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Science and Metaphysics a Methodological Investigation Zainal Science and Metaphysics A Methodological Investigation Zainal Abidin Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History an d Philosophy of Science Indiana University April 2005 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date of Oral Examination: April 4, 2005 Doctoral Comm ittee : _______________________ Michael L. Friedman, Ph.D. _______________________ Noretta Koertge, Ph.D. _______________________ Michael Dickson, Ph.D. _______________________ John Walbridge, Ph.D. ii I dedicate this to my wife, Alida, who has encouraged and supported me since the beginning of my study at IU, a year after our marriage; who has willingly and happily walked with me all the way through good as well as difficult times. iii Acknowledgments Many people have contributed significantly to the completion of this dissertation as well as to making my five years in Bloomington so enjoyable and worthwhile, to say the least. Since my first days at the History and Philosophy of Science Department until my dissertation defense, Noretta Koertge h ad been most supportive and encouraging me to follow what I really wanted to pursue. She had also willingly spent her time with me to explore new possibilities for me. Michael Friedman had been an inspiration to me as a fine and committed teacher whom I wa nt to emulate. The courses I take from John Walbridge and conversations with him allowed me to maintain and enrich my interest in Islamic philosophy. My thanks also to Michael Dickson, who helped me not only in my learning, but more specially my teaching a t IU. I am of course also indebted to folks at HPS —the professors, staffs and friends. The professors have made my education at IU so enjoyable and have been so kind to let students explore their own interests. I also thank them for the trust it gave me to teach several classes, one of which was of my own design, which I didn’t dream of when I came here. My last three years was financially supported by HPS teaching assistantships which enriched my education considerably. My thanks to Becky Wood who was alwa ys responsive and never tired taking care of everything related to my education at IU. Outside HPS, many people have also been essential in helping me to come to this stage. A scholarship from the Fulbright Foundation was what first brought me to iv Bloomington. I thank the Fulbright, which has funded my first two years at IU, and especially its Jakarta office, AMINEF. Since I first met him in Indonesia in 2001, John Raines of Temple University, Philadelphia, had always helped me finish this dissertation, in cluding in correcting most chapters in this dissertation. I thank him for being a constant source of encouragement. My many thanks to Pak Achmad Mursyidi and Pak Irwan Abdullah, the director and executive director of the Center for Religious and Cross -cultural Studies (CRCS), Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, who gave me all the space and time I needed in the final stages of this dissertation. Many thanks to all the staffs at CRCS —Harwanto, Arqom, Agus, Bibit, Helmi, and Ingrid —who have been so helpful. I thank also the visiting professors at CRCS whose question “have you finished your dissertation?” helped me a lot to always return to my dissertation despite the many works I had to finish at CRCS. My parents, brothers and sisters have been unfailing in th eir support. Finally and most importantly, thanks and love to my wife Alida and our daughters, Naila, Maria and Sophia. I owe them more than I possibly can express here. Without them, and their sacrifices, I would never be at this point in my life. v ABS TRACT ZAINAL ABIDIN Science and Metaphysics: A Methodological Investigation Traditionally, knowledge of nature as it really is belonged to the realm of metaphysics. With the rise of empirical sciences in the seventeenth century, and Logical Positivism in the twentieth century, metaphysics as an a priori knowledge had gradually lost its credibility, to be replaced by the sciences. Recently, however, there are ideas of constructing metaphysics that is somehow grounded on science (e.g. experimental metaphysi cs, metaphysical naturalism, and certain forms of constructive theology as discussed in recent science and religion discourse). The main question addressed in this dissertation concerns the possibility of such metaphysics. Science can be relevant to metap hysics only if one believes it to have significant things to say about the world; in other words, only if one holds some form of scientific realism. In this dissertation the author argues for the metaphysical ambiguity of scientific theories. This claim ca n be divided into two sub-claims: 