanic character of River Valley. the mountains, the peninsula is subject The Russians arrived' in 1696 and to frequent earthquakes. rapidly submerged the native tribes . The Japan current protects Kam­ . Today, there is a population of about a chatka from the extreme cold of quarter million, of which fewer than mainland Siberia, but the resulting 20,000 are natives. Petropavlovsk is monsoon-type climate creates some of the principal population center, com­ the worst fogs in the entire Pacific. prising about half the total. In addition During summer, the coasts are fog­ to the naval facilities at Petropavlovsk, bound more than half of the time. The the population is supported by fishing, coasts are relatively free of fog in fish processing, lumbering and mining. winter, but ice limits approach from Mining activity is carried out princi­ the sea. Precipitation is heavy with pally on the west coast where there are much snow in the winter except on the significant deposits of gold, copper, west coast where the winds from the molybdenum, mercury, coal and appar-

15 MILITARY REVIEW ently oil. The numerous hot springs The scheme collapsed when Lenin associated with the volcanic nature of finally became aware that Vanderlip the peninsula enabled the Soviets to had no official standing. The Brooklyn establish a 5,OOO-kilowatt geothermal Bridge had never been sold, or nearly power station in 1964-the' first of its sold, on so grand a scale. kind in the Soviet Union. The incident tells something of The center of the lumbering in­ where Russian interests are focused in dustry is Klyuchi, northeast of Petro­ time of crisis. Lenin obviously was p~vlovsk. Roads and trails connect preoccupied with events in European these two points and ports on the east Russia. Now, as in Lenin's day, that is and west coasts. where the great preponderance of the Although a peninsula in the tech­ Russian people live. Experience with nical sense, Kamchatka is in the forced and induced migrations of Rus­ strategic sense more truly an island sians into Eastern Siberia indicates separated from the principal centers of that European Russia is also the place Soviet power less by water than by where the great majority of Russians huge expanses of difficult terrain and prefer to go on living. As a result, the climate. The peninsula is supported Soviets never have been able to pop­ principally from the Vladivostok ulate their Far Eastern territories to a region, 1,500 miles distant by sea and degree commensurate with the re­ air. Yakutsk, the nearest inland center sources of the region. Further, there is of support, is about the same distance evidence of a resentment in European away across an almost tackless wil· Russia of the large sums spent to derness. The Northern Sea Route based develop the Far Eastern provinces. In at Archangel in European Russia short, the huge sums needed to passes along the Kamchatka coast, but overcome the permafrost and extreme it is a tenuous link at best. cold of Siberia would be more pro­ The remoteness of Kamchatka from ductive if invested in the European European Russia and even from the homeland. principal center of Soviet Far Eastern The nightmare of the Soviets is the power in the Pacific Maritime Prov­ knowledge that 'U"apanese capital and inces led to a bizarre incident Chinese labor C;buld develop Eastern whereby the peninsula might have Siberia more n/pidly and more fully come under American influence or than can the Russians. This fear is control almost for the asking. certain to increase as the growth of the Victimized by his own propaganda overall Russian Caucasian population and stereotypes, Lenin in 1920 was slows or declines while the numbers, almost conned by one Washington needs and aspirations of the East Baker Vanderlip into an agreement by Asian peoples continue to increase. which Kamchatka would be leased to The population gap between the Rus­ the United States for a period of 60 sians and their Far Eastern neighbors years. "We shall give America a ter­ probably never will be closed, but the ritory," Lenin wrote of the deal. "In technology gap that is the foundation this way we incite American imperi­ of Russian superiority in East Asia is alism against the Japanese bour­ being closed rapidly. geoisie." Can the United States use the weak-

16 KAMCHATKA nesses and the" inherent,vulnerabilities respons~ already has been mentioned. of the Russian position in East Asia to There is a range of other responses reinforce or restore deterrence? available to the Soviets, but they are The strategic position of the United all severely limited by considerations States in the North Pacific is relatively of logistics and geography. stronger than that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets could reinforce a American naval and amphibious threatened Kamchatka by air, but they forces can maneuver anywhere in the could_ not support a sizable garrison North Pacific without passing the sort except by sea. As noted, support by sea of strategic defiles that confront the must come through narrow and easily greater part of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. blocked passages from the south or The Aleutians provide the United around the Siberian landmass. Any States with the means to project land­ attempt by the United States to detach based tactical air power to within 600 Kamchatka from Soviet control could miles of Petropavlovsk-in effect, a trigger a naval war in the North Pa­ protected corridor spanning the Pa­ cific supported by transfer of Soviet cific. The principal base for projection naval forces from Europe. These forces of US power in the region is the North­ would be exposed in transit to the same western United States. That base area hazards that led to the destruction of cannot be attacked successfully except an earlier Russian fleet in 1904. Even if by triggering a strategic nuclear ex­ they arrived safely, it is doubtful that change. There are no political restric­ the existing base and industrial tions posed by the territorial waters or structure of the Soviet Far East could air space of third nations. support them for long. The absence of large civilian popu­ Similar limitations apply to the lations and of the potential for colla­ marshaling of tactical air power in teral damage to anything but ocean Eastern Siberia. Forced to organize a and sub-Arctic wilderness suggest that defensive effort of this magnitude, it is the risk of tactical nuclear warfare doubtful that the Soviets would wish to might be higher in the North Pacific continue major military initiatives in than elsewhere. Because of their rela­ Europe or the Middle East, particularly tively weak strategic position in the with China, whether openly hostile or region, the use of tactical nuclear nominally friendly, waiting on the weapons might be more attractive to flank for what Mao Tse-tung has called the Soviets than to the attacker. ,China's "accounting" with the Rus­ Without discounting the seriousness sians. of the tactical nuclear risks, it can be What is presented here is not a plan concluded that, by deliberately and for aggression against the Soviet publicly posing a threat to Kamchatka, Union, any more than the mai!1te­ the United States would be in a po­ nance of an adequate strategic nuclear sition to exact from the Soviets a high deterrent represents such a plan. By price for Soviet adventurism in the discussing inherent Soviet weaknesses Middle East, Europe or other areas of in East Asia, it is meant simply to vital or major interest to the United point out that it is not always neces­ States and its allies. sary to confront the Soviets at the The upper range of likely Soviet point or points of their greatest

17 MIlITARY REVIEW strength in order to dissuade them strategic position in the North Pacific, from a dangerous course of action. but it would require consideration of The US forces necessary to detach Canadian sensibilities· concerning Kamchatka from Soviet control are shipment of military freight during a largely already in existence, Employed crisis in which Canada did not con­ in the North Pacific, these forces could sider itself involved. divert a much larger proportion of The actual employment of forces Soviet military strength and economic against Kamchatka would presume reSources than would be the case if the that a major crisis involving the same US forces were to be transported United States and the Soviet Union to theaters on the doorstep of the already had occurred. Exercise of the principal centers of Soviet power, as in Kamchatka deterrent, therefore, would Europe or the Middle East. The be aimed at lessening the dangers statement attributed to Prime Minister inherent in confrontation in some more Harold Wilson of Britain that "one critical area, such as Europe or the soldier east of Suez is worth a Middle East. thousand on the Rhine" is truer in the The emergence of nuclear parity North Pacific and Northeast Asia than marks the end of a period of relative anywhere else. certainty in the relationships between The ability to create and to make the superpowers. The history of believable this added deterrent rests on mankind indicates that, when any the ability of the United States to weapon reaches thIs stage, it is no retain or establish air and naval supe­ longer the weapon itself that is a riority in the North Pacific. Security of determinant of action, but how the the Alaskan North Slope oil fields weapon is used. It would be reckless to would seem sufficient in itself to justify depend on the destructiveness of such a capability. Some further devel­ nuclear weapons as, ipso facto, a ne­ opment of the mainland Alaska and gation of all of this long history. If we Aleutians base system and an increase are to continue to maintain a pre­ in amphibious shipping probably carious peace, new ways to reinforce would be necessaTY. Annual exercises deterrence must be found. To accom­ on the Alaskan coast and in the Aleu­ plish this, it will be necessary to widen tians in various seasons would be the spectrum of strategic thought essential. Linkage of the Alaska beyond Europe and, lately, the Middle Railroad to the continental system East. The North Pacific offers possibil­ would strengthen the overall US ities. ~

NOTICE. The February 1978 Issue of the MR contained an Item In the "Under Study" feature on a new publication. Review of the Soviet Ground Forces The agency which distributes the Review, the Defense Intelligence Agency, has asked that requests for the monthly publication be submitted through commal)d channels rather than directly to the agency as previously stated

18 Soviet Bloc Maneuvers

Recent Exercise Patterns and Their Implications for European Security

Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

Since the signing of the Final Act at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Hel8inki in Augu8t 1975, the Soviets have announced several Soviet/pact ma­ neuvers. However, none have been on the scale of those held in the 1960s and early 1970s. The West has no way of knowing if other field exercises were held or how many or of what magnitude. The West remembers the exercises that took place prior to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the "confidence-building measures" contained in the CSCE Final Act may have had some impact, any future agreements on prior notification of large-scale military activity must include a workable verification clause.

19 MIlITARY REVIEW

IntroductIOn

OVIET and Warsaw Pact maneuvers With exercises Dnieper, Dvina (1970) Shave long held a fascination for and Yug (1971). the paradrop/airlanding Western military observers. In the 1960s of entire airborne divisions gave Soviet and early 1970s, a series of Widely threats to use military force in the 1973 publicized, large-scale exercises taking October War added credibility. In ad- place in Eastern Europe, the Soviet UnIOn dltlon, a number of exercises since the and throughout the world's oceans have mld-1960s have Indicated a growing afforded the West with at least a limited Soviet Interest In nonnuclear operations. opportunity to study and assess how well Exercises like Opal-71 (1971) and Shield- Soviet and pact armed forces could Im- 72 (1972) made It clear that the most plement the tactical doctrine and opera- probable contingency for pact forces In tlonal concepts governing the em- Hungary Will be commitment against the ployment of those forces designated to NATO Central Region, carry out wartime operations against A number of Western military writers NATO have discussed Soviet bloc maneuvers, Beginning In the early 1960s and with many Interpretations of their slgnlfi- continuing to 1972. the USSR-either cance haVing been offered.' But by far Unilaterally or 10lntly with other Warsaw the greatest concern to Western decl- Pact states-camed out at least one sionmakers has been In the area of well-publicized military maneuver a year IndiCatiOnS and warning of hostilities. (see the accompanYing table for a While fully recognizing that the pact has lengthy. but by no means complete, many reasons for conducting exercises.> listing of Soviet/pact exercises) So­ pia nners cha rged with the defense of viet/pact press releases on these .exer­ Western Europe must view any unusual cises almost always rewarded the careful Warsaw Pact troop concentration or reader with some inSight Into Warsaw movement as a pOSSible prelude to Pact military capabilities and planning hostile military operations. and, on occasion. revealed the eXistence That exercise activity could be used as of some new piece of military hardware. a means of preparing for actual combat It was In Dmeper (1967), for example. operations was, of course, a precedent that the Soviets demonstrated the em­ set long before the existence of the ployment of helicopters in a ground Warsaw Pact and NATO. But the Soviet­ attack and antlarmor role, an event that led invaSion of Czechoslovakia freshly 'heralded the Widespread introduction of illustrated how attack preparations in' armed helicopters Into Soviet forces In Europe could be carried out under the the exercises Oder (1967), Sever-58 cover of exercise activity' ExerCise (1968), Oder-Neisse (1969), Oke,m Sumava, the huge logistic Neman ex­ (1970) and Comrades-in-Arms (1970), ercise, Sever-58, Sky Shield and others the Warsaw Pact demonstrated ItS capa­ (all In 1968 and all discussed In the bility and its almost certain intent In Soviet/pact press) are viewed by most wartime to carry out numerous am­ Western observers as being conducted at phibIOus operations against the NATO least in part in preparation for the inter­ Northern and Central Regions (and to th\3 vention in Czechoslovakia' Thus, large­ south as well). scale pact exercises-announced or

20 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS " otherwise-must remain a cause of some "document on confidence-building meas­ concern to the West. ures and certain aspects of security and It has been principally for this disarmament,'" it was noted that each of reason-the uncertainties surroundiNg the participating states (which the So­ large pact troop movements-that viets Invariably refer to as "33 European Western negotiators have pushed for states, the USA and Canada") had agreed provisions calling for the prior notifi­ to notify all other signatories of any cation of-and exchange of information military exercise exceeding 25,000 on-military exercises and troop move­ troops "independently or combined with ments in both the Conference on Se­ any pOSSible air or naval components (in curity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) thiS context, the word troops includes and the continuing Mutual and Balanced amphibiOUS and airborne troops):'6 This Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. Before meant, then, that, of the 25,000 troops, discussing recent trends In Soviet bloc only ground, airborne and naval infantry maneuvers, it IS worth briefly reviewing (marine) personnel would be counted the prior notification proVisions of the regardless of how many naval and air CSCE Final Act and what is apparently force personnel were Involved. It also being discussed In thiS area at the MBFR was stated that: talks. .. notification will be given of major military maneuvers which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any particI­ CSCE and MBFR: pating state as well as, If applicable, In "Confidence-Building Measures" the .adjoining sea area and air space. 7 and "Associated Measures" [For those states] ... whose terntory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of maneuvers which Since the signing of the CSCE Final take place in an area within 250 kil­ . Act in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, world ometers from Its frontier facing or attention has centered most heavily on shared With any other European partici­ the human rights provisions of the pating state. agreement It IS with those portions of Thus, prior notification of all major the Final Act labeled "confldence­ exercises taking place In the East Eu· building measures,"' however, that are of ropean Warsaw Pact states should be most concern here. Under the heading given, as well as exercises taking place in

Graham H Turblvd'e Jr IS currently at the University of Montana working toward hiS doc­ torate In history He recefved a B A In RUSSIan from Southern IIImols University and an M A In RUSSIan studies from George Washmgton UnIverSity From 1969 to 1975. he was WIth the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense H,s artIcle "Paradrop at the Buknn Bndgehead An Account of the SOVIet Dmeper Airborne OperatIon"' appeared In the December 1976 Military ReVIew

21 MILITARY REVIEW

SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT EXERCISES

1961-July 19771

NAME DATE LOCATION PARTICIPANTS

Unnamed] Dc. 1961 East Germanv USSR East Germany3

Unnamed Sep 1962 Poland USSR. Poland. East Germany

Unnamed Sep 1962 Czechoslovakia USSR. Czechoslovakia, Poland

Unnamed Oct 1962 Rumania USSR, Rumania, Bulgaria

Quartet Sep 1963 East German'll USSR. East Germany. Poland. Czechoslovakia

Unnamed Jun 1964 Czechoslovakia USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germanv

Unnamed Sep 1964 Bulgaria USSR, Bulgaria. Rumania

Unnamed Apr 1965 East Germany USSR. East Germany

October Storm Oct ,1965 East Germany USSR, East Germany. Poland. Czechm,Iovakl8

Vita va Sep 1966 Czechoslovakia USSR. Czechoslovakia, East Germany. Hungary

Unnamed Jun 1967 ,Czechoslovakia, Hungary USSR. Czechoslovakia. Hungary

Rhodope Aug 1967 Bulgaria. USSR USSR. Bulgana, Rumanta

Florett Aug 1967 fast Germany USSR. East Germany

Dnteper Sep 1967 USSR USSR

Oder Oct 1967 Poland USSR, Poland, East Germany

Sumava Jun 1968 USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia. USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary East Germany. Hungary

Sever-58 Jul 1968 Naval/amphibIous operatIons USSR, Poland, East Germany BaltiC and North AtlantiC

Sky Shield JullAug 1968 USSR, Eastern Europe USSR, Warsaw Pact·wlde

Neman Jull Aug 1968 USSR. Poland. East Germany USSR. Poland. East Germany

Unnamed Aug 1968 Hungary USSR. Hungary

Unnamed Aug 1968 USSR, Poland. East Germany USSR. Poland, East Germanv

Unnamed Mar 1969 East Germany USSR. East Germany

Sprmg-59 MarfApr 1969 East.Germany. Poland. USSR. Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia

Oder-Neisse Sep 1969 Poland USSR, Poland, East Germany, '1zechoslovakla

22 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS " Unnamed Junl Jul 1') 1970 CzechoslovakIa USSR. CzechoslovakIa

OVlna Mar 1970 !.JSSR USSR

Unnamed Aug 1970 Czecho51ovakla USSR. Czechoslovakia

CDmrades·In·Arms Oct 1970 East Germany USSR. East Germany. Poland. Czechoslovakia. Hungary, . Bulgaria, RumanIa

Okean 70 Apr/May 1970 WorldWide naval exerCise with USSR amphibious landings by fleet manne elements

Yug Jun 1971 USSR USSR

Opaf.71 Aug 1971 Czechoslovakia, Hungary USSR. Czechoslovakia, Hungary

Unnamed Oct 1971 Czechoslovakia USSR. Czechoslovakia

Unnamed Feb 1972 RUmanIa USSR. Rumania. Bulgana

Unnamed Apr 1972 Poland USSR. Poland

Sprmg·72 May 1972 Poland Poland

Shleld-72 Sep 1972 Czechoslovakia USSR. Czechoslovakia, East Germany. Poland. ~ungary

Vertes-73 Sep 1973 Hungary USSR. Hungary

Summer. 74 Jun 1974 Poland USSR Poland

Okean- 75 (Also Apr 1975 WorldWide naval exerCise USSR called Sprmg-75J

Kavkaz·76 Jan/ Feb 1976 USSR USSR

~ever·76 Jun 1976 USSR USSR

Shield· 76 Sep 1976 Poland USSR. Poland, East Germany Czechoslovakia

Unnamed Oct 1976 Hungary USSR, Hungary

Unnamed Jul 1977 Naval ell.ercls~ In Baltic Sea USSR. Poland. East Germany

Karpaty 77 Jul 1977 USSR USSR

1 ThiS table Shpuld m no sense be regarded as a complete listing of those Soviet and Warsaw Pact maneuvers held from 1961·77 and discussed In the Sovletl pact media but only as a compIlation of some of the more prominent ones 2 Whenever possible the names of Soviet/pact exercises have been mcluded Howe\ier In a number of Instances exercises were either unnamed or their deSignations were not revealed In the Sovletlpact media sources used to compile the table In those cases the exercIses are listed as unnamed 3 Oleg PenkovsklY The PenkovsklY Papers. Translated by Peter Deflabm. Avon Books. N Y 1965 pp 241-45 mdlcated that. In October 1 £161, general strategic military exerCises· would commence and that these exercIses would take place over the entire temtory of the SovIet UnIon and the terTifory of the people s democracies With the mam strIke directed against Germany~on maps, of course The armed forces of the people s democracIes were to partiCipate as well Whether the October 1961 Warsaw Pact exercise listed abo\ie represented a part or all of the exercise PenkovsklY beheved would take place at the same time cannot be determmed but a relationShIp seems likely

23 MILITARY REVIEW the westernmost 250 kilometers of the practice during the thirties to inVite USSR (with the exceptl6ns of those noted foreign military observers to attend ma­ In footnote 8). It also was stated that neuvers, and at the same time the world prior notification would be given 21 days was plunging rapidly toward World War or more before the exercise "or In the II," With Kostko gOing on to state that case of a maneuver arranged at shorter assOCiated measures "have the objective notice at the earliest possible opportunity of preserving Intact the eXisting NATO prior to the starting date. "9 Other military mechanlsm."'2 co'nfldence-bulldlng measures prOVided In any event, despite the opposition of for the exchange of observers at exer­ at least some elements of the Soviet cises. the prenotification of other smaller government. the Issue of announcing exercises not reaching the 25,000-man exercises and troop movements prior to level (If deSired by the participant holding their commencement became a tOPIC for the exerCise as a tension-reducing negotiation in both the CSCE and the measure) and the prior notificatIOn of MBFR talks With the signing of the Final major military movements at the Act In August 1975, and the Soviet discretion of the Signatories '0 These agreement to abide by the prOVISions, measures were seen as haVing the po­ Western observers awaited with conSid­ tential for easing military tensions In erable Interest for the prior notification Europe generally (by the West at least), of-and inVitatIOn of observers to-the while promoting stability and redUCing first Soviet/Warsaw Pact exercise the chances of misunderstandings ove~, military activity which could lead to war 1 Western negotiators reportedly are Initial Soviet Reaction to the Military push Ing for Sl mila r prior notification ar­ Provisions of the Final Act rangements In the MBFR talks (the of­ fiCial deSignation IS Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and ASSOCiated Shortly after the signing of the Final Measures In Central Europe). The prior Act. NATO stepped up preparations for notification diSCUSSions failing under the carrying out a series of scheduled ma­ "associated measures" area of the talks neuvers In Europe which were to take have seen the West calling for exchanges place over a period of some two months of information on both large-scale exer­ and would Include the movement of US cises and unit redeployments, as well as troops to Germany In the annual Re­ other subjects." forger exerclse. 13 As a NATO commu­ Some Soviet spokesmen have been nique noted' less than enthUSiastic' over the asso­ In accordance with the provisions of Ciated measure provISions. For example, the Final Act, the Allies concerned have Soviet commentator Yu. Kostko, writing already notified all CSCE partiCipants of a during the preparatory stages of the number of military maneuvers and have MBFR talks In the June 1972 Issue of Invited observers. The Allies look for the Mlrovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye Implementation of such measures also by otnoshenniye (World Economics and In­ the members of the Warsaw Pact. ,. ternatIOnal RelatIOns), noted in regard to Soviet reaction was not long in the Ineffectiveness of assOCiated meas­ coming It took the form of Widespread ures "It IS well known that It was the and heated denunciations of the United

