NON-NATURALISM REVISITED; RIGHTS/OBLIGA TIONS AS EMERGENT ENTITIES

Eike-Henner W. KLUGE University of Victoria

Introduction Meta-ethical speculations about rights and obligations. as indeed meta-ethical speculations in general, are characterized by profound disagreement over the nature of the relevant terms. I Broadly spea• king, we can distinguish three general types of approaches: realism, nominalism and non-cognitivism.2 Each of these occurs in several variations. For instance, realism may be naturalistic - which is to say, it may attempt to reduce the relevant expressions to claims dealing with ordinary properties; or it may be non-naturalistic - which is to say, it may claim that wh at ultimately grounds such expressions are properties sui generis: distinct from ordinary ones but ontologically on a par with them. 3 Nominalism, in turn, may analyze right/obligation locutions as statements about (explicit or implicit) contractual agreements, or as reportive of custom, convention or habit - but in any case will view their meanings as a matter of pure convention.4 Non-cognitivism, finally, may be either emotive, attitudinal or performative in focus - or any combination of these-

1. Cf. W.K. Frankena, Ethies (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963) pp. 4 ff. and "Recent Conceptions of Morality" in H.-N. Castaöeda and George Nakhnikian, eds. Morality and the Language 0/ Conduet (Wayne State U. Press, Detroit, 1965) pp. 1-24, and R.ß. Brandt, Ethieal Theory (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1959) pp. 7-10 et passim. Brandt also refers to it as "critical ethics". 2. This nomenclature is not quite that currently in vogue. The reasons for this departure will become apparent as we go along. 3. Cf. Brandt, op. eil., pp. 151-202. I am here conflating wh at Brandt calls naturalism and non-naturalism. The ontological reason for such a move lies in the fact that both types of theories claim an ontological reference for their characteristic locutions. 4. Cf. ibid., pp. 271 ff. et passim. 140 and will portray right/obligation statements as expression of emotion, attitude or intent. 5 None of these approaches is entirely satisfactory. At least, not as they are usually presented. The most serious draw-back of non• natur~lism is its failure to explain the precise ontological status of the properties that supposedly ground right/obligation statements: A difficulty wh ich is only compounded by the lack of verificational structure for its assertions. The properties identified as the bases of right/ obligation locutions are said to be unobservable in any ordi• nary fashion and to lack all normal criteria of identification.6 An appeal is frequently made to a moral sense or to intuition, but this can scarcely be considered successfuI.7 Naturalism, on the other hand, whatever its particular version,8 is singularly unable to give a satisfactory account of obligation because of the apparent impossibi• lity of deriving moral imperatives from statements of matters offact: the perennial core of the 'is - ought' debate.9 Even if successful, however, it would still be vulnerable to an "open question" attack.lO Nor does the contractual model fare any better. As has been observed on different occasions, it either reduces ethics to law or so me such, or else it fails to capture the peculiarly ethical aspect of rights/obliga• tions. 11 We pass over the plethora of linguistic and ordinary language approaches that fall within the nominalistic camp.

5. Cf. ibid., pp. 203-240. It will be apparent that different types oftheories will fall under this rubric: e.g., that of C.L. Stevenson as well as that of J.L. Austin. As before, I am concentrating solelyon the metaphysical/ontologi• cal implications of their respective approaches. 6. Cf. G.E. Moore, Prineipia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, 1903) pp. 7-8 et passim as the best example ofthis intuitionistic approach. See also Brandt, op. eit. Chapter 8 for a good discussion, especially pp. 190 ff. et passim. 7. See Brandt, op. eit., pp. 189 ff. 8. Cf. op eit. Chapter 7. 9. For a general critique along these lines which is aimed at "meta• physical definitions" in general, cf. A.C. Ewing, Ethics (Free Press, New York, 1953) p. 101. 10. Cf. W.K. Frankena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy", reprinted in W. Sellars and J. Hospers, Readings in Ethical Theory. 11. The two may in fact reduce to the same thing. We shall not investigate this approach.