1) That a modest version of scientific realism can be defended, which justifies the belief that scientific theories speak about the world, but 2) what precisely the world is like as presented by the theories is not fully -determined. A metaphysical system can be vi constructed only through the process of interpretation, in which the function of the theories is more in the direction of putting constraints on possible metaphysical interpretation of them. Another related conclusio n is that some theories are more readily interpretable compared to others. In the final part of the dissertation an illustration is given, which is drawn from recent discourse on science and theology. This illustration of an attempt to ground a (philosophical) theology on science shows how the above conclusions apply to this case. Keywords: scientific realism, metaphysics, interpretation, theology, Bas van Fraassen, Ernan McMullin vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………iv Abstract ………………………………………………………………………vi Chapter 1 Introduction:“Science” and “Metaphysics” …………………… ………..…1 A. Background 1. Grounding metaphysics on science? ………………………………...1 2. Is science grounded on metaphysics? ………………………………10 3. Pierre Duhem on the relation betw een science and metaphysics …..14 B. Formulation of the Problem 1. Preliminary formulation of the problem: on the aim of science ……22 2. On “science”, “worldview”, and “metaphysics”…………………….24 3. Formulation of the problem and methodology ……………………...32 C. Outline of the Chapters ……………………………………………………..39 Chapter 2 Qualifying Realism ………………………………………………………….. 42 1. For and against realism ………………………………………………46 2. Differentiation between the “good” and the “bad” parts of theories ...55 a. Structural realism …… …………………………………………… .55 b. Contesting Laudan’s meta -induction ………………………...69 Chapter 3 Inference to the Best Explanation and Its Limitations …………………… 75 1. The reach of evidence and retroduction …………………………….75 2. The structure of retroduction and IBE ……………………………...81 3. Objections and replies ………………………………………………88 viii 4. McMullin on structural explanation ………………………………..100 5. Differentiation of areas of retroductive success ……………………103 Chapter 4 Realism, Interpretation, and Metaphysics ………………………………… 113 1. Realis m and commitment to metaphysics …………………………...115 2. Searle’s “External realism” …………………………………………120 3. Interpretation and “metaphysics” ………………………………….. 133 4. Conclusions …………………………………………………………151 Chapter 5 “Grounding Metaphysics on Science”: An Illustrati on …………………… 153 1. The relevance of science to (philosophical) theology ………………158 a. Constructive empiricism …………………………………….158 b. Naïve realism ………………………………………………..162 c. “Critical realism” …………………………………………...165 2. The interpretive method ……………………………………………..168 3. Plurality of interpretations …………………………………………..175 4. Distinction between scientific disciplines …………………………..180 5. Conclusions ………………………………………………………… 183 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………..186 ix Chapter 1 Introduction: “Science” and “ Metaphysics” A. Background In contemporary discussions about the relation between science and metaphysics, there are two related issues. The first issue concerns the endeavor to ground metaphysics/worldview on the results of science, while the second p oses a question as to whether science presupposes a certain metaphysics or worldview. 1 1. Grounding metaphysics on science? Along with the progress of empirical science since the beginning of its modern history, the legitimacy of metaphysics as an intelle ctual undertaking has been 1 “Metaphysics” is perhaps not the best term for the kind of knowledge ref erred to here. An alternative I shall consider later in this chapter is “worldview”. In philosophy of science we find this term is recently used by Abner Shimony (1989) in his essay, “Search for a worldview which can accommodate our knowledge of microphysi cs”. For him, a worldview consists of (i) a metaphysics, (ii) an epistemology, (iii) a theory of language and (iv) a theory of ethical and aesthetic values. ( ibid. , 62) He concentrates on the first two; it is through the meshing of these two enterprises th at he hopes to attain his aim of “the closing of the circle”, following the tradition of systematic philosophers such as Aristotle and Kant. Schlick also uses the term “worldview” in a similar sense to Shimony’s, though, it seems, without the third element . Different philosophers use the term to refer to different kinds of knowledge —sometimes contradicting each other. In any case, I shall clarify the term “metaphysics” later in this chapter. 1 questioned by philosophers such that being “metaphysical” is a vice in today’s philosophy. Indeed, after the 17th
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