24 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS

f< States and NATO for raising tensions In was this' Would the Warsaw Pact ac­ Europe by carrYing out and publicizing tually give prior notification of their own the exercises-all of which were carried larger exercises according to the ground out and announced by NATO in strict rules of the Final Act-particularly in. adherence to the agreements signed only light of Initial Communist reaction? Given weeks earlier The NATO invitations to the pact penchant for large, we 1(-, send observers were ignored by the pact publicized maneuvers, It could be ex­ nations. Citing violations of the "liplrit of pected that this question would be an­ Helsinki," one Soviet source presented swered qUickly-or could it? A closer look the following review of these events' at the Warsaw Pact exercise pattern It would seem that a certain decline in suggests that a definite-If not the mllitaflstlc activIties of the bloc permanent-change had taken place should have occurred after the suc­ some three years prior to the Signing of cessful conclusIOn of the Conference on the Helsinki document. at a time when Secunty and Cooperation In Europe, the prior notification Issue was beginning However, thIs has not been the case. to be seriously discussed Instead, the NA TO leadership undertook a whole series of large military ma­ neuvers (8arfrost-75, 8ig Rochade, Deep From Shleld-72 to Kavkaz-76 Express, and others). This kind of saber rattlmg, so charactenstlc of the Cold War days, is in fundamental contradIction to Warsaw Pact exercise Shi~/d-72 took the atmosphere of detente and the spirit place from 4-16 September 1972 and of the European Conference whIch was Included the partiCipation of Soviet, perceIved everywhere as the beginmng Czechoslovak. East German, Polish and of a new stage In the life of European Hungarian armed forces elements It nations. 15 was In every sense a "large-scale" ex­ And. in another Soviet publication, erCise, with the pact media reporting that Lieutenant Colonel N Chaldymov ob­ "several tens of thousands of troops and served. several thousands of combat vehicles;' The militant circles of NA TO are were participating 18 The exercise was vigorous opponents of detente ThIs IS observed by a number of high-ranking confirmed among other things by the fact Soviet and Warsaw Pact officials, to that soon after the European Conference Include then Soviet defense minister, in autumn last year the NA TO staffs Marshal Andret Grechko, and former carried out a whole series of military Warsaw Pact commander in chief, exercIses in Western Europe. As the Marshal I I. Yakubovsky. When speaking Washington Post put it, they were con­ of Warsaw Pact exercises generally, and ducted on a scale and accompamed by Shield-72 In particular, one pact com­ propaganda trumpeting that would have mentator stated the follOWing: been regarded as provocative even in the Joint exercises are of extraordinary years of the cold war. 16 importance for further strengthening of While Dr Joseph Luns, secretary the combat readiness and coordination of general of NATO, and others were qUick the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact to pOint out the absurdities in the Soviet Treaty member states. T-hey have shown charges." the most pressing question traditionally the high degree of !;ombat

25 MIlITARY REVIEW readmess of troops, reliability of weap­ type of training for troops and units. onry, mastery in its operation, high Havmg said all this, it is necessary to organization ability of commanders, examine possible explanations for this staffs, political bodies, (Communist) Party rather sudden down-playing of their mil­ and youth orgamzations, as well as the Itary exercise actIVity which earlier they good tramtng and morale, political and had reported with such pride. First of all, combat Qualities of military units the years 1 972-76 saw a continuation of This year's JOint exercises will be the alarming Soviet/pact military called Shleld-72 ... (EmphaSIS added.)'9 bUildup, a process that had been going The above passage IS typical of many on for some years. In reviewing the pact pact media reports on the exercise, and bUildup during thiS period, the North the language Illustrates the fact that pact Atlantic CounCil noted in May 1976 that: exercises had by 1972 become "tradi­ Accordingly, ministers felt they must tional" and yearly occurrences Upon once again vOice their concern at the Shield· 72's termination. Marshal Yaku­ sustained growth in the Warsaw Pact bovsky noted that "one of the major joint countries military power on land, at sea, exercises of the JOint Armed Forces of and in the air beyond levels apparently the Warsaw Pact had ended."20 The justified for defensive purposes. 22 completion of the exercise also marked But, while the pact steadily was Intro­ the last of those widely publicized "tradi­ ducing new equipment into the forward tional JOint exercises" and of well­ area, the Soviets also were pushing for a publicized. large-scale Soviet/pact exer­ European security conference and had­ cises generally for several years. reluctantly---'agreed to undertake the To be sure, there were relatively terse MBFR discussions. If one looks at the press announcements of exercises and 1 972 press releases on Shield-72, he limited commentary on them, most Will fmd that the descriptions of the notably the Vertes-73 and Lato·74 ma­ exercise were accompanied with calls for neuvers One Western European press the long-deSired security conference. For source-In a quote attributed to the example, Czechoslovak Central Com­ exercise commander-Indicated that mittee general secretary, Gustav Husak, Vertes-73 Involved "several tens of thou­ speaking at the parade terminating sands of soldiers" ("mehrere zehn­ Shield-72, noted: tousend soldaten'V' But, while this Recognition of existing realities and of could well have been the case, the next the inviolability of the frontiers estab­ three years saw an uncustomary silence lished after World War I/, renunciation on the part of the Warsaw Pact nations of the use of force or the threat to use regarding their maneuvers. This does not force, and all our other pOSitive proposals mean that they did not conduct any contained in the Prague declaration of large-scale field training exercises. the meeting of the Political Consultative During this period, Soviet military Committee of the Warsaw Pact in journals related countless examples of January of this year [1972] are a sound "lessons learned" from unidentified field basIs on which future cooperation among training which could have ranged in size European nations could develop. These from company level to several divisions. Questions shOUld be a topic of discussion In addition, the value of field training was at a prepared conference on European constantly put forth as the most valuable seCUrtty and cooperation. ... 23

26 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS " It may have occurred to the Soviets As is known, the activeness of the and their pact allies at about thiS time 'enemy' in exercises and training and the that the continued publicity they were strengthening of the impact of its real giving to Warsaw Pact military capabil­ presence are factors which raise the Ities was not really commensurate With results of training time. But among some their proclamations on European security there IS the opinion that this can be and their desire for the European con­ achieved only on large-scale exercises. ference While there was apparently no However, the training and exercise prac­ question about curtailing the Introduction tices in the subunits mdicate the mva­ of more and newer equipment Into Ifcllty of such an opinion. 2' Eastern Europe (it continued at any rate), The article went on to describe how there was no question but what the realistiC opposed-force training was large, well-publiCized combined arms carried out In a subUnit With excellent maneuvers were very vIsible Indeed. results. The view expressed in the above Too, it was very difficult to critiCize passage was expanded upon by the NATO exercises and actions while car­ deputy commander for combat training of rying out larger troop maneuvers them­ the Central Group of Forces (CGF), selves. (as was the case With Shield-72 Czechoslovakia, Lieutenant General V. where Soviet critiCism of NATO's Strong Bukharenko, who observed the follOWing Express conducted concurrently had to about an unidentified CGF exercise held be somewhat muted) It seems likely, In the fall of 1976: then, that the Soviets-greatly deSirous The final exercise demonstrated that of the CSCE-decided sometime In late m many Units and subunits the ability of 1972 to curtail publiCity sharply on their commanders to organize and mamtam exercises and to present, as much as coordmated action has increased. This pOSSible, a picture of relative military has been promoted by tactical drills and inactivity throughout EaStern Europe. command-staff exercises held m the Also, the Soviets were apparently unen­ field, durmg which commanders learned thusiastic over the prospect of exercise to coordinate the actions of the various prenotification provisions becoming a elements m the. combat formation and all part of any agreement, and may well subunits partiCipating In the en­ have Wished to down-play their con­ gagement. Brief tactical exercises and tinued Importance in order to negotiate group dnlls involved working on' the most favorable-and least specific­ problems of controllmg subUnits with the arrangement for the confidence-building aid of various means of communication measure proviSions under the CSCE. and prearranged signals. Drills and exer­ The realization of thiS apparent Soviet cises would be directed as a rule by the Wish for a lower military profile In Europe regimental commander or by one of his may have been helped, in part, by im­ deputies. The results convince us that proved Soviet training techniques and the expended labor was not in vain. 25 concepts. There IS some evidence that at Other articles emphaSizing the least some Soviet officers believe that a conduct of numerous, complex field exer­ number of the benefits derived from the cises at regimental or lower level, as well larger exercises can be gained in other as the col'iduct of "command-staff" exer­ ways. Thus, one article by a junior Soviet cises involVing higher level personnel but officer expressed the following view few troops In the field, have been ap-

27 MIlITARY REVIEW pearing in the Soviet military press for for future pact maneuver activity and the the last few years (Summer-74 being an "reduction of tension in Europe." example of a large "command-staff' exercise). It IS possible that the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies may not The 1976 Training Year: have perceived the absolute need for Exercises Kavkaz-76. Sever-76 and Shield-76 exercises on the same scale as a VIta va or Shield-72.26 While there IS still every indication In January 1976, the USSR Ministry that the Soviets believe sizable joint of Defense announced that "corps-level" exercises involving two or more member maneuvers code-named Kavkaz-76 nations or unilateral exercises involving would be carried out in the several divIsions must be held periodi­ Transcaucasus Military District from 25 cally, there also may have been the January to 6 February. Taking place in feeling that the pact forces were not the areas of Kutalsi, Yerevan and Tbillsi, risking any degradation In combat read­ the exercise was said to Involve "nearly Iness for foregOing those combined arms 25,000 officers and men" though, under exercises involving 100,000 or more the CSCE, the air force elements would personnel-at least for several years and not be counted. As regards the CSCE, the perhaps as a standard practice. Unpubll­ Soviets stressed their compliance With clzed maneuvers of aboui half that size or the provIsions of the Final Act, noting: smaller would be far less viSible and, True to the peace-loving policy the possibly In the Soviet/pact view, Just as Soviet Government while carrying into effective when combined With the ben­ life the Peace Programme adopted by efits derived from more freq-uent the Communist Party, is fulfilling exactly command·staff exorcises and opposed­ the clauses of the Final Act of the force field training held at division level Conference on Security and Cooperation and below In Europe. In conformity with the Final At any rate, In the first months fol­ Act the Soviet Union invited observers, lOWing the signing of the Final Act (1 representatives of the People's Republic August 1975), the Warsaw pact nations of Bulgaria, the Republic of Greece, the had not announced their attention to hold Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Re­ any military exerctses. Reports abounded public of Turkey and the Socialist Federal In the West European press that the Republic of Yugoslavia to attend the Soviets were, In fact, carrYing out exer­ 'Kavkaz' manoeuvres. 27 cises In excess of 25,000 troops and The exercise was attended by former Simply not announcing them. Whatever Soviet Minister of Defense Grechko the accuracy of these reports, the USSR whose presence usually was noted only surprised many Westetn observers in the at the most important exercises. The first nine mOnths of 1976 by giving prior tactical play was notable for the con­ notification of three exercises-two tinued Soviet interest it revealed in con­ Soviet and one Warsaw Pact-and by ventional operations (featuring a now Inviting a limited number of observers to often-rehearsed dismounted infantry attend each of them. It IS worth briefly attack against prepared defenses), its discussing these three exercises and emphasis on mountain operations and attempting to determine what they mean the employment of several relatively new

28 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS

t< items of eqUipment, most notably the Mi- number of occasions in Soviet-released 24 Hind helicopter gunship28 photographs of Sever-76, and It was The exercise was, by Soviet pointed out in the Soviet military press standards, not particularly remarkable-as that the new weapons were highly regards Size, Involving no more than two mobile even In the rough topography of divisions and perhaps-considering the the exerCise area. Another relatively new probable presence of nondivisional lo­ Item of equipment which was promi­ gistic support personnel-only elements nently displayed was the 11-ton GT-T of two divIsions. Kavkaz-76 was signif­ M1970 Infantry combat vehicle, designed icant mainly in that it was the first especially for transporting troops over exercise the USSR had announced under extremely rugged, marshy terraln. 29 At· the CSCE provIsions and the first to least part of the maneuver was carried which they had invited observers from out in a nuclear environment, with Frog· the West under these provisions. And it . 7 tactical nuclear launchers much in broke a three-year virtual silence on eVidence. publicizing specific combined arms ma­ As with Kavkaz-76, the Sever-76 neuvers. maneuver was not large by Soviet In less than four months follOWing the standards. Several years earlier, the\!, completion of Kavkaz-76, the USSR had would not have attracted much attention announced its Intention to hold yet if indeed the Soviets would have men· another exercise, this time opposite the tloned them in the media at all. And it NATO Northern Region. Code-named should be noted that the pnor notification Sever-76, the exercise was announced of these exercises of "nearly 25,000" by the Soviets to include again "nearly troops was purely "discretionary" unaer 25,000 officers and men." Taking place the terms of the CSCE confldence­ in the Leningrad Military Dlstnct and building measure provIsions. The impli­ centering in the Petrozavodsk, Ses· cation was that these maneuvers were troretsk and Vyborg areas, the opposed· the largest that the Soviets had held force exercise emphasized operations by since August 1975 and were announced "Northern" and "Southern" forces in the as a gesture of good will In accord With marshy, rugged terrain so typical of these the "splnt of Helslnkl."30 . northern regions. A prominent place In Finally, from 9-16 September 1976, the exercise was occupied by heliborne the Warsaw Pact command held its first assault operations, with armed Mi-24 Widely publiCized maneuver In four years. Hind gunships and MI-8 Hip transport . ThiS exercise-called ShIeld· 76-took helicopters conducting at least two taco place In western Poland and involved tical assault landings. An assault Soviet, POliSh, East German and Czech­ crossing of the Vuoksi River was carried oslovak forces Troop strength for the out (with heavy heliborne and artillery exercise was announced at "approxI­ support) mately 35,000 men" or no more than a One of the most Interesting aspects of total of three or four diVISion equivalents the river-crossing phase was the subse­ for the four nations participating. quent crosSing of the new M1974 Nevertheless, the maneuver was 122mm self-propelled gun over a PMP carned out with much the same fanfare heavy pontoon bndge. These self­ of earlier Warsaw Pact exercises. In propelled weapons were pictured on a addition to the pact representatives, ob-

29 MILITARY REVIEW servers from Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, at the Shield-76 joint headquarters mini­ Yugoslavia, Austria, Sweden, Finland and mized the significance of such language NATO-member Denmark attended. Soviet diversity In multinational exercises by Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinqv also was obserVing that "If any problem of u nder­ present, indicating the high-level Soviet standing arises ... we switch to Russian Interest that traditionally has marked which we all know."34 "Important" maneuvers. Ignoring the fact Tactical play in the exercise again that there had not been a major pact featured heliborne operations in con­ maneuver announced for sometime, Junction with the always impressive pact Krasnya Zvezda (Red Star) observed that: tank and motorized Infantry operations . . . . combined exercises of the Joint One source noted-rather redundantly in Forces of the Warsaw Pact member view of the major Soviet effort in this nations have become a tradition,3 1 [and area-that "these rotary-wing aircraft that] ... close contacts, particularly are acqUiring an increasingly broad range JOint exerCises, are becoming an increas· of combat employment."35 Shield-76 also ingly effective form of improving combat involved another assault river crossing of skills and promote a deepening of inter­ the type the pact performs so well, with national ties. 32 BMP infantry combat vehicles playing a That much attention must be devoted major role in the crossing. The crossing to the problems of multinational staffs also included the construction of a PMP working together was rndicated by the heavy pontoon bridge which, according to comment that "on the communications one source, was "built literally in min­ channels one could hear POliSh, Russian, utes."36 Also of note was the dropping of German and Czech "33 One staff officer a Soviet airborne regiment in the latter

The representatives of the Soviet. Polish. Czechoslovak and East German armed forces were participants In Shield· 76

30 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS r .

Soviet BMP-equipped motorIZed rifle company on a tactical training exercise

part of the exercise. This statement was, In fact, well­ With regard to the CSCE aspects of reflected in the three "large-scale" exer­ the exercise, the Soviets were pleased to cises briefly discussed above. They did quote a Finnish officer observing the Involve the continued exercising and exercise who reportedly said: testing of relatively new equipment and As a representative of the country concepts (self-propelled artillery and its where the historic Conference was held employment, armed helicopters and hell­ m 1975 I am happy to stress that our borne assault operations, the integration presence here fully corresponds to the of BMPs mto the combined arms team, decisions and spint of the Conference in and so forth), but were no more than HelSinki and that thIs wIll undoubtedly tactical In scope-at least Insofar as promote cooperation between different Soviet/pact media sources have revealed states in the fIeld of military science 37 and nonpact observers at the exercises Thus, the Soviet/pact 1976 training were allowed to witness. year saw what was described by the In accord With patterns established In Soviets as three "large-scale" exercises. 1976, the first Widely publiCized exercise As Krasnya Zvezda (Red Star) put It. of 1977 was announced In compliance The emphasis in the current traming With the HelSinki Final Act. Exercise year [1976) IS a campaIgn to achIeve Karpaty-77 involved 27,000 troops and further Improvement m combat read· was held In the Lvov-Lutsk-Rovno area of mess, to improve the quality of combat the Carpathian MIlitary District from 11- performance, as well as persistent mas­ 16 July 1977. ThiS opposed-force ex­ termg of new eqUIpment and weapons ercise was directed by the Carpathian Throughout the entlfe period of training M,litary District commander, Colonel considerable attentIon is focused on General V Vorennikov, who, In a 13 July problems of tactics. 38 article In Sotslaflsticheskaya mdustriya

31 MIlITARY REVIEW

(Socialist Industry), noted: "These are really relatively small exercises-if Soviet planned exercises. Very ordinary. The announcements are to be believed. What main goal is to work out tactical missions this means in terms of European se­ and coordination of vaned branches of curity, the reduction of tension and the troops."" "Southern" (offensive) and bUilding of confidence and stability de­ "Northern" (defensive) forces carned out serves closer attention. combined arms operations which were, in part, witnessed by nonpact observers from the Federal Republic of Germany, The Warsaw Pact and Prior Notification Italy, Austria, France and Yugoslavia. of Maneuvers: Some Thoughts for the Future Again, the impressive operations by Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters in an antitank role IS worthy of note, as was In 1935, a number of Western military the widespread employment of self­ observers were Invited to attend major propelled artillery units. The exercise Soviet army exercises in the USSR. scenario saw Southern units, who were Soviet Lieutenant General I. I. Lisov said to be "somewhat superior In forces described one aspect of this event as and means," attack Northern troops who, follows: despite heavy resistance, have their de­ DUring Red Army maneuvers near fenses penetrated, fall to halt a Southern Kiev in the fall of 1935 the foreign river croSSing, and in the face of unsuc­ generals present saw how 2,500 Red cessful counterattacks are forced to Army men in complete order landed from withdraw. Pursuing Southern units, after the air within a period of 10 minutes and a chase of "several hundred kilometers," immediately opened fire from automatic overtake Northern forces and engage rifles But as [Soviet Defense Commissar] Northern march security elements' and Voroshilov reported, they did not see the hastily brought up reserves In a meeting simultaneous landing in another part of engagement. Southern "superiority" and the SOVIet Union by a force of 5, 700 men "combat initiative" ultimately win the (more than a brigade) which carried out day. the very same operation. And still later Reported field activity in Karpaty-77, they learned that the number of jumps as with those exercises of the 1976 made by the populace was approaching a training year, emphasized tactics at di­ million. 40 vision level and lower, as well as the Soviet political commentator Yu. employment of new equipment. It was Kostko may have had similar incidents in comparable In size to those 1976 exer­ mind when he delivered his comments cises, and, as with those maneuvers, the on the ineffectiveness of Western pro­ CSCE aspects received special attention posals to exchange information and ob­ In the exerCise reporting. Soviet/pact servers during maneuvers. In any event, exercise activity had evolved from the his observations should be kept in mind huge, highly publiCized maneuvers of the by Western planners as well-that IS, 1960s and early 1970s to a period of that ground observers at exercises­ near silence on the subject extending particularly when limited as they have from late 1972 to early 1976. The 1976 been under the CSCE-serve a limited training year and the first half of 1977 purpose. As trained observers will attest, saw increased publicity given to what are determining the number of troops and

32 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS units participating" in as fluid and structure for a fully operational wartime complex an event as a military exercise . front (army group). the magnitude of the spread over many square miles of terrain problem facing NATO planners can be can be as difficult as counting beans in a appreciated. jar-and sometimes no more accurate. Such JOint exerCises, exclusive of the A central question regarding So­ larger, better publicized pact and Soviet viet/pact exercises is the number and maneuvers, are probably carried out In size of those actually conducted. While the Dther groups of forces as well. De­ there IS no way to estimate the size of spite pact Silence about them, they most maneuvers accurately on the basIs of likely have been-and are-going on at a press reports, there IS every reason to pace commensurate with that desCribed· believe that the Soviets and their allies by General F.lelsswer 42 (it should be have conducted far more JOint maneuvers noted that these smaller JOint eXerclses­ than those reported In the pact press or and certainly the command and staff otherwise coming to the attention of the exercises-could fall below the 25,000 usually sensitive West European media troop mark and quite probably do In most How often the Soviets and other pact cases. But such exercises taking place nations actua lIy conduct JOint exercises with some frequency must add to the involving at least two participating na­ uncertainties surrounding pact exercise tions may \ have been revealed by East actiVity.) German Major General Werner As noted earlier in the article, there Fleisswer, deputy defense minister In may well have been a reduction in the 1969. The general noted that, during the Size of Soviet/pact training exercises period 1964-68, Soviet and East German overall. but, for the pact to maintain ItS forces conducted 10 JOint command and combat readiness, both staffs and ma­ staff exercises for higher staffs, 10 neuver units must be exercised Jointly command and staff exercises for two While a great deal can be accomplished divIsions (on each occaSion, one East at lower echelons and through small Joint German division and one Group of Soviet exerCises, even the most recent Soviet FOl'Ces, Germany, divIsion); 16 ground sources indicate that the larger­ force JOint maneuvers and troop exer­ particularly multinational-exercises Cises, and four joint air and joint naval remain a key element In the pact training exerclses. 41 program Whether such exercises Will Needless to say, few of these exer­ ever reach the 100,000 troop level agai n Cises were reported at the time In the remains to be seen But It can be ex­ pact or Western press, and the actual pected that future Soviet/pact exercises number of troops deployed in the field will be of suffiCient size to constitute an cannot be determined But. when one Imminent potential threat to NATO. considers that a command and staff The capability of the Western allies to exerCise for higher staffs, a command assess the scope and Intent of So­ and staff exercise at division level, a JOint viet/pact exercises is not known. As ground force maneuver, a JOint air ex­ General James H. Polk, commander In ercise and a jOint naval exercise for pac! chief of the US Army In Europe during forces In East Germany all carried out the August 1968 Soviet invaSion of concurrently may be only a few steps Czechoslovakia, indicated, NATO knowl­ away from creating the command edge of the many exercises preceding

33 MIlITARY REVIEW the invasion was best for those taking - mosphere of mutual trust." Soviet ac­ place In East Germany and Czechoslo­ tions in the CSCE (and the Strategic vakia 43 But, as General Polk has pointed Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as well as out, assessments of Soviet activity in earlier precedents) have convinced a Czechoslovakia were influenced in some number of analysts that the USSR will measure by press reports, with knowl­ push any agreement to Its limit and edge of the activity of Soviet units in perhaps beyond, Poland and Hungary "not precise, either The ongoing MBFR talks are dealing as 10 strength or location" due to the with issues at least as complex as the closing of border-staging areas to foreign' SALT agreement and the CSCE. Western observers.44 NATO commanders appar­ negotiators reportedly have pushed for ently were left to draw what conclusions the Inclusion of "associated measures" they could largely 'on the basIs of pact dealing with the prior notification of press and radio reports on exercise ac­ exerCises and exchange of information tivity in Poland, Hungary and the USSR on other troop movements along with (see the table). However much NATO's actual troop reductions in Central ability to assess pact exercise activity Europe. may have changed in the 10 years since One certainly could see NATO nations the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it would gaining some additional security by being seem that large troop movements and Informed of such details as when So­ maneuvers must remain Just as ambig­ viet/pact exercises or major troop rede­ uous In intent ployments would take place, the number The confidence-bUilding measure pro­ of troops and units imlolved, the area of vIsions of the CSCE Final Act and the activity and other information. But, given associated measures which are part of the ambiguous nature of any military the MBFR talks represent efforts to re­ exercise activity, the Soviet history of solve some of the uncertainties sur­ obscuring or at least attempting to ob­ rounding large maneuvers. Under the scure the size, scope, frequency and confidence-building measure provisions, Intent of their maneuvers, and the So­ the Soviets have been In recent months viet's past performance on international more forthcoming about a few of their agreements, it is questionable just how exercises than many analysts may have useful such data would be unless NATO anticipated. However, Just how well the possesses, or through the talks estab­ Soviets have met the terms of the ex­ lished, the means of verifying them.46 ercise prior notification agreement is a An MBFR-associated agreement on subject of some dispute, with spokesmen the prior notification of large-scale mil­ as prominent as NATO Secretary General itary activity which was not based on Luns questioning the Soviet perform­ reliable verification means would have ance 41j little more utility than a voluntary CSCE­ There IS no question that the Soviets style declaration of peaceful intent and can and have manipulated their.. coverage good will. Such an agreement might do of exercises, with the treatment of the no more than foster the kind of wishful military activity preceding the invasion of thinking that has characterized Western Czechoslovakia being a particularly good expectations In past dealings with the example. The military provIsions of the USS R but, at worst, could lead to the CSCE have done little to create an "at- most dangerous kind of self-deception.

34 SOVIET BLOC MANEUVERS

NOTES

1 For a dIscussion of a humber of SovIet and Warsaw Pact Affairs US JOInt Pubhcatlons Research Service {JPRSJ. Number e ... erClses, see John E'nckSon SovlI~f MIlItary Power. Royal UnIted 68517 pp 49 50 • SerVices InstItute London I:.ng 1970 DP 93·96 and TlTomas W 25 V Buk.harenko Art of Coordinated ActIOn Thoughts on the Wolfe SOviet Power and Europe 1945·1970 The Johns Hop~lns Result$. of the TraIning Year Krasnya Zvezda (Red Star), 21 OC1ober UnIverSIty Press BaltImore Md. 1970 pp 47782 For a 100R at 1976 as translated In Tlan!JlatlOns on USSR M,litary AffairS. JPRS certa,n dspects 01 several of the larger Sovret/pacl maneuvers see Number 66517 pp 49-50 also John F Meehan III SovIet Maneuvers Summer 1971 26 Shleld·72. for e){ample was ostlmated to ,"valve ··some Military Re ... rew Ap\ll 197:7 DD 1421 Thomas M Salisbury III 100000 !roope; See John ErIckson Sh,eld 72 Warsaw Pact KAyKAZ 76 M./tfary Rpvlevo. June 1977 pp 47 55 and Graham MIlitary E... erclses Jovrnal of the Royal Umted SerVIces Institute fOI H Turblvolle Jr 'Warsaw Pact E... erClse ShleJd 72 Military ReVIew Defence Studies December 1972. pp 32 34 Jul.,. 1973 pp 1724 Warsaw Pact !=orces In Hungary A Key 27 The Kavkaz Manoeuvres SovIet Md,taryRevrevv May 1976 Element In Pacl ContIngency Plannong Journal of the Royal Umted p 5 For a fme Western analysrs of the exercIse see Salisbury op ISen"ces Institute lor Defence Studies December 1976 PD 47 51 Cit pp 47 55 An account of a rare earlier Instance In whIch the and 'Warsaw Pact amphlb ops ,n Northern Europe Marine Corps USSR mVlted foreIgn observers to wItness a post.World War II Gazette Octobp.r 1976 pp 20 27 exerCIse IS found In Seymour Topptng RUSSIa E'xhlblts AtomIC 2 The most notable reasons tor conducting exerCises Include Intantrv The New Yorlr Times 18 August 1961 those str,ctly mlhtarv reasons Uest."g new doct"nal concepts and 28 Forces m the Transcaucasus M,htary DIStTlC! would In wartime contIngenCIes trdlnrng staffs and troops testing new equipment and probably be tasked to conduct operatIonS agalno:;t the NATO Southern so forthl the deSIre to Impress the West and the world with RegIon ExerClseo; In thIS mlillar". dlstnct rellect a SovIet concern WIth", SovIet/Warsaw Pact milItary capabilItIes the need to present and operaHons In mountainOUS terra on a type of operatIon whIch has as fOSler a pIcture of bloc milItary solidaTity to external and Internal mUCh application to Turkey and Greece as to the Caucasus observers and In some cases as an ,"strumenl of milItary coerCion 29 !=or some e){celtent color photographs of Sever 76 see So 3 The OcTober 1973 MIddle East War represents a more recent vetsk,,, vom (SoVIet Sofaler), Number 16 1976 e){ample of how maneuvers can be successfully employed 10 dlsgurse '30 Wh,le the CSCE confIdence buold'"g measure prOVISIons de attack preparatIons flvmg from polItIcal deCISron rest upon a voluntary baSIS, the 4 See for example Erockson op CIt. pp 94·95 SIgnatories solemnly pledged to adhere to them T .... ere are some 5 The Department 01 State Bullerm 1 September 1975 pp 321 prOVISIonS that are however SImply allowed for at the discrellon 29 of the partIcipatIng countfles The prior notillcation of mlhtar". 6 Ibid p 326 All notifICations are of course VOluntary exerCIses of less than 2S 000 troops falls Into the latter category and 71bla are therefore even more VOluntary than the forme I 8 Ibid II was further noted that the particIpatIng State need not. 31 Krasnya Zverda (Rea Star) 9 Seplember 1976 as translated In however gIve notifIcation In cases In whICh that area IS also Translations on USSR M,litary Affalr!J JPRS Number 88372 p 2 contiguous to the partlclpatong State 5 frontier faCing or shared WIth 32 IbId p 3 . a non European non partICipating Stale Thus a SovIet exerCIse 33 Krasnya lverda (Red Star) 15 September 1976 as translated conduCTed along the SovIet IranIan border IIran being a non In TranslatIons on USSR Mlbtary Affalfs JPRS Number 68372 p 5 European nonpartlc,.,atln9 natIon) but WIth." 250 kt10melers of 34 /(ra!Jnya /veraa (Red Starl 10 September 1976 as translated Turkey la CSCE SIgnatory) need not be announced !n Trans/atlon!J on USSR Military Affalfs. JPRS Number 68372 p 5 9 Ibid 35 Krasnya Zvezda (RedStar! 15 September 1976 op CIt p 10 10. See Ibid pp 327·29 for a full dISCUSSIon of these and other 36 IOId. p 12 The opposrte bank had been selled bv a hellborne confidence bUlldmg measures disarmament and general conSldera assaull torce and remforced by amph'blOus vehIcles arld snorkeling trons tankS 11 See for example A:..el Horhager The MB~R Talks Problems 37 The Shchlt 76 Manoeuvres SovIet Mlli(ary Re""ew and Prospects International Defense ReVIew Apnl1976 DP 189 January 1977 p 32 92 38 Krasnya Z"erda (Rea Stat) 14 Seplember 1976 as translated 12 Vu Koo;tk.o On the Problem of ReductIon of Armed !=orces In In Tram lations on USSR Military AflalfS JPRS l\Iumb€'r 68372 p 19 Europe M,rov(jl'a ekonomd/.a I mezhdunarodmyf' otno!Jhemye 39 L Somlk The Iron D'VISIon Allacks Sotslaltst,cheskaya (Wotld EconomICS ana InternatIonal Affa,r!J1 as found In ForeIgn mdustflya (SOCIalist Indu!JtrYI 17 July 1977 p 6 as tranSlated In Broadcast InformatIon Service-Dally Report-Soviet Umon 25 June Translations 0/1 USSR M,f,tar" AffaIrs JPRS Number 69709 p 43 It 1973.-V 11 IS worth not,ng too that the Warsaw Pact car ned out a JOInt naval t 3 See. for ellample CraIg R WhItney Communists Get NATO eller!;',se rn the o;outhern part of the 8alt,c Sea In mrOsummer InvltatlOno; The New York Times 13 September 1975 for a 1977 Pact commander Marshal of the Soviet UnIon y G Kullkov diSCuSSion Of Impending NATO exerCIses In the tall of 1975 directed the exerCIse whrrr, was saId to demonstrate the mcreao;ed 14 The Department of State Buf/elm 12 January 1976 p 57 level of operatIonal tactIcal tramlng of the staffs and the hIgh speCIal 15 A Svetlov The Sov,et UnIOn s Struggle for MIlitary Detente tramlng and naval skIrts at the forces partrclpat'mg In It See Internat,onal Affairs January 1976 as translated In Straff'fjlC Sovetskaya E!Jtonlya rSo~,et ESlonla) 8 Jul". 1977 p 4 dS translated ReView W"'ler 1977 pp 11826 In Translations on USSR Military AffaIrs JPRS l\Iumber 69906 p 81 16 N Chaldymov NATO and Delente Sov,et Military RpVIf'w february 1976 p 42 • 40 I I Lrso\! Desafllnllrl-voraushnne desanty {Parachutists - 17 For some of Dr Luno; remark.s see Sovlel Is CrItiCized by A,rbome Landmgl, Mlltlar". PubliShIng House of the Mtnrslr". of Leader of NATO. The New York Times 26 September 1975 Defense of the USSR Moo;cow USSR 1968 p 27 m the edillon 18 Budapest MTI (Magyar TavlTafl Irodal Domestic ServIce In tlanslated by the US Army foreIgn SCience and Techn01og". Center HungClr.an 0700 GreenWIch Mean T,ffle (GMT) 12 September 1972 {F5TC HT 23 27 701 as found In Foreign Broadcast Informal/on Sefilice-Dally Rpport­ 41 vollrsarmee (People s Army), Number 2~ 1969 p 3 Eastern Europe 13 September 1972 p Jl 42 MedIa reporto; on trammg ,n the SovIet groups of forces 19 Prague CTK (Ceskoslovenska Tlskova Kancelarl InternatIOnal mdlcate a very hIgh level at act""ty but are often vague as to the full Service In English 0948 GMT 6 September 1972 as found In scope of the tramlng An example of <;uch a )Olnt group natIonal ForeIgn Broadcast InformatIon SerVice-DatiI' Report Eastern ellercrse that has come 10 WeSlern attentIon SInce the CSeE was the Europe, 6 September 1972. p 05 Soviet Southern Group of Force,> Hungar". Hungarian People s Army 20 Prague DomestIc ServIce In CleCh 0930 GMT 16 September maneuver carned out ,n October 1976 1972 as found In foreign Broadcast Information Service-Daily 43 General James H Polk Reflectlono; on the Clechoslo\lak!an Report-Eastern Europe 18 September 1972 p J9 InvaSIOn 1968 Straleg'c ReView W,nter 1977 pp 30 37 21 See Allgememe Schwelzeflsche Mlfltarreltschrlft Number 2 44 Ibid p 32 1974 p 77 45 In December 1975 Dr Luns md!c.ated that the USSR had not 22 The Department of State Bulletm 21 June 1976 p 774 gIVen nohhtalron of a recent mll,tary e)(erClse See StrategIc Survey 23 Prague DomestIc ServIce In Czech 0930 GMT 16 September 1975 The InternatIonal InstItute for Strategic StudIes London Eng 1972 op Cit p J7 1976 ., 120 24 N Velovrk Duel on the MinefIeld Krasnya Zvezda IRed Star) 46 For a good diSCUSSIon of the vero/,callon ISSue ,n arms control 12 January 1977 as translated In Tran/atlons on USSR Mllitar" talk.~. agreements see Ibid. pp 1 t 1 16

35 Boris Popov and the Electric Piranha

Lieutenant Colonel James B. Channon, US Army

Boris Popov commands a large mechanized army which has invaded the land of Durndl. His offense is rolling along covering the prescribed number of kilometers per day. However, he is losing. His forces are being decimated by an enemy who operates in small, highly mobile teams which appear out of nowhere, night and day, to attack his flanks and rear, then disperse before his forces can engage them in close combat. The electric piranha is a combination of our conventional weapons technology and some of the not so conventional tactics we learned in Vietnam. Dispersion, speed and night operations coupled with our superior technology might give us "little guys" an edge if we adopt hit-and-run tactics instead of trying to slug it out "toe-to­ toe" u'ith our "big guy" adversaries.

OMETIME In the future, in a land not too unfamiliar, a ponderous figure Sstrides about his command post BOris Popov IS fuming. His staff snivels at the tails of his greatcoat. He screams, "Four days In the attack, no real enemy and I'm losing'" True enough, the great war machine of Boris Popov had spearheaded Into the land of Durndl, yet, by all reports, he was losing. The babushkas under BOris' command were following their rote and practiced offense. moving forward like a giant machine, taking measured strides each

36 ELEl.TRIC PIRANHA day." Following their great curtain of fire and under a veil of smoke, they were making ground-gaining progress to be sure. But there were no fixed enemy to key on, and each day'S situation reports showed that Boris' force was being eaten away like a cancer .•

He bellowed again, "Where are they, staff? Where are they?" The staff cowered under his presence, for Boris ran the 3d Siberian Motorized Foot Horde with an iron hand

One of them offered, "They just can't be seen. They come out at night. ... They work In small teams, they seem to be everywhere."

"Do you think I'm a fool?" he shouted back. "You know very well Uncle Sam's boys always line up neat clusters on the military crest well forward in the field of battle. . and so you tell me they are not to be seen?"

"That IS true, Comrade General. is true. They just don't seem to be anywhere in particular."

"But they can see us all nght!" Bons wailed again and turned, thrashing about the small command post. "They can see us all nght, and how do you explain that, Anatoh?"

The staff officer cnnged, looked up at Boris and said, "They can see at night. They have strange masks which they wear, and they can see at night Not only can they see well, but they can see far. It's amazing! I think they are electric glasses."

Bons said, "And I suppose after they shoot at you, you can't see them?':

"Oh, yes, Comrade General, we can see them; however, they fire but once, and then they are off on their trail bikes, off Into the woods They vanish."

"Vanish!" Popov said. "Vanish, and I suppose that the large barrage we received on our mass tank formation was done by a small team?"

Lieutenant Colonel James B Channon IS With the Olfec­ •...~ tOrate of Education and CUrriculum AffairS. USACGSC He receIved a B A In fme arts and an M A In behaVIoral communications from the Un/verslly of Kentucky and an M MAS from the USACGSC He has served m Infantry and mtelllgence POSItIons In the United States. Vietnam and Germany H,s article "Prep8nng the Off,cer Corps for the 19905" appeared In the May 1978 MIlitary Review ...

37 MILITARY REVIEW

"Yes, strange as it seems, they only use one medium rocket launcher in one location. Nearly as we can tell, it's fired by two men, and those two men have other Jobs In the rear somewhere: gasoline, transportation, supply or something of that sort. The rocket launcher system is preaimed into the kill zone; they Just go out and trigger the launcher. It's terrible."

"Yes, I know," said Bons, "any fool can fire a rocket launcher How IS it they are also able to fire at our tanks with such pinpOint accuracy? Tell me that"

"Well, they use electnc pOinting devices. They shine long red lights at our tanks, and then the rounds seem to fall out of the sky They never seem to miss If It Isn't artillery, It'S the aircraft they call on single Side band."

"That doesn't seem likely We travel at such a speed, shrouded by such a veil of smoke and dust. that it's Impossible for any army to see us from their positions Our suppressive fires must surely drive them to cover."

"That's what we thought, Excellency, but they have small metal shelters called 'boxholes' which they use as temporary shelter to ward off shrapnel and chemicals and afterward shed like so much extra clothing."

"Ah! So they do fiX themselves for a time!"

"Yes, normally, Comrade General, that IS true, but those Wily deVils lay under cover, let us go by and shoot us from the rear where we are not masked

38 ELECTRIC PIRANHA by" our smoke screens.... They shoot us at night, and they shoot us from unexpected places. They seem to be everywhere."

"And how do they coordinate such a skillful and well-sequenced kind of offensive defense?" BOris asked.

"Well, we haven't been able to Jam their communications because they don't seem to use their radios. They Just operate autonomously out of their own given sector. They have plenty of room to move about, and they communicate by shooting flares overhead in very simple codes. When they sense a decIsive engagement, they simply splinter off to fight another time."

"Very well, very well, what about our progress? We are moving into the enemy's territory according to the timetable even though we are losing people Are we going to make the river on schedule?"

"Sir, we may make the river on schedule, but we may not have any effective forces once we get there. Right now, our lines of supply are dangerously unprotected, and ammunition in our lead elements IS Just about exhausted We have tanks; we have firepower. But I'm afraid our mass and momentum will be spent by the time we get to the Rhine."

39 MIlITARY REVIEW

"Well." Boris'muttered, "perhaps our comrades' attack from the north will be enough to carry the day"

"Well, It'S not qUite that e<:!sy. I'm not sure our tanks will arrive because of fuel problems," Anatoll stammered

"What fuel? We Just take fuel from the homes and factories of the DLI"rndllans, Isn't that rlghP" .

"That's right, Your Excellency, but they have polluted It With some kind of contaminate, and Irs beginning to freeze our engines while they are on the move

"Damnl Why don't they stand up and fight like men?"'

What Is an Electnc Piranha?

The electriC piranha IS a tactic, albeit portrayed In somewhat catchy terms, but not so unconventlOl;al as It may seem The electriC piranha, as a symbol, represents a simple syntheSIS of our conventional weapons teChnology and some of the not so conventional tactics we learned In Vietnam.

We were the big guys In Vietnam, the firepower kids, fighting a Shadow enemy In any way you assess that confliCt. you must agree that, pound for pound, our firepower was frequently wasted against their tactics. In the next conflict, It IS BoriS who Will be the big guy We will be the Side subjected to a massive curtain of suppressive fires and :smoke It IS we who cannot afford to become the easy, fixed, concentrated target of those massed fires Therefore, It seems prudent to adopt tactics of disperSion, speed and operations at night If these tactics are Intelligently combined With the unquestionable technological superiority we will enjoy-for example, precIsion gUided munitions (PGMs)-then we Will have a reasonable opportunity to thwart a numerically superior opponent.

Principles of War or Operational Art

It seems that when you are the little guy-little In numbers or little In equipment-modified principles of war apply Lessons learned from the Vietnam and Middle East Wars prOVide excellent examples The principles of war we have operated With for so mpny years would not have served the North Vietnamese very well. But those principles espoused by Mao and Glap could effectively be woven Into the fabriC of our doctrine of the future We can

40 ElECTRIC PIRANHA

be like the fish in the sea; In fact, In order to keep from being easy targets, we must be the fish In the sea. Yea, verily, the piranha!

Some of the techniques found in the oriental martial arts are insightful. The ability to take a force coming at you and direct it away from your sensitive areas, and Into an area that Will diSSipate It. IS fundamental. .The foll()wing principles, sifted from the martial arts, are useful for viewing the battlefield from the perspective of the little guy:

• Multisensory dominance-Seeing the enemy With every Interpretive sense you have before and during the engagement will reveal how to use hiS. great strength against him and how to use your reduced strength optimally. Never duck-never close your eyes-heads up!

• Critical target focus-Never lose track of those vital pOints in his corporate body that can bring him down. Close hiS eyes first With two pointed fingers, then shut his communications WIth a shaft of fingers In his throat, then let the bulk of hiS power lash out blindly, then sever his spinal cord and thus completely destroy his means to find you and organize and direct hiS total force against you.

• Spend your opponent's energy-If you cannot stop your opponent's blow before it gains momentum, then, with minimum energy, deflect this blow onto. unimportant terrain. If he wants to put his main effort into one spearhead,

41 MILITARY REVIEW help him go quickly to that end. Let him overextend himself while you nibble away at his life line.

• Combine and focus your energy-Strike with your hind legs collected under you. Strike back after you have softened the opponent and when you can sustain your drive with prevIOusly hidden resources Make a rapid commitment to the area most critical to his defeat.

• Set·strike-set-Focus on a soft spot, then strike with power. Do this over and over, remembering to focus each time. Do not flail away blindly; that wastes energy. Keep the momentum of this sequence, but do not be careless about it.

• Have staying power-When two forces are nearly equally expended, the one who claims victory may, In fact. convince the other he has something left. With flags, broadcasts, leaflets and resolve, the fight continues till one Side says "uncle," or the other Side convincingly claims "victory." (Note: These notions are really more akin to the Soviet Idea of operational art-somewhere between principles of war and tactics.)

Technology

We In the Un Ited States have a great deal of which to be proud. Across the board, our technological achievements can give our fighting men great advantages. The question about whether better advantage can be gained from ponderous, complex pieces of equipment or by light and versatile pieces of equipment has been a matter of debate since the land combat study was completed by the US Army Combat Developments Command in 1972 That study suggested that very lightweight tanks and antitank weapons should be the staple for our Army. Somehow, the logic of that study was defeated at higher echelons. Whether the decision was political or based on sound theory IS not clear. A novel proposal that seems to have the greatest promise, the trail bike, received poor reception at tl"]e higher levels Perhaps such an uncomplicated idea did not require great expenditures in defense dollars and, therefore, was not so appealing to some

In any case, tactics uSing light antitank weapons and fast, mobile teams mounted on trail bikes may be just the counter to the tactics of our rather awesome and ponderous potential enemy. Standing In front of this battering ram would be the last way to achieve a ratio of e?

42 ELECTRIC PIRANHA

You might argue that, In order to win battles, you need to control key terrain with a sizable force. That is a tactic not easily executed with such a decentralized concept as I would suggest. But the notion of a highly technical guerrilla force that operates at night in sma II areas of responsibility seems useful.

Our Army traditionally has had peacetime discipline problems when It structured units Into small "elite" groups. In this case, "elite" is going to be the only way to deal with a numerically superior enemy. If David had not hit Goliath smack between the eyes, his hours on earth would have been numbered. The battlefield where we may fight our next battle differs from our recent experiences, for we now have different weapons systems to employ in new ways.

A technOlogical guemlla concept is not wllhout precedent In modern armies. The Yugoslavian nation is, in fact. an armed populace. Likewise, the Swiss rely on the citizen-soldier literally fighting in his own backyard. They do not have night vision deVices and the kind of preCision weaponry available to our forces. However, their scheme of operations remains effective and does not violate the lessons of Mao.

An advantage of operating In this guerrilla mode is the opportunity to recruit partisan help. One of the prinCipal imponderables of any kind of

43 MIlITARY REVIEW defense In Europe IS the unknown congestion presented by a populace fleeing in front of an advancing Invader. If, during training, the guerrillas would Include the citizenry In their operations, the chances of having partisan help dUring confhct would be greatly Improved The populace can help fight, but, more importantly, It can help With the pre-positIOning and delivery of ammunition, fuel and food. If they are gainfully employed, they need not be an obstacle on the highways

'The offense. the primary way to Win in war, would be frequently employed by these small teams. The best way to achieve a favorable force ralio With respect to your enemy IS to assemble units rapidly at the place on the battlefield where you Wish to engage. This permits a temporary, but deCISive, advantage at POints of our choosing Preemptive attacks on the enemy assembly a~eas are very much a part of the ongoing concept. Small teams helicoptered or biked Into the enemy's rear could cause a great deal of destruction and confUSion at rally POints or along predictable enemy approach routes and firing POSitions It may be that operating just over the border dunng hiS initial assault would give us the most protected area In which to attnt his forces and cut hiS supply lines'

We also should operJte against hiS "nervous system," those com­ mand/control and fire direction facilities, for. Without that "nervous system," he loses flexibility and confidence dUring dnves for deep objectives.

In the best tradition of the martial arts, let us never stand directly In the path of our enemy's directed energy. Let us permit him to proceed to any place he Wishes to go In such a manner that he will extend himself far beyond hiS means to sustain hiS energies And, dUring that period of extenSion, attrlt him like a cancer, making It Impossible for him to arrive at hiS final objeclive With either a coherent force or the confidence to claim victory

Concept/Characteristics

The follOWing charactenstlcs exemplify the concept of the technological guernlia E'ach of these features attempts to use the utmost energies of our fighting technology and the best taclics of a lightly manned guerrilla force

• Small, highly Independent fighting teams

"""Night VISion technology IS no longer Buck Rogers' stuff The cost redUCtion for Infrared goggles for an Infantryman has and probably Will continue to make dramatic progress Newer cheaper goggles do not see a5 far, but. when covpled With "arming light" technology, they give the mfantryman hiS first night offensive capability An Infrared light IS pOInted from the hip. and, when on target, the goggled soldier blasts away

44 ELECTRIC PIRANHA

• High mobility for man-portable weapons systems uSing trail bikes and helicopters.

• PinPOint accuracy provided by PGMs

• Dispersed, difficult to detect or neutralize "killing power" provided by medium rocket launchers spread throughout the rear service area.

• Chemical and nuclear protection provided by the "boxhole."

• Deep strike capability provided by the Air Force

• Continuous day-night operation prescribed by an area of responsibility.

• Reduced vulnerability to electronic warfare by autonomous action and by use of simple prearranged audio and visual signals.

• Continued ability to engage the enemy uSing pre-positioned rations and ammunition

• Partisan support provided by close working relationships in training with the indigenous population.

• Favorable combat power ratios by chOOSing the pOint of attack.

• Attacking the enemy system at ItS weakest pOints along extended supply lines.

ConclusIOns

The preceding analogies-electric piranhas or technological guerrillas and the martial arts technlques--were created to showcase Ideas The nexus of such an Idea should be examined. Remembering that the principles of guerrilla warfare historically have worked very well against a large conven­ tional force, we should use those proven lessons to our advantage.

Another way to gain an advantage over an enemy is to use well those systems which h~ has not perfected like the precIsion day/night weapons technology we possess. Remember, you cannot use a 3-kilometer-range precision weapon well If you are in the midst of a hall of suppressive fires and your target bobs up and down at 13 kilometers an hour In a veil of smoke. Optimization IS the name of the game. And, In case you forgot, we are now the little guys. ""R

45 from AN COSANTOIR The Puerto Rican o Military Forces

Captain Shaun M. Darragh, Puerto Rican Army National Guard

a.nom·a.ly (a nom'a Ie), n., pl. -lies 1. a deviation from the common rule, type or form. 2. someone or something anom­ alous. The Carribean island of Puerto Rico certainly fits the definition in the Random House dictionary. Its Spanish­ speaking people are American citizens but pay no US income taxes. Those who are on the federal payroll pay taxes to the US government, but cannot vote. Puerto Ricans do .not consider their country a state, yet neither do they fit the description of a commonwealth. Add the Puerto Rican Na­ tional Guard to the mixture and even more of an anomaly emerges; a state instit'ution which exists within a country which is not a state; a military force founded by an Irish general, funded for the most part by the United States and composed of Latin-Americans; a force whose official lan­ guage, English, is a foreign one. Yet the Puerto Rican National Guard is highly successful. Here are some of the reasons why.

Condensed from An. CosantOlr. September 1977

46 PUERTO RICAN FORCES I> UERTO Rico is the easternmost anomalies exist. One of these anom­ Pand smallest island of the Greater alies is the Puerto Rican National Antilles chain. Measuring approxi­ Guard (PRNG). . mately 100 miles in width and 30 mifes The Fuerzas Militares de Puerto in depth, it is tropical in climate and Rico are authorized under Puerto Rican inhabited by some three million people law. However, the Puerto Rican mil­ whose means of livelihood range from itary forces are, in reality, a state subsistence farming and the culti­ Army and Air National Guard of the vation of sugar cane and coffee, to the US National Guard. Though they are manufacture of pharmaceuticals, com­ by their own definition the organized puters and the world-famous Puerto military force of the Commonwealth of Rican rums. Puerto Rico, they are also an integral Presently a "Free Associated State" part of the US Army and Air Force. of the United States by virtue of the The US· government, in fact, pays 1952 Puerto Rican Constitution, the all federally recognized personnel for island is a former colony of both Spain participation in authorized drills and and the United States. The exact defi­ for active duty in connection with nition of what constitutes a "Free training or mobilization. The United Associated State" is a recurrent theme States also procures and issues uni­ in the Puerto Rican political scene. By forms (enlisted men), arms and anyone's definition, Puerto Rico is not equipment, and provides funds for both a "state," and what distinguishes it ordnance and quartermaster stores, as from the other states of the union and well as station property. It further miscellaneous territories is that the matches Puerto Rican funds for the country considers itself a nation. construction and maintenance of Puerto Ricans have considered them­ training facilities. selves such since the 18th century, and, The US government audits and despite the fact that it has never been inspects every unit of the Puerto Rican an independent country, it has jeal­ National Guard at least once annually. ously guarded its right to proclaim In this regard, the Puerto Rican Na­ itself to be. The right of Puerto Rican tional Guard is no different from any independence has been affirmed by other component of the US National both the United States and the United Guard. Nations. The PRNG is directly responsible to As is only natural in an envi­ . the governor of Puerto Rico who is its ronment where two free and sovereign commander in chief through the ad­ peoples coexist as the result of a pact jutant general of Puerto Rico. Through freely entered by both of them, certain the adjutant general, the Puerto Rican government appoints, promotes, transfers, assigns and separates all officers, warrant officers and enlisted This article represents the views of the author men in the PRNG. This force totals 662 only and should not be construed as representing officers and 7,497 enlisted men whose any official or unofficial point of view of the Puerto Rican military forces. members, with the possible exception of a few immigrants, are native Puerto Ricans.

47 MIlITARY REVIEW

M16Al rifle, as well as such standard Organization infantry weapons as the M79 40mm grenade launcher and the M1911Al .45-caliber pistol. The weapons platoon The dual mission of the Puerto is equipped with the 81mm mortar and Rican military forces is demonstrated M60 machineguns. The combat by the composition of the Puerto Rican support company contains the bat­ Army National Guard which has both talions' moun ted reconnaissance tactical combat forces, their supporting platoon, 4.2-inch mortar platoon, elements, and internal security forces. mounted antitank platoon and air de­ The two elements directly below the fense and ground surveillance ele­ adjutant general are the 92d Infantry ments. Brigade and the 292d Area Head­ The cavalry troop, which consti­ quarters. tutes the brigade's organic reconnais­ The 92d Infantry Brigade is a sep­ sance element, is equipped with the arate, standard infantry organization MI13-series armored personnel carriers capable of independent operations and M48A3 medium tanks. under a corps structure or inclusion The 292d Area Headquarters pro­ within a divisional element. The vides command and control for the brigade structure is as follows: remaining elements of the Puerto Headquarters Com,pany, 92d In- Rican Army National Guard. They fantry Brigade include the: Troop E, 192d Cavalry (Armored) 201st Surgical Hospital 892d Engineer Company (Combat) 1st Battalion, 162d Artillery 2d Battalion, l62d Artillery (105mm 124th Military Police Battalion Towed) 125th Military Police Battalion 1st Battalion, 65th Infantry 130th Engineer Battalion 1st Battalion, 295th Infantry 248th Army Band 1st Battalion, 296th Infantry Company E, 65th Infantry 192d Support Battalion Company E deserves special The infantry battalions of the 92d mention in that it is an airborne Brigade are organized into a head­ ranger company whose primary quarters company, three rifle compa­ mission entails long-range reconnais­ nies and a combat support company. sance, including insertion into the area The rifle companies consist of three by either airmobile means or para­ rifle platoons armed with the 5.56mm chute. The Puerto Rican Air National Guard consists of the 156th Tactical Fighter Group, whose subordinate 198th Tactical Fighter Squadron con­ Captam Shaun ~\J Darra&h, Puerto Rlcan Army NatIOnal Guard. IS a graduate of both tains F J04C and F I04D model aircraft, the Officer Candidate School-Armor and the and the 140th Aircraft Control and US Manne Corps AmphIbIOus Warfare Warning Squadron. The air element School. He holds a degree m Latm Ame;ican hlstory and tS studymg law at the Umt'erslty is the smaller of the two, and its chain of Puerto R,co. of command comes through the as­ sistant adjutant general for air.

48 PUERTO RICAN FORCES I'

defeat of these armies in the field led to Origins the dissolution of the Puerto Rican armed forces. The colonial regime which followed Despite the fact that Puerto Rican the American armies raised a Puerto military forces are obviously American Rican regiment later incorporated into in organization and equipment, their the Regular US Arniy as the 65th origins predate the US invasion by Infantry Regiment. Following World over a century. War I, during which Puerto Ricans _ 1\'rior to the 18th century, the de­ fought in the 373d Infantry, the terri­ feftsle of the island was left largely in torial National Guard was organized the hands of the Spanish regular forces under the direction of a presidentially who garrisoned the massive El Morro­ appointed US governor. Despite the San Cristobal fort system in San Juan. fact that an American governor held The remainder of the island had a the reins, the PRNG raised in 1919 was loose system of militia based solely organized, recruited and trained by upon the requirement that its members native Puerto Ricans. were physically fit to bear arms. In 1952, this organization passed Spain's disastrous losses in the Seven under the control of an elected Puerto Years' War, however, forced a reorgani­ Rican governor and thus obtained the zation of its overseas empire. Irish curious duality of being both a federal General Alejandro O'Reilly was dis­ National Guard and the Fuerzas Mili­ patched to the Indies with, among tares de Puerto Rico recognized by the other things, the mission of reorganiz­ Commonwealth government. ing the Caribbean defenses. O'Reilh's reforms included a system of semiregular militia, or­ ~ecruitment ganized, equipped and trained in line l.__ ------1 with the regular army, backed up by a lesser trained urban corps. This body The PRNG maintains a full-time was designated the Disciplined Militia recruiting effort through a technician and constituted seven battalions of on the adjutant general's staff. He, in infantry, one squadron of cavalry and turn, supervises a program through the several batteries of both field and coast unit-level recruiting and retention non­ artillery. Active by 1 April 1766, the commissioned officers. This program Milicia Disciplinada saw active service includes radio broadcasts, activities against the English in 1797 as well as centered upon the unit armories and the Dominican Republic and is ac­ CIVIC action projects designed to cepted by US, Spanish and Puerto identify the unit with the local com­ Rican historians as the immediate munity. The effectiveness of this forerunner of the PRNG. program can be judged by the fact that The Disciplined Militia was dis­ most unit strengths seldom dip below banded at the outbreak of the Spanish­ the 1DO-percent mark and remain American War, and its personnel were closer to the lID-percent maximum transferred into volunteer battalions of authorized strength. the Spanish army. The subsequent Ironically, the atmosphere most

49 MILITARY REVIEW conducive to successful recruiting is the various nonresident instruction found in the rural communities and departments of the US Army and small towns while the San Juan metro­ Marine Corps Institute. Courses range politan area is the most difficult. This from mortar gunnery and forward can be explained, in part, by the differ­ observation techniques to the handling ences between Puerto Rican and Amer­ of supplies, and both officer and en­ ican cultures. That of the Puerto listed participation is high, especially Rican residing outside the San Juan since many of the courses are needed to are'a is centered upon traditional qualify for promotion. Hispano-American values which in­ The second is instruction at either a clude a fierce loyalty to one's town or Reserve school within Puerto Rico or region, as well as a' generally more one of the resident courses in the respectful attitude toward authority. United States or the School of the Rare is the town without an avenue Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. named in honor of the 65th Infantry, Attendance at the Reserve school us­ and many towns have streets and ually means participation in night barrios named after heroes of the mi­ classes and summer attendance at a litia such as Pepe Dlaz and Capitan particular phase of instruction at a Correa. regular service school. The level of the Reserve schools is usually that of the senior noncommissioned officer and Enlistment and IndiVidual Training commissioned officer. The third means of individual training is provided through the PRNG Persons who join the PRNG sign a itself. Courses currently stressed by the loyalty oath to both the Common­ PRNG include a recondo wealth and the United States. Their (reconnaissance-commando) course, a commitment is for six years. They are Noncommissioned Officer Academy then sent to the United States for six and attendance at the Puerto Rico months' training which includes both Military Academy which offers a year basic infantry training and advanced and a half program leading to a com­ individual training in a particular mission. skill. Unfortunately, all instruction during this period is in English, and, while recruits may improve their Unit Training second language somewhat, they often fail to grasp many important military subjects. This places an even greater Training at the unit level follows a burden upon the unit training pro­ strict regimen outlined in both Army grams within the PRNG where in­ and National Guard Board publica­ struction is in Spanish. tiuns. Each unit has a training When the soldier returns to the unit, schedule based upon 48 paid drills a there are still several sources of indi­ year and a 15-day active duty training vidual training available. The first of period in the summer. Each drill is a these is the correspondence instruction four-hour period. Members receive one available through such institutions as day's pay based upon their years of

50 PUERTO RICAN FORCES

CD English class

CD Mortar training

CD CBR training

CD Inspecting aircraft MILITARY REVIEW service and rank for each drill period. upon learning through execution of the National Guard pay tables are com­ mission. patible with those of the Active Army. Puerto Rico is one of the most densely inhabited countries in the Evaluation world, and, therefore, the lack of ade­ quate training facilities presents a problem. The PRNG maintains a The danger confronting the armed training site at Salinas on the southern forces of any small nation is that self­ coast of the island where units may evaluation leads to complacency. This maneuver and conduct field firing of was avoided in O'Reilly's militia since certain types of weapons. However, the the governor general was either a Salinas site is only 6,000 acres, and, Spanish military officer or had a reg­ thus, space for the infantry battalions ular officer to whom he delegated his is limited. Certain types of ammunition authority as captain general. Under must be prohibited due to safety the Spanish system, the Puerto Rican factors. An M48 tank-firing armor­ militia performed its duties under the piercing, discarding-sabot ammu­ strict evaluation of experienced regular nition, for example, can easily fire officers assigned to the governor gen­ more than halfway across the island. eral's staff. Of a more immediate concern is This system is generally in effect whether or not the effectiveness of a today but with several important dif­ unit which habitually uses the same ferences. First, the PRNG does training area can really be evaluated. evaluate itself since the adjutant At a training site where phase lines, general of Puerto Rico bears the ul­ unit boundaries, checkpoints, coordi­ timate responsibility for its success or nation points and observation posts failure. However, in this task, he is inevitably coincide with last year's advised and assisted by Regular of­ terrain features, it obviously cannot be. ficers of the US Army and Air Force This obstacle to a valid training and who are assigned to the PRNG Ad­ evaluation vehicle has been overcome visory Group of the Army Reserve somewhat in recent years through Readiness Command. They advise and amphibious operations to several of assist within specifically established Puerto Rico's outlying islands. Many guidelines and perform the addi­ units of the PRNG also conduct their tionally important function of evalu­ annual training at sites within the ation. Their evaluation furnishes the Continental United States and commanders and staffs of the Puerto Panama. Rican military forces with a two­ This training program has un­ dimensional point of view. dergone a rapid expansion in recent At the beginning of this article, the years. Weapons qualification is now PRNG was termed an anomaly. It is accomplished during a weekend prior an anomaly primarily because it is a to the summer encampment, making state institution which exists within a more time available for specialized unit country that is not a state. It is a training. Classroom instruction is kept military force founded by an Irish to a minimum, and emphasis is placed general, funded, for the most part, by

52 PUERTO RICAN FORCES

the United States and composed of mobilize, even partially, assets of the Latin-Americans-a force whose of­ Puerto Rican military forces for the ficial language, English, is a foreign Vietnam War despite the fact that one. National Guard units from the United The United States needs competent States served in that theater. Elements military Reserve forces. The Puerto of the Puerto Rican Air National 'Rican military forces were federally Guard were mobilized for the 1962 mobilized during World War II and the Cu ban missile crisis. J Korean War. An analysis of both occa­ The basic question is: Can the sions reveals that the PRNG has been PRNG continue to fulfill this dual historically deployed in conjunction mission now that Puerto Rico is with the Caribbean defenses in which moving toward more complete au­ the defense of their own country was tonomy from the United States and an inherent mission. Only when such still retain the option of future possible danger was past were they redeployed, independence? Perhaps, and perhaps as for the invasion of Japan, or demo· not. It is obvious, however, that a bilized, as in the case of Korea. Of thorough review of the "status" of the particular significance is the fact that Puerto Rican National Guard is long the United States did not attempt to overd ue. "i..

Information Needed From Nuclear Test Participants Military and Civilian persons who participated In atmospheric nuclear testmg conducted from 1949·63 should contact the Department of Defense (DOD) at Its toll free 800·638-8300 number DOD estimates that some 200.000 to 300.000 persons. most of them no longer In serVice. participated In the tests The primary reason for contacting nuclear test participants IS to determine If there are any health hazards connected With the tests OffiCials indicate that the radiation dosage from anyone of the tests IS far below industrial tolerances It was set at about 2 REMs. the same amount of radiation received from two X-rays or from the sun by liVing 10 years at a higher altitude such as Denver. Colo One former Serviceman Involved In the tests developed leu­ kemia about a year ago. and the Defense Department and other governmental agencies want to make sure that extensive followup testing IS conducted

53 Successful Evaluation

Colonel Ronald J. Rabin, US Army

\ E['aluation can work for any organization which has specific goals and objectil'es in mind and possesses the organiza­ tional maturity to use it properly. Evaluation performs two important functions for an organization: quality control and feedbacll. The higher the quality of feedback, the higher the quality of decision regarding allocation of resources and furthering organizational goals. To accomplish successful el'aluation, the el'aluators have to be independent and objectil'e-outside the span of control of those being eval­ uated. El'aluators also must have sufficient experience and expertise in the areas they check. Data analysis is a critical step in the-proeess and may be done on a statistical signifi­ cance basis or on an interpretatil'e, practical significance ba .• is. El'aluation does not have to strike fear into the hearts of those being el'aluated if el'aluation is removed from the personality lel'el and put to work on the organizational goals level to assist the decisionmaking process.

VALUATORS, through proper their products and processes. Eevaluation processes, perform two In this short article, I will try to baHic and essential functions for their persuade you that independent, ob· organizations: quality control and jective evaluation is necessary to an feedback. organization and is an achievable or· Being an evaluator at the US Army ganizational goal. You may think that Infantry School (USAIS) at Fort your organization has a good evalu· Benning, Georgia, is exciting and of no ation system-but, in fact, it may not, mean value to the infantry and the and good evaluation can save re­ Army. The problem ~ is that disserta­ sources. Finally, I will put some tions concerning evaluation qua evalu­ USA IS Directorate of Evaluation ation can be a little less exciting than (DEV) concepts of operation on the the job itself or the results. In fact, table for your consideration. discussions concerning evaluation can Organizations need quality feed­ be deadly, but no more so than organi­ back for a variety of reasons. From zations conducting business as usual a systems point of view, organizations in the absence of a sound evaluation of must receive feedback or ultimately

54 SUCCESSFUL EVALUATION suffer the catastrophic" effects of en- nizational process. Not the least of tropy. Military organizations are no these other needs for evaluati6n is our exception. In fact, some feedback loop society's ever·increasing and ex­ is usually present within the overall panding technological base. Tech­ construct of our organizations. Hind­ nology is driving· us into an increas· sight or foresight-chicken or egg­ ingly sophisticated, complex makes no difference. The important environment. Command and control thing is that the loop exists. Great! So, systems, weapons systems, training now we don't have to be concerned systems-you name it and it is be· about entropy (if, in fact, we were at coming increasingly specialized and all). Maybe so. I would offer that it is complex. not simply getting feedback or getting Patting our tummies and pontifi: a lot of it that is important. The im­ cating solutions in the absence of good portant aspeat is its quality. quantitative analysis is the wrong way Feedback enters into the organiza­ to do business in this kind of environ· tion's problem-solving/decisionmaking m~nt. A solid evaluation system is process, and organizational decisions invaluable in helping the organization drive resource allocation. Because all keep pace-it is your sextant, or loran, organizations should want to max­ or whatever, that tells you where you imize resources in the accomplishment are. Knowing where you are is funda· of organizational goals, it is essential mental to deciding where you are going that decisions affecting resource allo­ and why. To quote one of my col· cations be high-quality decisions. leagues, "I don't want the data to Therefore, quality feedback is also dictate the results." Neither do 1. But I essential to the organization. If understand even less how one can feedback is of high quality and used in make decisions in the absence (or the decisionmaking process, it will complete disregard) of hard data. contribute to higher quality decisions Simply stated, in today's environment which, in turn, maximize resources. an organization needs quality feedback -In addition to theory (entropy) and to function effectively and efficiently. utility (quality decisions), there are In the absence of quality feedback, other reasons why evaluation is a quality decisions are not apt to necessary and important part of orga- happen. Obviously, this has no small

Colonel Ronald ,J Rabm IS director. Dlree torate of EvaluatIOn, US Army Infantry School. Fort Benntn{!,. Ga He has attended MISSISSIPPI Southern College. the Unwerslty of Southern MISSIS81PPI and Geor{!,e Wash zngton Un WertH ty. and lS a graduate of the Defense Language Institute. West Coast Branch. the USACGSC and the Natwnal War College He has served In Korea. Vletnam and wah the Orrlce of the ChIef of Stafr, US Army, Washm{!,ton. D C.

55 MILITARY REVIEW impact on resource utilization. developer (TD) develop "it" and "its" In the foregoing. the word "quality" related training delivery system (the was linked to feedback. This was to CD/TD interface); the trainer (the brir:lg out the distinction between USAIS or units in the field) imple­ feedback and quality feedback. The ments/uses "it," and the evaluator terms will be used interchangeably. but tells the commandant how "it" is quality [{'pdback is what we are talking working, ahf.ut. Our independence is assured be­ There are spveral wavs to check cause we are not organizationally sub­ your organization's evalu~ti~e mecha­ ordinate to any of the developers of nism to determine if your feedback has "it," and, so, we have no intraorganiza­ the e requIsite quality. I offer two tional biases to cloud issues. Our objec­ qupstions you can ask which may help tivitv is retained because we do not you determine whether or not your participate in the combat or training evaluation' quality control resource is developments programs; therpfore, we hpmg used to its maximum potential in have no ego involvemeillt in the fielded produeing quality feedback. Is your systpms (weapons or training). evaluator independent and objeetive? If your organizational evaluation Is your organizational climate con, system is not independent and ob­ dueiv(' to recpivmg independent and jective. you may not really have a objective feedhack-bad ncws as well system that pays its own way in terms as good'? of contributions by way of quality The requirement that evaluators be feedback to the organization's problem· indeppnd"ent and objective stems from solving, decisionmaking processes. In a simple (yet often ignored) idea: If you such an environment, one wastes re­ want to know the answer to the sourcps in at least two ways. First, question How is "it" working?, you will resources committed to the evaluation probably get a more valid and. effort are not heing maximized. t1H'refore. more useful response if the Sl'cond, organizational decisions con· person you ask is not the same person cerning resource allocation probably as thl' one who put "it" together­ will not be of the quality they would be whatevpr "it" happens to be. In other if quality feedback were available. words, the builder of a house may not All the quality feedback in the I", the hest person to ask if that house world will not help an organization is well,conFtructed. You will prohably which lacks the maturity to use it. If gpt a heltpr answpr-more independent your organizational climate is not con­ and ohjectIve-if you ask someonp ducivp to reeeiving and considering all other than the builder. Hut that the feedback-the good news and the someone also must understand how bad-then you cannot capitalize on the housps should be built. full potential of that feedback. This independent, objective concept The creation of the right kind of for evaluation is in operation at Fort climate is. of course, leadership·related. Benning as follows: With regard to all Organizational leaders must establish systems-weapons or training-for a climate which allows the evaluator to which the USAIS is proponent, the evaluate objectIvely and to present his combat developer (CD) andior training findings candidly. It isn't a question of

56 SUCCESSFUL EVALUATION

honesty or integrity. It is a question of • Requires organizational maturity. objectivity or, better stated, the lack The USAIS has succeeded in thereof on the part of the developer. putting these general concepts into Developers, like commanders, like action. That sounds like program de­ engineers, like electricians, and others, veloper talk, but, in this case, we have belil2ve that their products (whatever the results of our evaluations to sub­ their form) are the best. Quality control stantiate the claim. These results, (evaluation) is essential because of, not however, are related to something more in spite of, this honest conviction. It is than the implementation of the general extrl2mely difficult for leaders or conceptual framework outlined above. managers to identify urgent problems During our two years' existence, we within their own systems. (If this were have developed concepts of operation not the case, a lot of consulting firms which form the real substantive base wuuld be uut of business!) for our evaluation effort. The rest of While the organizational leader this article will concentrate on these. must establish a climate which nur­ The first problem we faced was tures good evaluation, the evaluator determining how we should organize has to carry the ball. He must "stand internally in order to conduct effective and be cuunted." At times, evaluators evaluation operations. The US Army will find themselves m conflict with Training and Doctrine Command their cu-workers. Further, this conflict (TRADOC) Staffing Guide provided a usually involves not only co-workers, cornucopia of missions and functions but also supervisors. Quite often, the for the DEV-the scope of these was developer co-worker will have "sold" a broad but definable, therefore program to a supervisor who is a manageable. The organization mutual supervisor of both the de- espoused by the Staffing Guide was I. veloper and the evaluator. By ap­ not really functional in that it sepa­ proving a developer's program, the rated the basic evaluative functions of supervisor assumes some responsibili­ data collection and data analysis ty/ego involvement of his own. On a into separate subcells. "bad news" day, the evaluator, in We modified that organizational effect, will be telling his supervisor concept into one which emphasizes a that he (the supervisor) may have functional approach wherein a team is. made a bad program decision. It can given a particular system to evaluate. get uncomfortable, but it is a challenge That team not only designs the data and certainly can be exciting. collection effort, but also collects and The preceding concepts concerning analyzes the data. In addition to these evaluation are considered to be gen­ functional teams, we retain a small erally applicable. Essentially, these group of "technical experts" (four concepts say that good evaluation: Ph.D.s of various disciplines) who • Is necessary to an organization. provide intraorganizational assistance • Must be independent and ob­ as needed. jective to be effective in providing The final aspect of the TRADOC quality feedback. Staffing Guide had to do with the • Is invaluable to quality decision­ allocation of personnel resources. In making and maximizing resources. terms of numbers of people, the con-

57 MILITARY REVIEW

straint was and remains severe. Since Basic Course or the 11 Series Soldiers' we could not disregard this Manuals and Skill Qualification constraint-we worked around it. Tests). Based on the idea that the evaluator Weapon systems are those in which must have sufficient experience and a weapon is the focal point and the expertise to check the homework of the training of individuals or units is re­ developers eff~ctively, we were able to lated to maximizing the effects of that write job descriptions which allowed us weapon (for example, mortars, the to recruit the requisite experience and TOW and the M16). This is important expertise through an improved grade! because, as the proponent agency for rank structure. As a result, size is infantry training and weapons less a deterrent to our evaluation systems, the USAIS is responsible for' program-at least in the quality of providing the field a complete package product area-than it would have been called a training delivery system (TDS) as originally designed. Broad mission, for each of the programs or systems. functional organization, relatively When delivered to the trainer, the TDS small size and high levels of expertise package should provide all the training descrihe the USAIS Directorate of support materials needed to conduct Evaluation. These descriptors also fa· productive training. cilitate effective evaluation. The recognition of proponent re­ Concurrent with solving those or· sponsibility for training delivery ganizational problems, we had to de­ systems provides a key element in our velop methods of operation which evaluation effort because it answers would facilitate the accomplishment of the question what, or in what context, our mission. Given a fielded system, we should evaluate. A TOS is designed our hroadly defined mission is to so that, all other things equal and identify training, training development given the training prescribed in the and com hat development problems; TDS, a particular target audience define those problems; determine the would be trained to a level which nature of prohlem solution; and pass would help to maximize its combat those prohlems to the developers for effecti veness. solutions. This means that, to some extent at The key is mission accomplishment least, units in the field can be only as in terms of fielded systems. We ration· effective as the training delivery alized that the USAIS is proponent for system provided by the proponent. It two basic kinds of systems: training cannot be overemphasized that, if the systems and weapon systems. In this TOS is inadequate, it will have an context, training systems are defined adverse effect on units, individuals and as those which deal with a variety of weapons system effectiveness. Since technical and tactical skills which quality control must focus on organiza­ infantrymen must master and which tional outputs, the object of the USAIS are encompassed in a course of in­ quality control or evaluation effort struction or training program devel­ must be USAIS proponent training oped by the USAIS for use at the delivery systems . . school or by units in the field or both Having identified the what of our (for example, the Infantry Officers' evaluation (the TDS), the next decision

58 SUCCESSFUL EVALUATION

i' had to do with where we ought to collecting data-both objective (quanti­ concentrate our efforts. In keeping tative) and subjective (qualitative)-in with TRADOC's School Model '76 and each of the applicable areas of focus. the natural inclination of the infan1;ry While all of our study efforts may not to believe that the best place to find out include all of the five focal points "how it is working" is wherever the shown at Figure 1, they all do include action is, we decided to concentrate on the soldier, his training (because it is individual and unit performance in the intimately related to the TDS) and his field. At the USAIS, we believe that the resultant proficiency. As a result, we measure of success of any TDS we expend a good deal of our resources in produce is the level of performance by these three areas. Here is why: individuals and units in the field. - • The soldier is one component of a While we continue to collect a:-.d system within which he operates. analyze data concerning resident • Performance standards (demon­ courses and students, our emphasis is strated proficiency) must be in terms of on effectiveness in the field. This ob· outputs required from the soldier for jective of TDS evaluation is a subject the total system to function effectively we painstakingly explain to units in and efficiently. Any analysis of profi­ the field which provide us with sub­ ciency must include objective data jpcts for evaluation. We attempt to using hands-on performance testing make our evaluations no·risk proposi­ whenever possible. This helps to tions (unit and individual anonymity). answer the question, Can he? This benefits the unit in two ways. • In addition to demonstrated profi­ First, the feedback obtained causes the ciency, training or weapon system TDS to improve over time, thereby evaluations must consider other enhancing unit effectiveness. Second, aspects related to soldiers' perform­ units can get a detailed fix on where ance. Because the soldier is a person, they are without expending precious many internal and external factors unit resources. affect his duty performance, which is -So, what we evaluate is the TDS, the behavior we observe. While many and where we do it is primarily in the aspects of human behavior can be field. Hoou we do it is fundamentally quantified, analysis of such data is related to several guidelines that we largely a subjective process. Will he? developed. These are based on two Does he want to? formulas that are fairly well-known • If combat or training developers within TRADOC. The first one says do not consider Can he?, Will he? and that a total weapon system consists of Does he want to?, there cannot-be the the soldier, his training and his requisite match of system weapon. The second one says that componenfs-man, weapon and battlefield effectiveness is a function of training-necessary for effective and the weapon, the soldier's proficiency efficient operation of that system. As a and the tactic or technique of em­ result, maximum battlefield effec­ ployment. We have combined these two tiveness cannot' be reached. ideas as shown in Figure 1. In carrying out our mission, we In carrying out our mission, we conduct what we call total system develop methods and techniques for evaluations (TSEs). We look at one of

59 MIlITARY REVIEW two basic kinds of systems: training or civilian and what he learned in basic weapon. Obviously, some of the combat training; and that he would subsets of these two systems could be perform at some level of effectiveness so large and complex as to ,defy defin· in a unit after AlT. Schematically, the itive evaluation. As a result, we define system we were evaluating took the the system before we begin. We also form shown in Figure 2. The process of know that. in those systems, some or system definition is an essential first all· of the areas of focus shown at step in the evaluation process. Figure I will obtain. All that remains This second part concentrated on is to determine which kind of system how the USAIS has operationalized we are evaluating, what are its key quality control!feedback. Of course, a subsystems and which areas of focus lot of the nitty-gritty of instrument need to be considered. design, collection, planning, data anal­ For example, when we did our in· ysis, and so forth have been omitted. fantry advanced individual training That could get laborious and, the more (AIT) TSE, we knew that it was a we get into details, the less general training system; that a soldier would utility for the reader. I would suggest receive training in multiple infantry that the more scientific and disciplined skills; that the soldier would bring two your evaluation, the better the results. things to training with him-what he In addition, if you do not put the learned formally and informally as a computer to work for you, you may

Focus of USAIS Evaluations

1. Total Weapon System = Soldier + training + weapon Plus 2. Battlefield Effectiveness = F (Weapon x proficiency x tactic and technique of employment) 3. Synthesis: Soldier + training = proficiency Weapon is constant Tactic and technique of employment (doctrine) maximizes employment of the system 4. Therefore: Focus on: A. Soldier as a person (think-feel-behave) B. Training (design and conduct) C. Proficiency (result of combining A and B) D. Weapon (include simulators) E. Tactic and technique (understood-executed) Figure 1

60 SUCCESSFUL EVALUATION

f'

Note E Effectiveness of AIT graduate in field Figure 2 never get finished. In this latter job. The data analysis phase probably regard, planning your computer pro­ can be handled in two general ways.' grams concurrent with developing your First, you can present the data as the data collection instruments can reduce computer delivers it to you (statisti­ yOUr time by as much as one-half. cal significance). In a sense, this is Operationalization of the quality analysis because the computer will control/evaluation/feedback concept provide you significances and devia­ at the USAIS is predicated on organiz­ tions and all of that. Secondly, you can ing functionally; ensuring that expe­ add an interpretation to the data (prac­ ri~nce and expertise are present in the tical significance). What does it mean? organization; ensuring that we I believe that the latter is the evalu­ oriented evaluation on the USAIS ator's job. It adds to your risks and product (TDSs for training and your confrontations with co-workers, weapons systems); and clearly articu­ but, if you have it together, it is the lating where evaluation had to focus so real essence of being an evaluator. as to deliver a useful product to meet Evaluation at USAIS is a success. I USAIS organizational needs. believe that it can be successful in any There is one final area to consider: organization given that the organi­ analysis of the data. This is the biggest zation has specific goals and Dbjectives challenge to the evaluator, but it may in mind and has the maturity to put well be the most satisfying part of the evaluation to work. ~

61 Interoperability of Allied Forces in Europe: Some Historical Peacetime Realities

Benjamin Franklin Cooling and Part I Lieutenant Colonel John A. Hixson, US Army

"~: " ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE

The Roman legions initially had effective cooperation with Rome's allies. But, as time passed and peace came, this cooperation dwindled to the point that, when war came again, there was mass confusion and finally defeat. After the Middle Ages, the lack of interoperability among nation­ states in a coalition was again evident. The Spanish Army of Flanders and the international force of the Duke of Marl­ borough are prime examples. Napoleon's repeated victories over the coalition forces opposing him speak to the lack of interoperability among these allies. The Triple Entente of Ru88ia, France and Great Britain and their foes, the Triple Alliance of Central Powers consisting of Germany, Austro­ Hungary and Turkey, were no better prepared to operate as coalition armies on the eve of World War I. Lessons learned as a result of previous coalitions during wartime were forgotten during periods of peace and had to be relearned in each subsequent war.

EALING with the enemy is a simple whirlwind of wartime Allied difficulty Dand straightforward matter when from 1914 to 1918 by failing to develop contrasted with securing close cooper­ some very baSICS in a peacetime envI­ ation with an ally. By the same token no ronment. Even there, however, they were small part of our War College Studies part of an almost ageless tradition. should be devoted to an endeavor to Historical analysis of the peacetime foresee exactly what to expect and how interoperabillty of Allied forces In Europe to reduce friction should we have Allies, at the field army level tends to be diS­ which may God forbid, in the next war.' turbing. Countless studies have analyzed So concluded Major General Fox actual wartime coalitions and Joint opera- . Conner in a lecture delivered at the Army tlons. Similarly, the very top echelons of War College in 1939. Best known as the political and military planning and coop­ mentor of General Dwight D. Eisen­ eration have faSCinated historians and hower, Conner's experience had been policy analysts for sometime.2 But an with Allies In wartime; hiS cYnicism was abiding and gnawing question remains repeated both by his own generation of largely unanswered: What pellcetime military professionals as well as those measures have been applied to achieve a who served with Ike and Patton later on. higher level of international force inte­ But the sentiments might Just as well gration which would be expected to fight have been uttered by a Roman, Eng­ in a defensive posture? Historical ex­ lishman, Frenchman, Russian, German, amples dating from the ancient Roman~ Pole or Turk. All had reaped the may give us some clues.

Part II of this article Will appear In the September 1978 M,llt8ry Re'lliew

63 MILITARY REVIEW

though by no means slight. The preindustrial age rendered minimal the problems of "standardi­ ~======-> zation" in weaponry, logistics and com­ munication for ally and Roman alike. Ancient Rome Battlefield signals were either aural through blaring trumpets or the visual ~------~ sign of the eagle standard. Similarly, if Latin accompanied the spread of Roman civilization, then the language of the masters was never a major impediment Certain experiences and patterns of to relations between Rome's legionnaires Roman and allied interoperability were and their auxilia allies. established early In the history of that Certainly, liaison officers from both ancient state. They continued in some parties may have smoothed the rough form to the so-called "fall" of Rome in edges, but Roman officers commanded the Christian epoch. Allied contingents both legions and allied units. Moreover, attached to regular Roman legions pro­ the long time span of Roman history vided both strength and weakness in tends to level the peaks and valleys In military, political and cultural terms. terms of problems with allied forces. But Early Roman armies of the republic the auxilia genera Ity provided capable comprised both Roman citizens and non­ scouts, skirmish troops, light infantry citizens drawn from Italian "allies" of the and, above all, cavalry so desperately city-state. Such allies were the fore­ needed by the heavy infantry of the runners of auxiliary contingents recruited Roman legion. in outer and more primitive provinces as We do know, however, that, as the well as from client states beyond the centuries passed, the reward of citi­ frontier. Motivation for "alliance" was zenship was a double-edged sword. As communicated to the serving ranks in the the perimeters of empire stabilized in the form of common enemy, financial subsi­ Imperial Age, line legions became locked dization or threat of reprisal to parent to permanent stations and provincialized tribe or client state, promises of land and by local recruitment. Whole tribes of booty and even Internal competition be­ barbarians became integrated into tween Roman and allied units and their Roman Units by 382 B.C., serving under individual warriors But from the bloody their own chieftains not under Romans. social war of 91-87 B.C. dated the The allure of Rome became gold, not primary Inducement to alliance-the citizenship. To the emperor on the banks promise of eventual Roman citizenship of the Tiber, any recrUit be'came a po­ generally upon demobilization. tential warrior for battles between rival Within a tWin-level Roman army contestants for his throne. structure, the citizen legion, ordinarily Coupled to "Germanization" of the well-disciplined and reliable, tacitly western Roman army was a failure to served to keep the noncitizen auxilia secure a partnership between the bar­ under control, even resorting to the,lr barian immigrants and Roman land­ tactical superiority where necessary. This owners In Europe, a partnership was a latent function of the legion ai- doomed to founder upon traditional Latin

64 ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE ,., feelings of superiority over Unter­ "darkness and chaos" of the Middle menschen, or legal relations between Ages. The emergence of England. France, patron and client. Perhaps German le­ Portugal and Spain-OWing fealty· to a gionnaires remained loyal, but not so tHe particular sovereign-meant that an federates. Surrounded by Roman racial almost ceaseless pattern of both do­ hatred, they naturally felt no fealty mestic and international conflicts would toward a distant ideal of another place Involve each or all In warfare on the and time. By 409 A.D .. such allied troops European continent. or outSide Europe failed to prevent other German tribes dunng the Crusades. Historical records from crossing into Spain. Ethnic disunity remain Indistinct for determining contributed to the abandonment of strengths and weaknesses of allied oper- . Britain and sections of the Danubian atlons. But analYSIS of several case frontier line. studies including the Spanish "Army of Thus, in the end, the superb team of Flanders" in the 16th and 17th centuries. legIOnnaires from Rome and allied pro­ as well as the international force of the vincial auxilia gave way, first to inte­ Duke of Marlborough In the 18th century. gration in fortified camps along the Will Illustrate allied Interoperability In strategic boundanes of the empire, and that age. later to complete provinclalizatlon of the The Spanish Army of Flanders (1567- imperial armies. What the new breed of 1659) reflected the transitIOnal penod native defense forces desired by the between the demise of the Roman fourth and fifth centunes was akin to Empire and the appearance of our modern "national liberation" modern natlon-state.3 The early modern movements-freedom and self- empire of the Spanish Hapsburgs. like determination. the Romans. covered a sizable geo­ The resultant failure of allied Interop­ graphical and multiethnic area although erabllity gave way to the Dark or Middle linked through the common bond of the Ages where the glOries that were Rome Holy Roman CatholiC Church. Communi­ became ad hoc alliances and allegiances cation and control were pnmitlve and to powerful princes linked by feudal ties difficult. of fealty and force. Patron and client In The empire's armed forces reflected allied relations assumed only slightly the composition of sOCiety-deriving from different meaning. no less than SIX different "nations." some even beyond the stnct adminis- . trative boundanes of the Hapsburgs. Spain. Italy, Burgundy, Germany and the Bntlsh Isles prOVided units to fight beSide Allied Forces in the local Walloons in the Army of Flanders. Early Modern Period Even the armies of England and France consisted of multinational contingents. Manpower was a never-ending re­ qUirement for power-hungry sovereigns seeking European hegemony. But how to control such diverse ele­ Alliances and coalitions accompanied ments In one's army. that was the the nse of modern nation-states after the question. The ostenSible purpose of the.

65 MIlITARY REVIEW

Spanish Army of Flanders was to stifle_ tlngent dress supposedly promoted esprit domestic ;nsurrectlOn in the Dutch prov­ de corps). the Hapsburg treasury took inces. But. to reduce friction between care of weapon and logistical responsibil­ contingents. the national contingents ities. If standardization was not a were maintained 'as separate adminis­ problem for this multinational a,rmy. trative Units Only Spaniards could serve getting men and material across an often In or command Spanish contingents. hostile. checkerboard Europe was a Even Englishmen were forbidden to never-ceasing Issue. cOr(lmand Scottish or Irish units. and In the end. the abiding problem of the Milanese or Roman troops were for­ multinational armies of the early bidden to serve In Napolese units. Hapsburg 'estate remained fiscal and Germans were carefully recruited from geographical. Use of troops raised in one Hapsburg patrimonial estates such as area to fight In another combined with Austria. Alsace and Tyrol to assure their weaknesses of the Hapsburg treasury. political and religious conformity. When men are not paid or fed or quar­ The fact that such an army was a ter~d over long campaign periods. then Jumble of nationalities. none of them multinational forces, like national armies, calling the Netherlands home. was not lose their efficiency as instruments of necessarily a disadvantage Like the state policy. And so it was with the Romans before them. tre Spanish Haps­ Spanish Army of Flanders. burgs felt that stationing a Unit far from There was nothing wrong with its homeland ensured solidity and alle­ Spain's military organization. The multi­ giance The Walloons. for e)(ample. were national army remained the hallmark of counted upon to have the highest de­ the Hapsburgs until 1918 when the last serlion or defection rate In the Flanders force of the Austro-Hungarian dynasty force-yet they were necessary Simply mobilized With the aid of recruiting for numbers' sake. Similarly. the Duke of posters printed in no less than 15 lan­ Alva never forgot that Germans In the guages It continued to fight even after army had proved Intractable In earlier the collapse of the empire it had sworn to German Protestant revolts simply be­ defend. On the other hand. the interoper­ cause many of the rebels were relalives. ability of early modern multinational servants. neighbors or friends. The armies possibly owed more to so-called BriliSh units had notorious procliVities for "great captains" of the time than to any deserting their erstwhile Dutch allies. foreru nners of present-day devices for and even the Italians were suspect ensuring alliance force solidity. In the end. they all proved their The mercenary allegiance to Unit fighting mettle. but at the top of the captains. growing largely out of Roman pecking order stood the Spanish Infan­ patron-client relatIOnships or feudal ar­ trymen. Surely. the caste feeling of their rangements of the Middle Ages, led Spanish Hapsburg employers had a rip­ eventually to veneration of leaders from pling effect down through the national Gustavus Adolphus to Frederick of order of command Prussia. They were hereditary rulers as More at Issue were matters of well as great battle chieftains. Yet few weapons. subsistence. supply. and so surpassed 52-year-old. John Churchill, forth. While standardization of uniforms Earl (later Duke) of Marlborough. He was frowned upon (again national con- displayed an uncanny knack for smooth-

66 ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE ing the differences between allies of the period. By the 18th century, France followed Spain as the supreme threat to the European balance of power. As Louis XIV snatched European hegemony from the Hapsburgs, stili another coalition of allies Marlborough accomplished unity on was forged to counter his threat. The politico-military as well as allied military Holy Roman Empire Jeamed with Prot­ levels. His protagonists ranged from estant England and the Netherlands for Dutch field deputies like De Renswoude, the Crown of Spain The Dutch aligned Van Collen or Gosllnga, and Dutch gen­ with their traditional English enemies In erals Overklrk, Opdam and Glnkel, to order to preserve eXistence. The English Eugene of Savoy and George of Hanover teamed with a collection of "unspeakable Yet adroit use of Integrity and trust allied foreigners" In the name of self­ with patience, politeness and charm preservation of their Protestantism and enabled Marlborough to cajole and liberty as well as power. Prusslans cast dictate. acquiesce and demand In order covetous eyes on allies' property Savoy to bind up the fragile alliance to the had little affinity for distant peoples but common cause. was concerned with ItS own independ­ Marlborough's headquarters was ence and what It would gain from France staffed by Englishmen yet It was open As Marlborough observed on the eve of equally to any British or allied general Doual In 1710' desirous of communication with Marl­ This army is compos'd of eight dif­ borough It may be that long years In ferent nattons and next to the bles.omg of coalition fighting had "natlvlzed" Marl­ God, we owe all our success to our borough at the expense of his home unammity which has been hitherto as If political base. Perhaps It was merely that in reality we were but one nation 4 tired continental professional so'ldlers l]1e success of the coalition against saw thiS Englishman as. France may be seen too much at this a new, a pnvate man, a subject, distance I as the personal success of acqUIred by merit and management, a Marlborough. Yet, lacking eVidence to the more decIding mfluence than hIgh birth. contrary, it was he who overcame the conftrmed authonty and even the crown natural differences emitting from nation­ of Great Bntam had gIven to King ality, strains of war and goals and . William. methods. And supposedly it was he who Stili, nothing succeeds like success overcame continental antipathy to a Had Marlborough not won the Battles of general who had "never grounded Blenheim. Ramlilies and Malplaquet, all himself in the theory of war by profes­ of his suavity and diplomacy might have sional study," but who owed his position gone for naught Victory Infected both as English commander In chief In the peers at command level and men In the Netherlands and subsequently deputy ranks of allied armies If not necessarily captain general of the Dutch forces to given to formal councils of war. a su­ "court favor, diplomatic influence, a preme commander of the Age of Marl­ chain of accidents and the mutually borough had frequent contact and dis­ destructive claims of better men." cussIOn with his own countrymen as well

67 MILITARY REVIEW as generals of foreign conlingents. At military conversations a.lmost moot. The this time, the staff was not necessarily military prepared to fight anyone deemed the commander's major source of com· the enemy of the state by the politicians. mUnicatlOn. He was In close and almost Peacetime planning for wartime cooper­ daily contact with hiS subordinate com· ation In an era of great national rivalries manders, and language proved no barner was somewhat unfathomable to soldiers for the Interpersonal relations of men of and sailors of the age. the same class. banded together through A pattern became set. Prewar paper long-term service against a common coalitions went calmlY and loosely to enemy. war. NatIOnal armies and navies gen­ Those nationally organized contln' erally moved independently or in very gents at lower echelons could thus be loose cooperalion against a common foe Impregnated easily With the SPirits of In the opening campaigns. Then, as their own commanders once Marl­ defeats or victories failed to produce borough and hiS chieftains had earned resolution, time effected changes and their colleagues' respect. A magic key more complex interallied planning Still, may be detected although ItS secrets not thiS planning remained at the highest completely set free In the words of one levels-almost always divorced from op­ Marlborough analyst eratIonal realities. The era from the as ttme passes and hiS authorltv French Revolution to the century aber­ becomes established . . '. one cannot tell ratIOn known as the Crimean War pro­ the difference from the wording of the VIdes excellent examples of mteropera­ letter between ally and English ad· blilty In an age of revolutions. dressee. In these Instances, coalitions of Eu­ ropean natIOns arrayed themselves against commonly perceived threats to the balance of power and stability of the continent. From 1789 to 1815, It was revolutionary and NapoleonIC France. At The Age of RevolutIOns ';r mldcentury, It was czarist Russia threat­ ening to untidy the face of the Middle )" East. particularly the Turkish Straits. In . '.. - - - \ :; ('1 ~ ~ .. --.---~-_ .r these coalitions, several strong and weak powers attempted to effect military ~o ~cJ ~ '--____ strategic policy divorced from the real­ Ities of military operations and knowl­ SophistIcated nation-states had edge of military capabilities The results emerged by the end of the 18th and the were often less than deSired, particularly onset of the 19th centuries. Their Jealous With respect to Interoperability of allied striving for power and wealth Injected an forces. unstable element to the world scene OperatIOns against revolutionary and thereafter AllIances were at best left to NapoleoniC France consumed nearly a the diplomats. and military profeSSIOnals quarter-century and completely disrupted thought little of prewar negotiations European affairs in the process. The except at the very highest level ShlftJrig emergence of a social and political threat sands of diplomacy rendered prewar to the established ruling oligarchies pro-

68 ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE " foundly rocked European capitals. True, of the period until, eventually, years of there had been a revolution m distant experience enabled an Arthur Wellesley North America. That was thought to'have (Wellington) to forge an allied army, been an internal English problem, or ill redeem the Iberian Peninsula from Na­ best a fleetmg opportunity for European poleon and, finally, stand the ultimate powers like France and Spain to twist the test at Waterloo in 1815.5 lion's tail abroad It was not anticipated The passage of the French emperor as a forerunner of things to come m from' the stage of history promised 100 contmental Europe. Yet, after 1789, fear years of peace. True, there were no and hatred of Jacobmlsm quickly cat­ major wars until 1914, but the century alyzed as /iberte. ega/lte, and fraternite was hardly peaceful. In the 1850s, the emblazoned across the face of the con­ colonial struggles of expansive Russia tment, wmnmg colleagues and allies to and Imperial Britain disrupted the the French cause balance of power as had a wave of How does one overthrow revolution internal revolutions In the 1830s and and restore the Bourbon monarchy? Time 1840s. after time, until Waterloo ended It all for The relatively short. almost forgotten France, the coalition of allies moved With conflict In the Crimea highlighted opera­ grand design and lofty plans, only to be tional problems of allies and their military roundly defeated piecemeal by the institutions. The victors of the past-such French and their satellite states. Either as the Duke of Wellington and his the lack of agreed-upon political alms or lieutenants-remembered almost noth­ an overriding strategic plan has reo Ing about the whims of allied Interoper­ celved the blame But British cries of ability and the need to prepare for them "cowardly allies" only dimly veil the In peacetime. difficulties that were experienced at op­ ViCtOriOUS Britain had led the Concert erational levels below planning and of Europe after 1815 6 But Its Instru· treaty level once the actual fighting men~s of military force grew obsolete and began stolid The Royal Navy was the first line' For example, the grandiose plans of of defense, while the army sagged under the Second Coalition In 1798-99 called memories of peninsular VictOrieS, the for Austrian and Russian armies to drive aged hand of Wellington and the eternal the French from Italy and SWitzerland British curse of having to hire ItS man­ before movmg mto France An Anglo­ power rather than conscript It Fur­ Dutch expeditionary force m the Nether­ . thermore. home administration was bi- lands would thrust through Belgium furcated and political. toward Paris, possibly brlngmg Prussia By contrast, the defeated French had Into the war In ItS wake. reformed and centralized Military' In the end, however, the coalition conduct of colonial operations In Algena enjoyed success only In Italy The thrust In the 1830s had given them a Jump on through SWitzerland ended With the dis­ tailOring forces for overseas military op­ persion and defeat of the Austrians, and erations Their war minister was a the Anglo-Dutch expeditlo.nary force was soldier, their soldiery flushed With Al­ stopped a few miles beyond the gerian victory. France was clearly the beachhead, forced to capitulate and re­ superior military partner at the time of er"bark. ThiS pattern continued for most Crimea.

69 MIlITARY REVIEW

Traditional Francophobia and its tradi­ years, Napoleon III had gone the way of tional hauteur based on maritime superi­ hiS uncle. Sedan for the French and the ority kept Britain from an Integrated colonial fights of the British "unlearned" approach to the Crimea op~ration. For­ the lessons of allied interoperability from gotten by its antiquated senior veteran the French Revolution to the Crimea for commanders who had fought with Wel­ stili another generation of Anglo-French lington were the peninsular experiences military professionals, Everyone seemed with allies. Of course, Integration of possessed by a "small-wars" mentality. Spanish and Portuguese or the Dutch­ Belgian units in the NapoleoniC era always had been the weaker with the ~---,=g::-lE-=::::::;;::::l':ii1i==':::s=e::illi~~ stronger under British supreme gUidance. The French felt equal to the Allies on the Eve of World War I British as a nation and a military force. Napoleon wanted the British to command by sea, the French by land, with a supreme war council to coordinate The English wanted none of that. "Cooper­ ation" was their answer-that IS, sep­ arate national land and se~ forces Nineteenth-century Europe moved in­ working In parallel, coordinated fashion exorably onward through a succession of Two disastrous Crimean winters and unification wars in Italy and Germany, many combat miscues finally produced flareups In the Balkans and overseas some effort at a supreme council. But It races for colonies and raw materials. came too late. RUSSia anticipated Aus­ Intense nationalist rivalries seemingly trian intervention in early 1856 and sued mitigated against military alliances, and for an armistice "Cooperation" With all even the experience of an allied expedi­ ItS anticipated difficulties was the actual tionary force In China at the turn of the legacy of Crimea. The price paid for century was an aberration. unrestricted national sovereignty was a Vast, new power blocs were destined prolonged war, duplication of effort, un­ to develop under such unsettling condi­ necessary suffering and a waste of good tIOns. But soldiers and sailors particularly men and material resources due to a lack remained SUSPICIOUS of diplomats' at­ of prewar Interoperability planning. tempts to find friends in a hostile world. The lessons of history once more The earlier wartime lessons of Napoleon receded from View after Crimea. That and the Crimea meant little to a new neither Britain nor France reflected long generation of xenophobic members of the upon the reluctance of both states to War Office, Admiralty or Genera/stab. subordinate their national sovereignties The European balance of power by could be seen In events on the eve of and 1914 was reflected by two major and early In World War I. Over 60 years after contending alliances with RUSSia, France the Crimea, the British had forgotten and Great Britain roughly aligned as the allied lessons of the Crimea, and both Triple Entente, and Germany, Austro­ France and Britain paid no attention to Hungary and Turkey grouped as the Napoleon Ill's enjoinder at unified Triple Alliance of Central Powers. Britain command. Why should they? Within 20 remained rather weakly committed, and

70 ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE

Italy had just recently withdrawn fr.om associates looked upon military matters. the Triple Alliance. Both groupings diS' From the time of the elder Helmuth played all the traditional weaknesses and Moltke onward. there was a minimum of omiSSions associated With peacetime anything approaching comb'lned systems of thiS type. particularly at an planning. operational level. Very little preparation Count Alfred von Schlleffen displayed on either side had been made to ensure complete mistrust of the Austrians coordination and victory should such durmg his prewar period as chief of staff. deterrence fail He chose to communicate With them as The whole Improbability of the Central httle as pOSSible. and. when he did. scant Powers alliance seems qUite apparent In attention was paid to courtesy or the retrospect 7 A coalition of states charac­ views of the Austrians When SchlieHen terized by extremely divergent war alms. shifted. the German focus of planning· radically different socioeconomic struc· was only belatedly passed to Vienna. tures and contrasting strategic capabil­ Erich von Ludendorff admitted later that ities. even their cultural and geographical he really learned about the Austrian ally differences. were enormous. If Germany oQly after the shooting started provided the linchpin of the coalition and fountainhead of strategic gUidance. moral sustenance and financial largess. It also projected a condescending attitude toward ItS lesser colleagues. thereby aggravating the strains and "minority" status of the latter. Part of the problem was the extreme formality of men and their institutions at this time. German Kaiser Wilhelm and Austro-Hungarlan Emperor Franz Josef might agree upon strategic objectives during protocol Visits to one another's capitals. But·,relatlons up and down the hierarchical chainS were strict. formal and cold-completely untrammeled by political interference or Influence from parliamentary Institutions. Moreover. the German-Austrian relations symbolized The German General Staff possessed differences between a people who made only the most rudimentary knowledge of "lack of system a way of life and another the strength. organizatIOn. command that seemed to deify order and live for It structure. national composition and tac­ alone"-Prusslan effiCiency contrasted tical forms of ItS Austro-Hungarlan ally. With Austrian GemUtlIchkeit. Moreover. German and Austrian chiefs of Long before 1914. the well-trained staff hated one another With a passion Prusslan staff officers and attaches who Lost In the ethnlclsm. nationalism and had any contact With their Austrian false confidence were the realities of counterparts seemed puzzled and military morale. an ineffiCient and un­ shocked With the way their southern Wieldy reserve system, unsatisfactory

71 MILITARY REVIEW munitions and deterioration of the frontier operations In India and Afghan­ strategiC railway net-all Austnan weak Istan. But most English officers had POints vis-a-vIs the enemy on Its front, little firsthand knowledge save what czanst Russia The unreality _reached a attaches and army chiefs brought home pOint In August 1914 when the younger from Infrequent tours In the Russian Mottke rather off-handedly brushed aSide capital. the Austrian liaison officer Stlirgh With Of the French, of course, It was the- comment "You have a good army different A whole coterie of Francophihc You'll beat the Russians" British staffers sprang up during the The prewar situation for Germans and decade before World War I. Through Turks was qUite Similar. Major General adrOit maneuver, secret planning and Otto Llman von Sanders went to Turkey drive, they managed to commit a Bntish to train the land forces In 1913 It was Expeditionary Force on paper to some not long before his 42-member miSSion future battle in Fla nders without the extended authonty over German and general knowledge of either the British TurkiSh military establishments alike, government or the general public. On evoking passive resistance from the ally both Sides of the channel, they effected and strong notes of protest from St peacetime Anglo-French cooperation at Petersburg Von Sanders concluded later various stages of liaison and staff work, The German officers, unfamiliar with planning In the directorates of military the language and wltn but superficial operations and curricular instruction. In understanding of the country and of the the entangling continental COMmitments, Turkish Army, should never have been the French could never be quite sure of made to shoulder the responsibility for perfidious Albion. conditions strange to them to the e,xtent Even at that, It was all terribly that It was done traditional-natIOnal armies planning to Under their stern gaze, however, the fight Side by Side in carefully delineated Turks Improved pay, administration, sectors, liaison never going lower than clothing and sanitatIOn Yet, once again, general staff levels and cooperation German superiority and ethniclsm largely confined to French-speaking Eng­ erected a barrier between allies Neither lishmen like Spears (himself a product of German nor Turk really knew much an Anglo-French family, background and about Turkish army dependability under culture) Called -into the Military Intelli­ fire gence 5 sectIOn at the War Office, Spears Surely, more might have been ex­ received instructions to create an Anglo­ pected from the Grand Alliance facing French code. The War Office admitted the disparate Central Powers 8 Anglo­ only one bilingual code eXisted-in French cooperation talks began as early Japanese-and It could not find that as 1906 and continued despite many copy Spears recalled that he was handed hardships through the years They were a number of old codes to browse over, much closer than Similar Franco-RUSSian "but when I asked for French codes I was or Anglo-RUSSian conversations, staff told the French would not let us even see VISitS and protocol miSSions any of theirS, not even an old one." The Bntish never lost their awe of the Undaunted, the young Englishman "paper tiger" army of czanst Russ'm stumbled through the exercise, and pres­ which many of their officers had seen In ently found himself, codes in hand, as-

72 ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE signed to English" signal umts sendIng was Interesting to see how our men messages to the French army on mao instantly spotted by the way the Morse neuvers across the channel. Spears signals were transmitted that they were recalled later' not being sent by Englishmen. Neither the French nor the English Such were the conditions of allied­ operatives were to know they were com· interoperability In Europe on the eve of municatmg With a foreign army. but it World War I.

NOTES

1 Fo~ Conner, The Allted High Command and Allied Un,t... of Powers and Coalrtmn Warfare 19141918 Parameters Volume I. Direction' Lecture at the US Army War COllege 10 February 1939 WrntEH 1972 pp 36·49 Gordon A Craig The World War I Alliance Army War College OperatIonal Arch, .. e5 US Army M,llta'" History of the Central Power5 In RetrOSpect The Military CoheSion of the Institute Carlisle Barracks Pa Alliance. Journal o{ Modern HIMor}' September 1965 pp 336 44 2 See tor 81<.8mple Roy Chowdbury Military Alftances ana Otto llman von Sander!;, Five Years m Turkey US Naval Inst,tute Neutrality In War and Peace Onent longman5 Bomba~ India 1966 Press AnnapoliS Md 1927 J M McGanty ForeIgn Influence on Sir Fredenck Maunce Lessons of A/hed CooperatIon Na"al Military the Ottoman 1 urk.lsh Army 1800-1918 Ph D dissertatIon Amer. and Air. 7914 7918 OldordUmver<;ltvPre'is N Y 1942Stan1eyR Ican UniverSity 196a UnlverSl1y Mlcrofllm5. Ann Arbor Mlch Larsen and James Lawton Collins Jr Alherf PartlCIf)BCton In Vietnam 1968 and Ulrrch Trumpener, German Milltar~ AId to Turkey In Department of the Army, WashingTon D C 1975 David!=" Trask. t914 An H.stoncal Reevaluation Journal of Modern History June The United Stares In the Supreme War CounCIl Ameflcan War Arms 1960 pp 14549 ana IntElr Alhed Strategy 191' 1918 WeSleyan UmverSltv Press Middletown. Conn 1961 or Forrest C Pogue The Supreme 8 allan Bond The V,ctofJan Army and the Staff Cof/ege 1854 Commana. Department of the Army Washington D C 1954 1914 Eyre Methuen London Eng 1972 NIchols J D Ombram 3 Geoffrey Parker The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Roaa The Impenal General Stall and the M,litary POliCY of a Contlnentat 15677659. Cambridge UniverSIty Press N Y 1972 Strategy Dunng the 1911 InternatIonal Cns.s Mtlllary Afftllrs 4 R E Scouller Marlborough-The International Commander October 1970 pp 83 93 M,chael D Krause Anglo French MIlitary The Army Quarterl~ and Defence Journal July 1972 pp 438 SO PlannIng. 1905 19t4 Before the Flfst World War A Stuoy In 5 Piers Mackesy Statesmen at War The Strategy 01 Overthrow MIlitary DIplomacy Ph 0 d,ssertat,on Georgetown Unlver5Jty 179B 1799 Longman Inc: N Y 1974 1968 UmverSlty Microfilms Ann Arbor MI(,h 1968 Edward 6 James B Agnew The Great War That Almost Was The Spears L,alson. 1974 A Narrative of the Great Retreat Stern & Oa'y Cnmea 1853 1856' Parameters Volume 111 Number 1 1973 pp N y 1968 fdwaro Spears The Plcn,c BaSket W W Norton & Co. 46-57 and A J Barker Thp War Agamst Russ,a 1854 7856. Holt Inc N Y 1967 and Samuet R WIllIamson The Poht'C5 of Grana Rinehart & Winston N 'y 1970 Strategy Brrta,n and France Prepare for War 1904 1914 HarvarQ 7 James B Agnew The ImpOSSible .o.Jhance The Central Umve'sl!y Press Camb"dge Mass 1969

BenJamm Franklm Coolmg IS aSsistant di· LIeutenant Colonel John A Hixson IS rector, H,stoflcal Services. US Army MIlitary chief, Oral History. US Army Military History HIstory Institute. Carlisle Barracks. Pa He reo InstItute. Carlisle Barracks. Pa He received a celVed a B A from Rutgers University and an 8 S from the USMA. an M A from Rice Um­ A M and Ph D from the Umverslty of Pennsyl· vefSlty and IS a 1977 USACGSC graduate He vania HIS article -'Crelghton Abrams at the US has served In the History Department at the Army War College" appeared In the June 1978 USMA and with the XVIII Alfborne Corps Ar· MIlitary ReView Ullery. Fort 8ragg. N C

73 The 1974 decision to implement a new Enlisted Personnel Management System triggered a revolution in training de­ velopment. With the development of the Instructional Systems Development Model, the adoption of Criterion Ref­ erenced Instruction and the acceptance of self-paced in­ struction as the primary teaching method in the Army, the training development revolution took form. However, without the necessary organizations, people and timing, the revolution would have met an early demise. Despite initial problems, the training development record of accomplish­ ments has been generally good. The revolution is continuing and marks a turning point in Army training.

OR the past several years, a remarkable change has been taking place Fwithin the Army's training community. In fact, it has been more than a change. It is an all·encompassing revolution in training philosophies, concepts and methodology. Thousands of people are involved in researching, designing, developing and implementing new courses, documentation and supporting materials. Tens of millions of dollars are being spent annually on these efforts and to upgrade and provide facilities and equipment to support this revolution.

The reasons behind this quiet revolution in training developments are many, and they vary in complexity and origin. Unfortunately, with the exception of

74 ARMY TRAINING DEVELOPMENT the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and those elsewhere in the Army who deal directly with training on a day-to-day basis, the vast majority of the Army do not comprehend the tremendous changes taking place. By not understanding the big picture, as well as the many smaller ones, fear, anxiety and even resistance to change are prevalent throughout the Army today.

To better comprehend what is taking place, the program must be fully understood by all concerned. To ensure this is accomplished, the Army must adequately explain the major factors influencing this so-called revolution; their impact upon TRADOC and its subordinate schools; and the resulting philoso- phies, concepts and processes involved. .

Perhaps the most significant single action signaling the beginning of this revolution was the Army chief of staffs 1974 decision to implement a new enlisted personnel management system (EPMS). Under this new system, the Army proposed to integrate the four components of the system into a single, well-coordinated entity. Training, testing, classification and promotion would be interdependent for the first time in the Army's history. Said differently, a soldier first must be trained in his military occupational specialty (MaS), must successfully pass the new Skill Qualification Test (SQT) and must be reclassified to the next higher skill level before he or she is eligible for promotion to the next higher grade. The EPMS was to be a phased operation with implementation covering a multiyear period from 1976 through 1979.

Inherent in this system were a number of actions which caused TRADOC and its subordinate schools to re-examine the entire training scheme. First, it required a thorough examination of each career management field (CMF) or grouping of related jobs to ensure a proper relationship of skills and a viable career pattern for all. Similarly, each MaS, or job, was examined to ensure sufficient challenge to the individual and proper progression in the job-related skills.

Second, each MaS was divided into five distinct skill levels with COrre­ sponding levels of training. This scheme ensured continuous training through-

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Wendt lS WIth the US Army MLSs!le and MUnltLOns Center and School. Redstone Arsenal. Ala lie recewed a B.S. In physical sCIences from Washington State Unrverslty. an M.S. in educatlOnal adminlstratzon {rom Kansas State Unwerslly and tS a 1977 graduate of the USACGSC. He has served In Europe and Vietnam and with the Safeguard Systems Command. HuntsvIlle. Ala., and the KwaJalem MIssile Range.

75 MIlITARY REVIEW

out a soldier's career and provided for training when and where the individual soldier required it. A typical progression/schooling pattern might resemble the following model.

After entering the service, a soldier would attend basic. combat training (BCT), followed by advanced individual training (AIT). Upon successful completion of AIT, the service member would be awarded an MOS with a skill level 1. Skill level 1 would include grades El to E4 and could be defined as a first-term or apprentice period. The soldier would perform in this MOS and skill level until promotion to the grade of E4.

At this point, the soldier would attend a Primary Noncommissioned Officers Course (PNCOC) to train for skill level 2 or grade E5. Once this training was completed, the soldier would be tested through the SQT. Achievement of a higher passing score on the SQT would bring reclassification to skill level 2 and then, and only then, eligibility for promotion to the grade of E5. Achievement of a minimum passing score would verify the soldier's current skill level and require a retest the following year in order to become eligible for promotion. Failure of the SQT would also require a retest the following year. A second failure would result in reclassification to another MOS or elimination from the Army.

The same scheme would continue with the senior E5 receiving training at a Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC) and being tested to qualify for a skill level 3 designation and promotion to E6. Similarly, senior E6s would attend the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC) to achieve a skill level 4 designation and to qualify for promotion to E7. Senior E7s and EBs would attend Senior Noncommissioned Officers Courses (SNCOCs) or the US Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), if selected, to prepare for skill level 5 senior NCO positions.

To provide for selected highly technical MOS training, Prim'ary Technical Courses (PTCs) and Basic Technical Courses (BTCs) were established as counterparts to the PNCOCs and BNCOCs. In addition, a Primary Leadership Course (PLC) was established to provide training in technical leadership skills.

The training was to be a combination of institutional and extension courses. The BCT and AIT were to be institutional and provided at a Continental United States service school or training center. The PNCOC, BNCOC and PLC were to be taught in division NCO academies or at overseas training centers for better proximity to the majority of potential attendees. Due to the technical nature of the instruction and equipment requirements, the PTC and BTC for technical MOSs were to be taught at the proponent service schools. The ANCOC, SNCOC and courses for sergeants major were to be taught in residence for those selected. In general, greater emphasis was placed on noninstitutional training at the middle skill levels in order to allow more people to accomplish more

76 ARMV TRAINING DEVELOPMENT training as" close as possible to their job sites.

Another aspect of EPMS philosophy was to train a soldier only in those critical tasks which he or she mus,t master to do a particular job. An elaborate job-task analysis of each skill level of each MOS was conducted. Only the most critical tasks were to be taught in residence with the less critical information taught through nonresidence courses or eliminated from the curriculum.

A final provision was the development of the supporting manuals tests and associated documentation. These included the Soldiers' Manual, the Com­ manders' Manual, the Job Book and the Skill Qualification Test.

The Soldiers' Manual was the soldier's bible, so to speak. It contained a listing of all of the critical tasks that the soldier was required to perform in his MOS at the current and next higher skill level. In addition, it provided the cues, conditions and standards for each task along with the equipment required and the appropriate references. Mastery of the tasks should guarantee successful passage of the SQT. One Soldiers' Manual was to be developed for each, skill level of each MOS. '

The Commanders' Manual provided a complete listing of critical tasks by skill level for a complete MOS. Using this manual, a commander or NCO would know exactly what each of his soldiers was responsible for knowing in his particular job, the references required and the standards to be met.

The Job Book is a supervisory training record for skill level 1 and skill level 2 personnel. It contains a listing of critical tasks and space for the midlevel supervisor to record comments with regard to the proficiency and initiative of each of his charges. .

The SQT is a new concept in MOS proficiency testing. This test represents a radical departure from the traditional MOS tests. First of all, it is performance­ based. Demonstration of one's ability to perform a critical task is all-important. The SQT contains three components-written, performance certification and hands-on. The written component is somewhat similar to the old MOS test except that it is performance-oriented and tests only those tasks critical to a soldier's job performance. The performance or commander's certification component contains tasks that are too complex, difficult or time-consuming to be tested during the immediate testing period. The commander or supervisor simply certifies that the soldier has, in fact, successfully performed those tasks in the previous 12 months. Examples are physical training, marksmanship or, the repair/theck-out of a complex radar system.

The final component is the hands-on component. Here, the soldier has to perform a selected number of critical tasks at the time of the test. Examples of this type of testing might be weapons assembly, parts or ammunition identifi·

77 MILITARY REVIEW

cation, or fonns completion. In all ca~es, the tests are perfonnance-oriented and rated by a go-no go method.

A second fac'tor which contributed substantially to the revolution in training development was the adoption of the Instructional Systems Development (lSD) model. In 1973, the Combat Arms Training Board (CATB) at Fort Benning, Georgia, contracted with Florida State University for development of a total systems approach to training development. The result ot this contract was the publication, in 1975, of a five-volume set of documentation called the Inter­ service Procedures for Instructional Systems Design, commonly called the ISD model or the ISD approach. By coincidence as much as design, these procedures supported the efforts that were required of TRADOC schools if they were to realign their instructional programs properly with EPMS philosophies and guidelines.

I The ISD model was based upon basic research in the management, communicative and behavioral sciences. It was based heavily on occupational surveys and job analyses and on absolute standards ofperfonnance. It brought together many innovations in training methodology which allowed for adap­ tation of anyone of a number of schemes to fit most any situation. Finally, the ISD approach stressed the application of modern technology to optimize training effectiveness, efficiency and cost.

The ISD model incorporated five phases. They included analysis, design, development, implementation and control. The analysis phase stressed a detailed and exhaustive front-ehd analysis. Without a good look at just what tasks were to be performed at certain skill levels within each MOS, it was impossible to design and develop an adequate training program. In this phase, detailed task lists were developed by proponent schools and validated in the field. The critical tasks for adequate job performance were selected for training either by extension or in residence at a TRADOC center or school. Supporting data to include cues, conditions and standards, plus applicable references, were included.

The second step, or Phase II, of the process was design. Here, the data developed during the analysis phase was further manipulated to detennine the learning objectives involved as well as appropriate methods for testing each task. Finally, the sequencing of tasks for course development was accom­ plished.

The third phase was that of development. Here, for the first time, the lesson and course development process was evident. Data from the analysis and design phases were classified by objective, media selections were made and development of instruction and materials took place. This process was the same for resident or extension training· and individual or group training. It was viewed as a whole and not as separate entities.

78 ARMY TRAINING DEVELOPMENT

The implementation" phase incorporated the training itself, accompanied by the myriad of related resource, staff, faculty and documentation requirements.

Finally, there was the control phase. This consisted of the evaluation process which operated on feedback data and served as the quality control function for the center and school commanders.

A related development which strengthened the performance-based character­ istics of the ISO approach was the incorporation of Robert F. Mager's Criterion Reference Instruction (CRI) into the Army's training development fold. While the ISO approach to training development was the best and most complete process available to Army educators, it did have its weaknesses. The design and development phases allowed for wide latitude in the selection of training modes and media. The CRI approach placed a great deal more emphasis and structure into the conversion of the job-task analysis data to learning processes and stressed performance-oriented training.

In 1976, the Training Management Institute, a subordinate agency within TRADOC headquarters and an offshoot of the CATB, contracted with Or. Mager and associates for instruction and materials relating to his CRI approach. The CRI appeared to be just the vehicle to augment the ISO model and ensure that performance-oriented training would, in fact, be the accepted method of training in the TRAOOC schools.

A third factor in the training development revolution was the incorporation of self-paced instruction as a primary method of instruction. It lent itself well to the performance-oriented aspects of the EPMS, ISO and CRI. Through use of the self-paced mode, students could progress at their own rate via individual programed tests, slide presentations, audio and video tapes, 8mm and 16mm films and training devices and equipment. Self-paced instruction also leveled out peak loading problems, reduced attrition rates and allowed full implemen­ tation of the go-no go testing method.

A fourth item of significance involved organizations, people and timing. If it had not been for these factors, it is probable that the revolution would have met an early death. Organizationally, Department of the Army directed implemen­ tation of the EPMS and assigned a stringent, phased implementation schedule to TRADOC. TRAOOC, already at work on the ISO, performance-oriented training and self-paced instruction, tied the many pieces together_

General William E. DePuy, commanding general, TRAOOC; Major General Paul F. Gorman, TRAOOC deputy chief of staff for training; and Colonel Frank' Hart of the Training Management Institute played key roles in comprehending and molding the many processes and pressing forward with the job at hand. Finally, timing must be considered to be crucial. Had the right organizations, the right people and the right programs not conv~rged at approximately the

79 MILI1ARY REVIEW

same time, it is doubtful that the job could have been accomplished.

The impact of these various factors upon TRADOC and its many service schools was tremendous. It appeared as if a dam had broken and the floodwaters were everywhere at once. There was so much to do, so few people and such little time to do it. These normally conservative institutions suddenly were inundated with new ways of doing business. Included were reorganization of the schools; reorientation of philosophies, concepts and methods; extensive 'education and training of personnel; and requirements for additional resources.

It became apparent early that the existing organization of the service schools did not facilitate this revolution. Training development activities had been decentralized in the combat development and training areas. Both of these organizations had their primary missions to consider first, and training analysis, design and development were given lower priorities. In addition, the status quo prevailed.

In late 1975, General DePuy directed that each of the schools implement a new school organizational model which included, for the first time, a Direc­ torate of Training Development (DTD). This organization was created from existing resources within the school and had as its mission the implementation of the EPMS. The creation of this organization was intended to develop a group of people devoted solely to training development activities. They were to be independent of the trainers, with an eye toward development of a systematic, logical and efficient training system. By fall 1976, all of the schools had completed this reorganization." There was a good deal of resistance within the training community. The status quo had been challenged. In many cases, the DTD personnel were ignored initially, then viewed as a threat and, finally, reluctantly accepted as necessary elements within the school environment.

A second impact upon TRADOC and the schools was the process of re­ education. What was this thing called the EPMS? What were the products that must be produced? What was lSD, CRI, self-paced instruction, and so forth? How did they fit together? To answer these questions to the satisfaction of the various staff and faculty elements was a significant undertaking. Efforts to do this were made on a broad front. Department of the Army began a compre­ hensive information program to acquaint personnel with the EPMS. TRADOC established lSD, CRI and self-paced workshops for managers at all levels. The individual schools established in-house staff and faculty educational programs to educate the workers and home in on the more specific problems facing that particular schoo!.

In many cases, a great deal of time was lost in this massive redirection and re-education effort, but the job was accomplished. Generally, it can be said that those who r~cognized the significance and importance of the retraining effort early fared better in the long run.

80 ARMY TRAINING DEVElOPMENT

I' Finally, resources in terms of people, money and time were required. Suddenly, the schools found a significant increase in workload at their doorsteps. At the same time, the Army as a whole, and TRADOC in particular, were being forced by Congress an.d the Department of. Defense to tighten their collective belts. With additional permanent employees not authorized, schools were forced to look within and "rob Peter to pay Paul." In some cases, monies were allocated to fund temporary employees to pick up the slack, but these cases were few.

To produce the required Soldiers' and Commanders' Manuals, Job Books and Skill Qualification Tests alone required in the tens of millions of dollars. Add to that the costs of workshops, training materials, travel and temporary employees, and the investment becomes tremendous.

Time was perhaps the driving force in the whole process. Detailed, time­ phased schedules were established with milestones based upon optimistic, success-oriented planning. Little or no deviation was allowed without signi· ficant extenuating circumstances. This tended to compound the people and money resource problem. If it were not for the command emphasis at TRADOC, and the efforts of a small but dedicated and overworked group at the service schools, the effort may never have been accomplished.

Having examined the factors influencing the training development revo­ lution and the resulting impacts upon the schools, we must examine the resulting processes and systems. Perhaps this can best be accomplished by examining the organization primarily involved and the process or flow of activities through this organization.

The reorganization of each TRADOC school created a Directorate of .Training Development. For th'e first time, an organization was devoted totally' to the training development function. Activities included the determination of what was to be taught, where it was to be taught, why it was to be taught, how it was to be taught and when it was to be taught. In addition, all resident and extension courses, complete with supporting documentation, and all EPMS­ directed products originated within the .confines of this organization.

The directorate was composed of a relatively large group of people organized along the lines of the ISD model. Exact size depended upon the job required at any particular school. Size was determined by the number of MOSs for which a school was proponent and, to some degree, by the complexity of these MOSs. The primary operating elements were the Training Analysis and Design Division and the Course Development Division. These were, in turn, broken into individual and collective, and resident and extension segments, respectively. In addition to these primary organizations, there was a training literature group and a staff and faculty development organization, both of which were found in previous school models. Each school was given some flexibility in its detailed

81 MIlITARY REVIEW

organization but was generaUy bound to fit within the envelope prescribed by TRADOC.

The exact processes used to support this revolution in training developments varied slightly in each school and somewhat depended on the personalities involved. However, a typical methodology follows.

The first step in EPMS implementation and in this process was the eMF and MOS redesign. It was necessary that each eMF be examined to ensure that every enlisted soldier had the opportunity to progress from EI to E9 within that eMF. Second, the MOS or jobs within that eMF had to be related or compatible to ensure that individuals could progress and work in fields that were complimentary. Finally, each MOS was examined thoroughly in breadth and depth to ensure a viable and challenging field for every soldier. In many cases, the eMF and MOS structures were found lacking and changes were made.

Once these parameters were established, the true training development process was initiated in line with the ISD and eRI models. The initial step was to conduct a thorough job-task analysis of every MOS. The accepted procedure involved development of a comprehensive task list. The tasks were further assigned to the skill level at which they would be performed initially. These preliminary task lists were developed within the confines of a particular school and represented a first cut at the job.

The task lists then were subjected to a field validation process whereby job incumbents verified the accuracy of the tasks and the skill level placement. Along with this validation, a determination of task criticality was made and quantified. Factors considered in this process included the percent of incum­ bents performing the task, frequency of performance, consequence of inade­ quate performance, task delay tolerance, training difficulty and implications of training site selections.

Armed with this information, the job-task analysts developed the final task list containing those tasks which were critical to job performance and which required . training at some point in a soldier's career. The key questions were when and where. The "when" was easily answered by checking the skill level at which this task must be performed initially. The "where" posed another problem. Emphasis was on reducing the resident training base and pushing as much training as practicable to the field. Those tasks which could be taught in the field were selected for the extension mode of training. This was tempered by assessing what the individual was required to know upon arrival in order to be productive and the unit's ability to train the individual once on board.

After completion of the what, where, when, why and how, there existed a substantial data base upon which.to build the training system. This data base would be used to develop the products required by the EPMS. By following the

82 ARMY TRAINING DEVElOPMENT data closely, the Soldiers' Manuals, Commanders' Manuals, Job Books and Skill Qualification Tests would reflect those critical tasks required of a soldier at each skill level of each MOS.

At the same time, this data base was used to devel~p the resident and nonresident courses and materials required to teach the individual soldier. It was an absolute requirement that every critical task have a training site and a positive training method. Nothing was to be left to chan;:e. Tasks listed as a skill level 1 requirement were included in BCT or ArT resident courses or provided in extension courses or formal on the job packages as appropriate. Skill level 2 tasks were scheduled for the Primary Noncommissioned Officer Courses, Primary Technical Courses, Primary Leadership Courses or self-study as appropriate. Skill level 3 tasks were designated for the Basic Noncommis­ sioned Officer Courses, Basic Technical Courses, Primary Leadership Courses (skill level 2 and skill level 3) or by individual extension courses. Skill level 4 and 5 tasks were included in the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Courses, Senior Noncommissioned Officers Courses or the US Army Sergeants Major Academy respectively. Parallel extension courses were developed for these senior courses as selection for the resident courses was centralized at De­ partment of the Army level and was very competitive.

Again, the system required that every task identified with an MOS be taught through resident or extension modes. The emphasis on extension, or nonres­ ident, training represented a new thrust in Army training. Extension training had been a hit-or-miss proposition and had been left to the field umts for implementation. Under the EPMS, the schools became responsible for the development of all extension training. This training took the form of Training Extension Course packages, training circulars, graphic training aids, formal on th~ job packages, and so forth. It also included printed, audio only, visual only ,and audio-visual modes.

Initially, the primary emphasis centered on the support of active forces. This emphasis shifted in 1977 as the Reserve and National GuarCl forces became prime targets for this training offensive. Every unit in the total force has or soon will have access to the products' of this training revolution. These products, developed using the latest in educational I/hilosophy and technology, will have a positive effect on the posture of our fotces.

As can Ihe seen, the training development revolution has been, and is, a complex and dynamic process. To date, the record of accomplishment has been generally good. Certain problems and delays have been experienced, but not as many as one might expect for an undertaking of this scope and depth. Resistance continues, but the rpalities of the situation present a clearer success story as the days pass. Without a doubt, the revolution has succeeded and will be looked upon as a turning point in Army training for many years to come. '"'1..

83 ~EVIEWS

The Neutron Bomb for NATO Defense: have some merit, partic~larly when placed An Alternative in political perspective. By R. G. Shreffler Both of Shreffler's theses have been, Orb/s, Winter 1978 and will continue to be, debated. At least, they have added some substantive fuel to The US proposal to refit the Lance the flames. missile with an enhanced radiation or fusion warhead has produced an issue of The Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union major proportions on the national and An Institute for the Study of Conflict international scene. The furor accom­ Special Report panying the debate has been mostly emo­ March 1978 (Great Britain) tional with poorly grounded arguments. Is this article any different? Shreffler, who served as the first NATO No analysis of Soviet strategic inten­ director of nuclear weapon planning, tions is valid unless due weight is given to thinks the new Lance warhead should not the ideological self-justification of the be deployed. First, he argues, is the suita­ regime. To ignore or discount this fador, bility of the Lance missile itself. Equipped and the closed and totalitarian nature of with an inferior inertial·guidance system, the Soviet system, can only lead to mis­ 50 percent of the missiles fall outside of an judgment. The issues are of such im­ area with a radius between 400 and 450 portance that any such misjudgment could meters. With such low accuracy, it is dif­ be costly and dangerous or, at the very ficult to engage acquired targets on the least, lead to disappointed hopes and expec­ battlefield. The use of large lethal areas, tations unfulfilled in any negotiations with which could partially justify a preference the Soviet Union. for fusion warheads, onlY partially compen­ In this special report, the Institute for sates for this deficiency. Of course, along the Study of Conflict as C) considers the with large lethal areas goes higher collat-. ideological basis of Soviet military doctrine eral damage which defeats the advertised and examines the decisionmaking process advantage of the fusion warhead. as well as the actual state of weaponry on Secondly, says the author, NATO has either side in the Strateg;c Arms Limita­ never had an adequate doctrine for the use tions Talks (SALT). of battlefield nuclear weapons. Even Although the report principally involves though the Army has made some concerted consideration of SALT for which the efforts recently to be more specific in its United Slates bears the major burden of doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons, responsibility, the gravamen of the report neutron bomb or otherwise, will not find applies equally to other aspects of Western acceptance in Europe because of the at­ defense. tendant danger of extremely high civilian What are the issues? They include not casualties. He advocates using a fixed only war and peaee and the survival of border nuclear defense (not necessarily a mankind, but the preservation of pluralistic fusion one) along the forward edge of a 100- and representative societies in which free kilometer·deep defensive zone. This is a inquiry is possible. ISC has laid some cold, departure from present doctrine and may hard facts on the line in this one.

84 REVIEWS

Terrorism: "An International Journal Compensation and the Military Institution Volume 1, Number 1, 1977-78 By Charles C. Moskos Jr. Air Force MagaZine, April 1978

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It With the advent of the all-volunteer was probably ancient history to Genghis force, the underlying premise of the mil­ Khan, but its modern forms are introducing itary organization, along with its compen­ unique 'and formidable problems to the sation system, has come under redefinition. world. Cost-benefit analyses have dominated the Recognizing the seriousness and com· debate on military compensation. How does plexity of these new modes of violence in this issue bear on national security and the the framework of conflict resolution, the institutional integrity of the armed forces? editors have launched a new journal, Ter· According to Moskos, one of the rorism: An International Journal, in an country's leading military sociologists, attempt to isolate for critical scrutiny the clearly discernible trends indicate the many problems associated with world ter­ American military is moving from an insti­ rorism. The quarterly publication has as its tutional form to one more and more resem­ mission the examination of the types, bling that of an occupation. Some of these causes, consequences, control and meaning trends are termination of the draft, linking of all forms of terrorist action. According to military pay with civilian rates, reliance on the editor in chief, Yonah Alexander, it will monetary incentives and the increasing present the results of original research reliance on civilian contractors to carry out without restrictions on the ideological or the tasks heretofore in the domain of uni­ political approach of contributors and will formed personnel. These changes foster a offer dialogue on the subject for the purpose calculati ve and utilitarian approach to of advancing the cause of peace with service life and can result in two unde­ justice. sirable consequences. It can lead to com­ Some titles from the first issue are: plete occupationalism with a resulting con­ "Terror: The Crime of the Privileged," fusion of the military role, internally and "Profile of a Terrorist," "Treating the externally. It also can cause a backlash of Symptoms of Terrorism" and "The Problem deliberate conservatism on the part ofthose of International Terrorism at the United who will invoke traditional values as rep-' Nations." The journal also offers abstracts resentative of the "real military." of documents on terrorism and a selected The damaging effects on the armed bibliography each month. Requests for forces of such confusion and dissension information and manuscript submission would be incalculable. The solution, says should be to the editor in chief in care ofthe the author, is to break the mind-set that State University of New York, Oneonta, sees the all-volunteer force as possible only N.Y. 13820. in terms of the marketplace.

These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure accurate translatIOn and summarization. However, for more detailed accounts, readers should refer to the original articles No official endorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements in these items is intended or should be mferred.-Editor.

85 ~TUDIES .

Forty-five of the Anny's most important manuals, published by the US Anny Training and Doctrine Command as Department of Army publications, are classified as "How to Fight" field manuals (FMs). Twenty-one of these "How to Fight" manuals have been published to date and are listed in Department of the Army Circular 310·1, Military Publications, 21 October 1977. Below are those yet to be published and their projected publication dates. Users should expect a small delay after publication to allow for distribution to the field.

Publication Number and Title Date

FM 7·8, The Light Infantry Platoon and Squad Sep 78 FM 7·10, The Infantry Company Dec 78 FM 7-30, Infantry Brigade Operations Jan 79 FM 21·75, Combat Skills of the Soldier Oct 78 FM 30·5, Combai Intelligence Dec 79 FM 71·3, Armored and Mechanized Brigade Operations Apr 79 FM 71·101, Air Assault Division Operations Mar79 FM 71·102, Infantry and Airborne Division Operations Feb 79 FM 100·15, Corps Operations Mar 79 FM 100· ,Operational Terms and Graphics Jun 79 FM 101·5, Command and Control of Combat Operations Sep 78 FM 3·87, NBC Reconnaissance and Decontamination Operations Mar79 FM 6·21, FIeld Artillery Battalion Dec 78 FM 6·22, Division Artillery, FA Brigade, Corps Artillery Jan 79 FM 11·92, Corps Signal Communications Aug 78 FM 90·2, Tactical Deception Nov78 FM 90·4, Airmobile Operations Sep 78 FM 90·5, Jungle Operations Aug 78 FM 90·6, Mountain Operations Mar79 FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations Nov 78 FM 90-10, Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain Mar79 FM 90·11, Operations in Cold Weather Mar79 FM 90-13, Rwer Crossing Operations Dec 78 FM 90·14, Rear Area Combat Operations Jun 79

Items in thls department are Bummaries of studies currently underway or recently completed in the defense community. While every effort is made to ensure accuracy. publication lead time may result in differences between the summaries and the actual study program.

86 ~ETTERS 0

On the New Military Review Walter Goerlitz? If so, what is in Dupuy's work that makes it "a challenging new explanation of why, for over a century, · .. journal now looks like a proper one Germany produced the world's best rather than a little digest journal. armies"? Dr. Brooks Kleber, in his recent review for the Military Review, points out that "Not all of Dupuy's arguments neces­ Dr. Frank N Trager sarily hold water." I'd like to expand Dr. Kleber's views. Dupuy's purpose in writing is to find an explanation for German battlefield effec­ · .. noted the changes in Military tiveness when fighting outnumbered, out· Review with pleasure. What took you so gunned and otherwise constrained­ long? certainly a germane topic to most Army officers. His explanation is found in the Brig Gen Robert A. Sullivan, USA institutionalization of military excellence typified by the German General Staff and its impact upon the German army. This leads me to expect a much needed scrutiny · .. April issue of MR floored me. I agree of the effects of that institution upon doc­ it has eye appeal, but will it continue the trine, training, planning, officer education, usual good articles of old? operational conduct, institutional devel· opment and its historical evolution. I was Brig Gen A. J. Maxham, Army NGUS, Ret disappointed. Dupuy covers the well·plowed field of the politics of the General Staff and its effect on the army. Furthermore, he writes with uncritical adulation. In the attempt to correlate battlefield · .. refreshing to see MR moving out effectiveness with General Staff institution­ aggressIVely at a time when so many alized excellence, Dupuy discovers the military publications are retrenching. central ideas of the Prussian reformers of 1806: He correctly analyzes the motivating forces of these reformers and marvels at Col Wil Ebel. USAR their creation of the General Staff. Cer­ tainly, the reformers sought to create a unified institution for planning, raising, provisioning, training and directing armies in peace and war. They wanted to institu­ Only Adulation tionalize military genius as Dupuy puts it. Yet their instrument was to be not only the I am perplexed why Colonel T. N. General Staff itself as a planning and Dupuy's book A Genius for War: The operational executing agency but, most German Army and the General Staff, 1807- importantly, a unified concept of inter­ 1.945 (Military Review, May 1978, pp 88·89) action between a General Staff, personnel is receiving such a high degree of acclaim and logistical agencies, all within a unified and interest. Are readers ignoring the War Department and controlled by a war established works of Gordon Craig and minister.

87 MILITARY REVIEW

I submit that Dupuy has misjudged this· Yet too few are examined in detail. While central concept. As the General Staff 'rose Hutier tactics are mentioned and evaluated in stature and became independent of the as the predecessor of the blitzkrieg tactics, War Department (de facto 1866 and de jure further analysis is lacking. Scant mention 1883). unified approaches to defense is made of Guderian's contribution. Again, problems receded. For example. the too much familiar territory is covered planning aspect of the General Staff during without reflective analysis. General Schlieffen's tenure was not correlated to the Seeckt-the sphynx of the Weimar period­ actuality of raising and provisioning an is treated with adulation. Certainly, one army with the War Ministry. This led needs to ask whether a soldier sworn to Schlieffen to calculate forces that were not uphold and defend the government of in the force structure nor even advocated by Weimar should not be charged with de­ the war minister. sertion when that government faced a coup. In Dupuy's treatment, other problems lncreduously, Dupuy heaps praise on are excluded. Germane to contemporary Seeckt for the ultimate defeat of the coup consid.. rations is officer education. A de­ while scant attention is given to the tailed examination of the German Kriegsa· Socialist-led general strike. . kademie as an institution upon which the Dupuy covers more familiar ground in excellence of the General Staff was based his treatment of the German army after would be necessary to support Dupuy's 1933. He has much to say on Schleicher's contention. He does not examine, for ex­ part in the takeover of power. He mentions ample, the fertile 1870-1914 period which several changes in the structure of the High embraces several interesting changes. Command, and the army leader's part in For example, originally, the size of the the elimination of the SA (storm trooper) student body in the Knegsakademle was leadership. He does not critically examine tied to the number of· eligible officers. the nature of the General Staffs low as­ Although there were increases in the size of sessment of Russia's war-making potential. the classes prior to 1914, these were not Undoubtedly, Dupuy is too much swayed large enough to offset the tremendous by Halder's assessment of operations in the growth of the number of positions in the war to view Hitler's input in the decision­ General Staff. By 1914, in contrast to-1870, making process to be at all positive. During most graduates of the Kriegsakademle the war itself, much could have been said went into the General Staff instead of re­ about the methods of training, incorpor­ entering the mainstream of the army. The ation of battlefield experience into doctrine Knegsakademie thereby became a General and General Staff training. Disappoint­ Staff institution rather than its intended ingly little is mentioned. purpose of educating selected officers In conclusion, there is vait'e in Dupuy's throughout the army. It is this type of view of the combat effectiveness of the topical detail which is missmg from German army being due to its institutions; Dupuy's pages. what is lack'ing is the development of this Fully one-half of the book is devoted to theme from an institutional viewpoint. the post·1914 German army. This 20th­ century period is intensely interesting for its institutional and doctrinal development. Mal Michael D. Krause. USA

Letters is a feature designed expressly to afford our reader. an opportunity to air their opinions and ideas on military topics. It i. not restricted to comments or rebuttals on previously published material but is open to any variety of expression which may stimulate or improve the value of thought in the military community.

The right to edit is reserved by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily in deference to available space.-Editor.

88 ~EWS .

UNITED STATES

US BUYS NORWEGIAN MISSILES, , .

The Pentagon has decided to buy Greece, Sweden. Turkey and Norway Norway's Penguin lightweight antiship currently have the Penguin In their in­ missile system The anticipated buy ventories. and an improved version is would represent only the second foreign reported under development in Norway. missile bought for the US Armed Forces. The Roland II. a Franco-German surface­ , .. AND GERMAN TRUCKS to-air antiaircraft missile. is the first (MR. Mar 1978. p 101). The Penguin would provide an offensive punch to small In another move toward increased displacement US naval craft. The $7.000 standardization of NATO's military missile has a 17-mlle range and would eqUipment, the Army has announced It complement more expensive. US-made will purchase $100 million worth of Harpoon missiles on surface combatant German-made trucks. buses and fork lifts vessels. in the first major overseas procurement of military vehicles for US forces. The E!.uilt by McDonnell Douglas, the ship initial order Involves 8.641 vehicles and or submarine-launched Harpoon has a will be followed by additional purchases long range (35 miles) and a bigger price In later years -OMS Intelligence. © tag-half a million dollars. 1978

The Milltarv Review, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of mformatlon contained In the NEWS section of thiS publicatIon Items are printed as a service to the readers No official endorsement of the Views, opinions or factual statements IS Intended -Editor

89 MILITARY REVIEW

FOXHOLE COVERS TO BECOME STANDARD ISSUE ITEMS

Plans to provide foxhole covers, devel­ time-consuming work of hardening oped in 1970 by the US Army Mobility (making less vulnerable) fighting posi- Equipment Research and Development tions. Command, as standard issue for combat Constructed of woven dacron fabric, personnel operating forward of brigade the cover weighs 1 pound, 10 ounces rear boundaries were announced re­ and is 6 feet by 5 feet, 4 inches. Tubular cently by the Department of the Army. sections along each side can be filled Tactical survival stucjles conducted by with dirt and anchored In shallow ditches the US Army Engineer-School stressed on all sides. that the highly mobile modern battlefield demands timely positioning of combat When topped by 18 inches of soil, the forces to achieve maximum effec­ cover is capable of withstanding effects tiveness. of shrapnel, blasts and other debris. Two Today's soldier, the report states, or more covers can be joined by use of must be able to dig in qUickly, fight and snap fasteners located on each side of,; move out while under hostile fire. the cover.-Army Research and Devel-' Foxhole covers will hopefully eliminate opment.

USSR NEW INTERCEPTOR

According to recent NATO infor­ feature and US Defense Intelligence mation. two prototypes of a new Soviet Agency information that it is a modified Interceptor are in the test phase. Aircraft dual seat MIG25 with new engines and experts disagree as to the designation of bigger afterburner sections. The fuselage the new aircraft which appears to be apparently is .91 meters (almost 3 feet) eqUipped With two large Tumansky en­ longer; the wings, 1 meter (3.28 feet) gines and twin tail finS. longer each; and the tail unit, stretched by .2 meters (.656 feet). The question arises over whether the aircraft IS really a Mlkoyan Construction The new interceptor also seems to be Collective new development called eqUipped with an advanced radar system, MIG29 or a further development of the probably that of the Flogger D. The total MIG25 Foxbat which Lieutenant Viktor concept of this new aircraft would seem 8elenko first mentioned after his flight to to indicate that it was deSigned for Japan with a MIG25. fighting cruise missiles. Western experts do not expect the aircraft to go into series Indications that the new aircraft is a production before 1980.-Soldat una . "super" MIG25 include the twin tail fi~ Technik, © 1978.

90 NEWS

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CONDOR

Currently undergomg manufacturer's Water and airtight. the vehicle has ex­ trials is a new infantry fighting vehicle cellent nuclear. biological. and chemical (IFV) developed by the West German firm protection. of Thyssen Henschel.

The Condor is a fully amphibious 4x4 The IFV's main armament consists of wheeled armored vehicle developed as a Rhelnmetall T/i20 15 one-man turret an IFV but is sUitable fbr operation in a eqUipped with a 20mm cannon. A coaxial number of other roles. For mstance. the machinegun also may be fitted. vehicle may be employed as a personnel carrier. reconnaissdnce vehicle. logistics The six-cylinder. water-cooled diesel vehicle or weapons carrier. can drive the Condor at a road speed of 150 kilometers per hour at ranges up to The interior of the Condor is designed 500 kilometers.-International Defense to carry 12 men (3 crew and 9 mfantry). Review, © 1978.

91 ~OOKS

Politics in the Soviet Military

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER. Edited by lawrence l Whelten 182 Pages Crane, Russak & Co, N Y 1977 $1450

One of the problems of Soviet studies is that publications on the subject quickly become out of date. It, therefore, becomes imperative for Sovietologists to obtain good recent studies of the Soviet scene and not waste their time on the many mediocre volumes on the USSR which are published annually. One such good volume is Professor Whetten's compendium of articles dealing with Soviet foreign policy. This book, the result of an international conference on Soviet affairs held in May 1975, surveys the various areas of the world where the Soviet Union is attempting to assert its dominance. The areas discussed in this volume are: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and India, and East and Southeast Asia. Other articles deal with Soviet defense policy, the Ostpolitik, and Soviet-American bilateralism. As ~ith Dr. Whetten's companion volume, The Future of Soviet Military Power (MR, September 1977, pp 99-100), the title may mislead one into assuming that the book treats "military" foreign policy as some separate strategy of the Kremlin. It does no such thing-the military is scarcely mentioned in several of the articles­ rather, the writers consistently recognize the fact the Soviets use the military as but one of many resources in their global strategy and treat their studies accordingly. Of particular interest are areas of the world where the Soviets are weak, notably the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. One wonders, after reading William E. Griffith's article "The Decline of Soviet Influence in the Middle East," why the Carter administration recently provided the Soviets with a re-entry into this area via the Geneva negotiating table, especially when good will toward the Soviets had declined so much in its closest Middle East allies. The intricacies of Soviet-Chinese relations in Asia are discussed in Joachim Glaubitz' article, "Some Aspects of Recent Soviet Policy Toward East and Southeast Asia." It is one of the best brief accounts of the changing relations between the two nations written to date. If I have to disagree on any points made in this book, it would be in the area of Eastern Europe. The time when these articles were written (1975) has no doubt dated them slightly, and Western Europe is no longer as weak nor Eastern Europe as

92 BOOKS strong as in" that time of the energy crisis. For this reason, the articles dealing on these subjects should be considered with an eye to more recent internal changes within these two European power blocs. The overly publicized ups and downs of Soviet·United States foreign relations have sometimes obscured the generally consistent path that the two nations have trod in avoiding armed confrontation with each other. Recent Soviet military buildups and muscle·flexings have caused numerous Western political scientists and military strategists to worry that an unexpected turn in the road is in the offing. Yet, to look into the future, one needs to orient himself as to where the Soviets are now in the various parts of the world.' To me, Whetten's collection should be a must for anyone new to Soviet foreign affairs. Certainly, it is a valuable volume to all the "old·timers" who have been studying the USSR in the recent past.

George Kalbouss. OhIO State Umverstty

POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES by MIChael J Deane 297 Pages Crane. Russak & Co. N Y 1977 $1750

The stated purpose of Deane's authoritative new study of Soviet party·military relations is to: ... analyze the changing relationship among the MPA (Main Political Adminis· tration, a section of the CPSU's Central Committee which insures the political reliability of the Soviet Armed Forces), the Party and the professional military. Through policy and content analysis of numerous Soviet and non-Soviet publica­ tions and an explanation of the careers and backgrounds of major Soviet political and military leaders, the work outlines the political-military policies advocated by the- three groups and provides an assessment of the future significance of political control in party-military relations. Deane's study is a welcome complement to Roman Kolkowicz' pioneering effort, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, since he essentially picks up where, the latter left off, with Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, Deane's book is free of his predecessor's bias. Kolkowicz set out to prove that: . , . the relationship between the Communist Party and the Soviet military is essentially conflict-prone and thus presents a perennial threat to the political stability of the Soviet state. Deane concludes that the military is "less than" a homogeneous interest group. But, while he several times reminds us of Lenin's words that, in modern warfare, "he who has the greatest equipment, the greatest level of organization, discipline, and the best vehicles is the victor," Deane does not seem to appreciate the extent to which Soviet society itself has been militarized. He chooses to put Brezhnev's and l)'stinov's promotions to marshal of the Soviet Union in quotations, indicating that they are less than military. Deane's study examines only one of the several overlapping and redundant

93 MIlITARY REVIEW control organs which lace the Soviet armed forces. No mention is made of the KGB (Committee of State Security) "Special Departments," the military councils, party control commissions or people's control bodies, and little attention is devoted to party and Komsomol organieations. Despite these two deficiencies, the work is a comprehensive study of the party's political control apparatus, beginning with an examination of socialist views of the military before the Bolshevik Revolution. He points out that political commissars had been appointed in the field army of Kerensky's Provisional Government as early as June 1917, and notes that Trotsky's goal of unified command envisioned that eventually unit leaders would become both commander and commissar. He notes that commissars first began to file attestations of command as early as 1919, a political "laying on of hands" certifying political reliability which continues to this day. The study provides good coverage of the Stalinist and early post-Stalinist years, but focuses mainly on events since Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. Its concentration on the era of detente should recommend it to a wide circle of Western policymakers as well as informed citizens. We are reminded that Brezhnev remarked at the 25th Party Congress (February-March 1976), "We make no secret of the fact that we see in detente the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction." As Deane also notes, the Soviets openly state that their increased military might-the shift in the "correlation of forces" in socialism's favor-forced the capitalist states to confront "reality" and yield to Soviet demands for "peace." Detente, however, does not prevent Soviet political workers from instilling a class hatred toward the aggressive intrigues of imperialism. Reading Deane's book, one realizes that the Soviets see the present as "an increasingly acute ideological struggle," even at a time when many respected Western analysts see ideology as a dead issue. I hope this book will have a wide readership.

Mal Eugene D. Betlt, USA

Take Me to YourI Leaders. •

MANAGEMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES by John Downey 221 Pages McGraw HIli, N Y 1977 £550

What is the military profession for? The natural reply is: to fight. But, in fact, its role is now usually to prevent war. Here is the principal theme of this extraordinary book. The emphasis on the Army's mission being "success in combat" is familiar to all

94 BOOKS of us who have" received training in US military schools. Yet, as Downey points out, "Combat is the last resort of modern defense, and if it occurs it is a sign of failure." We particularly recognize in this expression the importance of deterring nuclear war. "In international relations," says Qowney, "where Clausewitz saw war as an extension of politics, politics has become an extension of, or a substitute for, war." This may be one of the most crucial issues facing the military professional today. The warrior concept, according to the author, is "not merely becoming more complex, but is stood on its head." In his terms, "Military organization and management is in a state of latent revolution." Downey and his collaborators (a vice admiral, a brigadier and a group captain) demonstrate remarkably clear insight into the current relationship of the military profession and defense management in the Western industrialized world. They see the higher direction of defense policy as a meeting point for three streams of ideas: the will of the people, decisions of government and ideas of the military themselves. They observe that, because of the military emphasis on war, its influence in defense policy is declining. The military emphasis of combat operations, often known as the "G3 complex," is brought clearly into focus: Generalists trained in purely military skills are heavily indoctrinated with the self-asserted goals of the system and tend to reject others as contaminatory. Advisory or research functions are less favored as employments than command functions since, although the former are increasingly more relevant, the latter are associated with the ethos of the system and carry the higher status. The chapter on leadership is one of the best in print on that subject and puts to rest the notion that the military can exercise more authority with less real leadership than other organizations. Nominal authority (position power) is correctly seen as only an element of real authority which is the essence of personal leadership. The military is good at combat leadership-personal leadership. But it is recognized that leadership is not an end in itself, and the military is not as good in. elucidating ends (conducting, guiding, persuading) toward which leadership is a means and which are vital skills for influencing higher defense policy. In a military officer's "dual career," the early qualities of command leadership must give way to the development of skills of influence and resource management if the military is to remain influential in defense policy. A need is seen for a "stronger intellectual.foundation" for the military profession. The fundamental change required, says Downey, is "away from a system modeled solely on the battlefield" and "towards a system designed to manage the military part of a multi-disciplined corporate science." Today, we see an emerging awareness of these issues in the military profession. Are they valid? Are we losing influence in defense policy? We need look only at the demise of the BI bomber and at military budget cuts to answer such questions. What we choose to do about it will depend, in part, upon how well we understand the kinds of issues which Downey expresses so clearly. In my opinion, this book will become a landmark of military thought and should be high-priority reading for every military professional. Lt Col MelVin J. Stanford. USAR Consultmg Faculty. USACGSC

95 MILITARY REVIEW

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE by Norman DIXon 448 Pages BasIc Books. N Y 1976 $1250

Despite its provocative title, this book is neither an attack on the military nor a quick dip into pop psychology at the professional soldier's expense. Rather, it is a detailed and well-documented study of one aspect of command-that of the psycho­ logical makeup of military leaders. If modem methods of analysis show that effective leaders have traits in common-the US Army lists "fourteen characteristics of a good leader"-is it not also likely that inadequate leadership also has common traits? This is the author's thesis, and he states, "In theory, then, errors of generalship could be prevented by attention to these causes." Dixon cites both military studies and medical research in support of his ideas. The first third of his book consists of detailed accounts of 12 campaigns, illustrating how their outcomes resulted. from the personalities of the leaders involved. All the examples are taken from British military experience, thus obviating any stigma of anti-Vietnam bias on the part of the author. The second section discusses the officer's perception of his role and his rela­ tionship to his peers and to society as well as to his superiors and subordinates. The author concludes that three situations encourage incompetence. They are, first, the fact that "the leadership qualities required at one level may result in promotion (but) are often not those relevant to a higher level"; second, that more mistakes have resulted "from a dearth of boldness than from a lack of caution"; and third, that "fear of failure rather than hope of success tends to be the dominant motive force in decisionmaking." . Following a detailed discussio'n of these situations, the final portion of the book gives examples of both successful and unsuccessful leadership. More important, the author demonstrates that some leaders who possessed negative characteristics achieved greatness in spite of their flaws, while others overcame their deficiencies by conscious effort. Even a reader who does not agree with Dr. Dixon's initial premise will appreciate this section. The author's style is articulate and entertaining and is entirely free of the snide put-down too often found in current "military" writings authored by civilians. The footnotes are extensive, and the bibliography is quite useful.

Capt Richard E. Wynn. USAR

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

'FINLANDllATlON": A Map to a Metaphor by Adam M FOCKE WULF 190 AT WAR by Alfred P"ce 160 Pages Garfmkle Foreword by Robert Strausz·Hupe 56 Pages Sc"bner's, N Y 1977 $12 50 Foreign Pohcy Research Institute. Philadelphia, Pa 1978 GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN NACHTJAGD: 1917·1945 by $1400. Gebhard Aders 392 Pages. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart, FRG THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE NUCLEAR ERA: Heartland, 1977 Rlmlands, and the TechnologICal Revolution by Cohn S FULfiLLMENT Of A MISSION: SYria and Lebanon, 1941- Gray 80 Pages Crane, Russak & Co, N Y 1977 $6 ~O 1944 by Mafor·General Sir Edward Spears 311 Pages Archon clothbound $295 paperbound Books. Hamden, Conn 1977 $19 00

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